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8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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American Association for Public Opinion Research
Comparing Mass and Elite Subjective Orientations in Urban ChinaAuthor(s): Jie ChenSource: The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Summer, 1999), pp. 193-219Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public
Opinion ResearchStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2991254
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2/28
COMPARING MASS AND
ELITE
SUBJECTIVE ORIENTATIONS
IN URBAN CHINA
JIECHEN
Abstract Comparisonsof mass and elite sociopolitical prefer-
ences and evels of theirattitudinalonsistencyarecritical or under-
standingmass-elite
interactionand hence
politicaldevelopment
n
such a rapidlychangingsociety as China.
Yet
such
studies
are very
scarce or urbanChina.Basedontheresponses o
identicalquestions
asked of both mass and elite interviewees
n
Beijing,
this
article
submitsfour important indings.First,while the masses and elites
shared imilarviews ongovernment olicy performance
nd
the role
of
the individual
n
politics, they
held
quite
different
positions
on
issues of regime legitimacy, reform assessment,
and
democratic
principles.Second, these
two
sets
of
political
actors
organized
heir
subjectiveorientations o some issues similarlybutto othersdiffer-
ently. Third,
n
general,
the elites
in
this
study
had low attitudinal
consistency
relative
o
their
counterparts
n
many
otherstudies.
And,
finally, such relatively ow attitudinal onsistencyamongthe elites
seemed to be caused at least
in
part by the ongoing
decay
of the
Chinese
Communist
Party's(CCP) grassrootsorganizations.
These
findingshave strong mplications or the weaknessand
strength
of
the
CCP's
rule
and hence
China's
sociopoliticalstability.
Do ordinary itizensandpoliticalelitesin China haresimilarpositionson
majorsociopolitical
ssues?
Do
the two
groups
construct heir
respective
positions (or subjectiveorientations) imilarly?
These
questionshave
a
lot
to
do with
explaining
he nature
and characteristics f
the
relationship
between
the
two sets of
political actors,
and hence with
predicting
ocio-
political development
n
that
rapidlychangingsociety.
Among
studies of democraticand transitional
ocieties,
there are at
JIE CHEN
is associateprofessorof political science and directorof the Instituteof
Asian Studies at Old
Dominion
University.
The research
reported
here was
supported
by
Old Dominion
University,
he Social Science Research nstitute
of
the
University
of
Tennessee-Knoxville, University
of Wisconsin-River
Falls,
and the Public
Opinion
Research Instituteof
People's University
of China
in
Beijing.
The author wishes to
thank Christine
Drake,
Robert
Holden,
Xiushi
Yang,
and the
anonymous
referees for
their careful
readings
and
insightful
comments
on
earlierversions
of
this article.
Public
OpinionQuarterly
Volume 63:193-219
?
1999
by
the AmericanAssociation or Public
Opinion
Research
All
rights
reserved.
0033-362X/99/6302-0001$02.50
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
3/28
194
Jie Chen
least three major
concerns hathavemotivated nquiries
nto congruence
(or similarity)between
mass
and
elite
attitudesand constraintor consis-
tency) of theirrespectivebelief systems(e.g., Achen 1978;Converseand
Pierce 1986; Dalton
1985; Hermann1986; Huberand Powell
1994; Jen-
nings 1992; Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger,
1995, 1997;
Reisinger et al.
1996).
In
relation
o congruence, firstconcernhas been about
he quality
of representation
y the politicalelites. Accordingto these
studies, the
degree of congruence
between mass
and elite subjectiveorientations o
majorpolitical
ssues serves
as
a
good
indicatormeasuring ow well polit-
ical leaders
represent
he
views
of
ordinary eople
n a
society.
As Manion
(1996, p. 736)
has noted,
a
high quality
of representations usually re-
flectedin significantagreementbetween citizens and elected leadersor
governingparties
on
specific
issues or a
general deological
dimension.
Again,
in
the same context
of attitude
congruence,
a second concern
s
about the
sociopolitical
consequence
of
the
gap
between
mass and elite
attitudinal
preferences.
Some
analysts
argue
that the
high
level
of dis-
agreement
etweenmass and
elite
attitudes
an
have
serious
political
con-
sequences, especially
in
societies
experiencingprofound
economic
and
political
reforms: If the leaders
. . .
are
significantly
out of
step
with
popularpreferences,mplementingdifficultor controversial olicies will
be that much
harder; imilarly,
f
ordinary
itizens havepreferences
hat
differ from those
of the elite .
.
.
they
could
come
to
view the
political
and economic
reforms
as either
meaningless
or
lacking egitimacy.
Under
these circumstances
he
citizenry
may
not
only
fail
to
comply
with
the
reformsbut
they may act to undermine hem (Miller,
Hesli, and Rei-
singer 1995, p.
30).
In
relation
to
attitudeconstraint,
a third concerninspiringstudies on
this
subject
s about the communication etween
the
masses and
elites.
As many analystsof constraint aveargued,a significantdiscrepancy e-
tween
the
levels
of
belief consistencyof
these two
groupscan
cause a
seriouscommunication arrier etween them
in their
dialogues
on
major
policy
issues.
As
Jennings
has
explained,
or
example,
if elites view the
world
n
a
decidedly
more constrained nd stable
fashion,
then it
presum-
ably
becomes more difficult for them to
fashion
agendas
and
priorities
thatcan
appeal
o
large
swatchesof a more
variegated,
nconstrained
ank
and
file. Fromthe other
side,
if
ordinary
itizens do not
put
their
political
thoughts ogether
n
a consistentand stable
fashion,
or
if
they put
them
together n a quitedifferent ashionthando elites, it is not difficult o see
why they might
be befuddledor
discouraged y
the behavior
of
what
they
see as doctrinaire f
'ideological'
elites
(Jennings1992, p. 421).
In
essence,
these
three
major
concernsaddressed
by
previousstudies
are
all
about
the
nature,characteristics,
nd
consequences
of the interac-
tions
between
the elites and the masses.
I
believe that
although
most of
these studies deal with elite-mass
nterplay
n
democratic ystems,their
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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Mass and Elite Orientations in China
195
insights into and approaches o congruence
and constraint an also be
very useful for analyzing elite-mass interactions
n
post-Deng China.
Chinatodayis by no means a democratic ociety by Westernstandards.
Nonetheless,as Chinese society undergoes
ignificantand rapidshifts in
its political and economic structures,he relationsbetween the govern-
ment and its
people
have
changeddramatically Pei 1998, p. 77). One
of the most important ndicationsof such
a dramatic hange is that the
local political elites have become-willingly
or unwillingly-more re-
sponsive to popularviews as more channelsand opportunities ave be-
come available or
ordinary
itizens'
participation
n public affairs,espe-
cially
at local
levels,
since the
early 1980s
(see, e.g., Bernstein, 1993;
Jennings1997;Manion1996;O'Brien 1994; Pei 1994; Shi 1997; Shue
1988).1
n
Beijing,
for
example,
a
growing
numberof municipalpolicies
and
regulations-on
such issues as
housing, pollution, unemployment
benefits,
and
the
appointment
f
district-government
fficials-have been
adjusted
or
corrected
by municipal
eaders
(of course,
not without
their
nitial
reluctance)due,
at least
in
part,
o
public complaints hrough
various channels
n recent
years (see
Shi
1997, chap. 2). Although
the
current lite-mass
relationship
an
hardly
be characterized
s one between
therepresentativesnd therepresented,hisrelationship asno doubtbe-
come
more
interactive,
or
reciprocal,
han it was
in
the
prereform
ra.
Under these
circumstances,
he
study
of mass-elite attitude
congruence
and constraint
s two
key aspects
of the
interplay
betweenthese
two sets
of
political
actors seems to
be
more
important
han ever before.
In this
connection,
a
systematic
analysis
of
attitude
congruence
and
constraint
an
help
shed some
light
on
at least two urgentpolitical
ssues
in
the context of the elite-massrelationship
n
contemporaryChina.One
is sociopolitical tability.Measuredby the
conceptof congruence,a high
degreeof similaritybetweenmass and elite subjectiveorientations o the
country's
most salient
sociopolitical
ssues will more
likely
be
a
factor
fosteringpoliticalharmony
between
the two
groups,
andhence social sta-
bility. Conversely,
as Miller and
his
associates
(1995, p. 30)
have
sug-
gested,
a
high degree
of differencebetweenelite and
mass
subjective
ori-
entations
will
more
likely
be a
catalyst
for serious conflictsbetween
the
two
groups,
and
hence
potential
social
instability (especially
because
China's
political representation ystem
is
still
very
limited
and
fragile,
and hence
inadequate
or
resolving
the conflicts
effectively).
Related o attitude onstraint mong he elites andthemasses,theother
political question
s whether
(given
the
use
of coercion
as a last
resort)
the current ulingelites
can resolve their conflicts with the masses over
some
major
controversialssues-such as
major
economic
restructuring,
1.
For
example,
citizens now have
opportunities
o
participate
n
competitive
lections of
local administrators
n
ruralareasand
delegates
o localpeople's congresses
n
both
rural
and urbanareas.
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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196
jie Chen
democratization, nd
the currentregime
legitimacy-in a consensual,
peaceful
manner
without
expandingthe current, imited
representation
system.The currenteadershave time andagainrejected heideaof estab-
lishing a Westernstyle democracy n
China.
Nonetheless, given the
lessons they have
learned rom the 1989
Tiananmenncident,2hey have
become more willing to play kinder and
gentler politics (Pei 1998,
pp.
69-73) through he
party-led dialogue between the
masses and
the
cadresto resolveconflictsand
controversies e.g., Jiang
1998). Any
meaningful dialogue
involves
two-way
communication hat is
signifi-
cantly
affected
by
the
degree
of
similarityor
difference
between he levels
of attitude onstraint
mongthe two
groups
nvolved in
thedialogue(see
Jennings1992, p. 421). Thehigh degreeof similaritybetween the levels
of attitudeconstraint
mong
the
elites and
masses,
as mentioned
above,
could enhance he
feasibility
and
effectivenessof thedialogueand there-
fore increase
he
chancesof consensualresolutionof
controversies.Con-
versely,a large gapbetweenthe levels of
attitude
onsistencyamong
the
two
groups
could foreshadow
difficultcommunication etween
them,
and
hence a dim futurefor
consensual,peaceful
resolution
of controversies.
In
today's China,
his issue of effective and
meaningful
dialogue
between
thepoliticalelites andmasseshas become ncreasingly mportant s more
and more
frustrated
mployees
of state-owned
enterprises lip
into the
army
of the
unemployed
due to
nation-wideeconomic
restructuring.3
While a
study
of
attitude
congruence
between local
leaders
and
their
constituentsand selectors
in
ruralChina
has
just emerged
(see
Manion
1996),
so
far there has been no
empirical
study comparing
he levels of
attitudeconstraint
mong
the elites and the masses in
China,
nor on the
issues of either
attitude
ongruence
r
constraintn an
urban ettingwithin
that
country.
Therefore,
s
part
of the
concertedeffort
among
studentsof
Chinesepoliticsandcomparative oliticsto graspnew dynamicsbehind
the
elite-mass
nteraction,
his
study
s
intended o
providesuch a needed
analysis
of
both
congruence
and
constraint
n
an
urbanenvironment
n
China.
Specifically,
begin my analysis
with a brief
discussionabout he
data and
clusters
of
attitudinaltems for
comparison;
then examine the
similarities nddifferencesbetween
subjective
orientations f local
politi-
cal elites and the
masses, analyze
the difference
between
the
levels
of
attitude
onstraint
mong
the two
groups, nvestigatemajor
actors nflu-
encing
the level of elite attitude
onstraint,
nd
finallyconcludewith some
2. Although
the current op CCP leadership
has so far refused to reverse
in public
the
originalofficial verdictof the
1989Tiananmenncident, t has done some
soul searching
in private
regarding he domestic and
internationalonsequencesof
large-scalecoercion
(e.g., see Jiang
1997).
3. According
o Hu Angang(1997), a leading
Chinesescholarof labor
markets, he actual
unemployment ate
n
urbanareas
was as
high
as about8
percent; his rate wasexpected
to climb to
10-15 percentas soon as the
governmentbeganto restructure
tate-owned
enterprises.
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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Mass and Elite Orientations
in China
197
implicationsof my findings
or futurepolitical and economicchanges n
post-Deng
China.
Data and Clusters of
Subjective Orientations
The data
analyzed
n
this studycome froma representative-sample
urvey
conducted
n
an urban ocale, Beijing, in late 1997
(see Appendix A).
Two important nd unique
features
of
the survey data
allow us to carry
out this
analysis.
One
is
that
this
cross-sectional urvey ncludedrespon-
dentswho were eitherordinary itizens (626)
or
typical
ocal, urbanpoliti-
cal elites (68). Inthisstudy,we defined ocal politicalelites according
to
two
important
riteria:administrative osition andmembership
n the
Chinese
Communist
Party (CCP).
In
today's China,
the administrative
apparatus
f local
governments
till
prevails
over
the
legislativeapparatus
(e.g.,
see
Lieberthal 995). Therefore,
hose who hold
administrative
osi-
tions aretypicallyconsideredpolitical elites,4
since
they
have
real
power
to influence he
socioeconomic ife of
ordinary
itizens.Moreover,
most
of the
important
dministrative
osts
at local
levels
(at
east
in
urban
areas)
arestill occupiedby CCPmembers, ortheregimestill insistsuponexer-
cising
the
party
eadership
at all levels of
government.
A
typical
ad-
ministrative
anking ystem
in urbanareasstratifies adres
nto
threema-
jor categories:
bureau-level
juji) leaders,
who
are
considered
high-level
cadres
gaoji
ganbu);
department-levelchuji)
eaders,who are
mid-level
cadres
zhongjiganbu);
and section-level
keji)
leaders,
who
are
ordinary
cadres
(yiban ganbu) (see
Shi
1997, p. 56).
Politicalelite
respondents
n
our
sample
covered all
three
categories(about
24
percent
bureau-level,
36
percentdepartment-level,
nd 40
percentsection-level).5And,
as dis-
cussedin the nextsection,all these cadresdid havepowerto set local
policies
in their domains.
The
other
mportant
eatureof the data is that the
same questionnaire
4. Whencomparing lite and
mass
belief systems,Miller,Hesli, and
Reisinger 1995) and
Reisingeret al. (1996) also includedadministratorsn the categoryof the
elite.
5. Under he CCP's guidelinesand supervision,uji and chujicadresof boththe municipal
governmentand districtgovernments under he municipalgovernment)
reselected by
the municipalpeople's congress (elected by the districtpeople's congresses)or district
people's congresses (elected directly by
the
people);
most
keji
cadres are
appointedby
theirhigherauthorities.
But
all
of them
may be removed
from
office by the municipal
people's congressordistrictpeople's congresses seeCentralCommittee1995).Forexam-
ple, in July 1996, the directorof the financialbureauof the BeijingMunicipality juji, or
high-level cadre)
was removedfrom office
by
a motion
passed
in
the Beijing Municipal
People's Congressbecause of his misallocationof public funds (Wu 1998).
In addition,
all
these cadres
have
been increasingly crutinized y the massesthrough
ariouschannels,
such as the news media andcomplaintbureaus.Thus,at least
in
theory, he cadres
n our
sample
are
expected
o
be accountable o their
constituents, iven
that the
formershould
not work to undermine he CCP's one-party ule. For a more detaileddiscussionon the
cadre
system
and mass
scrutiny
of the cadres
n
contemporary hina,
also see Shi (1997).
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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198 Jie Chen
items regarding ttitudes oward
majorsociopolitical ssues were applied
to both elite and mass interviewees.These two features, herefore, acili-
tate the following analysis of congruenceand constraint,which is based
on
comparison
f
positions
of
the
entireset
of
elites and the entireset
of
ordinary itizens-sampled from the same sociogeographic ocation6-
on the same set of sociopolitical
ssues.
Within our
questionnaire,
3 questions
were asked
regarding espon-
dents' subjectiveorientations.Rather han including all these questions
in our analysisof congruenceand constraint,7 e decided to select
and
categorize he questionsaccording
o their naturally ccurring lusters
(Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger 1995,p. 8). Following the steps of Miller,
Hesli, andReisinger 1995), we conductedan exploratory actoranalysis
with all 33 questions,usingthe sample
of
bothmass andelite respondents.
As table
1
shows, five major actors,composed
of 24
questions see
Ap-
pendixB), emerged
romthe factor
analysis.
These five factors
dealtwith
subjective
orientations o five substantive
reas:
nstrumental
upport
or
evaluationof governmentpolicies),
affective support(or
evaluationof
regime legitimacy),politicalefficacy,
assessment
of
reform,
and
demo-
cratic
values. These five factors ogether xplain
about
half(48.6 percent)
of theitem varianceamongall 33 items. The instrumentalupport luster
(the
most
important actor)explained
19.2
percent
of the item
variance,
while the other
four
major
actorsof affectivesupport,politicalefficacy,
reformassessment,
and democratic alues
explained9.8, 7.1, 6.8,
and
5.7
percent
of the
variance,respectively.
These five clusters constitute
the
focus for
this
analysis
of attitude
congruence
and constraint.
The
remaining
nine
items,
outside of the five
major actors,
oaded on
five additional actors
that
together
accounted
or
only
about
10
percent
of
the item variance from
a
low
of 1.1
percent
o
a high
of
2.5 percent).
Due to their ow percentage f variance xplanation, hesenine itemswere
excluded
n this
analysis.
The five clustersof
questions,
we believe, capture he subjective
orien-
tations o some
of
the
most
salient
aspects
of
sociopoliticalreality
n
con-
temporary
China.
The instrumental
upport
cluster includes
eight
items
6. Rather hanmatching ach
member f
political
elites with
his
or her
constituents,Miller,
Hesli, and Reisinger 1995, 1997) and Reisinger
et al. (1996) also made a comparison f
the entire set of elites and
the
entire set
of
ordinary itizens of the same geographical
locationof theirresidence when they studied
belief congruence r/andconstraintn post-
Soviet societies.However, t shouldbe noted hat,unlike he elites in mostprevious tudies
(e.g., ConverseandPierce 1986;Jennings1992;Miller,Hesli, andReisinger1995, 1997),
who tend to have higherpositions
and
come
from largergeographical
bases
(national
or
regional),
the CCP cadres
n
our
study
are local political elites who do not have direct
influenceon public affairs
at
national
evel
and
yet have morefrequent ontactswith their
constituents.
7. Converse(1964) and Jennings 1992) once appliedsuch an approach o the study of
attitude/belief onstraint.
They
divided
all
possible
questions nto subsets
on
the basis
of
face validity (Converse1964, p. 229; Jennings
1992, p. 425).
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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Mass and Elite
Orientations in China
199
Table
1.
Factor
Analysis of
All
Attitudinal temsin the
1997
Beijing
Survey
InstrumentalAffective
Political Reform Democratic
Support Support
Efficacy Assessment Value
Item
(1) (2)
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(9) (10)
Q12.C .77
Q12.I .74
Q12.H .66
Q12.K .65 .27
.26
Q12.B .63 .30 .33
Q12.D .62
Q12.F
.58
.38
Q12.E .56
-.36
.33
Q20.G .76
Q20.H
.74
Q20.E
.74
.29
Q20.F .72 -.27
Q20.I .28 .67
Q20.M .58
Q21.N .77
Q21.S .69
Q21.0
.65
Q21.P .53 .42
Q20.A
.69
Q20.B
.28 .66
Q20.D
.59
Q20.L
-.25
.68
Q20.K
.66
Q20.J .29
.34
.52
Q14.
.81
Q13. .73
Q12.A
.28
.72
Q12.J .35
.29 .39 -.26
Q20.Q -.74
Q20.R
.67
.29
Ql l.
.70
Q9.
.69
Q10.
.77
SOURCE.-The
1997
Beijing Survey.
NOTE.-Figures in this table are factor loadings of .25 or larger from the varimax ro-
tated
matrix for
all factors with
eighenvalues greater
than
1.0.
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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200
jie Chen
linked to public policy areas:
minimizing he gap betweenrich
and poor,
combatingpollution,providingwelfareservicesto the needy,
fightingof-
ficial corruption,providing ob security, mprovinghousing conditions,
providingadequatemedical carefor all, and maintaining rder.
Ourpre-
survey interviews indicate widespread nterest
in
each
of
these policy
areas.
n
other
words,
all these items
collectively
measure he overalleval-
uations
of and
support
or
government
policies.
The affective supportcluster
contains
six
questions referring
o the
diffused or generalizedattachments Macridisand Burg 1991,
p. 8)
the
respondents
have for the political regime: its values and
norms and
its politicalinstitutions.Because these attachments r evaluations
are all
vital to thevery survivalof any type of regime,they are togetherconsid-
ered an indicator
of
regime
legitimacy (e.g., Easton 1975;Miller 1993).
This cluster of
questions,
herefore,distinguishes
hose
who
approve
of
the current
political system
from those who
do
not.
The political efficacy
cluster
encompasses
our
questions
referring
o
the feeling that
individual
political
action does
have,
or can have, an
impact upon the political process
(Campbell,Gurin,and
Miller
1954,
p. 187).
It has been
argued
hatsuch
feeling
motivates
people
to pay atten-
tionto andparticipaten politicsandpublicaffairs(e.g., NathanandShi
1993, Jennings1997).
Conversely,
he absence of
such a
feeling
of effi-
cacy
evokes
political apathy
and withdrawal
Chen 1997).
The reformassessmentcluster
(composed
of three
questions)
reflects
respondents' atisfaction
r dissatisfactionwith the overalleffects
of
post-
Mao reformson theirmaterial ife and
politicalstatus,
andtheir
prediction
of the futureof the reforms.
These
questions clearly
differentiate hose
who have
perceived
hemselvesas beneficiaries f
the reforms
romthose
who have
not
and,therefore,
hose who are
ikely
to
support
eforms rom
those who are not.
Finally, the questions n the democraticvalue cluster capture
respon-
dents' attitudes oward hreedemocratic
principles: ompetitive
elections
of
government
fficials
by
the
population, qualprotection
and
rights
for
all
people regardless
f
their
politicalviews,
andthe
existenceof the inde-
pendent
news mediawith the freedom o
expose
and
criticize
government
wrongdoing.
These
principles,amongothers,
arecritical o the
emergence
as well as the survival
of a
democratic
ystem
in
any society (e.g.,
Chen
and
Zhong 1998;
Gibson
and Duch
1993). Therefore,
hose
favoring
de-
mocratization remore ikelyto supportheseprinciples,while thosesup-
porting
an
authoritarianule
are less inclined to endorsethese values.
In
sum,
these five clustersof 24
questions ogether apture
espondents'
subjective
orientations owardsome
of the most salient
aspects
of socio-
political
ife
in
contemporary
hina.These
questions
hus
provide
a broad
empirical
basis for our
comparison
of mass and elite
subjective
value
systems.
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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Mass and
Elite Orientations in China
201
Congruence between
Mass
and Elite
Subjective
Orientations
How similarordifferent houldwe expect
elite andmass subjective
orien-
tations o be
in
today's China?Thereare, as
mentionedabove, almost
no
survey-based
mpiricalstudies dealing with value congruence
between
ordinarypeople
and
political elites.8As a result,the expectations
about
mass-elitebeliefcongruence
n
this study
arebasedmainlyon sometheo-
retical analysesrelevant o this subject.
First,we
expect that ocal political
elites, or CCPcadres,are moresup-
portiveof majorgovernment oliciesthanthemasspublic.The important
reason for this expectationcomes from
the unique policy making
and
implementation
ystem
that
s
still
characterizeds a top-down process
in China.In this
process,while the central
or national)Partyelites make
majorpolicies,
the local cadres can make
necessaryadjustments
as
local policies) when
implementing
he
majorpolicies (Shi 1997, p.
106).
Therefore, he
local cadresare better
situated o makethe currentpolicies
fit
their
needs or
policy interpretations
e.g., Brugger
and
Reglar
1994;
Jennings1997;
Pei
1994, chap. 3)
and
hence tend
to
have more
positive
evaluationsof thepolicies (i.e., higherscores on the instrumentalupport
items)
than do
ordinary
itizens.
Second,we
anticipate
hat ocal elites
in
our
sample
aremore
supportive
of the current
political system.
It is
quite
obvious
that,
because of the
CCP's
unchallengeable ulingposition
n
the current
politicalregime,
ts
cadres
still
have
many
kinds of
privileges
that
ordinary
itizens
do
not
enjoy,
such as unusual
access to informationand influential ndivid-
uals and more
opportunities
or
working
he
system (Jennings
1997,
p. 267).
In
other
words,
the CCP
cadresare
definitely
he
greatest
bene-
ficiaries of the currentpolitical system.Thus, they should score higher
on the
affective
support
tems
than the masses.
Third,
our
expectation
about
congruencebetweenmass and elitepoliti-
cal
efficacy
s ambivalent: lite
political
efficacy
could be
higher
or lower
thanmass
efficacy.
Thereare
at least two
important ontending
iews that
can
be
drawn rom
previous
studies and field
evidence.
One is
that CCP
local cadresare less
efficacious,since
they still operatewithin
a
Leninist
framework hat
emphasizes
nternal
discipline
and
hierarchy,
nstead of
a
sense of individual nfluence
(e.g., Zang 1993).
This
view seems to
be supported y the numerous peechesmadeby the CCPtopleadership
stressingpartydiscipline
and
harmony
e.g., Jiang 1998).
The otherview
is that
the local cadres
may
have a
stronger ense of individual nfluence
because
they
can make local
policies
and influencethe
implementation
8. An exception o this is Manion's 1996) studyof mass-eliteattitude ongruence
n rural
China.
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
11/28
202 jie Chen
of centralpolicies due to the increasingautonomy hat ocal governments
andproduction nitshave gainedsince reform e.g., Goldstein1994, 274;
Lieberthal nd Oksenberg1988).
Fourth,we expect that political elites tend to give a more positive as-
sessmentof the reformsas a whole thanmost ordinary eople do. In post-
Mao China,all majorreformprograms ave been carriedout through he
party-state ierarchy
n
a
top-downmanner.Although he local cadres
do
not have much sayin initiatingmajorreformpolicies, they do have privi-
leges, which ordinary itizens do not enjoy, such as being better nformed
of the intentsand
prospects
of reforms
e.g.,
via centraldocuments or
zhongyangweijian)
and
using
their discretion
(though imited)
to ad-
just and mplement pecificreformpolicies.As a result, ocal cadresare
better ituated obenefitmost from heseparty-led eforms e.g., Jennings,
1997; Pei 1994).
Finally, we expect thatpolitical
elites
may be
less democratic
han,
or
just as
democratic
s, ordinary eoplemay
be. On
the
one
hand,according
to some China analysts, ocal cadres could be less democraticbecause
they operate,
as mentioned
above,
in
a nondemocratic
artysystem (i.e.,
a Leninist
ystem)
andhave been
constantly
bombardedwith authoritarian
propaganda rom the centralparty organ. On the other hand, according
to another
group
of
analysts,
cadres' attitudes owarddemocratic
values
could
be
quite similar
o
ordinary
itizens'
attitudes,given that currently
most
cadresare
younger,
better
educated,
and more technocratic han
old-generation adres,
andhence much ess averse o the idea of democra-
tization (e.g., Cheng
and White
1990; Goldstein 1994, pp. 716-17;
Lee
1991;
Pei
1994, chaps. 2-3).
To test these expectationsagainstthe empiricalevidencecollected
in
our
survey,we compare he means
of
mass and elite attitude ndices that
arecomputed rom themeasures n eachof the five substantive lusters.9
Figure 1 presents he results of the comparison.10
Elites were
only slightly
more
supportive
f
current,majorgovernment
policies
thanwere
ordinary eople,
and
the differencebetween heirevalu-
ationswas not
significant at
the
.05
level). Contrary
o ourearlier
xpecta-
tion,
this
resultimplies that there
was
quitea high degree
of
elite-mass
congruence
on the issue of instrumental
upport.
A
possible
reason for
9. We formed wo additive ndices
(one
for
mass,
the otherfor
elite)
for each of the five
major actorsby adding he values of all items in each cluster ogether.Then we
rescaled
all the indicesso thatthe rangeof valuesfor each indexwas 1-4. Thesamemethodwas
also used
in
an
analysisby Miller, Hesli,
and
Reisinger 1995, p. 14).
10. In the meantime, ollowing the same procedureas used for the comparisonof
elite
and mass attitudes
see
note
9),
we also
compared
he
means
of
attitude ndices
of two
subgroupswithinthe elites (juji and chujicadres n one groupand keji cadres
n
another)
in all five attitudinal ategories.The results (not presented n this article) ndicated
hat
the
attitude ndex means
of
these two groupsare not significantlydifferent n any one
of
the five categories at the .05 level), and that the means of
keji
cadreswere much
closer
to
those
of
juji/chuji cadresthan to the means of the total masses.
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
12/28
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8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
13/28
204 Jie Chen
such anunexpected esultcouldbe thaturban adreshadmuch ess discre-
tion than
expected
to
manipulatemajor policies
in
favor
of
their own
interestsas centralgovernment egulations/legislations ecame increas-
ingly extensive and pervasive(e.g., see Tanner1994). Therefore, adres
no longer felt the impacts
of
majorpolicies significantlydifferently rom
ordinarypeople.
In terms of the affective supportcluster, as we expected, elites were
significantly at the .001 level)
more
supportiveof the current egime's
norms
and institutions
hanwere
ordinarypeople. Along with the above-
mentioned inding,this result can be understood o mean that, although
the two
sets
of
political actors
elt
similareffects
of
specific government
policies on theirpersonal ives, cadres still had a higher degreeof emo-
tional and ideological
attachment or the currentCommunist
egime. It
appears hat
he
constant
ampaignsby
the CCP central
eadership
o
pro-
mote its ideologies
had
made
a difference
amongthe local
cadres
(see
Jiang 1998).
As for
the questionsregardingpolitical efficacy,
we found that elites
andmasses were not
significantlydifferent at
the .05
level)
in
their
sense
of
the individual nfluence
on
public affairs,although
he masses scored
slightlyhigher hanthe elites.Thisresultmay provethatthe two compet-
ing views, mentionedabove,
were
both correct:
on
the
one
hand,
urban
cadresfelt
powerless
when
facing
the formidable
partyhierarchy;
n
the
other, they
felt a bit
more
powerful
when
dealing
with
ordinarypeople
under
heirdirectcontrol
(Shi 1997). Yet,
a
mix of
these two mentalities
togetherproduced
certain
evel of
efficacyamong
he local
cadres,
which
converged o
some
extent with the
level
of efficacy amongthe masses.
In
terms
of
the cluster
of
items dealing with reform assessment,we
found
thaturbancadresregistereda significantly at the .001 level) more
positiveevaluationof post-Maoreformsas a whole thandidtheordinary
people.
This result
seems to confirmour earlier
expectation.
And it
may
further
mply
that
given
the currentdirectionand
speed
of
reform,
ocal
cadreswill continue
o be the
stronger upporters
f the reform
programs
initiatedby
the
centralauthority.
Finally,
we found that ocal elites were
significantly at
the .001
level)
less
supportive
of
some
major
democratic
principles
han were
ordinary
people.
This
findingapparently
onfirmsone
of
the
competingarguments
mentioned
above,
that CCP cadres are less
democratically
riented
be-
cause of theauthoritariannfluence romtheparty'sorganizationalystem
and
its
ideological propaganda.
In
sum,
our
findingsportray
a mixed
picture
of
congruence
between
mass
and elite
subjective
orientationsoward ive
major
clustersof socio-
political
issues.
Apparently,
both
groups
shared
very
similar views on
governmentpolicy performance
nd the role of the
individual
n
public
affairsand
politics. Yet,
therewere some
controversies,
r
at
least
uneasi-
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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Mass and Elite Orientations in China
205
ness, between he two groupsover the issues
of regime egitimacy,reform
assessment,andpotentialdemocratization. an
the
politicalelites resolve
these controversiesby convincinga majorityof ordinarypeople that the
currentpolitical system is worth as much
supportas the elites believe?
And can the elites persuade he masses thatreform s equally beneficial
to
all,
and that
democratization
hould be at least delayed?These ques-
tions,
as
we discussed above,
can be betteransweredby comparing he
levels
of
attitudinal
onstraint
mong
the elites
and
masses.
Levels of Attitude Constraint among Elites
and Masses
So
far
therehave been
no
empirical
studies
comparing,the
evels of atti-
tude
constraint,
r
consistency,among political
elites
and the
masses
in
contemporaryChina.
But there have been such studies
in
some well-
establisheddemocratic
ystems
and
in
post-Soviet
societies, although,
as
some analysts point
out
(Jennings1992; Miller, Hesli,
and
Reisinger
1995),
the
numberof
these studies is still
very
small. Our
expectations
aboutattitudeconstraintamongthese two sets of political actors,there-
fore,
are
mainly
derived
from those studies in other
systems.
There
seem to be
at
least three
major
areasof consensus
n
these studies.
First, hey have all foundthat
he
level
of attitude onstraint mongelites,
measuredby average nteritem
orrelations,
s distinctlyhigherthan that
among
the
masses as
a whole.
Some analysts
of
these studies
(Converse
and Pierce
1986; Granberg
and
Holmberg 1988; Jennings 1992) argue
that
he
higher
evel
of attitude
onsistencyamong
elites results romtheir
constant
ontemplation
ndarticulation f
publicpolicies
andsocial
goals,
whereas he lower level of constraint mong ordinarypeopleas a whole
is attributableo their ack
of
opportunities
relative o the elites) to engage
in
such activities.
Second,
most
of
these
studies
agree
thatwithin he mass
public,
attitudes ndbeliefs shouldbe
more consistent
among
he citizens
who
are
most
actively
involved
in
politics
and
public
affairs han
among
those who are not. This
is
because
a
higher
frequency
of
involvement
n
politics
or
public
affairs
instead
of formal
party
or
government ositions)
provides
his
segment
of
the
public
with more
opportunities
o be familiar
with
and
articulate
ociopolitical ssues,
which
helps
foster more consis-
tent attitudes.And, finally,theyhavesuggested hatthe levels of attitude
constraint n more
salientand
personally
elevant ssues
(such
as
regime
legitimacy
and
specificpublicpolicies
related
o
people's daily lives)
tend
to be
higher
than those on abstract
and
complex
issues
(such
as
foreign
policy
and democratic
principles) e.g.,
see
Jennings1992; Miller, Hesli,
and
Reisinger 1995).
To test these three
hypotheses,
ollowing
the
steps
of the
previous
stud-
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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206
jie
Chen
ies (e.g., Granberg nd
Holmberg1988;Jennings1992; Miller,Hesli, and
Reisinger 1995),
we
computed
he average nteritem orrelation or each
of the fivemajorclusters orthe totalelites,thetotal masses,andthemost
active citizens.11 he results
are presented
n
figure 2.
In
general, he empirical
evidence presented n figure 2 confirmsonly
some of our
expectations,while contradicting thers.First,in terms
of
the differencebetween the levels of
constraintamong the elite and the
masses as a whole, only for theinstrumentalupport ndaffective
support
clusterswas
it
truethatthe
level
of attitude
onsistencyamongelites
was
distinctlyhigherthan that of
the
generalpublic.
For the other
three sub-
stantiveclusters, he levels of attitude
onsistencyamong
the
two groups
were almost he same(only .01 or.02 difference or eachcluster). nother
words,
relative to the
masses,
the
level of elite attitudeconstraint
was
considerably
ower than
expected.
These
findingsbring
both
good
and bad
news
to the
ruling elite.
The
good news
is
that
since
both
groups
share he same
(or verysimilar)
evels
of attitudeconstraint
egarding
he role of the
individual,
reformassess-
ment, and democratic
principles,
the elites should have little
difficulty
in
convincing ordinary
people
that
central-leadership uidance
s more
importanthanindividual nitiatives,that reform s or will be good for
everyone,
and that
democratization-especially by
the
Western stan-
dards-should be
delayedat least for the
present.
But the badnews is
that,
because elites
and
ordinary
people
construct
heir
values about
regime
legitimacy quite differently,
elites will
have
a hardtime
persuading
he
publicthat he current uthoritarian
egime
merits
strongsupport.
n addi-
tion, although
both
elites and
ordinarypeople now equallysupport
major
government olicies (as fig.
1
indicated),
he local elites
may have a
seri-
ous
problem ustifying major
governmentpolicies
if
policy performance
declines (e.g., a higher inflationrate,a higher unemployment ate, or a
climbing
crime
rate).
This is
because there
is a
distinct
gap between
the
way
elites and
ordinarypeople organize
heir evaluationsof
government
policy performance see fig. 2).
Second,
the
empirical
evidence confirms
he
anticipated ap
between
the levels
of
attitude
onstraint
mong
he
most active
citizens
and
among
the rest of the
public
on
all five substantive ssue
areas,although
he
gap
was
quite
narrow or the clustersof
politicalefficacy,
reform
assessment,
and democratic
principles.
On the same
three ssue
clusters,
surprisingly,
11. We also
computed
and
compared
he
average
nteritemcorrelations or each of
the
five
attitude lusters
or
juji
and
chuji
cadres n one
group
and
keji
cadres n another.The
results
(not presented
n
this
article)
did
not show
any
remarkable istinction
between
the two
groups
in the
levels
of attitude
consistency
for
any
one of the five attitudinal
clusters: he minusculedifferencesof the
average
nteritem orrelations etween the
two
groups
for
the five clusters
ranged
rom .0012 to
.0028. Again, these resultsapparently
suggested
hat
keji
cadresdid
belong
to the same
category
of the
elites defined n this
study.
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
16/28
42,
0
m
co
E
>
(1)
0
C)
0
E m
oo
't
cu
o cn m
Cy)
CY)
0
= z
?
e: D
E
F ~~
~~
Q
XQ
E
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
23/28
214
Jie Chen
ratization ince the structures
f their attitudes oward these issues are
quitesimilar.The other mplication, owever, s
that he two groupsmight
haveseriousdifficulties n trying o resolvetheirexistingor potential on-
troversiesover government
policy performance nd the CCP's right to
rule because of the significantdifferencebetween
the internalorganiza-
tions
of
their views on
these two issues.
Finally,the above-mentionedindings and
implicationsalso indicate
both the weaknessand
strengthof CCP rule in
post-DengChina.On the
one hand,
the
lack
of consensuswith the
masses
on the issue of regime
legitimacyandthe lack
of ability o reachsuch
a consensus due to differ-
ent
constraintevels)
constitute he weakestpoint
of CCPgovernance.On
the otherhand,the existence of agreementwith the masses on the issue
of the individual's ole
in
politics
and he
absence
of communication arri-
ers (due to
the
similarconstraint evels)
in
this issue arearepresent
he
strength
of CCP
rule. If
sociopolitical
stability
refers to social
harmony
under
he CCP
one-party ule,
as the
top party
eadership
defined
t
(see
Jiang 1998), the most
challenging, f not impossible,task for the
ruling
party
and its
cadres
s to reach a
generalagreement
with the masses on
the
legitimacy
of such
one-party
rule. And the most valuable asset
the
CCP has for buttressingts authoritarianule is the consensusbetween
the elites and
the
masses
that he individual hould
not
play
a
very impor-
tant role in
public
affairs
and should
obey
authority.
n
short,
the most
consensual
part
of the interaction r
dialogue
between the elites and
the masses
in
urban
China is more
likely
to be based on their common
understanding
f
the
importance
f central
authority
nstead
of their
af-
fective
support or,
or emotionalattachment
o,
the current fficial de-
ology
and
politicalsystem.
In
conclusion,
we
emphasize
he need for more extensiveand nclusive
studiescomparing he beliefs and values of the masses and the elites at
various
evels and
in different
settings
in
this rapidlychangingsociety.
As Chinaenters
he next
millennium,
with
its
more modernized
conomy
and
society,
the
political
attitudes
and
the structuresof
such attitudes
among
the two
sets
of
political
actors will almost
certainlyexperience
moredramatic
hanges,
andsuch
changes
will
eventually
affectthe future
of
this
dynamiccountry.
Appendix A
Survey
and
Sample
This
analysis
s basedon
a
publicopinion
1997
in
cooperation
with the Public
Opir
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
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Mass and Elite Orientations in China 215
ple's Universityof China.Our sample site
has two salient features.First, as the
capitalof the country,Beijingis viewed as the
political center
n
contemporary
China.Significant oliticalevents-such as theCulturalRevolutionandthe 1989
DemocracyMovement-started in Beijing.
Second,Beijing is the cultural enter
of China and
has
the most
developed educational
ystem
in
the
country.
As a
result, Beijing residentstend to be better
informedabout political events and
issues than do people elsewhere,especially those in remote and
ruralareas.
The data for this study were obtainedfrom a representative ampleof 720
adults
(including
both
ordinarypeople
and
local political elites)
in
the Beijing
region.This probability amplewas derived
rom a multistage amplingprocess.
Eight urbandistricts qu), includingsix regular-sizedistrictsand two large-size
districts,wererandomly hosenat the first
stage
of
sampling.
Fromeach of the six
regular-sizedistricts, our residentialneighborhoods juweihui) were randomly
chosen;
from each of the two
large-size
districts,
six residential
neighborhoods
were randomly hosen at
the
second stage of
sampling.
This
process yielded
36
residential eighborhoods. hen 20 householdswererandomly hosen fromeach
of
the 36 residential
neighborhoods
t
the third
stage, producing
a total of
720
households.
At
the final
stage,
one
individualwas chosen
randomly
rom
each
of
the 720 households
as the
interviewee.Of
the
720
questionnaires
elivered
(by
our
field
interviewers),
00
were
brought
back. Of these returned
question-
naires,
we excluded ix fromourdataset because
hey
did not contain nformation
aboutrespondents' ociopolitical tatus e.g., cadrevs. noncadre nd/orpartyvs.
nonpartymember).Thus,
the
adjusted esponse
rateof the
survey
was 96
percent
(694),
whichwas
veryhighby
Western
tandards,
ut
quite
similar
o the
response
rates
from other
surveys
conducted n
China see Chen and Zhong 1998; Nathan
andShi
1993).Among
our
respondents,
8 were ocal CCPcadres
ganbu),repre-
sentingall
three
majoradministrativeanksat
the
local level-16 at the bureau
level,
24 at the
departmentevel, and 28 at
the
section evel.
They
were from the
municipal
or district
governmental
gencies/organizations. 4
The
underlyingdemographic
haracteristics f the
sampleapproximated
hose
of the 1996
government
ensus andan
earlier
urvey
conducted
n
Beijing.
About
equalnumbersof men(51.4 percent)and women(48.6 percent)appearedn the
sample.Similarly,
he
1996
government
ensus showedthatmales accounted or
50.7
percent
of the
population
n
Beijing(see
BeijingMunicipal
StatisticalBureau
1997).
The
respondents
n our
sample represented ll age groups,ranging rom
18 to
76 years
of
age (with
an
averageage of
42): 18-25,
11.3
percent;26-35,
22.1
percent;36-45,
24.7
percent;46-55,
16.3
percent;56-65,
18.4
percent;
and
65
and
over,
7.2
percent.
The statistics
of
the 1996 census showed the
age
distributions f the
Beijing population
as follows:
18-25,
14.1
percent;26-35,
25.6
percent;36-45,
21.9
percent; 6-55,
13.2
percent; 6-65,
15.7
percent;
nd
65 and over 9.5 percent (see Beijing MunicipalStatisticalBureau1997). The
average
differencebetween our
sample
and the census
in
all
age groups
was 2.9
percent.
The education
evels of the
respondents
anged
rom
elementary
duca-
tion
(13 percent),
middle school education
24 percent),high
school
education
(48 percent),
o
college degree(15 percent).Although
herewere no
comparable
14. For
the
election,appointment, nd removalof these
cadres,see
note 5.
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
25/28
216
Jie
Chen
statisticsavailable
n
the 1996 census (or any government ensuses
in the
past
several years),15he education evels
in
this sample approximatedhose
in
an
earlier epresentativeurveyconductedn Beijing n 1995 (elementary ducation,
12 percent;middle and high school education,76 percent;and college degree,
12 percent) see Chen and Zhong 1998). Overall, his sampleyielded a sampling
errorof less than
4
percent.
Care was
taken to minimize
linguistic misinterpretations
nd
respondent
f-
fects. Theoriginalwordingof ourquestionnairewhichwas firstdesigned
n
the
United
States)
was reviewed
by
the PORI to fit
the Chinese social and cultural
contextand to
provide
or seamlesstranslationrom
English
o
Chinese.College
studentsof journalismandsociologywereemployedas field interviewers; hey
were
trained y project
members n field
nterviewing echniques
efore he
actual
surveywas carried ut.Respondentswere offeredconfidentialityndencouraged
toprovideanswers hatbestcapturedheir rue eelings.Ingeneral, ircumstantial
evidence
suggests
hat
Chinese
respondents
eel
muchfreer o
express
heirviews
in such a public opinion survey as ours than
is
typicallyassumed
n
the West.
This
is
in
partbecause,
since the
reform,
he
Chinesegovernment
has not effec-
tively
censored
or
regulatedpublic opinion
researchdue to weakened
party
con-
trol at the grassroots evel
and the lack of
any
consistentofficial rules
governing
survey
research.16
Appendix B
The
Five Clusters
of the
24
Items Revealed
by
the Factor
Analysis
INSTRUMENTAL SUPPORT CLUSTER
Q12: Please rate government olicy performance
n
the following areas,using a
scale of 1-5 (1 = very poor;2 = poor;3 = good;4 = very good;5 = excellent).
Q12.C. Narrowing
he
gap
between rich and
poor;
Q12.I. Combatingpollution;
Q12.H. Providingadequate
welfare
to
the
needy;
Q12.K. Eliminating orruption;
Q12.B. Providing ob security;
Q12.D. Improvinghousing conditions;
Q12.F. Providingadequate
medical care for
all;
Q12.E. Maintaining
ocial
order.
15. The statistics close but not comparable o our measuresof education evel) we could
find from all the recentgovernment ensuseswere only the figuresof graduates y level
and type of school and studentenrollment n institutions f highereducation n each
year (see, e.g., Beijing MunicipalStatisticalBureau 1997, 1998; State StatisticalBureau
1995).
16. For example,even some journalists rom Taiwanwere surprised y the fact that
when
interviewed y the media,averageChinesepeople could expressopinions hatcontradicted
official
propaganda. ee Many
Don't
Want
to See a
Fight betweenMainlandand Tai-
wan
(1996, p. A3).
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
26/28
Mass and Elite Orientations
in China 217
AFFECTIVE
SUPPORT
CLUSTER
Do you agreewith the following statements? 1 = stronglydisagree;2 = dis-
agree;3
=
agree;4
=
strongly
agree).
Q20.G.I respectourgovernmental
rgans.
Q20.H.
In our
country
citizens' basic
rights
ate well
protected.
Q20.E. I am proud o live in socialist China.
Q20.F. Supporting ur politicalsystem is my obligation.
Q20.I. The judicial system is
basically
fair
in
our
country.
Q20.M.
What I value is the same as what our
government
has
promoted.
POLITICAL EFFICACY CLUSTER
Do you agree with the following statements? 1 =strongly agree;2
=
agree;
3
=
disagree;
4
=
stronglydisagree).
Q21.N.
The
well-being
of
the
country
s
mainly dependentupon
state lead-
ers,
not the individuals.
Q21.S.
In
general
I
don't
thinkI
shouldargue
with the authorities ven
though
I believe
my
idea
is
correct.
Q21.0. Suggestions
and
complaints
made
by
the individuals o
the
govern-
ment are often ignored.
Q21.P. CurrentlyChina
doesn't need
political changes.
REFORM
ASSESSMENT CLUSTER
Do you agreewith the following statements?
1
=
stronglydisagree;
2
=
dis-
agree;
3
=
agree;
4
=
stronglyagree).
Q26.A.Since
the
reforms
n
1978, my living conditionshavenoticeably
m-
proved.
Q26.B. Since the reforms
n
1978, my
social statushas
noticeably
m-
proved.
Q26.D.
It is
unlikely
that
Chinawill
experiencesociopolitical
urmoil
n
the
next
10
years.
DEMOCRATIC
VALUE CLUSTER
Do
you agree with
the
following statements?1
=
stronglydisagree;2
=
dis-
agree;3 = agree;4 = stronglyagree).
Q20.L.
Electionsto
governmental
ositions
should
be
conducted
n
such a
way
that
there is more
than
one
candidate or each
post.
Q20.K.
The media shouldbe free
to
expose governmentwrongdoings
uch
as
corruption.
Q20.J. Regardless
of one's
political
belief,
he
or
she is entitledto the same
rights
and
protections
as
anyone
else.
8/12/2019 Comparing Mass and Elite
27/28
218
Jie
Chen
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