Communica)veAc)oninGroupsandSupportNetworks

ToddDaviesSymbolicSystemsProgram&

CenterfortheStudyofLanguageandInforma)on

StanfordUniversity

SYMSYS275/BIO175April26,2017

Communica)veAc)on

Ajointac)oninwhichpar)cipantscommunicate,andinwhichtheac)onisthepurposetowhichthecommunica)onisdirectedTermisfromJürgenHabermas(1981),ATheoryofCommunica=veAc=on

Twotypesofconflict

BeliefsAssignmentsofTrueorFalse(orofprobabili)es)toproposi)ons,e.g.•  “Ibelieveitwillraintomorrow.”•  “IbelievethatifDeborahteachestheclass,students

willlikeit.”Preferences

Assignmentsofrela)vedesiretopossibleoutcomes,e.g.•  “Iprefersunshineoverrain.”•  “Ipreferea)ngindoorsoverapicnicintherain.”

FourFormsofCommunica)veAc)on

Rosenschein,S.J.,&Davies,T.(toappear).Coordina)ontechnologyforac)vesupportnetworks:Context,needfinding,anddesign.AI&Society.

UsualApproachestoPreferenceConflictsinDecisionTheory

Preferenceaggrega)on(socialchoicetheory)•  Vo)ngmethods(choosing,ranking,approving)•  Decisionrules(majority/condorcet,plurality,borda,instantrunoff)

Bargaining/nego)a)onRandomselec)on

Preferenceresolu)oncanbelesseffec)vethandelibera)on

Example:•  Personcini)allyprefersac)ona•  Persondini)allyprefersac)ona’•  Bothini)allypreferoutcomexoverx’,anddonotcarewhich

ac)on(aora’)achievesthis•  Butcknowsp(x|a)=1andp(x|a’)=0•  Anddthinksp(x|a)=.4andp(x|a’)=.6•  Bothcanddarera)onal•  Therefore:Ifcandddiscusstheirbeliefspriortoafinalvote

oragreement,theywillconvergeonac)onabecausechasbederinforma)onaboutp(x|a)thanddoes.

•  Afocusonpreferencesonly,withoutdelibera)on,missesthisinforma)onandmightleadtoaworseoutcome

FourFormsofCommunica)veAc)on

Howdotheseformsrelatetoconceptssuchas…?•  “collec)veintelligence”•  “smartci)es”and“civicintelligence”•  “GlobalBrain”and“MassMind”(Bloom,2000)

Asomewhatcontroversialposi)on…

“Intelligence”isaconsensusconcept–itappliesonlywhen(most)peopleagreethatonesolu)on,ac)on,orplanisbederthanothers.Inmanysocialsitua)ons,especiallythoseinvolvinglargenumbersofpeople,thereisnogeneralagreementonwhatisthebederorbestcourseofac)on.Therefore…a“collec)velyintelligent”courseofac)onimpliesthatthestakeholderseither...•  havelowinterpersonalgoalconflict,or•  agreethatthecourseofac)onisagoodwaytoresolve

theirconflicts

Let’sdeepenthisabit...

3branchesofdecisionTheory•  ExpectedU)lityTheory(singleagentin“gamesagainstnature”)–VonNeumann&Morgenstern,1944

•  GameTheory(mul)pleagentscompe)ngforpayoffs)–Nashequilibrium,1951

•  SocialChoiceTheory(mul)pleagentsthatmustagreeonasocialoutcome)–Arrow,1951

PreferenceProfiles

PreferenceProfiles

SocialChoiceTheory

DEFINITION:Preferencerela*onsR,P,andIrespec)velyexistbetweentwooutcomeswhenevertheoutcomescanbematchedwithlabelsxandysuchthat:•  xRy,meaningxispreferredorindifferenttoy(weakpreference).

•  xPy,meaningxispreferredtoy,andholdsiffnotyRx.(strictpreference).

•  xIy,meaningxisindifferenttoy,andholdsiffxRyandyRx(indifference).

SocialChoiceTheory(con)nued)

DEFINITION:Apreferencerela)onRisweaklyorderediffforalloutcomesx,y,andz:inasetofoutcomesX:•  xRyoryRx(completeness).•  xRyandyRzimplyxRz(transi*vity).

SocialChoiceTheory(con)nued)DEFINITION:Asocialwelfarefunc*onisafunc)onfsuchthatif•  Xisthesetofallconceivablesocialoutcomesorstates(|X|≥3),

•  Nisasetofindividuals(2≤⏐N⏐=n),and•  DisadomainofpreferenceprofilesRN=<R1,R2,…Rn>,suchthat

•  foralliinN,Riisaweaklyorderedpreferencerela)onforindividualioverX(individualra*onality),

thenfmapsDintoarangeRofpossiblesocialpreferencerela)onsRNonXforgroupN.

SocialChoiceTheory(con)nued)

DEFINITION:Asocialwelfarefunc)onfisanArrowsocialwelfarefunc*onif•  thedomainDoffcontainsallpossiblepreferenceprofilesRN(universaldomain),

and•  therangeRoffisthesetofweaklyorderedsocialpreferencerela)onsRN(collec*vera*onality).

SocialChoiceTheory(con)nued)THEOREM:Arrow'sImpossibilityTheorem(Arrow,1951/1963).TherecanbenoArrowsocialwelfarefunc)onfsa)sfyingallofthefollowing:•  forallsocialoutcomesxandyinX,ifapreferenceprofileRNobeys

xPiyforeachindividualiinN,thenf(RN)yieldsxRNy(weakParetoefficiency);

•  forallpreferenceprofilesRNandRN'inD,andallsocialoutcomesxandyinX,ifRNandRN'obeyxRiyiffxRi'yforallindividualsiinN,thenf(RN)andf(RN')yieldxRNyiffxRN'y(independenceofirrelevantalterna*ves);

and•  thereisnoindividualdinNsuchthatforallpreferenceprofilesRN

inD,andallsocialoutcomesxandyinX,ifxPdythenf(RN)yieldsxPNy(non-dictatorship).

SocialChoiceTheory(con)nued)DEFINITION:AsocialchoiceruleCmapsthedomainDofpreferenceprofiles,togetherwithenvironmentsS⊆X,intosubsetsofS.SIDENOTE:Theabovedefini)ondoesnotassumethatCobeysanordering.Arrowdidassumethis,however:DEFINITION:AsocialchoiceruleCisanArrowsocialchoicefunc*onifitisdeterminedbyanArrowsocialwelfarefunc)onfandforallenvironmentsS⊆X,C(S,f(RN))={x⏐xisinSand,forallyinS,f(RN)yieldsxRNy}.

RevealedSocialPreferences(Davies&Shah2004)

DEFINITION:GivenasetXofsocialoutcomes,apreferenceprofileRN,andasocialchoiceruleC,xRN*y(meaningthereisarevealedsocialpreferenceforxinrela)ontoy)iffthereissomeenvironmentS⊆X,suchthatxandyareinSandxisinC(S,RN).

RevealedSocialPreferences(Davies&Shah2004,con)nued)

DEFINITION:Weakaxiomofrevealedsocialpreference.GivenasetXofsocialoutcomes,apreferenceprofileRN,andasocialchoiceruleC,asocialpreferencerela)onRNsa)sfiesinter-menuconsistency(IMC)*iffitisarevealedsocialpreferencerela)onunderCforallpairsofsocialoutcomesinX,andthefollowingcondi)onholds:ForallenvironmentsS⊆X,ifxandyareinSandxisinC(S,RN),thenforallenvironmentsS'⊆XsuchthatxandyareinS',ifyisinC(S',RN),thenxisinC(S',RN).*ThistermisfromSen(1993).

RevealedSocialPreferences(Davies&Shah2004,con)nued)

THEOREM:IfRN*isarevealedsocialpreferencerela)onassociatedwithasetXofsocialoutcomes,apreferenceprofileRN,andasocialchoiceruleC,andRN*violatesinter-menuconsistency,thenitviolatescollec)vera)onality.TDavies,T.&Shah,R(2004).Intui)vepreferenceaggrega)on:Testsofindependenceandconsistency.hdp://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2213600

Intui)vePreferenceAggrega)on(5voters)

Intui)vePreferenceAggrega)on(3voters)

PreferenceAggrega)on:ConclusionsArrow’sTheoremshowsthatinthegeneralcaseofacollec)onofagents,thereisnowaytoaggregatetheirpreferencesthatleadsto“consistent”choicesacrossdifferentpreferenceprofilesSingle-agentdecisiontheory(i.e.ExpectedU)lityTheory)assumesconsistentchoicesacrossvaryingmenusarepossibleforindividuals,atleastintheoryTherefore…Arrow’stheoremprovidesanargumentthatcollec)vedecisionmakingcannotbera)onalinthesamesenseasindividualdecisionmaking.Humanintui)onsaboutfairpreferenceaggrega)onrobustlyviolateArrow’scondi)ons.Buthumansdonotagreeonwhatisthefairestsocialchoicerule.Sowhatdoesthismeanfor“collec)veintelligence”?

Animportantques)onfacinghumanity…

Ifweassumethata“collec)velyintelligent”solu)ontoasocialproblemorissueisonethatmostpeoplewouldagreeisbederthanothersolu)ons…Arethesocialproblemsorissueswefacesuscep)bletocollec)velyintelligentsolu)ons?

Examplesofresearch:Coordina)on(Rosenschein&Davies,toappear)

Coordina)onlevelsandsublevels:•  Individualsengageinbehaviorthatrequirescoordina)onbetweentasks,

eveniftheindividualisviewedas–  isolatedfromothers,andthatrequirescoordina)onwithotherswhenthat

individualis–  connectedtothem;

•  Networksofindividuals,whoareconnectedtoeachotherbutwhoretainautonomytodecideontheirownac)ons,maycoordinatefor–  informa=on-sharing,e.g.incommuni)esofprac)ce(Wenger,1998),orto

providemore–  directsupportforeachother;and

•  Teams,whosemembersareconsciouslyworkingtogethertoachievethesamegoal(s),andmusttypicallycoordinatewitheachotherwhethertheycometogetheronan–  ad-hocbasisorasmembersofan–  organiza=on.

Examplesofresearch:Coordina)on

Fourapplica)onareasforimprovingcoordina)oninac)vesupportnetworks:(i)academiccoaching,(ii)voca)onaltraining,(iii)earlylearninginterven)on,and(iv)volunteercoordina)on

Examplesofresearch:Coordina)on

Wearguethatthetoolsneededtosupportcoordina)oninac)vesupportnetworksaredifferentfromthosethatworkbestinteams,becausethoseinasupportnetworkare•  lessobligatedtodoneededtasks•  morelikelytobefocusedonothertasksandjobsasprimary(moredistractable)

•  morelikelytoengageintermidentlyoronlywhentheyhaveextra)me

Rosenschein,S.J.,&Davies,T.(toappear).Coordina)ontechnologyforac)vesupportnetworks:Context,needfinding,anddesign.AI&Society.

Examplesofresearch:Delibera)onCommunityplanningprocessesovenleaveoutkeystakeholdersbecausetheyrelyonfacetofacemee)ngsthatnoteveryonecanmake–needonlinetoolsforjoiningthedelibera)on.

Davies,T.,Sywulka,B.,Saffold,R.,&Jhaveri,R.(2002).Communitydemocracyonline:ApreliminaryreportfromEastPaloAlto.

Differentmaindelibera)onmethodsallleadtosubstan)alchangesinknowledgeand/orawtudesoverandabovebackgroundinforma)on

Carman,K.L.,etal.(2015).Effec)venessofpublicdelibera)onmethodsforgatheringinputonissuesinhealthcare:Resultsfromarandomizedtrial.SocialScience&Medicine,133,11-20..

Onlinedelibera)onmethodsdonotappeartonega)velyaffectequalityofpar)cipa)onrela)vetofacetofacemethods,exceptforasmalleffectonracialdisparity(African-AmericanversusWhite).

Showers,E.,Tindall,N.,&Davies,T.(2015,August).EqualityofPar)cipa)onOnlineVersusFacetoFace:CondensedAnalysisoftheCommunityForumDelibera)veMethodsDemonstra)on.InInterna=onalConferenceonElectronicPar=cipa=on(pp.53-67).SpringerInterna)onalPublishing.