Survey of 2014 SC Decisions inCONSTITUTIONAL LAWBy: Atty. Edwin Yan

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS'ASSOCIATION vs. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSIONG.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014(Police Power, Due Process and Equal Protection Clause)

FACTS Real Estate Service Act of 2009 aims to professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision. Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of DTI through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP). Such authority is now transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created under the new law. Petitioners argued that the new law is constitutionally infirm because it violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers most basic ownership rights, the right to use and dispose property and Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned since both are property owners dealing with their own property.

ISSUES1. Does R.A. No. 9646 violate the due process clause?2. Does R.A. No. 9646 violate the equal protection clause?

RULING1. NO. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure. The law is a valid exercise of the States police power. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.2. NO. Real estate developers at present constitute a sector that hires or employs the largest number of brokers, sales persons, appraisers and consultants due to sheer number of products (lots, houses and condominium units) they advertise and sell nationwide. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of house and lot buyers. Substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property owners exempted under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose.

SR METALS, INC., ET AL. vs. THE HONORABLE ANGELO T. REYES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF DENRG.R. No. 179669. June 4, 2014(Equal Protection Clause)

Petitioner mining corporations were awarded a 2 yr Small Scale Mining Permit (SSMP) by the Provincial Mining Regulatory of Agusan del Norte, allowing them to extract Nickel and Cobalt (Ni-Co) in a 20- hectare mining site in sitio Bugnang, Brgy. La Fraternidad, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. The Environment Compliance Certificates (ECCs) issued to them contain a restriction that the Nico ore they are allowed to extract annually should not exceed 50,000 MTs pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1899. Due to over extraction, the DENR Secretary Angelo T. Reyes issued a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) against the petitioners suspending their operations.

Relying on the opinion of DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez that Section 1 of PD 1899 is deemed impliedly repealed by RA 7076 as nothing from the provisions of the latter law mentions anything pertaining to an annual production quota for small scale mining, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but the same was denied because the ECCs have been mooted by their expiration and also in recognition of the power of the DENR to issue the CDO. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 1 of PD 1899 violates the equal protection clause considering that no substantial distinction allegedly exists between miners covered under RA 7076, who can extract as much as they can, and those covered under PD 1899 who were imposed an extraction limit.RULING: The Court does not subscribe to petitioners averment that the 50,000 MTs production limit does not apply to small-scale miners under RA 7076. Both PD 1899 and RA 7076 delegated to the DENR, thru its Secretary, the power to promulgate the necessary IRRs to give effect to the said laws. The DENR, in the exercise of such power, had just recently resolved the question on the production limit in small-scale mining by issuing DMC 2007-07 (Clarificatory Guidelines in the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Laws) which imposes the annual production limit of 50,000 DMT to both SSMPs under PD 1899 and Small-Scale Mining Contracts (SSMCs) under RA 7076. The DENR harmonized the two laws. With the 50,000 MT limit likewise imposed on small-scale miners under RA 7076, the issue raised on violation of the equal protection clause is moot. The fact is, the DENR treats all small-scale miners equally as the production limit applies to all of them.

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, ET AL. vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.G.R. No. 209287. July 1, 2014(Equal Protection Clause)

FACTSOn September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech revealing that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. DBM Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM explained that the releases were part of Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.

The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAPs use of savings, namely: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings. As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.

Petitioners argued that DAP was unfair as it was selective because the funds was not available to all legislators, and others being unaware thereof. There was also no reasonable classification used in distributing the funds under DAP and there was different treatment as to usage by the legislators.

The OSG counters the challenges, stating that the supposed discrimination in the release of funds under the DAP could be raised only by the affected Members of Congress themselves, and if the challenge based on the violation of the Equal Protection Clause was really against the constitutionality of the DAP, the arguments of the petitioners should be directed to the entitlement of the legislators to the funds, not to the proposition that all of the legislators should have been given such entitlement.

ISSUEWhether or not the DAP violates the Equal Protection Clause.

RULINGNO. The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and Congressmen being unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some of them having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the Executive discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently, the Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection. To have the Court do so despite the inadequacy of the showing of factual and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the outcome would not do justice to those for whose supposed benefit the claim of denial of equal protection has been made.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.G.R. No. 213181. August 19, 2014(Due Process)FACTSOn March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules, the JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for position about to be vacated by Associate Justuce Abad due to his compulsory retirement. Among those nominated for the said position is Francis H. Jardeleza, which he accepted. He appeared before the council on June 30, 2014 where Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He requested that the same directive should also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio. As claimed by the JBC, Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that he wanted to hear for himself Jardelezas explanation on the matter. Jardeleza, however, refused as he would not be lulled into waiving his rights. Jardeleza then put into record a written statement expressing his views on the situation and requested the JBC to defer its meeting considering that the Court en banc would meet the next day to act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.

After the deliberation and proceedings, a shortlist composed of names of qualified nominees was conveyed to the President, wherein the name of petitioner was excluded from the said list. Jardeleza was ditched by reasons that Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Ma. Lourdes Sereno invoked Sec. 2, Rule 10 of the JBC-009 questioning the applicants integrity and therefrom, pursuant to Sec. 4 of the same rule, questionable character bears the necessity to garner unanimity of votes from the JBC members. Justice-respondent impugned petitioners integrity based (a) on his ability to discharge the duties of his office particularly in handling of an international arbitration case for the government, (b) on his alleged affair with another woman aside from his wife, and (c) on the acts of insider trading. Also with dubious integrity, Jardeleza only garnered a vote of 4 out of the 6 members of the JBC- falling short of the required unanimous vote. Despite of the petitioners demand to defer the proceedings until such time he would be granted the right to be heard, the JBC proceeded for the submission of the shortlist to the President.

ISSUES1. Whether the issues raised against Jardeleza befit Question or Challenges on Integrity as contemplated under Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.2. Whether the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.3. Whether Jeredeleza was deprived of his right to due process.

RULING1. Yes, Jardelezas alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within the contemplation of a question of integrity. As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidences of qualification laid down in JBC-009, integrity is closely related to, or not at least, approximately equated to an applicants good reputation of honesty, incorruptability, irreproachable conduct and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standard. The alleged act of Jardeleza of having extra-marital affair and insider tradings reflect his integrity. While, his conduct in handling of an international arbitration case is not within the purview of integrity, but depends entirely upon the sound judgment acting in his capacity as the attorney of the government.2. Yes, sui generis character of JBC proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-010. Notwithstanding being a class of its own, the right to be heard and to explain ones self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicants qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.3. Yes, Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANAG.R. No. 200334. July 30, 2014(Search and Seizure)

FACTSPolice Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel, La Union, received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) [would] be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order to intercept the suspect. PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. Both of them were brought to the police station. While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. Inside Cogaeds sack was four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops, and inside Dayaos yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.

ISSUEWhether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant.

RULINGNO. The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The said provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and seizures are reasonable. As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge. However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless.

One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is stop and frisk. Stop and frisk searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court. The search involved in the case at bar was initially a stop and frisk search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

Stop and frisk searches are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness present in the situation where the police officer finds him or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal about riding a jeepney and carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signaled to the police that Cogaed was suspicious. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant. The circumstances of the case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In Aruta, this Court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Arutas arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. It was the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be admissible. The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. Cogaeds silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officers excessive intrusion into his private space. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LARRY MENDOZA Y ESTRADAG.R. No. 192432. June 23, 2014(Presumption of Innocence)

FACTSLarry Mendoza y Estrada was found guilty of violation of Section 5 and a violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. On August 28, 2007 in the Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal accused willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell, deliver, and give away to a poseur buyer PO1 Arnel Diocena of white crystalline substance contained in 3 heat sealed transparent plastic sachets, which substance was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride also known as shabu, a dangerous drugs, in violation of RA No. 9165.

Policemen Arnel Diocena and Alfredo DG Lim received reports that an alias Larry was selling shabu in Binangonan, Rizal. They organized a buy-bust operation around 10:45pm and waited in the corner on their motorcycle while Lim positioned themselves in the perimeter. Larry then asked how much they were buying and Diocena told Php500 worth. Larry took out two plastic sachets of shabu. Diocena lit the left signal light to signal Lim and other cops that the deal was done. They then arrested Larry who turned out to be the accused. After frisking him, they recovered another sachet of shabu from him. These were then sent to the police crime lab for forensic testing where they tested it positive to the test Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.

The court of appeals affirmed the conviction of the accused. Where the accused-appellant failed to present any plausible reason or ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely impute to him such a serious and unfounded charge.

ISSUEWhether the Court of Appeals erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violations of Section 5 and Section 11 of RA No. 9165?

RULINGYES. The Court of Appeals and RTC erred in relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the arresting officers. They should not give too much primacy to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty at the expense of the higher and stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused in a prosecution for violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. The presumption of regularity is rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity or of any failure to perform a duty. Judicial reliance on the presumption despite any hint of irregularity in the procedure undertaken by the agents of the law will thus be fundamentally unsound because such hint is itself affirmative proof of irregularity. The presumption of regularity stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of official duty. And even in that instance, the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.

The State did not satisfactorily explain substantial lapses committed by the buy-bust team in the chain of custody; hence, the guilt of the accused for the crime charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt. To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. That proof is vital to the judgment of conviction. The state did not show the presence during the seizure and confiscation of the contraband, as well as during the physical inventory and photographing of the contraband, of the representatives from the media or the Department of Justice, or of any elected public official.

The marking after seizure by the arresting officer, being the starting point in the custodial link, should be made immediately upon the seizure as practicable under the obtaining circumstances. An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team did not observe the statutory procedures on preserving the chain of custody. The buy-bust team had 48 days when the test buy was conducted within which to have the media and the Department of Justice be represented during the buy-bust operation, as well as to invite an elected public official of the place operation to witness the operation. With the chain of custody being demonstrably broken, the accused deserved to be acquitted of the serious charges. The unexplained failures and lapses committed by the buy-bust team could not be fairly ignored.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO ANDAYA Y REANOG.R. No. 183700. October 13, 2014(Presumption of Innocence)

FACTSThe accused Pablito Andaya was charged of violation of R.A. 9165. The accused was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers who are the witness of the prosecution. According to their testimonies and the blotter report, their asset who conducting a surveillance of the accused arrived in their station and told them that he had arranged to buy a shabu from Andaya. The police officers arrived in the house of the accused and occupy specific position, when the asset gave the mark money on the accused the police officers approached and introduced themselves then he was brought to the police station. The specimen was sent to crime lab and was positive shabu.

The accused-appellant denied the accusation. He stated that the police arrived in his house while he was home watching TV with his family, when he opened the door a police officer poked a gun at him and brought him outside the house handcuffed. The policemen searched the house and found nothing. He was brought to the station and detained. After three days he was released and received a subpoena from the prosecutors office. His wife Crisanta, corroborated the appellants testimony and added that his husbands loss of cellphone and money in his wallet. She was asked to produced 5,000 pesos but only raise 2,000 pesos.

RTC rendered a decision that the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. He is therefore sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and to pay the costs of this action. In his appeal in the Court of appeals he argued that the Trial court erred in not finding the accused-appellants search and arrest was illegal and in convicting the accused of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES1. Whether the police officers violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures by searching his house and arresting him. 2. Whether he is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt because of the non-presentation of the confidential informant of the prosecution.

RULINGYES. The members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that they had seen from their positions the poseur buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave something to the poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not present the confidential informant-poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue against that except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction. Another mark of suspicion attending the evidence of guilt related to the reliance by the members of the buy-bust team on the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. To start with, the record does not show what the prearranged signal consisted of. The criminal accusation against a person must be substantiated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court should steadfastly safeguard his right to be presumed innocent. Although his innocence could be doubted, for his reputation in his community might not be lily-white or lustrous, he should not fear a conviction for any crime, least of all one as grave as drug pushing, unless the evidence against him was clear, competent and beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the presumption of innocence in his favor would be rendered empty.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLENN SALVADOR Y BALVERDE, ET AL.G.R. No. 190621. February 10, 2014(Search and Seizure)

FACTSIn a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the items seized from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible in evidence as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the said items have been preserved.

At around 2:45 p.m. of September 3, 2003, a team of arrived at Road 10, Barangay Pag-asa, Quezon City to conduct a buy-bust operation. PO2 Soriano and the CI proceeded to appellants house while the rest of the buy-bust team positioned themselves within viewing distance. The CI introduced PO2 Soriano to appellant as a drug dependent who wanted to purchaseP200.00 worth of shabu. During their conversation, Parcon arrived and asked appellant for shabu. Appellant gave her a small heat-sealed plastic sachet that she placed in her coin purse. Thereafter, PO2 Soriano handed to appellant the buy-bust money consisting of two 100-peso bills and the latter, in turn, gave him a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Soriano then immediately arrested appellant and recovered from his right hand pocket the buy bust money. At this juncture, PO2 Sorianos teammates rushed to the scene. PO1 Pineda arrested Parcon and recovered from her a plastic sachet also containing white crystalline substance

Appellant and Parcon were then taken to the Baler Police Station. The items recovered during the buy-bust operation were marked by PO2 Soriano as "SJ-03" and "AP-03" and turned over to the designated investigator, PO1 Vicente Calatay (PO1 Calatay). PO1 Calatay then prepared a letter-request for laboratory examination, which, together with the confiscated specimen, was brought by PO2 Soriano to the PNP Crime Laboratory.

The RTC held that the evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant and Parcon for the crimes charged. It did not find impressive appellants claim of extortion by the police officers and instead upheld the buy-bust operation which it found to have been carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. It ruled that absent proof of evil motive on the part of the police, the presumption of regularity which runs in their favor stands.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. He stated in his brief that the trial court erred in declaring his guilt despite the non-compliance with the requirements for the proper custody of the seized dangerous acts under RA No. 9165.

ISSUEWhether or not the failure to strictly comply Section 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 will render an arrest illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence?

RULINGThe appeal was dismissed. In arguing for his acquittal, appellant heavily relies on the failure of the buy-bust team to immediately photograph and conduct a physical inventory of the seized items in his presence. However, failure to strictly comply with the above procedure will not render an arrest illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence. Substantial compliance is allowed as provided for in Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165.

The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photographed the objects confiscated does not ipso facto result in the unlawful arrest of the accused or render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. This is due to the proviso added in the implementing rules stating that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have not been preserved."What is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for they will be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG vs. TERESITA D. RIVERAG.R. No. 200148, June 04, 2014(Privileged Communication)

FACTSRivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation. About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be effective on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of the same year to complete the turnover of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas, who succeeded her.

Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.

On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text message to one of BANFFs official cellular phones held by Lumapas:

I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko. I dont deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras[.] [S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.

Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan including incentive up to the last date na nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.

When Syhunliong learned of such text messages, he filed a libel suit against Rivera. Syhunliong alleged that the text messages conveyed malicious and offensive insinuations that tend to destroy his good name and reputation and thus exposed him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Rivera filed a Motion to Quash the Information arguing that the text message merely reflected the undue stress she suffered due to the delay in the release of her salaries, incentives and benefits, and that they were sent as part of her duty to defend her own interests. She further argued that there is no malice in her text messages and they were not for consumption, so she could not be held liable for the crime of libel.

The RTC however denied her Motion to Quash. It ruled that texting to a person other than the person defamed constitutes sufficient publication, for the person to whom the text message is sent is a third person in relation to its writer and the person defamed.

But the Court of Appeals (CA) disagreed with the RTC. It ruled that Tessie has the right to express an opinion on a matter of undeniable interest to her. It held that the text message is not libelous since it does not serve to cast a shadow on Syhunliongs character and integrity, there being no direct and personal imputation of venality on him. Also, the CA said a responsible officer should not be so onion-skinned as to react through the filing of criminal charges.

ISSUEAre Riveras text messages privileged communication?

RULINGThe rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty.

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.

The Supreme Court (SC) agreed with the CA. It pointed out that Riveras text message is Privileged Communication which is a communication in good faith, on any matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a duty, made to a person having a corresponding duty. A privileged communication is usually made in private and confidential in nature.

In this case, Rivera had an interest to protect and that she addressed it to an officer also having interest on the matter, hence, it is privileged communication and was not meant for public consumption. Furthermore there was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned, the SC declared.

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA vs. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO AND JOHN DOESG.R. No. 202666. September 29, 2014(Right to Privacy)

FACTSNenita Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara both minors, were, graduating high school students at St. Theresas College (STC), Cebu City. While changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments which were uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan on her Faebooks profile. Back at school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero a computer teacher learned about these pictures which show that Julia and Julienne were drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarette inside a bar and were wearing articles that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres, which were viewable by any Facebook users. Escudero reported the matter for appropriate action, thereafter, identified students to have deported them in a manner proscribed by the schools Student Handbook. Their penalty was not to join the commencement exercises scheduled. However, Angelas mother filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages. RTC issued a temporary restraining order allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which the STC filed a motion for reconsideration. Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance of the TRO remained unresolved. Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their childrens privacy and a writ of habeas data be issued; respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained in violation of the childrens right to privacy.

Ruling of the RTC Dismissed the petition for habeas data since petitioners failed to prove the existence of any actual or threatened violation of the minors right to privacy.

ISSUES1. Whether a writ of habeas data should be issued given the facts?2. Whether there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case?

RULING1. No. Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will not prosper. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty, or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The records are bereft of any evidence, other than the bare assertions of the minor students that they utilized Facebooks privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they can not now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.2. No. STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity, it is necessary that said user, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. Utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation of the users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to said posts. Hence, respondent STC and its officials did not violate minors privacy rights. No cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS/ABC DEVT. CORP. vs. COMELEC/MANILA BROADCASTING CO., INC., ET AL. vs. COMELEC/KAPISANAN NG MGA BROKASTER NG PILIPINAS, ET AL. vs. COMELEC/RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC. vs. COMELECG.R. No. 205357/G.R. No. 205374/G.R. No. 205592G.R. No. 205852/G.R. No. 206360. September 2, 2014(Freedom of Expression)

FACTSFive (5) petitions were filed before the SC questioning the constitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. The controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation of the limitation on the number of minutes that candidates may use for television and radio advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 (R.A. No. 9006), otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued Resolutions implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes per station. For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a per station basis, to a total aggregate basis. Petitioners contend, among others, that Section 9 (a) of the said Resolution, which imposes a notice requirement, is vague and infringes on the constitutionally protected freedom of speech, of the press and of expression, and on the right of people to be informed on matters of public concern.

Respondent likewise alleges that petitioners do not have locus standi, as the constitutional rights and freedoms they enumerate are not personal to them, rather, they belong to candidates, political parties and the Filipino electorate in general, as the limitations are imposed on candidates, not on media outlets.

ISSUES1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi;2. Whether Section 9 (a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 infringes on the constitutionality protected freedom of speech, of the press, and of expression, and on the right of people to be informed on matters of public concern.

RULING1. Yes. For petitioner-intervenor Senator Cayetano, he undoubtedly has standing since he is a candidate whose ability to reach out to the electorate is impacted by the assailed Resolutions. For the broadcast companies, they similarly have the standing in view of the direct injury they may suffer relative to their ability to carry out their tasks of disseminating information because of the burdens imposed on them. If in regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert a constitutional right of their clients, with more reason should establishments which publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the constitutional freedom of speech of candidates and of the right to information of the public, not to speak of their own freedom of the press. If in regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert a constitutional right of their clients, with more reason should establishments which publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the constitutional freedom of speech of candidates and of the right to information of the public, not to speak of their own freedom of the press. So, the SC uphold the standing of petitioners on that basis.2. Yes. Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. [F]reedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy. Accordingly, the same must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state interest. The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits leveling the playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. The reporting/monitoring requirement is a reasonable means adopted by the Comelec to ensure that the parties and candidates are afforded equal opportunities to promote their respective candidacies. Unlike the restrictive aggregate-based airtime limits, the directive to give prior notice is not unduly burdensome and unreasonable, much less, could it be characterized as prior restraint since there is no restriction on dissemination of information before broadcast. Also, the right to reply under Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615 as revised by Resolution No. 9631 is reasonable and consistent with the constitutional mandate that the Comelec shall provide for a right to reply as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest, fair and credible elections. The petitions are partially granted, Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, is upheld and remain in full force and effect.

JAMES M. IMBONG, ET AL. vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET AL.G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563. April 8, 2014(Facial Challenge, Right to Life and Health, Religious Freedom, Right to Privacy, Academic Freedom, Equal Protection Clause, Due Process and Involuntary Servitude)

FACTSIn response to the uncontrollable pace of the countrys population growth, Republic Act. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. The RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population control. Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (RH-IRR)for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

Challengers from various sectors of society assaiiled the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. The implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. 2. The RH Law violates the right to health. The RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which causes cancer and other health problems. 3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. Also, its provisions regarding the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. The RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide 48 hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution.5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. Rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 6. The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. 7. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. 8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family. The RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs. 9. The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 10. The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. 11. The RH Law violates Natural Law. 12. The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.

In their defense, the respondents, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the reasons that: 1) there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination; 2) some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3) the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

ISSUES RULING

A. PROCEDURAL ISSUES1. Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy? Yes.

a. There is an actual case or controversy because the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed. Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof.

b. The issues are of transcendental importance. The RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. The Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

2. Whether the petitioners can challenge the RH Law on its face considering that it is not a speech regulating measure? Yes.

Facial Challenge is proper. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, also determines whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Govt. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied challenge, still the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a governmental act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked.

3. Whether the RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule? No.

The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. A textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.

B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1. Whether the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn? No.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. Whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

The clear intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum.

However, under Section 3.0l(a) and G of the RH-IRR which recognizes as abortifacients only those that primarilyinduce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb is unconstitutional. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn. The "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must always be upheld.

2. Whether the RH Law violates the peoples right to health? No.

Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

The provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies.

3. a. Whether the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom when requiring conscientious objectors to refer their patients to another healthcare provider? Yes.

The principle of separation of church and state is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Some of relevant provisions are:Article II, Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.Article III, Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.

The case at bar does not involve speech but purely conduct arising from religious belief. Under Philippine jurisprudence, the "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once a medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modern reproductive health products and services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.

The Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors. While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. However, while generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. The last paragraph of Sec. 5.24 of the RH-IRR which provides that public health officers cannot be considered conscientious objectors is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause is equally protective of the religious freedom of public health officers. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the govt.

b. Whether the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom when requiring would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition before the issuance of a marriage license? No.

Those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, and are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable.

4. Whether the RH Law violates the constitutional provisions protecting The Family and the Right to Privacy (marital privacy)? Yes

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.In this case, the RH Law bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states: (i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. Section 7 of the RH Law states:No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such State intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. The right to privacy was first recognized in Morfe v. Mutuc which adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut which invalidated a Connecticut statute, which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense, on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority. There are two exceptions to this rule: 1) insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor; and 2) as in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures..

5. Whether the RH Law violates Academic Freedom? No ruling.

Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

6. Whether the RH Law violates the Due Process Clause for being vague? No.

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. In determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider." Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion because they are used synonymously.

7. Whether the RH Law violates the Equal Protection Clause? No.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. There is no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Art. XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8. Whether the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee against Involuntary Servitude? No.

Article III Section 18(2) states that no involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion, which are not present in this case.

A reading of the assailed provision reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service.

9. Whether the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration is valid? Yes.

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA is equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make the law effective.

10. Whether the RH Law violates the Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)? No.

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. But the essence of the said provision is that unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals,or the training of barangay health workers,it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation.

Further, the RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of the ARMM. The Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.

11. Whether the RH Law violates Natural Law? No ruling.

The Court does not duly recognize natural law as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. The Constitution is its only guidepost.

DISPOSITIVE PORTIONR.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; 7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

DEPARTMENT FO AGRARIAN REFORM, REP BY SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN vs. SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA, ET AL. G.R. No. 183290. July 9, 2014(Just Compensation)

FACTSThe respondents are owners of the land subject to Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriation in pursuant to PD No. 27, Tenants Emancipation Decree. The respondents were not satisfied with the compensation offered by the petitioner thus filed a case with the Regional Trial Court. The RTC assigned two commissioners to submit a report and recommend a reasonable compensation for the subject land. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent stating that the land though acquired through PD No. 27 it is still covered by RA No. 6657 which provides the determination of the reasonable amount of just compensation. The result led the petitioner to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUEWhether the just compensation was proper.

RULINGNO. The Court states that the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this case where the just compensation for the subject land acquired under PD 27 has yet to be paid, just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having mere suppletory effects. This means that PD 27 and EO 228 will only apply when there are gaps in RA 6657 where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are superseded.

For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking.

The Court reiterated the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA No. 6657 which must be equally considered, to wit:(a) The acquisition cost of the land, (b) The current value of like properties,(c) The nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) The owner's sworn valuation, (e) The tax declarations, (f) The assessment made by government assessors, (g) The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) The nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.

The Court found that the Regional Trial Court only took into consideration the acquisition price of landholding situated in the same locality and the market value of the subject land declared by the respondents in determining the just compensation without taking in account the other factors as stated above.

Lastly, the Court stated that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function hence, courts cannot be unduly restricted in their determination thereof. To do so would deprive the courts of their judicial prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic function of inputting data and arriving at the valuation. While the courts should be mindful of the different formulae created by the DAR in arriving at just compensation, they are not strictly bound to adhere thereto if the situations before them do not warrant it.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE T. LAJOM, REP. BY PORFIRIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL./JOSE T. LAJOM, REP. BY PORFIRIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. VS. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 184982/G.R. No. 185048. August 20, 2014(Just Compensation)

FACTSJose T. Lajom and his mother Vicenta Vda. De Lajom were the registered owners of several parcels of land with an aggregate area of 27 hectares more or less, located at Alua, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1991, a 24 hectares, more or less, portion of the subject land was placed under the governments Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 2710 otherwise known as the Tenants Emancipation Decree, as amended. Accordingly, the Department of Agrarian Reform , through the Land Bank of the Philippines, offered to pay Lajom the following amounts as just compensation for the following constitutive areas of the subject portion: (a) P19,434.00 for 11.3060 hectares, (b) P17,505.65 for 2.4173 hectares, and (c) P80,733.45 for 10.3949 hectares. (DAR valuation). Records show, however, that despite non-payment of the offered just compensation, DAR granted twelve (12) Emancipation Patents between 1994 and 1998 in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries.

Lajom rejected the DAR evaluation and instead, filed an amended petition for determination of just compensation and cancellation of land transfers against the DAR, the LBP, and the said farmer-beneficiaries. He alleged, inter alia, that in computing the amount of just compensation, the DAR erroneously applied the provisions of PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 of 1997, that have been repealed by Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which took effect on June 15, 1988. Thus, he asserted that the value of the subject portion should be computed based on the provisions of RA 6657, and not of PD 27 and/or EO 228.

Lajom stressed that the DAR evaluation was arrived at without due process, highly prejudicial and inimical to his and his heirs property rights.

RTC: the RTC rejected the DAR evaluation and, using the formula Land Value = (AGP x 2.5 Hectares x Government Support Price [GSP] x Area) under PD 27 and EO 228, fixed the just compensation for the subject portion at the total amount of P3,858,912.00, with legal interest at the rate of 6% from 1991 until fully paid.

CA: the CA affirmed with modification the RTC Decision, deleting the award of 6% interest and in lieu thereof, ordered LBP to pay Lajom, through his representatives and/or heirs, interest by way of damages at the rate of 12% on the just compensation award of P3,858,912.00 from March 11, 2004 until fully paid.

The CA found no error on the part of the RTC in considering 1991 as the time of the subject portions actual taking, instead of October 21, 1972 when PD 27 took effect.

ISSUEWhat is the proper reckoning period to determine just compensation?

RULINGRecords show that even before Lajom filed a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation in May 1993, RA 6657 had already taken effect on June 15, 1988. Similarly, the emancipation patents had been issued in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries prior to the filing of the said petition, and both the taking and the evaluation of the subject portion occurred after the passage of RA 6657. Quite evidently, the matters pertaining to the correct just compensation award for the subject portion were still in contention at the time RA 6657 took effect; thus, as correctly ruled by the CA, its provisions should have been applied, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily. Since the emancipation patents in this case had been issued between the years 1994 and 1998, the just compensation for the subject portion should then be reckoned therefrom, being considered the time of taking or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTORINO PERALTAG.R. No. 182704. April 23, 2014By: Rachelle Wendy Jaramillo

FACTSRespondent is the registered owner of two parcels of agricultural land located at Sinangguyan, Don Carlos, Bukidnon and 2.73 hectares were placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program and distributed to tenant-beneficiaries pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27. He challenged the valuation made by DAR in August 2000 which was still based on P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, by filing a petition with the SAC for judicial determination of just compensation on October 17, 2000. Clearly, the agrarian reform process initiated under P.D. No. 27 remains incomplete when R.A. No. 6657 took effect on June 15, 1988. Petitioner contends that the LTPA valuation was agreed upon between respondent and tenant-beneficiaries in September 1981, which valuation was confirmed and validated for payment by DAR and LBP in 1982. Since the amount of the agreed compensation has since then been made available to respondent, petitioner avers that no delay can be imputed to the government.

RULINGThe SC held that the DARAB is vested with primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the valuation of land and the preliminary determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the LBP. Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. In sum, if the issue of just compensation is not settled prior to the passage of R.A. No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under P.D. No. 27. The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. In computing the just compensation for expropriation proceedings, what should take into consideration is the value of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of judgment. The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic hence the SC remanded the case back to the SAC for reception of evidence as to the date of the grant of the emancipation patents which shall serve as the reckoning point for the computation of just compensation due to respondent. The records failed to show the date when such EPs have been issued to the tenant-beneficiaries who signed the LTPA. Remand is necessary for the reason that the SAC based its determination of just compensation solely on the opinion of the municipal assessor as to the current market value of respondents land, which was not supported by any documentary evidence.

WILLIAM CO A.K.A. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, REPRESENTED BY ELIZABETH UYG.R. No. 183994. June 30, 2014(Right to Speedy Trial)

FACTSNew Prosperity Plastic Products represented by Ms. Elizabeth Uy, filed a criminal case against Co for his alleged violation of BP Bilang 22. Due to the non-appearance of Ms. Uy and her counsel in the first trial, the case was provisionally dismissed. Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases. Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion and denied Cos motion for reconsideration.When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from handling the criminal cases. The cases were, thereafter, raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases. It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096 which was dismissed as per Resolution dated February 13, 2006.There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006. Before the MeTC Branch 50, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on. Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096.In spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order granting Cos motion.When the court subsequently denied Uys motion for reconsideration,Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.

ISSUEWhether the dismissal of the criminal cases against the petitioner, on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial, constitutes final dismissal of these cases.

RULINGNO. Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing the criminal cases should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. We disagree. Cos charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept." In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case."While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE C. GO AND AIDA C. DELA ROSAG.R. No. 201644. September 24, 2014(Due Process)

FACTSOn September 28, 2000, 7 Informations stemming from a criminal complaint instituted by Private Complainant PDIC were filed before the RTC against various accused, including Respondents Go and Dela Rosa charging them ofEstafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents for allegedly defrauding Orient Commercial Banking Corporation.After numerous postponements, respondents were finally arraigned on November 13, 2001. The trial of the case was marred by a series of postponements/cancellation of hearings caused mainly by the prosecution, resulting in its inability to finish its presentation of evidence despite the lapse of almost 5 years.This prompted respondents to file aMotion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute and for violation of their right to speedy trialclaiming that the prosecution was afforded all the opportunity to complete and terminate its case, but still to no avail.

The RTC dismissed the criminal cases, ruling that the respondents right to speedy trial was violated as they were compelled to wait for 5 years without the prosecution completing its presentation of evidence due to its neglect. The prosecution moved for reconsideration which was granted by the RTC resulting in the reinstatement of the criminal cases against respondents. Respondents moved for reconsideration but denied by the RTC. Respondents raised the issue to the CA. A copy of said petition was served on the private complainant and not on the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, as it was not even impleaded as party to the case.

The CA without ordering the respondents to implead the People, annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC, and consequently dismissed the criminal cases on the ground that prosecutions prolonged delay in presenting its witnesses and exhibits, and in filing its formal offer of evidence was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive to respondents, violating their right to speedy trial. It further held that double jeopardy had already attached in favor of respondents, considering that the criminal cases against them were dismissed due to violation of the right to speedy trial. PDIC moved for reconsideration but denied.

Thereafter, the OSG filed the instant petition,imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in giving due course to respondentscertioraripetition and proceeding to decide the case contending that the People was neither impleaded nor served a copy of said petition, thereby violating its right to due process of law and rendering the CA without any authority or jurisdiction to promulgate its issuances.

ISSUEWhether or not the Peoples right to due process was violated.

RULINGRespondentscertioraripetition should not have been resolved by the CA, without the People, as represented by the OSG, having first been impleaded since the People is an indispensable party to the proceedings. While the failure to implead an indispensable party is notper sea ground for the dismissal of an action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it remains essential as it is jurisdictional that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders judgment because the absence of such indispensab