Complaint

STATE OF NEW YORK: RENSSELAER COUNTY TROY CITY COURT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, : : -against- : : WALTER HEALEY, : Defendant. : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

FELONY COMPLAINT

Assistant Attorney General Lauren Popper Ellis

212-416-6025

SENIOR INVESTIGATOR MICHAEL BATTISTI, SHIELD NUMBER 102, of the

Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York (“OAG”), located at the State Capitol,

Albany, New York, deposes and states the following:

Charges

On or about the dates specified below, at the City of Troy, County of Rensselaer, State of

New York, and elsewhere, the defendant committed the offenses of:

IDENTITY THEFT IN THE FIRST DEGREE, in violation of section 190.80(1) of the

New York Penal Law, a Class D Felony (1 Count);

UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION IN

THE SECOND DEGREE, in violation of section 190.82 of the New York Penal Law, a Class E

Felony (1 count);

TAMPERING WITH PUBLIC RECORDS IN THE FIRST DEGREE, in violation of

section 175.25 of the New York Penal Law, a Class D Felony (1 count); and

OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT, in violation of section 195.00(1) of the New York Penal

Law, a Class A misdemeanor (1 count);

in that the defendant did:

in or about April 2006 and continuing through in or about December 2008, knowingly

1

and with intent to defraud assume the identity of another person by presenting himself as that

other person, by acting as that other person and by using personal identifying information of that

other person, and thereby obtain goods, money, property and services and use credit in the name

of such other person in an aggregate amount that exceeds two thousand dollars;

in or about October 2008, knowingly possess more than two hundred fifty items of

personal identification information of the following nature: a person’s financial services account

number or code, savings account number or code, checking account number or code, brokerage

account number or code, credit card account number or code, debit card number or code,

automated teller machine number or code, personal identification number, mother's maiden

name, computer system password, electronic signature or unique biometric data that is a

fingerprint, voice print, retinal image or iris image of another person knowing such information

was intended to be used in furtherance of the commission of a crime defined in this chapter;

in or about June 2008, knowing that he did not have the authority of anyone entitled to

grant it, and with intent to defraud, knowingly remove, mutilate, destroy, conceal, make a false

entry in and falsely alter a record and other written instrument filed with, deposited in, and

otherwise constituting a record of a public office and public servant; and

in or about May through July 2008, being a public servant, and with intent to obtain a

benefit and deprive another person of a benefit, commit an act relating to his office but

constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official functions, knowing that such act was

unauthorized.

2

Summary

Introduction

As set forth below, OAG investigation has shown that the defendant, a veteran employee

of the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (“DTF”), abused his official position

by improperly taking confidential information from DTF files, opened numerous credit cards and

lines of credit using names and social security numbers other than his own, and ran up over

$200,000 in unpaid charges on such accounts. Evidence collected during the investigation shows

that, while at DTF, the defendant: made numerous unauthorized accesses to DTF computer

systems, improperly took identification information from DTF files, stored identification

information regarding numerous taxpayers and others at his residence, and used such information

to obtain credit cards. The defendant also opened and used multiple credit cards and lines of

credit in the names of his deceased mother and sister and in his own name but using the social

security numbers of other individuals, including two children.

Defendant’s Duties and Breach of Duties at DTF

The defendant worked at DTF in various positions from approximately March 1986

through December 2008. In 2006, he was assigned to a DTF unit that scans sets of identification

documents (including social security cards and birth certificates) that taxpayers have submitted

to DTF in connection with routine audits. Employees of this unit have access to computer

programs and paper files containing taxpayers’ identification information (including names and

social security numbers) and copies of taxpayers’ identification documents.

In 2008, an employee of this unit noticed irregularities in sets of documents to which the

defendant had been assigned. Subsequent investigation revealed that numerous document sets to

which the defendant had recently been assigned were missing pages and had cover sheets that

3

had been modified by hand to conceal the missing pages. A DTF audit of the defendant’s

computer accesses for May, June, and July 2008 showed him accessing the records of hundreds

of taxpayers, far more than were conceivably required for his job, including a sample of fifty-

three records found to have no relation to his job responsibilities.

Evidence Obtained by OAG Search Warrant

In October 2008, OAG obtained and executed a warrant to search the defendant’s

residence. The search uncovered hundreds of pages of tax records, identity documents, and

credit card statements and applications, including:

• copies of over seven hundred New York State tax forms containing identifying

information of New York State taxpayers;

• numerous identity documents, including copies of over three hundred birth

certificates and over one thousand social security cards in the names of various New

York taxpayers and their children;

• hundreds of pages of credit card statements, credit card inquiry letters, credit

applications and credit cards in the names of “Walter Healey” and numerous other

individuals; and

• approximately 2,000 post-it notes with the social security numbers of New York

taxpayers handwritten on them – many of them accompanied by handwritten notes

such as “good prospect,” “had money,” and “go with this one”;

Subsequent OAG Investigation

Subsequent OAG investigation revealed over ninety credit accounts at over twenty banks

opened using the defendant’s home address and a social security number other than his own.

These accounts were opened using the social security numbers of at least fifteen different

4

individuals, including a four-year old boy and at least four individuals who were deceased at the

time accounts were opened in their names, including the defendant’s own mother and sister.

These ninety accounts together show over $250,000 in credit used and over $200,000 in unpaid

balances.

The basis for specific charges is set forth below.

Factual Allegations

This below information is based upon: my conversations with Mark Tenzer, Criminal

Investigator, DTF Office of the Deputy Inspector General; Mark Spencer, Investigator, OAG;

Nicole L. McNamee-Wicks, Special Agent, United States Social Security Administration; Martin

Lavergne, Regional Investigator, Fraud Investigations, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.; Patricia

Weber, Special Fraud Investigator, GE Money Bank; and DTF employees and other persons

known to OAG; and my examination of records maintained by J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.;

GE Money Bank; Credit One Bank; Capital One Services, Inc.; Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.;

HSBC Card Services, Inc.; Valero Payment Services Company; and the DTF.

The offenses were committed under the following circumstances:

Credit Account Opened in Name and SSN of Jane Doe 1; Over $2,000 in Credit Used

1. Evidence seized from the defendant’s residence along with records of J.P. Morgan

Chase Bank, N.A. and the DTF tends to show that the defendant applied for and received a credit

card using the name and social security number of an individual known to OAG who resides in

Nassau County (“Jane Doe 1”) without her authorization and, thereafter, used over $2,000 of

credit in her name on this account.

2. With regard to this account, I am informed by Martin Lavergne, Regional

Investigator, Fraud Investigations, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. that, in April 2006, a “First

5

Niagara” Visa, account number ending in 9287, was opened in the name of Jane Doe 1. I am

further informed by Investigator Lavergne that records of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. that he

has reviewed show a certain social security number associated with this account.

3. I have reviewed records of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. that include an

application dated “4/1/06” associated with this account. The application contains the following

information filled in by hand and purporting to be the personal information of the individual

applying for the account: Jane Doe 1’s name; the social security number provided by Investigator

Lavergne as associated with this account; the address “143 Oakwood Avenue Troy, NY 12180;”

the home telephone number “518 272-4797;” and a mother’s maiden name. A signature in the

name of Jane Doe 1 appears on the application.

4. I am further informed by Investigator Lavergne that, on or about April 12, 2006, a

credit card associated with this “First Niagara” Visa, account number ending in 9287, was mailed

to 143 Oakwood Avenue in Troy, New York.

5. I have reviewed records of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., which show that from

on or about May 19, 2006, through approximately December 11, 2008, a total of $7,279.73 of

credit in the name of Jane Doe 1 was used on this “First Niagara” Visa, account number ending

in 9287, including $4,499.05 in cash advances and purchases, and $2,780.68 in fees.

6. I am informed by Nicole L. McNamee-Wicks, Special Agent, United States

Social Security Administration, that the social security number associated with this “First

Niagara” Visa, account number ending in 9287, was issued to an individual with Jane Doe 1’s

name.

7. I am informed by Jane Doe 1 that the social security number associated with this

“First Niagara” Visa, account number ending in 9287, is her social security number. I am further

6

informed by Jane Doe 1: that she did not apply for a “First Niagara” Visa card in or about April

2006; that she has no knowledge of the “First Niagara” Visa, account number ending in 9287;

and that she did not authorize any charges in her name on such an account. I am further

informed by Jane Doe 1: that she has never requested a credit account using the address 143

Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York; that she has no knowledge of the address 143 Oakwood

Avenue, Troy, New York; and that she has never authorized anyone affiliated with that address

to open or apply for a credit account in her name. I showed Jane Doe 1 a copy of the

aforementioned “First Niagara” Visa application dated “4/1/06,” and she informed me that she

did not recognize the application or the signature on the application.

8. I am informed by Mark Tenzer, Criminal Investigator, DTF Office of the Deputy

Inspector General, that the telephone number 518-272-4797, that appeared on the “4/1/06” “First

Niagara” Visa application, and the address 143 Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York, are the

address and telephone number that DTF has for the defendant in their personnel file.

9. I am informed by OAG Investigator Mark Spencer that on October 17, 2008, the

defendant admitted, in sum and substance, that: he had lived at 143 Oakwood Avenue for

approximately thirty-five years and that he lives there alone but took care of his mother until she

died in 1995. I have reviewed a certificate of death, maintained as an official record of the Troy

City Clerk, belonging to a woman with the same last name as the defendant, who resided at 143

Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York, and died in 1995, and who, I therefore believe, was the

defendant’s mother. The maiden name that appears on this death certificate, which I believe

belongs to the defendant’s mother, is the same “Mother’s Maiden Name” that appears on the

aforementioned “First Niagara” Visa application.

10. Upon executing a search warrant at 143 Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York, I

7

found at that residence, among other things, a credit card statement dated October 2008

regarding “First Niagara” Visa account number ending in 9287 in the name of Jane Doe 1. I also

found at that residence documentation related to at least six other credit card accounts in the

name of Jane Doe 1.

Identification Information of over 2,000 New York Taxpayers Found in Defendant’s Residence; Evidence Shows Intent to Commit Identity Theft

11. Evidence seized from 143 Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York, tends to show that

the defendant amassed thousands of social security numbers and used at least some of these

numbers to apply for and obtain credit from various banks.


found over two thousand post-it notes, each with a name and social security number handwritten

on it. I am informed by DTF Investigator Mark Tenzer that over two thousand of the names and

social security numbers that appear on these post-it notes are the names and associated social

security numbers of New York State taxpayers or the children of New York State taxpayers,

according to records kept in the regular course of business by DTF.

13. My review of these post-it notes shows that many contain handwritten notes;

notes on three such post-it notes that read “good prospect,” “had money,” and “go with this one”

demonstrate an intent of the writer to use the information on the post-it notes in furtherance of

identity theft. My review of these post-it notes shows that at least thirty of them contain

handwritten numbers such as “1,809,000.00” or “FED AGI 1,369,671.00” that appear to be

information about the income or finances of the individual whose information is written on the

post-it note.

14. I am informed by a written statement executed by the defendant on October 17,

2008, that the defendant admits, in sum and substance, that while he was in the employ of DTF,

8

he took “confidential information that [he] knew was illegal to take” and used this information to

apply for credit cards.

15. My investigation demonstrates that a number of the names and social security

numbers found written on post-it notes were used to open credit accounts in the names of the

individuals listed on the post-it notes, for the benefit of the defendant. For example: One of the

post-it notes I found at 143 Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York, bears the handwritten name of a

person known to OAG who resides in Warren County (“John Doe 1”) and a handwritten number.

16. I am informed by Special Agent McNamee-Wicks of the United States Social

Security Administration that the number handwritten on this post-it note is a social security

number that was issued to an individual with John Doe 1’s name.

17. I am informed by Regional Investigator Lavergne of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,

N.A. that on or about August 25, 2008, a “First Niagara” Visa, account number ending in 4621,

in the name of John Doe 1 was opened using John Doe 1’s social security number and the

address 143 Oakwood Avenue in Troy, New York, and that, on or about that date, a credit card

was mailed to 143 Oakwood Avenue in Troy, New York.

18. I have reviewed records of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. that include an

application dated “7/16/08” associated with this account. This application contains the following

information filled in by hand and purporting to be the personal information of the individual

applying for the account: John Doe 1’s name and social security number; the address “143

Oakwood Avenue Troy, NY 12180;” the home telephone number “518 272-4797;” and a

mother’s maiden name that matches the maiden name discussed in paragraph 9 above and which

I believe to be the maiden name of the defendant’s mother. A signature in the name of John Doe

1 appears on the application.

9

19. I have reviewed records of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., which show that on or

about September 28, 2008, continuing through October 24, 2008, a total of $52.28 of credit in

the name of John Doe 1 was used on the “First Niagara” Visa account number ending in 4621,

including $41.50 in cash advances and $10.78 in fees.

20. I am informed by Patricia Weber, Special Fraud Investigator, GE Money Bank

that: on or about October 17, 2007, a Wal-Mart Store credit card, account number ending in

5825, in the name of John Doe 1 was opened using John Doe 1’s social security number and the

address 143 Oakwood Avenue in Troy, New York; on or about October 21, 2007, the credit card

was mailed to 143 Oakwood Avenue in Troy, New York; and, on or about October 27, 2007, the

credit card was activated from telephone number 518-272-4797.

21. I have reviewed records of GE Money Bank that show that from approximately

October 2007 through December 2008, a total of $812.71 of credit in the name of John Doe 1

was used on this Wal-Mart Store credit card, account number ending in 5825, including $581.86

in charges and cash advances and $230.85 in fees.

22. I also have reviewed records of Credit One Bank, Capital One Services, Inc.,

Citibank (South Dakota), N.A, HSBC Card Services, Inc., and Valero Payment Services

Company that show credit card applications and/or accounts bearing John Doe 1’s name and

social security number, the address 143 Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York, and the telephone

number 518-272-4797.

23. On October 15, 2008, I was informed by Jane Doe 2 that John Doe 1 was her

then-three-year-old son. I was further informed by Jane Doe 2 that: she had no connection to

143 Oakwood Avenue in Troy, New York, and neither did her son; she never lived at the address

and she does not know a Walter Healey; she does not have any credit cards in her son’s name;

10

and she never gave anyone permission or authority to use her son’s name or social security

number in any manner, including submitting an application to any entity, including credit card

companies.


2008, that the defendant admits, in sum and substance: that he recalls John Doe 1’s name, that he

“randomly selected this name after seeing possibly a birth certificate that was going to the [DTF]

Scanning Unit;” that he “believe[s]” he wrote down John Doe 1’s name and social security

number and took that information home with him; and that he applied for and received a credit

card in John Doe 1’s name and used that credit card to make purchases.

25. Another of the post-it notes found upon execution of the search warrant at 143

Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York, bears the handwritten name of another person known to

OAG (“John Doe 2”) and a handwritten number.

26. I am informed by Special Agent McNamee-Wicks that the number handwritten on

this post-it note is a social security number that was issued to an individual with John Doe 2’s

name.

27. I am informed by Patricia Weber, Special Fraud Investigator, GE Money Bank

that: on or about September 7, 2007, a Wal-Mart Store credit card, account number ending in

0793, in the name of John Doe 2 was opened using John Doe 2’s social security number and the

address 143 Oakwood Avenue in Troy, New York; on or about September 9, 2007, the credit

card was mailed to 143 Oakwood Avenue in Troy, New York; and, on or about September 18,

2007, the credit card was activated from telephone number 518-272-4797.

28. Records of GE Money Bank that I have reviewed show that from approximately

September 2007 through approximately December 2008, a total of $512.91 of credit in the name

11

of John Doe 2 was used on the Wal-Mart Store credit card, account number ending in 0793,

including $421.08 in charges and cash advances and $91.83 in fees.


2008, that the defendant admits, in sum and substance: that he recalls John Doe 2’s name; that he

obtained John Doe 2’s name and social security number from paperwork that came through the

DTF Scanning Unit; that he took that information home with him; and that he applied for and

received a credit card in John Doe 2’s name and used that credit card to make purchases.

Materials Found at Defendant’s Home and DTF Records Show Evidence of Tampering

30. Information I have obtained from DTF employees, DTF records, and evidence

seized at 143 Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York, indicates that the defendant, while an

employee of DTF’s Scanning Unit, took records from and made false entries in DTF files,

thereby obtaining taxpayers’ identification information.

31. I am informed by DTF personnel records that I have reviewed that, from

approximately March 1986 through approximately December 2008, the defendant was an

employee of DTF.

32. I am informed by a DTF Tax Technician who is the head of DTF’s Scanning Unit,

that from in or about June 2006 through December 2008, the defendant was assigned to DTF’s

Scanning Unit. I am further informed by the head of the Scanning Unit that she has been with

the DTF for thirty years, has worked at the Scanning Unit for approximately ten years, and is

currently responsible for overseeing its daily operations.

33. I am informed by the head of the Scanning Unit of the following regarding its

general operations:

a. The Scanning Unit is essentially a recordkeeping unit. In cases of audits and

12

special tax exemption filings, taxpayers are required to submit to DTF copies of

certain documents, such as social security cards, permanent residence cards, or

birth certificates. Once DTF reviews of individual taxpayer cases have been

completed, the taxpayers’ submitted documents are forwarded to the Scanning

Unit to be scanned into the DTF computer program called Image Viewer (“Image

Viewer”), which contains electronic copies of documents that have been

submitted to DTF.

b. Non-supervisor employees of the Scanning Unit have three different job

responsibilities: scanning, validating, and verifying. When scanning, an

employee scans hard copy files and documents into the Image Viewer. When

validating, an employee makes certain that all sheets of a hard copy file have been

scanned correctly into the Image Viewer. When verifying, an employee checks

the validator’s work and gives a final confirmation that all sheets in a file have

been correctly scanned. A header sheet is filled out for each taxpayer’s file that is

scanned. The DTF employees who scanned, validated and verified each file sign

off on the header sheet and keep notes within each taxpayer’s hard copy file of the

number of hard copy pages associated with that file. It is the general practice to

have three distinct employees scan, validate and verify one file.

34. I am further informed by the head of the Scanning Unit that: on or about Monday,

June 23, 2008, she learned that a page was missing from the hard copy file of a certain New

York taxpayer known to OAG (“Jane Doe 3”) whose file had recently been scanned into the

Image Viewer, but not yet verified. I am further informed by the head of the Scanning Unit that,

based on her observations at the time, the missing page contained copies of the social security

13

35. I am further informed by the head of the Scanning Unit of the following, based on

her review of DTF records and her own observations: that the header cover sheet for Jane Doe

3’s file showed Walter Healey’s initials as the validator; that a separate cover sheet had the

number “19” handwritten on it to denote the number of pages contained in Jane Doe 3’s hard

copy file but that the number “19” had been crossed out and the number “18” handwritten in its

place; that she believed the “18” was written in Healey’s handwriting; and that a review of all the

files that contained Healey’s initials as the verifier or validator for June 19 and June 20 of 2008

(two dates near to the date when Jane Doe 3’s file had been scanned and validated) revealed that,

for those two dates, seventeen other hard copy files were missing pages that had been scanned

into the Image Viewer.

36. These seventeen hard copy files, including the file of Jane Doe 3, were collected

by the head of the Scanning Unit and provided to the DTF Inspector General’s Office on or

about June 25, 2008. My review of these records shows that: Jane Doe 3’s hard copy file

contains only eighteen pages of identification documents; a page containing a copy of the birth

certificate and social security card of her son, John Doe 3, is not present in this hard copy file;

the header cover sheet of this file shows the defendant’s initials as the validator; the number “19”

appears on a cover sheet denoting the number of pages that should be present in the hard copy

file; the number “19” has been crossed out and the number “18” handwritten in; and the

handwriting of the number “18” looks similar to the handwriting I observed on various credit

card applications and other documents that I found at 143 Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York.

37. I am informed by DTF Investigator Tenzer that records maintained in Image

Viewer show nineteen scanned pages associated with Jane Doe 3’s file, including a page

14

containing images of the birth certificate and social security card of her son, John Doe 3, that

does not appear in Jane Doe 3’s hard copy file.


found in the second floor open area of that residence, among other things, a page containing

images of the birth certificate and social security card of John Doe 3. I am informed by DTF

Investigator Tenzer that this page looks identical to the copy of the page that appears on Image

Viewer but is missing from the hard copy file of Jane Doe 3.

39. I am informed by the head of DTF’s Scanning Unit that she did not authorize the

defendant to remove a page containing images of the birth certificate and social security card of

John Doe 3 from DTF files and that, to her knowledge, no other DTF employee or other person

would have had the authority to so authorize the defendant.

40. I am informed by a Supervisor in DTF’s Audit Group 1: that copies of the birth

certificate and social security card of John Doe 3 were documents that DTF employees were

required to and did obtain pursuant to an audit of Jane Doe 3’s tax returns and, therefore, in the

discharge of their official duties under New York State Tax Law Sections 697(a) and 697(b)(1);

that these documents were deposited with and maintained in DTF files by authority of these

laws; and that, while maintained in the Scanning Unit, these documents and the hard copy file in

which they were contained had value, purpose, and importance in assisting DTF employees to

fulfill their official duties and the public purpose of conducting tax audits.


2008, that defendant admits, in sum and substance, that he took from DTF “confidential

information that [he] knew was illegal to take;” further admits he took certain actions while a

DTF employee, including taking “confidential information,” “to prove . . . to the NYS

15

Department of Tax & Finance that this could be done” and “because [he] had gone deep into

debt and [] needed access to money.”

Defendant’s Unauthorized Accesses to DTF Computer Systems and Associated Credit Card Application

42. Information I have obtained from DTF employees and records demonstrates that

the defendant, while a DTF employee, made unauthorized access to DTF computer systems and

used information he accessed to apply for credit cards.

43. As described in paragraph 31 above, DTF personnel records that I have reviewed

show that the defendant was a DTF employee from approximately 1986 through December 2008.

44. I am informed by DTF’s Director of Labor Relations that employees of DTF: are

permitted to access information in DTF files and computer systems on a need-to-know basis

only; are prohibited from divulging information obtained during employment with DTF; and are

prohibited from using such information for personal purposes.

45. I am informed by records kept in the usual course of business by DTF that the

defendant was made aware of these obligations related to his official functions when, on January

13, 1988, DTF provided him with and he signed an “Agreement to Conditions of Employment,”

which stated, in pertinent part:

Employees are prohibited from divulging any information they might obtain during their employment with [DTF] be it authorized or inadvertently obtained . . . . Access to information is on a need-to-know basis. Unauthorized access whether physical or electronic constitutes a direct violation of departmental policy. Unauthorized use of data obtained through the computer system is prohibited. Personal use of such data constitutes improper handling of taxpayer information, abuse of departmental trust and fraudulent appropriation of computer time and is punishable accordingly. Similarly, unauthorized use of physical data is a violation of departmental policy and is therefore, prohibited. 46. I am further informed by DTF’s Director of Labor Relations that, based on her

knowledge of DTF policy and procedures and her review of DTF personnel records, Healey was

16

obligated to abide by the 1988 Conditions of Employment throughout his employment at DTF.

47. I am further informed by DTF’s Director of Labor Relations that, based on her

knowledge of DTF policy and procedures and her review of DTF personnel records, DTF

employee Walter Healey was reminded of his obligations with regard to information disclosure

and unauthorized access through a September 1998 Executive Policy Memorandum which was

distributed to all DTF employees on September 2, 1998, and which stated, in pertinent part:

It is the Department policy that access to information be made only on a strict need-to-know basis. . . . Unauthorized access to physical or computer tax files, access beyond the scope of an employee’s assigned duties and responsibilities, or unauthorized disclosure of confidential information will subject an employee to disciplinary action and/or criminal prosecution.

48. I am further informed by DTF’s Director of Labor Relations that, based on her

knowledge of DTF policy and procedures and her review of DTF personnel records, the

defendant was obligated to abide by the September 1998 Executive Policy Memorandum

throughout his employment at DTF after September 1998.

49. I am informed by the head of DTF’s Scanning Unit, that, as part of his duties as

Clerk I, Healey was given access to Image Viewer and to a DTF computer program called

Personal Income Tax Selection (“PITSEL”) that contains electronically stored versions of

taxpayers’ personal information, including names, social security numbers, addresses and tax

documents.

50. I am further informed by the head of the Scanning Unit that, under DTF’s policy

that information is available to employees on a “need-to-know” basis only, employees of the

Scanning Unit have authority to access PITSEL and the Image Viewer on a “need-to-know”

basis only, and may only makes accesses for work-related purposes. I am further informed by

the head of DTF’s Scanning Unit that the defendant’s duties there called for him to access certain

17

information from PITSEL, but only for those taxpayers whose information he was assigned to

review. If a taxpayer’s file never went through the Scanning Unit, the defendant had no

legitimate reason for accessing the information.

51. I am informed by DTF Investigator Tenzer that, in or about August 2008, the DTF

Office of the Deputy Inspector General conducted an audit using DTF employee Walter Healey’s

employee login code of Healey’s PITSEL accesses for the period of May, June and July of 2008.

I am further informed by Investigator Tenzer that this audit generated a list of fifty-three

taxpayers whose records were among those Healey accessed in PITSEL during this time.

52. I am informed by the head of the Scanning Unit that, based on DTF records that

she reviewed, none of these fifty-three taxpayers’ files had come through the Scanning Unit as of

August 2008, and, therefore, according to DTF policies described above and made known to the

defendant, because the defendant’s authority to access PITSEL and Image Viewer was strictly

limited to work-related purposes on a “need to know” basis, he did not have authority to access

these fifty-three taxpayers’ records in PITSEL.

53. I am informed by DTF Investigator Tenzer that one of the records Healey

accessed during July 2008, was the record of a person known to OAG (“John Doe 4”). I am

informed by Investigator Tenzer that DTF records that he has reviewed show that Healey

accessed John Doe 4’s record in PITSEL at approximately 12:35 p.m. on July 8, 2008. I am

informed by the head of the Scanning Unit that, based on DTF records that she reviewed, John

Doe 4’s file had not gone through the Scanning Unit as of August 2008, thus the defendant had

no business-related purpose for accessing this taxpayer’s record in July 2008, so his access was

unauthorized.

54. Records of Capital One Services, Inc. that I have reviewed include an application

18

19

dated “08-07-08” requesting a “Capital One” credit card in the name of John Doe 4, and using a

certain social security number; the address “143 Oakwood Avenue, Troy, New York;” and the

telephone number “518-272-4797.”

55. I am informed by Special Agent McNamee-Wicks of the United States Social

Security Administration that the social security number that appears on the Capital One credit

card application is a social security number that was issued to an individual with John Doe 4’s

name.

56. I am informed by John Doe 4 that the last four digits of his social security number

match the social security number used on the “08-07-08” Capital One application; that he has

never applied for or otherwise requested a credit account using the address 143 Oakwood

Avenue, Troy, New York; that he has no knowledge of the address 143 Oakwood Avenue, Troy,

New York; and that he has never authorized anyone affiliated with that address to open or apply

for a credit account in his name.

FALSE STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN

ARE PUNISHABLE AS A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR PURSUANT TO SECTION 210.45 OF THE PENAL LAW Dated: Albany, New York April 21, 2009

__________________________________________

SENIOR INVESTIGATOR MICHAEL BATTISTI

Documents

Complaint