COMPETITION WORKSHOP - OECD · 19/09/2013 Session_4.1_Canada_Examples_(Mark_Rona yne) 4 Canadian Markets for Generic Drugs • Substantial sunk costs to enter supply of a particular

Session_4.1_Breakout_(Mark_Ronayne) 22/09/2013

Session_4.1_Breakout_(Mark_Ronayne) 1

COMPETITION WORKSHOP Mexico City

Session 4 (2) Break-Out

Mexico

Mark Ronayne

September 25, 2013



Background

• Credit cards are a widely used form of payment in a country.

The cards allow persons to access credit through sponsoring financial institutions in order to pay for goods at the point of sale.

– When a merchant allows a customer to use a credit card a percentage of the total amount is kept by the credit card company.

– Competition among card issuing financial institutions helps to ensure that interest rates are kept to a reasonable level.

• There are three providers of credit card services, one with more than a 60% share, one with over 30%, the

other with less than 10%.

• Credit card companies issue basic and rewards cards.

– Rewards cards are purchased by consumers at price reflecting their rewards level.

– Percentage of the sale kept by credit card company increases with level of rewards provided under the card. – Over past several years, supply and us of high rewards cards increasing.

• Credit cards one of 3 forms of payment .

– Others ,cash and debit or bank cards, involve much lower merchant fees or costs.

Background

• With high reward cards increasing, merchants are increasingly vocal about cost imposed on them due to credit card rules preventing them charging customers more for using credit cards.

• The credit card companies claim that the no-surcharge rule protects consumers against opportunistic behaviour by retailers at the cash register (ie imposing high fees for using credit cards) and provide card owners with better information on how much a product will cost when bought using the credit card. – Credit card company rules do not prevent retailers from discounting

prices for persons using cash or debit cards.

• Consumer groups are concerned that simply allowing merchants to surcharge consumers for using credit cards could result in substantial price inceases.



Background

• An independent study has found: – The two largest credit card companies both have substantial market power.

– Discounting is not a practical or effective means for merchants to encourage the use of other forms of payment.

– The merchant rules enhance the credit card companies’ market power through “cost externalization” under which:

– The relatively high costs of credit card payments are spread across all forms of payment allowing credit card companies to charge higher fees.

– Persons paying with cash or debit cards, in essence cross-subsidize those using cards.

• The government is considering 3 policy options:

– Do nothing, supported by credit card companies. – Prohibit any restrictions on surcharging supported by merchants’ associations.

– Consumer groups support allowing surcharging to a maximum of 2% of the value of products sold.

Discussion Issues

• What potential anti-competitive concerns may be raise by the merchant and consumer group proposals.

• What quantitative and qualitative information might be used to assess the relative merits of the proposed changes.

Session_4.1_Canada_Examples_(Mark_Ronayne)

19/09/2013

Session_4.1_Canada_Examples_(Mark_Ronayne) 1

Session 4 Two Stages of Evaluation

Generic Drugs Case Study

Mexico, September 25

Mark Ronayne

Background

• Pharmaceuticals are an important part of health care delivery in Canada.

– Second largest and fastest growing source of health care costs in Canada.

– Account for close to 20% of all health care spending (about $20 billion annually)


19/09/2013


Background

• Generics play an important part in controlling Canadian pharmaceutical costs.

– Contain same active ingredients and are “bio-equivalent” to patented pharmaceuticals.

– Provide competition for brand-name pharmaceuticals after patent protection.

– Legislation in all provinces allows generics to be dispensed in replacement for their corresponding brand-name pharmaceutical.

Background

• Generics account for over 50% of all prescriptions.

– Well over $3 billion annually.

• Studies found dispensed prices for Canadian generics to be high.

– June 2006 report Patented Medicines Price Review

Board (PMPRB) found Canadian prices to be substantially higher than in 10 of the 11 comparator countries.


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Canadian Markets for Generic Drugs

• Most pharmaceuticals are provided in Canada under related insurance plans.

– Provincial government plans most important and have tended to determine nature of private plans.

– Plans do not directly pay for pharmaceuticals, but rather reimburse either the pharmacy or the patient.


• Pharmacies dispense pharmaceuticals prescribed by physicians. – Where a physician prescribes a brand-name pharmaceutical,

interchangeability laws generally allow pharmacy to dispense generic.

• While differences in company size and sales, high level of generics supplier competition.

– Over 10 suppliers. – Largest supplies 34% of all generics in Canada. – Top 4 supply 71%. – Smaller competitors tend to have limited range of products.


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• Substantial sunk costs to enter supply of a particular generic.

– Costs due to research and development, and patent litigation / up to $3 million per product.

– Can be significant in relation to pharmaceuticals in small demand.

– Multiple competitors for other pharmaceuticals.

• Conclusion: – Lack of competition not the main problem. – Government policies more likely cause.

Potentially Anti-competitive Policies

• Several policies raised potential competition checklist issues.

– Formulary listing practices.

– Price caps.

– Most-favored nation policies.


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Formulary listing practices • In order to be dispensed generic drugs must have their drug

identification number and list price included on a public formulary.

– Suppliers able to change their formulary price at any time.

• Formulary intended to provide clarity regarding pricing and assist persons to find low cost alternatives.

• But potentially provides convenient mechanism for monitoring competitors’ list prices.


Price Caps

• Require generics to be priced at no more than a fixed per cent of their brand-name counterpart.

• Intended to ensure a minimum level of savings from generic drugs.

• Used by Canada’s 2 largest provinces.

• Initial cap set at about 2/3 of the brand-name pharmaceutical

price.

• Potential to create reference price and restrict entry.


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Most Favoured Nation Provisions • Require that the price offered to a provincial drug plan

for a generic be at least as low as that provided to any other provincial drug plan.

• Used by two provinces, Quebec and Newfoundland.

• Can provide disincentive to compete by requiring confidential information to be revealed and decreasing benefits from offering low prices to one plan.

Competition Assessment

• Combination of policies created a competitive framework in which generic manufacturers competed to supply the intermediary, pharmacies, and not the payer, drug plans.

• Ontario and Quebec price caps established point for coordinating on list prices. – Indicated maximum willingness to pay.

• Interchangeability meant pharmacies only needed to stock one

generic. • Generics competed to be stocked by pharmacies by setting price at

the maximum allowed and offering discounts and rebates to pharmacies.


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• Offering of low list prices to discouraged by formulary listing policies.

– Any supplier offering lower list prices identified.

– Easy for other suppliers to match the lower price.

– Offering lower list prices does not provide competitive advantage.

– Can also lead to retaliatory action by pharmacies (stop buying other of the supplier’s products).


Direct Costs

• Over $1 billion dollars a year going to pharmacies in unreported rebates.

– Rather than obtaining competitive prices, plans paying full

list price for generics. – Pharmacies receiving inflated profits on generic sales

including rebates of more than 50% of the reported costs. • Estimated to be more than $240,000 per year for an average

pharmacy. • This was in addition to negotiated fees already being paid to the

pharmacies for dispensing services.


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• Indirect effects.

– With prices controlled, increased incentive to compete in other potentially wasteful dimensions (longer store hours / more pharmacies / nicer store fronts and interiors / more advertising subject to constraints on advertising prices).

– Less money in a budget constrained health care system for treating patients.

Consideration of Alternatives

Alternatives 1. Price and Rebate Regulation

2. Bulk Buying

3. Market-based Mechanisms

4. Pharmacy Competition


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Price and Rebate Regulation • Ontario government initial response.

– Reduce the maximum price for generics to 35% of brand. – Prohibit rebates.

• But allow subsidies for pharmacy services, like patient days and counselling.

• Intended to ensure greater cost savings, promote

greater supply of pharmacy services and help mitigate economic impact on pharmacies.


Competition Assessment • Prices paid in many cases in excess of competitive price level. • In other cases prices may be too low leading to scarcity.

• Subject to amount of professional services support, potential to lead to

excess profits for generic manufacturers.

• Possible increase of pharmacy services of questionable value compared to other uses of rebates.

• Need to monitor granting and use of professional services rebates to ensure put toward their intended purpose.

• Smaller suppliers concerned that elimination or restriction of price competition would have a disproportionate effect on them.

– In past low pricing had been a way for them to overcome disadvantage of having limited product lines.


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Bulk Buying

• Use provinces’ collective buying power to obtain the lowest possible price for generic drugs. – Approach used by New Zealand which tenders out the supply of pharmaceuticals for the country.


• Potential to lead to low generic drug prices.

• Would create large buyer that could threaten competition among Canadian suppliers. – Possible exit of suppliers that are unsuccessful in obtaining large orders or that are of too small a

scale to meet demand.

• Not necessary. – Supply of most generics already highly competitive. – Even small independent pharmacies able to get competitive rebates.


Market-based solutions

• Shift focus of competition among generic suppliers from pharmacies to drug plan providers.

• Mechanisms to obtain competitive generic drug prices.

- Competitive contracting provincial or local demand. - Only one generic on formulary, require others to offer discounts to be listed.


• Potential to obtain actual competitive prices for generic drugs.

• Maintains and uses existing competition among generic suppliers.

• Need to maintain incentive for pharmacies to dispense generics through regulation or fee-

setting.

• Interprovincial cooperation or coordination needed to avoid potential negative effects of

MFN clauses.


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Pharmacy Competition • Pharmacies compete to be included in network of pharmacies serving members of a

plan.

• Widely used strategy by US pharmacy benefit managers and drug plans.

Competition Assessment • Promotes competition in dispensing fees and services as well as pharmaceutical

prices.

• Not feasible in all areas, requires effective competition between pharmacies.

• Leads to pharmacies either being in or out potentially having disproportionate effect on many public plan members, aged and low-income persons.

• Due to size of public plans, could lead to concentration through exit of excluded pharmacies.


Conclusion • From competition perspective, use of market mechanisms the

best approach for public plans. • Potential to obtain competitive prices, lower generic drug costs.

• While new mechanisms and approaches would need to be

developed by provinces, such as competitive bidding processes, these would entail large costs compared to the potential savings. – Obstacles should not be overestimated.

• Hospitals already use competitive bidding for much smaller volumes of generics. • Already used to a limited extent by one small province.


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Other Considerations

Setting • Public drug plans a provincial area, no national forum. • Strong entrenched interests, especially pharmacy

professional and business associations.

• Relevant government and drug plan officials unfamiliar with competition and marketplace matters. – Heavily driven by budget concerns.

Effects

Promoting pro-competitive options • Bureau reports and analysis widely

reported and cited as reason in support of drug plan changes. – Lead article in Canada’s most influential daily

newspaper.

• Meetings and presentations held with plan

managers and government officials in a number of provinces.


19/09/2013


Effects

Developments to date • Initial failed Ontario competitive bidding experiment.

– Process did not take into account competitive dimensions of the generic

drug sector.

– Generic manufacturers did not cooperate due to threat that potential benefits of winning could be more than offset by pharmacy boycotts or restrictions on their other products and in other parts of the country.

• Provinces continuing to attempt to get savings through more and

more strict regulation. – Competitive prices still not obtained.

– Continuing issues regarding rebates. – Concerns emerging regarding shortages.

Effects

Developments to date

• Starting to see private plans using more innovative approaches such as pharmacy networks.

• As concerns issues worsen, may see renewed interest in pro-competitive reform.

Session_4.1_Initial and full evaluation as decision tools (Sean Ennis)

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Session_4.1_Initial and full evaluation as decision tools (Sean Ennis) 1

INITIAL AND FULL EVALUATION AS DECISION TOOLS Sean F. Ennis OECD Mexico City 25 September

OECD Competition Assessment Toolkit

• Competition Assessment Toolkit (CAT), 2011 – http://www.oecd.org/competition/toolkit

• Designed for government officials in decision-making roles and staff who will conduct the assessments

• The “Guidance” chapter details the framework and the steps needed to implement competition assessments

• CAT includes writings on – Institutional options for competition assessments – Integrating competition assessments into regulatory

impact analysis • The CAT has a two-step assessment process

2


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OECD Competition Assessment Toolkit

• Step One: A competition assessment checklist – Designed as an initial screen to “qualitatively” assess market

interventions that may be relatively problematic – Structured to be conducted in short time frame – Framework is based on concepts from Industrial Organization

theories, and competition policy and law enforcement

• IF potential harm to competition and innovation is identified, then a more detailed review is recommended

• Step Two: Detailed competition assessment – Designed to fully evaluate those interventions that have the

potential to cause significant harm – Make recommendation to restructure rules & regulations to

minimize harm to competition

3

Competition Assessment Checklist Initial Screening: Checklist Question #1

• Does the rule or regulation limit the number or range of suppliers?

• This could arise, for example, if a regulation 1. Grants exclusive rights for a company to supply

goods or services 2. Establishes a license, permit or authorization process

as a requirement for operation 3. Limits the ability of some suppliers to provide a good

or service 4. Significantly raises cost of entry or exit by a supplier 5. Creates a geographic barrier to the ability of

companies to supply goods or services, invest capital or supply labor

4


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• Does the rule or regulation limit the ability of suppliers to compete?

• This could arise, for example, if a regulation

1. Controls or substantially influences the prices for goods or services

2. Limits freedom of suppliers to advertise or market their goods or services

3. Sets standards for product quality that provide an advantage to some suppliers over others or that are above the level that many well-informed customers would choose

4. Significantly raises costs of production for some suppliers relative to others (especially by treating incumbents differently from new entrants)

5


• Does the rule or regulation reduce the incentive of suppliers to compete?


1. Creates a self-regulatory or co-regulatory regime

2. Requires or encourages information on supplier outputs, prices, sales or costs to be published

3. Exempts the activity of a particular industry or group of suppliers from the operation of general competition law

6


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• Does the rule or regulation limit the choices and information available to customers?


1. Limits the choices that a consumer can make

2. Reduces mobility of customers between suppliers of goods or services by increasing the explicit or implicit costs of changing suppliers

3. Limits useful and relevant information available to customers

7

Competition Assessment Checklist Initial Screening Based on the Checklist

• The checklist consists of four core questions

• A YES answer to any of the four questions would signal a competition concern and warrant a detailed review of the rule or regulation under consideration

8


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Competition Assessments Detailed Review

• The detailed evaluation would focus on the specific intervention and potential quantification of whether the rule or regulation might – Impose barriers to entry of new businesses – Force certain types of businesses to exit – Increase the prices of goods and services – Reduce product or process innovation – Significantly increase concentration in the relevant

market • Are any upstream or downstream markets

affected? – If YES – Evaluate effects on the related markets

9

Competition Assessments Detailed Review

• We provide an overview of the detailed review process for one example:

– Daycare services

10


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Competition Assessments Detailed Review: Provision of Daycare Services

• There is a proposed regulation to place a maximum price on daycare services.

• The proposed regulation generated a “yes” answer to checklist questions #1 and #2

• The detailed review relates to a thorough assessment of the market and quantification of the effects

• At a general level, a good rule of thumb is that price caps should be avoided wherever possible because the – Potential harm to the markets is large – Benefits to consumers are not always guaranteed

11


• Regarding quantification …

• First, quantify prices considering the key benefit claim

– “With a price cap, daycare services will be more affordable”

• We will need to conduct a survey of daycare centers and collect price data

– Need to ensure that the sample generated is not biased towards either the low-end or high-end providers

– The sample must be truly representative

• With the data at hand

– Calculate the mean price

– Plot distribution of prices

– Where does the proposed price cap fall in this distribution?

12


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Mean=$755

Proposed price cap?

13


• Now consider a price ceiling where the proposed price is above the current mean price – All prices currently above the ceiling will fall to the posted

ceiling

• Since the truly high prices have been eliminated, does this imply that the mean price will now be lower? – Not necessarily – The posted price ceiling could serve as a focal point for

prices for all daycare providers – Over time, the current lower-priced providers could raise

their prices to the posted ceiling – This may end up increasing the mean price!

14


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Mean=$755

Price cap=$800

High prices

Drop to $800

Lower prices may

have a tendency to

converge to the

posted ceiling

15


• Focal point effects could arise, for example, due to – The fact that since the regulation has taken away the

ability of many daycare providers to differentiate and compete based on quality and variety, the market will very likely gravitate towards only a core provision of services and prices

– Collusion

• While the precise extent to which this will occur will depend on various market specific factors, it is far from clear that the mean price will be lower than before

• Thus, even the basic socio-economic price benefits and greater affordability are questionable

16


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• If ceiling is set equal to the existing mean – All prices above the ceiling collapse to the mean – Focal point effects: low initial prices could converge to the

ceiling – Net effect may be no change in the mean price – Quality and variety will unambiguously fall

• If the ceiling price is set below the mean – The mean price would fall – Potentially large exits from the market – Dramatic drop in quality and variety – These would occur due to the posted price being too low to

cover the costs of providing even the basic quality

17


• Second, consider quantification of quality of daycare services provided

• When conducting the price survey, one would need to gather information on quality from the providers – In our earlier checklist-based assessment

exercise, we identified several dimensions. For example • Children-to-teacher ratio • Number of educational programs • Range of educational programs • Quality and variety of food

18


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• The quality information will be vital for two reasons • One: If the data show that the higher-priced daycare

centers also provided better quality, it would point to the misguided price cap initiative

• Two: If the Government insists on setting a price cap, the collected data will provide some quantification of the likely loss of quality as the higher-end providers will either exit or reduce their quality

• Some of the examples from price-cap regulations in markets such as housing, airlines, telecommunications, point to such consequences

19


• In summary, for a detailed review we will – Need to collect data on

• Prices charged by the daycare centers • Various dimensions of quality differences across the providers

– Place the proposed price cap in the existing price distribution

– Assess the effects of the price cap on • The mean price • All the dimensions of quality

• Price ceilings can cause significant harm to the markets – They will not necessarily provide consumers with the “claimed” benefits

20

Session_4.1_Ireland_Examples_

Identifying_Solutions_(Declan_Purcell)


Identifying_Solutions_(Declan_Purcell) 1

Developing Solutions

4th Session, Topic 1

Declan Purcell

24 September 2013

Regulation of Legal Services

Two kinds of lawyer in Ireland –

8,500 “sitting down” lawyers (Solicitors)

Deal with private and commercial transactions, personal

injury, family law, wills, etc.

Mostly small practices, but also large commercial law

firms

Handle client accounts

2,300 “standing up” lawyers (Barristers/Advocates)

Focus on court representation and legal advice only

Do not handle clients’ money





Regulatory Arrangements

Solicitors

largely self-regulated by a private body (“The Law

Society”), although some State law does apply

Law Society both represents & promotes solicitors’

interests and regulates them

Advocates

completely self-regulated by a private body (“The

Bar Council”)

Bar Council both represents & promotes advocates’

interests and regulates them

Competition-related concerns –

Advocates

Professional Training Monopoly – training body

is effectively controlled by Advocates

No direct access by consumers to Advocates –

must go through a solicitor

Rigid form of business structure

Lack of price transparency for consumers

Price-setting for junior advocates

Blanket ban on advertising





Competition-related concerns –

Solicitors

Professional Training Monopoly – training body is effectively controlled by Solicitors

Monopoly for solicitors on property transactions

Rigid form of business structure

Lack of price transparency for consumers

Unnecessary restrictions on advertising

Restriction on switching solicitors – lien on file

Example of restriction and impacts

• Monopoly for solicitors on property transactions

• In Ireland, only solicitors can provide conveyancing services to the public for payment

• This limits competition for these services, and therefore consumer choice

• No competitive pressure on solicitors’ fees for property transactions, no pressure to innovate in service delivery

• Also stops the development of conveyancing specialists

• In other countries, specialist paralegal professionals (“conveyancers”) are also licensed to provide conveyancing services, as well as solicitors

• Regulation of independent licensed conveyancers introduced in England and Wales in 1987, in New South Wales 1992, in New Zealand in 2006

• Average cost of conveying a house in England fell by 25% between 1989 and 1998

• Solicitors’ firms responded by providing conveyancing services outside traditional office hours and “on-line” to facilitate customers

• Therefore, specialist conveyancers should be licensed and allowed to offer conveyancing services to the public in Ireland





Analysing these restrictions

Many restrictions in place, as already described

Each one analysed individually –

Effects of restriction identified (both on consumers and on lawyers themselves)

Stated rationale for restriction set out

International examples considered

Views of interested parties sought

Analysis by Competition Authority on restriction-by-restriction basis (and often from first principles)

Predominant Overall Concern

Current regulatory framework for lawyers creates potential conflicts that can’t be resolved – between lawyers’ commercial interests and the interests of consumers of legal services

Barristers totally self-regulated and solicitors are largely self-regulated with minimal independent oversight in some areas

Representative bodies for barristers and solicitors lobby for and promote the interests of the legal profession

But, as regulators of the legal profession, these Bodies must ensure that the profession operates for consumers’ benefit

These two roles conflict and housing them in the same organisation lacks transparency. When the interests of the profession and consumers collide, consumers invariably lose

Competition in legal services in the State has been and continues to be severely hampered by many unnecessary restrictions permeating the whole legal profession.

Nothing less than complete regulatory overhaul will be enough





Key Overall Finding

The layers of restrictions which apply to the legal profession have arisen over decades/ centuries of self-regulation by professional bodies that also represent the interests of their members. The removal or amendment of all disproportionate restrictions on competition would not be enough to safeguard competition on an on going basis. These measures would not be capable of addressing the conflict of interest faced by the existing self-regulatory bodies that also represent the interests of their members.

Key Recommendation

Regulation of the legal profession and legal services should be overseen by a new Legal Services Commission (LSC)

LSC would be a statutory, independent, transparent and accountable body, involving a wider group of stakeholders than in the previous model of self-regulation.





CA Interim Report 2005

Two Options for new Regulatory Commission

A LSC would have full responsibility for regulation of legal services, including all the regulatory powers and responsibilities previously undertaken by the professional bodies. The professional bodies would retain representative functions

B LSC would be responsible for regulation of legal services, but would delegate many regulatory functions to existing and possibly new self-regulatory bodies. LSC would have explicit authority to make new regulations and would have power to veto the rules of the self-regulatory bodies. These bodies would not be allowed to exercise representative

functions

Full Public Consultation on

Interim Report

Strong welcome from public, media, analysts

But immediately and continuously opposed by

professional bodies

Silence from Government

Strong public media and advocacy campaign

by CA





Conclusions from further Analysis

After a year of consultations and further

analysis, Final Report published end-2006

Status Quo Option rejected – problems too

widespread and ingrained to continue with old system

Option of LSC with full powers rejected as too

expensive and burdensome – taxpayers and

consumers would ultimately pay, and existing

regulatory expertise of professional bodies wasted

Option of establishing LSC but allowing existing

Regulators to operate under supervision – adopted

What happened then ?

Renewed welcome from public, analysts,

media, but renewed opposition from

professional bodies

Again, silence from Government

Stronger and more sustained public media and

advocacy campaign by Competition Authority

between 2006 and 2010





Troika MOU – December 2010

Commitment by Government to EU/ECB/IMF

“Government will introduce legislative changes

to remove restrictions to trade and competition

in sheltered sectors including –

……………………………………………

– the legal profession, establishing an independent

regulator for the profession and implementing

……………….. outstanding Competition Authority

recommendations to reduce legal costs”

Government Programme 2011-2016

Undertaking by new incoming Government

“We will establish independent regulation of

the legal professions to improve access and

competition, make legal costs more

transparent and ensure adequate procedures

for addressing consumer complaints.”





Progress since 2011

Legal Services Bill published October 2011, implementing most of Competition Authority Recommendations, including the establishment of an Independent Regulator.

Model recommended by Competition Authority generally adopted

Passage of Bill very slow – still not passed by Parliament, but expected by end-2013

NB – No RIA published with Bill – Minister promises one during Summer 2013

Session_4.1_Lista de verificiacion_(COFEMER)

29/09/2013

Session_4.1_Lista de verificiacion_(COFEMER) 1

TALLER SOBRE ANÁLISIS

DE LA COMPETENCIA EN

EL CONTEXTO DE LA MIR

Lista de verificación de competencia

México, D.F., 24-25 Septiembre 2013

COFEMER – MIR con Análisis de

Competencia

Indique si la propuesta regulatoria contiene alguna de las siguientes acciones:

1. ¿Otorga derechos especiales o exclusivos a los agentes para prestar servicios u ofrecer bienes?

2. ¿Establece procedimientos de obtención de licencias, permisos o autorizaciones como requisito para iniciar operaciones, o bien iniciar alguna actividad adicional?

3. ¿Crea esquemas preferenciales en las compras de Gobierno a efecto de promover o beneficiar a algunos agentes?

4. ¿Establece requisitos técnicos, administrativos o de tipo económico para que los agentes participen en el(los) mercado(s)?

5. ¿Establece condiciones o delimita áreas o zonas geográficas para ofrecer bienes o servicios?

6. ¿Establece canales de venta o de distribución exclusivos (presenciales, por internet, telefónicas, por citar algunos)?

7. ¿Establece normas o reglas de calidad para los productos o servicios?

7. ¿Otorga preferencias o ventajas de cualquier tipo a algún agente?

8. ¿Determina el uso obligatorio de algún estándar, modelo, plataforma o tecnología en particular, o de algún producto o servicio protegido por derechos de propiedad intelectual?

9. ¿Restringe de alguna forma la capacidad de los productos o vendedores de innovar u ofrecer nuevos productos? ¿Establece normas o reglas de calidad para los productos o servicios?

10. ¿Establece o influye de manera substancial en la determinación de precios máximos, mínimos, tarifas o en general, cualquier otro mecanismo de control de precios y/o cantidades de bienes o servicios?

11. ¿Exime del cumplimiento de otra normativa o regulación a una o a ciertas empresas, incrementando de este modo los costos de competidores y nuevos proveedores?

Session_4.1_Lista de verificiacion_(COFEMER)

29/09/2013

Session_4.1_Lista de verificiacion_(COFEMER) 2

COFEMER – MIR con Análisis de

Competencia

12. ¿Exime del cumplimiento de otra normativa o regulación a una o a ciertas empresas, incrementando de este modo los costos de competidores y nuevos proveedores?

13. ¿Hace o haría más difícil a los consumidores cambiar de proveedor o compañía?

14. ¿Modifica o disminuye la información indispensable para que los consumidores puedan tomar una decisión de consumo informada?

15. ¿Exime del cumplimiento de la Ley Federal de Competencia Económica?

16. ¿Crea o fomenta un régimen de autorregulación o co-regulación?

17. ¿Obliga, faculta o favorece que los participantes en el (los) mercado(s) intercambien, compartan o hagan pública información sobre costos, precios, ventas, producción otros datos de tipo confidencial?

MIR con análisis de impacto en la

competencia

Documents

COMPETITION WORKSHOP - OECD · 19/09/2013 Session_4.1_Canada_Examples_(Mark_Rona yne) 4 Canadian Markets for Generic Drugs • Substantial sunk costs to enter supply of a particular