Community Organization and Rural Development- A Learning Process Approach

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Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach

Author(s): David C. KortenReviewed work(s):Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 40, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1980), pp. 480-511Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3110204 .

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PUBLICADMINISTRATIONEVIEW

CommunityOrganizationn d R u r a l

Development:

A Learning P r o c e s s Approach

David C. Korten, The Ford Foundation and The Asian Institute of Management

EDITOR'SNOTE

Through a grant made available by The Ford Founda-

tion, PAR is pleased to present to its readers a compre-hensively documented, in-depth research study on "Com-

munity Organization and Rural Development: A LearningProcess Approach," by David C. Korten. This study com-bines both extensive and intensive analysis of develop-ment assistance programs in Asia, and focuses specifically

on five case studies which provide the basis for the author'sstrong conviction that Third World development assistance

programs must be part of a holistically perceived learning

process as opposed to a bureaucratically mandated blue-

print design. Stated in the abstract, this proposition, in andof itself, should cause no surprise. The real value of Kor-ten's efforts, however, may be found in his case studieswhich provide rich insights into just what can be accom-

plished in the way of social development if the development

The World Bank estimates that nearly 800 million peo-ple, or roughly 40 percent of the population of the develop-ing nations, still live in absolute poverty;1studies indicatethat in many instances the poor have not benefited-in-deed, they may have suffered absolute loss-during earlystages of national development.2 In response there has been

growing interest in new approaches to national develop-ment intended to bring the poor more rapidly into full par-ticipation in development decisions, implementation, andbenefits.3 Many observers have looked to effective commu-

nity controlled social organizations as important if not es-sential instruments if the rural poor are to give meaningfulexpression to their views, mobilize their own resources in

self-help action, and enforce their demands on the broadernational political and economic systems.4

DavidC. Korten sproject pecialistnpopulation ndsocialdevel-opmentmanagementorTheFordFoundation ased nits ManilaField Office. He holds concurrent ppointments s visitingpro-fessorat the AsianInstituteof Management,acultyassociateofthe CornellUniversityRuralDevelopmentCommittee,and visit-ing lecturerat the School of PublicHealth,HarvardUniversity.His specialconcern s thedevelopment f managementechnolo-gies suitedto the needs of participativeuralandurbandevelop-ment.

process itself can be viewed as a learning experience for allparticipants involved.

Korten's study focuses on international development as-sistance programs in the Third World, and developmentspecialists in this area of interest-academicians as well aspractitioners-should certainly benefit from the extensivedocumentation incorporated in the footnotes of the study.Many of Korten's notes are extensively annotated; virtuallyall are currentand timely. As such, they representa rich re-

source which enhances the value of this study even further.Development assistance programs are, of course, no

longer the monopoly of comparative-international publicadministration specialists. Community development assis-tance programs have long since become an integral part ofthe urban policy process in America. For this reason, Kor-ten's study should also provide urban policy specialists withsome fertile thoughts for further pilferage.

* Though many nationaland internationalagenciesclaimcommitment o

participative pproaches o helpingthe ruralpoor, little progresshas been made in translatingambitiousplansinto effectiveaction. The recordof earliercommunitydevelopment nd cooperatives fforts is largelya historyoffailure,resultingmoreoften in strengtheninghe positionoftraditional litesthan in integrating oorerelements nto thenationaldevelopment rocess.Manycurrent allsfor involve-mentof theruralpoorare ittlemore hanwishful hinking, n-adequatelynformedbypastexperiences to theinvestmentsninstitutionalnnovation equiredo give reality o animportantidea. The prevailingblueprintapproach o developmentpro-grammingwithits emphasison detailedpre-planningndtimeboundedprojects s itself citedas an importantmpediment.

Examination f a numberof Asianprograms uggests hatthe more successfulgrew out of village experience.Conse-

quently heywere ableto achievean unusualdegreeof fit be-tweenbeneficiary eeds,program utputs,andthecompetenceof theassisting rganizaiton.Thekeywasnotpreplanning, utan organizationwitha capacity or embracing rror, earningwiththepeople,andbuildingnewknowledge ndinstitutionalcapacity hroughaction.A modelof the learningprocessap-proachto buildingprogram trategiesand appropriate rga-nizational ompetenceuggestsa newprogramhouldprogressthrough hreedevelopmentaltages n whichthe focalconcernis successively n learning o be effective,learning o be effi-cient,andlearning o expand. Implicationsor the roleof thesocial scientistand for action by funding agenciesare dis-cussed.

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER980

480



COMMUNITYRGANIZATIONNDRURAL EVELOPMENT

Given this interestwe might expect that the difficult

problemsof howto involve he ruralpoorin theirownde-

velopment, through local organizationsand otherwise,wouldbereceivingmajorattention ndevelopmentournalsandcurrentpolicydocuments.Yetthis is not thecase.Such

widelyreaddevelopmentournalsas WorldDevelopment,EconomicDevelopmentand CulturalChange,and the In-ternationalDevelopmentReview seldom mentionthe sub-

ject. The recent489-pageAsianDevelopmentBank reviewof Asian developmentgives the topic four pages.5The

440-pagepresentationby Worthmanand Cummingsof a

strategy or meetingthe worldfood crisisbasedon small

family farm productiondevotes two brief paragraphsofarmerassociations ndcooperativeswithbarelya mentionof the impediments osedby villagesocialstructureso the

implementationof their recommendations.'The WorldBank's1975RuralDevelopmentSectorPolicy Paper givesfive paragraphs o the importanceof local participationandbrieflyacknowledgesomeimpediments, utsays ittleabout how they mightbe overcome.The76-page"A Stra-

tegyfor a MoreEffectiveBilateralDevelopmentAssistance

Program:An A.I.D. Policy Paper," distributed o allUSAID missions as an attachment o its "ProgramGui-dance for FY 1980,"stresses hat the USAIDstrategy:

... involves effectivepopularparticipation y the poor ... indecisionmakingo that heirneeds, esires,apacitiesnd ndige-nousinstitutionsrerecognized,nderstood,ndgivenmajorweight.

... projectscurrentlyn voguepresentdiffi-cultproblemswhich emain o besolvedandtheirsolution s inhibited y programmingprocedures etter uitedto largecapitalde-

velopmentrojectsthan to people-centereddevelopment.

But meansand impediments rehardlymentioned.

Unfortunatelymorethan threedecadesof moderndevel-

opmentexperienceprovidesubstantialevidencethat this

paucityof attention o howdevelopment ffortscaneffec-

tivelyelicittheparticipation f the ruralpoorcannotbe ex-

plainedeither n termsof the problembeingtoo new to be

recognizedor having ong since been solved.

Failuresof the Past

In particular,experiencesover the past three decadeswithcooperatives ndcommunitydevelopmentmovementsin the ThirdWorldprovidesome sobering essons.

Coperatives

The member controlledcooperativehas long been anidea with almostuniversalappeal, being widelypromotedin muchof the developingworld as an integral nstrumentof nationalruraldevelopmentpolicy. But the typicalout-comecan be summarized riefly.

[Rluralooperativesndevelopingreasodaybringittlebenefitto themasses f poorernhabitantsf thoseareas ndcannot egenerallyegardedsagents f change nddevelopmentor suchgroups.t is the better-offuralnhabitantshomainlyakead-vantage f thecooperativeervices ndfacilities uchasgovern-ment upportedredit nd echnicalssistancehannelledhroughcooperatives.7

Oftenthe servicesofferedby cooperatives, uchas pro-duction oansandmarketingervicesare of little use to thelandless aboreror the subsistence armer.In cooperativeswithcommunitywidemembershiphe distribution f con-trol over theiractivities ends to parallel he structureofcontrol in the broadercommunity.In relatively tratifiedcommunities ts poorermembers eldomhavea voice and

commonlyfind themselves neligiblefor certainservicessuchas loans. Moreover, oo often the co-op leadersare

corruptand abusiveof theirpower.Wherethe poor have

organized heirown co-ops to challengeestablishedcom-

munity nterests heyhavecommonly acedretaliatory c-tions they wereill-equipped o resist.8Womenmaybe ex-

cluded,exceptwhen thereis no male head of household,

evenwherewomen are the chiefagricultural roducers.9One reasonsuggested or the failures s that thesecoop-

eratives oo often have been creationsof government, n-tendedto promotegovernmentpoliciesand provide gov-ernment ontrol overmarkets,rather hanvoluntary rea-tions of individualsto increase their collective market

power.'" n most Asian countries hey enjoyso littlepopu-lar supportand so little marketpowerthat if governmentpressures nd inducements uch as access o special ervicesand subsidieswerewithdrawnmostwouldsoonbecome n-active."

Onestudyof 14cooperativesn Asia included our thatwerecomparativelyuccessful.These had fourcharacteris-

tics in common: 1) theywere ocated n communitieswithrelativelyunstratifiedand cohesive social structures; 2)their internalstructures llowed members o hold leadersaccountable ndenforcedmemberdiscipline;3)a relative-

ly homogeneousmembership f smalland medium and-holderssaw the co-op as an instrument or capitalforma-tion and the introductionof technical nnovationsratherthan simplya means for obtaininggovernment acilities;and(4) theyhadstrongexternalinkageswithrelatively f-fectivegovernment gencieswhich not only regulated heir

functioningbut also provided raining,services,facilities,and assistance n resolvingconflicts betweenmembers.2Such preconditionsare of coursedemandingand not al-

waysreplicable.CommunityDevelopment

Though he roots of the communitydevelopmentmove-mentcanbe tracedbackto the 1920s13t wasa Ford Foun-dation fundedpilot project ntroducedn the EtawahDis-trict of UttarPradesh,Indiain October1948whichiniti-atedthe chainof eventsthatbrought t into prominencenthe post-colonial era. Using multi-purposevillage levelworkers n the Etawahprojectachieved mpressive esultsin self-helpapproaches o increasingagricultural roduc-tion andstrengtheningural nfrastructure.n 1952, he In-

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1980

481




dian government adopted the concept as the basis of a ma-

jor national ruraldevelopment effort. However, it failed to

adopt the painstaking approach to developing a participa-tive administrative structure able to respond to bottom-upinitiatives which had been the key to the Etawah project'ssuccess.14

The attention attractedby India's launching of a national

community development effort led to the initiation of simi-

lar programs in over 60 nations of Asia, Africa, and LatinAmerica during the 1950s, labeled by Holdcroft as Com-

munity Development's "Decade of Prominence." But by1960 some programs were already faltering and by 1965

most had been terminated or drastically reduced. Commu-

nity development had promised much, yet delivered little.15

With changes in national governments came the desire of

new leaders to establish their commitment to new and, pre-

sumably, more powerful development concepts. Central

economic planning was embraced, with an emphasis on

programs promoting immediate economic growth." Com-

munity development offices were abolished or integratedinto other organizations.'7

The decline may have reflected impatience as much asanything; perhaps it was unrealistic to expect any programto achieve significant results in the reduction of poverty and

food shortages in so short a period."8But a number of char-

acteristic weaknesses have been identified in the conceptand its implementation."

(1) Existing power structures were accepted as a given andno attempt was made to change them. Village level

workers aligned themselves with the traditional villageelites who captured such benefits as the programs of-fered. Recognizing this, the poor majority did not re-

spond. The conflicts of interest inherent in stratified vil-

lage social structures were not recognized in programdesigns.

(2) Responsibility for implementation of community de-

velopment was placed in administratively separateministries or agencies which paralleled the establishedline agencies of government. Attempts were made at

local levels to bring these parallel agencies under the

control of the community development agency in the in-

terestsof improved coordination, but this resulted in bu-

reaucratic conflict that was often a key element in the

movement's demise.

(3) Greater emphasis tended to be placed on the expansionof social services than on increasing rural incomes, and

many of the social services offered seemed of doubtfulvalue. This was not so much a function of the commu-

nity development concept-the Etawah pilot projecthad stressed promoting agricultural production-as anoutcome of bureaucratic territoriality.20

(4) Implementation was done through conventional bureau-cratic structuresin which programsand targetswere for-

mulated centrally with little regard to the willingness or

capability of the people to respond; often little real par-ticipation was involved. Demands that field workers re-

port on the implementation of dozens of centrally man-

datedactivities eriouslycut into the timeavailable oractual work with the community.Whenworkingwiththe community, he fieldworkereasilyfell into the pat-tern of actuallydirecting ocal level programs.Again,thesepatternswere n sharpcontrast o theEtawahpilotprojectwhichhad stressed hedevelopment f organiza-tionalprocesseshatplaceda premium n beingrespon-siveto communitydentifiedneeds.21

(5)Littlewasdone to build ndependentmember ontrolledlocal organizationsable to solve local problemsandmakedemandson the broader ystem.Furthermore,hevillage tselftended o be treatedas a self-contained e-

velopmentunit withlittle attentiongivento the needtolinkself-governing illages nto larger,more economic-allyviableregionalunits.

Current onorExperience

The currentconcernfor the ruralpoor and their par-ticipation n thedevelopment rocesshashadanimportant

impacton nationalagencyand donor funding priorities,butexperiencendicates hat the reallocation f funds snot

enough.The types of projects currently n vogue presentdifficultproblemswhichremain o be solvedand theirsolu-tion is inhibitedby programming roceduresbettersuitedto large capital developmentprojects than to people-centeredruraldevelopment.

In the discussion hat follows the focus ison largedonorsbecause he information s accessible nd theirnumbers re

comparativelymall.It is moredifficult o generalize boutthe diversenational experiences,however.National andeven sub-national evelopment rogrammersre n generalworkingwithprioritiesand programmingmethods similar

to thoseof the majordonors-in partas a resultof donorinfluence-and face corresponding ressures.

Experience ithPovertyFocused rogramming

The WorldBank hasresponded o the newemphasison

povertyby realigningts loanportfolioto increase he pro-portion of loans going to countrieswith an annual percapita income below $280. It has also substantially n-creased he percentage f its portfoliodevoted to agricul-ture and ruraldevelopmentprojects,and sinceFY73overhalf of theseprojectshavebeenchosenand designedspe-cificallyto benefitthe ruralpoor.2 Its ruraldevelopmentsectorpolicypapercallsexplicitly or:

Participation y the ruralpoor in the planningand implementa-tion processes hrough ocal government,projectadvisorycom-

mittees,cooperatives nd other forms of group organi7ation.

Underthe 1973foreignassistance egislationpassed bythe UnitedStatesCongress,commonlyreferredo as "TheNew DirectionsMandate,"not only have the prioritiesofUSAIDbeenreoriented,t is largelyrestricted o assistance

targeteddirectly o thepoor majority-with participationmajortheme.It is publiclycommitted o the conceptthattheeconomicbenefitsof itsdevelopment rojects houldbe

"widelyandsignificantlyharedbythepoor";and thatthe


482



COMMUNITYRGANIZATION NDRURALDEVELOPMENT

poor, includingwomen,shouldbe actively ngagedn deci-sion makingand implementationn ways whichincrease"their echnical killsand/or theircapacity o organize orcommonpurposesand for greateraccess o thebenefitsof

development."23

Unfortunately,good intentionsseldom suffice and thedifficultieshave surfacedfairlyquickly. A discussionof

"new-style" rural development projects in the World

Bank's 1978AnnualReportobserved hat:

... withhindsight,roject esign nd hepace fimplementationhavebeen ooambitious,esultingn delays ndshortfallsromoriginal xpectation.... Amonghemoredifficult spectss theestablishmentf systemswithinwhich mall armers an them-selves avea say nhowprogramsredesignednd mplemented,andhow heir kills, xpert nowledgef the ocal armingnvi-ronment,nd heir apacityo help hemselvesanbefully nte-gratedntoan overall ffort.

Awarenessof the need for changein approachat theBank s growing,24utthemagnitude f thechangesnpro-ceduresand staff compositioncalledfor is great.An un-

published1977 review of 164 WorldRank ruraldevelop-mentprojectappraisal eportsconcluded hat themajoritycontainedonlythe mostminimaldataon thesocial,demo-

graphic,and economiccharacteristics f the projectareaand made no attempt o analyzesuchdataas it mightbearon projectdesign.25 imilarly, t was concluded hat littlehad beendoneinBankassistedprojects o utilize hepoten-tial of indigenous ocialorganizations.2'

The Bank'sPIDERProject n Mexicohas received pe-cial attentionbecause ts plan ncorporatedmanyadvanced

conceptsfor integratedarea development.An importantdesignfeaturewasto be extensivepopularparticipationn

project decision making and implementation.A recentBankstaff paperconcluded hattheearlycommitments f

the Mexican mplementing gencies o a participatory p-proachwere ittle morethan wishful hinking inceno localmechanismshad been developedto give reality to theideal.2

Some "New Directions"USAIDprojectsearlier ookedto as prototypesof the agency'snewemphasison popularparticipation averevealed imilargapsbetween he plan-ning conceptsand the realitiesof implementation.28hereis, asyet, littleevidence o suggest hatsuchexperiences reisolatedphenomenaor that others have the answer."

It is frequently uggestedhatwhat s needed s morepri-vateinitiative n attacking he problemswhichgovernmentbureaucraciesannot manage. Thoughthis view is an at-

tractiveone, there is little evidence o suggestthat, whenundertakenon anythingapproaching he scale required,private voluntaryefforts are consistentlymore effectivethan those of government.30

Somefairlysubstantial mountsof moneyarepresentlybeingchannelled o the ThirdWorld hroughprivate olun-

taryorganizationsPVOs),manyof whichhavebeengoingthrougha sometimespainfulre-examinationf theirroles.

Organizations uch as Catholic Relief Services,Save theChildrenFoundation,WorldVision, CARE, and ChurchWorld Service have built major internationalprogramsbasedon relief and welfareactivities.Recognizinghat the

answer o poverty ies not in relief, but in increasing he

capacityof the poor to meet their own needs, they are in

varyingstagesof creatingmoredevelopmentally riented

programs.Relief activities end by theirnatureto be topdown, carryinga presumption hat the recipientsare forone reasonor anotherunable o meet theirown needs. Thereorientationequiredorthemto becomeeffective n trulybottom-updevelopments no smallundertaking.

It isfrequentlyuggestedhatwhat s neededis moreprivateinitiative n attacking heproblemswhichgovernment ureaucraciescannotmanage.... There s littleevidenceosuggestthat,whenundertaken n anythingapproachinghescalerequired,rivatevolun-tary effortsare consistentlymoreeffectivethan hoseofgovernment.

Viewed n historicalperspectivehe current"newdirec-tions" areperhaps ess a newthrust n

developmentssis-

tance than a returnswingof the pendulumas the resultsproducedby the economicplannersduring heirperiodofascendance ome ntoquestionmuchas didthe workof thecommunitydevelopersbefore them. Holdcroft suggeststhat too little attentionwas given to buildinga coherentbody of knowledgeout of the theoryand empirical xper-ience of the communitydevelopmentera with the resultthatmanyof its lessonsremainunlearned.31 heresult s anew generationof planners, rainedprimarilyn the toolsof economicanalysis,responding o an appealing onceptthatpromisedo overcome omefailuresof what,forthem,were morefamiliarapproaches,but which was not so newas it seemed.

Fortunately, ot all of thelessonshavegoneunobserved.More emphasis s now placedon makingparticipationaconcern of all agenciesengaged n ruraldevelopment,oneconomicbenefits,and on regional ntegration.Yet, othersseemto havegonelargelyunrecognized.Thus,wecontinueto see:(a) reliance or the planningandimplementation f

"participative"developmenton centralizedbureaucratic

organizationswhichhave little capacityto respondto di-versecommunity-definedeedsor to build fromcommu-

nityskillsandvalues; b) inadequatenvestment n the dif-ficultprocessof building ommunity roblem olvingcapa-city; (c) inadequateattentionto dealingwith socialdiver-sity, and especiallywith highlystratified ocial structures,

and (d) insufficient ntegrationof the technicaland socialcomponentsof developmentaction. These are areas inwhichthe barrierso appropriate ctionhaveprovenmostformidableand it is important o stress the fact that thelack of moneyis not the centralproblem.

Constraints on Public Donors

If a lessonemergesout of thisaccumulatedxperience,tis that in dealingwiththepoor,redirection f fundsto newcategories f projects s onlypartof theneed. Anotherpartis buildingthe capacityof donor organizations-whether


483



484

publicorprivate, oreignornational,planner rimplemen-tor-to provideassistancen wayswhichrespond o localneeds while buildinglocal social and technicalcapacity.Unfortunately,most largedonorsseem to be under sub-stantialpressurenot to follow this lattercourse-the rhe-toricof currentprojectdocumentsnotwithstanding.32

Excessivepressures or immediateresults,as measured

by goodsand servicesdelivered,driveoutattention o insti-

tutionbuildingandmakeit difficultto movebeyonda re-lief and welfareapproach o poverty; he distributionoffood is a lot faster hanteachingpeoplehow to grow t. Asubstantialbias towardproject as contrasted o programfundingcompounds he problems.Projectsby naturedealwith time boundedstart-upcosts and emphasize acilitiesandequipmento theneglectof thedevelopment nd fund-

ing of capacities or their sustainedoperationand main-tenance. Their demandsfor detailed,up-frontplanning,coupledwithrigorousadherenceo fast-pacedmplementa-tionschedules ndpre-plannedpecifications, ssumes ask

requirementsre well understoodwhen, in fact, even thenatureof theproblems illdefined.Furthermoretvirtually

ensures hat thereal decisionswillremainwithprofessionaltechniciansand governmentbureaucrats eitherof whomare rewarded or being responsive o local conditionsnor

contributingoward he development f local institutional

capacities.Emphasis n meetingprojectdisbursementchedules nd

on terminalprojectoutcomes eads to an insistenceon thecreationof specialprojectunits,using special ncentives o

buypeopleawayfrom morepermanent rganizations nd,thus, underminingheirpotentialfor sustained ong-termaction. Pressures o move ever-larger mountsof moneyquicklywithout commensuratetaff increasesplacea pre-miumon largecapitalandtechnologyntensiveprojects.Asa consequence,heavyimportcomponentsarebest ableto

absorbsuchlargesumsof moneyon schedule,whereas f-fective work with the ruralpoor requiresa high ratio of

peopleto financial nput;andit almostalways akes ongerthan anticipated.When a largedonor such as the WorldBankoperateswith a few field offices, relying nsteadonthesupervision f itinerant roupsof expertswithdivergentviewsmakingquick judgmentsduringshortvisits,there slittle prospectof providing he consistent, nformed,and

PUBLIC DMINISTRATIONEVIEW

sympathetic support required for effective institution

building.In generalthe need is for a flexible, sustained,experi-

mental,action basedcapacitybuildingstyle of assistancewhichmostmajordonors areill equipped o provide.Theresult s a substantial ap betweenwhat donorsespouseas

policyand whatthey actually ind themselvespressuredodo by their own politicaland bureaucraticmperatives.33

(SeeFigure1.)As an example,the Asian DevelopmentBank's(ADB)

statedpolicyin irrigationdevelopments to emphasize:a)low cost perhectare,(b) manysmallfarmerbeneficiaries,and(c) production ainswithina short ime,suchas two tofive years.These criteria hould eadit to emphasize eha-bilitationof small rrigation ystems,but, in fact, the costsare so low and spreadamongso manyindividual ystemsthat it is difficultto builda substantial roject oan aroundsuch work.Thus, the averageADB irrigationoan was for$40million n 1978,withthepressuresn the direction f in-

creasing hisaverage o theADB soughtfurther xpansionof its total lending.3

A partialanswer s greater mphasison programas con-trasted o projectfundingand both the World Bank andthe ADB are currently xperimentingwith programstyleloans less tied to schedules and blueprint style plans.35However,unless nstitutional apacitybuilding s includedas an integral part of the loan package, the approachassumes hepriorexistenceof strongadministering rgani-zations able to take a responsible, lexible,and locallyre-

sponsiveapproach n the commitment f its funds.Gener-

allysuchan assumptions unwarranted.USAIDprovides ts ownexamplesof contradictions e-

tweenpurposeandprocedure.While ts mandateand rhe-toric stressparticipation f thepoorindecisionmaking,ex-

actlywhere he poor areto be involved n the sequenceofits projectdevelopment rocess s unclear.The fact is thatUSAID s accountable o the U.S. Congress ndto agenciessuch as the Office of Management nd Budget,not to the

poorvillagerso whose needs t is supposed o be respond-ing.Not surprisingly,heUSAIDprogrammers more ike-

ly to be proccupiedwith the needs and involvement f the

groupsthat arbitratehis program han with those of the

FIGURE1Contradictions n ForeignAssistanceProgramming

Poverty-focused uraldevelopmentinvolvesprojectswhich are:

Small

Administrative ndpersonnel-intensive

Difficultto monitorandinspect

Slow to implement

Not suitablefor complex techniquesof projectappraisal

Donorsremain mpelledto

preferprojectswhich are:

Large

Capital-andimport-intensive

Easyto monitor andinspect

Quickto implement

Suitablefor social cost-benefitanalysis




COMMUNITY RGANIZATION ND RURALDEVELOPMENT

poor beneficiaries;ndeed the agency'sprocedures ll butensureit. In preparinga Project Paper for approval n

WashingtonheUSAIDprogram fficer mustcomplywithdetailedspecifications pelledout in a guidancedocumentof more than 100pages.Oneresultof suchrequirementssthat even host governmentcounterparts end to excludethemselves romthe USAIDplanningprocess,havingnei-therthe time nor the patience o involve themselvesn the

formfillingexercise.Moreover, n the processof avoidingthe morepointless outine, heyarealsoexcluded rompar-ticipation n the feasibilityanalysis, mplementation lan-ning, and budgeting.3' he result s that whateverearningemergesfrom these exercisesaccruesto the USAID pro-grammersndconsultants,notto thelocalagencieswhoul-

timatelywill have the responsibilityor implementation.Nonetheless,USAID is on the whole makingthe most

seriouseffort of anylargedonorto cometo gripswith the

problemsof improvingon its past performancen dealingwith rural poverty." The number, competence, and com-

mitmentof thepeopleworkingon thisproblem hroughoutthe agency s impressive.Just how successful heycan be,

given the constraints mposed by agency's politicalenvi-ronmentand its own procedures, emains o be seen.

The Positive Side:FiveAsian SuccessStories

As discouraging sthegeneralpictures, notall effortsat

participative pproacheso ruraldevelopment ave failed.Thissectionpresentsa seriesof cases from Asia on exper-iencesthat sharethreecharacteristicsn common:eachin-volves a ruraldevelopmenteffort which seeks to engageruralpeople in their own advancement; ach is generallyrecognized s moresuccessful hantheaverage; nd each s

dependenton effective programaction more than on a

uniquely favorablesetting. Beyond that, the cases werechosen for their diversity n objectives,setting, and ap-proach.These five caseson individualprograms over theIndianNationalDairyDevelopmentBoard,the SriLankan

SarvodayaShramadanaMovement, he BangladeshRuralAdvancementCommittee, heThailandCommunityBased

FamilyPlanningServices,and the PhilippineNationalIrri-

gationAdministrationCommunal rrigationProgram.Atthe end of the section a brief discussionof some of the

politicallymotivatedpeasantmovementswhichhavebeen a

significant actor in modernAsian historyprovidesaddi-tionalperspective.

IndianNationalDairyDevelopmentoardOne form of villageaction that has enjoyedmore than

typical successin the ThirdWorldis the vertically nte-

gratedsingle ndustrycooperative.Amongthe variousex-

amples, which include the Colombian coffee and the

Malaysian ubbergrowersassociation, he systemof dairycooperatives romotedbythe IndianNationalDairyDevel-

opmentBoardhas attractedparticularnternationalnter-est. Bythe end of 1976a total of 4,530 villagecooperativeswitha combinedmembershipf 2 million armers adbeen

organized,andeffortswereunderway o developa system

of similar mallmilkproducer ooperativeshroughout n-dia.3'

Members f thevillage evelcooperative ocietynormallyownone ortwo cowsanddepositmilktwiceeachdayat thecollectionpoint maintainedby the society. Specialtruckscollectthe milk from the villagestoragevatsand deliver tto processing entersoperatedby a cooperativeunion com-prisedof some 80village ocieties.Processeddairyproductsare sold in majorurbancenters hroughthe facilitiesof afederationof the dairyunions.

Studies ndicate that the programoperateswith a highlevelof efficiencyandlack of corruption, ndprovidesma-

jor socialandeconomicbenefits o thepoorestmembers fthe member villages3'while assuring urban consumers of a

regular upplyof qualitymilkproductsat fairprices.Ithasalso contributed o a weakening f casteand sexualbarriersas all castesof both sexeshavelearned o waittheirturn na single ineto deliver heirmilk.Thisrepresents substan-tial socialadvance n ruralIndia."

Several eaturesof theprogram ontribute o thesuccessof the program:

* The benefitsare accessible o the poorestmembersofthecommunity s even a poorlandless amilycan main-tain a cow, a practicewellestablished ytradition n In-dia.

* Thevillageco-opsarebackedbya strongandhighlydis-

ciplinedsupportsystemwhichprovidesat a fair pricethe entirerangeof servicesrequired or profitablepro-duction, from veterinary are and feed to an assuredmarket.

* All technologiesand methodsemployedhavebeenpro-ven under ocal conditions.

* Everythings doneaccordingo carefullydeveloped ys-temsin whichthoseresponsible rethoroughly rained.

* A combinationof strong, externally-auditedmanage-ment systems,dailypayments o members,and publictransactions includingtests for quality of the milk)leaves ittle room for dishonesty n thepartof co-opof-ficials. With little opportunity for corruption, only themoreresponsiblendividuals reattracted o leadershippositions.

* The basic functionsof the villagemilkcooperatives reso simple hat few demandsareplacedon their eadersandmembers ither or communalaboror forcomplexdecisions hat mightfavorone groupoveranother.

Thestrongand sustainedeadership f VergheseKurien,the founderand head of the NDDB, is also important.However,anothercritical actor s moreeasilyoverlooked:the processby whichthe NDDB came into beingcontrastssharplywith that of the moretypical,centrallyorganized,government ponsored,co-op movementsn Asia in whichthe membersusuallyhave little interestbeyondcollectinggovernmenthandouts.

The NDDB, which traces its historyback to the mid-1940s, s a creationof farmers espondingo a felt need. In-dia's colonial governmenthad contractedwith a private


485



PUBLICDMINISTRATIONEVIEW

dairyto purchaseand processmilk fromvillages n KairaDistrictof GujaratStatefor sale in Bombay,and the farm-ers who supplied he dairygrewresentfulof the low and

fluctuatingpricesbeingoffered. Eventually,a boycott ofthe government chemewas organi7edwhichled, in 1946,to the formatinof theAnand Milk Producers'UnionLim-ited under hechairmanshipf Tribhuvandas atel,one ofthe farmermembers.By 1947, eight village cooperatives

with 432 memberswereoperatingunder the cooperativeunion. The basic outlinesof the programbeganto emergeearly as the farmersworkedout a schemeresponsive otheir own needs. In 1949,a young man namedVergheseKurien,fresh from a U.S. universityeducation,was as-

signedby the governmento a low levelposition n the In-dian ResearchCreameryn Anand.Boredwith hisunchal-

lengingassignment, ebeganadvising heuniononthepur-chase of dairymachinery.He was lateraskedby its mem-bersto help themwith its installationand the trainingoftheir workers.He stayedon to becomemanagerof the co-

operative.

Excessive ressuresor immediateesults, smeasured y goods and servicesdelivered,driveoutattentiono institutionuildingndmake t difficulto movebeyond reliefandwelfare pproachopoverty;hedistributionoffood is a lotfaster thanteaching eoplehow to grow t.

Kurien earnedalongwiththe farmersn a village etting.Oncea successfulprototypeprogram adbeen workedout,largelybythefarmers,t was notpassed o someestablished

organizationor boaderreplication.Rather,a neworgani-

zationgrewaround he prototype-from the bottomup-graduallybuildingand testing ts own capacity o provideeffective supportto federationsof primarycooperativesand addingadditional ayersat its top as the program x-

panded. Appropriatemanagement ystemswere workedout through experience o meet the demandsof the pro-gram.The values of integrity, ervice,andcommitmentothepoorestmember-producerseredeeply mbeddedn its

emergingstructures.Management taff were hired freshfromschool, trained hroughexperience n thejob, indoc-trinatedn thevaluesof theprogram, ndadvanced apidlyas it grew.

The process of bottom-up learningand growth fromwithincontinued for 10

yearsbefore the effort

extendedbeyond Gujarat tate,and when theNationalDairyDevel-

opmentBoardwas created n 1965 t was with the villagetrained Kurienas its head. We may assumeas well thatmost of the personneland systemsof the NDDB wereab-sorbeddirectly rom the cooperativest was to serveandreplicate.Muchexperiencewiththe villagepeopleand thedairy ndustryhad been accumulated nd assimilatedntothe organization y that time.

The NDDB is currently lanninga majorexpansionpro-gram o be fundedby a $150million oan fromthe WorldBank and salesof dairycommoditiesdonatedby foreign

governments. t will also move simultaneouslynto a new

programof vegetableoil cooperatives.To the currentpro-fessional taff of 600,the newprogramswillrequirehe ad-dition of 400 new managersper year for the next severalyears o be trained na newNDDBestablishedmanagementschool. The combinationof rapid expansioninto stateswhichpresentdifferent nstitutionalettings,a basicshiftinits approacho management evelopment, nda move into

a new type of program-possibly foregoing he long pro-cessof bottom-up.program esignandorganization uild-ing that characterizedhe milk program-will no doubt

placesubstantial ressures n the NDDB. Itwillbe instruc-tive to see whether t can replicate ts own successundersuch conditions.

Sarvodaya haramadanaMovementof Sri Lanka

The SarvodayaSharamadanaMovement SSM)41f SriLanka s both privateand national n scope, has a strongreligiousorientation,operateswithout formalties to gov-ernment,and, likethe IndianNationalDairyDevelopmentBoard,wasbuiltfroma modestvillageexperience yabold

andcharismaticeader.Yet,while he NDDBwasbuilton astructureof carefullydesignedmanagement ystemsandemphasized conomicoutcomes,the SSMhas givenmoreof its attention o the articulation f its philosophy han tobuildingappropriatemanagementystemsandhas empha-sizedchanges n the heart of man over changes n villageeconomiesandsocialstructures.42t represents search ora developmentmodel consonant with the uniqueculturaland spiritualheritageof the SriLankanpeople.

TheSSMoperates hroughanunusually omplexorgani-zational structure,encompassinga variety of voluntarymembership roupsloosely linkedby formalized,profes-sionally taffedadministrativetructures.Thepreferred il-

lage level organizationincludes individual groups foryouth, mothers,farmers,children,preschool, elders,andfor personswith specialeducationand skills. At the na-tionallevel there s a largeexecutivecouncilcomprisedofofficersof the movement,directors lectedby the generalmembership, nd35persons nvited or theirparticularx-pertise.SixregionalDevelopmentEducationCenterswhichprovide he primary upport acilitiesare linkedto the vil-lagethrough74extension enters.Activitiesarediverseand

generally oosely structuredon the philosophythat indi-vidualcommunityprograms hould emergeas an expres-sion of the needsof the people.43

The originsof SSMtrace back to 1958 whena govern-mentruraldevelopmentofficer

proposedto the

principaland teachersof NalandaCollege,a smallBuddhist econ-daryschool, that theyseek to acquaint heirstudentswiththe problemsof rural ife throughparticipationn a work-study campin a poor ruralvillage.The idea appealed othem as a unique educationalexperience.One of theseteacherswas the young A. T. Ariyaratne,aroundwhosephilosophyand personalityhe SSM was laterbuild.4

The firstcampwas held in December1958.The villageselectedconsistedof 35 Rodiyafamilies,membersof a de-spisedcaste that livedby begging.Routinely uffering hemost extremeforms of discrimination,hey were barred


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COMMUNITY RGANIZATIONNDRURALDEVELOPMENT

fromattending choolorevenreceiving eligious itesasnomemberof a highercaste,not eventhemonks,wouldhave

any associationwith them. To enter a Rodiyahome ordrink from a cup which a Rodiyahad touched wasnearlyunthinkableor a non-Rodiya. twas,thus,a notableeventwhena groupof 80students, eachers;boyscouts,andgov-ernmentofficialsfrommiddle-class amilies et off to sharetheirlaborwiththe peopleof Kanatholuwa illage n dig-gingwellsandlatrines,constructing smallroad,andper-formingother services.Eachparticipant ontributed venthe money for his own food and sharedin the tasks of

pitching entsand food preparation.Thecamp astedonly 10days.Theactualparticipationf

thevillagepeopleexceptasrecipientswasminimal; ndfol-

low-upactionwas left to the government.But the signifi-canceof the campwas not found in the wells and latrines

constructed, o much as in the fact that 80 members f themiddleclasshadengaged or 10days n manual abor ntheserviceof an outcasteclass.

Thetimingof thecampwasrightas Sri Lankawasin themidst of a socialawakening o the plightof ruralpeoples

and the inequitiesof the castesystem.The campwaswellpublicizedn theColombopressand tsparticipants uicklywonbroadrecognition,ncluding letterof commendationfrom the Prime Minister. Soon other camps, known as

Shramadanas,werebeing organized,each bringingmoreurbanmiddleand upperclassvolunteers nto contactwiththe realitiesof ruralpovertyand castediscrimination.

In theearly1960sa majorreorientation f the basicpro-gramoccurred: ts philosophy,basedon Buddhist each-

ings, took explicit hapeanda concern or sustained illageleveldevelopment ctionled to recruitinghe villagemonkas a communitydevelopmentworker. The villagetempleemergedas the centerof Sarvodayadevelopment ctivity.

In 1968,a planwas launched or the comprehensiveevel-opmentefforts in 100villagesbasedon the newconcept.

Foreignfundingwas introducedn the early1970s ead-

ing to the establishment f a permanentheadquartersnd

bureaucracy.A widerangeof new, centrallyplannedandfundedactivities merged, ncluding heoperationof coop-erative farms. In 1975, the 100-villageprogramwas ex-

panded o 1,000villages.Training enterswereestablishedto train women who would manage preschoolchild careand mother-child eeding centers, to prepareyouth for

communitydevelopmentwork,andto developskills n ag-ricultureand technical fields. All educationalprogramswere to instilla commitment o serving he poorestof Sri

Lanka'spoor.In 1978,a case study by NandasenaRatnapala,a local

university rofessor,noted that the breadthof Sarvodaya'smembershipnvolvementand the strengthof its spiritualcommitmenthad not alwaysbeentranslatednto programaccomplishment.45houghactivitieshad been undertakenin 2,000 villages,the programsweremoreor less perma-nentlyestablished n only about 300. Only a fraction ofthoseeligibleparticipated irectlyn SSMactivities,mainlyas passivebeneficiaries f servicesprovidedby SSM staffand the local monks. The leadership rainingand desig-natedpatternsof villageorganization adnot, in mostvil-

lages,resulted n a self-reliant evelopment rocess.In the

training ourses,weaknesseswere notedin coursecontent,competence f instructors, ndteachingmethods.Evidenceof abusein the handlingof fundshad resulted n the cen-tralizationof control over individualvillageprogramac-

tions, turning he regionaland extensioncenters nto littlemore than "channels or transmitting nd carrying ut di-rectives rom the central evel."4'

With the introductionof major foreign funding, SSMhad introduced adicallynew programactivitiesand orga-nizationforms whilesimultaneously ndertaking apidex-

pansionbeforeeitherwere ested. While t remained n im-

portantmoral force and continuedto enlist Sri Lankansfrom all socialstrata n the cause of the poor, its develop-mental mpactwas limitedto a smallminorityof the vil-

lagesin which t worked.WhenRatnapala's tudyappeared,Ariyaratne espond-

ed by invitinghimto join the SSM as headof its newlyes-tablishedResearch nstitute.Whileseeking o demonstratea continuingcommitment o the basicphilosophiesof themovement, he studiesof the institutesoughtto stimulate

soberreflectionon thegapsbetween hephilosophyand therealitiesof its performance.47ne of its firststudiesnotedthat:48

* Candidates or layman'strainingprogramswere sup-posed to be selectedby the people, yet some were se-lectedby local influentials ven in directcontraventionof decisionsby localgroups.Also, communitydevelop-ment raineeswerebeingselectedbythe local member f

parliament.

* Thevillageschosento receiveSSM assistanceweresup-posed to be isolated, inhabited by under-privileged

classes, lacking essential public services, and having

uniquesocial, economic,or culturalproblems;yet anyvillage n whicha few enthusiasticndividuals xpressedinterestwasbeingadmitted.

* Whenever inancial resourceswereprovidedcentrally,equalcontributions f financeor labor wereto be pro-videdby the community; et the salariesof key villagevolunteersand most otherexpenseswerebeingmet en-

tirely by the center, including he salaries of the pre-schoolteacherswhichoriginallywereto be raisedby the

village.

Thestudywenton to notethatwhilethe leadersof SSMwereoncein directdailycontactwith thevillageprograms,

thus ensuringeffectiveupwardcommunication, hey hadsincebecomeseparatedromthevillagevolunteersby elab-oratebureaucratictructures opulatedby salaried" 'offi-cials' who consider communicationbetweenparticipantsand the center as of very little value."4'

Thoughsome Sarvodaya taff were not pleased by the

study, a numberof constructiveactions resulted.Sarvo-daya'strainingprogramsweresubstantiallyevampedwith

emphasison preparing illagers o make more of the pro-gramming ecisions or themselves.Thescreening f train-ees was tightened.Moretrainingwas done within the vil-lage, with each trainingcenteractingas the area coordi-


487




nator. Of the 2,400villageswhich had someformof SSM

activityas of January1980, heestimated10percentwhichhaddeveloped ffectiveSarvodayan rganizations, eneral-ly the verypoorest,were to be givensubstantial utonomyin the planningof theirown development ctivities.5'

Subsequently,he Research nstitute's tylewasreorient-ed to place itself in less of an adversary ole. SSM fieldworkersweretrainedto engage villagers n gatheringand

interpreting ata on their own villagesand programs s aconsciousness-raisingxperience.Findingswerediscussedwithoperating taff in the search orsolutions o identifiedweaknesses n programdesignand staff performance riorto theirpublication.51

Sarvodaya'sproblemsare not yet solved. Developmentof capacities or decentralized ecisionmakingin an or-

ganizationaccustomed o centralized ontrol s not aneasyprocess. But a new learningmechanismhas been intro-duced and seriousattention s being givento making t aneffective tool for programmprovement.

BangladeshRuralAdvancementCommittee

Oneof the most attractiveof the smallerprivatevolun-

taryagenciesworking n ruraldevelopments the Bangla-desh Rural AdvancementCommittee BRAC)headedbyMr. F. H. Abed, a formeraccountant urneddevelopmentmanager.The reason s BRAC'sunusualcapacity orrapidlearning-through the constant identification,acknowl-

edgement,andcorrection f its own errors. tshistorymaybe dividedroughly nto threephases,eachof whichhasin-volved a majorreorientationn its programandproducedsignificant essonsof broader nterest.5

PhaseI: TheReliefApproach.The BRACwas formed n

early1972 o resettle efugeesn the Sullaareaof Northeast

Bangladesh ollowingthe war of partition romPakistan.Four medical teamsprovideddaily outpatientcarein thefourcampswhere he BRACworkers ived.Resettled efu-

gees were assisted in reconstructinghomes and fishingboats. Emergencyood suppliessustained hem until theirfieldsbeganproducing.Yet BRACworkerswere mpressedthat thelivingconditions or thetypicalresettledSullaresi-dent were little better than they had been in the refugeecamps.This wasBRAC'sfirstmajor earningandevenbyNovember1972 ts energieswerebeingredirectedo a more

development rientedprogramof assistance.PhaseII: The SectorialApproach.BRAC'searlydevel-

opmentactivitiesconsisted of a numberof relativelydis-cretesectorialprogramactivities: onstruction f commu-

nity centers, functionaleducation, agriculture, isheries,cooperatives,health and familyplanning,and vocational

training or women-each of whicheventually roducedtsown newlearning.

Foradministrativeurposes heprojectareaof some 200

villageswas divided nto 11sections,eachwitha fieldcampsupervised y an areamanagero whomfour to fivemulti-

purpose developmentworkers reported. A field coor-dinator upervisedwozonalprogram oordinatorswho, inturn, supervisedhe 11sections.

One of the firstactionswas to open255literacycenters

staffedby 300villagers rainedas literacy nstructors.The

goalwasto eliminate heprojectarea's90 percent lliteracywithinthreeyears. Enthusiasmwas high when 5,000 vil-

lagersenrolled n the first course.But whenonly 5 percentcompleted he course,a reviewby BRAC staff concludedthat the materialsand methods used werenot relevant o

villager interests or needs. Consequently, a materials

development nitwas establishedn early1974which nter-

viewedvillagerso determine heirsubstantialnterests,anddeveloped lessons around these topics. Adult learningmethods were stressed-mainly group discussionsorga-nizedaroundkeywords,sentences,and arithmetic xercisesin whichthe instructor ook an unconventionalacilitatorrole.Materialswere estedandteachers etrainedn courses

designed to develop facilitation skills. When the new

literacy ourseswere ntroducedo thevillages,completionratesfor the first two were41 and 46 percent,respectively.

In health, a modification of BRAC's methods beganeven during he reliefphasewhen the threat of a choleraepidemicconvinced BRAC's four medical doctors theycouldnot do thejob alone.Theyquickly rainedvillagersn

thetechniques f treating holeraandseverediarrhea ases.Thusbegana patternwhich all subsequentBRAC health

programshave followed: the physician'srole would be,first,as a trainer, econd,as a planner,andonly lastlyas acurer. The Phase II health systemwas designedaround

paramedicsrained o treat18 to 20 common llnesses,pro-vide innoculations, and educate villagers in preventivehealthmeasures.A cadreof femaleworkers ecruitedam-

ily planningacceptorsand distributed upplies.The area

managers upervisedhese healthworkerswhile the physi-ciansprovidedcontinuing rainingand handledreferrals.

In agriculture,he BRAC workerscultivated heir owndemonstratin lots at theircampsites, whichusuallycon-sistedof two acresof rice and a half acreof

vegetables.As

wasdulynotedby the farmers f thearea,thiswas an unu-sualactivity orcollegegraduates.Thestatureof theBRACworkers s agriculturaldvisorswassubstantiallynhancedwhentheir fieldsproduced ome of the bestcropsseeninthe area.Farmersn selectedprojectareasreceived echni-cal assistancehroughgroupmeetings,as wellas assistancein obtainingnew seedsandother nputs.Severalgroups o-

talling 300 landless laborerswere assisted in obtainingleases on 500 acres of fallow governmentand privatelyowned land.53 rrigationand flood control projectswereconstructed nder"food for work"projects.Othereffortsincludedproviding ishermenwithboatsandwithtwinefornets. Specialwomen'sprogramsprovided raining n voca-

tionalskillssuch as sewing.A numberof cooperatives lreadyexisted n the project

areawhen BRACarrived, houghmost were neffective n

serving he broaderpopulation,havingbeentaken overbythe larger andownerswho monopolized he benefitsgov-ernmentchanneled hroughthem. BRAC was able to re-

juvenatemany throughmember raining,encouragementof regularmeetings, ntroductionof improvedaccountingpractices,and initiationof governmentaudits.A numberof new societies wereformed,includingsecond and thirdtieredstructures t union and thanalevels.


488



COMMUNITYRGANIZATION ND RURALDEVELOPMENT

As experiencewasgained n eachof theseundertakings,further nsightsbeganto emerge.

* Those who werebenefitingmost from the BRACpro-gramswerethose with relativelyarger andholdings stoo few of its programs ddressedheneedsof theland-less or near andless.

* While BRAChadbeenattemptingo formall members

of a villageinto a singleorgani7ation, he interestsoflandedand landlesswere so opposedthat it wasnearlyimpossible ora singlecommunitybasedorganizationoservethemboth simultaneously.

* EachBRACprogramwas operatingmore or less inde-

pendentlyof the others.Theoveralleffort was not pro-viding each recipientsimultaneouslywith reinforcingbenefits n a waythat would achieverealdevelopmentalimpact.

* The programremainedheavily dependenton BRACstaff andleadership.Theorganizationalmechanisms ywhichthe communitymight ndependentlyustainpro-

gramactivitieswerenot emerging.* Paramedicshad becomeprimarily bsorbed n provid-

ing curativeservices,neglectinghealth educationre-

sponsibilities,yet theironce a weekvisitsto individual

villagesdid not provide adequateaccessto even theircurative ervices.Furthermore, omenwerereluctantouse the servicesof the maleparamedics.

* Theimpactof theliteracyprogramwasstill imited.The

materialswere not keyed to direct support of other

BRACactivitiesn thevillageand thosewhocompletedthe coursehadno material vailableo readat their evel

of readingproficiency,while their writingproficiencywas not adequateto write an informative etter to a

friendor relative.

* Development f women'sprogramswasbeing nhibited

by the fact that, with the exceptionof familyplanningworkers,allBRACpersonnelworkingat thevillage evelweremen.

* In several nstances here was no market or the voca-tional skillsdeveloped n BRAC courses.Forexample,women who receivedthree-month rainingcoursesin

sewingusingUNICEF-donatedewingmachines ound

no markets or theirproductsand could not affordto

purchasemachinesonly for familyuse. The need wasfor integratedncomeearningprojects.

* Evenwithboats available he fishermen ontinued o beexploitedby thosewho controlled ishingrights,credit,and markets.

* Widespreaduse of the high yieldingrice varietieswasblockedby the limitedoutputof government eedpro-grams.

* Of some15,000 armand landless armer amilies n the

projectarea,only 300 landlessbenefited rom the land

programand only 600 farmersbenefited romthe pro-duction mprovementfforts. Theidea of constructingGonokendropeople'scenter) n eachvillage o serveas

a focal point for community ife and developmentac-tivitiesprovedunrealistic iventhe seeminglyrreconcil-able factionalismwhichdividedmostvillages.

Overall the predominantlycentrallyplanned sectoral

programshad consistentlygravitated owardpatternsof

operation hat mainlybenefited he moreeasilyreachableandthe relativelybetter-off o the neglectof the more dis-

advantaged.Phase III: The People Approach. Numerous actions

were aken o correct hedeficiencies dentified n PhaseII.Somewerefairlyspecificsuchas thedecisions o trainfull-time femalevillagehealthworkers o servethe preventiveand simplecurativehealth needs of mothers and youngchildren,and to hire females as paramedicsand multi-

purposedevelopmentworkers.More basic was the shiftduring1975and 1976 owarda

more people centeredapproachtargetedentirelyto the

poorest50percentof thevillagepopulation-defined oper-ationallyas those familieswhose livelihoodsdepended n

parton selling aborto thirdparties-with programnitia-

tivescoming argely romthe beneficiaries.Groupsof 20 to30 wereorganizedaround similareconomic nterestssuchas landless aborers,destitutewomen,and fishermen.Thefunctional iteracy rainingwasused to buildan organiza-tion, raiseconsciousness,and lead into joint activitiesre-

sponsive o identifiedneeds.Forexample, andless aborers

organizedo lease and,destitutewomen o undertake ad-dy processing,andfishermen o purchasse boat. As pro-jects were identifiedby each group, BRAC providedre-sourcessuchas credit or "food for work" grains.Onceafew suchgroupswereestablishedn a village t had beenan-

ticipatedthat they would assist in formingother groupsthrougha buildingblock processuntil all the poor of the

villagewereorganized.Experimentationwith these meth-ods continues n certain BRAC projectareas. Therehasbeena concern hat the smallergroupsmightdevelop airlyexclusiventerests,making heprocessof building owarda

village-wideorganizationof the poor more difficult than

anticipated.ConsequentlyBRACwasexperimentingn itsRuralCreditand TrainingProjectand its OutreachPro-

gramwitha newapproachwhichfeatured:

* An initialsurveydonebyoutreach taffprovidesa pointof entry o thevillageand identifiesmembers f the tar-

get group-i.e., those householdsn which abor s soldto thirdparties.

* Informaldiscussionsareinitiatedat traditionalgather-ingplaces o identify hemajorconcernsof thepoorand

potential eaders.The discussiongroupstend to growuntil a villageassembly s held and an organizationofthepoor formed o address he issuesof immediate ndmutualconcern o them.

* As leadersare identifiedthey are sent to the BRAC

trainingcenterat Savarto learn organizingand con-sciousness aisingmethods.Thecontactherewithlead-ers from similarvillagesbuilds awareness hat others

throughoutBangladesh harea similarplight.


489




* As group cohesiveness s built, joint activitiesare de-

veloped based on locally availableresources.Supple-mentalBRACresources re offeredonlyafterthegrouphas proven ts resourcefulnessn utilizingresourcesal-

ready ocallyavailable.

* Functionaleducation s introducedonly as the peopledemand t. The curriculumontinues o addressiteracy

and numerical kills, but raisingconsciousness f vari-ous formsof exploitationand buildingcommitment o

groupaction arethe primaryobjectives.

* Collectiveaction is taken on such concernsas demandsfora rightful hare n government rograms,bargainingfor improvedwages, share cropping and land leaseterms, and schemes to gain control over productiveassets."

* "Food for work" schemessuchas the clearingof land

collectively eased for farmingare plannedand imple-mentedunderthe supervision f theirown leaders.

* Women's activitiesemphasizeproductive mployment,includingcultivationand earthmovingprojects,ratherthan conventional women's activities such as sewingwhich wouldattractwomenof relativelymore well-to-do families.

* Underthe OutreachProgram,BRACworkersare notbased n thevillage,thusminimizinghepresence f theBRACestablishment.

The approachof the OutreachProgramgenerates omehelpfulprocessdynamics.First he financiallymoresecurevillagersnormally xclude hemselvesromparticipation ssoon as they learnthat BRAC is not providinghandouts

and that manyof the activities nvolvemanual abor.Sec-ond, as the organi7edpoor of a villageset aboutto nego-tiate for higherwageratestheyquickly earn hattheycanbe effectiveonlyif neighboring illagesare alsoorganized;consequently,they set about on their own to organizethem. As word spreads,people come from villagesmilesawayaskingthe organi7edvillagesfor assistance n orga-nizing.As theprocessbuildsa momentumof its ownthereis a significantdecline n theBRACstaff inputrequired ervillageorgani7ed.

PhaseIII alsobrought heintroduction f a research nitto analyzefundamental ocioeconomicproblems.BRACstaff see research s a powerful ool for programmprove-

ment,using t to addressprogram elevantquestionsrelat-ing to the dynamicsof ruralpoverty,seeking nsights nto

questions uch as:Who controls hatassets n theruralvil-

lage and why?55How are some familiesable to advancethemselves, while others become increasingly mpover-ished?Howdo peasantsperceive amine?Credit?Suchstu-dies have documented owpopulationpressures avecom-binedwithcropfailures o breakdowntraditionally rotec-tive socialstructures,eading o the conclusion hataccessto consumption redit n time of crisis s more mportantomost poor families than access to productioncredit.5sBRAC is re-examiningts creditprograms ccordingly.

With the change n orientation"participatoryesearch"

techniqueswere ntroduced, uch as askinga peasantpanelto discuss a designated opic and then recording heir ob-servations.A staff facilitatorkeepsthe discussionwithina

piearrangedramework,but allows the participantsmaxi-mumscopein exploring he subject.

Villagers concerned about the misappropriationof"food for work" grains by corruptofficials inspireda

studyon corruption.WhentheyaskedBRAC'shelpit wasdecidednothingcouldbe done withoutmoreinformation.BRACstaff members tarted ecording eports romvillag-ers. This stimulatedstill more reports.Adding data ga-thered from official records,BRAC workersand the vil-

lagersdetermined xactlyhow much each individualwas

takingand how. WhenUnion Councilsand Thamaoffi-cials were presentedwith these facts, "food for work"grainssuddenlybecameavailable o the poorfor theirpro-jects. One observationwhich emergesfrom these under-

takings s that as researchhas become ntegral o programoperations, he line betweenresearcher,ield worker,andeven thepeoplethemselvess no longerwelldefined-each

participatesn agenda setting, data collection, and inter-pretation.

[Whats neededfor uccess s]... a highde-gree of fit between rogramdesign,benefi-ciaryneeds, nd hecapacitiesftheassistingorganization.

BRAC'sresponsive tyle of programming as emergedwithin the framework f well developedmanagement ys-temsdesigned o facilitatedecentralizedperationwithinastrongbut evolvingpolicy framework.Abed's leadership

styleencourages pendiscussionof difficult ssues andac-ceptanceof apparenterrors,yet providesfirm decisionswhenthey are needed.BRAC'sorganization onformstotheLikertmodelof overlappingeams.Eachteammeetsona regularbasisfordiscussion f currentproblems,andeachmember of the staff is assisted in developingskills as adiscussion eader.57Continually nvesting n developmentof new skillsandmethodologies,BRACsends tspersonnelinto the villagearmed with a good deal more than highideals.5'

Thespontaneouseplication RAC sobservingsprob-ablythestrongest vailablendicator hat tsprograms tru-ly meeting eltneeds,yetBRAC acessome mportant hal-

lenges.Powerful ocialforces owardpositivechangeshavebeenset in motionby the BRACapproach,andmaintain-ingthe momentum f those forceswithout ncurring ma-jor backlashposesa difficultchallenge.BRACis also pre-paring o launcha nation-wide inglepurposeprogram otrain rural mothers in oral rehydration echniques fortreatingdiarrhea.Twothousandnewworkerswillbeaddedto its staff of 378(January1980 igures),s'workingunderaseparate upervisorytructure.Thus, BRACwillbe simul-taneouslyrunning wo programsbased on quite differentoperating equirements.Whatstrains hismayplaceon itsorganization emain o be seen.


490



COMMUNITYRGANIZATIONNDRURALDEVELOPMENT

Thailand'sCommunity asedFamilyPlanningServices CBFPS)

Reachinghe ruralpoorneed not always nvolvecommu-nity organizations,as demonstratedby Thailand'sCom-munityBasedFamilyPlanningServices CBFPS),headed

by the colorful and controversialMechaiVeravaidya."Asof 1979 t wasdistributing irthcontrolpillsthroughcom-

munityvolunteersn 16,200Thaivillages.From 1965-72,Mechai,then chief of the Development

EvaluationDivision of the National EconomicDevelop-ment Board, traveledextensively hroughoutThailand oobservegovernment evelopment rogramsn action. Twofundamental onclusionsemerged: 1) nearlyall develop-ment programswere failing becausethey were designedfrom the top down, involvedno participation f the peo-ple, and seldomprovided ffectivefollow-upon completedprojects;and(2)suchgainsas werebeingmadewererapid-ly cancelledout by populationgrowth.He decided o de-vote himselfto actionon both problems.

In 1971, Mechai becamea part-timeconsultant o the

PlannedParenthoodAssociationof Thailand PPAT),andwasappointed ts ExecutiveDirector n 1973.At that time

family planningwas available n Thailandonly throughgovernmentmedical acilitieswhichvillagers eldomused.Mechaiwantedto bring t closer to the people.So in 1972he sent a manto walkthrougha villageand talk to peopleabout familyplanning, tellingthose who were interestedthat therewould be a doctorat the local school the follow-

ing Sunday.More than 100 womencame,three-fourths fwhomhad nevervisited he governmenthospitalonly twokilometersaway. A secondexperiment,usingstudents orecruit illagerso go to anearby overnment ealth acilitywasrelatively nsuccessful.He concluded hat:(1)thedoc-tor hadto come to the people;and

(2)the

settingmustbe

familiar.

Beneficiaryeeds... areafunction fthepo-litical economic,ndsocialcontext n whichthebeneficiariesiveandcannot eadequatelydefinedorpurposes f determiningrograminput equirementsndependentlyfthatcon-text.

A thirdexperiment stablished hat in Thailand amilyplanningpromotion ould bepublicand fun.At a localfair

he hiredentertainerso dressup in familyplanningT-shirtsandto blowup condomsas balloonsfor the children.At a

familyplanningbooth contestantsknockedover canswitha ballto win condoms.Condoms ervedas ticketsof admis-sion to a folk danceexhibition.Attractingattentionwith

stimulatingbad reactions, such unconventionalpromo-tionalmethodssubsequently ecamea Mechai rademark.

Such ad hoc experimentation ontinueduntil January1974.By that time he reali7ed hatif familyplanningwere

goingto bebrought o thepeople,someonewithgreatern-terestthanthe physicianswould haveto do it, but he stillneeded one unconventionalphysician o help him test his

latest idea. Dr. Kom Pongkun, the Medical Officer for

BanglamungDistrict,proved o be theman.Together heyrecruited ive shopkeepersknown to Dr. Komin each offive villages n BanglamungDistrict.Ignoring he legalre-

quirement hat birth controlpills could be dispensedonlyon a physician'sprescription, hey providedeach with a

supplyof pills and an explanationof theiruse. The dis-tributorcould chargesix bahts for eachcycleof pills and

keeponeas a commission.As week ater hedistributorse-portedgood sales. So by mid-February 974,MechaiandDr. Komtrained70 newdistributorsn a one-daycourse oservethe restof the district.

Thoughsomedifficultpoliticalbattlesensuedas opposi-tionto the schememounted,on May 17, 1974 heNational

Family Planning CoordinatingCommittee removed the

legal restrictionon pill dispensingby non-physicians ndauthorizedextensionof the scheme to 23 additional dis-tricts.Having alreadyobtainedfundingfrom the Interna-tional PlannedParenthoodFederation,Mechaicompletedthis initialexpansionby December.Since the strongestop-positionhad come from within his own organization, he

PPAT, he subsequentlyoperatedthe Community-BasedFamilyPlanningServicesCBFPS) argely ndependently fthe parentorganization.

Testingand revisioncontinuedduringthe earlyexpan-sion. Varioustypes of distributorswere tried-includingvillageheadmenandfarmers-and the methodsof selectionwere refined.Alternative upervision ndresupply ystemswere ested:a "G Model"reliedon governmentmedicalof-ficers o selectandtraindistributors, rovide ogistical up-port,and collectthefunds; n a "P Model" thesefunctionswereall performedby CBFPSpersonnel.Twolessonswerelearned: he medicalofficers,whoseprimary esponsibilitywas for clinic operations, could not simultaneously

managea village-based ystem,but theircooperationwasvery important.Thus, CBFPS subsequentlyhandled all

operationsbutpaidthemedicalofficersa fixed honorariumto act as "medicalsupervisors."Later,when the govern-ment createda newpost of districtpublichealthofficer to

supervise illage-basedmidwives, esponsibilityormedical

supervisionwas transferredo them. Lessonswere earnedinpromotionas well:familyplanningmovieswerepopular,but had littleimpacton acceptance ates;coloredcondomsmade colorful promotionsbut the pill was the preferredmethodamongthe villagers.

Learningwasalso involved n developing ffectiveman-agement ystems.Complaintsromdistributorsstablished

that resupplyof contraceptivepills and condomsby mailwas unreliable.Finally a system was devised wherebysupervisors eceived uppliesat theirmonthlymeetingfordelivery o the villagedistributorswho also receivedpre-paid, pre-addressed ost cards to mail to Bangkokwhen-eversupplies ailed o arrive.At thesamemeeting tatisticalreportswerecollected,resultsreviewed ndnewtargets et.A commissionsystem for supervisorswas introduced n1978.

As the programgrew, new layersof managementwereadded at the top, but to ensurecontinuedcontactwith ac-tual field operations,all staff were scheduledto make


491




periodic visits to the villages with local supervisors. New

personnel were introduced into established districts to gaininitial experience, releasing more experienced people to

open new districts.In general the learning process which maintained con-

tinuing program improvement came not from formal stu-

dies, but from the immediate experience of the program

leadership who were in direct contact with villagers and

program operations. Mechai observed that:

IntheearlydaysI dideverything-talking o thedoctors, electingandtrainingdistributors,ollow-up,blowingup condoms or thechildren.The only thing I didn't do myself was the resupply.That'sthewayI learnedmybusiness.And I think t is a good wayto learn.

At the same time substantial attention was given to mak-

ing more formal information an effective managementtool, resulting in substantial deviation from conventional,donor-mandated evaluation procedures. Distributor re-

porting requirements were gradually, but drastically, sim-

plified to provide only data essential to program moni-

toring. Carefully plannedand

constantlyupdated visual

displays drew attention at each program level to trends and

highlighted problem areas. Conventional impact surveyswere found to be largely useless since the results took too

long to process and they did not relate to specific admin-

istrative units. Thus, a "mini-survey" technique was intro-

duced in 1978. Each month the supervisor did a house-to-

house surveyin a given number of villages, finding out who

was practicing birth control, by what methods, and who

was using supplies obtained from what source. Not only did

it provide an up-to-date overview of each village, but the re-

sults were put to immediate use. Women who were not

practicing birth control were urged on the spot to make use

of their village pill supplier. Older women with several

children relying on the pill were advised about sterilization.Interest in potential new products, such as injectables, was

assessed. By continuously moving from village to village, a

given district could be completely surveyed in 12 to 18

months. Research and operations were totally integrated.

These xperiences... lluminatehy ffectivefit is so seldom chievedn ruraldevelopmenteffortsthrough heprevailing lueprint p-proach to developing rogramming. heircomparativeuccesswas basedon a ratherdifferentrocessof bottom-uprogram nd

organizationalevelopment, learningpro.cessapproach.

By 1980, between the efforts of various public and pri-vate agencies, the need for easy access to contraceptive sup-ply had been largely met in most Thai villages. Anticipatingthis development, the Population and Community Devel-

opment Association, which incorporated the CBFPS as a

bureau, was formed in 1977 to undertake a widely diversi-fied range of family planning and community developmentactivities building on the infrastructure of the CBFPS. Ex-

perimentswere underway n everything rom pig raisingand the financingof latrineconstruction o relief servicesforrefugeesand themarketing f pumpkins.Manyof these

undertakings posed rather different technical and organi7a-tionalrequirements.As of January1980most werestillatthe small pilot stage, with the problemsof buildingthe

managementystemsrequiredo support arger calerepli-cation still to be faced.

PhilippineNationalIrrigationAdministrationCommunalrrigationProgram

Lineagenciesof governmentshroughoutAsia are mak-

ing new efforts to reachthe ruralpoor and to encourageformationof localorganizationsn supportof program c-tivities.Yet, seldomdo thesecentrallydesigned ffortsgivemore thanlip service o relating n a meaningfulwayto lo-

callyidentifiedneedsor to examininghe managementys-temswhichdominate heagency'sprogramso seewhether

theyareconsistentwith a participative pproach.Exampleswhichconstitutewelcomeexceptions romthe moregeneralpatternareemergingn Asia, oneexamplebeing heefforts

of the National IrrigationAdministration NIA) of thePhilippineso strengthents work in supportof communal

irrigators' ssociations.Government ssistanceo smallfarmer-ownedndoper-

atedgravity rrigation ystemsnthePhilippinesracesbackto the early1900s,but it wasgenerallyimitedto the con-structionof physical acilities.Especiallyduring he 1950sand 60s it was dominatedby "porkbarrel"politicswhich

spreadavailable undsoverso manydifferentprojects hat

planningand constructionwere often inadequate.In the

early1970sefforts weremade to correct he deficiencies fthe past, but evenwith morerationalallocation of funds

manycompletedsystemsfell rapidly nto disuseor served

substantiallyewerfarmers han intended.One theoryar-guedthatattentionwas needed o helping hefarmers ormeffectiveassociationsable to performthe operationsandmaintenance asks once constructionwascompleted.

Consequently, wo actions were taken in 1976 by theNIA, whichwasresponsibleor overall rrigationdevelop-ment n thePhilippines.Onewas to concludeanagreementwiththe FarmSystemsDevelopmentCorporationFSDC),a publiccorporationwith experiencen developingsmallpumpfed irrigation ystems,underwhichFSDCwould or-

ganizefarmers o operateand maintainmanyof thephysi-cal systemswhich the NIA was constructing."Coordina-tion was to be managedby a centralcommitteecomposedof representativesf eachof the twoagencies.Therewasanassumption mplicit n thisagreementhatthetechnical ndthe socialsub-systemsould be created eparately ndthen

merged.The secondaction was to initiatea pilot projectat Laur

in CentralLuzon to experimentwitha more ntegrated p-proach n whichthe capacityof the wateruserassociationwouldbedeveloped hroughactive nvolvementntheplan-ning and constructionactivities:planning systemlayout,obtainingwaterrightsandrightsof way,organizing olun-teer labor nputsto systemconstruction,andexerting on-trol overprojectexpenditures.'2


492



COMMUNITYRGANIZATIONNDRURAL EVELOPMTNT

Integratingocial and technicaldevelopmentprovedex-

tremelydifficult.Inonecommunityt waslearnedhow dif-ficultdealingwith localpowerstruggles anbe-leading totheabandonment f construction lansuntilthe local asso-ciationreorganizedtself some two years ater.In a second

community t was learned hat high level of commitmentfrom a cohesive farmergroup does not necessarilymake

thingseasier for the engineers: chedulingand systemde-

signissuesresulted n numerousdelaysandchanges;orga-nization of volunteer aborpresentedunfamiliarproblemsworkedout only through engthymeetings;and farmern-sistenceon monitoringpurchases ndlimitingpersonaluseof vehiclesusinggasolinecharged o the farmers' oan ac-countswasnot alwayswelcomedby projectengineers.Thefarmerseven questioned he engineerson basic technical

judgments,such as the type of materialchosen for dam

construction, nsistingthat the proposedstructurewouldnot withstand he force of local floods. Finally,however,the new dam was completedusingthe designfavoredbyNIA's design engineers-only to be washed out a fewmonths ater.

The experiencewas sobering n the difficultieswhichitsuggestedhe NIA must face if it were o workeffectivelyn

supportof communitymanaged rrigation;ts capabilitieson both the technicaland the institutional ide would needto be upgraded ndintegrated.Numerous hanges n oper-ating procedureswere implied.Yet, it established n themindsof NIA's leadershiphat thereweremajorbenefits obe gained n return.Not onlycould farmerparticipationn

systemplanningand construction esult n a strongerwateruserassociationbetterequipped o operateand maintainthe finishedsystem,but it couldalso result n a betterde-

signed and constructed rrigationsystemmore likely tomeet farmerneeds. The resultwasa strengthenedommit-ment

byone of the

largestpublicagenciesn

thePhilippines(43,000 employees) o builda newcapacity or communitylevel action.

Thoughstillunfolding, heNIA experiences off specialinterest n providinga modelof organizational hangebywhicha large,established,bureaucratic,echnology-based,publicorganizationmay be able to redesign ts programsand structureshrougha bottom-up,field based,learningprocessanalogous o thatbywhich hesuccessfulprogramsof organizations uch as the NationalDairyDevelopmentBoard, the BangladeshRural AdvancementCommittee,and the Community Based Family Planning Services

emerged.TheNIA model has the followingkeyelements:63

* A Seriesof Time-PhasedLearningLaboratories." ni-

tially two NIA communals assistanceprojects were

designatedas learning aboratories n which teams ofNIA personnel: a) workedout methods or integratingthe social and technicalaspectsof systemrehabilitationthroughfull involvementof farmers n planningandconstruction; b) built an understanding f the specialproblemsposed by these methodsand of the capacitiesNIA would require o use them effectively; c) built acadreof engineers,organizers,and managers killed ntheirapplicationo facilitatedisseminationo therestof

the organization;and (d) identified conflicts betweenthe new methodsand the broaderpoliciesand proce-duresof theNIA. Assessment f the initialpilotswas us-ed to refinemethodssubsequently mployed n two ad-ditionalpilot systems,also designatedas learning ab-oratories.Theserefinementsmade t possible o shortenlead times, reduce the numberof organizers equired,improveprojectsite selection,and avoid manyof the

conflictsbetween armers, ngineers, ndorganizers n-countered n the earlierpilots.

* A National CommunalIrrigationCommittee.A toplevelworkingcommittee,headedby NIA AssistantAd-ministrator enjaminBagadionwhois themoving orcebehind the communals ffort, coordinates he learningprocess.Committeemembershipncludes central evelNIA officials and an FSDC representative, s well as

academically asedmembers epresentinghedisciplinesof social science, management,and agricultural ngi-neering.Most committeemembershaveday-to-dayre-

sponsibility or one or anotheraspectof the learningprocessactivity.Meetingsare heldmonthly o evaluate

progress,nterpretheexperiencerom thelearningab-

oratorysites and othercommitteesponsoredresearch,initiatenew studiesas needed,commissionpreparationof trainingmaterials, ndplanstrategiesor phaseddis-seminationof newmethods.

* Process OrientedResearch.Research s an integralpartof the learningprocess.Thefocalconcern s withbuild-ing into the NIA the new skills,methods,and systemsappropriateo its newparticipative pproach.The out-side researchers re full participants, heir roles dis-

tinguished romthoseof NIA personnelby theirspecialexpertise ather hanby anypresumption f specialob-

jectivity.65a. Social Sciences. Social scientists nvolvedfrom the

Instituteof PhilippineCulturehave had threemainconcerns: 1)development ndoperationalestingofguidelinesfor rapid collection and assessmentbyNIA field staff of social-institutional ata("institu-tionalprofiles")critical o project electionandplan-ning; 2)processdocumentation asedon participantobservation n learning aboratorysites to providemonthlynon-evaluativenarrative eedback on keyprocessevents o operatingpersonnel,provincial ndregionalmanagers,and membersof the CommunalIrrigationCommittee; 3) studyof the organization,maintenance, and water management methodsworkedout by farmersn functioning ssociations sa basis for NIA assistance o other communals nworkingout methods suited to their own circum-stances;66nd(4) trainingof NIA personneln use ofthe new tools beingdeveloped.

b. Management.Management xpertsfrom the AsianInstituteof Management:1) assessthe fit betweenrequirementsf the newmethods for assistingcom-munalsand existingNIA management ystems;672)adviseon newmanagementolesandprocedures;3)


493




assist n planning he organizational hangeprocess;and(4)coordinateworkshops or NIA managers nd

engineerson the newmethods.

c. Water Management.An agriculturalengineeringteamfrom the InternationalRice Research nstituteandtheUniversity f thePhilippines t LosBafios s

developing: 1) simplifiedmethods or diagnosisandcorrectionof common water

management roblemsto be used by farmersand NIA engineers;and (2)simplifiedwatermanagement ystems uited o needsof small wateruser associations.Thesewillbe oper-ationally estedand refined n thepilotsites and thenwill serveas the basis for trainingprogramsdirectedto farmers, ngineers, ndorganizers hroughouthe

country.

* SeedingPilots. Once the CommunalIrrigationCom-mittee hass concluded that a reasonablysatisfactoryprogrammodel and supportingmethodshad beenpro-duced in the learning aboratory ystems,a workshopwas heldin December1979for the directorsof eachoftheNIA's 12regionsat whichan orientationo thenew

approachwasprovided.Eachwas calledon to designateone upcomingsystemrehabilitationn his regionas a

pilot. Each region, thus, would be "seeded" with itsownlearning aboratoryhroughwhichregionalperson-nel could gain experiencewith the new methods and

adoptthem to theirneeds.Additional rainingwould beheld for the engineerof each province n whichsuch a

pilotwasto be located,as well as the institutional rga-nizersto be assigned o them. Regular ollow-upmeet-

ingswouldbe held for further rainingand to shareex-

periencen dealingwith uncommonproblems.Theper-sonnelinvolved n thesepilotswouldthen be in a posi-tion to assist n spreadingunderstandingf the methodfurtherwithin theirrespective egions.

While warenesssbecoming idespreadhatthe blueprint pproachs an inadequatee-sponse o ruraldevelopmentroblems,tsas-sumptionsndproceduresontinueo domi-nate most ruraldevelopmentrogrammingand... mostdevelopmentanagementrain-ing.

Work on the first NIApilot systems

hadbegun

n 1976.Threeanda halfyears ater he firststepswerebeingtakento seed the largerorganization.At least threeand a halfmore years would be requiredbefore the new methodswould be understood hroughout he organization."Thatsevenyearsmaybe requiredor such a changeprocesshad

important mplications,as it extendswellbeyondthe pro-gramming yclesof most donorsandplanningagencies.It

requires ommitment,patience,and substantial ontinuityof leadershipo confront hedifficultieswhichareencoun-teredon an almostdailybasis.Even hough hesehavebeenpresent n theNIA, therestill is no assurance heeffort will

succeed.All thepilotsystems n which he newappioach s

beingdevelopedreceived ntensiveattention rom all levelsof management nd numerousoutsideexperts.The inten-

sityof input per system s graduallybeingreducedand thedetailsof a phaseddissemination rocessarebeingworkedout withthe usual care.Yet it remains o be seenwhetherthe newstylesof workingwith farmers an be sustainedona largerscale and whether certain mansgementsystem

problems, ome of whichfall beyondthe controlof NIA'smanagement, an be resolved."9

PeasantMovements

That the ruralpoor can be mobilized or significantac-tion on felt needs s mostdramaticallyllustrated y theex-perienceof successfulpeasantmovements.7Thesearebestknownfor theirefforts to seek relief from the oppressivepracticesof governmentofficials, landlords, and otherpowerfulelites n matters elating o rights o land,the ten-ants'right o securityof tenureand a fairshareof the har-vest, and the laborers'rightto a fair income.The peasantmovementshave backed theirdemandswith strikes,civil

disobedience,demonstrations,assassinations,and armedrebellionas suitstheirpurposes.

The stakeshave,at times,beenhighand the numbers fparticipantsargeasdemonstrated ythe massacre f half amillion eftistpeasantsafter the abortive1965coup in In-donesia,71 nd the overthrowof establishedregimesinChina and Vietnamby peasant based liberationmove-ments. In the Philippines he Huk Movement,built on ahistoryof peasantuprisings xtendingback to the 1800s,led the resistance gainstJapaneseoccupationof the Phil-ippines during World War II.72 The Japanese TenantUnionsplayeda prominent ole in the protectionof Japa-nesepeasantrights n the 1920s.73 varietyof tenantand

farm labor organizationshave been influential n Indianpoliticssince the 1950s.74

Untilthe end of thelastcenturynearlyall suchrebellionsfailedmiserably.75 igdalseesa combinationof forces offairlyrecentoriginas creating he preconditionsor morerecent successes:(a) severepopulationgrowth increasespressures n the resourcebase on whichthe peasant's ive-lihooddepends; b)withdrawal f thepatronremovesbotha sourceof supportand a sourceof controlbased on a re-ciprocalface-to-facerelationship; c) demandsof centralgovernmentor newtaxes force thepeasant's ntry ntothemarketeconomy o achievea cashincome;while(d) tradi-tionalsourcesof craft ncomearelost to competition rommodern

wageproduction.7' s traditional upportandcon-trolstructures reakdown,inequitiesn landtenureandso-cial structure ecomemorepronouncedn their mpact.Fi-nally, the dependenceof the ruralpoor on the traditionalpatronis replacedby dependenceon the imperfectoftencorrupteconomicand political nstitutionsof a moderniz-ing state.7 This new dependences less tolerable han theold as the peasanthas even fewermeansof pressinghisclaims than he did within the traditionalinstitutionalframeworks.His loyaltyto the new system s understand-ablylimited.7'

Competitionbetween the alternativeprioritiesof the


494




FIGURE2

SchematicRepresentationof Fit Requirements

Means f Demand xpression

modem and traditionaleconomiesfor use of the naturalresourcebase-one for the expansionof economicoutputandexportearnings,heother orpersonal urvival-is alsoa critical actor. Historically,efforts to pushpeasantsofftheir andto makewayfor estateagriculture, nd more re-

cently he competitionbetweenuplandpeoplesandlogginginterests,havebeenimportantn stimulating rganized e-sistance.7'The consistent ack of response o peasantap-pealsbyelitedominatedegalsystems urther ontributesothe alienationprocess."

Thedataonpeasantmovementsuggestthat]... f thesuccessof anysuchmovement asan outcome f projectpapers, ocialbenefit-cost analyses,environmentalmpactstate-ments,or PERT charts,the sourcedocu-mentsexaminedmadeno mention f it.

Yet, it is significant hatthestrongerpeasantmovements

havenot beenviolentexplosionsof peasantdiscontent.Ra-

ther, theyhavebedgunwithpatientgrassrootsorganizingwork, buildingslowly on the most stronglyfelt peasantgrievances.Gradually hey havecreatedalternative ocial,

economic,and

politicalstructureswithin heruralcommu-

nitywith a demonstratedapacity o meetthe needsof the

ruralpoormoreeffectivelyand to providemoreopportuni-tiesfor advancementhanhasthe "legitimate" rder.81 c-

cordingto Migdal, in the more successfulpeasantmove-mentsthe actualuse of violencehasbeensecondaryo the

process of power building. Moreover,while the powerbuildingprocessmay nclude orcing helargemerchantso

relinquish heir monopoly control over local markets, t

mayalsoinvolvemoremundane ctivities uchasprovidingeducation, medical care, and transportation acilities-even the implementation f rentceilingandinterestreduc-

Organizationalecision rocess

tion policiesannouncedby a governmentoo weak to en-force them. "The majortask of the movement s not to

outfightbut to outadministerhe government."12During he courseof thispowerbuildingprocessa vari-

ety of demandsare made on the old order. Initially heymaybe relativelyminor,but as ruralelitesrespond n waysnot consistentwith law andcustom,the neworganizationsbecomeincreasingly adicali7ed,with an escalation n de-mandsand the use of confrontation actics."

Important o the processis a strong, generallycharis-matic eaderwhocanarticulate isfollowers' eelingsabouttheir

repressedonditionsand withwhom

theycanbuilda

personal dentification.Among people traditionallymoreorientedto vertical than to horizontalrelationships, heleaderfirst serves as a psychologicalreplacement or the

patronwhose mage s shifting rom thatof father igure o

tyrant.As thisdisplacementakesplacetheprocessof con-sciousnessraisingcan proceedtowarddevelopmentof asenseof horizontal lasssolidarity.84

Examination f the historyand dynamicsof successful

peasantmovementsprovidesunsettling nsights nto whatconstitutethe most deeply felt of peasant needs and a

powerfulreminder hat participation n decisionmakingand resourcecontrol involvespotentiallyvolatilepoliticalissues.Implicit s the questionof whether he "real"needs

of the ruralpoorcan be addressed y working rom withinestablishedsocietal frameworks.The cases of successfulAsianruraldevelopment xperiences xamined n this sec-tion suggest hat, thoughdifficult,the possibilitymayexistif actionis takenon the lessonstheyoffer.

SocialIntervention s a LearningProcess

Thesecases of relativelypromisingexperience eflect aremarkable iversity.In some of the initiativecame from

government;n others t wasprivateor mixed.Someorigi-


495




nated n nationalpolicywhileothersemergedromthebot-tom-upasa localeffort wasbuilt nto a programwith nter-nationalvisibility.Some dealtwitha relatively arrow on-cernsuch as milkproduction, rrigation,or contraceptivedistribution,whileothers took a comprehensivepproachto the needs of givenvillagecommunities.Someinvolved

specificcommitment o thepoorwhileothersmadeno dis-tinctionbetween he ruralclasses.

AchievingFit:Blueprint ersusLearningProcess

Apparentlyhe determinantsf successcannotbe foundin an easilyreplicableprogramvariable-whetherprivateor public,multi-purposer single-purpose, roadlyor nar-rowlydefined argetgroup.Eachprojectwassuccessfulbe-cause t had workedout a programmodelresponsiveo thebeneficiaryneeds at a particular ime and placeand eachhad builta strongorganization apableof making hepro-gramwork.Put anotherway, theyhad achieveda highde-greeof fit betweenprogramdesign,beneficiary eeds,andthe capacitiesof the assistingorganization. See Figure2.)

The conceptof fit has assumeda central mportancen

the fields of businesspolicy and organizational esignasresearchhas illuminated he importantrelationshipsbe-tweentask,context,andorgani7ational ariables, onclud-ingthattheperformancef anorganizations a functionofthe fit achievedbetweenthose variables."5 lthough the

concept s simple, heelements hatgo intoachieving it arevariedandcomplex,especiallywhentheconcept s appliedto participativeuraldevelopment.

Between he intendedbeneficiaries nd theprogram, hecritical it to be achieved s betweenbeneficiaryneedsandthe particular esources,andservicesmadeavailable o thecommunity as programoutputs. Beneficiaryneeds, ofcourse,area functionof thepolitical,economic,and socialcontext in whichthe beneficiaries ive and cannotbe ade-quatelydefined or purposesof determining rogramnputrequirementsndependently f that context.

Betweenbeneficiaries nd the assistingorganization,hecritical it is between he meansby whichbeneficiaries reable to define and communicate heirneeds and the pro-cessesbywhich heorganizationmakesdecisions.Thismayrequire hangesbothat thecommunityevel-developing away for the poor to express heirneeds-and the assistingorganization'sevel-developing waysfor the organizationto respond o such nformation."Thewayin which his fitis achievedwill largelydeterminewhether he interventionbuilds or diminishes he community'scapacityfor localproblemsolving.

Between heprogramandtheorganization,hecritical itis between the task requirements f the programand thedistinctivecompetenceof the organization.The task re-quirementsonsistof whatever heorganization'smembersmustdo to produce he inputsandmakethemavailable othe beneficiaries.The distinctivecompetenceof the orga-nization relates to the structures,routines, and normswhichgovernthe organization'sunctioningandthe tech-nical and social capabilities t bringsto bearin providingthe program.'7

Thespecificsolutionswhich he variousprograms xam-

ined had found to the requirementor fit variedsubstan-tially, and each was probablyuniqueto a particular imeand set of circumstances.Thus, the commonalities hatmay be looked to as providing mportant essonsare notfound in their final programor organizational lueprints,but rather n the processby whichbothprogram ndorga-nizationwere developedconcurrently.These experienceshelpto illuminatewhyeffective it is so seldomachieved n

ruraldevelopment ffortsthrough he prevailingblueprintapproacho development rogramming. heircomparativesuccesswasbased on a ratherdifferentprocessof bottom-up programand organizationaldevelopment,a learningprocessapproach."

TheBlueprintApproach.The textbookversionof howdevelopmentprogrammings supposed o work is labelledthe blueprintapproach n recognitionof its emphasisoncarefulpre-planning. ts keyelementsareshown in Figure3. Researchersresupposed o providedata frompilotpro-jects and other studieswhich will allow the plannerstochoosethe mostcosteffectiveprojectdesign orachievinggivendevelopment utcomeand to reduce t to a blueprint

for implementation.Administrators f the implementingorganization resupposed o execute heprojectplanfaith-fully,muchas a contractorwouldfollowconstruction lue-prints, specifications,and schedules.An evaluation re-searchers supposed o measure ctualchanges nthetargetpopulationandreportactualversusplannedchanges o theplannersat the end of the projectcycle so that the blue-printscan be revised.

FIGURE3

TheBlueprintApproach o DevelopmentProgramming

The project-its identification, ormulation,design,ap-praisal,selection, organization, mplementation, upervi-sion, termination,and evaluation-is treatedas the basicunit of development ction."8t becomes he instrument ywhich planned developmental hangesare introduced nwhatotherwisewould be the normalcourseof events."Itsdistinguishingcharacteristicshave been summarizedasfollows:


496




Aproject . . hasdefinitegoals,a definite ime-frame, nd acare-

ful specificationof resource equirements.... Projectgoalstake

many orms,but heyall haveonecommoneature:heyare er-minal.Reachinghegoalconcludesheproject."Emphasisnoriginal.)

Theblueprint pproachhas an appealing enseof order,specialization, ndrecognition f the superordinateoleofthe intellectualwhich makesit easilydefensible n budget

presentations. ndeed, its emphasison well-plannedandclearlydefinedprojectswithdiscreteandvisibleoutcomesis well suited to the construction f a large-scale,physicalinfrastructure here he taskis defined,the outcomes er-

minal, the environment table, and the costs predictable.However,in ruraldevelopmentobjectivesare moreoften

multiple, ll-definedandsubject o negotiated hange, ask

requirementsnclear,outcomesunboundedby time,envi-ronmentsunstable,and costs unpredictable.'

Whereknowledge s nearlynon-existent, he blueprintapproachcalls for behavingas if knowledgewerenearlyperfect.Wherethe needis to buildcapacity or sustained

developmentaction, it assumesthat developmentactions

are terminal and that temporary organizations willsuffice.'3 Where the need is for a close integrationof

knowledgebuilding,decisionmaking, and action takingroles,it sharplydifferentiateshe functionsandeventhein-stitutional ocationsof the researcher,he planner,andtheadministrator.

Whileawareness s becomingwidespreadhat the blue-

printapproachs aninadequate esponse o the ruraldevel-

opment problem,' its assumptionsand procedurescon-tinue to dominatemost ruraldevelopmentprogrammingand to provide he core contentof mostdevelopmentman-agment raining.This situationprobablywillcontinueuntil

greaterattention s given to the explicationof viableop-

tions.The Learning Process Approach. Examination of the

Asian success cases suggeststhat the blueprintapproachneverplayedmore than an incidental olein theirdevelop-ment. These five programswerenot designedand imple-mented-rather they emergedout of a learningprocess nwhichvillagersandprogrampersonnel hared heirknowl-

edgeandresourceso createa programwhichachieved fitbetweenneedsandcapacitiesof the beneficiaries nd thoseof the outsiderswho wereproviding he assistance.Lead-

ershipandteamwork,rather hanblueprints,werethe keyelements.Often the individualswho emerged s the central

figureswere nvolvedat the very nitialstage n thisvillageexperience,earningat first handthe natureof beneficiaryneeds and what was required o address hemeffectively.As progresswas made n dealingwiththeproblemof fit be-tweenbeneficiary ndprogram,attentionwasgiveneitherto buildinga supportingorganization roundthe require-mentsof the program,or to adapting hecapabilities f an

existingorgamizationo fit those requirements.Bothpro-gramandorganization merged ut of a learningprocess nwhich research nd action were ntegrallyinked.

The NationalDairyDevelopmentBoard(NDDB) s per-hapsa prototypeof thisbottom-upprogram ndorganiza-tion building process. The outlines of the model were

workedout largelyby a groupof smallvillage dairy pro-ducers o meet theirown needs. TheyoungKurienbroughttechnicaland marketing kills, and out of theircollective

knowledge ndcommitment strong upportingnfrastruc-ture was fashioned,eventually esultingn an officialpro-gramof nationalscope.

The Community Based Family Planning Service

(CBFPS)providesa parallel xperiencenvolving ess com-

plex technologies and support requirements.Anotheryoung man of strongpersonalityand village experience,Mechai,engaged n collaborationwith villagers o try outan idea for makingcontraceptivesmoreavailable.Out of

earlyexperimentation programmodel anda well-defined

supportingorganizationemerged,growingand adaptingwiththe expansionof the program.

The programof the BangladeshRural AdvancementCommittee BRAC)movedrapidly hroughthree distinct

phasesas it learned rom tsearlyerrors. n the firststage t

largelyacted for the people, in the secondthe peopleweredrawn nto participationn BRAC definedprograms,andin the third t organized he peopleand responded n sup-

port of their initiatives. Organizationalstrength builtthrough he experience f the earlierphasesmadepossiblethethirdphase n whichanunusuallyhighdegreeof fit wasachieved.Researcher, illager,andoutreachworkerall en-

gaged directlyin the process of buildingand using the

knowledgebase for improvedprogramdesign.The result

provedso powerful n its response o felt needsthat a pro-cessof spontaneous eplicationwas set in motion.

The SarvodayaShramadanaMovement SSM)offers avariation on the three stages of BRAC's developmentthoughgrowthwasfaster,andthe fit was weaker.It beganas an effort to (1) provideschoolboys with an experiencewhichwouldraisetheir consciousness egardinghe life of

poor villagersand (2) help breakdown the socialbarrierswhich solatedSriLanka'smostdiscriminated astes.This

early experience,n which its leadershipwas shaped,con-sistedprimarily f sponsoring hortwork-study amps.Atthis stagetherewas a fairly good fit between he needsofthe schoolboys,theprogram,andthesupporting rganiza-tion. Butas the Sarvodayaeadersbecamemore sensitizedto the needs of the ruralpoor, they realized he need formoresustaineddevelopment ction. A substantial hift wasmade n program ocus, but withtoo little attention o im-

plementational etailspriorto the creationof a substan-

tiallyexpandedorganizationo enlargeprogram overage.The resultwas a highlycentralized nd ill-definedorgani-zationalstructurewhich fit

poorlywith

programrequire-mentsandhad nadequatemechanismsorrelating o bene-

ficiarydemands,while solating ts leadershipromcontactwithoperating ealities.Recognizinghesedeficiencies fterseveralyears,a researchmechanismwas eventually ntro-ducedto facilitate eedbackand corrective ctionthroughinvolvingvillagersand staff in collecting, assessing,and

actingon programperformance ata.

The NationalIrrigationAdministration'sNIA)newpar-ticipativestyle communalsprogramwas still at an earlystageof development,but it illustrates n expliciteffort tosimulatewithina largeestablished rganizationhetypeof


497




bottom-up program design and organization building pro-cess of the NDDB, BRAC, CBFPS experiences. NIA per-sonnel first worked with village people to evolve a more

suitable program model, and, then, they gradually workedto build into the larger NIA organization the capabilitiesneeded to achieve a fit with the new program model's task

requirements. This included a variety of training seminars,

replication of the pilot project learning experiences, addi-

tions of new types of personnel such as community orga-nizers, and changes in organi7ational structures and pro-cedures.

The data on peasant movements suggest an almost re-

markably parallel to the bottom-up, capacity building pro-cess which built on first-hand knowledge of the people and

their needs. This has led to the creation of institutional

capacities better able to address these needs using largely lo-

cally available resources. If the success of any such move-ment was an outcome of project papers, social benefit-cost

analyses, environmental impact statements, or PERT

charts, the source documents examined made no mentionof it.

The LearningOrganization

Achieving fit through the learning process approach calls

for organizations that have little in common with the im-

plementing organizations geared to reliable adherence to

detailed plans and conditions precedent favored in the blue-

print approach. Its requirementis for organizations with awell developed capacity for responsive and anticipatory

adaptation-organizaitons that: (a) embraceerror; (b) planwith the people; and (c) link knowledge building with ac-

tion.

Embracing Error. Preplanned interventions into variedand constantly changing socio-technical systems will nearly

always proveto

bein

errorby some margin in terms of pro-ducing the effect intended. The response to this erroris oneof the best available indicators of the quality of an organi-zation's leadership.

There are three characteristicresponses to error: to denyit, to externalize it, or to embrace it. Every individual hassome tendencies toward each, but organizations developnorms reinforcing one or another tendency until it becomesa dominant characteristic.

The dominant response in the self-deceiving organizationis to deny error. If top management treats error as an indi-

cation of personal incompetence, the organization's mem-

bers will rapidly become highly skilled in making sure thaterrors are hidden. This can be quite reassuring to those

removed from operating reality as it confirms their self im-

age as competent leaders. They can impress visitors with

their polished briefings, fully confident that their centrallyplanned and administered program is achieving the intend-ed impact on the beneficiaries. Such briefings sometimes

impress the unwary, but the claim that a program is work-

ing exactly as originally planned is an almost sure sign tothe alert observer that the organization suffers form a seri-ous information blockage that is hiding errors and pre-venting learning. A trip to the field is likely to reveal a

largely inoperative program able to accomplish little more

than completion of the forms on which accomplishmentsare reported. Where exceptions are found they will nor-

mally involve an unusually strong individual with a goodsense of his or her community who has taken the initiativein working out a new program which achieves a fit with

beneficiary needs, but which looks rather different than the

one prescribed by program norms, and is achieved in spite

of, rather than because of the larger organizations.

The defeated organization typically portrays a ratherdif-ferent public image, although its operating reality may

closely resemble that of the self-deceiving organization. Its

members speak openly and in rich detail of their organi-zation's errors by way of pointing out how impossible their

task is given the perversity of an environment which does

not respond according to their wishes-they externalize the

source of the error. Thus, errorbecomes impotence. As in-

dividuals reinforce each others' perceptions, they maycome to feel so totally overcome by circumstancesbeyondtheir control that they do nothing-except to report their

problems to higher management in the hope that someonewill do something. But each level feels similarly defeated

and only passes the problem on for attention by still higherauthority. The lack of action further contributes to impo-tence and demoralization.

The learning organization embraceserror.'5Aware of the

limitations of their knowledge members of this type of or-

ganization look on error as a vital source of data for mak-

ing adjustments to achieve a better fit with beneficiaryneeds. An organization in which such learning is valued is

characterized by the candor and practical sophisticationwith which its membersdiscuss their own errors, what theyhave learned from them, and the corrective actions they are

attempting. Intellectual integrity is combined with a sense

of vitality and purpose. Such a climate in an organization is

an almost certain indication of effective leadership.

Planning with the People. Rural people have a great dealto contribute to program design." They have a substantial

capacity for learning and change,'7but they also have goodreason to be skeptical of the strangerbearing ideas for im-

proving their lives untested in their setting. The history of

rural development bears testament to the wisdom of their

caution. One of numerous weaknesses of centrallydesignedprogramsis that planners proceed as if they were writing on

a clean slate and possessing all the knowledge relevant to

improving the villagers' life. In reality they are making in-

terventions into well-established socio-technical systemswithin which the poor have, over many years, worked out

appropriate methods to meet their basic survival needs-

otherwise they would not still be around. Sometimes theyhave come to terms with harsh trade-offs, as in the case ofIndian hill tribes that hae learnedto plant low yielding, ear-

ly maturing grains rather than face the increased risk ofdeath from starvation while waiting for the higher yieldingvarieties to mature." Such knowledge, crucial to any effort

by outsiders to improve the well-being of the rural poor, is

possessed by the people, but easily overlooked by plannerswho have not had-or do not seek-the opportunity to ask.

Building on what the people already know and the re-sources they already possess has numerous advantages. The

SEtI'EMBER/OCTOBER980

498




adjustments equiredromthem aremoreeasilymadeandthe risks of imposingnew methodsunsuited o theirneedsare substantiallyreduced.Also, indigenous technologiesareusuallywithinthe control of the community.Buildingon, ratherthan replacing hose technologiesreducesthelikelihood hat theprogramnterventionwill "de-skill" he

villagersand, thus, increase heirdependenceon external

expertsand suppliersover whomtheyhaveno social con-

trol.Thesuccessfulprogramsnvolved ubstantial lanningwiththepeople,especiallyn theirearlystages n which hebasic programmodels were developed. Generally,theybuilt from and enhanced community capabilitieswhile

openingnew options. Whereoutsidedependencewas in-

volved, as to some extent it almost nevitablywas, effortsweremade to reduce he attendantrisks.9

Linking Knowledge o Action. The blueprintapproachcommonlyassumes that the knowledge required or the

preparationof programdesigns can be generated nde-

pendentlyof the organizational apacity required or itsutiization.'1 This is reflected n its sharpdifferentiationbetweenthe roles of researcher,planner,and administra-

tor-often assumedto be from differentorganizations-whichinevitably eparatesknowledge rom decisionfromaction. Thosepersons n day-to-day ontactwiththe com-

munity reality and organi7ational function-the ad-

ministrators, he field operationspersonnel,and the vil-

lagers-have no defined role in the definitionof needsorthemakingof programdesigndecisions.Thedecisionmak-

ing role is assigned, nstead,to the individuals urthestre-moved from the relevantdata-the professionalplanners.

Suchseparations not found in the successcases exam-ined. Especiallyn theearlystagesall threeroleswerecom-bined n a single ndividual r a closeknit team. Evenasthe

organizations rew, hemodeof operation tressed heir n-

tegration. Researchers worked hand-in-hand with

operatingpersonnel,planningwas done by those respon-sible for implementation, ndtop management pentsub-stantial imein the field keeping n contactwithoperatingreality.The processof rapid,creativeadaptation ssentialto achievingand sustaining he fit on whicheffectiveper-formancedependsnearlydemands uchintegration.

It bearsnote thatthe same ntegration f roles s charac-teristicof the moresuccessfulpilot projectsundertaken o

providedesign nputs o professionalplanners,although ts

significance s seldom noted. Unfortunately, heirresem-blanceto the earlyfield experiences n whichmajorsuc-cessfulprograms ave beenbuiltendsthere. Carried ut asresearch tudies,theyaretypicallyunder he directionof a

special researchteam, possibly from a universityor re-search nstitute,and are carriedout apartfromthe direct

operational ontrolof anyoperating gency hatmightap-ply theirfindingson a larger cale. After a predeterminedtimetheproject eam s disbanded nd its leadersreturn othe universityo analyzeandpublish heir data on the pre-sumption hat the final blueprintwas the key to whateverresultswere obtained.Whatremains s an ideareduced o

paperwhile the operatingorganization-the vibrant ocialorganism which encompassedthe skills, commitment,knowledgeand systemsrequired o give the idea life and

adapt t to localcircumstances s required-hass beendis-carded.

In fact, the effectivenessof a givenprogramdesign s atleastasdependent n thepresence f anorganizationwithawelldevelopedcapacity o make t workas it is on the spe-cificsof the design tself. Thisis an important easonwhypilot project results producedby one organizationareseldomreplicatedby another.Theblueprintapproach m-

plicitlyassumesthat any lack of fit betweenthe task re-quirements f the programdesignand the capabilitiesofthe organizationeventuallychosen to implement t can

readilybe correctedhroughshorttermtrainingandpossi-blythe introduction f newcategories f personnel uchas

village evelworkersat the bottom of an existing tructure.Seldom s attentiongivento the implicationsor higheror-

ganizationalevelswiththe result hat the new workersmayfind themselves equiredo conformto inappropriate ro-ceduresand dependenton unresponsive upportsystemswhich eave them unable to accomplish he tasksexpectedof them.01'

Bycontrast, heNDDB, BRAC, CBFPS,and SSMwere

all organizations uilt up from the teams that created heoriginalprogram.The functioningprogramand the orga-nizational apacity o actuate t wereboth preservedn liv-

ing form andboth continued o evolvein response o fur-therexperience ndthe demandsof expansion.In the NIA

case, the field-based earning aboratoriesweresponsoredby andunder he operational ontrolof theagency hatin-tended to use the knowledgegained. These laboratoriesweredesignednot only to producea programmodel, butalsograduallyo build heexperiencewithin he broader r-

ganization required o make it work. Where researcherswere nvolved, heywere n supporting ather han control-

lingroles.In each instancethe operatingmethods that were de-

velopedin the early stagesweregradually ranslated nto

supportivemanagementystems.The individualswho hadcreatedand sustained he fit were assignedto guide the

learning experiencesof others until they too gained the

knowledge,commitment,and skills to makethe programwork.As the programmoved into new communities,newlessonswere earned, ncludingessons on how to maintainthe fit betweenprogram ndpeopleas the organization x-

panded.Newknowledge ndtheorganizational apacity o

put it to workwere created imultaneously y one andthesameprocess.

ThreeStagesof the LearningProcess

In its idealizedrepresentationhe learningprocessap-proachto programdevelopmentproceeds throughthree

stages.Ineachstagethe emphasiss on a different earningtask, successivelyon effectiveness,efficiency,and expan-sion. (See Figure4.)

In Stage I-learning to be effective-the majorconcernis withdevelopinga workingprogrammodelin the settingof a village evellearningaboratoryhathasa high degreeof fit withbeneficiary eeds.Normallyhisphasewillbe re-source ntensive,particularlyich n itsrequirementsor in-tellectual nput, andwill require ubstantial reedom rom


499




normaladministrativeonstraints. t is a time of investmentin knowledgeand capacitybuilding-learning what is re-

quired o achieve it for a giventime andsetting.Not onlydoes thisstage nvolvebasic earningaboutcommunitydy-namics,and evenlearningwhat are the relevantquestionsto be asked, but it also involves learninghow to learn

throughan action researchprocess.As in the beginningof

anylearningprocess t shouldbe considerednormal or er-

rorrates o be high,thoughon a downwardrend,andeffi-ciency low. The programbegins to make the transitionfromStage1 to Stage2 whenit is foundto be effective n

responding o an identifiedneed andit achievesan accep-table level of fit betweenbeneficiaries, he workingpro-gram model, and the capabilitiesof the action researchteam.

In Stage2-learning to be efficient-the majorconcernshifts to reducing he input requirements er unit of out-

put. Throughcarefulanalysisof Stage 1 experience,ex-traneousactivitiesnotessential o effectiveness regradual-ly eliminated ndthe important ctivities outinized.Whilethere may also be some continuedgains in effectiveness

with furtherexperience, t is morelikelythat someloss ofeffectivenesswith furtherexperience,t is morelikelythatsome loss of effectivenesswill be a necessarypriceof in-

creasing fficiency.In Stage2, thereshouldalso be seriousattentionpaidto the problemof achieving it betweenpro-gram requirements nd realisticallyattainableorganiza-tionalcapacities, ecognizingheorganizationalonstraints

thatwill haveto be accepted n the courseof program x-

pansion.Modestprogram xpansionduringStage2 will in-crease he cadreof personsexperiencedn making he pro-gramworkavailable o helpbuildthe expandedorganiza-tionalcapability equiredn Stage3. Onceacceptableevelsof effectiveness ndefficiencyhavebeenobtained, hepro-gram model reasonablystabilized, an expanded cadre

trained, and basic management systems requirementsworkedout, then theway spreparedortransitiono Stage3.

In Stage 3-learning to expand-the centralconcern swithan orderlyphasedexpansionof theprogram.Theem-

phasis will be on expansionof organizational apacity,thoughcontinuedrefinementsmayalso be requiredn the

program o respond o the demandsof largerscaleopera-tion. But constantattentionmustbe givento ensuring hatan acceptableevel of fit is maintained venthough expan-sion willmeansome nevitable acrificen effectiveness nd

efficiency.The rate of expansionwill be governed argelyby howfast thenecessary rganizationalapabilities anbe

developed o support t. Bythe endof Stage3 theprogram

should have matured o the point of a relativelystable,large-scale peration.

OnceStage3 has beencompleted he organizationmayturn to the solution of newproblems,as severalof the or-

ganizations tudiedhadstarted o do. Or, if bythis timethe

beneficiarypopulationhas made suchprogressas to upsetthe fit previously ttained, heremaybe needto repeat he

FIGURE4

ProgramLearningCurves

V

0

> TIME

Note: It shouldbe expectedthatsomeeffectivenesswillbe sacrificed n theinterestof efficiencyandexpansion.Withexpansionefficiency will likely suffer due to trade-offs with the requirements of expansion.


-Jl

500



COMMUNITYRGANIZATIONNDRURALDEVELOPMENT

learning ycleto redefine heprogram ndrealignorgani7a-tionalcapabilities ccordingly.

The specificsof how each stageis structuredwill differ

substantially ependingon whethera new organizations

beingbuilt anew from thebottom-uporwhether he task sto build an appropriate ewcapacity n an existingorgani-zation, as in the caseof the NIA.

Whenthe casestudywasprepared,heNIA wasin Stage2 in the development f its newcommunalsprogram.Theintensityof the research ndorganizernputswasbeingre-duced gradually n the pilot schemes,certainproceduresthathadproveneffectivewerebeingroutinized,and atten-tionwasbeinggiven o theeventualproblemso be faced n

achieving it between he largerorgani7ation nd the pro-gramtask requirements.BRAC wasalso well into Stage2withits Phase IIIprogram,as the village evelchangepro-cesses t had initiatedbeganto take on theirown momen-

tum, increasing rogram utputperunitof BRACstaff in-

put. The contraceptive elivery ystemof the CBFPS hadincreasedefficiencyto the point where t had become es-

sentially elf-financing nd its expansionphasewasalready

completed;t hadcompletedStage3 and its leadershipwaslookingfornewchallenges.The NDDBhad movedwellin-to Stage3 expansionandwas alsobeginningo venture ntonew fields.

The SSM offers a parallelto the BRAC in havingin-troduced undamental hanges n program rientationdur-

ing the courseof its history,but withoutreinitiating he

learningprocesssequence. Instead, it moved almost di-

rectly nto rapidexpansion.Consequentlyt found itself ina situation omewhatanalogous o thatof the NIA; i.e., a

largeestablihedbureaucracywith an establishedprogramthat was not producing he desiredresults.Finally,recog-nizing he natureof theproblem,actionwas takento initi-

ate an internal earningprocessdirected o achieving m-provedfit.A look at thesuccessfulprogramsn relationshipo their

learning urveshighlights nimportanteatureof theirsuc-cess. They werenot "designedand implemented."They,and the organizations hat sustained hem, "evolved and

grew."

The SocialScientistas CapacityBuilder

It would seem thatthesocial scientist houldhavea cen-tral roleto play nparticipativeuraldevelopment iven hesubstantialneed for new capacity o addresssocialvaria-

bles;and, indeed,socialscientists urrently njoyunprece-denteddemand or theirservicesn theThirdWorld.How-ever,they, so far, seemto have had little influenceon the

design or performanceof the typical ruraldevelopmentprogram.Thisis not surprisingonsideringhetypesof ac-tivitiestheyhave most often beencalledupon to do.

* SummativeEvaluation.Thisgenerally onsistsof docu-mentingfailureafterthe time for correctiveactionhaslong past.

* Pilot Projects.Commonlyocatedoutsideof theagencywith program esponsibility nd designed o producea

program lueprintorapplication yothers, hefocus ison the wrongproduct-an ideawhich s not backedbythe capacity o make it operational.

* BaselineSurveys.Substantial mountsof socialsciencedata maybe gathered,presumably s a basis for plan-ningdecisions.Butthedata areoftenirrelevant o plan-ning, and even if they were not, the organizations owhichresultsare directed eldomhave a

capacityo use

them for other thanselectiveuse in justifyingdecisionsmadeon othergrounds."2

Thus, the productswhichthe socialscientist s commonlycalleduponto produceare eitheruntimely,or unusablebythe consumers o whomtheyaresupposedly argeted.

Rarely s the socialscientistcalled on to helpan organi-zationbuild a capacity o actuallyusesocialscienceknowl-

edgeanddatain waysthatwouldcontributedirectly o im-

provingperformance.At least four exceptionsare found

amongthe successcases:BRAC, NIA, SSM,and CBFPS.In each,therehas beena healthyskepticism f the more

conventional esearchmethodsandresearcher olerelation-

ships.Theyhaveexperimented ith newmethodsandroleswhichputthe researchernthepositionof providingheac-tion agency personnelwith simpletools to facilitatetheir

rapidcollectionand interpretation f social data directlyrelevant o action. To be effective n these rolesthe socialscientists nvolved have led to becomeintimately amiliarwithagencyoperations, ngaging hemselvesna processof

learninghow they could become more relevant to theirclient's needs.

Theyhavesoughtto demystify he socialsciences,mak-

ing it everyperson'stool, turningboth agency personneland in someinstances hevillagershemselvesnto moreef-fective action researchers.They have stresseddisciplined

observation,guided nterviews, nd informantpanelsoverformal surveys;timeliness over rigor; oral over writtencommunication; nformed interpretationover statistical

analysis;narrative ver numericalpresentation; nd atten-tion to processand intermediate utcomes as a basis for

rapid adaptationoverdetailedassessmentof "final" out-comes. Rather han the staticprofilesprovidedby typicalsocioeconomic urveys, heyhavesoughtan understandingof the dynamicsof the socio-technicalystems hatgovernvillage ife as a basis for improvingpredictions f the con-

sequencesof any given development ntervention.Theyhavesoughtspecific dentification f targetgroupmembersandbehavior n termsrelevant o programaction.m'

It is not uncommon or the leadersofprograms

whichhave earned o makeeffectiveuseof socialscienceresearchto drawa sharpdistinctionbetween he moreconventionalbaseline urveys nd formalevaluation tudies heirorgani-zations do "becausethe donorswant them," and the re-search ntegral o action which drives their own programand organizationaldevelopmentprocesses.Their lack ofenthusiasm or the former s not out of fearof exposure,but out of concern hatthesetypesof research ontributelittle to improvingperformance,whilecommanding tten-tion and resourcesbetterusedelsewhere.

Thatadministratorsndoperatingpersonnel anbecome


501




effective contributors o researchwhen its methodsandsubstancesareappropriateo theirneedsis perhapsa dis-

coveryas fundamental s the realization hat uneducated

villagersknowsomethinguseful aboutvillagesocial struc-tures and the technologicalchoices relevant o theirown

well-being.Some social scientistshave too easilyassumedthatprogrampersonnel recongenitally nableand/or un-

willing o assess theirown performance ndmakecreative

adaptations n their own operations.Neitherresearcher,administrator, orvillagers likely o achievehis or herpo-tential for contribution o developmentuntil theyjoin as

partnersn a mutual earningprocess,committednot to thesearch for magicalblueprints,but to the buildingof new

capacities or action.

Conclusion:A Need for Action BasedCapacityBuilding

The concepts and methods of the blueprintapproachmay be moreof a hindrance han an aid in the program-mingof effectiveruraldevelopment ction where he need

is for an adaptive,bottom-upprocessof programand or-ganizationaldevelopment hroughwhich an adequatefit

maybe achievedbetweenbeneficiaryneeds,programout-

puts, and organizational ompetence.This calls not formoresophisticatedkills n thepreparation f detailedpro-ject plans,but rather or skills n building apacities or ac-tion throughaction.

Of course,just as very few centrallyplannedruralde-

velopmentprograms chieve he three-way it requiredoreffectiveperformance, ew of the manyvillagebasedde-

velopment fforts whichdo achieve it on a local basisever

develop ntocapacities or sustained ctionon a significantscale. Perhapsthey lack a strategyfor progressing uc-

cessively hrough he threebasicstagesof learningo beef-fective, learning o be efficient, and learning o expand.Even if they have once been effectivethey may not have

gone beyondthis stageto articulate nswers o suchques-tionsas: Whywerewe successful n this instance?To whatextentwas the outcomecontext-dependent?What lessons

might have broader application? Under what cir-cumstances?Orif theyhave addressed uchquestionsper-haps they have not takenthe next step of translatingheanswers o these questions nto problem solvingroutinessuited o moreefficientapplication r of asking hemselveswhattypeof organizationwould be requiredo apply heseroutineson a larger cale.And, of course,even if theydid

progresshroughStage2 perhaps heycould not or did not

want to expandto Stage 3. Jut wherethe sequencemostoften stopsand whyis an importantquestiondeserving fcarefulexamination.Perhapsa clearervisionof the learn-

ing processapproachas a basis for formulatingprogramand organizational evelopment trategieswould, in itself,facilitate emovalof theblockage n organizationswithpo-tentialfor furtherdevelopment.

Greaterunderstandingf the requirementsf the learn-

ing processapproachon the partof fundingagenciesmaybe of particularmportance iventheirdominant nfluenceon programmingstrategies and methods, though the

changes heymustmake f theyareto apply ts lessonsaresubstantial.For example,a portionof theirfundingport-folios might be programmednot around sectors, butaround ndividualswiththe leadershipqualities, he ideas,andthecommitmento advancinghecauseof ruralpeoplefrom which substantialprograms might be built. Thiswouldprovide herecipient hangeagentswith the flexible

fundingwhichmightallowthemover a periodof fiveto ten

yearsto carrytheiridea through he threedevelopmentalstagesto the buildingof a majormatureprogram.'1

Thedetails or both operatingagencyand funderwould

varysubstantially ependingon purpose,setting,whether

governmentor private,whethera new or an established

organization,whetherlocally or internationally unded,and theparticularearning tageto whichtheprogramhadadvanced.15But the essentialnatureof the processwouldremainmuch the same. The constantelementswould in-clude the requirementsor leadership,demandingntellec-tualdiscipline, reedom o deviate romthe initialplanand

budget, and continuing attention to staff developmentthroughaction basedlearning.

Stage 1 investmentswouldrepresent ery high risksforthe fundingagency-i.e., they would representa sort ofventurecapitalcommitment.Only 10 to 20 percentof pro-grams undedfor Stage1mightbe expected o meritStage2 support,especially s the fundingagency s itselflearninghow to spotpromisingeads andsupport hem n appropri-ateways.Butif as manyas one out of 10 turnedout even-

tuallyto be a BRAC,an NDDB, a CBFPS,or a national

agencysuch as theNIA with a new nation-wide apacity o

manageeffectivelya $100million-a-year rogramn a waythat worked n supportof farmerorganization nd initia-

tive,it wouldbea veryfavorable eturnon investment, nda substantial mprovementover currentfunding agency

performance.A significantbarrier o an appropriate esponsefrom

fundingagenciesdrivenby the bureaucraticmperativeomove largeamountsof moneyis that a matureprogramwouldnot be ready o put largeblocks of funding o effec-tive use on a sustained basis until the end of Stage 3.'1' A

major undermightwell havedifficultyplacingmore han 5

percentof its funds in promisingStage 1 programs n a

givenyear.Butto provide he closemonitoring equiredoensure he availability f appropriateechnicaland finan-cialsupportas neededand to makedifficult udgments e-

gardingwhethera given effort no longerexhibitedsuffi-cient potential to merit continuedsupport, the fundingagencywouldprobablyhave to commitfrom 10 to 15per-

cent of its staff to the effort. Thus, it would be for thefundera highlystaff intensiveundertaking."07

A second barrier s presentedby establishedprogram-ming procedures.A demand or detailedpreplanning nd

subsequent dherenceo detailed ine itembudgets,projectplans and implementation cheduleswould immediatelypre-empthelearningprocessby imposing he demand hat

leadershipof the incipienteffort act as if it knewwhat itwasdoingbefore there wasan opportunity or learning ooccur.108

Given heseand otherbarriers, ncluding he lackof sup-


502



COMMUNITY RGANIZATION ND RURALDEVELOPMENT

portingresearch ndtraining apacity n management ndthesocial sciencesgeared o itsrequirements,ctionon this

proposalpresentsno smallchallenge.But the alternativeslikelyto be a continuingrecordof failure n the attack onruralpoverty,no matterhow muchmoney s committed.

Notes

1. WorldDevelopmentReport, 1978(Washington,D.C.: TheWorldBank), p. 7.

2. IrmaAdelman, "DevelopingEconomics-A Reassessmentof Goals,"AmericanEconomicReview,Vol. 65, No. 2, May1975,pp. 302-309.IrmaAdelmanandCynthiaTaftMorris,Economic Growthand SocialEquity in DevelopingCoun-tries (Stanford:Stanford UniversityPress, 1973); Hollis

Chenery,et al., Redistributionwith Growth London:Ox-fordPress, 1974);and WorldDevelopmentReport,op. cit.

3. United Nations Economicand SocialCouncil,Commissionfor SocialDevelopment,Reportof the Twenty-Fourthes-

sion, 6-24 January1975,ECOSOCOfficial Records:Fifty-EighthSession,SupplementNo. 3, EICN.5/525;Committeeon InternationalRelationsof the House of Representatives,

New Directionsin DevelopmentAID, Excerpts rom theLegislation Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1976);RuralDevelopment:SectorPaper (Washing-ton, D.C.: World Bank, 1975);EdgarOwens and Robert

Shaw, DevelopmentReconsidered:Bridgingthe Gap Be-tween Governmentand People (LexingtonBooks, 1972);NormanT. Uphoff, JohnM. Cohen,and ArthurA. Gold-

smith, Feasibilityand Application of RuralDevelopmentParticipation:A State-of-the-Art aper,Monograph eries,No. 3, RuralDevelopmentCommittee,CornellUniversity,Ithaca, New York, January 1979; Solon Barraclough,"Farmer'sOrganizations n Planning and ImplementingRuralDevelopment," n RanaanWeitz(ed.), RuralDevel-

opment in a Changing World(Cambridge,Mass.: MITPress, 1972);Elliot R. Morss, et al., Strategies or Small

FarmerDevelopment,Vols. I and II (Boulder,Colo.: West-viewPress, Inc., 1976);and JohnD. Montgomery ndMil-ton J. Esman,"PopularParticipationn DevelopmentAd-

ministration," ournalof Comparative dministration,Vol.

3, No. 3, November1971,pp. 358-382.4. In addition o references ited n footnote3above,see Milton

J. Esman,"DevelopmentAdministration nd ConstituencyOrganization,"PublicAdministrationReview,March-April1978, pp. 166-172;MaryRacelisHollnsteiner,"Mobilizingthe RuralPoor ThroughCommunityOrganization," hilip-pine Studies,Vol. 27, ThirdQuarter1979,pp. 387-416;Mil-ton J. Esmanand JohnD. Montgomery,TheAdministration

of Human ResourceDevelopment,draftbackground aperfor the WorldDevelopmentReport1980,December1979;

NormanUphoff and Milton J. Esman,Local Organizationfor RuralDevelopment:Analysisof AsianExperience,RuralLocalGovernmentMonographNo. 19, RuralDevelopmentCommittee,CornellUniversity, thaca,N.Y., 1974.

5. AsianDevelopmentBank,RuralAsia;Challenge ndOppor-tunity (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977). See pp.227-230.

6. SterlingWortmanand RalphW. Cummings,Jr., To FeedThis World:TheChallenge nd theStrategyBaltimore: heJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 1978).Seep. 278.

7. RuralCooperativessAgentsof Change:A ResearchReportanda Debate Geneva:UnitedNationsResearchnstituteorSocialDevelopment, 975),p. ix. See alsoNikolausNewiger,

"The Role of RuralOrganizationsn PromotingParticipa-tion: Reviewand Analysisof Past Experience,"LandRe-

form, Land Settlementand Cooperatives,No. 2, 1978,pp.58-63;andUnitedNations,NationalExperiencen Promot-

ingtheCooperativeMovement:Reportof theSecretaryGen-eral (New York: Economicand SocialCouncilReportNo.

E/1978115,1978).8. RuralCooperatives, p. cit., pp. ix-x.9. Ibid., p. 16.

10. Ibid., pp. 4-5, 10;Newinger,op. cit., andInayatullah,Coop-erativesandDevelopmentn Asia: A Studyof Cooperativesin FourteenRural Communities f Iran,Pakistanand Cey-lon (Geneva:UnitedNations ResearchInstitute for Social

Development,1972),p. 265.11. Ibid., p. 264. Thoughsometimes ooked to as examplesof

more successfulnationally ponsoredcooperatives, he Tai-wan Farmers'associationsare less an exceptionthan theymightseem, owing theirexistenceto theirgovernment n-forcedmonopolyposition n markets or fertilizer ndbasic

commodities,and to an unusually trong governmental d-ministrativenfrastructurewhich ensuresstrictregulation.BenedictStavis,Rural Local Governance nd AgriculturalDevelopmentin Taiwan, Rural DevelopmentCommittee

SpecialSerieson Rural Local GovernmentNo. 15, CornellUniversity, thaca, N.Y., November1974,pp. 61-104.

12. Ibid., pp. 267-269. Two of the exceptionswerepartof theComilla project in East Pakistan, an effort sufficientlyuniquethat somecriticsargued t should not have been in-cluded n the study.Yet, apparently ven the Comillacoop-erativeswereeventually apturedby the relativelymoreaf-fluentfarmersn theirserviceareasonce the ComillaRural

DevelopmentAcademy relaxed the external controls in-troducedearlier o preventsuch an occurrence.HarryW.

Blair,"RuralDevelopment,ClassStructurendBureaucracyin Bangladesh,"WorldDevelopment,Vol. 6, No. 1, January1978pp. 65-82.

13. See Lane C. Holdcroft,"The Rise and Fall of CommunityDevelopmentn DevelopingCountries,1950-65:A Critical

Analysisand an AnnotatedBibliography,"MSURuralDe-velopmentPaperNo. 2, Departmentof AgriculturalEco-

nomics,MichiganStateUniversity,East Lansing,Michigan48824, 1978,pp. 5-8.

14. For a discussionof how the Etawahdesignand administra-tive structures iffered romthoseof the Indiannationalpro-gramseeGeraldSussman,"ThePilotProjectand theDesignof Implementingtrategies:CommunityDevelopmentn In-

dia," MerilleS. Grindleed.),PoliticsandPolicy Implemen-tationin the ThirdWorld Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUni-

versityPress, forthcoming); nd StanleyJ. Heginbotham,Culturesn Conflict:TheFourFacesof IndianBureaucracy(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1975).

15. Basedon Holdcroft,op. cit., p. 15.

16. Ibid., p. 23.17. Uphoff, Cohen,andGoldsmith,op. cit., p. 18.18. Ibid., p. 19.19. This ist of weaknessess basedonIdem.;Holdcroft,op. cit.;

Uphoff, Cohen,and Goldsmith,op. cit., pp. 13-31;Owensand Shaw,op. cit.; and UnitedNations,PopularParticipa-tioninDevelopment: mergingTrendsnCommunityDevel-opment (New York: United Nations Departmentof Eco-nomicand SocialAffairs, 1971).Experiencewithcommunityactionprogramsn the United Statessuggests hat the diffi-cult barrierso effectivecommunityevelaction o benefit he

poorare not confined o the ThirdWorld.Theideaof work-

ing through ndependent ommunityactionagencieswhich


503




wouldsimultaneouslyerveas a coordinatingmechanismnda link betweengovernment nd the poor servedas the basisfor America'sWaron Poverty.Underfunded ndlackingan

organized olitical onstituency,his federalprogram apidlyran into seriousoppositionfrom establishedagenciesandlocalgovernmentshatfelttheirpowerwasbeingchallenged.Efforts o organizehepoorandpromoteocal nitiativewereabandoned.The communityactionagenciesbecame argelyinstruments or implementation f federally nitiatedpro-

gramsthroughcontractswith local school systemsandvol-untarywelfareagencies. nvolvement f thepoor n programinitiationand developmentwas minimal,and the impactofmostprogramsmarginal.PeterMarrisandMartinRein,Di-lemmasof SocialReform:PovertyandCommunityAction nthe UnitedStates, Second Edition (Chicago:Aldine Pub-

lishingCompany, 1973),pp. 224-269.20. Sussman,op. cit.21. Idem.;and Heginbotham, p. cit.22. WorldBankAnnualReport1978 Washington,D.C.:World

Bank, 1978), pp. 9-20; and personalcommunicationromTed J. Davies,January12, 1980.Actually,Bank ending or

agriculture nd ruraldevelopment ropped rom39 percentof total loans in FY 1978to only 25 percent n FY 1979,

thought is claimed hiswas a

temporary henomenandnot

an indicationof a new trend. WorldBankAnnualReport1979(Washington,D.C.: WorldBank, 1979),p. 9.

23. Agencyfor InternationalDevelopment, mplementationf"NewDirections" nDevelopmentAssistance,Report o theCommittee n International elationson Implementationf

LegislativeReforms n the ForeignAssistanceAct of 1973

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office,1975),pp. 7-8.

24. In contrast o the conventionalmacro-economicerspectiveof earlierreports, he Bank's third WorldDevelopmentRe-

port highlights rangeof social and institutionalssues.Sev-eralBankstaffmembers reworking o strengthenhesocialand institutional imensions f its ownprogramming.

25. RobertS. Saunders,"SocialAnalysis n RuralDevelopment

Projects:A Reviewof BankExperience,"August29, 1977,unpublished.

26. Robert S. Saunders,"TraditionalCooperation, ndigenousPeasant'sGroupsand RuralDevelopment:A Lookat Possi-bilitiesandExperiences,"August29, 1977,unpublished.

27. MichaelM. Cernea,MeasuringProject Impact:Monitoringand Evaluation n the PIDERRuralDevelopmentProject-Mexico,World Bank Staff WorkingPaperNo. 332 (Wash-ington,D.C.: TheWorldBank,June1979).Wishful hinkingon theparticipation imension f Bankprojectshasnotbeenlimited o the PIDERproject.A reviewof 164Bankapprai-sal reports oundthat more thanone-third uggestedorma-tion of sometype of peasantgroupas a componentof the

project activity. In addition, one-sixthindicated that the

communitywouldcontribute ree labor for construction c-tivities.Yet, discussion f traditional atterns f cooperationwhichmightprovidea basisforsuchactionwasrare,and theimplementingtrategiesorgaining ooperationneitherpro-viding ree abororcreatingneworganizationswasgenerallyleftvague, f mentioned t all. Saunders,"TraditionalCoop-eration,"op. cit., pp. 13-17.

28. A ruraldevelopment ectorloan made to the Nicaraguangovernmentonceiveda comprehensivemulti-sectoral evel-opmenteffort basedon local farmercontrolledassociationslinked to area marketingcooperatives.Under pressure oshow fast resultsin the absenceof adequatemechanismseither or farmerorganization r intersectoraloordination,

theactualprogramwaslargely imited o small farmer reditand subsidized arm inputsdeliveredby the implementingagency's own extensionagents. A computerdrivenman-agement nformation ystemdecidedwho would be eligiblefor creditusingcriteriawhichwerea carefully uarded ecret,andcalculatedarmplansandcomputed reditrequirementson thebasisof a standard ormulawhich ook no accountoflocalcircumstancesr farmerpreferences. armer rganizingactivitynevergot off the ground. In several nstances he

technologypackageproved nappropriateo farmer'sneeds.Organizationalmperativesominatedmplementationo thevirtualexclusionof plan concepts.John C. Ickisand DavidC. Korten,Strategyand Structure n Rural Development(forthcoming).A USAID fundedprojectbased at Cornell

University eeks essonsfromUSAIDprojectswhichappearin their mplementationo provide xamples f effectivepeo-ple participation.Some difficultyhas been encounteredn

findingsuchprojects.Of course the failureshavemanycausesbeyondthe lim-

itation of donorprocedures nd programmingkills.Oneisthe lack of recipientgovernmentpoliticalcommitment.Seefor exampleM. R. Redclift,"The Influenceof the Agencyfor International evelopmentAID)on Ecuador'sAgrarian

DevelopmentPolicy,"LatinAmerican

Studies,Vol. II, No.1, 1979,pp. 185-201.29. The Inter-American oundation was createdby the U.S.

Congressn 1969specificallyo fundsmall-scale rojectsde-

signedand implementedby indigenous,non-governmentalgroups n LatinAmerica.Theirpublished elf-evaluation e-portsclaimsubstantial uccess.Inter-Americanoundation,They Know How (Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,1977).But udgment houldperhapsbewith-held until more critical ndependent xternal valuations reavailable.

30. John C. Ickis and CathrineObernekindlyshared nsightsfrom theirrespective ngoingstudiesof PVOruraldevelop-mentefforts. One PVO thatstandsout fromtherest n itsde-

velopmental rack record s OXFAMwhichprovides inan-

cial assistance o a numberof unusuallyeffectiveand in-digenous private voluntarydevelopmentorganizations nAsia, LatinAmerica,and Africa.

37. Forself-critical nalysesby presentand formerUSAID staffsee FrankJ. Young, "U.S. ForeignAssistanceStrategyRe-considered,"TheFletcherForum,Vol. 3, No. 2, Summer1979,pp. 100-108;CoralieBryant,"Organizationalmpedi-ments to MakingParticipating Reality:'SwimmingUp-stream'in AID," forthcomingn RuralDevelopmentPar-

ticipationReview,andAlice L. Morton,"BriefingPaperonLocal Action Guidance and Implementation,"Office forRuralandAdministrative evelopment,nternalAID docu-ment.

38. Basic data on the Indiandairy cooperative xperiencehasbeen drawn roma varietyof sourcesncluding:A. H. Som-jee and GeetaSomjee,"CooperativeDairyingandthe Pro-files of SocialChangen India,"EconomicDevelopment ndCulturalChange,No. 3, Vol. 26, April 1978, pp. 577-590;RuthB. Dixon,RuralWomen t Work:StrategiesforDevel-opment n SouthAsia (Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsUni-versityPress,1978),pp. 50-56;GeorgeDorsey,"Milk&Jus-tice," Ceres, November-December978, pp. 31-38; D. S.Thakur,"Impactof DairyDevelopmentThroughMilk Co-operatives:A CaseStudyof Gujarat," ndianJournalofAg-riculturalEconomics,No. 3, Vol. 30, July-September975;AnnualReport1977-78of theNationalDairyDevelopmentBoard;KamlaChowdhury,"BackgroundMemorandumor


504




31. Holdcroft,op. cit., p. 3.32. SeeE. Philip Morgan,"ManagingDevelopmentAssistance:

Some Effects with SpecialReference o SouthernAfrica,"SADEX, Vol. 1, No. 4 (January/February980),African

Bibliographic enter,Washington,D.C.; JudithTendler, n-

sideForeignAid (Baltimore,Md.:The JohnsHopkinsUni-

versityPress, 1975); HarryW. Strachan,"Side Effectsof

Planning n the Aid ControlSystem,"WorldDevelopment,Vol.

6,No. 4

(April, 1978),pp. 467-478;andRobertCham-

bers,"ProjectSelection orPoverty-Focused uralDevelop-ment'Simple s Optimal,"WorldDevelopment,Vol. 6, No.

2 (February1978),pp. 209-219.The ultimatebureaucratic

imperativenthelargedonororganizations to move ncreas-

ingsumsof money.The amountof moneymovedat a givenlevelof staffing s the mostvisiblemeasureof donoraccom-

plishmentand that realitydominatesdecisionprocesses.An Airgram romAID/Washingtondated3129/78on the

subjectof "ProgramGuidance or FY 1980"estimatedhat

the amountsof developmentassistanceavailablefor Re-

gionalBureauProgramswould ncrease rom$628million n

1977 o $3,160million n 1983.At the same ime t noted hat"We do not expectpersonnelevels to increaseas rapidlyas

programevels.In fact, thePresidents currentlyommitted

to holdingpersonnelevelsdown.... Missions houldcon-sider effectiveways of providingassistance hat do not re-

quirelargenumbersof U.S. personnel."Thus, in UNAIDthetermcost effectiveness ometimes omes o takeon a new

meaningas in: "Wecannotaffordto takeon smallprojectsno matterhow important he resultsmay be-it just isn't

'cost-effective.'" (Emphasis dded.)33. Basedon Chambers, p. cit., pp. 210-211.34. Officialsof recipient overnments esperatelyn needof for-

eign exchange ace a corresponding ilemma.Any shift in

donorpolicieswhichwouldreduce rdelay oreignassistanceflowsis not likelyto be receivedwarmlyby them.

35. An Asian DevelopmentBank policy permittinguse of the

program oan vehiclewas approved n 1977. A recentstaff

papersuggeststhat assistanceon a programbasis may be

more appropriatethan conventional project approacheswhere"Administrativelexibility s neededso that appro-priateadjustmentso changingcircumstancesan be made

rapidlyat the local level withoutcostly delay." The paper

goes on to suggest hat the currentpolicymaystill be overlyrestrictive ndthatexpanded nd liberalized seof programlendingwouldbeappropriate.MartinC. Evans,etal., Sector

PaperonAgriculturendRuralDevelopmentManila:Asian

DevelopmentBank, 1979), pp. 62-65.See alsoAsianDevel-

opmentBank,op. cit., pp. 310-311.36. The followingis not atypicalof the observationsmadeby

USAIDmissionpersonnel:

Probably80 percentof our staff timegoes into completing

agency paperwork.Actually the more sophisticatedthe

analysis equiredhemore ikely t will be leftto thelast min-uteandbe carried ut onlyto justifydecisionsalreadymade.Wehada full-time ociologist n onemissionwhere was as-

signedwhosebiggest rustrationwasalwaysbeingcalled n atthe lastminute o complete he socialanalysisstatement e-

quiredbefore the project plan could go forward o Wash-

ington.

Manyof the problemscan be tracedto the complexandoften skepticalpoliticalclimatewithinwhichUSAID mustbrokerdemandsof manybureaucraticndpoliticalconstitu-enciesrelating o suchthingsas contracting rocedures, u-man rights considerations, ffirmativeaction policies,and

environmentalprotectionreportingrequirements-all ad-

ministered y peoplefarremoved rom field realities. n ad-

dition, it mustbe responsiveo congressional versight om-mitteeswhichkeep close watchover its operationand de-

mandevidenceof short-term esults.Evenso, there s a sensein the agency hatmanyof the procedural urdensareself-

inflicted, resultingfrom a dysfunctionaland unnecessaryoverreactiono congressionalriticism.TheAgency'scurrent

leaderhsipscommittedo simplifying roceduresndto cut-

ting back personnelon the theorythat needlesspaperworkcanbereducedo suchan extent hata smaller taff will have

ample time to addressthe more creativerequirements fUSAID'sdevelopment rogramming.a ProposedGrant o NationalDairyDevelopmentBoard or

Establishing Centre or Management nd ConsultancynRuralDevelopment,"FordFoundationOffice n NewDelhi,May 20, 1977; Ford Foundation, "RecommendationorGrantActionto NationalDairyDevelopment," uly6, 1979;and Devaki Jain, Women'sQuestfor Power: Five CaseStudies Ghaziabad,U.P. India:VikasPublishingHousePvt

Ltd., 1980),pp. 77-120.39. The fact that it accomplisheshis whileremainingopen to

participation y all classes n a highlystratified ocialsetting

withstrongclass conflictsmakes hiscaseof special nterest.See Somjeeand Somjee,op. cit., and KamlaChowdhury,"Non-formal Education and Development," paperpresentedat the Symposiumon AgriculturalResearchandEducationSystems orDevelopment f theIndianCouncilof

AgriculturalResearch,September , 1979. How it is accom-

plishedneeds further xamination.40. Reportedlyhis was nottrue n the earlier earswhenharijans

("untouchables")wereforcedto deliver heirmilkseparate-ly. DavidMollerandShokMahadevan, The MiracleWork-erof Kaira," ndianReader'sDigest,October1977.Thedy-namicsby whichthischangeoccurredarenot elaboratednthereports haveseen.Itshouldalsobe notedthat nspiteofitshighmarksas a contributor o important ocialadvances,theNDDB hasbeencriticized or inadequate ttention o the

anomaly hat, althoughcattle careand milkproductionarealmostentirelywomen'sactivities n India,the membershipof mostof the unions s dominatdbymen who areevenmore

substantially ver-representedn leadershippositions. Fur-

thermore,womenreceive ittle trainingunder NDDB pro-gramsandare not hiredfor staff positions.

41. SarvodayaShramadanaranslates iterally"the awakeningof all in societybythe mutual haringof one'stime,thoughtandenergy."

42. For an articulationof Sarvodayaphilosophy see A. T.

Aryaratne,CollectedWorks,Volume , editedbyNandasena

Ratnapala(Colombo: SarvodayaResearch Institute, un-

dated). The theme that Sarvodaya'saccomplishments remoreoftenreflectedn thegrowthof the spiritof thepeople

rather han in moreconventionalndicatorsof villagelevelchange s broughtout in NandasenaRatnapala,CommunityParticipationn RuralDevelopment: tudyof SevenSelected

Villagesn Sri Lanka(Colombo:SarvodayaResearch nsti-

tute, 1978);andNandasenaRatnapala,VillageFarms:Com-

munityParticipation nd theRole of RuralCredit Colom-bo: SarvodayaResearchnstitute,undated).ThevariousSar-

vodayapublications itedmaybe obtained rom the Sarvo-

dayaResearch nstitute,148 GalleRoad, Dehiwala,Colom-

bo, SriLanka.43. The intendedprocedures that Sarvodayaworkersand the

leadersof newly ormedvillageassociationsointlycarryoutandanalyzea socio-economicurveyand usethisas thebasis


505




for the planningof activitiesspecificallyaddressed o theneedsof thevillage.Often, however, he datacollections in-

adequate ndthose nvolvedarenotwellversednhowto usethe dataforplanningpurposes.Asaresult heytend, nstead,to copy ideas obtained rom othervillages.NandasenaRat-

napala, TheSarvodayaMovement:Self-Help n Sri Lanka

(Essex, Conn.: InternationalCouncilfor EducationalDe-

velopment,1978).44. For the detailed accountof the early campson whichthis

summarys basedseeNandasenaRatnapala,Sarvodaya ndthe Rodiyas:Birthof Sarvodaya Colombo:SarvodayaRe-

search,undated).45. TheSarvodayaMovement,op. cit.46. Summarizedrom Idem.47. Basedon interviewswithNandasenaRatnapalan Colombo,

January1980.48. Summarizedrom NandasenaRatnapala,StudyService n

SarvodayaShramadanaMovement,Sri Lanka, 1958-1976

(Colombo:SarvodayaResearchCentre,undated),pp. 25-35.49. Ibid., pp. 32-33.50. InterviewswithRatnapala,op. cit.51. Idem.

52. In thisbrieftreatment, do not distinguish etweenBRAC's

Sulla,Manikgang, ndJamalpur rojects,eachof whichhas

its own specialcharacteristics.While BRAC has formallydividedthe Sulla project nto threephases,the conceptof

threephasesas used here refersmorebroadlyto BRAC's

overallprogram evelopment.The discussion f Phases and

II is basedon ManzoorAhmed,"BRAC:BuildingHuman

Infrastructureo Serve he RuralPoor," CaseStudyNo. 2,InternationalCouncil for EducationalDevelopment,P.O.

Box 217, Essex,Connecticut 6426,USA, 1977. Discussion

of PhaseIIIis based argelyon interviewswithBRAC taffin

Dacca on January26, 1980, supplementedby data from

Ahmed,Idem., and earlier nterviewswith BRACstaff in

January1977.53. 1977data.54. Landowners referday laborbecausedepressedwagelevels

mean ncreased eturns o land relative o sharecropping r-rangements.By exertingupwardpressure n wageratesthe

intention s to makesharecroppingand leasearrangementsmoreattractiveo landowners.BRAC s experimenting ith

schemeshatgivethepoorcontroloverfactorsof productionother han andandlabor.Forexample,groupsof poorhave

beenorganized o purchasepumpswithwhichtheysell irri-

gationservices o the landed.55. An asset is definedby BRACas anythingwhichgenerates

new incomeor reducesexpenditure.See BangladeshRural

AdvancementCommittee,ResearchManual Dacca:BRAC,June 1979).BRACpublicationsmaybe ordered rom Ban-

gladeshRuralAdvancementCommittee,211OuterCircular

Road, Maghbazar,Dacca-17,Bangladesh.56. BangladeshRuralAdvancementCommittee,PeasantPercep-

tions:Famine(Dacca:BRAC,July 1979).See also Bangla-desh RuralAdvancementCommittee,WhoGets Whatand

Why:ResourceAllocationin a BangladeshVillage Dacca:BRAC,March1979);and BangladeshRuralAdvancementCommittee,AshramVillage:An Analysisof ResourceFlows

(Dacca:BRAC,undated).57. Theuseof the teammeeting o facilitateopen, upward low

of communication, downward low of support,and con-

tinuing n-servicerainingwas basicto the managementys-temsof the EtawahPilot Project,showsup as a featureof

mostpilot healthschemes n India,and was probablymorecrucialthan the highlytoutedintegrated erviceconcept n

the accomplishmentsf the Narangwalhealthproject.See

Heginbotham, p. cit., pp.44-48;DavidF. Pyle, "VoluntaryAgency-ManagedrojectsDelivering n IntegratedPackageof Health, Nutrition and Population Services: TheMaharastra xperience,"TheFordFoundation,NewDelhi,India,March1979,pp. 22-23;M. N. Murthiand David C.

Korten,"AnExperimentnParticipation,"n StevenH. Ap-pelbaum ed.), StressManagementor HealthCareProfes-sionals(AspenSystemsCorporation,orthcoming);Allen D.

Jedlicka,Organizationor RuralDevelopment:Risk Takingand AppropriateTechnology New York: Praeger, 1977);FrancesF. KortenandDavid C. Korten,Casebookor Fam-

ily PlanningManagement:MotivatingEffectiveClinic Per-

formance (ChestnutHill, Mass.: The Pathfinder Fund,1977).

58. BRAC's ntelligent ttention o program etails s reflectedn

many aspectsof its operation.For example,its paramedicprograms based on analysisof themajorhealthconditionsfaced ntheprojectareas.A trainingmanualwritten o bein-

telligible o its paramedic taff spellsout simplifiedproce-dures for identifying ymptoms,and prescribingreatment.A rigorous six-monthtrainingprogramis keyed to themanual whichthe traineeretainsfor future reference.See

BangladeshRuralAdvancementCommittee,TenDiseases:ATreatmentGuidefor Medical Paraprofessionals Dacca:BRAC,December1979).

The carefulattention iven o development f managementsystems s reflected n a procedurentroduced n 1976forselectionof new staff. Candidateswho pass preliminaryscreening pendtwo days in a "selectioncourse"in which

they engage n a numberof exercises rom BRACtrainingmoduleswhichprovidean opportunityo exhibitcommuni-

cation, planning,and analyticskills. Duringthese sessionsBRACstaff assessnotonlythecandidate'skills,but also hisor herpersonality, erception f development roblems,and

leadershipqualities,Ahmed,op. cit., p. 64.

59. Abedestimatedhat as of January1980 his staffwaswork-

ingwithapproximately00villages,but stressed his wason-

ly a guess.Thespontaneousprocessof replication f villageorganizationsnow in processmakesdifficult, and possiblyeven nappropriatenyeffortto maintain n accurate uanti-tative recordof programaccomplishments.Normallythe

lack of such datawouldbe considered sign of weak man-

agement.But we stillhavea lot to learnabout the kinds of

managementystemsappropriateo particularypesof social

developmentfforts.As BRAChasshiftedfromthe sectoral

approachof PhaseII to the peopleapproachof PhaseIII,BRAC staff havefelt it appropriateo de-emphasize uanti-tative performancendicators,whichinevitablyplace pres-sureon field staff to usurpinitiative rom the communityleadership.

The emphasisnow is on the "strength"of the villageor-

ganizationand the "feeling"withinthe group. The assess-

mentsareexplicitly ubjective nd BRAC eadersdiscouragenatural endencieson the partof field staff fo compareac-

complishmentsn theirrespective illages,stressinghateach

village s unique n its particular otentialsand thatspecificaccomplishmentsre the responsibilityf village eadership,not of the BRACworker.According o Abed, as BRAC'smethodshavebecomemoreresponsiveo realvillageneedsandperformanceargetshavebeende-emphasized,taffmo-tivationandprogramaccomplishmentsave both improvedcommensurately-thoughhis s alsoa subjective ssessment.Cautionmustbe exercisedn generalizingrom this experi-enceas it is a functionof BRAC'sparticular istoryandthe


506



COMMUNITYORGANIZATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

staff commitment, expertise, and task definition which that

history has produced.60. This report is based largely on an interview with Mechai Vira-

vaidya conducted on January 28, 1980 with supplemental in-

formation drawn from S. Burintratikul and M. C.

Samaniego, "CBFPS in Thailand: A Community-based Ap-

proach to Family Planning," Case Study No. 6, Interna-

tional Council for Educational Development, P.O. Box 217,

Essex, Connecticut 06426, U.S.A.; and Mechai Viravaidya,"Distribution and Logistics Aspects of Rural Community-based Contraceptive Distribution," Asian Centre for Popu-lation and Community Development, undated, unpublished.

61. Benjamin U. Bagadion and Frances F. Korten, "Government

Assistance to Communal Irrigationin the Philippines: Facts,

History and Current Issues," Philippine Agricultural Engi-

neering Journal, Vol. X, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1979, pp.5-9.

62. For details see Carlos D. Isles and Manual L. Collado,"Farmer Participation in Communal Irrigation Develop-ment: Lessons from Laur," Philippine Agricultural Engi-

neering Journal, Vol. X, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1979, pp.

3-4; and Felipe Alfonso, "Farmer Participation in the Devel-

opment of Communal Systems: Skills and Structural Impli-

cations," Philippine Agricultural Engineering Journal, Vol.X, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1979, pp. 28-31.

63. For further discussion see Benjamin U. Bagadion and Fran-

ces F. Korten, "Developing Viable Irrigators' Associations:

Lessons from Small Scale Irrigation in the Philippines," Ag-ricultural Administration (in press).

64. The term learning laboratory is used to refer to a pilot effort

in which the emphasis is on learning about and refining pro-cess. It is geared to rapid assessment and refinement of meth-

ods; as soon as it is evident that a method or approach is not

producing the intended intermediate outcomes it is revised

based on the additional insight generated by the experience.The concept and its application are elaborated in David C.

Korten, "The Pilot Project: Formal Experiment or LearningLaboratory?" The Ford Foundation, Manila, Philippines,

April 10, 1979, unpublished.

65. Rather than reports, the research products are new methods,

procedures, and training courses. The researchers are mem-

bers, along with management, of the committees that review

research products to determine how they will be used and

they regularly serve as instructors and resource persons in

NIA workshops and training programs.66. See Romana P. de los Reyes, Managing Communal Gravity

Systems: Farmers' Approaches and Implications for Pro-

gram Planning (Quezon City, Philippines: Institute of Phi-

lippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, 1980); and

Romana P. de los Reyes and Ma. Francisca P. Viado, "Pro-

files of Two Communal Gravity Systems," Philippine Agri-cultural Engineering Journal, Vol. X, No. 2, Second Quar-

ter, February 1979, pp. 14-18.67. For preliminary analyses see Bagadion and F. Korten, op.cit.; Alfonso, op. cit.; and Felipe B. Alfonso, "AssistingFarmer Controlled Development of Communal IrrigationSystems," in David C. Korten and Felipe B. Alofnso (eds.),Bureaucracy and the Poor: Closing the Gap (Singapore:McGraw-Hill, forthcoming).

68. Communals (farmer owned and operated systems) account

for approximately one-half of all irrigatedareas in the Philip-

pines. The other half is serviced by larger government owned

and operated "national" systems. Bagadion and F. Korten,

op. cit. The methods being developed under the communals

program may also have relevance for the NIA's work on na-

tional systems, but as of early 1980 this had not been pur-sued.

69. One such problem, finally resolved in early 1980, resultedfrom a conflict between the monsoon season and the Philip-

pine government's budgeting cycle. The Philippine's mon-

soon season begins roughly in the middle of the fiscal year.Funds for communals rehabilitation were budgeted annuallyby the government's Budget Commission for each individual

system to be assisted, although actual releases commonlywere not approved until two or three months into the year,

leaving only about two months for construction before the

rains-which often washed-out incompleted structures.Funds for a project not expended in the year approved didnot carry over to the next year. The solution was to obtain a

higher priority for communals work which allowed more

timely funds releases, and to redefine communal irrigationwork as a programrather than a collection of individual con-

struction projects. This would allow long term planning, amore flexible approach to preparatory work, and the provi-sion of other kinds of needed assistance not necessarily tiedto a specific construction project.

70. The conclusions that follow do not apply to the more mod-erate peasant organizations created by members of the rural

elite in an attempt to create a counterforce to the more radi-cal movements, as for example the Philippine Federation of

Free Farmers described by Blondi Po, Rural Organizationand Rural Development in the Philippines: A DocumentaryStudy (Quezon City: Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneode Manila University, 1977), pp. 56-79.

71. Gerit Huizer, "The Strategy of Peasant Mobilization: SomeCases from Latin America and Southeast Asia," in June

Nash, Jorge Dangler, and Nicholas S. Hopkins (eds.), Popu-lar Participation in Social Change (The Hague: Mouton

Publishers, 1976), p. 332.

72. Po, op. cit., p. 34. For a treatment of early peasant rebellions

throughout Southeast Asia see Harry J. Benda, "PeasantMovements in Colonial Southeast Asia," in Mary RacelisHollnsteiner (ed.), Society, Culture and the Filipino (Quezon

City, Philippines: The Institute of Philippine Culture,Ateneo de Manila University, 1979), pp. 227-234.

73. Huizer, op. cit., pp. 314-322.

74. K. C. Alexander, "Some Aspects of Peasant Organizationsin South India," Rural Development Participation Review,Summer 1979, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 4-7; and Gail Ombedt,"Women and Rural Revolt in India," Journal of Peasant

Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, April 1978, pp. 370-403.75. Huizer, op. cit., p. 307.

76. Joel S. Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: PressuresToward Political and Social Change in the Third World

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp.87-111.

77. Ibid., pp. 193-225; Huizer, op. cit., pp. 309, 324-25.

78. Migdal, op. cit., p. 230.79. Huizer, op. cit., p. 309. Rapidly increasing alienation of the

rural poor from the resource bsae on which their livelihoods

depend is one of the most important development problems

currently facing Asian nations. This problem is characterized

by a rapid population growth and a conflict between modern

and traditional concepts of property rights, as well as the

conflict between subsistence and "development" oriented

uses of a finite land and water resource base. See John C.

Cool, "Authoritarianism and Development: The Search for

Alternatives," to appear in The Resources and Development

of the Indian Ocean Region, University of Western Australia

Press (forthcoming).


507




80. Ibid., pp. 331-338.See Po, op. cit., pp. 75-77 for a case

study.81. Migdal,op. cit., pp. 237-252.82. EqbalAhmad, "RevolutionaryWarfareand Counterinsur-

gency," n NormanMillerandRoderickAya (eds.),National

Liberation,Revolution n the ThirdWorld NewYork:TheFreePress, 1971),p. 157as citedbyMigdal,op. cit., p. 262.Too oftenthe government's est efforts at developmentnd

up beingcapturedbyelitesto

supplementheir traditional

sourcesof powerby establishing pparent ontrolovergov-ernment undsfor roads, schools,and healthfacilities.Thisweaknessof manycommunitydevelopment nd local gov-ernmentprogramswas noted earlier.Huizer,op. cit., pp.324-328.For discussionof this phenomenonn relation o

governmentffortsto build ocalpoliticalparticipationn the

Philippines ee Po, op. cit., pp. 54-56.83. Huizer,op. cit., pp. 328-329;andMigdal,op. cit., pp. 226-

256. In contemporary hilippines xperiencehe stimulus othis radicalizationrocess requentlynvolves egalactions oalienatethe poor from the land on whichthey havetradi-

tionallydependedortheir ivelihood o makewayforitsex-

ploitationby government r large corporationsn the causeof "nationaldevelopment." eeFrancisco uling,"The Cel-

lophil Story: Is a Giant StompingOut the Hill-Tribes?"Who, Vol. II, No. 24, September15, 1979,pp. 8-13;and

BenjaminBagadion,Jr., Jose Fernandez,RichardFernan-

dez, et al., Lawin theMobilization ndParticipatoryOrga-nizationof the RuralPoor: TheKagawasanCase(QuezonCity:Instituteof PhilippineCulture,Ateneode ManilaUni-

versity, 1979).Otherexamplesof the use of confrontation

techniques o mobilizeruralpoor in the Philippinesn de-fenseof theirrightsagainst ural litesandunresponsiveocalofficials arepresentedn MaryRacelisHollnsteiner,"Mobi-

lizingthe RuralPoor ThroughCommunityOrganization,"PhilippineStudies,Vol. 27, ThirdQuarter 979,pp. 387-417.

84. Huizer,op. cit., pp. 328-331.Huizerobserveshatsuch ead-ersalmostalwayscomefromamongtherelatively etteroff

peasantswho are essdependent n landowners rrichfarm-

ers and whomayhavehadanurbanbackground.Migdalar-guesthat thepeasantsack thenecessary rganizationalbili-

tyand have to depend n theearlystageson outsiderso pro-videit. Op. cit., p. 232. There s evidence hat the effectiveleadersendto befrommoreadvantagedlassesehan he ledeven in more moderate ypes of communityorganization.CristinaMontiel,RuralOrganizations nd RuralDevelop-ment in thePhilippines:A FieldStudy(QuezonCity:Insti-tute of PhilippineCulture:Ateneo de ManilaUniversity,1977),p. 117.

85. For a discussion f theconceptof fit anda reviewof thesup-portingresearch eeJayR. Galbraith ndDanielA. Nathan-

son, StrategyImplementation:The Role of StructureandProcess(St. Paul, Minn.:WestPublishingCompany,1978),

especiallypp.90-97.The research f John C. Ickis hasbeen

instrumentaln demonstratinghe utilityof the concept nruraldevelopment.See JohnC. Ickis, "Strategyand Struc-turein RuralDevelopment,"HarvardBusinessSchooldoc-toraldissertation,Boston, Mass., 1978;and JohnC. Ickis,"RuralDevelopmentManagement: trategy,Structure, nd

ManagerialRoles," in David C. Korten(ed.), PopulationandSocialDevelopmentManagement: ChallengeforMan-

agementSchools(Caracas: nstitutode EstudiosSuperioresde Administracion, 979), pp. 113-126. See also Sussman,

op. cit.; KortenandAlfonso,op. cit.;and IckisandKorten,op. cit.

86. SeeMontgomery ndEsman,"PopularParticipation," p.

cit. fordiscussion f differentmeans orachievinghisfitap-propriate o particular ircumstances. implybasing plan-ningon well-developed nowledgeof the peopleof the pro-gramarea,andof thestrategiesheyemploy orsurvival ndadvancementwouldbe a majoradvance or mostprograms.See Jay K. Satia, "DevelopmentalTasks and MiddleMan-

agement Roles in Rural Development,"and David C.

Korten,"SocialDevelopment: uttingPeopleFirst,"bothinKortenand

Alfonso, op.cit.

87. FrancesF. Korten,"CommunityParticipation:A Manage-mentPerspectiven Obstacles ndOptions," n Alfonso and

Korten,op. cit. reviews he obstacles n the typicalbureau-craticorganizationo oa participativetyleof ruraldevelop-mentaction. SeealsoDerickW. Brinkerhoff,"InsidePublic

Bureaucracy: mpoweringManagerso EmpowerClients,"Rural DevelopmentParticipationReview, Vol. 1, No. 1,Summer1979,pp. 7-9.

88. Theblueprint ndthelearning rocessapproacheseflect wo

fundamentally ifferentdecisionmakingparadigms:he ra-tionalandthecybernetic,whichhave beenarticulatedn de-tail by JohnD. Steinbruner,TheCyberneticTheoryof De-cisions: New Dimensionsof PoliticalAnalysis (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1974).The implications f

theseparadigm ifferences avebeenextensivelyxaminednthe literature.See JamesG. Marchand HerbertA. Simon,Organizations New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.);RichardCyertand JamesMarch,A BehavioralTheory f theFirm(EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1963);David

Braybrooke nd CharlesE. Lindblom,A Strategyof Deci-sion: PolicyEvaluationas a SocialProcess(NewYork:TheFreePress, 1963);Aaron Wildavsky,ThePolitics of Bud-

getaryProcess(Boston:Little,BrownandCompany, 1964);GrahamT. Allison,TheEssenceof Decision:ExplainingheCubanMissileCrisis(Boston:Little Brownand Company,1971);and Naomi Caidenand Aaron Wildavsky,PlanningandBudgetingn Poor CountriesNewYork:JohnWiley&Sons, 1974). The blueprintapproach o developmentpro-grammings derivative f the rationalparadigm,which ad-

dresseshowdecisions hould be madewherea singleactor isinvolved.Thelearningprocessmodel s derivative f the cy-berneticparadigmwhichprovidesa moreaccuratedescrip-tion of howdecisionsareactuallymadeand is moreuseful nthe analysisand improvement f complexdecisionmakingsystems. Although not in itself normative,the cyberneticparadigmervesas thebasicfor a numberof importantnor-mativemodels of learningprocess,organizationaldesign,andpolicyanalysis.Forexample, ee DonaldN. Michael,On

Learning o Plan-and Plenningto Learn(San Francisco:

Jossey-BassPublishers,1973);StaffordBeer,Platform orChange London:JohnWiley&Sons,Inc., 1974);RaymondA. Bauerand Rikk Larsen,"The Convergence f WhatIsand What ShouldBe," WorkingPaperHBS74-7, Divisionof Research,GraduateSchool of Business

Administration,HarvardUniversity,Boston, Mass.,March20, 1974;JayR.Galbraith,OrganizationDesign (Reading,Mass.:Addison-

WesleyPublishingCompany,1977);RussellL. Ackoff, "Na-tional DevelopmentPlanning Revisited,"OperationsRe-search, Vol. 25, No. 2, March-April1977, pp. 207-218;AaronWildavsky,SpeakingTruth o Power: TheArt and

Craftof PolicyAnalysis Boston:LittleBrown,1979);DavidC. Korten,"Towarda Technology or ManagingSocial De-

velopment," in Korten,Population, op. cit., pp. 20-50;JamesW. Botkin, MahdiElmandjra,MirceaMalitza,NoLimits to Learning:Bridging heHumanGap (Oxford:Per-gamonPress,1979);and BruceF. JohnstonandWilliamC.


508




Clark, On DesigningStrategiesor RuralDevelopment:A

PolicyAnalysisPerspectivein preparation).89. Abbreviatedersionsof theproject ycledescribed yDennis

A. Rondinelli,"Planningand ImplementingDevelopmentProjects:An Introduction,"n DennisA. Rondinelli ed.),PlanningDevelopmentProjects Stroudsburg, a.: Dowden,Hutchinson&Ross,Inc., 1977),p. 5. Rondinelli tresses hatthe formalmodelof theprojectcycledescribes ow it issup-posed to work, but that realityoften departssubstantially

from the prescription.bid., pp. 4-17. Rondinellicorrectlychallengesprojectmanagement'smperiousrationalitybutfails to question hebasicconceptof theprojectasthecentralfocus of developmentprogramming. taff membersof De-

velopmentAlternatives,nc. havegivensubstantial ttentionto the limitationsof ruraldevelopment rojectsdesignedbytheblueprintmodelandhavepioneeredhedevelopmentf aprocessmodel of projectmanagement.Morsset al., op. cit.,pp. 208-222, and Charles F. Sweet and Peter F. Weisel,"ProcessVersusBlueprintModels for DesigningRuralDe-

velopmentProjects,"in GeorgeHonadleand RudiKlauss(eds.), InternationalDevelopmentAdministration: mple-mentationAnalysis or DevelopmentProjects(New York:

PraegerPublishers,1979),pp. 127-145.Manyof theirargu-ments

parallelhose of the

present tudy;however, heyjoinRondinelli n failing o suggest hattheprojectconcept tselfand its emphasison breakingdevelopment p into discrete,time-bounded iecesmaybe the realheart of the problem.Chambers,however,madethepointa numberof yearsago.RobertChambers,ManagingRuralDevelopment:deasand

Experience rom East Africa (New York: Africana Pub-

lishingCo., 1974),pp. 29-31.90. NationalEconomicandDevelopmentAuthority,A Guide o

ProjectDevelopmentManila:NEDA, 1978),p. 6.91. "On Projects,"PasitamNewsletter:TheDesignProcess n

Development,No. 15,Summer1977,p. 1. It shouldbe notedthatprojectorganization erse is not anti-developmental,fcarriedout withina largermorepermanentnstitutional et-

ting specificallygearedto the projectmode of operation.

However, his s seldom hesettingnto whichprojectorgani-zations areintroducedn theThirdWorld.

92. Morgan,op. cit., pp.1-6;and BruceF. JohnstonandWilliamC. Clark, "Food, Healthand Population:Policy Analysisand DevelopmentPriorities in Low-IncomeCountries,"Working Paper 79-52, International nstitute for AppliedSystemsAnalysis,A-2361Laxenburg,Austria,pp. 66-74.

93. BruceF. Johnston," 'Integration' nd'BasicNeeds' n Stra-

tegies or RuralDevelopment,"n "RuralDevelopment tra-

tegies:A Surveyof PolicyOptionsand theConceptsof Inte-

grationand BasicNeeds,"a report o the Officeof RuralandAdministrative evelopment,U.S. Agencyfor International

Development,October15, 1979,pp. 1-11.TheWorldBank,the primary ffender, s graduallymovingawayfrominsist-

ingon creationof suchprojectmanagementnits,partlydueto the rebellionof its borrowers. n ruraldevelopmentewimportantoutcomes are terminal.Buildinga clinic is ter-minal.Improving ndmaintaininghehealthof aruralpopu-lation is not. Constructing n irrigation ystem s terminal.Improvingand sustainingefficient, reliable,and equitableaccess o water s not. Muchof theThirdWorldcountrysideis alreadyoversuppliedwithunderutilized linicsandirriga-tion facilitieswhichserveonly a fractionof theirdesignedserviceareawhichservesas sober estimonyo the imitationsof a terminalapproach o development.

94. Chambers,ManagingRural,op. cit.; Chambers,"ProjectSelection," op. cit.; Morgan, op. cit.; Ackoff, op. cit.;

CaidenandWildavsky, p. cit.;Morss,et al., op. cit.; Sweetand Weisel,op. cit.; andKorten,"Towarda Technology,"op. cit. For a comprehensiveeviewsee MarcusD. Ingle,"ImplementingDevelopmentPrograms:A State-of-the-ArtReview,"finalreportpreparedor the Office of RuralDe-

velopmentand DevelopmentAdministration,DevelopmentSupportBureau,U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelop-ment,January1979.

95. This discussionwassubstantiallynfluencedby Michael,op.cit.

96. In the Puebla Project in Mexico, agriculturalechnicianslearned romlocal farmers headvantages f intercropping,an experiencewhichled the Mexicangovernmentn early1975 o establish center ortraining griculturalesearchersand extensionistsn a new participatoryR&Dmodel. Re-

portedby WilliamF. Whyteand LynnGostyla, "TowardNewModelsof AgriculturalResearch ndDevelopment"obe includedas a chaptern a forthcoming ook byWhiteonnewapproacheso thegeneration f appropriate nowledgefor ruraldevelopment.

The idea thattheexpertsmight earn rom ruralpeoples snotnew,buthasonly recently ttractedmore hancurious n-terest. See LowellS. Hardin,"EmergingRoles of Agricul-

turalEconomistsWorkingn InternationalResearch nstitu-tions such as IRRI and CIMMYT"and MichaelCollison,"AgrarianChange,the Challenge or AgriculturalEcono-mists,"both arepaperspresented t the 17thConference fthe InternationalAssociationof AgriculturalEconomists,Banff, Canada,September1979.See also the IDS Bulletin,Vol. 10, No. 2, January1979,editedby RobertChambers,devotedentirely o the theme "RuralDevelopment:Whose

KnowledgeCounts?" In additionto an excellentreviewofthe importance f indigenous echnicalknowledge,variousauthorsdiscussappropriatemethodologies or elicitingand

applying uchknowledgen ruraldevelopment rograms.97. MichaelRedclift,"ProductionProgramsor SmallFarmers:

Plan Puebla as Mythand Reality,"The FordFoundation,Office for Mexicoand CentralAmerica,January1980pro-

videsa usefulperspectiven theways n whichMexican ornfarmers dapted atherhanadopted hetechnologies f Plan

Puebla,resultingn substantialncreasesn productionbut

usingvaried echnologypackageswhich often differed sub-

stantially rom thatofferedby the program.Redcliftarguesthat ncreasinghe effectiveness f agriculturalxtensionmaybe dependenton a betterunderstandingf this adaptationprocess,and urgesthat "New approacheso workingwithsmallfarmersbegin by askingwhyfarmers hooseto act as

they do." Ibid., p. 31. Peter Hildebrandhas describeda

methodologyused in Guatemala o do just this. A multi-

disciplinaryeamgoesto thefield to learn hemethodsbeingusedby farmers nd theirsocial,economic,andtechnical a-tional.Onlyoncesuchunderstandingsassimilated o theex-

pertsattempto makerecommendationso the farmerswhich

theybelieve he farmerswouldfind to beimprovementson-sistentwith theirsituation.Variousdeas are fieldtestedandthose whichseem to havemeritarepassedon to farmers orconsideration nd implementationn theirown fields withassistanceromtheteam.The secondyear hefarmers reontheirown, with the researchersbserving o see whichprac-ticesthey find sufficientlyattractive o continue.Onlythse

practicesare considered o have potentialfor broaderdis-semination. Personal interview and "Motivating SmallFarmerso AcceptChange,"paperpresented t the confer-enceon IntegratedCropandAnimalProduction o OptimizeResourceUtilizationon Small Farms n DevelopingCoun-


509




tries," The Rockefeller Foundation ConferenceCenter,Bellagio,Italy, October18-23, 1978,Institutode CienciayTechnologiaAgricolas,Guatemala,C.A., October1978.

98. Ranjit Gupta, "The PovertyTrap:LessonsfromDharam-

pur," in KortenandAlfonso, op. cit.99. TheCBFPS nvolveddelivery f anexternally elivered on-

traceptive echnology,but reduceddependence n theclinicand regular ommercial ourcesby introducing redundantoutletundervillagecontrol.In the case of the NDDB, the

membercontrolledcooperatives tructure ncreased illagermarketpowerand accessto sourcesof necessaryechnicalassistance. Well developed internal control systems andaudits imitedopportunitiesor corruption. nits communal

irrigationprogram he NIA was emphasizinghe develop-mentof irrigation ystemsoperatedunderdirectcommunitycontrolas an alternativeo dependence n thelargergovern-mentoperated ystems.

100. This is inherent n the idea thatblueprints an be generatedand testedbyoneorganizationorsubsequent pplication yanother. Johnston and Clark suggest that ". . the notion of

pilot projectsas 'tests' of developmentpolicy 'hypotheses'retainsa flavorof inappropriatephysics nvy'whenappliedin the development ontext.. ." On Designing Strategies,

op. cit.101. As anexample eeRushikeshMaru,"OrganizationorRuralHealth:The IndianExperience,"n KortenandAlfonso,op.cit.

102. RobertChambers alls ruralsurveys,

... one of the most inefficient industries in the world ...and yet thesehuge operationspersist,often in the name ofthe scienceof evaluation,preempting carcenational re-searchresources, ndgeneratingmoundsof data andpaperswhichare ikely o beanembarrassmento alluntilwhiteantsor paper-shreddersleanthingsup.

"ShortcutMethods n InformationGatheringor RuralDe-

velopmentProjectss," paperfor the WorldBankAgricul-turalSectorSymposia,January1980.

103. The ruralpoor usuallyare the leastvisiblemembersof theruralcommunity.There s littlehope of programs ssistingthem unlessspecificstepsaretakento makethemmorevisi-ble-i.e., determinewhoand where heyare,illuminateheirsurvival ndadvancementtrategies nd theirvulnerabilityoseasonality.Thesignificance f such nformation s broughtout very effectivelyby RobertChambers,RichardLong-hurst,DavidBradleyand RichardFeachem,"SeasonalDi-mensions o RuralPoverty:Analysisand Practical mplica-tions," DiscussionPaper142,Instituteof Development tu-dies at theUniversity f Sussex,Brighton,England,February1979;and RobertChambers,"RuralHealthPlanning:WhySeasonsMatter,"IDSWorkingPaper,Instituteof Develop-mentStudies,University f Sussex,Brighton,England,June

19,1979.BRAC

providesoneof the

bestexamples f the ef-fectivedevelopment nd use of such nformation t theoper-ating level. Gupta, op. cit. demonstrateshe use of peoplebaseddiagnosisasthebasisforregionalplanning.Animpor-tant demonstrationhatpeoplebaseddiagnosiscanserveasthe guidingframework n macro-plannings found in theCountryDevelopmentStrategyStatementFY 1982:Philip-pines, USAIDMissionto the Republicof Philippines,Jan-uary 1980. This methodologys discussed n moredetailinKorten,"SocialDevelopment,"op. cit. SeeYoung,op. cit.

104. Such ndividualsmightbe foundworkingwithina largeres-tablishedorganization, rheadinga smallvoluntary gency.Fundingwouldsupportan initialplanof actionintended o

takethe ideathroughStageI development, ut withtheun-

derstandinghattherewouldbe maximum reedom o reviseboth strategyand budgetas emergingexperiencedictated.Thetimerequiredwillvarysubstantiallywiththecomplexityof theactivity,but willseldombe lessthantwo to threeyears.

105. Unlessprogress ndicatedearlieraction, at the end of an

agreedperiodan assessmentwoulddeterminewhether he

undertakinghouldterminate,proceedwithfurtherStage 1testing,ormove ntoStage2. Thenextbudgetwouldsupportthetestingandrefinement f theprogramn additional ites,refinement nd routinization f provenmethods, nitialde-

velopmentof supportingmanagement ystems,and gradualexpansionof corestaff involvedwiththe experimental ro-gram.Onceready o move intoStage3 amore detailedplanandbudgetwould be developed or phasedprogram xpan-sion, buildingon the capacitiesdevelopedduringStages 1and 2.

106. At leastsome of these funds arelikelyto be used for smalllocal level projectsof the type identifiedby Robert Cham-bers, "ProjectSelection,"op. cit. It is neitherappropriatenor necessary,however, hat the fundsgoing to the agencycarrying uttheseprojectsbe project iedor administeredna projectmode.

107. In a properly onceivedpoverty-focuseduraldevelopmentprogram, he start-upcosts, to whichdevelopmentprojectfunding s normallyaddressed, relikelyto be quitemodestrelative o the maintenance osts of a matureprogram.In-deed, too muchmoney,too earlywill kill the learningpro-cess. Theimplicationsor thebasicstructure f developmentassistancefunding-built around the exactly opposite re-

quirementsof large-scale nfrastructure evelopment-aresubstantial.

This frameworkmightbe useful to fundingagencies n

shaping their own roles consistentwith their particularstrengthsand constraints.For exampleworkingwith pro-grams hroughStages1 and2 shouldprobablybe limited o

relativelysmaller donors with highly qualifiedfield staff,substantialprogramminglexibility,and no qualmsabout

takingon high risk, staff-intensive ctivities.Taking pro-grams hroughStage3 expansionnvolves omewhatess riskandrequires reaterunding hanStages1and 2. Itmayalsobe slightly ess staff intensive,but stillrequireshighlyquali-fiedstaffon theground. ntermediate onorssuchasUSAID

mightfind themselvesmost effectivehere. Whilenot impos-siblefor a donorsuchas USAID to be effective n Stages1and2 it would akeveryspecial ommitmento changing ro-grammingproceduresand orientations n ways consistentwiththe requirementsf thosestages.

ButevenStage3 demandsa degreeof flexibilityand sus-tainedon-the-groundtaff attention o movementof com-

paratively maller ums of money,which the largestdonorssuch as the WorldBankmayfind it particularly ifficultto

provide.Thelattermightmoreappropriatelyoncentrate npickingup the fundingof programswhichhave moved be-

yond Stage3 to maturity.By such timethe program houldhavedeveloped he capacity o absorbsubstantialblocks of

fundingfor well delineatedactivities.Moreover,since thelearningphasefor the programn questionhas largelybeencompleted t is less likely that the amountsand forms inwhichassistance reprovidedwillprematurelynhibitessen-tial learning.On the otherhand,it mightbe a usefulexperi-encefor the Bank o createa specialunit to specializen pro-gramdevelopmenthrough he earlierStagesworkingwithsmallamounts of funds, highlyflexibleprogramming ro-cedures,and staff intensive,on-the-groundupport.For all


510



COMMUNITY RGANIZATION NDRURALDEVELOPMENT

donorsgreater ensitivityo implications f thelearningpro-cess modelmighthelpavoiddoingharm o apromising rga-nizationby imposingon it typesof assistance ndprogram-mingmethodologiesnappropriateo the stageof develop-mentof the programbeingassisted.

108. Once an organizationhas achieved he development f onematureprogram,a significantdanger s thatit may aunchasecondnew programwithoutsufficientrecognitionof therole the learningprocessplayed n its originalprogram uc-

cess. Indeed,the earliersuccess s likelyto bringa rushofdonors o thedooreager o share n thegloryof anattractivesuccessbysupporting ewprogramswithina provenorgani-zation, but bringingmoneytied to inappropriate lueprintprogrammingmethodsand in quantities oo largeto allowfor the bottom-up earningprocess hroughwhich t maybenecessaryor eachnewprogramo progress.Sarvodayas acase in point. It was movingwell throughthe learningse-quenceuntil it suddenlybranchednto a varietyof newpro-gramswith new requirementswhile simultaneously nder-taking rapid expansion. At the time of this writingtheBRAC,NDDB, and CBFPSwereallmovingrapidlyntonewprogram reaswith donorprodding. t is not clear o metowhat extent the leadersof theseorganizations ully appre-ciated heimplications f thesenewundertakingsnd theex-tent to whichtheywill requirenewlearningand sometimesquitedifferent ypesof organizational ompetence. wouldhypothesize highprobability f failureunlesseachnewpro-gram s takenthrough he learningprocess equence.

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