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Review: Comments on Living High and Letting DieAuthor(s): Fred FeldmanReviewed work(s): Living High and Letting Die by Peter UngerSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 59, No. 1, (Mar., 1999), pp. 195-201Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653469Accessed: 28/04/2008 16:40

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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LIX, No. 1, March 1999

Comments on Living High and Letting Die

FRED FELDMAN

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Living High and Letting Die is advertised as a "Liberationist volume". Liber- ationism is a collection of views, including views in substantive normative ethics, in metaethics, and in the methodology of moral philosophy. I focus here on the substantive normative ethics, which Unger views as Libera- tionism's most important component.

Unger claims that the substantive normative component of Liberationism, together with certain empirical facts about people like us, entails that we ought to give quite a lot of our money to organizations such as Oxfam-Amer- ica, UNICEF, and CARE, to be used to prevent premature deaths among dis- tant children. Thus, for example, he says '... for a well-to-do adult, like you or me, it's badly wrong not to provide vital aid even if it costs many thou-

sands of dollars to lessen by just one the number of distant children who'll die young rather than live long.' (145) He says (151) that young philosophers should quit philosophy and take up some more remunerative line of work, and then donate most of their earnings to lessen death among children in dis- tant lands. Professors of law are instructed to resign their current academic positions and switch to higher paying jobs in corporate law. Then they should 'donate the lion's share of [their] much higher income toward helping save distant youngsters' lives.' ( 151)

Unger insists that we cannot evade his moral directives by claiming that we have special obligations to our children, or our elderly infirm parents, or our spouses. In one typical passage, he says, 'For most of us well-to-do folks, no considerations flowing from strong special obligations will change the moral picture much and, for most of our lives, we must give most of what comes our way to lessen distant serious suffering.' (150) Time after time, Unger specifies that the suffering to be alleviated is the life-threatening suffering of "toddlers" in 'the likes of Pakistan or Nigeria' (146), or "tykes" in sub-Saharan Africa (146), or dying "Third World kids" (6).

The normative claim is perplexing. Why does Unger think that people like us 'must give most of what comes our way to lessen distant serious suf-

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fering' among dying Third World tykes? Isn't it a bit fanatical to focus in this way on the suffering of distant dying children? Why wouldn't it be OK for some of us to give most of what comes our way to lessen the suffering of nearby dying children? Furthermore, I wonder why it would be wrong to give most of what comes our way to prevent premature deaths in teenagers. Surely death at age sixteen is a bad thing, too-perhaps almost as bad as death at age three. Yet Unger says that our duty is to give the lion's share of our income to organizations that prevent death among distant tykes and toddlers, not teenagers wherever they might be located. I also wonder why Unger thinks that we ought to be devoting our attention to dying children; why can't some of us give our money to organizations that aid children suffering from painful but non-fatal diseases? Further questions arise. Unger repeatedly asserts that well-to-do folks like us have a duty to help decrease a certain kind of evil (death among Third World tykes), but he apparently does not think that we have any duty to help decrease other sorts of evil (e.g., racial injustice, geni- tal mutilation, ethnic cleansing, slavery, terrorist bombings, destruction of the environment, drug addiction, homelessness, etc.). What justifies the exclusive focus on one sort of evil at the expense of all others?

Going beyond this, one might wonder why Unger thinks that we have no duty to increase any sorts of good (e.g., intellectual satisfactions among first world teenagers, aesthetic satisfactions among senior citizens, etc.). Why is this? Why do we have a strict duty to see to the decrease of one selected evil, but no duty at all to see to the increase of goods of any sort?

In this sort of situation, the natural approach is to take a look at the nor- mative theory, and attempt to determine whether it has the alleged implica- tions. If we do this, and we find that the theory does have these implications, then we can consider whether the theory is so attractive as to make us want to endorse it and its strange implications. Let us then consider the normative component of Liberationism, and try to determine whether it really implies that well-to-do folks like us have a moral obligation to give most of our wealth to prevent deaths among distant children. In Mill's Utilitarianism there is a famous passage wherein Mill says 'the creed which accepts as the foundation of morality "utility" or the "greatest happiness principle" holds...' and Mill goes on to state the essence of his utilitarian principle. In Kant's Groundwork there are (notoriously) several passages in which Kant states the supreme principle of morality. Ross, and Moore, and many other moral philosophers in this way tell us what they believe. No such passage can be found in Living High and Letting Die. Though he frequently asserts that Lib- erationism has certain normative implications, and he teases the reader with snippets of "Liberationist lore", Unger never forthrightly states the doctrine. So right at the outset we confront an interpretational puzzle.

According to a remark on the book flap, the normative component of Lib- erationism 'corresponds quite closely to what philosophers now call act

196 FRED FELDMAN

consequentialism'. Some commentators have suggested that some such view must underlie Unger's normative pronouncements.' However, the evidence of the book does not drive us to this view, and Unger (in private correspondence) has explicitly rejected it.

I suspect that Unger's real view is more complex. He says:

Often, it's good to treat morality as an infinity of moral principles, or precepts, each entailing infinitely many others, more and more specific. (57)

I suspect that Liberationism is to be construed in this way as "an infinity of moral precepts".

If this suspicion is right, then, in order to understand Liberationism fully, we would have to grasp the infinite collection of precepts. This, of course, is unrealistic. A further problem here is that though Unger states a few precepts, in several cases he subsequently rejects them. He apparently does this for strategic reasons that are not mentioned until late in the book. (145) He never makes clear which principles he really means to endorse. So it's with consid- erable uneasiness that I state something that I think is intended to be one of the components of Liberationism:

Very briefly, here's a fallible formulation of a fair bit of Liberationism's substantive side: Inso- far as they need her help to have a decent chance for decent lives, a person must do a great deal for those few people, like her highly dependent children, to whom she has the most seri- ous sort of special moral obligation. Insofar as it's compatible with that, which is often very considerably indeed, and sometimes even when it's not so compatible, she must do a lot for other innocent folks in need, so that they may have a decent chance for decent lives. (12)

Let's call this fallible formulation 'FF'. Unger implies that sometimes a person "must" do a great deal for her chil-

dren, but "must" also do a lot for others, even though these two obligations are not compatible. In light of the fact that these "musts" may in this way conflict, it seems reasonable to suppose that when Unger says that a person "must" do a certain thing, he means merely that there is some moral call upon her to do that thing, not that it is her "all things considered" absolute obligation. If this is right, then Unger's "must" statements express prima facie obligations. (He never says precisely this.)

FF is a complex statement of two prima facie obligations, together with some remarks about the relative stringency of the obligations. First, Unger mentions the case in which a person has "duties of special obligation" to her own children or others; they need her help in order to have a decent chance for decent lives. In this case Unger seems to want to say that the person has a prima facie obligation to do "a great deal" to help these people. Secondly, Unger mentions other "innocent folks"-ones to whom she has no duties of

In his review of Unger's book in The New Republic (October 14, 1996), Colin McGinn suggests that Unger's normative pronouncements might rest upon utilitarian assumptions.

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special obligation. Unger apparently wants to say that if she is in a position to help such folks have a decent chance for decent lives, then she also has a prima facie obligation to do "a lot" for those folks. Thirdly, Unger seems to want to say that sometimes the prima facie obligation to family overrides the prima facie obligation to strangers. In other cases, apparently, the reverse is true. Nothing in the context indicates what factors would determine which prima facie obligation would override which.

FF seems pretty plausible to me. However, it has no implications con- cerning anyone's absolute obligations to give substantial amounts of money to prevent deaths among distant children. Even if we grant that I have a prima facie obligation to do "a lot" for innocent strangers, we cannot conclude that this obligation focusses exclusively on the far-off dying children among those strangers. Even if we had some way to reach this conclusion, it still would not follow that this particular prima facie obligation overrides all the other prima facie obligations I might have to other innocent strangers. Indeed, it is consistent with FF and the facts to suppose that my overriding obligation is to use my time and money to help immigrant Cambodians in Northampton learn to speak English.

But the quoted passage comes early in the book. Perhaps it is one that Unger would reject as "obscenely lenient". (144) In the penultimate chapter, Unger states a number of more demanding principles. Let's consider some of these.

Unger states two principles of "Ethical Integrity"; one "Reasonable" and one "Weak". The "Reasonable" Principle is this:

Other things being even nearly equal, if it's all right for you to impose losses on others with the

result that there's a significant lessening in the serious losses suffered by others overall, then, if

you're to avoid doing what's seriously wrong, you can'tfail to impose equal or smaller losses

on yourself, nor can you fail to accept such losses, when the result's an equal or greater significant lessening of such serious losses overall. (1 39X40)2

The Reasonable Principle, as Unger acknowledges (140) "lack[s] ambi- tion". It is not very demanding at all. More specifically, it does not imply that I now have an obligation to give anything to aid children in distant lands.

For, in the first place, the Reasonable Principle implies only that I must be prepared to accept losses If it's morally permissible for me to impose such

losses on others. So if it would not be permissible for me to steal money from you to prevent serious losses by others, then (so far as this principle is concerned) I may have no obligation to give any of my money to prevent

2 The "weak" principle is weaker than the Reasonable Principle, demanding only that we be prepared to accept "much lesser losses" for ourselves if we are prepared to impose greater losses on others in the name of decreased serious losses overall.

198 FRED FELDMAN

such losses. (Unger thinks it is morally permissible in some cases for me to steal for this purpose.)

In the second place, the Reasonable Principle begins with the notorious weasel-words 'other things being even nearly equal'. Although I don't know precisely what these words are supposed to mean, I suspect that they might mean 'unless there is something else that is more important'. If that's right, then the principle implies merely that if it's OK to impose losses on others, and if there's nothing more important for me to do with my money, then it's obligatory for me to use my money to prevent equally serious losses. But since there very well might be plenty of other things that are more important, there is a second reason to doubt that this principle has the implications alleged.

There is a third reason to be dubious about the relevance of the Reasonable Principle. Let's suppose that it is in fact OK for me to impose a loss of one thousand dollars on others to prevent very serious losses overall, and let's suppose that in fact there is nothing more important for me to do with my money. Then the Reasonable Principle can be used to generate the conclusion that I have an obligation to accept a one thousand dollar loss for the purpose of preventing serious losses overall. But from this nothing follows about children in distant lands. It is consistent with the Reasonable Principle and all the imagined facts that it is my duty to use the thousand dollars to support research into the causes of leukemia among local teenagers, or even Alzheimer's Disease among elderly people in Connecticut. Clearly, teenage leukemia is a "serious loss", and my contribution of one thousand dollars might help to prevent it. The same is true of Alzheimer's Disease as well as a thousand other causes of suffering.

Thus, even when combined with a remarkable number of dubious empiri- cal and moral assumptions, the Reasonable Principle does not imply any- thing about my moral obligation to give money to prevent premature deaths among distant children.3 So far, then, we have seen nothing in Liberationism that has the implications Unger alleges.

Perhaps the most stringent precept stated in the book is this one:

Other things being even nearly equal, if your behaving in a certain way will result in the num- ber of people who very prematurely lose their lives being less than the number who will do so if you don't so behave and if even so you'll still be at least very modestly well off, then it's seriously wrong for you not to so behave. (144; Unger calls this "the Modest Principle".)

The Modest Principle might seem to have implications concerning my duties to prevent early deaths among Third World children. Again, however, I am doubtful. As before, this principle begins with 'other things being even

3 The weak principle is similar to the Reasonable Principle in relevant respects; it has no implications concerning duties to distant dying tykes.

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nearly equal'. Again, it seems to me that this must mean 'unless there is something else that is more important'. If so, The Modest Principle implies that I have a strict duty to help prevent premature death only if there is noth- ing else that's more important. Clearly, since there are other great evils, and my contribution might help to alleviate some of these, I may have no obliga- tion at all to help prevent premature deaths.

Unger clearly thinks that Liberationism contains a principle that implies that we absolutely ought to behave in such a way as to minimize very prema- ture deaths. And he seems to think that the best way to abide by that princi- ple would be to give substantial amounts of money to UNICEF, CARE, and Oxfam-America. Perhaps (though he never puts it this way) the principle is something like this:

If your behaving in a certain way will result in the number of people who very prematurely lose their lives being less than the number who will do so if you don't so behave and if even so you'll still be at least very modestly well off, then it's all-things-considered wrong for you not to so behave. (See 144; let's call this "the Fanatical Principle".)

Note that the Fanatical Principle does not begin with the phrase 'Other things being even nearly equal'. This is not a principle about prima facie wrongs, but about all-things- considered wrongs. Note also that it tells you that it is wrong to fail to minimize very premature deaths. It is conceivable that the Fanatical Principle, together with the empirical facts, entails that it would be wrong for well-to-do folks such as us to fail to give a lot of money to UNICEF. For it is conceivable that nothing else we can do will so dramat- ically reduce the number of people who very prematurely die.

However, the Fanatical Principle is clearly false. Consider the following case4:

A Trolley, a Switch, and Five Preemies. A trolley is hurtling down the tracks toward a switch. You are standing next to the switch (because your 3 million dollar lime-green Bugatti ran out of gas at that spot). You are wearing yellow Bermuda shorts. If you flip the switch, the trolley will run into a siding at Boston Children's Hospital, and five hundred innocent children will be very seriously (but not fatally) injured and three preemies in the neonatal intensive care unit will miraculously survive. Those preemies will go on to live thoroughly miserable lives-lives not worth living. If you do nothing, the trolley will run into a different siding at Massachusetts General Hospital, and two preemies will miraculously survive and five hundred innocent

4 The example is supposed to follow the style and pattern of a multitude of cases discussed by Unger.

200 FRED FELDMAN

teenagers will be instantly cured of their painful but not fatal diseases. Those two preemies will go on to live very productive and satisfying lives. You flip the switch, three miserable preemies survive, and five hundred innocent teenagers are seriously injured.

In this example, flipping the switch results in three people not losing their lives very prematurely (among other things). Doing nothing would have resulted in two people not losing their lives very prematurely (among other things). Thus, flipping the switch is the behavior that will minimize the number of people who will lose their lives very prematurely. So the Fanati- cal Principle implies that it is your all-things-considered duty to flip the switch.

Of course, in a case as bizarre as this one can never be confident of one's "intuitions".5 But insofar as I have any intuitions on this case, those intu- itions lead me to think that your obligation in the example would be to do nothing. Admittedly, if you do nothing, fewer preemies will survive (two rather than three). However, doing nothing has other consequences. Five hun- dred teenagers instantly recover from painful diseases; the preemies who sur- vive will live happy and productive lives. Flipping the switch, on the other hand, would have brought about five hundred painful injuries. The three sur- viving preemies would go on to live miserable lives. These consequences seem to me to matter; and they seem to point toward the obligatoriness of do- ing nothing in this case. Sometimes it's better to let more people lose their lives very prematurely; it depends upon a lot of other factors (which are of necessity ignored by the Fanatical Principle).

My conclusions are as follows: (1) Although Unger never clearly states the normative component of Liberationism, he does state a smattering of principles that might be parts of it. (2) None of these principles, together with the facts, implies that anyone has an all-in obligation to give anything to prevent premature deaths in distant lands. (3) Although Unger never does so, it is possible to concoct principles that might have the desired implica- tions. (4) Such principles are wholly implausible.

There are many sorts of evil in the world. Premature death in distant lands is just one of these. A person can lead a decent life by struggling hard against evils of other sorts. A person can lead a decent life by struggling hard to promote goods. There is no justification for claiming (as Unger does) that all of us lead indecent lives merely because we choose to try to make the world better in ways other than the way Unger seems to prefer.

5 Richard Hare's discussion of the reliability of "moral intuition" in his Moral Thinking (Oxford University Press, 1981) is still one of the very most insightful in the literature. His thoughtful (and scathing!) remarks about "playing trains" (139) are well worth careful consideration.

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