Leonardo

Comments on Theoretical PerspectivesAuthor(s): Richard ShiffSource: Leonardo, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1986), p. 269Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1578258 .

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Letters Letters Letters

Readers' comments on texts published in Leonardo are welcomed. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English and sent to the Main Editorial Office.

Readers' comments on texts published in Leonardo are welcomed. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English and sent to the Main Editorial Office.

Readers' comments on texts published in Leonardo are welcomed. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters. Letters should be written in English and sent to the Main Editorial Office.

COMMENTS ON GOMBRICH ON ART VERSUS BRYSON ON ART

I think that Ernst Gombrich may be spared the effort of taking issue with Norman Bryson's examples (Leonardo 18, 126-127, 1985) as there is already a substantial body of literature which does just that. I am referring, of course, to the reviews in professional art historical

journals. Readers of Leonardo who wish to pursue the matter can consult:

J. J. L. Whitely, "The Trouble with Words", Art Book Review 1, 39-40 (1982). R. Wrigley, "Word and Image...", Art International 26, 82-83 (1983). C. Duncan, "Rediscovering the Known", Art History 6, 246-248

(1983). A. Brookner, "Word and Image ...",

Burlington Magazine 125, 762-764

(1983). M. Podro, "Misconceived Alterna- tives", Art History 7, 243-247 (1984).

My own paper, which criticizes the first

chapter of Word and Image, will be

published as "Words and Pictures" in the British Journal of Aesthetics at the end of 1986.

Anyone tempted to believe Bryson's claims about the present state of British art history should look through back copies of the journal Art History. Anyone tempted to believe his, or David Carrier's, claims about Gombrich's views should read Gombrich's books. I would not like to be held responsible for the consequences of recommending Bryson's books, but in fairness they should be read if an objective view is to be obtained.

My own view is that much of what Bryson has said has been said before with greater cogency and clarity by other

people. Although Bryson claims to widen the scope of art history his bibliography makes very narrow reading, confined largely to a few fashionable figures. I find the lack of reference to any material from the journal Semiotica quite extraordinary,

COMMENTS ON GOMBRICH ON ART VERSUS BRYSON ON ART

I think that Ernst Gombrich may be spared the effort of taking issue with Norman Bryson's examples (Leonardo 18, 126-127, 1985) as there is already a substantial body of literature which does just that. I am referring, of course, to the reviews in professional art historical

journals. Readers of Leonardo who wish to pursue the matter can consult:

J. J. L. Whitely, "The Trouble with Words", Art Book Review 1, 39-40 (1982). R. Wrigley, "Word and Image...", Art International 26, 82-83 (1983). C. Duncan, "Rediscovering the Known", Art History 6, 246-248

(1983). A. Brookner, "Word and Image ...",

Burlington Magazine 125, 762-764

(1983). M. Podro, "Misconceived Alterna- tives", Art History 7, 243-247 (1984).

My own paper, which criticizes the first

chapter of Word and Image, will be

published as "Words and Pictures" in the British Journal of Aesthetics at the end of 1986.

Anyone tempted to believe Bryson's claims about the present state of British art history should look through back copies of the journal Art History. Anyone tempted to believe his, or David Carrier's, claims about Gombrich's views should read Gombrich's books. I would not like to be held responsible for the consequences of recommending Bryson's books, but in fairness they should be read if an objective view is to be obtained.

My own view is that much of what Bryson has said has been said before with greater cogency and clarity by other

people. Although Bryson claims to widen the scope of art history his bibliography makes very narrow reading, confined largely to a few fashionable figures. I find the lack of reference to any material from the journal Semiotica quite extraordinary,

COMMENTS ON GOMBRICH ON ART VERSUS BRYSON ON ART

I think that Ernst Gombrich may be spared the effort of taking issue with Norman Bryson's examples (Leonardo 18, 126-127, 1985) as there is already a substantial body of literature which does just that. I am referring, of course, to the reviews in professional art historical

journals. Readers of Leonardo who wish to pursue the matter can consult:

J. J. L. Whitely, "The Trouble with Words", Art Book Review 1, 39-40 (1982). R. Wrigley, "Word and Image...", Art International 26, 82-83 (1983). C. Duncan, "Rediscovering the Known", Art History 6, 246-248

(1983). A. Brookner, "Word and Image ...",

Burlington Magazine 125, 762-764

(1983). M. Podro, "Misconceived Alterna- tives", Art History 7, 243-247 (1984).

My own paper, which criticizes the first

chapter of Word and Image, will be

published as "Words and Pictures" in the British Journal of Aesthetics at the end of 1986.

Anyone tempted to believe Bryson's claims about the present state of British art history should look through back copies of the journal Art History. Anyone tempted to believe his, or David Carrier's, claims about Gombrich's views should read Gombrich's books. I would not like to be held responsible for the consequences of recommending Bryson's books, but in fairness they should be read if an objective view is to be obtained.

My own view is that much of what Bryson has said has been said before with greater cogency and clarity by other

people. Although Bryson claims to widen the scope of art history his bibliography makes very narrow reading, confined largely to a few fashionable figures. I find the lack of reference to any material from the journal Semiotica quite extraordinary,

as well as a lack of reference to semiotic conferences. I could go on but I won't.

Richard Woodfield Trent Polytechnic

Nottingham NG1 4BU, U.K.

COMMENTS ON THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

In his discussion of creativity and artificial intelligence (Leonardo 19, 77-80, 1986), David Carrier cites my recent study of Cezanne and calls attention to one of its major concerns, the incongruity of an artist's practice and its associated theory or interpretation. Theory and interpretation often seem more normative or stable than the creative works that are their referents. This is so at least in terms of a cumulative historical effect, as a line of commentary on a given artist's oeuvre becomes canonical. Yet the work remains elusive enough to allow innovation in criticism.

As Carrier points out, the goal of artificial intelligence (AI) is to simulate the processes that produce creative works, rather than to imitate such works or to simulate some 'intelligent' evaluation of them. AI is aiming for art in the purest sense. One of the provocative implica- tions of Carrier's discussion is that the success or failure of the AI project might itself be impossible to criticize or evaluate. Indeed, the "computer simula- tion of creative thinking" is a con- tradiction; either it cannot happen, or, if it did, we would not know that it did.

Briefly, in my own terms, let me explain this point, as an addendum to Carrier's argument. To the extent that AI seeks to create in the modern artistic sense, it seeks a certain originality (actually, two originalities). AI strives to express both the originality we associate with individual difference (subjectivity) and the originality we associate with in- novative, unprecedented achievement. But, if we follow the examples Carrier cites, AI seems only to offer a third and 'older' kind of originality, the 'originality' or precedence of a first or proper solution. In other words, we regard the processes of AI as creative only when we

as well as a lack of reference to semiotic conferences. I could go on but I won't.

Richard Woodfield Trent Polytechnic

Nottingham NG1 4BU, U.K.

COMMENTS ON THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

In his discussion of creativity and artificial intelligence (Leonardo 19, 77-80, 1986), David Carrier cites my recent study of Cezanne and calls attention to one of its major concerns, the incongruity of an artist's practice and its associated theory or interpretation. Theory and interpretation often seem more normative or stable than the creative works that are their referents. This is so at least in terms of a cumulative historical effect, as a line of commentary on a given artist's oeuvre becomes canonical. Yet the work remains elusive enough to allow innovation in criticism.

As Carrier points out, the goal of artificial intelligence (AI) is to simulate the processes that produce creative works, rather than to imitate such works or to simulate some 'intelligent' evaluation of them. AI is aiming for art in the purest sense. One of the provocative implica- tions of Carrier's discussion is that the success or failure of the AI project might itself be impossible to criticize or evaluate. Indeed, the "computer simula- tion of creative thinking" is a con- tradiction; either it cannot happen, or, if it did, we would not know that it did.

Briefly, in my own terms, let me explain this point, as an addendum to Carrier's argument. To the extent that AI seeks to create in the modern artistic sense, it seeks a certain originality (actually, two originalities). AI strives to express both the originality we associate with individual difference (subjectivity) and the originality we associate with in- novative, unprecedented achievement. But, if we follow the examples Carrier cites, AI seems only to offer a third and 'older' kind of originality, the 'originality' or precedence of a first or proper solution. In other words, we regard the processes of AI as creative only when we

as well as a lack of reference to semiotic conferences. I could go on but I won't.

Richard Woodfield Trent Polytechnic

Nottingham NG1 4BU, U.K.

COMMENTS ON THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

In his discussion of creativity and artificial intelligence (Leonardo 19, 77-80, 1986), David Carrier cites my recent study of Cezanne and calls attention to one of its major concerns, the incongruity of an artist's practice and its associated theory or interpretation. Theory and interpretation often seem more normative or stable than the creative works that are their referents. This is so at least in terms of a cumulative historical effect, as a line of commentary on a given artist's oeuvre becomes canonical. Yet the work remains elusive enough to allow innovation in criticism.

As Carrier points out, the goal of artificial intelligence (AI) is to simulate the processes that produce creative works, rather than to imitate such works or to simulate some 'intelligent' evaluation of them. AI is aiming for art in the purest sense. One of the provocative implica- tions of Carrier's discussion is that the success or failure of the AI project might itself be impossible to criticize or evaluate. Indeed, the "computer simula- tion of creative thinking" is a con- tradiction; either it cannot happen, or, if it did, we would not know that it did.

Briefly, in my own terms, let me explain this point, as an addendum to Carrier's argument. To the extent that AI seeks to create in the modern artistic sense, it seeks a certain originality (actually, two originalities). AI strives to express both the originality we associate with individual difference (subjectivity) and the originality we associate with in- novative, unprecedented achievement. But, if we follow the examples Carrier cites, AI seems only to offer a third and 'older' kind of originality, the 'originality' or precedence of a first or proper solution. In other words, we regard the processes of AI as creative only when we

recognize in their products the very kinds of qualities and structures that already fit our preconceived, canonical notions of the creative and the original. This circularity may also characterize our evaluation of the products of human artistic creation. But our custom, for better or worse, is to deny the possibility of such a firm standard of evaluation and to reassert continually the incommensur- ability of creativity and its end products.

As a critical discourse of the artificial (or made) and the natural (or found) unfolds, incommensurability remains in the realm of the natural. How could AI simulate that feature of the creative? Simulation itself is a matter of measure rather than incommensurability. From an artistic perspective, the processes and products of artificial intelligence can always be measured against the superior standard set by the natural, itself the 'original' or privileged term in this dualistic relationship. Speculators in the stock of AI might be served by entertaining a fully dialectical relation- ship between the artificial and the natural in order to think beyond the hierarchical dualism. Perhaps they would do even better to avoid the issue of artistic creativity entirely.

Richard Shiff Department of Art History

University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC 27514

U.S.A.

REPLY TO RICHARD SHIFF

In his letter, Richard Shiff provides a

highly subtle interpretation of my dis- cussion of creativity and his study of Cezanne's art. Since his remarks are brief and elliptical, and deal with a very important issue, I hope that in some future publication he will develop these ideas in more detail. My reply here may not do justice to his claims.

Why do we value originality in problem solving and in art? The first person to solve a mathematical equation provides an unprecedented achievement. If another person later solves that equation without knowing that it already has been solved, we may think that person is as intelligent as the first

recognize in their products the very kinds of qualities and structures that already fit our preconceived, canonical notions of the creative and the original. This circularity may also characterize our evaluation of the products of human artistic creation. But our custom, for better or worse, is to deny the possibility of such a firm standard of evaluation and to reassert continually the incommensur- ability of creativity and its end products.

As a critical discourse of the artificial (or made) and the natural (or found) unfolds, incommensurability remains in the realm of the natural. How could AI simulate that feature of the creative? Simulation itself is a matter of measure rather than incommensurability. From an artistic perspective, the processes and products of artificial intelligence can always be measured against the superior standard set by the natural, itself the 'original' or privileged term in this dualistic relationship. Speculators in the stock of AI might be served by entertaining a fully dialectical relation- ship between the artificial and the natural in order to think beyond the hierarchical dualism. Perhaps they would do even better to avoid the issue of artistic creativity entirely.

Richard Shiff Department of Art History

University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC 27514

U.S.A.

REPLY TO RICHARD SHIFF

In his letter, Richard Shiff provides a

highly subtle interpretation of my dis- cussion of creativity and his study of Cezanne's art. Since his remarks are brief and elliptical, and deal with a very important issue, I hope that in some future publication he will develop these ideas in more detail. My reply here may not do justice to his claims.

Why do we value originality in problem solving and in art? The first person to solve a mathematical equation provides an unprecedented achievement. If another person later solves that equation without knowing that it already has been solved, we may think that person is as intelligent as the first

recognize in their products the very kinds of qualities and structures that already fit our preconceived, canonical notions of the creative and the original. This circularity may also characterize our evaluation of the products of human artistic creation. But our custom, for better or worse, is to deny the possibility of such a firm standard of evaluation and to reassert continually the incommensur- ability of creativity and its end products.

As a critical discourse of the artificial (or made) and the natural (or found) unfolds, incommensurability remains in the realm of the natural. How could AI simulate that feature of the creative? Simulation itself is a matter of measure rather than incommensurability. From an artistic perspective, the processes and products of artificial intelligence can always be measured against the superior standard set by the natural, itself the 'original' or privileged term in this dualistic relationship. Speculators in the stock of AI might be served by entertaining a fully dialectical relation- ship between the artificial and the natural in order to think beyond the hierarchical dualism. Perhaps they would do even better to avoid the issue of artistic creativity entirely.

Richard Shiff Department of Art History

University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC 27514

U.S.A.

REPLY TO RICHARD SHIFF

In his letter, Richard Shiff provides a

highly subtle interpretation of my dis- cussion of creativity and his study of Cezanne's art. Since his remarks are brief and elliptical, and deal with a very important issue, I hope that in some future publication he will develop these ideas in more detail. My reply here may not do justice to his claims.

Why do we value originality in problem solving and in art? The first person to solve a mathematical equation provides an unprecedented achievement. If another person later solves that equation without knowing that it already has been solved, we may think that person is as intelligent as the first

Pergamon Journals Ltd. Printed in Great Britain. 0024-094X/86 $3.00+0.00

Pergamon Journals Ltd. Printed in Great Britain. 0024-094X/86 $3.00+0.00

Pergamon Journals Ltd. Printed in Great Britain. 0024-094X/86 $3.00+0.00

LEONARDO, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 269-273, 1986 LEONARDO, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 269-273, 1986 LEONARDO, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 269-273, 1986 269 269 269

This content downloaded from 195.78.109.164 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 19:37:51 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions