Leonardo

Comments on "Performing Objects: Technology without Purpose"Author(s): Itsuo SakaneSource: Leonardo, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1985), p. 212Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1578061 .

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rotating a section around an axis. Several forms can be developed and merged to form a compound form. One form can be made to pass partly or completely through another, as when two forms occupy the same location in space, and the result can be a composite which the student is unlikely to have anticipated. It is even possible for the viewer to 'fly' through the forms and experience the interior. The forms are geometric; given enough data points on the screen, approximations to organic forms are possible. The program's design, and in a way its limitations, might serve as the 'grid' Mr Jones seeks.

Donald J. Bush Center for the Humanities

Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287. U.S.A.

Reply to D. J. Bush and A. Mailer

Both D. J. Bush (above) and A. Mailer (Leonardo 18, 126 (1985)), who commented on my paper indicated (quite rightly) that it was an extremely limited approach. It was not intended to do more than introduce a way of thinking. In sum, the project described amounted to 12 days out of a 3-year program.

Both writers are correct in suggesting that modelling processes, at present carried on in drawing, could be equally well developed using computer graphics. However, the required input of time to get even modest results in this field with sophisticated software, is con- siderable. The extent to which emergent imagery is carried on a parallel sequence of kinesthetic experiences, such as are felt during the direct manipulation of materials, is unknown. It is unlikely to be negligible. Confining modelling merely to computing would deprive students of this experience.

Donald Bush makes a good point when he says that the use of grids on a plane as a decision matrix tends to favour the interior designer or architect, rather than the industrial designer. This seemed to us a price worth paying, given its other benefits in the time spent. Of course, other projects continue the theme of construction and composition in more 'organic' ways, and we also do some life drawing for the purpose of encouraging the students to handle complex forms and long- range orders.

It has to be said, however, that life drawing for the designer has more of a long-term benefit as a perceptual (and, indeed, moral) regime than any immediate short-term appli- cability.

Peter Lloyd Jones School of Three-Dimensional Design

Kingston Polytechnic Knights Park

Kingston upon Thames Surrey, U.K.

Comments on "Performing Objects: Technology Without Purpose"

I have read Timothy Richards' article (Leonardo 17, 237 (1984)) with curiosity and interest.

The artists' motivation was to connect

rotating a section around an axis. Several forms can be developed and merged to form a compound form. One form can be made to pass partly or completely through another, as when two forms occupy the same location in space, and the result can be a composite which the student is unlikely to have anticipated. It is even possible for the viewer to 'fly' through the forms and experience the interior. The forms are geometric; given enough data points on the screen, approximations to organic forms are possible. The program's design, and in a way its limitations, might serve as the 'grid' Mr Jones seeks.

Donald J. Bush Center for the Humanities

Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287. U.S.A.

Reply to D. J. Bush and A. Mailer

Both D. J. Bush (above) and A. Mailer (Leonardo 18, 126 (1985)), who commented on my paper indicated (quite rightly) that it was an extremely limited approach. It was not intended to do more than introduce a way of thinking. In sum, the project described amounted to 12 days out of a 3-year program.

Both writers are correct in suggesting that modelling processes, at present carried on in drawing, could be equally well developed using computer graphics. However, the required input of time to get even modest results in this field with sophisticated software, is con- siderable. The extent to which emergent imagery is carried on a parallel sequence of kinesthetic experiences, such as are felt during the direct manipulation of materials, is unknown. It is unlikely to be negligible. Confining modelling merely to computing would deprive students of this experience.

Donald Bush makes a good point when he says that the use of grids on a plane as a decision matrix tends to favour the interior designer or architect, rather than the industrial designer. This seemed to us a price worth paying, given its other benefits in the time spent. Of course, other projects continue the theme of construction and composition in more 'organic' ways, and we also do some life drawing for the purpose of encouraging the students to handle complex forms and long- range orders.

It has to be said, however, that life drawing for the designer has more of a long-term benefit as a perceptual (and, indeed, moral) regime than any immediate short-term appli- cability.

Peter Lloyd Jones School of Three-Dimensional Design

Kingston Polytechnic Knights Park

Kingston upon Thames Surrey, U.K.

Comments on "Performing Objects: Technology Without Purpose"

I have read Timothy Richards' article (Leonardo 17, 237 (1984)) with curiosity and interest.

The artists' motivation was to connect

rotating a section around an axis. Several forms can be developed and merged to form a compound form. One form can be made to pass partly or completely through another, as when two forms occupy the same location in space, and the result can be a composite which the student is unlikely to have anticipated. It is even possible for the viewer to 'fly' through the forms and experience the interior. The forms are geometric; given enough data points on the screen, approximations to organic forms are possible. The program's design, and in a way its limitations, might serve as the 'grid' Mr Jones seeks.

Donald J. Bush Center for the Humanities

Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287. U.S.A.

Reply to D. J. Bush and A. Mailer

Both D. J. Bush (above) and A. Mailer (Leonardo 18, 126 (1985)), who commented on my paper indicated (quite rightly) that it was an extremely limited approach. It was not intended to do more than introduce a way of thinking. In sum, the project described amounted to 12 days out of a 3-year program.

Both writers are correct in suggesting that modelling processes, at present carried on in drawing, could be equally well developed using computer graphics. However, the required input of time to get even modest results in this field with sophisticated software, is con- siderable. The extent to which emergent imagery is carried on a parallel sequence of kinesthetic experiences, such as are felt during the direct manipulation of materials, is unknown. It is unlikely to be negligible. Confining modelling merely to computing would deprive students of this experience.

Donald Bush makes a good point when he says that the use of grids on a plane as a decision matrix tends to favour the interior designer or architect, rather than the industrial designer. This seemed to us a price worth paying, given its other benefits in the time spent. Of course, other projects continue the theme of construction and composition in more 'organic' ways, and we also do some life drawing for the purpose of encouraging the students to handle complex forms and long- range orders.

It has to be said, however, that life drawing for the designer has more of a long-term benefit as a perceptual (and, indeed, moral) regime than any immediate short-term appli- cability.

Peter Lloyd Jones School of Three-Dimensional Design

Kingston Polytechnic Knights Park

Kingston upon Thames Surrey, U.K.

Comments on "Performing Objects: Technology Without Purpose"

I have read Timothy Richards' article (Leonardo 17, 237 (1984)) with curiosity and interest.

The artists' motivation was to connect

rotating a section around an axis. Several forms can be developed and merged to form a compound form. One form can be made to pass partly or completely through another, as when two forms occupy the same location in space, and the result can be a composite which the student is unlikely to have anticipated. It is even possible for the viewer to 'fly' through the forms and experience the interior. The forms are geometric; given enough data points on the screen, approximations to organic forms are possible. The program's design, and in a way its limitations, might serve as the 'grid' Mr Jones seeks.

Donald J. Bush Center for the Humanities

Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287. U.S.A.

Reply to D. J. Bush and A. Mailer

Both D. J. Bush (above) and A. Mailer (Leonardo 18, 126 (1985)), who commented on my paper indicated (quite rightly) that it was an extremely limited approach. It was not intended to do more than introduce a way of thinking. In sum, the project described amounted to 12 days out of a 3-year program.

Both writers are correct in suggesting that modelling processes, at present carried on in drawing, could be equally well developed using computer graphics. However, the required input of time to get even modest results in this field with sophisticated software, is con- siderable. The extent to which emergent imagery is carried on a parallel sequence of kinesthetic experiences, such as are felt during the direct manipulation of materials, is unknown. It is unlikely to be negligible. Confining modelling merely to computing would deprive students of this experience.

Donald Bush makes a good point when he says that the use of grids on a plane as a decision matrix tends to favour the interior designer or architect, rather than the industrial designer. This seemed to us a price worth paying, given its other benefits in the time spent. Of course, other projects continue the theme of construction and composition in more 'organic' ways, and we also do some life drawing for the purpose of encouraging the students to handle complex forms and long- range orders.

It has to be said, however, that life drawing for the designer has more of a long-term benefit as a perceptual (and, indeed, moral) regime than any immediate short-term appli- cability.

Peter Lloyd Jones School of Three-Dimensional Design

Kingston Polytechnic Knights Park

Kingston upon Thames Surrey, U.K.

Comments on "Performing Objects: Technology Without Purpose"

I have read Timothy Richards' article (Leonardo 17, 237 (1984)) with curiosity and interest.

The artists' motivation was to connect several mechanical tools, which originally had no relationship to each other, in a completely different context and thus create a sort of chain-reaction performance. Its humorous use of cause and effect reminded me of the caricatures of Rube Goldberg or the 'Useless Machines' of Bruno Munari. The major

several mechanical tools, which originally had no relationship to each other, in a completely different context and thus create a sort of chain-reaction performance. Its humorous use of cause and effect reminded me of the caricatures of Rube Goldberg or the 'Useless Machines' of Bruno Munari. The major

several mechanical tools, which originally had no relationship to each other, in a completely different context and thus create a sort of chain-reaction performance. Its humorous use of cause and effect reminded me of the caricatures of Rube Goldberg or the 'Useless Machines' of Bruno Munari. The major

several mechanical tools, which originally had no relationship to each other, in a completely different context and thus create a sort of chain-reaction performance. Its humorous use of cause and effect reminded me of the caricatures of Rube Goldberg or the 'Useless Machines' of Bruno Munari. The major

difference between Richards' 'Entertainment Machinery' and the works of Goldberg or Munari is that the chain-reaction of Richards' work is not purpose-oriented but process- oriented.

Richards explains that he did not intend to evoke any specific intellectual questions but rather wished to appeal directly to the viewer. But I consider his performing objects to be metaphoric and satirical pieces possible only in our own particular age of technology.

His machinery worked neither punctually nor reliably, as the viewer expected. It seemed to resist its creator's calculated program, the will of the human being. Its behavior was largely unanticipated, uncontrollably timid, even self-destructive. When it fell down at last on the floor, viewers must have felt as if it were dead. It reminded me of the robot K-456 of Nam Jun Paik, which behaved not like a machine but like something living which was accusing the technological age. I believe this satirical character of the work reveals black humor against the machine age.

The only point I could not understand in Richards' article was whether the potential for dangerous accidents was introduced inten- tionally. If there were no danger, the excitement would be lost; but if there were too much danger, the humorous aspects would be damaged. Perhaps the danger threshold would best be varied according to the cultural background of the audience. From the point of a typical Japanese viewer, I would guess that Richards' work was almost at the limit of such a threshold. Performing art of this type should exist basically on the boundary between danger and humor.

It is interesting to note that the number of artists creating kinetic artworks 'without purpose' seems to be increasing in the world today. For example, Jim Whiting of London has made many shocking robots, some in conjunction with Herb Hancock's music performances. Japanese artist Nobutaika Kotake has been making many 'Nonsense Machines' which behave humorously and sometimes satirically. For example, his artwork made from discarded parts of an old clock washes one part of its body by moving another part.

I think these tendencies of such artists today reveal symbolically the artists' consciousness toward the age of science and technology.

Itsuo Sakane Department of Arts and Sciences

The Asahi Shimbun 5-3-2, Tsukiji

Chuo-Ku, Tokyo 104 Japan

Reply to David Carrier

I wish to reply to Professor Carrier's letter (Leonardo 18, 126 (1985)) indicating that he can produce evidence in the form of three quotations from Art and Illusion which supports his position. Let me begin with the second of his quotations: "Only in extreme cases ... are the illusions of art illusions about our real environment, but they are illusions all the same" (p. 277). Carrier has taken cognisance of some of the literature on illusionistic painting, but let me recommend to

difference between Richards' 'Entertainment Machinery' and the works of Goldberg or Munari is that the chain-reaction of Richards' work is not purpose-oriented but process- oriented.

Richards explains that he did not intend to evoke any specific intellectual questions but rather wished to appeal directly to the viewer. But I consider his performing objects to be metaphoric and satirical pieces possible only in our own particular age of technology.

His machinery worked neither punctually nor reliably, as the viewer expected. It seemed to resist its creator's calculated program, the will of the human being. Its behavior was largely unanticipated, uncontrollably timid, even self-destructive. When it fell down at last on the floor, viewers must have felt as if it were dead. It reminded me of the robot K-456 of Nam Jun Paik, which behaved not like a machine but like something living which was accusing the technological age. I believe this satirical character of the work reveals black humor against the machine age.

The only point I could not understand in Richards' article was whether the potential for dangerous accidents was introduced inten- tionally. If there were no danger, the excitement would be lost; but if there were too much danger, the humorous aspects would be damaged. Perhaps the danger threshold would best be varied according to the cultural background of the audience. From the point of a typical Japanese viewer, I would guess that Richards' work was almost at the limit of such a threshold. Performing art of this type should exist basically on the boundary between danger and humor.

It is interesting to note that the number of artists creating kinetic artworks 'without purpose' seems to be increasing in the world today. For example, Jim Whiting of London has made many shocking robots, some in conjunction with Herb Hancock's music performances. Japanese artist Nobutaika Kotake has been making many 'Nonsense Machines' which behave humorously and sometimes satirically. For example, his artwork made from discarded parts of an old clock washes one part of its body by moving another part.

I think these tendencies of such artists today reveal symbolically the artists' consciousness toward the age of science and technology.

Itsuo Sakane Department of Arts and Sciences

The Asahi Shimbun 5-3-2, Tsukiji

Chuo-Ku, Tokyo 104 Japan

Reply to David Carrier

I wish to reply to Professor Carrier's letter (Leonardo 18, 126 (1985)) indicating that he can produce evidence in the form of three quotations from Art and Illusion which supports his position. Let me begin with the second of his quotations: "Only in extreme cases ... are the illusions of art illusions about our real environment, but they are illusions all the same" (p. 277). Carrier has taken cognisance of some of the literature on illusionistic painting, but let me recommend to

difference between Richards' 'Entertainment Machinery' and the works of Goldberg or Munari is that the chain-reaction of Richards' work is not purpose-oriented but process- oriented.

Richards explains that he did not intend to evoke any specific intellectual questions but rather wished to appeal directly to the viewer. But I consider his performing objects to be metaphoric and satirical pieces possible only in our own particular age of technology.

His machinery worked neither punctually nor reliably, as the viewer expected. It seemed to resist its creator's calculated program, the will of the human being. Its behavior was largely unanticipated, uncontrollably timid, even self-destructive. When it fell down at last on the floor, viewers must have felt as if it were dead. It reminded me of the robot K-456 of Nam Jun Paik, which behaved not like a machine but like something living which was accusing the technological age. I believe this satirical character of the work reveals black humor against the machine age.

The only point I could not understand in Richards' article was whether the potential for dangerous accidents was introduced inten- tionally. If there were no danger, the excitement would be lost; but if there were too much danger, the humorous aspects would be damaged. Perhaps the danger threshold would best be varied according to the cultural background of the audience. From the point of a typical Japanese viewer, I would guess that Richards' work was almost at the limit of such a threshold. Performing art of this type should exist basically on the boundary between danger and humor.

It is interesting to note that the number of artists creating kinetic artworks 'without purpose' seems to be increasing in the world today. For example, Jim Whiting of London has made many shocking robots, some in conjunction with Herb Hancock's music performances. Japanese artist Nobutaika Kotake has been making many 'Nonsense Machines' which behave humorously and sometimes satirically. For example, his artwork made from discarded parts of an old clock washes one part of its body by moving another part.

I think these tendencies of such artists today reveal symbolically the artists' consciousness toward the age of science and technology.

Itsuo Sakane Department of Arts and Sciences

The Asahi Shimbun 5-3-2, Tsukiji

Chuo-Ku, Tokyo 104 Japan

Reply to David Carrier

I wish to reply to Professor Carrier's letter (Leonardo 18, 126 (1985)) indicating that he can produce evidence in the form of three quotations from Art and Illusion which supports his position. Let me begin with the second of his quotations: "Only in extreme cases ... are the illusions of art illusions about our real environment, but they are illusions all the same" (p. 277). Carrier has taken cognisance of some of the literature on illusionistic painting, but let me recommend to

difference between Richards' 'Entertainment Machinery' and the works of Goldberg or Munari is that the chain-reaction of Richards' work is not purpose-oriented but process- oriented.

Richards explains that he did not intend to evoke any specific intellectual questions but rather wished to appeal directly to the viewer. But I consider his performing objects to be metaphoric and satirical pieces possible only in our own particular age of technology.

His machinery worked neither punctually nor reliably, as the viewer expected. It seemed to resist its creator's calculated program, the will of the human being. Its behavior was largely unanticipated, uncontrollably timid, even self-destructive. When it fell down at last on the floor, viewers must have felt as if it were dead. It reminded me of the robot K-456 of Nam Jun Paik, which behaved not like a machine but like something living which was accusing the technological age. I believe this satirical character of the work reveals black humor against the machine age.

The only point I could not understand in Richards' article was whether the potential for dangerous accidents was introduced inten- tionally. If there were no danger, the excitement would be lost; but if there were too much danger, the humorous aspects would be damaged. Perhaps the danger threshold would best be varied according to the cultural background of the audience. From the point of a typical Japanese viewer, I would guess that Richards' work was almost at the limit of such a threshold. Performing art of this type should exist basically on the boundary between danger and humor.

It is interesting to note that the number of artists creating kinetic artworks 'without purpose' seems to be increasing in the world today. For example, Jim Whiting of London has made many shocking robots, some in conjunction with Herb Hancock's music performances. Japanese artist Nobutaika Kotake has been making many 'Nonsense Machines' which behave humorously and sometimes satirically. For example, his artwork made from discarded parts of an old clock washes one part of its body by moving another part.

I think these tendencies of such artists today reveal symbolically the artists' consciousness toward the age of science and technology.

Itsuo Sakane Department of Arts and Sciences

The Asahi Shimbun 5-3-2, Tsukiji

Chuo-Ku, Tokyo 104 Japan

Reply to David Carrier

I wish to reply to Professor Carrier's letter (Leonardo 18, 126 (1985)) indicating that he can produce evidence in the form of three quotations from Art and Illusion which supports his position. Let me begin with the second of his quotations: "Only in extreme cases ... are the illusions of art illusions about our real environment, but they are illusions all the same" (p. 277). Carrier has taken cognisance of some of the literature on illusionistic painting, but let me recommend to him a few titles which are even more relevant to the 'extreme cases' I had in mind: Martin Battersly, Trompe L'oeil, the Eye Deceived, London, 1974; M. L. d'Otrange Mastai, Illusion in Art, a History of Pictorial Illusionism, London, 1976; and Alberto Veca,

him a few titles which are even more relevant to the 'extreme cases' I had in mind: Martin Battersly, Trompe L'oeil, the Eye Deceived, London, 1974; M. L. d'Otrange Mastai, Illusion in Art, a History of Pictorial Illusionism, London, 1976; and Alberto Veca,

him a few titles which are even more relevant to the 'extreme cases' I had in mind: Martin Battersly, Trompe L'oeil, the Eye Deceived, London, 1974; M. L. d'Otrange Mastai, Illusion in Art, a History of Pictorial Illusionism, London, 1976; and Alberto Veca,

him a few titles which are even more relevant to the 'extreme cases' I had in mind: Martin Battersly, Trompe L'oeil, the Eye Deceived, London, 1974; M. L. d'Otrange Mastai, Illusion in Art, a History of Pictorial Illusionism, London, 1976; and Alberto Veca,

ILLUSION Fig. 1.

Inganno e Realta, Trompe l'oeil in Europa XVI-XVIII Centuries, Galleria Lorenzelli, Bergamo, Sept. 1980. A perusal of these books will explain why I have always considered these cases to be psychologically interesting but aesthetically marginal. What, then, did I mean when I continued that "the illusions of art" are rarely illusions about our real environment, "but are illusions all the same"? There is no mystery here and no contradiction.

Take the case of the phantom ridge that most observers see on the letters known as 'shadow antiqua' illustrated in my book on page 210 (Fig. 1). These so-called 'subjective contours' are now frequently discussed in psychological literature in connection with 'Kanisza's Triangle' (see my The Sense of Order, p. 107). They have been known to impede the correct reading of scientific photographs, but artists, of course, have often relied on this contribution of what I call 'the beholder's share'. Or take the familiar effect of a perspectival setting on the apparent scale of identical figures illustrated in my book on page 280 (Fig. 2). This example should make clear what I mean by switching between readings; the reader can experiment with this illus- tration, turning it upside down, partially covering it or simply attempting to alter his or her 'mental set'. Far from being a mere curiosity, it turns out that the same effect in a more or less weakened form can be observed and even measured in applying a pair of dividers to any perspectival rendering. The same also applies to the popular trick of so representing a pointing finger or gun that it seems to aim at the viewer wherever he or she stands (p. 113, Fig. 3). Conditions which enhance or inhibit this effect that can be studied in any picture gallery are also capable of further investigation.

These, then, are but a few examples of illusions in the strict sense in which experi- mental psychology uses the term. Obviously they are not illusions about our real environment, but about the display we have in

ILLUSION Fig. 1.

Inganno e Realta, Trompe l'oeil in Europa XVI-XVIII Centuries, Galleria Lorenzelli, Bergamo, Sept. 1980. A perusal of these books will explain why I have always considered these cases to be psychologically interesting but aesthetically marginal. What, then, did I mean when I continued that "the illusions of art" are rarely illusions about our real environment, "but are illusions all the same"? There is no mystery here and no contradiction.

Take the case of the phantom ridge that most observers see on the letters known as 'shadow antiqua' illustrated in my book on page 210 (Fig. 1). These so-called 'subjective contours' are now frequently discussed in psychological literature in connection with 'Kanisza's Triangle' (see my The Sense of Order, p. 107). They have been known to impede the correct reading of scientific photographs, but artists, of course, have often relied on this contribution of what I call 'the beholder's share'. Or take the familiar effect of a perspectival setting on the apparent scale of identical figures illustrated in my book on page 280 (Fig. 2). This example should make clear what I mean by switching between readings; the reader can experiment with this illus- tration, turning it upside down, partially covering it or simply attempting to alter his or her 'mental set'. Far from being a mere curiosity, it turns out that the same effect in a more or less weakened form can be observed and even measured in applying a pair of dividers to any perspectival rendering. The same also applies to the popular trick of so representing a pointing finger or gun that it seems to aim at the viewer wherever he or she stands (p. 113, Fig. 3). Conditions which enhance or inhibit this effect that can be studied in any picture gallery are also capable of further investigation.

These, then, are but a few examples of illusions in the strict sense in which experi- mental psychology uses the term. Obviously they are not illusions about our real environment, but about the display we have in

ILLUSION Fig. 1.

Inganno e Realta, Trompe l'oeil in Europa XVI-XVIII Centuries, Galleria Lorenzelli, Bergamo, Sept. 1980. A perusal of these books will explain why I have always considered these cases to be psychologically interesting but aesthetically marginal. What, then, did I mean when I continued that "the illusions of art" are rarely illusions about our real environment, "but are illusions all the same"? There is no mystery here and no contradiction.

Take the case of the phantom ridge that most observers see on the letters known as 'shadow antiqua' illustrated in my book on page 210 (Fig. 1). These so-called 'subjective contours' are now frequently discussed in psychological literature in connection with 'Kanisza's Triangle' (see my The Sense of Order, p. 107). They have been known to impede the correct reading of scientific photographs, but artists, of course, have often relied on this contribution of what I call 'the beholder's share'. Or take the familiar effect of a perspectival setting on the apparent scale of identical figures illustrated in my book on page 280 (Fig. 2). This example should make clear what I mean by switching between readings; the reader can experiment with this illus- tration, turning it upside down, partially covering it or simply attempting to alter his or her 'mental set'. Far from being a mere curiosity, it turns out that the same effect in a more or less weakened form can be observed and even measured in applying a pair of dividers to any perspectival rendering. The same also applies to the popular trick of so representing a pointing finger or gun that it seems to aim at the viewer wherever he or she stands (p. 113, Fig. 3). Conditions which enhance or inhibit this effect that can be studied in any picture gallery are also capable of further investigation.

These, then, are but a few examples of illusions in the strict sense in which experi- mental psychology uses the term. Obviously they are not illusions about our real environment, but about the display we have in

ILLUSION Fig. 1.

Inganno e Realta, Trompe l'oeil in Europa XVI-XVIII Centuries, Galleria Lorenzelli, Bergamo, Sept. 1980. A perusal of these books will explain why I have always considered these cases to be psychologically interesting but aesthetically marginal. What, then, did I mean when I continued that "the illusions of art" are rarely illusions about our real environment, "but are illusions all the same"? There is no mystery here and no contradiction.

Take the case of the phantom ridge that most observers see on the letters known as 'shadow antiqua' illustrated in my book on page 210 (Fig. 1). These so-called 'subjective contours' are now frequently discussed in psychological literature in connection with 'Kanisza's Triangle' (see my The Sense of Order, p. 107). They have been known to impede the correct reading of scientific photographs, but artists, of course, have often relied on this contribution of what I call 'the beholder's share'. Or take the familiar effect of a perspectival setting on the apparent scale of identical figures illustrated in my book on page 280 (Fig. 2). This example should make clear what I mean by switching between readings; the reader can experiment with this illus- tration, turning it upside down, partially covering it or simply attempting to alter his or her 'mental set'. Far from being a mere curiosity, it turns out that the same effect in a more or less weakened form can be observed and even measured in applying a pair of dividers to any perspectival rendering. The same also applies to the popular trick of so representing a pointing finger or gun that it seems to aim at the viewer wherever he or she stands (p. 113, Fig. 3). Conditions which enhance or inhibit this effect that can be studied in any picture gallery are also capable of further investigation.

These, then, are but a few examples of illusions in the strict sense in which experi- mental psychology uses the term. Obviously they are not illusions about our real environment, but about the display we have in

Fig. 2. Fig. 2. Fig. 2. Fig. 2.

Letters Letters Letters Letters 212 212 212 212

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