Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting, 22

United States Joint Forces CommandJoint Warfighting Center

Office of the Secretary of DefenseJoint Warfighters Joint Test and Evaluation

22 March 2002

Commander’sHandbook for

Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting

Report Documentation Page

Report Date 22 Mar 2002

Report Type N/A

Dates Covered (from... to) -

Title and Subtitle Commander’s Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting

Contract Number

Grant Number

Program Element Number

Author(s) Project Number

Task Number

Work Unit Number

Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) National Defense University Institute for NationalStrategic Studies Washington D C 20319-5066

Performing Organization Report Number

Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)

Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s)

Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s)

Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

Supplementary Notes The original document contains color images.

Abstract

Subject Terms

Report Classification unclassified

Classification of this page unclassified

Classification of Abstract unclassified

Limitation of Abstract UU

Number of Pages 117

U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMANDJOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER

116 LAKE VIEW PARKWAYSUFFOLK VA 23435-2697

22 March 2002

MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER

This Handbook is designed for joint force commanders and their staffs toassist them in rapid target engagement. It is meant to be a resource tool forthe joint force commander, joint force headquarters, and the joint forcecomponents. Though consistent with joint and Service doctrine, it is not adoctrinal publication. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting,17 January 2002, is the authoritative publication and has an appendix fortime-sensitive targeting considerations.

As we learned from experiences in such locales as Iraq, Kosovo, andAfghanistan, our ability to engage time-sensitive targets in a timely, efficient,and effective manner is a requisite for successful military operations. USforces are faced with an ever-increasing threat from adversaries that pose (orcould pose) a direct danger and demand an immediate response. Thecomplexities of engaging time-sensitive targets require joint force commandersand their staffs to fully appreciate the coordination and integration that arerequired to minimize the chance of fratricide and other collateral effects. ThisHandbook provides examples from combatant commands and joint task forcesto assist in the prosecution of time-sensitive targets.

Corrections or suggestions for improvement of this Handbook are welcome.They should be sent to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center (USJFCOM/JW 100), 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, Virginia, 23435-2697.

GORDON C. NASHBrigadier General, U.S. Marine CorpsCommander

PREFACE

i

The United States Joint Forces Command JointWarfighting Center and the Office of theSecretary of Defense Joint Warfighters JointTest and Evaluation have developed thisCommander’s Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting, to facilitate rapid targetengagement by a joint force commander (JFC)within an operational area. This handbook isnot intended to be authoritative, but is offeredas a supplement to extant joint targetingdoctrine.

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms,defines time-sensitive targets (TST) as,“Those targets requiring immediate responsebecause they pose (or will soon pose) dangerto friendly forces or are highly lucrative,fleeting targets of opportunity.”

For the purposes of this handbook, a “joint”TST refers to a TST that requires cooperationand/or coordination by two or more Servicesor components to successfully engage.Examples of joint TSTs include those caseswhen one component fires into or throughanother component’s area of operations (AO),or when the effects of attacking a TST couldcause fratricide or other collateral effects thatmay impact another component’s mission.

The focus of this handbook is on theprocesses required to engage joint TSTs in atimely, efficient, and effective manner. Onlyjoint TSTs are addressed to highlight thecoordination required between the joint forcecomponents to successfully engage thesetargets. Additionally, only targets on theEarth’s surface, whether on land or sea, arediscussed since joint doctrinal procedures arewell established within the air and maritimecomponents that effectively addressengagement of time-sensitive air andsubsurface targets, and therefore will not bediscussed in this handbook.

This handbook has been developed expresslyfor:

• JFCs—who develop and recommendrules of engagement, issue commander’sguidance, establish risk parameters, anddesignate TSTs.

• The joint force headquarters—thosewho prioritize targets, establishboundaries and control measures withinan operational area, and coordinate anddeconflict joint TST attack optionsamong the joint force components.

• The joint force component forces—those who ultimately employ theweaponry to engage joint TSTs.

Considerable emphasis has been given tothe significance of the JFC guidance in thejoint TST process. (Note: Throughout thishandbook, maroon print has been used foradditional emphasis or clarification.) As willbe seen, not only is the JFC joint TSTguidance an indispensable force-protectionmeasure, it could be, depending upon thethreat, one of the most critical decisions ofthe entire joint operation.

This handbook explores the concept of jointTSTs and discusses the TST decision cycle.The importance of joint TST command andcontrol is highlighted, along with a specificsample of a possible JFC joint TST guidancestatement.

Lastly, useful collaborative tools, successfulexamples from combatant commands and jointtask forces, and checklists have been includedto facilitate the prosecution of joint TSTswithin an operational area.

ii

Preface

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting

Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

PagePreface ............................................................................................................................... i

CHAPTER ITHE CONCEPT OF JOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING

• Introduction ............................................................................................................... I-1• Targets ....................................................................................................................... I-1• Targeting .................................................................................................................... I-2• Joint Targeting ........................................................................................................... I-3• Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting .................................................................................... I-4• Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting in a Major Theater of War ........................................... I-6• Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting in Small-Scale Contingencies ...................................... I-7

CHAPTER IIJOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING DECISION CYCLES AND COMPONENTCONSIDERATIONS

• Introduction .............................................................................................................. II-1• The Joint Targeting Cycle .......................................................................................... II-1• Service-Specific Considerations for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting ............................ II-5• Space Force Considerations for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting ................................. II-7

CHAPTER IIIJOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING COMMAND AND CONTROL

• Introduction ............................................................................................................. III-1• The Importance of Joint Target Visibility ................................................................... III-1• The Joint Task Force Commander ............................................................................. III-2• The Joint Task Force Operations Directorate, J-3 ...................................................... III-7• The Joint Task Force Intelligence Directorate, J-2 ...................................................... III-8• The Joint Targeting Coordination Board ................................................................... III-9• The Joint Fires Element (JFE) .................................................................................. III-10• Joint Targeting Coordination Measures .................................................................. III-11

CHAPTER IVENGAGING JOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS

• Introduction .............................................................................................................. IV-1• Centralized Planning .................................................................................................. IV-1• Decentralized Execution ............................................................................................. IV-1• Intelligence/Operations Interface ............................................................................... IV-2• Engagement Capabilities and Limitations ................................................................... IV-2• Combat Assessment .................................................................................................. IV-4

iv

Table of Contents


APPENDIX

A US European Command TST Procedures and Tools .............................................A-1B US Central Command TST Procedures and Tools ................................................. B-1C US Forces Korea TST Procedures and Tools ........................................................ C-1D Engagement Capabilities and Limitations ............................................................. D-1E Notional Time-Sensitive Target Check List ........................................................... E-1F Joint Time-Critical Targets .................................................................................... F-1G References ........................................................................................................... G-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................. GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-6

FIGUREFigure I-1 General Target Categories and Subcategories ................................... I-2Figure I-2 Time-Sensitive Target Categories ....................................................... I-5Figure II-1 Joint Targeting Cycle Phases ............................................................ II-1Figure II-2 Time-Sensitive Targeting Process ..................................................... II-4Figure II-3 Force Enhancement Operations-Surveillance and

Reconnaissance ................................................................................. II-8Figure III-1 Joint Force Areas of Target/Engagement Responsibilities ............ III-12Figure IV-1 The Combat Assessment Process .................................................... IV-6Figure C-A-1 Shared Target Worksheet “State Diagram” ................................... C-A-1Figure C-A-2 Target Worksheet .......................................................................... C-A-2Figure C-A-3 Notional Target Worksheet Distribution Configuration ................ C-A-2Figure C-B-1 TST Web Page ................................................................................C-B-1Figure C-B-2 Target Coordination Log ................................................................C-B-2Figure C-B-3 TST Web Page Edit Feature ...........................................................C-B-3Figure C-C-1 “My Information” Window Set-up .................................................C-C-2Figure C-C-2 TST Conference Selection ..............................................................C-C-2Figure C-C-3 “Text Chat” and Targeting Log Desktop ........................................C-C-3Figure C-C-4 Enter Target Worksheet ..................................................................C-C-4Figure C-C-5 Nominate Target Worksheet ...........................................................C-C-5Figure C-C-6 Authorize Prosecution Worksheet .................................................C-C-6Figure C-C- 7 Clear Execution Worksheet ............................................................C-C-7Figure C-C-8 Reported Employment Worksheet ..................................................C-C-8Figure C-C-9 Report Results Worksheet ..............................................................C-C-9Figure F-1 TST/TCT Relationship ...................................................................... F-2

CHAPTER ITHE CONCEPT OF JOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING

I-1

1. Introduction

a. In an operational area, surface time-sensitive targets (TSTs) located and identifiedwithin a joint force component area ofoperations (AO) may be engaged by thecomponent commander using inside-the-AOcoordination and organic assets. Similarly,joint force air defense and subsurface forceshave established doctrinal procedures forengaging adversary air and submarine TSTs.However, a large proportion of TSTs withinan AO involve cross-boundary and/or multi-component joint force assets for detection,analysis, identification, decision, andexecution. These joint TSTs are prioritized,categorized, coordinated, deconflicted, anddirected for engagement by the joint force.

b. To ensure a common understanding ofthe concept of joint TST, this chapter providesa targeting overview based upon JointPublication (JP) 3-60, Joint Doctrine forTargeting, JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint FireSupport, and Air/Land/Sea ApplicationCenter Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures Publication, Targeting.

c. JP 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms,defines TSTs as, “Those targets requiringimmediate response because they pose (or willsoon pose) danger to friendly forces or arehighly lucrative, fleeting targets ofopportunity.” For the purposes of thishandbook, the following terms are used forease of understanding:

• A TST is defined as stated above.

• A joint TST refers to a TST that requirescooperation and/or coordination by twoor more Services or components tosuccessfully engage. Examples of jointTSTs include those cases when one

component fires into or through anothercomponent’s AO, or when the effects ofattacking a TST could cause fratricide orother collateral effects that may impactanother component’s mission.

d. Succeeding chapters will review jointforce TST decision cycles and joint TSTcommand and control with emphasis on thesignificant role of the joint force commander(JFC), and offer detailed guidance andrecommendations for engaging joint TSTs.

2. Targets

a. JP 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms,defines a target as: “1. An area, complex,installation, force, equipment, capability,function, or behavior identified for possibleaction to support the commander’s objectives,guidance, and intent. Targets fall into twogeneral categories: planned and immediate.2. In intelligence usage, a country, area,installation, agency, or person against whichintelligence operations are directed. 3. Anarea designated and numbered for futurefiring. 4. In gunfire support usage, an impactburst that hits the target.” This handbookdiscusses the first definition only.

b. Figure I-1 depicts the general targetcategories and subcategories.

• Planned targets are targets that areknown to exist in an operational area, andagainst which effects are scheduled inadvance or are on-call. Examples rangefrom targets on joint target lists in theapplicable campaign plan, to targetsdetected in sufficient time to list in theair tasking order, mission-type orders, orfire support plans. Planned targets havetwo subcategories: scheduled or on-call.

I-2

Chapter I


•• Scheduled targets are planned targetsupon which fires will be delivered at aspecific time.

•• On-call targets are planned targetsthat are known to exist in an operationalarea and are located in sufficient time fordeliberate planning to meet emergingsituations specific to campaignobjectives.

• Immediate targets are those that havebeen identified too late, or not selectedfor action in time to be included in thenormal targeting process, and thereforehave not been scheduled. Immediatetargets have two subcategories:unplanned and unanticipated.

•• Unplanned immediate targets areimmediate targets that are known to existin an operational area but are not

detected, located, or selected for actionin sufficient time to be included in thenormal targeting process.

•• Unanticipated immediate targetsare those immediate targets that areunknown or not expected to exist in anoperational area.

3. Targeting

a. Targeting is defined as: “the process ofselecting and prioritizing targets and matchingthe appropriate response to them, takingaccount of operational requirements andcapabilities.”

b. Target selection at the joint force andcomponent-level seeks targets that meet militaryobjectives, determines desired effects, and selectsor tasks the means to achieve those effects.

Figure I-1. General Target Categories and Subcategories

GENERAL TARGET CATEGORIESAND SUBCATEGORIES

IMMEDIATE TARGETSPLANNEDPLANNEDTARGETS

ScheduledTargets

UnplannedImmediate

Targets

UnanticipatedImmediate

TargetsOn-Call

Targets

I-3

The Concept of Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting

c. Targeting occurs at all levels ofcommand within a joint force and isperformed at all levels by forces capable ofdelivering fires or attacking targets with bothlethal and nonlethal disruptive and destructivemeans. Targeting is a function shared by bothoperations and intelligence. However, therequirement to deconflict duplicative effortsof different echelons within the same force,and to synchronize the attack of these targetswith other components of the joint force,complicates the targeting cycle. Therefore,an effective and efficient joint targeting cycleis essential for the JFC and components toplan and execute joint operations.

4. Joint Targeting

a. Joint targeting may be described as:“The process of selecting targets within aJFC’s operational area and matching theappropriate component responses to them,considering operational requirements andcapabilities.” Joint targeting is characterizedby the integration and coordination of land,sea, air, space, and special operations assetsin the target detection and engagement cycle.

b. The purpose of the joint targeting cycleis to provide the JFC with a target list tosupport the joint force campaign objectivesor a subordinate component commander’ssupporting objectives. Consequently,components must understand the jointtargeting cycle to achieve the effects necessaryto accomplish JFC objectives. For furtherdetails concerning the joint targeting cycle,refer to Chapter II, Joint Time-SensitiveTargeting Decision Cycles and ComponentConsiderations.

c. The focus of the joint targeting cycle canrange from the restricted time and spaceconstraints of the immediate tacticalenvironment to the broadest extent of thegeopolitical sphere in the strategicenvironment. However, its primary concern

is always to enable the commander to mosteffectively employ military capabilities toachieve the joint force objectives.

d. The joint targeting cycle supports thecommander’s campaign plan, objectives,scheme of maneuver, and employment ofmilitary force to achieve a desired militaryendstate. It integrates capabilities of nationalassets, geographic combatant commands,subordinate joint forces, multinational forces,and component commands, all of whichpossess varying capabilities and requirements.The joint targeting cycle is described as a“cyclical process” with sequential phases.However, the joint targeting cycle is really acontinuously operating series of closelyrelated, interacting, and interdependentfunctions. The six functions/cycles are—commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent;target development, validation, nomination,and prioritization; capabilities analysis;commander’s decision and force assignment;mission planning and force execution; andcombat assessment (CA). The joint targetingcycle is not a static, inflexible process butrather a dynamic one that must be fluidlyapplied. (See Figure II-1 on page II-1.)

e. Joint targeting integrates intelligence onthe threat, target system, and targetcharacteristics with operations data on forceposture, capabilities, weapons effects,objectives, rules of engagement (ROE), anddoctrine. Joint targeting matches objectivesand guidance with inputs from intelligence,operations, and other functional areas, suchas logistics and communications, to identifythe forces necessary to achieve the objectives.Joint targeting examines all lethal andnonlethal applications of force and spans notonly nuclear and conventional forceapplications, but also electronic warfare,space, and special operations. To be effective,joint targeting must identify the bestweapon for the intended target withappropriate timing to meet the objectivesestablished by the JFC.

I-4

Chapter I


5. Joint Time-SensitiveTargeting

a. Other adjectives commonly used todescribe a joint TST are emerging, perishable,high payoff, short dwell, or critical-mobile.This handbook deals exclusively with surface(land or sea) joint TSTs. Most surface TSTstypically move rapidly and hide throughoutthe battlespace, limiting their exposure time,however, depending upon the operationalsituation, fixed targets may also be designatedas joint TSTs.

b. In terms of the joint targeting cycle, theJFC and component commanders specificallydesignate surface joint TSTs as priorities withinthe commander’s objectives and guidancephase. Target development dedicates sensorsfor detection and identification, andweaponeering assessment provides the JFCoptions for attack. Force application assignsattack assets, after which the executionplanning/force execution phase employs force.

c. Examples of mobile surface joint TSTsinclude:

• Mobile rocket launchers (MRLs)

• Mobile high threat surface-to-air missiles(SAMs)

• Mobile radar sites, or mobile commandand control (C2) vehicles and facilities

• Naval vessels, military or civilian, in theact of laying mines

• Loaded transporter, erector, launchers(TEL)

• Deployed weapons of mass destruction(WMD)

• Deployed theater ballistic missiles(TBM)

• Armored concentrations marshaled tostrike

• Troops in contact situations

• TSTs designated by the JFC in theoperation order (OPORD) and revisedin subsequent fragmentary orders(FRAGorders)

d. Fixed surface joint TSTs may includeoperational-level command centers that, oncetheir location is determined, could bedestroyed quickly to enhance friendly forceactions. Other fixed-surface joint TSTs couldinclude surface-to-surface missile sites orbridges. For example, a previously untargeted

Joint TSTs may include armored concentrations.

I-5


bridge that is about to be crossed by anadversary armored counterattack force rapidlybecomes time-sensitive to thwart theadversary counterattack.

e. Surface joint TSTs are classified as eitherplanned or immediate (Figure I-2).

• Planned surface joint TSTs are ordinarilyfixed targets, known to exist in anoperational area, that have been upgradedto time-sensitive status due to JFC/component commander priorities. Thisis normally the result of a newly acquired“short dwell” status that presents anexceptional operational or tacticalopportunity. Fires and attacks are placedon-call against planned surface jointTSTs. Generally, surface joint TSTs (asplanned targets) are limited in number.

• Immediate surface joint TSTs are mobileTSTs against which fire or attackshave not been scheduled. Some fixedjoint TSTs also may be immediate.

Immediate surface joint TSTs havetwo subcategories—unplanned andunanticipated.

•• Unplanned immediate surface jointTSTs are those known to exist in theoperational area but have no fire orattacks scheduled. They are generallythe largest category of surface joint TSTs.They require established procedures forproactive, timely acquisition by sensorsand immediate response once acquired.The JFC directs component commandersto assign adequate attack assets torespond to all unplanned immediatesurface joint TSTs in an operational area.In situations where a JFC or componentcommander does not have sufficientattack assets, prioritization must occur.

•• Unanticipated immediate surfacejoint TSTs are those surface joint TSTsnot expected or unknown to exist in anoperational area. This category of surfacejoint TST is often highly perishable as

Figure I-2. Time-Sensitive Target Categories

TIME SENSITIVETARGET CATEGORIES

PLANNED TARGETS(KNOWN)

IMMEDIATE TARGETS

Scheduled UnplannedTargets(Known)

On-Call UnanticipatedTargets

(Unknown)

Time-Sensitive TargetsTime-Sensitive Targets

I-6

Chapter I


response is extremely reactive due to theelement of surprise. Establishedprocedures for proactive, timelyacquisition and immediate response arestill required. JFC/componentcommanders can minimize the effect ofthis element of surprise by ensuringprocedures are flexible to responsesagainst this type of target.

6. Joint Time-SensitiveTargeting in a Major Theaterof War

a. The joint TST cycle is essentially thesame in major theaters of war (MTW) andsmall-scale contingencies (SSC). However,in a MTW, the geographic combatantcommander normally establishes broadtargeting guidance during theater campaignsand major operations. This guidance mayimpact on the JFC designation of joint TSTswithin the operational area.

b. In some cases, strike approval may berequired from the combatant commanderand/or Secretary of Defense, depending onpolitical considerations.

c. The appropriate response for each jointTST is often heavily dependent on the levelof conflict, the clarity of the desired outcome,and ROE. For example, during a MTW theJFC may be able to accept a higher level ofrisk to friendly forces and noncombatants toensure a quicker response when attackingadversary WMDs. But during a limitedcontingency operation, the risk of collateraldamage may require more detailed andtime-consuming coordination.

d. Targets are prioritized based on the JFCobjectives and guidance and the differingrequirements of joint force components asthey strive to achieve the joint forceobjectives. The joint targeting cycle integratesmilitary force to achieve the JFC’s objectives,

guidance, and intent. JFCs establish broadplanning and targeting guidance for attack ofadversary strategic and operational centers ofgravity and interdiction of adversaries as anintegral part of joint planning during MTWoperations. With the advice of subordinatecommanders, JFCs set priorities, providetargeting guidance, and determine the weightof effort to be provided to various operations.The JFC identifies and clearly promulgatesjoint TSTs for acquisition and engagement.Subordinate commanders recommend to theJFC how to use their combat power mosteffectively to achieve the objectives.

e. The joint intelligence sections (J-2)support joint TST development with resourcesof the theater Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)at the geographic combatant command level,or the joint intelligence support element(JISE), at the subordinate joint task force (JTF)level. Component intelligence assets andintelligence organizations, along withaugmentation from national intelligenceagencies, also contribute. The theater JICprovides the coordination of intelligenceresources, reporting, and services to supportthe tactical commanders.

f. The theater JIC is located at combatantcommand level and integrates all national andDepartment of Defense supportingcapabilities to develop a current intelligencepicture. The National Military JointIntelligence Center (NMJIC) supports theseefforts. The theater JIC is the center ofintelligence activities supporting the JTF,J-2, and components and provides the all-source analysis and target materials to supportthe targeting and CA process.

g. At the JTF, a JISE assists in coordinatingJIC operations. However, current JTF C2systems do not allow unified, real-timecoordination and deconfliction of allcomponents. Likewise, national and in-theater sensors do not necessarily provide allcomponents with a “common picture” of the

I-7


battlespace. Similarly, the All SourceAnalysis System (ASAS) cannot transmit theland/amphibious components’ view of thebattlespace to the air component’s TheaterIntegrated Situation Display (TISD). As aresult, components view the battlespace fromtheir unique perspective.

7. Joint Time-SensitiveTargeting in Small-ScaleContingencies

a. As was previously mentioned, during alimited contingency operation, the desire tominimize collateral damage may require moredetailed and time-consuming targetingcoordination than in a MTW.

b. All military operations are driven bypolitical considerations. However, SSCs, suchas military operations other than war(MOOTW), are more sensitive to suchconsiderations due to the overriding goal toprevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities.In MOOTW, political considerationspermeate all levels and the military may notbe the primary player. As a result, theseoperations normally have more restrictivetargeting ROE than in a MTW.

c. As in a MTW, the goal in a SSC is toachieve national objectives as quickly aspossible and conclude military operations onterms favorable to the United States and itsallies/coalition partners. However, thepurposes of conducting a SSC may bemultiple, with the relative importance orhierarchy of such purposes changing orunclear; for example, to deter potentialaggressors, protect national interests, supportthe United Nations (UN) or regionalorganizations, satisfy treaty obligations,support civil authorities, or provide foreignhumanitarian assistance (FHA). The specificgoal of a SSC may be peaceful settlement,assistance rendered to civil authorities, orproviding security for FHA.

d. Joint TST and associated fire support areplanned and employed during SSCs. SSCoperations may include combatting terrorism,counterdrug operations, enforcement ofsanctions, nation assistance, noncombatantevacuation operations, peace operations, orstrikes and raids. Joint TST during SSCsrequires special emphasis on the ROE and theneed to limit collateral damage. This SSCemphasis on limiting collateral damage maydictate an increased employment of precisionengagement kinetic weapons or non-kinetic/nonlethal JTF assets.

e. ROE in SSCs are generally morerestrictive, detailed, and sensitive to politicalconcerns than in MTW, consistent always withthe right of self-defense. ROE during SSCsare balanced between the need for securityand restraint. Restraint is best achieved whentargeting ROE issued at the beginning of anoperation address most anticipated situationsthat may arise. ROE should be consistentlyreviewed and revised as necessary.

f. During SSCs, joint force joint TSTs andassociated fire support capabilities may bemore limited, with fewer national intelligenceassets available, than in a MTW. Generally,components establish a force list (personnel,equipment, and supplies) and associatedmovement requirements to support a specificjoint force operation. The geographicalcombatant commander, in coordination withother commanders, then determines themilitary forces and other national meansrequired to accomplish the mission, allocatesor requests the military forces, and determinesthe command relationships for the joint force.Because the joint force force list is directlyrelated to the joint force mission, joint TSTcomponent engagement capabilities generallywill reflect the current joint force mission andnormally will be significantly less than thoseallocated during a MTW.

I-8

Chapter I


Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIJOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING DECISION CYCLES

AND COMPONENT CONSIDERATIONS

II-1

1. Introduction

The surface and air targeting processes arewell documented in JP 3-60, Joint Doctrinefor Targeting, Appendix C. Accordingly,this chapter focuses on the joint targetingcycle, TST processes, and Service-specificand space force enhancement TSTconsiderations.

2. The Joint Targeting Cycle

a. The joint targeting cycle establishes thedistinct qualities of each targeting function in

its corresponding phase within the cycle. Thejoint targeting cycle has six phases:commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent;target development, validation, nomination,and prioritization; capabilities analysis;commander’s decision and force assignment;mission planning and force execution; andCA. (See Figure II-1)

• Phase 1 - Commander’s Objectives,Guidance, and Intent. The JFCsobjectives support the Secretary ofDefense's desired endstate for the conductof military actions, while the guidanceprovided with the objectives stipulates

Figure II-1. Joint Targeting Cycle Phases

JOINT TARGETING CYCLE PHASES

JOINT TARGETINGCYCLE

Commander’sDecision and Force

Assignment

Target Development,Validation,

Nomination, andPrioritization

Commander’sObjectives,

Guidance, and Intent

Mission Planning andForce Execution

CombatAssessment

CapabilitiesAnalysis

II-2

Chapter II


particular conditions related to theexecution of operations (e.g., limitationson collateral damage). The commander’sintent summarizes the “bottom-line” tosubordinates so that all know the generalidea of what must be accomplished in thefight and why. Understanding thecommander’s objectives, guidance,and intent is the most important phasein the joint targeting cycle, because itencapsulates all the higher national-levelguidance in a set of outcomes relevant tothe present warfighting situation and setsthe course for all that follows.

• Phase 2 - Target Development,Validation, Nomination, andPrioritization. The JFC’s objectives arenormally directed against adversarycapabilities. These capabilities arethemselves enabled by physical and virtualinfrastructures. Critical to the success ofthe targeting cycle is the establishment ofintelligence requirements. Targeteersmust work closely with collectionmanagers to ensure that targetdevelopment, and pre-strike and post-strike requirements, are integrated into thecollection plan. This intelligence supportis vital for the analysis performed in targetdevelopment, as well as to prepare forfuture targeting during the executionof operations. Integral to targetdevelopment is target validation. Targetvalidation determines whether a targetremains a viable element of the targetsystem and whether, under the law ofarmed conflict (LOAC), it is a permissibletarget. Once potential targets are identifiedand validated, they are nominated throughthe proper channels for approval, generallyinvolving their deliberation in acoordinating body, such as a joint force orcomponent target board/meeting. Targetsare then prioritized based on the JFC’sobjectives and guidance and the mutual

support required between joint forcecomponents as they strive to achieve thejoint force objectives.

• Phase 3 - Capabilities Analysis.Coincident with the determination oftargets and desired outcomes for thosetargets, it is necessary to select the mostpromising forces for application againstthose targets. This phase of the jointtargeting cycle involves estimating theeffects of lethal or nonlethal attacksagainst specific targets. Its purpose is toweigh the relative efficacy of theavailable forces as an aid to achievingthe objectives set forth by the JFC andsubordinate commanders. Once thecapabilities analysis phase is completed,the results can be merged with theindividual component target nominationsto create the target recommendations forthe JFC. The essential element of the jointtargeting cycle is to link anticipatedeffects to the JFC’s objectives.

• Phase 4 - Commander’s Decision andForce Assignment. Target nominationlists and associated forces are vettedthrough the appropriate coordinatingbodies representing the joint forcecomponents and national interagencygroups to ensure compliance withcommander’s objectives, guidance, andintent. Once the JFC has approved thetarget list, or elements thereof, taskingorders are prepared and released to theexecuting components and forces. Thejoint targeting process facilitates thepublication of tasking orders byproviding amplifying informationnecessary for detailed force-levelplanning of operations. This phase of thejoint targeting cycle sets the stage for theplanning and execution of operations thatperform discrete tasks in synergisticsupport of over-arching objectives.

II-3

Joint TST Decision Cycles and Component Considerations

• Phase 5 - Mission Planning and ForceExecution. Upon receipt of taskingorders, detailed planning is performed forthe execution of operations. The jointtargeting cycle supports this planning byproviding the tactical-level planners withdirect access to detailed information onthe targets, supported by the nominatingcomponent’s analytical reasoning thatlinked the target with the desired effect(Phase 2).

• Phase 6 - Combat Assessment. CAis a crucial part of operations. The jointtargeting process provides short-termassistance for immediate decisions andaids long-term planning for thecomposition and capabilities of futureforces. This is essential to provide to theJFC a fully developed picture of thebattlespace. A critical ingredient foreffective CA is an understanding of allaspects of target development and its linkto the JFC’s objectives and guidance. CAis performed at all levels. At the JTFlevel, the CA process should normallybe an all source joint program supportedby all components and designed todetermine if the required effects on the

adversary envisioned in the operationsplan are being achieved. CA addressesthe effectiveness of operations for taskedor apportioned missions. This directlyimpacts the JFC’s apportionmentnominations and decision. The supportedcommander makes these assessments.The end product of CA at the operationallevel is an assessment that is incorporatedinto strategy and guidance development.CA is composed of three interrelatedcomponents: battle damage assessment(BDA), munitions effectivenessassessment (MEA), and future targetingor reattack recommendations. Futuretarget nominations and reattackrecommendations, merge the picture ofwhat was done (BDA) with how it wasdone (MEA) and compares the resultwith predetermined measures ofeffectiveness that were developed at thestart of the joint targeting process. Thepurposes of this phase in the process areto determine degree of success inachieving objectives and to formulate anyrequired follow-up actions, or to indicatereadiness to move on to new tasks in thepath to achieving the overall JFCobjectives.

Upon receipt of tasking orders, detailed planning is performedfor the execution of operations.

II-4

Chapter II


b. Timeliness. A critical factor inprosecuting TSTs is the requirement toconduct all the steps of the joint targetingcycle in a short time. The JFC has severaloptions with which to structure C2 operationsfor attacks against TSTs. One of the keyelements in reducing the coordination timefor these attacks is to delegate the authorityto engage as low in the chain of commandas possible. Though the overall responsibilityfor the mission will remain with the variouscomponent commanders, the authority toengage should be delegated within the C2node that has the best information orsituational awareness to perform the missionand has direct communications with firingunits. Placing the appropriate level ofbattlespace awareness at subordinate C2nodes can streamline the C2 cycle and allowtimely engagement of these targets. Thedecentralized C2 nodes can exchange sensor,status, and target information with a fidelitythat permits them to operate as a single,integrated C2 entity. Tied together by widearea networks and common interactive

displays, they can effectively performdecentralized, coordinated execution onjoint TSTs.

c. Compressed Decision Cycle. Althoughsuccessful attack of TSTs requires thetargeting process to be significantly time-compressed, each individual joint targetingcycle phase is still performed except inthose unique TST instances specified by theJFC. To successfully time-compress thetargeting cycle, the joint force and componentstaffs must be thoroughly familiar with thedetails of each phase of the cycle and with thespecific nodes or cells in the joint force andcomponents responsible for each portion ofthe process. Conducting detailed priorplanning and coordination between jointforces, a thorough intelligence preparationof the battlespace (IPB), employmentof interoperable command, control,communications, computers, and intelligence(C4I) systems, and clear guidance on whatconstitutes a TST, all save considerable time.

Figure II-2. Time-Sensitive Targeting Process

Target

TIME SENSITIVE TARGETING PROCESS

Detect

Locate

Identify

Assess

Strike

Decide

RESTRIKE

II-5


d. TST Process. Within the TST process,there are six steps: detect, locate, identify,decide, strike, and assess. (See Figure II-2)For the initial engagement, the outer cycle(detect, locate, identify, decide, and strike) isused. After the initial engagement, both cyclesrun at the same time and interact throughanalysis at the decision step. The six steps ofthe mission cycle interact continuously at thedecision stage where target analysis isperformed.

3. Service-SpecificConsiderations for JointTime-Sensitive Targeting

a. Air/Ground Operations. The theaterair-ground system (TAGS) is the functionalarchitecture through which interoperable air/ground operations occur. Joint air operationsare normally directed from a joint airoperations center (JAOC). Depending on theappointed joint force air componentcommander (JFACC), the JAOC may eitherbe an Air Force forces (AFFOR) air operationscenter (AOC), Marine Corps forces(MARFOR) aviation combat element tacticalair command center (TACC), or Navy forces(NAVFOR) tactical air control center (TACC).Ground operations are normally directedthrough an operations center, such as the Armyforces (ARFOR) tactical operations center(TOC) or MARFOR combat operations center(COC). Other key ARFOR agencies forground operations are the fire support element(FSE), Army Air and Missile DefenseCommand (AAMDC), deep operationscoordination cell (DOCC), and air, missiledefense planning coordination system tacticaloperations center (AMD PCS TOC). KeyMARFOR agencies include the force firescoordination center (FFCC), fire supportcoordination center (FSCC), and fire directioncenter (FDC). The NAVFOR supports groundoperations with the supporting armscoordination center (SACC).

b. Interoperable air/ground operationsenhance:

• Deconfliction of the battlespace

• Coordination and synchronization ofattack assets

• Expeditious joint target coordination

• Transmission of joint battlespace controland coordination measures

• Conversion of target coordinates betweenlatitude/longitude (LAT/LONG) anduniversal transverse mercators (UTM)

• Exchange of component commander’starget lists

• Employment of common grid references(grid boxes)

• Enhancement of mutual air/groundsituational awareness

c. Liaison Agencies. Between the JFACCand the land or maritime componentcommander, liaison agencies exist to conductcoordination, deconfliction, synchronization,and integration of operations. At anestablished JAOC, the ARFOR operate abattlefield coordination detachment (BCD).Liaison officers (LNO), as appropriate,represent the MARFOR and NAVFOR. EachArmy Corps has an attached air supportoperations center (ASOC) that is functionallyaligned to coordinate close air support.Similarly, the MARFOR operate a direct airsupport center (DASC) to coordinate airoperations with land operations, either withthe MARFOR COC or ARFOR TOC, asappropriate.

d. Unique Air/Ground C2 Capabilities.The ARFOR and AFFOR employ uniquecapabilities that enhance joint TST attacks.

II-6

Chapter II


• Deep Operations Coordination Cell. Ifassigned as the land componentcommander, the ARFOR may deploy aDOCC into the AO. The DOCC is a C2node that plans, coordinates, andmanages deep operations; to includesurface joint TST attacks, within the landforce commander’s AO. The DOCCdevelops deep attack plans and selectsattack assets based on several factorsincluding the location of attack assetswith respect to targets, the operationalstatus of attack assets, target ranges, thenumber and type of missions in progress,munitions available, the adversary airdefense threat, and the accuracy of thetargeting acquisition data. This target-weapon pairing process is automatic.Targets that can be better serviced by jointor other component assets will benominated to joint headquarters forprosecution (such as a JAOC). DOCCsmay recommend direct sensor-to-shooter dissemination of targetinginformation to meet critical timelinesassociated with urgent joint TSTs.The DOCC may employ an AMD PCSTOC to decentralize execution of surfaceTST attacks.

• Interconnectivity. Currently fielded C4Isystems have significant limitations inelectronic interconnectivity andautomated data planning between theJAOC (whether it be the USAF AOC,USMC TACC, or USN TACC) and theBCD. See Appendices A through C forrecommendations establishing joint TSTcollaborative tools. Presently, onlyverbal and manual hardcopycoordination and deconfliction occurs.Similar limitations exist betweenthe ARFOR TOC/MARFOR COCand ASOC/DASC. The level ofinteroperability is solely dependent on theability of personnel in all organizationsto work with each other. However,component unique C2 systems exist:

•• Theater Battlespace ManagementCore System. Theater BattlespaceManagement Core System (TBMCS) isa set of 54 applications, of which 16 areused jointly by all Services, that providesplanning, execution, and intelligenceprocessing in support of the air operationsfor force and unit level operations. It wasdeveloped from re-engineering existingair operations application softwares,Contingency Theater AutomatedPlanning System and the WingCommand and Control System; GlobalCommand and Control System (GCCS)Integrated Imagery and Intelligence (I3);the Defense Information InfrastructureCommon Operating Environment(DII COE); commercial-off-the-shelf(COTS); and other supplied third partyproducts. TBMCS also uses a DII COEUnified Build (UB) core and GCCS I3components to produce an all source airCommon Operational Picture (COP) thatpresents an integrated battlespace picture.

•• Advanced Field Artillery TacticalData System. The advanced fieldartillery tactical data system (AFATDS)is the primary C2 fire support systemfor the ARFOR/MARFOR. AFATDSdigitally links the land/amphibiousforce commander with their respectiveoperations centers, FSE/FSCC, andfiring units (to include the Armytactical missile system [ATACMS]).AFATDS enables timely and automatedC2 connectivity, sharing of situationalawareness, and coordination anddeconfliction of surface TST attacks.

•• AFATDS - TBMCS Interface.Currently, AFATDS and TBMCS areundergoing modifications to enable eachsystem to share key elements ofinformation. Initially, AFATDS andTBMCS will be able to share preplannedair information (such as the ATO andairspace control plan [ACP]) and real-time

II-7


indirect fire trajectories (to includeATACMS) for coordination anddeconfliction of surface joint TST attacks.

•• Information Requirements:Interoperable air/ground operations in thepursuit of surface joint TST attacksrequire information to be passed betweenair and ground C2 agencies.

4. Space Force Considerationsfor Joint Time-SensitiveTargeting

a. Space systems and space-basedintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(ISR) assets can provide increased battlespaceawareness to a JFC. Space systems may beable to detect an adversary’s movementand support a TST engagement before itsactions can affect the friendly operation.

b. Precision navigation and smartmunitions permit the engagement of targetswith the minimum number of weapons neededto achieve the desired effect while minimizingcollateral damage. This allows a JFC to

concentrate forces and apply the combatpower at other points in the battlespace.Precision navigation capability enables theapplication of overwhelming force at keypoints of attack. For example, accuratenavigation signals can improve weaponaccuracy, thus increasing the probability ofkill against fixed targets, minimizing collateraldamage and allowing use of advanced stand-off munitions to increase crew survivability.

c. The unique advantages of globalcoverage, wide fields of view, and thecapability to revisit targets make observationof the Earth from space a powerful tool. Spaceforces can have access to any point on Earth,and proper management of satellite orbits andconstellations offers overflight flexibility.

d. Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance. ISR is the assimilation ofpersonnel and capabilities that provides detailedinformation about a given operational area. Themonitoring of air, land, and maritime targets fromspace contributes to the JFC’s battlespaceawareness by providing information onadversary threat locations, dispositions, andintentions. (See Figure II-3)

Space systems may be able to detect an adversary’s movement.

II-8

Chapter II


• Intelligence. Space systems contributeto the development of intelligencethrough surveillance and reconnaissanceactivities.

• Surveillance. Space systems can providecommanders with systematic observationof space, air, surface or subsurface areas,places, persons, or things by visual, aural,electronic, photographic, or other meansthat provides commanders with increasedsituational awareness within a givenoperational area.

• Reconnaissance. Because space systemshave unrestricted overflight of otherwisedenied areas, they can gather informationabout the activities and resources of anadversary or potential adversary, orprovide data concerning meteorological,hydrographic, or geographiccharacteristics of a particular area.

e. Space Liaison Officers, Joint SpaceSupport Teams, and Component SpaceSupport Teams and Support Personnel

• Space Liaison Officers. US SpaceCommand (USSPACECOM) LNO maybe attached to supported combatantcommand staffs in order to help ensurethat space-based capabilities are

appropriately integrated into respectivecombatant commander’s planning,operations, training, and execution.

• Joint Space Support Teams. Uponrequest of a supported combatantcommander and on order of the Secretaryof Defense, USSPACECOM transferstask-organized joint space support teams(JSST) to the operational control(OPCON) of the supported commanderto facilitate tasking and use of joint spaceforces, and ensure that space support isprovided to the supported combatantcommander. JSSTs provide support tothe combatant commander throughreach-back to USSPACECOM’s SpaceOperations Center (SPOC). Specificexamples of tailored support provided byJSSTs to the JFC include:

•• Facilitating the distribution of missilewarning data and other space-basedinformation to the theater

•• Forecasting the vulnerability offriendly operations to observation bysatellites of hostile nations

•• Providing information on foreignspace reliance and methods to deny (orexploit) adversary utilization of space,

Figure II-3. Force Enhancement Operations-Surveillance and Reconnaissance

FORCE ENHANCEMENT OPERATIONS-SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

ReconnaissanceSurveillance

World-wide accessQuick reaction

Atmospheric disturbancesPredictable overflight

schedule

APPLICATION ADVANTAGES LIMITATIONS

II-9


which may support an adversary’stargeting operations

•• Providing deconfliction of spacesystems requirements between thecomponent commanders

•• Providing detailed information on USand foreign satellite capabilities andoperational status and the threat posedby foreign space systems

•• Coordinating in-theater space controlassets

• Component Space Support Teams andSupport Personnel. In addition toJSST support, the commander,USSPACECOM may also direct spacecomponent commanders to providetailored SSTs. Both Army SpaceCommand (ARSPACE) and Naval SpaceCommand (NAVSPACECOM) haveSSTs that are task-organized andequipped to meet the needs of thesupported combatant commander. TheUSAF does not maintain SSTs but hasintegrated space support personnel intoall Air Force component staffs. Specific

examples of tailored support provided bySSTs and personnel to Servicecomponents include the following:

•• Analysis of impact of spacecapabilities on courses of action

•• IPB

•• Mission rehearsal support

•• Imagery and rectified multi-spectralimagery (MSI) products in support of TST

•• Predicted global positioning system(GPS) navigation signal accuracy neededto support TST

•• Adversary and commercial spaceorder of battle assessment

•• Orbit predictions to determinevulnerabilities of forces on the groundand availability of US, allied, and/orcommercial satellites

•• Space-based information, products,and necessary reach-back

II-10

Chapter II


Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIJOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING

COMMAND AND CONTROL

III-1

1. Introduction

Pre-established and well-rehearsed C2procedures are essential to the timelyengagement of joint TSTs. Beginning withthe JFC’s guidance on what constitutes a jointTST within the operational area, levels ofacceptable risk are established and specificguidance is disseminated to joint forcecomponent commands. Joint forceheadquarters elements and componentsidentify, monitor, and track targets andrecommend target engagement priorities to theJFC. C2 coordination measures establish theparameters that are necessary to successfullyengage targets across component boundariesand liaison elements within the joint forceexpedite the joint targeting process.

2. The Importance of JointTarget Visibility

a. The JFC has several options with whichto structure C2 operations for attacks againstjoint TSTs. Though the overall responsibilityfor the mission execution remains with the

component commanders, the authority toengage may be delegated to the C2 node thathas the best information or situationalawareness to perform the mission, or may bespecified by the supported and supportingrelationship of the C2 nodes involved.Placing the appropriate level of battlespaceawareness at component C2 nodes canstreamline the C2 cycle and allow timelyengagement of these targets. Thedecentralized C2 nodes can exchange sensor,status, and target information with a fidelitythat permits them to operate as a single,integrated C2 entity. Tied together by widearea networks and common interactivedisplays, they can effectively performdecentralized, coordinated execution ofjoint time-sensitive attacks. See AppendicesA through C for recommendations onestablishing and using joint TST collaborativetools.

b. Fire support planners and/orcoordinators should ensure that targetacquisition systems are identified and focusedon detecting and locating priority targets.Staffs should ensure that target information

Target acquisition systems must be focused on locating priority targets.

III-2

Chapter III


from all sources is evaluated and routed tothe appropriate engagement units. Thisincludes information from all echelons andfrom adjacent and supporting elements.

c. Timely response is key to successfuljoint TST attack. To expedite joint TSTresponse times, rapid communications andcoordination between the components andtheir elements are vital. Often there are formalliaison elements in place to do just that. Anexample of one such liaison element is theBCD situated within the JAOC. The BCDstays abreast of the operational situation andprovides information reports to its higherheadquarters. If the BCD, or any otherelement, recommends direct attack of ajoint TST, the affected commander mustbe informed as soon as practicable.

d. In-flight reports are also a valuablesource of target information. Information onjoint TSTs should be passed to responsiblecommands immediately. The JAOC, ASOC,airborne battlefield command and controlcenter (ABCCC), Joint Surveillance, TargetAttack Radar System (JSTARS), AirborneWarning and Control System (AWACS), andradar sites monitor in-flight reports and areable to expedite target information to theappropriate component commands viacomponent liaison links.

3. The Joint Force Commander

a. Commander’s Guidance

• The JFC develops guidance that directsand focuses operational planning andtargeting. The commander’s objectivesand guidance identify what is to beachieved and under what conditionsand parameters. This is the mostimportant stage in the joint targetingcycle. Without clear understanding ofwhat is to be achieved, it is impossiblefor efficient targeting strategies to be

devised. An objective mustbe understandable, attainable,measurable, and achievable. The JFCguidance should also clearly define andcoordinate joint TST procedures.Unclear guidance may result inmisunderstandings and conflictingprocedures throughout the joint force thatdelay attacks on joint TSTs. Clearguidance provides the framework foremploying forces to achieve theobjectives.

• During the commander’s objectives andguidance phase, the JFC/componentcommander designates specific surfacejoint TSTs as priorities requiringimmediate response. Also, the JFCestablishes specific guidance on howcoordination, deconfliction, andsynchronization will occur amongcomponents assigned in the operationalarea. Once this guidance is set forth,planned and reactive procedures forattacking surface joint TSTs areestablished. JFC guidance sets thebasic procedural framework for thecomponents to comply with thecommander’s intent and expeditetargeting of surface joint TSTs.Commanders should also periodicallyreview in-place TST guidance forpossible adjustments to keep abreast ofchanging situations and the flow of battleor operation.

• Defining joint TSTs, as a more highlyfocused target set, is insufficient toguarantee proper planning andcoordination to allow rapid andeffective prosecution. The key is forthe JFC or component commander todesignate their priorities in thecommander’s guidance. A prioritizedlist of joint TSTs can then be developedusing this guidance. However, sincesome joint TSTs may be unknown orunanticipated during normal planning

III-3

Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting Command and Control

cycles, the commander’s joint TSTguidance should be broad enough toallow quick designation of, and responseto, a new joint TST type, while stillfollowing the commander’s intent.

• JFCs must also clearly define what a jointTST is so components have a commonunderstanding of what constitutes a jointTST. In this regard, the JFC andcomponent commanders must identifythose joint TSTs that truly requireimmediate action and are not justhighly mobile or merely lucrativetargets.

• JFC objectives and guidance tocomponent commanders enable andsupport different phases of the jointtargeting process. Examples include:

•• Identification and assignment ofprimary sensors and weapon systemsspecifically assigned to support attackson joint TSTs.

•• Establishment of planned, deconflictedfire areas (with definable trigger events)against specific surface joint TSTs.

•• Directives to component commandersto task assets for standby or secondarymissions as backup to primary sensorsand weapon systems. An example wouldbe the JFACC designating aircraft mostlikely to be diverted to assist attackoperations.

•• Determination of surface joint TSTengagement authority and supported andsupporting relationships based on eithercomponent commander AO, componentcommander assigned mission, or acombination thereof.

•• If necessary, specification of thosefew, exceptional circumstances whencomponent commanders who firstacquire specific surface joint TSTshave authority for immediateengagement responsibility regardlessof assigned AO or mission. In otherwords, the JFC should determine thosesituations, if any, where immediatedestruction of the imminent TST threatoutweighs the potential for fratricide orduplication of effort. Inherently, thisdetermination, to whatever degree, mayallow a component to bypass the

JFCs must clearly define a joint TST.

III-4

Chapter III


requirement for informing, coordinating,deconflicting, and synchronizing.However, if time allows, these effortsshould be accomplished beforeengagement. The JFC carefully balancesthe risk between the surface TST threatand the potential for fratricide.

•• Id e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s p e c i f i ccommunication/data links betweencomponent C2 elements to conduct rapidcoordination. This includes authorizingdirect liaison and coordination authority.Establishment of priority sensor toshooter communication links withdefined conditions for circumventingnormal command/coordination channels,to improve timeliness of response.

•• The JFC also communicates guidanceand intent to component commanders toallow them the flexibility to make theproper decision regarding rapid selectionof “best capable” attack asset.

•• The JFC objectives and guidance areshaped by the principles of war, theLOAC, and established ROE.

b. Rules of Engagement

• All targeting decisions must be made inlight of the applicable ROE. In additionto ROE regulated by the Secretary ofDefense and operational commanders,US forces all operate under standing rulesof engagement (SROE). The purpose ofthe SROE is to enable the inherent rightof self-defense and provide guidance forthe application of force for missionaccomplishment. US Forces SROEapply to all military operations andcontingencies including war. Joint forcecomponents and supporting commandersare responsible for ensuring compliance.

• The JFC provides guidance on targetsthat may not be engaged under the LOACor applicable ROE. The JFC may alsomake available specific assets foroperational area-wide employment, suchas a certain number of ATACMS orTomahawk land-attack missiles(TLAMs).

• Many air defense threats are notidentified in enough time to plansuppression. This “opportune”suppression is usually unplanned andincludes aircrew self-defense and attackagainst targets of opportunity. The JFC

Air defense threats may not be identified in time to plan suppression.

III-5


also coordinates and establishes theROE for opportune suppression.

• Certain joint TSTs, designated by theJFC may preclude the use of normalcoordination procedures. In such cases,appropriate coordination measures, priorcoordination, on-scene command, andROE should allow rapid attack of thesetargets. Joint TSTs and other targets ofopportunity should be coordinatedbetween affected componentcommanders prior to attack. Whenmission objectives, desired effects, andgeneral deconfliction and timesequencing have been jointly plannedand integrated, details such as attacktactics and individual missiondeconfliction can be worked out bycomponents responsible for execution.

c. Acceptable Risk

• The initial risk assessment is key toresponsive joint TST prosecution. Withthe compression of the decision cyclecomes increased risks due to insufficienttime for more detailed coordination.Therefore, the requirement for early riskassessment and determining whatconstitutes acceptable risk becomes vitalto an efficient joint TST program. Timecompression and the resultingincreased risk requires dedicatedmeans for expediting cross component/staff coordination. The solution lies inthorough training, detailed operatingprocedures, robust real-timecommunications, and an enablingcollaborative tool. When targetacquisition of an emerging joint TSToccurs, operators rely upon JFC’sguidance and their own experience toassess acceptable risk.

• Understanding the level of riskacceptable to the JFC is a critical aspectof successful joint TST engagement.

This is a complex task. Often the needto attack quickly, at the expense of timefor complete planning and coordinationcauses an increase in risk. Theseconsiderations must be balanced againstthe danger of not attacking the joint TSTin time and thus risking mission failureor harm to friendly forces. Items to beconsidered in the risk assessment include:

•• Risk to friendly forces

••• Possible fratricide

••• Increased risk to attacking forcesdue to less time for planning andcoordination

•• Risk to noncombatants or possiblecollateral damage

•• Disruption of diverting assets fromtheir deliberately planned missions

•• Risk of possible redundant attacks

•• Accepted use of nonoptimumweapons

• JFC’s guidance may stipulate the degreeof acceptable risk when engaging specificjoint TSTs. Specific joint TSTs maybe such a threat to the force or tomission accomplishment that the JFCis willing to accept a higher level of riskand attack the target immediatelyupon its detection. In its simplest form,this may mean announcing that a targetis about to be fired on rather than waitingfor confirmation of target areadeconfliction. More commonly, the riskassociated with joint TSTs involves thepossible trade-off of diverting acquisitionand/or attack assets from its plannedmission to that of a joint TST. Personnelinvolved in the prosecution of jointTSTs must have a clear understandingof the risks involved and balance the

III-6

Chapter III


time required for coordination againstthe danger of not engaging the targetin time.

• While the JFC may accept anincreased risk of fratricide in attackingjoint TSTs, this does not eliminate therequirement to try to minimize thisrisk during joint TST engagements.

• Once a joint TST is identified, the majorsteps required to prosecute it are similarto those in the deliberate joint targetingprocess. The key to accomplishing therequired steps quickly enough to beeffective against joint TSTs is to do asmuch of the coordination and decision-making ahead of time as possible.Successful prosecution of joint TSTsrequires a well organized and wellrehearsed process for sharing sensor data,targeting information, identification ofsuitable strike assets, obtaining missionapproval, and rapid clearance for weaponemployment.

• The appropriate response for each jointTST is heavily dependent on the level ofconflict, the clarity of the desiredoutcome, and the ROE. For example, toensure a quicker response during a major

theater contingency the JFC may be ableto accept a higher level of risk to friendlyforces and noncombatants whenattacking adversary WMD. But duringa SSC, the risk of collateral damage mayrequire more detailed and timeconsuming coordination.

• Of particular concern in risk managementare those situations where it is anticipatedthat joint TSTs may develop in the jointforce rear area. Coordination anddeconfliction of these targets areespecially difficult since the JFC mustbalance the need for fast response withthe uncertainties of accurate location ofall the personnel in the rear area, bothmilitary and civilian.

d. Sample Joint Force Commander’sJoint TST Guidance

• Normally, the JFC will designate jointTSTs in a joint force OPORD and revisethe list in subsequent joint forceFRAGorders.

• Once a joint TST list has been definedby the JFC, the desired effects (e.g.,immediate destruction, 50 percentdamage, etc.) and the level of acceptable

Prosecution of joint TSTs requires a well organized process for sharing data.

III-7


risk to friendly forces and noncombatantsshould be clearly articulated and definedwhere needed. In addition, the firesresponsibilities of the joint forcecomponents should be spelled out indetail. If joint TSTs are of sufficientimportance to be designated joint TST,per the JFC guidance, a joint force staffwould probably want to ensure that theyare kept informed after each engagement.

• For a notional joint force with a missionof protecting a host nation’s keyleadership and keeping local sea lanes ofcommunication open against anadversary that has threatened use ofWMD, an example of JFC joint TSTguidance in the joint force OPORD couldresemble the following:

“Joint TSTs. Joint TSTs aredesignated as follows:

• Maritime vessels, military or civilian,in the act of laying mines.

• Adversary unconventional warfare/special operations forces.

• Adversary weapons systems capableof engaging the host nation’s capital.

These joint TSTs require expedientidentification and engagementconsistent with a compressed jointtargeting cycle. Destruction of thesejoint TSTs is desired.”

4. The Joint Force OperationsDirectorate, J-3

a. The J-3 assists the JFC in the dischargeof assigned responsibility for the direction andcontrol of operations, beginning with initialplanning, follow-through, and completion ofspecific operations. In this capacity, the J-3

plans, coordinates, and integrates operations.The flexibility and range of modern forcesrequire close coordination and integration foreffective unity of effort. If a joint targetingcoordination board (JTCB) is established bythe JFC, the J-3 will normally organize theJTCB and serve as a member.

b. Normally, the J-3 fires plans branchprepares draft targeting guidance andobjectives in conjunction with the jointplanning group (JPG). This guidance issubmitted to the JTCB members for commentand then sent to the JFC for approval. Uponapproval, the guidance is sent to allsubordinate headquarters and staffs forplanning and joint TST development.

c. At the JTF level, the joint operationscenter (JOC) is the focal point forsynchronizing and integrating joint operationsand fires throughout the JOA. In someinstances, JFCs have established TST reactionteams in the JOC to address joint TSTengagement within the JOA.

d. The joint force J-3 normally performsjoint targeting related duties as follows:

• Provides current operational assessment.

• Publishes the JFC’s joint targetingguidance and objectives and the JFC’sdaily joint targeting guidance letter.

• The joint integrated prioritized target list(JIPTL), restricted target list (RTL), andno-strike list (NSL) are reviewed at theJTCB. The J-3 forwards these lists tothe JFC for approval. Following JFCapproval, they are used in the jointtargeting planning process.

• Develops, for JFC approval, the theaterfire support coordination measures(FSCMs) and other appropriatemeasures submitted by components orsubordinate commanders.

III-8

Chapter III


• In coordination with the componentcommanders, develops proposedplacement of the land and maritime forcecomponent commander forwardboundaries.

• Provides the JTCB with thecommander’s joint targeting objectives,boundary, and FSCM changes for futureoperations to assist in the developmentof future targeting requirements.

• Recommends targets for inclusion in theJIPTL as part of the JFC’s planning staff.

• Monitors, and integrates as appropriate,targets in support of informationoperations (IO) objectives.

• Nominates targets in support of thetheater deception plan.

5. The Joint Force IntelligenceDirectorate, J-2

a. The theater JIC provides thecoordination of intelligence resources,reporting, and services to support the jointforce.

b. Because target development translates theJFC’s objectives and guidance into aquantifiable list of targets, it is a critical part ofthe warfighting process. For this reason,effective target development by the J-2 providesan important contribution to successfulexecution of a JFC’s campaign plan.

c. The J-2 oversees the intelligenceoperations of the joint force and providesintelligence to all levels of the command forplanning, directing, and conductingoperations. The J-2 is the staff agency withthe primary responsibility for prioritization ofintelligence collection efforts, target detection,validation, and BDA. Additionally, the J-2 isa major participant in the detection of targetsand the target prioritization process. Inaddition, the J-2 provides a significant inputto the J-3 and/or J-5 in the form of adversaryCOA assessments critical to the joint targetprioritization process and identification ofjoint TSTs.

d. Joint targeting related duties that arenormally performed by the J-2 are as follows:

• Assists the J-3 and J-5 in developingtargeting guidance, priorities, andobjectives for inclusion in the JFC’s

The J-2 oversees the intelligence operations of the joint force.

III-9


planning guidance, planning directives,and daily guidance letter.

• Identifies joint TSTs for immediateattack based on inputs using all-sourcefusion analysis in the JIC or JISE.

• Recommends targets for inclusion in theJIPTL.

• Supports target development forcomponents via the JOC.

• Assists the J-3 in development of the JFCRTL and/or NSL.

• Manages theater collection priorities viathe daily aerial reconnaissance andsurveillance conference and maintainsappropriate collection operationsmanagement liaison with the componentsand national intelligence agencies duringexecution.

• Manages JFC’s priority intelligencerequirements.

• Serves as executive agent for overallcoordination and direction of the JFCBDA cell within the JIC or JISE insupport of the J-3’s CA.

• Provides the theater and/or JOAintelligence assessment.

6. The Joint TargetingCoordination Board

a. Typically, JFCs organize a JTCB. If theJFC so designates, the JTCB may be anintegrating center for the targeting oversighteffort or a JFC-level review mechanism. Ineither case, it must be a joint activitycomprised of representatives from the jointforce staff, all components and, if deemednecessary, their subordinate units.

b. To provide the appropriate level of rank,experience, and focus, the deputy JFC or othersenior officer generally heads the JTCB.Component and joint force staff representationon the JTCB should also possess the necessaryrank, experience, and knowledge to speakauthoritatively for their respectivecomponents and staff elements.

c. The JFC defines the role of the JTCB.The JTCB provides a forum in which allcomponents can articulate strategies andpriorities for future operations to ensure thatthey are synchronized and integrated. TheJTCB normally refines the draft JIPTL forpresentation to the JFC for approval.

d. In multinational operations, the JTCBmay be subordinate to a multinationaltargeting coordination board, with JFCs ortheir agents representing the joint force on themultinational board.

e. The JTCB is typically responsible forthe following:

• Reviews targeting information.

• Develops targeting guidance andpriorities.

• Refines the draft JIPTL (thisresponsibility may be delegated).

• Maintains a complete list of restrictedtargets and areas where specialoperations forces (SOF) or componentreconnaissance units are operating toavoid fratricide and endangerment ofcurrent or future operations.

• Maintains a macro-level view of theoperational area and ensures thattargeting nominations are consistent withthe JFC’s concept of operations.

III-10

Chapter III


• Ensures that IO considerations areadequately addressed.

f. The JTCB may address at least three jointplanning cycles that are either being plannedor are about to be executed. A three-partpossible agenda follows.

• Review. The first section is a review ofprevious assumptions, plans, anddecisions that will be executed within thenext 24 to 48 hours. This is a final reviewof the next day’s targeting plan(s) toensure that it is still valid. The plan isbalanced against the latest CA and theprojected adversary and friendlysituations. This review is the JTCB’sfinal chance to modify the approvedtargeting priorities before it is executed.It should be noted that the JTCB isconcerned with future operations, not thecurrent battle. The operators alreadyhave the current day’s targeting plan(s)in hand and are preparing to execute.Changing priorities on the day ofexecution is possible, but that willnormally be handled through the J-3rather than the JTCB. Moreover,component commanders are normallyauthorized to make execution daychanges compelled by current conditionsconsistent with the JFC’s intent andmission objectives.

• Plan. The second portion of the agendacovers the main focus of the daily JTCB;i.e., approving or validating the joint firesplan to be executed 48-72 hours out. Theboard will review the proposed JIPTLand apportionment recommendation. Ifnecessary, the board may recommend atarget or target set be handled by aspecific component. The planning phaseof the JTCB ensures that operations (toinclude SOF), IO, fires, and intelligenceare fully integrated and coordinated in acomplementary effort throughout thedepth of the battlespace.

• Guidance. The third section of the JTCBagenda will focus on anticipating what thetargeting effort should be 72 to 96 hoursout. The targeting guidance and prioritiesapproved for the 72 to 96 hour windowwill guide the components targeting effortfor the upcoming joint targeting cycle.The approval of the JFC or designatedrepresentative is usually soughtimmediately upon adjournment of theJTCB. The targeting-related decisions arethen promulgated in message formatthroughout the joint force.

7. The Joint Fires Element(JFE)

a. The JFC may approve the formation ofa JFE within the joint force J-3. The JFE isan optional staff element that providesrecommendations to the J-3 to accomplishfires planning and coordination. Specificduties would be assigned by the J-3 withapproval by the JFC and may include any orall of the J-3’s tasks previously identified. TheJFE would provide the capability toaccomplish fires planning and coordinationfunctions. Essentially, the JFE is the JFC’ssubject matter expert on joint fires, andrecommends joint fires guidance and targetingpriorities. The JFE has no taskingauthority.

b. In its role as the JTCB primary agent,the JFE may pass guidance and apportionmentdecisions to the joint force components. OtherJFE responsibilities could include:

• Coordinates the drafting of the JFC’sJIPTL with the J-2.

• Assists the JIC in developing high-valuetargets (HVT) and high-payoff targets(HPT).

• Prepares and disseminates targetbulletins.

III-11


• Monitors for the J-3 TST attackoperations and makes recommendationsfor deconfliction.

• Deconflicts and validates targetnominations originating at the JFC leveland higher, then prioritizes and forwardsto the J-3 for review and eventualtransmission to the JFACC’s JAOC forinclusion in the JIPTL.

• Identifies potential conflicts inpreparation for the JTCB.

• Organizes a strategy team to addressintermediate targeting efforts to bridgethe gap between current operations andfuture plans being developed.

8. Joint Targeting CoordinationMeasures

a. JFCs employ various maneuver andmovement control and FSCMs to facilitateeffective joint operations. These measuresmay be used to expedite attacks againstsurface joint TSTs. Joint control andcoordination measures apply to all joint forcecomponents, and as such, the JFC has final

approval authority. The following is a jointtargeting coordination measure overview, formore detailed information see JP 3-60, JointDoctrine for Targeting, JP 3-0, Doctrine forJoint Operations, JP 3-03, Doctrine for JointInterdiction Operations, JP 3-09, Doctrine forJoint Fire Support, and JP 3-56.1, Commandand Control for Joint Air Operations. AlsoJP 3-09.3, Joint TTP for Close Air Support(CAS) has several excellent examples of howthese different coordination measures can beused in different combinations to controlattacking forces in many different situations.

b. A fundamental aspect of attacking atarget is the supported and supportingcommander relationships. The area betweenthe forward line of own troops (FLOT) andthe fire support coordination line (FSCL) isgenerally considered to be the area of closeoperations. Deep operations extend from theFSCL through the limits of the AO. The jointforce land component commander’s(JFLCC’s) deep operations extend from theFSCL to the forward boundary (FB).Additionally, the battlespace geometryframework below describes the commonauthorities/responsibilities of the commandersin relationship to their battle area. (See FigureIII-1)

The JFE may pass guidance to the joint force components.

III-12

Chapter III


c. The JFC is responsible for ensuringcoordination measures are appropriate,function as designed, and are well understood.These measures include use of boundaries,FSCMs, and ACMs.

d. Boundaries are maneuver controlmeasures that define surface areas to facilitatecoordination and deconfliction of operations.JFCs use lateral, rear, and forward boundariesto define AOs for land and naval forces.Boundaries give the JFC the ability toclearly define areas requiring coordinationand deconfliction of surface joint TSTattacks between components and units.

• FSCMs and associated procedures assist inthe C2 of joint forces. Within their AOs,land and amphibious commanders employpermissive and restrictive FSCMs toenhance the expeditious attack of targets;protect forces, populations, criticalinfrastructure, and sites of religious orcultural significance; and set the stage forfuture operations. Commanders positionand adjust FSCMs consistent with theoperational situation and in consultationwith superior, subordinate, supporting, andaffected commanders. FSCMs are

identified by location and date/time effective(as well as termination date/time, ifapplicable). FSCMs, when used properly,aid in the rapid engagement of surfacejoint TSTs.

•• Permissive Measures. Thesemeasures are normally used to authorizethe attack of targets without coordinationfrom the establishing commander (withinthe commander’s applicable boundaries)if certain circumstances are met.Permissive measures include free fireareas (FFAs), coordinated fire lines(CFLs), and the FSCL.

••• FFAs are specific areas intowhich any weapon system may firewithout additional coordination withthe establishing headquarters. FFAsdo not adequately deconflictbetween air and surface attacks onsurface TSTs unless they arecombined with adequate ACMs.The appropriate ground commanderestablishes FFAs.

••• Coordinated fire lines (CFLs)ar e l i n e s b e y o n d w h i c h

* See JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations

Figure III-1. Joint Force Areas of Target/Engagement Responsibilities

seitilibisnopseRtnemegagnE/tegraTfosaerAecroFtnioJ

TOLFOT

LCSF

LCSFOT

DRAWROFYRADNUOB

DRAWROFYRADNUOB

DNADNOYEB

SUOIBIHPMAEVITCEJBO

AERA

TNIOJLAICEPS

SNOITAREPOAERA

TNIOJRAERAERA

detroppuSrednammoC

ecroFtnioJdnaL

tnenopmoCrednammoC

)CCLFJ(

ecroFtnioJdnaL

tnenopmoCrednammoC

)CCLFJ(

riAecroFtnioJtnenopmoCrednammoC

)CCAFJ(

ecroFtnioJemitiraM

tnenopmoCrednammoC

)CCMFJ(

ecroFtnioJlaicepSsnoitarepOtnenopmoCrednammoC

)CCOSFJ(

aerAraeRtnioJrotanidrooC

)CARJ(ro

lacitcaT tabmoC)FCT(ecroFrednammoC

*)detangisedfi(

gnitroppuSrednammoC srehtOllA srehtOllA srehtOllA srehtOllA srehtOllA srehtOllA

gnitegraTytilibisnopseR llA llA llA llA llA llA

ecapsriAlortnoCytirohtuA

)ACA(

CCAFJ CCAFJ CCAFJ CMFJ CCAFJ CCAFJ

III-13


conventional, indirect, surface firesupport means (such as ATACMS,TLAMs, or naval surface firesupport [NSFS]) may fire at anytime within the boundaries of theestablishing headquarters withoutadditional coordination. Typically,land and amphibious forces useCFLs. CFLs expedite surface jointTSTs attacks as long as surface-to-surface means are used becausethey do not adequately deconflictsurface joint TST attacks by fixed-wing aircraft. CFLs are establishedby the appropriate groundcommander and should be placed asclose as practical to the FLOT.

••• A FSCL is a fire supportcoordinating measure that isestablished and adjusted byappropriate land or amphibiousforce commanders within theirboundaries in consultation withsuperior, subordinate, supporting,and affected commanders. FSCLsfacilitate the expeditious attack ofsurface targets of opportunitybeyond the coordinating measure.An FSCL does not divide an AO bydefining a boundary between close

and deep operations or a zone forclose air support. The FSCL appliesto all fires of air, land, and sea-basedweapon systems using any type ofammunition. Forces attackingtargets beyond an FSCL mustinform all affected commanders insufficient time to allow necessaryreaction to avoid fratricide.Supporting elements attackingtargets beyond the FSCL mustensure that the attack will notproduce adverse effects on, or to therear of, the line. Short of an FSCL,all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations arecontrolled by the appropriate landor amphibious force commander.The FSCL should follow welldefined terrain features.Coordination of attacks beyond theFSCL is especially critical tocommanders of air, land, and specialoperations forces. In exceptionalcircumstances, the inability toconduct this coordination will notpreclude the attack of targets beyondthe FSCL. However, failure to doso may increase the risk of fratricideand could waste limited resources.

FSCMs and associated procedures assist in the C2 of joint forces.

III-14

Chapter III


•• Restrictive Measures. Restrictivemeasures are used to restrict the use offire support assets in particular areas.They may be established by anycomponent commander and are normallyapplicable to all subordinate elements.Examples of restrictive measures areno-fire areas (NFAs), restricted fire lines(RFLs), restricted fire areas (RFAs), andairspace control authorities (ACAs).

••• NFAs are areas into which nofires or effects may enter. Thepurpose of an NFA is to protectforces operating forward of theFLOT or to protect areas, friendlyor adversary, that may serve apurpose in future operations. SOFNFAs are of particular concernduring TST attacks before SOFteams are often providing “eyes on”for the attacks and are therefore oftenvery close to the target locations.

••• RFLs are lines establishedbetween converging forces thatprohibit fires or the effects of firesacross the lines without coordinationfrom the establishing headquarters.RFLs deconflict componentsurface joint TST attacks “bydefault.” RFLs aid in deconflictionbut limit the JFC’s flexibility.

••• RFAs regulate and control fireand attacks into an area, accordingto stated restrictions. Surface TSTsacquired within a RFA may onlybe attacked in accordance withthe firing restrictions, unless theestablishing authority approvesotherwise.

••• ACAs are three-dimensionalblocks of airspace with defineddimensions that significantlyenhance deconfliction of surfacejoint TST attacks among

components. Friendly aircraft arereasonably free from friendly surfacefires, with artillery, helicopters, andfixed-wing aircraft given specificlateral or vertical airspace withinwhich to operate. ACAs allowsimultaneous component attacks ofsurface TSTs in close proximity toeach other by multiple attackmeans, of which one is normally air.ACAs are designed with a minimumaltitude, maximum altitude, specifiedwidth/length, and defined off of a linebetween two coordinate points.Friendly fires are not permittedthrough established ACAs.

• Airspace Control Measures. Theairspace in a combat zone is a crucialdimension of the battlespace used by allcomponents of the joint and allied forcesto conduct assigned missions. A highconcentration of friendly surface,subsurface, and air-launched weaponsystems must share this airspace withoutunnecessarily hindering combat powerthat is being applied in accordance withthe JFC operation plan. The goal ofcombat zone airspace control is toenhance air, land, maritime, and SOFeffectiveness in accomplishing the JFC’sobjectives.

• Common Reference Systems.Common reference systems provide auniversal, joint perspective with whichto define specific areas of the battlespace,enabling the commanders to efficientlycoordinate, deconflict, integrate, andsynchronize attacks. A commonreference system is especially usefulwhen used to coordinate mutuallyaccessible areas of attack and to rapidlydeconflict attack operations. Commonreference systems result in rapid,deconflicted attacks, enhancedprobability of mission success, andreduced potential for duplication of effort

III-15


and fratricide. Also, they allow for rapidcoordination of joint engagement and theemployment of combined arms. Theyare flexible enough to be used for avariety of other purposes, such asgeographically identifying search andsurveillance areas, identification ofrestricted zones, designation of highthreat areas (such as adversary surface-to-air missile battery locations), andreference points navigation,deconfliction, and target guidance. Theprimary purpose of a common systemis to provide an integrated commonframe of reference for joint forcesituational awareness to facilitateattack coordination, deconfliction,integration, and synchronization.There are two general categories oftheater-established common referencesystems: area and point.

•• An area reference system provides athree-dimensional reference, enablingtimely and effective coordination andcontrol and facilitates rapid attacksthroughout the designated operationalarea. Once identified, these areas mayintegrate control and coordinatingmeasures (in particular FSCMs andACMs), thereby enabling unhamperedprecision attack and flexibility of weaponsystem employment. Theater-level areareference systems are often described as“grid references,” “kill boxes” or, in the

case of Operation ALLIED FORCE,“engagement zones.”

•• Point references complement areareferences by providing a multitude ofcommon surface points to expeditecoordination throughout the operationalarea. The point reference system issimilar to the area reference system inthat it can be used to provide componentswith a common perspective of thebattlespace and allow for commonidentification of mutually accessibleattack areas. In addition, it can be usedto identify the center point for theestablishment of an appropriate FSCMand/or ACM.

• Bullseye and Search and Rescue DOT(SARDOT). The bullseye referencesystem is normally used duringcounterair engagements for situationalawareness on targeted and untargetedairborne threats and for other aerospacecoordination. Normally, theaters willonly establish a few bullseye referencepoints to ensure effectiveness. Bullseyesare not meant to provide detailed targetguidance, but general referenceinformation. Search and rescue zones,called “SARDOTs,” like bullseyes, arevery few in number and provide generalarea reference for search and rescueoperations.

III-16

Chapter III


Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVENGAGING JOINT TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS

IV-1

1. Introduction

a. Successfully engaging joint TSTsrequires centralized planning anddecentralized execution. Centralized planningoccurs at the joint force level with JFCguidance and intent, target prioritization, andestablishing the criteria for what constitutesjoint TSTs and the actions against them.Decentralized execution consists of delegatingengagement authority to joint forcecomponent commands—either directly, orthrough joint force target coordinatingagencies.

b. The joint force has several joint TSTcapable attack assets—each with its uniquecapabilities and limitations. However, nosingle weapon system encompasses the bestof all of these characteristics under allconditions. No single weapon system isalways “best capable” to deal with the jointTST threat.

2. Centralized Planning

There are many ways a JFC may implementcentralized joint TST targeting procedureswithin a joint force. The case studies inAppendices A through C provide examplesof how some joint commands address jointTST issues. Of course different combinationsof these examples can be selected as neededto better fit a given environment or situation.

3. Decentralized Execution

When directed, joint force components andtheir assigned forces execute operations whilemonitoring other components. Componentsreport laterally to each other and vertically tothe JFC. Component commanders monitorthe execution phase and provide real-timerecommendations for redirection of forces,reattack, and other taskings as the situationwarrants. Intelligence must also monitor the

The joint force has several joint TST capable attack assets—each with itsunique capabilities and limitations.

IV-2

Chapter IV


execution of the plan and be prepared toprovide immediate threat and target updatesshould a change in the plan be needed.Mission execution requires the flexibility toreact to unforeseen TSTs. The intelligencearchitecture and collection plan must bedesigned to rapidly address these types ofthreats.

4. Intelligence/OperationsInterface

a. Intelligence and operations staffs workclosely to optimize the force necessary toachieve the objective considering operationalrealities and data (available assets). Withguidance from the JFC, componentcommanders conduct force applicationplanning to fuse target, weapon system, andmunitions options. This results in the jointlycoordinated selection of forces and associatedweapon systems or platforms.

b. IPB can significantly enhance thetargeting process for surface TSTs byidentifying the probable locations or operatingareas where surface TSTs may emerge.Depending on the seriousness of the threat,resources available, and level of confidencein the IPB, component commanders may electto position or posture target acquisition andstrike assets to rapidly respond to theforecasted areas. During execution planning,intelligence also closely monitors target statusin order to update final planning beforeexecution. It must identify changes requiredto current taskings, as well as provide changesto follow-on target development phases andweaponeering phases. Inputs fromintelligence planners update adversary threatassessments and directly impact a broad area,such as tasking orders, OPORDs andassociated annexes, deconfliction plans,decision support templates (DSTs), schedulesof fires, and support OPORDs. Intelligenceplanners also play a major role in missionplanning support. This includes threat

locations, target materials, graphics, andgeospatial products to include precisecoordinates and surveyed data points.

5. Engagement Capabilities andLimitations

a. Introduction

• Generally, the primary weapon systemssuitable for surface joint TST attacks inan operational area are fixed-wingaircraft, attack helicopters, ATACMS,multiple launch rocket system (MLRS),conventional artillery, cruise missiles,NSFS, and SOF.

• Determination of the “best capable” TSTasset begins during the weaponeeringassessment phase and continues throughthe force application phase. Eachcomponent provides recommendationshighlighting the pros and cons of theiravailable weapon systems based upon thecurrent situation. The JFC also providesguidance to component commanders toallow them the flexibility to make theproper decision regarding rapid selectionof “best capable” attack asset.

• Each of the different weapon systems hasassociated pros and cons in each of thefollowing areas:

•• Effectiveness against different targettypes

•• Responsiveness

•• Range

•• Accuracy

•• Vulnerably to adversary threat

•• Associated risks of employment

IV-3

Engaging Joint Time-Sensitive Targets

b. Surface-to-Surface Systems

• The MLRS and cannon artillery areusually the most numerous TST-capablesystems in the battlespace. They providenear immediate response times andall-weather capability. However, theirlimited firing ranges make them mostsuitable for TSTs located in the generalarea between the FSCL and the FLOT.

• ATACMS possesses the responsivenessof MLRS, but with a much greater range.Although the ATACMS warhead isdesigned for attack of soft targets, itsaccuracy and all-weather capability,coupled with the extended range and quickresponse time, make it a formidablesystem against TSTs. The high angle oflaunch and impact, along with a very highaltitude flight path, does not require largeamounts of airspace to be deconflictedprior to firing. However, since the missilecannot be redirected after launch, it isdifficult to employ against moving targets.

• NSFS provides the advantages ofresponsive, all-weather, mobile gun andmissile support. However, it is relativelyshort ranged, limited in number, andrestricted to use in the littoral area whenattacking land-based targets.

c. Cruise Missiles. The long range andaccuracy of cruise missiles make them anexcellent weapon for use against targets inhigh threat areas, but the lead-time requiredto plan and execute cruise missile missionscould be a limiting factor against TSTs.

d. Manned Aircraft. Due to their range,speed, and flexible weapon selection, mannedaircraft are well suited to attack TSTs.Because the aircrew can provide “eyes on”during the attack, manned aircraft are ofparticular advantage when attacking mobiletargets or when exact target coordinates areunavailable. However, a permissive threatenvironment or suppression of adversary airdefenses may be required to avoidunacceptable risks to aircraft and aircrews.

MLRS and cannon artillery are usually the most numerous TST-capablesystems in the battlespace.

IV-4

Chapter IV


Rapid deconfliction of airspace can be achallenge in a congested environment.Manned aircraft possess both day and nightcapability, but are weather-dependent.

• Fixed-Wing Aircraft. The ability offixed-wing aircraft to move longdistances in relatively short timesprovides the force with the flexibility toquickly mass effects throughout thebattlespace. Weapon payloads can beadjusted to suit the mission, and with air-refueling they are capable of extendedloiter times. If needed, they can bequickly diverted in-flight to a new targetas long as suitable communications linksare available.

• Rotary-Wing Aircraft. Attackhelicopters provide excellent accuracywith an array of weapons but haverelatively short range. They are both day-and night-capable, but are more vulnerableto adversary defenses than fixed-wingaircraft due to low altitude and relativelyslow speed. However, due to theircapability of slow flight, rotary-wingaircraft can often operate in poorer weatherconditions than fixed-wing aircraft.

e. SOF. SOF’s primary contributionagainst TSTs is covert reconnaissance,surveillance, and terminal control of weaponssystems. If required, SOF can be employedin direct action to destroy or disable a TST,but this may compromise their primarymission and require extraction of the team.

f. Sensors. Various sensor platforms, bothmanned and unmanned, provide thewarfighter with the capability of detecting,identifying, tracking, and assessing TSTs.These sensors are most effective when cross-cued, and linked, to provide multiple sourcesand types of information.

• Manned airborne sensors allow flexibleoptions and detailed information

gathering both in their ability to beredirected and their array of sensors. Alimiting consideration in theiremployment is their vulnerability in ahigh threat environment.

• Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) havemany of the same benefits as mannedairborne sensors without risking humanlife. This makes them an excellent assetto provide surveillance of heavilydefended areas. They are readilyredirected if required, possess long loitertimes, and provide real-time feedback.UAV sensor packages can be degradedby adverse weather. Some UAVs have alimited field of view and have limitedresponsiveness while being redirected inthe battlespace due to their relatively slowspeed.

• Space-based sensors provide long-term,large area surveillance with excellentresolution and with minimal vulnerabilityto adversary actions. Depending on orbitand positioning, they may suffer gaps insurveillance periods and may be difficultto shift to a new surveillance area. By itsnature, satellite coverage schedules arepredictable and the adversary can adjustactivities to avoid detection. Also, theresponsiveness of information fromspace-based assets may not meet thetimelines for targeting TSTs.

6. Combat Assessment

a. CA is a crucial part of operations. Thejoint targeting process provides short-termassistance for immediate decisions and aidslong-term planning for the composition andcapabilities of future forces. This is essentialin order to provide to the JFC a fullydeveloped picture of the battlespace. A criticalingredient for effective CA is anunderstanding of all aspects of target

IV-5


development and its link to the JFC’sobjectives and guidance.

b. CA is performed at all levels. At theJFC level, the CA process should normallybe an all source joint program supported byall components and designed to determine ifthe required effects on the adversaryenvisioned in the campaign plan are beingachieved. CA addresses the effectiveness ofoperations for tasked or apportioned missions.This directly impacts the JFC’s apportionmentnominations and decision. The supportedcommander makes these assessments. Theend product of CA at the operational and/orstrategic level is a campaign assessment thatis incorporated into strategy and guidancedevelopment. (Note: Simply attacking targetson the JIPTL does not represent the totaleffectiveness of the operations.)

c. CA is composed of three interrelatedcomponents: BDA, MEA, and future targetingor reattack recommendations.

Combat assessment is a crucial partof operations.

• BDA. BDA is the complementaryactivity to the selection of targetsperformed in target development. It takesa three-phased approach to proceed froma micro-level examination of the damageor effect inflicted on a specific target, toultimately arriving at macro-levelconclusions regarding the functionaloutcomes created in the target system,retracing the macro-to-micro path ofanalysis in target development. Inaddition, to conduct BDA in thethree-phased approach, a baseline set oftarget system damage criteria andmeasures of effectiveness (MOE) mustbe established. These criteria andmeasures are invaluable to maintaininga standard measure of targetingeffectiveness. They help drive theconduct of military operations againsttarget systems in a more effectivesystematic fashion—achieving results ata greatly reduced effort, risk, and cost.The first phase examines the outcomes

IV-6

Chapter IV


at the specific targeted elements; thesecond phase estimates the functionalconsequences for the target systemcomponents; and the third phase projectsresults on the overall functioning of thetarget system and the consequent changesin the adversary’s behavior. The purposeof BDA is to compare what was actuallyaccomplished to what target developmentdetermined should be accomplishedwhen the targeting options were beingformulated. (See Figure IV-1)Consequently, a critical ingredient foreffective BDA is detailed familiarity withall aspects of the analysis performed inthe target development that justified thechosen targets and their linkage to theJFC’s objectives and guidance.

• MEA. MEA is the correspondingactivity to BDA, and directs itsassessments to after-the-fact studies ofhow capabilities were performed and themethod in which they were applied. Itcomplements the estimative analyses ofcapability assessment by examining theforensic evidence after attacks todetermine whether weapons and weaponsystems performed as expected. Thepurpose of MEA is to compare the actualeffectiveness of the means employed totheir anticipated effectiveness calculatedduring the capability assessment phaseof the joint targeting process. The resultsof MEA support both near-termimprovement in force employmenttactics and techniques and long-term

THE COMBAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Combat Assessment

Reattack Recommendation(Or Future Targeting Development)

MunitionsEffectivenessAssessment

Battle DamageAssessment

Physical DamageAssessment

Functional DamageAssessment

Target SystemAssessment

Figure IV-1. The Combat Assessment Process

IV-7


improvements in lethal and nonlethalcapabilities. Consequently, a criticalingredient for effective MEA is detailedfamiliarity with all inputs to thecalculations performed in capabilityassessment that resulted in weaponsystem selection.

• Future target nominations and reattackrecommendations merge the picture ofwhat was done (BDA) with how it wasdone (MEA) and compares the resultwith predetermined MOE that weredeveloped at the start of the joint targetingprocess. The purposes of this phase in

the process are to determine the degreeof success in achieving objectives and toformulate any required follow-up actions,or to indicate readiness to move on tonew tasks in the path to achieving theoverall JFC objectives. This last activityin the final phase both completes andbegins the joint targeting process anewby linking the achieved outcomes withstated objectives that began the cycle.

For further information on combatassessment, refer to JP 2-01.1,Intelligence Support to Targeting.

IV-8

Chapter IV


Intentionally Blank

A-1

APPENDIX AUS EUROPEAN COMMAND TST

PROCEDURES AND TOOLS

Annex A US European Command TST Collaborative Tools

A-2

Appendix A


US EUROPEAN COMMAND TSTPROCEDURES AND TOOLS

1. United States European Command(USEUCOM) has considered the followingconcept of operations for coordination anddeconfliction of joint TSTs within theUSEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

a. The USEUCOM J-2 Targeting Division(ECJ22T) manages the TST effort forheadquarters (HQ) USEUCOM. Itadministers the federated TST supportnetwork, acts as broker between theater andnational targeting agencies to determinefederation responsibilities, and providesdirection to focus the intelligence preparationof the battlespace (IPB) effort duringdeliberate planning. ECJ22T is responsiblefor HQ USEUCOM TST roles until a jointforce staff is established and prepared toassume them.

b. The JFC has primary responsibility forprosecuting TSTs within a JOA. Authorityfor TSTs are normally delegated to acomponent commander in the interest ofminimizing the TST engagement timeline.However, the JFC retains TST oversight. Thejoint force staff is instrumental to the TSTprocess during crisis action planning (CAP),providing recommendations for TSTprocedures. The JFC dictates howcoordination, deconfliction, andsynchronization will occur amongcomponents as well as develops a basicprocedural framework for TSTs, and delegatescollection management authority for IPB.

c. Specific targeting responsibilities of thejoint force staff include:

• Promulgating procedures for establishingjoint fires coordination measures. Theseare used to deconflict component firesand distinguish between procedures forclose air support (CAS)/joint fire support(JFS) and TSTs.

• Providing a prioritized list of TSTs bytarget type and/or geography within theJFC’s intent for fires. This can also includea weight of effort for TSTs compared withother fires, and is used to determineintelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance (ISR) and strike assets forTSTs during a given ATO cycle. This listis presented at the daily JTCB meeting,where it is coordinated and deconflictedwith the joint force components.

d. Joint force component commanders andtheir staffs carry out the air tasking/firesupport/strike operations orders with forceplanning and preparations for engagement offorces. Component commanders ensure thatspecific procedures for engaging TSTs thatsatisfy the overall TST CONOP are produced,promulgated, and rehearsed to the maximumextent possible. During combat operations,each component commander interacts with aTST collaborative network to most quicklyand efficiently engage TSTs.

e. During deliberate planning, thefoundation is established for future TSTprosecution. Analysis is performed on potentialenemies, providing assessments of theirmilitary capabilities. CONOPS and tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP) for

Appendix A was extracted from the US European Command, ED 40-16, CrisisTargeting Support Architecture, dated 11 March 2001.

A-3

US European Command TST Procedures and Tools

prosecuting TSTs are developed and exercised,to demonstrate their feasibility and familiarizetheater personnel with the TST process.

f. During CAP, procedures and IPB areexpanded and focused to the operation. Thegoal is to be fully prepared and rehearsed toprosecute TSTs once hostilities commence.A joint force is identified and formed,guidance and intent promulgated, forcesassigned, and procedures finalized. Whiletime may be limited, it is essential to have afunctioning TST process in place prior to forceexecution. To make use of valuable time as ajoint force is being formed, USEUCOM staffdirectorates begin the planning for TSToperations until the joint force staff is preparedto assume TST responsibilities.

g. Soon after a joint force is established, aTST authority is appointed, and the JFCpromulgates guidance on how collateraldamage will affect TST engagement as wellas methods of deconfliction betweenfunctional/Service components.

h. Authority for TSTs is normallydelegated to a functional componentcommander. This allows the prosecution ofTSTs at a low enough level to minimizeengagement timelines, yet high enough tointeract effectively with other components. TheJFC weighs such factors as preponderance offorce, operational objectives, and enemydisposition prior to making this decision. TSTauthority can be delegated to any component,and, depending on circumstances, may evenbe held by the joint force. While the chosencomponent maintains control of the TSTprocess, all components will perform certainTST functions, as outlined in specified TSTprocedures.

i. When the JFC issues his intent forfires, it must include specific guidance onTSTs. While this guidance may be relativelybroad at first, it should allow the TST effortto begin developing tactics to successfullyprosecute anticipated TSTs. Potential enemycourses of action should be identified,allowing a quick response to enemy behavior.Collection managers fashion an ISR plan tomost efficiently prosecute the JFC’sdesignated TSTs. The guidance should alsoidentify ROE, commander’s standards forTST approval (what is needed and at whatlevel), allowing the TST cell to prepare forupcoming hostilities. While this initialguidance may change as the operationmatures, it provides a baseline to begin theprocess.

j. The USEUCOM TST engagementcycle mirrors the joint targeting cycle, butis executed in an accelerated fashion. Allthe preparatory work allows a target to beidentified, tracked, prioritized, approved, andengaged in very short order. Well-rehearsedprocedures, adequate communications links,and trained personnel allow the rightcomponent to place the right weapon to bearon the right target at the right time. Individualcomponent TTP conforms to these generalprocedures. These procedures assume thata collaborative network is established andcontinually manned with all organizationssupporting TSTs.

k. The component delegated TSTauthority manages the collaborativenetwork with input from other membersof the network. TST procedures are executedin parallel to the maximum extent possible tominimize the TST timeline.

A-4

Appendix A


Intentionally Blank

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX AUS EUROPEAN COMMAND TST

COLLABORATIVE TOOLS

A-A-1

1. Existing systems are used by allUSEUCOM organizations engaging TSTsto quickly pass data between themselves.This allows rapid coordination anddeconfliction between components.

2. Specific system requirements are identifiedin JTF TTPs. An example of likelyUSEUCOM TST collaboration tools includethe following:

a. SIPRNET. A dedicated SIPRNETcollaboration room (information workspaceor equivalent) used by all federated TSTpartners to track, real time, all informationgathered on potential TSTs. Thiscollaboration also allows the federateddevelopment of Digital Target Folders(DTF) for each TST, and provides voice, chat,and white board capability. DTFs areconstructed for TSTs in much the samemanner as they are prepared during fixedtarget development, but on an acceleratedtimeline. During deliberate planning, DTFtemplates are constructed to the theaterstandard. They contain those fields necessaryto develop a TST (target identification,location, image, collection time delay,significance, target type dwell time, collateraldamage estimate, etc). During forceexecution, the DTF is quickly built on theTST collaborative network to efficientlydevelop the target use of the DTF providesa common standard for TSTs, and ensuresthat all commands participating in the TSTfight have the same information.

b. Sensitive Compartmented Information(SCI) ZIRCON Chat. A windows-based SCIprogram that is capable of collaboratinginformation from certain ISR assets that cannotbe passed on the SIPRNET.

c. Secure Telephone Unit III (STU-III)capability for backup and point-to-point voicecommunications when necessary.

d. Collection Management. If a separatecollection management cell is dedicated toTST prosecution, collection managementsoftware is provided. This may be therequirements management system (RMS),planning tools for resource integration,synchronization, and management (PRISM),or similar tools.

3. Conducting TST prosecution in a coalitionenvironment requires a computer networkreleasable to coalition partners. For example,a NATO operation may use LinkedOperational Intelligence Centers Europe(LOCE), with installed collaborationsoftware, as the hub of the TST collaborationnetwork. This setup may not allow as rapid aTST engagement cycle due to limitations inreleasing certain US-ONLY collectioninformation. The need to utilize coalitionassets versus the degradation in timelines needto be weighed when deciding to engage TSTsin a coalition operation.

A-A-2

Annex A to Appendix A


Intentionally Blank

B-1

APPENDIX BUS CENTRAL COMMAND

TST PROCEDURES AND TOOLS

Annex A US Central Command JTF TST Reaction Team Worksheet

B-2

Appendix B


US CENTRAL COMMANDTST PROCEDURES AND TOOLS

1. In United States Central Command,(USCENTCOM), some subordinate jointforces have established “TST ReactionTeam Procedures” within their jointoperations centers (JOCs).

a. The TST Reaction Team consists of:

• Senior FSE Representative

• J-3 Current Operations

• JOC Battle Captain

• Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)Fire Direction Officer

• Judge Advocate General (JAG)Representative

• Army Airspace Command and Control(A2C2) Representative

• Collections Manager

• Special Operations ComponentRepresentative

• C2 Representative

• Others as required

b. The TST Reaction Team procedures are:

• Notification of a surface joint TST ispassed from the land component analysisand control element (ACE) to the jointforce FSE by the quickest availablemethod. (This is normally secure voicewith SIPRNET backup.)

• The FSE determines if ATACMS (the jointforce TST engagement asset of choicebecause of its response time, accuracy, andall-weather capability) is an appropriateasset for employment against the TST. Infact, if ATACMS is not available, the TSTReaction Team is not convened and theTST is processed as a routine target witha compressed time cycle.

• If ATACMS is available, the FSE initiatesan “At My Command” mission with theland component and/or initiates an airmission through the BCD. CoordinatedATACMS and air attacks areUSCENTCOM’s preferred method ofengaging joint TSTs. An “At MyCommand” mission indicates that thejoint force FSE will provide requisitetargeting information and engagementauthorization to the land component.

• A “TST Alert” announcement is madein the joint operations and intelligencecenter. Upon this announcement, the on-watch TST Reaction Team convenes atthe FSE map immediately uponnotification of a TST that potentiallycould require an ATACMS engagement.

• The FSE Watch Officer rapidly briefs theTST Reaction Team from a TSTReaction Team Worksheet. An exampleof the TST Reaction Team Worksheet isin Appendix B.

• Following the TST briefing, anATACMS mission is either approved ordisapproved by the senior member of theTST Reaction Team.

Appendix B was extracted from a US Central Command JTF standingoperating procedure.

B-3

US Central Command TST Procedures and Tools

• If ATACMS is denied, “End of Mission”is sent to the land component. Airengagement options may continuefollowing normal air targeting cycleprocedures.

• If ATACMS is approved, missioncoordination continues and authorizationto engage is passed to the landcomponent. The FSE ensures timeseparation between ATACMS and airengagement assets.

• The FSE notifies the Battle Captain whenATACMS firing has commenced.

• Following the TST engagement, the FSEattempts to obtain and pass BDA to theACE, determines re-engagementrequirements, if any, and ends the TSTmission once desired effects are achieved.

B-4

Appendix B


Intentionally Blank

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX BUS CENTRAL COMMAND JTF TST REACTION TEAM

WORKSHEET

B-A-1

1. ROLL CALL

_____ Senior FSE Rep ______ JAG _______ JSOTF/SOCC Rep_____ J-3, Current Ops ______ A2C2 _______ C2 Rep_____ Battle Captain ______ Collect Mgr _______ Other: _____________ ASOC FDO

2. FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT TST SITUATION UPDATE(* Indicates information required from the Analysis and Control Element [ACE])

* Target Type/Size: ___________________________________________________* Target Location: Lat/Long ____________________________________________ UTM _____________________________________________________________* Activity/Movement: _________________________________________________* Acquisition Source: __________________________________________________* Acquisition Time: ___________________________________________________* Observed Target Now: Yes or No* Observed Target at TOT1: Yes or No or UndeterminedLauncher Location: ___________________________________________________Other Remarks: ______________________________________________________

ATTACK OPTIONS: ATACMS and:(Circle all that apply) USAF Air USAF PushCAS USMC Air Other: ______

ATTACK RECOMMENDATION: ____________________________________

3. APPROVED ATTACK ASSET (S): ___________________________________APPROVED BY: _____________________ at ___________________________

(Date/Time)

4. AUTOMATIC RE-ATTACK CRITERIA: ______________________________(Minimum measurable desired effects)

5. FINAL CLEARANCE

_______ JAG _____ BCD (airspace cleared at ____ until ______ )_______ A2C2 _____ USMC (airspace approval if required)_______ ATACMS “Ready” with _____________time of flight.

6. FIRE ATACMS (Complete the below procedures)

_______ Notify BATTLE CAPTAIN of “SHOT”_______ Obtain and pass BDA to ACE_______ Determine re-attack requirements, if any, and end the ATACMS mission

once desired effects are achieved.________________________________________________

1 Time on target.

B-A-2

Annex A to Appendix B


Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CUS FORCES KOREA

TST PROCEDURES AND TOOLS

Annex A Shared Target Worksheets and DatabaseB Joint TST WebsiteC Joint TST Information NetworkD Text Chat, Audio Chat, and Secure ConferencingE Whiteboarding

C-1

C-2

Appendix C


1. In United States Forces Korea (USFK), theCINC’s staff plans fires and maintainscentralized control while delegating actualexecution to the components for decentralizedexecution. For example, the JFLCC maydesignate a multiple launch rocket system(MLRS) platoon in a “hot” status to expeditefires on TSTs. The field artillery battalionpostures launchers within the “hot platoon”with “At My Command” missions to reduceresponse times. In the case of air assets, theJFACC may designate a block of aircraft sortiesto be kept in a higher than normal alert statusfor rapid launch, or pre-identify sorties assuitable candidates for a possible re-role ofits current airborne mission.

a. The decision authority to prosecuteindividual TSTs is maintained by thecomponents. Some general guidelines(relative to joint TST decision authorities) areoutlined below:

• TST location and current AO boundariesdetermine the lead component for eachTST.

• TST targeting authority is derived fromsupported and supporting commandrelationships.

• The supported commander isresponsible for converting JFC’sguidance into actionable TST taskingsbased on the current operationalsituation.

• There is only one authority in eachcomponent that may nominate TSTs forjoint prosecution.

• Supporting commanders will provideaugmentation or other support to asupported commander as required, anddevelop supporting procedures.

b. USFK has established a TSTInformation Network which links TSTinformation, enables rapid dissemination oftarget information, and enables timelyexecution instrumental to a sensor-to-shooterapplication. This virtual group of componentwarfighters facilitates joint TST prosecutionand integrates component TST decision cyclerequirements into joint procedures.

c. The USFK components’ lateralcoordination requirements are satisfied withthe TST information network, which consistsof the TST server, a shared target worksheetdatabase, a TST website, and a printed TSTguide. The network is implemented by a TSTinformation CONOPS. It supports the sharingof information when, for whatever the reason,dynamic targeting is employed. Althoughflexibility is required to capitalize on newcapabilities, changes to the plan may bringunsought consequences. The networkapplies existing software applications toimprove timeliness of lateral coordination andto reduce response cycle times associated withjoint TST prosecution.

d. The TST server is a rider on the theaterwide-area network (WAN) and usesMeetingPoint conferencing software,Microsoft NetMeeting, a web server for theTST web site, and a Microsoft Accessdatabase. The MeetingPoint conferencingsoftware is used to enable multi-channel voiceconferencing. Microsoft NetMeeting will

Appendix C was extracted from the Department of Defense Joint WarfightersTest and Evaluation, Time-Sensitive Target (TST) Guide, dated February 2001.

US FORCES KOREATST PROCEDURES AND TOOLS

C-3

US Forces Korea TST Procedures and Tools

support video conferencing, but due tobandwidth limitations on the WAN backbone,video conferencing is not used. The numberof MeetingPoint conferencing users are limitedby the number of licenses purchased.

e. Target information is shared usingelectronic target worksheets generated by thedatabase software in a shared directory onthe TST server.

f. The USFK TST web site is a web-basedcapability primarily designed to post TSTs,their prosecution status, and advise of BDA.It also provides a central location containinglinks to battle rhythm related data,commander’s guidance, and legacy electronicdocumentation. This capability provides nearreal-time information to the theater’s targetingpositions and cells. All TST-related positionscan access the TST web site via the Netscapebrowser using AFATDS, TBMCS, JointTargeting Toolbox (JTT), and GCCS.

g. The TST web page contains targetinformation posted to a joint TST targetinglog, planning documents, command guidance,and other reference material.

h. Links are provided to each associatedcommand’s/ component’s web page. This

provides each component’s operationalscheme of maneuver, master attack plan, orfire support plan. Also, links are provided toselected battle rhythm products, an electroniccopy of the TST guide, as well as theater andcomponent TTPs and other references.

i. Links to the JFC and component hit listsprovide a bulletin board to post specificcommand guidance and interest items as wellas JFC and component specific guidance onprosecuting TSTs.

j. Both target development and operationalanalysts use the log. Target developmentuses the log to examine the scope of dynamictargeting activity, to anticipate BDA reporting,and to update the JIPTL. Operational analystsuse the log to provide feedback to combatplans. Additionally, based on Internet protocol(IP) address control, a user may be givenprivileges to edit any target record. (Note: Inthe latest version of the TST Network,individuals (we recommended select colonels)can designate whom they want on thenetwork. This eliminates programmers/technicians bringing the application down toadd/change users. The edit feature is nowbased on password vice IP addresses.)

C-4

Appendix C


Intentionally Blank

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX CSHARED TARGET WORKSHEETS AND DATABASE

C-A-1

1. Target information is shared usingelectronic target worksheets generated by anAccess database application in a shareddirectory on the TST Server. The applicationallows users to configure data views that areformatted into targeting worksheet forms.Views of database records are distributed inprogrammed frames to selected clients. Thesedistributed views effectively query clients fordatabase inputs then redistribute the data toanother set of clients, based on the TSTprocess and associated informationrequirements. An Access application filegenerates the selective views of the datarecords, effectively filtering data for theselective redistribution by assigning datastates. After data is entered on a targetworksheet, the data updates the database andchanges the data record state. The worksheetstate diagram is shown in Figure C-A-1.

2. The target worksheet that displays thesedifferent data states is shown in Figure C-A-2.

The target worksheet is designed to act as anelectronic database. A form from the databaseserves as an electronic routing slip in aSALUTE or SPOT format that can act as asystem message alert (SMA) on any C4Isystem. The users can configure the targetworksheet routing.

3. An example configuration for sharedtarget worksheet distribution is shown inFigure C-A-3. A check in a configurationnode box allows the checked state to beviewed by that node. The only exception isthe first state or “Enter Target” state that has asingle send to restriction. The designated nodein the “Send To Initial Data” column will onlyview “Enter Target” data from their respectivenodes. This ensures that each component (orspecified node[s]) screens each nominatedjoint TST and verifies, validates, and qualifiesthe target.

Figure C-A-1. Shared Target Worksheet “State Diagram”

ImplementTST

Guidance

PerformTarget

Development

PerformWpn/Ops

Assessment

PlanExecution

ExecuteAttack

AssessEffects

Protected Target List (PTL)HPTL and Component Hit List (actionable Supported

Commander target selection standards and TST criteria)TargetData

Write to Database and Postto Joint Targeting Log

TargetableInformationRequired

Changesto JIPTL

Battle DamageAssessment(BDA)

EnteredTarget

NominatedTarget

AuthorizedProsecution

ClearedExecution

ReportedEmployment

TST Network (Terminals with shared targetworksheets and collaboration privileges)

Reject

Defer Tasking

Re-task

Reject

Re-task

Mission Report(MISREP)

Write to Databaseand Post to JointTargeting Log

Component Guidance, Objectives, and SpecializedTasks

Mobile TargetUpdates

CoordinationandDeconfliction

TaskedAssets

RequiredNotifications

ReportedEmploymentData

Dismiss Target

ReportResults

WAN (terminals with webbrowser)

TST Server (Meeting-Point MCU, SharedDatabase, Web Site, and File Server)

C-A-2

Annex A to Appendix C


Figure C-A-2. Target Worksheet

Figure C-A-3. Notional Target Worksheet Distribution Configuration

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX CJOINT TST WEBSITE

C-B-1

1. The TST web site is a web-based capabilitydesigned to establish a central locationcontaining links to battle rhythm related data,commander’s guidance, and legacy electronicdocumentation. This capability provides nearreal-time information to the theater’s targetingpositions and cells. The web server providesa central site for all targeting informationrelative to current operations. An exampleweb page is illustrated in Figure C-B-1. Thetop half of the page deals with proactive ortimely targeting information. The bottom halfis component guidance actionable tasks. AllTST-related positions are able to access theTST web site via CTAPS, ADOCS, AFATDS,TBMCS, and GCCS.

2. The TST web page contains targetinformation posted to the joint targeting log,HPTL link, mobile target updates, unsourced

changes to the published weaponeered andsourced JIPTL, and the protected target list.

3. The command patch buttons are links toeach command’s web page. Their purpose isto provide the component’s operationalscheme of maneuver, master attack plan, orfire support plan. Links are also provided toselected battle rhythm products, an electroniccopy of the US Forces Korea TST Guide, aswell as theater and component TTPs andreferences.

4. “Hit List” buttons under each componentpatch provides a bulletin board forcomponents to post specific guidance, interestitems, or commander’s guidance with specificactions required to prosecute TSTs. Supportedcommanders are responsible for establishingguidance—relative to their operational

Figure C-B-1. TST Web Page

UNCLASSIFIED, CLASSIFIED DATA REMOVED

C-B-2

Annex B to Appendix C


situations and critical combat effectsrequirements—into actionable items forsupporting commanders to execute.Information includes actionable tasks andcontrol measures required to execute pre-planned attacks and dynamic targeting as wellas securing target data when the operationalsituation dictates and combat effects are mostcritical.

5. The joint targeting log provides a historyof joint target prosecution data, decision, andactivity taken directly from the Accessdatabase. This log can be sorted by columnheading and may be viewed as a full pagespread sheet. Color codes are used to showthe current status of each target. A notionaltargeting log is shown in Figure C-B-2.

6. Both target development and operationalanalysis should use this log. Targetdevelopment uses this log to examine thescope of dynamic targeting activity, toanticipate BDA reporting, and to update theJIPTL. Operational analysts use this log to

provide feedback to OPLANS. Analystsshould determine why operational situationshad dynamic targeting requirements and iffuture plans should be adjusted accordingly.Analysis of data should determine if controlmeasures allowed adequate responsiveness orwere too restrictive for dynamic targeting tobe effective. Analysts should also determineif these changes were the result of the enemyoperating inside our decision cycle or becausestrike effects were not as expected.Additionally, based on internet protocol (IP)address control, a user may be given privilegesto edit any target record. This TST web pageedit feature displays the edit screen and anexample is shown in Figure C-B-3.

7. The “The How To Use This Web Page”link on the web page (Figure C-B-1) providesuser information as well as details inmaintaining, updating, and manipulating thesite. A “Suggestion for Improvement” linkallows users to post comments andsuggestions for improving the site.

Figure C-B-2. Target Coordination Log

C-B-3

Joint TST Website

Figure C-B-3. TST Web Page Edit Feature

C-B-4

Annex B to Appendix C


Intentionally Blank

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX CJOINT TST INFORMATION NETWORK

C-C-1

1. Based on USFORKOREA’s experience,some recommended information networkoperational procedures are summarizedbelow.

a. TST Information Network

• Restrict the Access target worksheets toonly the core component TST lateralcoordination points-of-contact terminals.

• Allow others to load amplifying targetworksheet information using the TSTweb page edit feature through allcollateral C4I systems.

• Always “Refresh” the target worksheetto pull-in updated information (loadedfrom the TST web page) before makingprocessing decisions.

• Implement separate component TSTinformation networks as inputs to thejoint TST information network.

b. Collaboration

• Use more broadcast “Text Chat” forannouncements and acknowledgementsassociated with web page TST record data.

• Use private “Text Chat” for componentTST activity and Access target worksheetcoordination.

• Format “Text Chat” like radiotransmissions and use to support the TSTnetwork and not as a system work-around.

2. The decision authority to prosecuteindividual TSTs is strictly limited towarfighting components. Some simple rules(relative to joint TST decision authorities) areoutlined below.

• Authority is derived from supported andsupporting command relationships.

• Supported commander is responsible forconverting commander’s guidance intoactionable TST taskings based on thecurrent operational situation.

• Only one component authority may“Nominate Target” for joint prosecution.

• Target location and AO determines thelead component for “AuthorizeProsecution.”

• Attack asset OPCON determines the leadcomponent for “Clear Execution.”

• Supporting commanders will provideaugmentation or other support to asupported commander as required, anddevelop supporting procedures.

3. Specific CONOPS for each phase of thejoint TST prosecution process and associatedtool/applications are outlined below.

a. “Text Chat” Collaboration

• Configure “My Information” under the“Tools” and “Options” menu options asshown in Figure C-C-1. This allowsinstant recognition of nodes duringcollaboration.

• Conference number one is reserved fortext chat. Four other conferences areavailable for different applications aslisted in Figure C-C-2. The systemadministrator can establish an unlimitednumber of conferences.

• A good way to keep abreast of joint TSTactivities is to open Netscape to the TST

C-C-2

Annex C to Appendix C


web page and open text chat across thebottom half of the screen as shown inFigure C-C-3. Start Access and the“Startup” form. When the “Waiting forTargets…” dialog box appears, minimize

Enter Your Position:FSC/CIO/IDO

Enter Your Position:FCE/CIO/IDO

Enter Your Location:DOCC/2ID/HTACC/KCOIC/

CACC/CMEF/TFCC

Enter Your Location:DOCC/2ID/AOC CO/

ACE/MARFOR COC/TFCC

Enter your GCCS-K “USER ID”Enter your GCCS “USER ID”

Select ‘For Business’Select ‘For Business’

Leaveas is

Leaveas is

Ensure that your Location, Position and emailinformation is entered correctly.Ensure that your Location, Position and emailinformation is entered correctly.

Figure C-C-1. “My Information” Window Set-up

Once the conferencing service is established, the operator must select aconference to join. A panel will display showing what conferences are available.

Select/highlight the conference of your choice, then select OK

Once the conferencing service is established, the operator must select aconference to join. A panel will display showing what conferences are available.

Select/highlight the conference of your choice, then select OK

Conference Selection Window

Figure C-C-2. TST Conference Selection

Access and the TST client form willemerge as a system message alert (SMA)when TST data is distributed. If you onlyparticipate in the “Initiate” process, thenminimize Access until a target is entered

C-C-3

Joint TST Information Network

c. Perform Target Development

• Acknowledge the red pop-up window byclicking “OK” or scroll worksheets inqueue to a specific targeting worksheet.

• Review target worksheet and determinetarget responsibilities (assess againstcurrent targeting guidance, restrictionsand limitations).

• Collaborate (using broadcast “Text Chat”or “Secure Conferencing”) to establishlevel of confidence in reported data, todetermine targetable data required, todetermine what additional information isrequired to prosecute the target withavailable assets, and to order time-sensitive requests for information.

• Perform target development (identify allcollateral damage restrictions).

Figure C-C-3. “Text Chat” and Targeting Log Desktop

Toggle between full

page spreadsheet

log and Web Page

Current TST prosecution status or state

3-way sortable

• Descending

• Ascending

• Recent on top



Select “Send To:”

from drop down

menu. “Everyone

in Chat” or select

private chat with

one individual

for TST priority consideration. OpenOutlook and minimize until needed.

b. Implement TST Guidance

• Review component synchronization celldefinition of TST operational situationsand convert into actionable tasks.

• Focus ISR cross-cueing and operationaltipping resources to monitor operationalsituations likely to generate TSTs.

• Load TST detection (SALUTE or SPOTformat) into a target worksheet.

• Click the “Enter Target” button followedwith private text chat, plain text message,or secure voice. (See Figure C-C-4)

• Update target worksheet (by assignedreference number) on TST web page withthe edit feature.

C-C-4



Figure C-C-4. Enter Target Worksheet

• Track target and develop target datapackage (formatted for the specificweapon system selected foremployment).

• Select “Refresh” on target worksheet todisplay any additional informationloaded into the target record.

• Modify or update target worksheet.

• Input “Targetable Information Required”remarks. (See Figure C-C-5)

• Record your decision by either selecting“Dismiss” or “Nominate Target.” (Note:“Dismiss” removes the record from allworksheet views but keeps it on the webpage for future consideration in theplanning cycle).

d. Perform Weaponeering/OperationalAssessment and Force Application

• Acknowledge the red pop-up window byclicking “OK” or scroll worksheets inqueue to a specific target worksheet.

• Review target worksheet and determinewhat options are available and assess theeffects on current operations and plannedactivity.

• Assume component responsibility forTST prosecution based on target locationand supported and supportingcommander relationship.

• Coordinate and de-conflict usingcollaboration (broadcast “Text Chat” or“Secure Conferencing”) to determine the


After available data is loaded into the white fields, select “Enter Target.” The data

writes to the database and a record number will be automatically assigned. The

information updates the TST web page when Netscape refresh/reload is selected.

C-C-5


optimum joint asset available to providethe required target effects and otheroptions available.

• Perform weaponeering and operationalassessment.

• Execute force application.

• Present the recommended course(s) ofaction to the OPCON decision authorityfor the attack assets.

• Select “Refresh” on target worksheet todisplay any additional informationloaded by other TST decision authorities.

• Assume responsibility for TST executionplanning if you have OPCON authorityof selected attack asset.

• Perform risk assessment for fratricide,combat losses, collateral damage, andmission failure.

• Apply control measures and issueassociated alert orders.

• Input “Coordination & De-Confliction”remarks. (See Figure C-C-6)

• Record your decision by either selecting“Reject” or “Approve Prosecution.”

e. Perform Execution Planning and AttackExecution

• Acknowledge red pop-up window byclicking “OK” or scroll worksheets inqueue to targeting worksheet referencenumber.

Figure C-C-5. Nominate Target Worksheet

After target is “Acquired,” the target worksheet enters the “Nominate” state. After

target development requirements are determined, decide if targetable data is available

and if the acquired target meets all criteria to be a joint TST. Click “Refresh” prior to

deciding to “Dismiss” or “Nominate” the target (as this will provide updated

information entered from any source via the web page edit feature). “Dismiss”

removes the record from others view and records the node’s decision in the data base.


C-C-6




Figure C-C-6. Authorize Prosecution Worksheet

• Review target worksheet and determinewhat final coordination, alert order ornotifications, and orders are required toexecute attack.

• Broadcast intentions or warning orderwith “Text Chat”, and issue associatedorders.

• Select “Refresh” on target worksheet todisplay any additional informationloaded by other coordinating authorities.

• Issue “Execution Orders”. (FigureC-C-7)

• Input “Tasked Assets” and “RequiredNotifications” remarks.

• Record your decision by either selecting“Defer,” “Reject,” or “Clear Execution.”

• If “Clear Execution” is selected, thisdecision authority is accepting the riskof collateral damage, mission failure,fratricide, and mission losses and/orensuring control measures are employedto prevent unsought consequences

f. Assess Mission Results and StrikeEffects

• Select “Refresh” on target worksheet todisplay any additional informationloaded by other reporting units, battlemanagement, and/or monitoringagencies.

• Input “Reported Employment Data”remarks. (See Figure C-C-8)

• Record your decision by either selecting“Re-task” or “Report Employment.”

C-C-7


Figure C-C-7. Clear Execution Worksheet

After a TST is authorized for prosecution, collateral damage probability is

determined and execution-planning results are considered for dynamic tasking. Select

“Refresh” to view all amplifying data entered through the web page. Based on

situational leadership, system capabilities, and risk assessment; decide to “Defer”

(which moves the state back to “Approve”), “Reject” (which moves the state back to

“Nominate”), or “Clear Execution” (which moves the state forward to “Report

Employment”). Associated orders and warning notifications must be transmitted (via

C2 systems) and recorded in the “white” text blocks as deemed necessary.


• Broadcast employment executionaccomplished on “Text Chat.”

• Select “Refresh” on target worksheet todisplay any additional informationloaded by other reporting units or asreflected in a mission-fired report,INFLTREP, and MISREPs.

• Input MISREP and/or BDA remarks.(See Figure C-C-9)

• Record your decision by selecting either“Re-task” or “Report Results.”

• Broadcast mission results on “Text Chat.”

C-C-8



After “Cleared Execution” the state changes to “Report Employment”. Monitor attack

execution to ensure compliance with control measures and accomplishment of

supporting actions. Report confirmation that fire unit, tactical element, or assigned

mission authority has accepted employment tasking. Prior to input of “Reported

Employment Data”, click on “Refresh” to update worksheet data from any nodes that

loaded target record data directly through the TST Web Page “Edit” Feature. Based

on available information, decide to either “Re-task” (which changes state back to

“Nominate”) or “Report Employment”.


Figure C-C-8. Reported Employment Worksheet

C-C-9


Figure C-C-9. Report Results Worksheet


After “Report Employment” the state changes to “Report Results”. After this action,

the record can only be edited via the TST Web Page edit feature. After employment

(and when weapons system mission reporting is not available to all components),

record the “Mission Fired Report”, INFLTREP, and/or MISREP into the “MISREP and

/or BDA” data field. Based on the results and collaboration with decision authorities,

decide to either “Re-task” (which changes the state back to “Nominate” and keeps the

historical data and tracks last history), “New Target” to start fresh, or “Report Results”

to log the record and remove the target worksheet from view. Action can be delayed,

however, holding a worksheet open will prevent the SMA feature from functioning (as

the pop-up SMA will only occur when no previous records are waiting in a node’s

queue).

C-C-10



Intentionally Blank

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX CTEXT CHAT, AUDIO CHAT, AND SECURE CONFERENCING

C-D-1

1. Text Chat

a. “Text Chat” is the preferred methodfor communication by collaborativegroups. It also has the important benefits ofproviding a log of activities as well as allowsmembers to review what has gone on inprevious sessions. Several considerations arelisted below.

b. Although all nodes can save the “TextChat” record, one node should be designatedto save the “Text Chat” as an official recordof the session.

c. “Private Chat” provides a two-personvirtual private network capability. “PrivateChat” can enhance the collaborative effort, buttoo much use can negatively impact the groupeffort. One use of “Private Chat” is the abilityto brief a node that arrived late onwhat happened during its absencewithout interrupting the rest of the group.

2. Audio Chat. “Audio Chat” is secure voicecommunications to complement “Text Chat.”Audio allows group members to quicklyexpress ideas and understand thegroup direction. Several “Audio Chat”considerations are as follows:

• Decide what actions the group will takewhen a member loses audio. Is itnecessary to duplicate the “Audio Chat”via “Text Chat”? Users must determinethe criticality of the cell losing audio tothe current collaborative session.

• Decide when and if the group will allow,“hot miking.” Hot miking leavesmicrophones on during the entire session.While hot miking makes the audio portion

more like normal conversation, it has twodisadvantages. First, it may pick upclassified conversations in thebackground. For this reason, hot mikingcannot be done from sensitive areas suchas a sensitive compartmented informationfacility (SCIF). Second, there is a risk thatparticipants will talk at the same time andcause some confusion or loss ofinformation. The session leader shoulddetermine whether or not to allow hotmiking.

• The network may not have the bandwidthto support audio for every member.When this occurs, the group shouldreschedule the session or continue withtext only. If one or more of the TST cellslose audio, then the group leader mustdecide on how to proceed. That decisionis greatly simplified if agreements aremade on to how to handle the situationprior to the session.

• Military personnel using NetMeetingshould view the audio capability as anextension of a tactical radio net and useradio procedures in the collaborativeenvironment. Members should makespecific requests or give specific answers.

3. Secure Conferencing. Secure conferencenetwork (SCN) is a telephone hotline thatrapidly connects all TST nodes in aconference call mode. The instrument at anyparticular node may be a dedicated KY-68 orDRSN telephone, or simply a speed-dialmode on a secure telephone. Secureconferencing is both an independent meansof collaborating on TST prosecution and a toolto support other collaborative toolssuch as NetMeeting.

C-D-2

Annex D to Appendix C


Intentionally Blank

ANNEX E TO APPENDIX CWHITEBOARDING

C-E-1

1. Whiteboard is a graphical collaborationtool. It is the primary tool to share a commonview of things such as PowerPoint slides,maps, and imagery. The utility of thewhiteboard is that anything seen on thedesktop of one member’s computer(regardless of the program, application, or website) can be captured and placed onto thewhiteboard for group viewing. When awhiteboard is initiated, everyone in theconference will receive the whiteboard in frontof other applications. Each time a change ismade to the whiteboard, the board re-opensin front of all other windows. You mustalways lock to maintain control of thewhiteboard. If bandwidth is restrictive, donot allow collaboration (which allowsdifferent, collaborative users to editwhiteboard while all other view the session).

2. The whiteboard can be used concurrentlywith “Audio and Text Chat.” However,operators must ensure that the “Text Chat”box is not obscured by the whiteboard toprevent loss of information flow. Eachoperator should keep the whiteboard at lessthan full screen size and align it with the upperleft-hand corner of the screen. The “TextChat” box should then be aligned with thelower right right-hand corner of the screen toremain visible while not interfering with theview of the whiteboard.

3. Protocols for whiteboard use should beestablished, disseminated, and enforced.Some organizations have found whiteboardcontrol to be of such concern that it is onlyused between two or three nodes at a timerather than shared with the entire network. Toenable all TST cells an opportunity to use thisvaluable collaborative asset, the followingconsiderations are recommended:

• The whiteboard has a common view thatis shared by all persons in the conference.The session leader should lock the

whiteboard and allows others to makeentries only after the coordinating by“Audio or Text Chat.” When control ofthe whiteboard is handed over to anothermember, the new whiteboard controllershould lock the whiteboard to preventothers from changing the view. If oneperson changes the view or the page orerases an object, all members of theconference will see the changesimultaneously. Chaos can occur ifseveral people try to make simultaneouschanges or entries.

• The session leader is responsible fororchestrating the save operation and newwhiteboard or image loading.

•• He decides who is responsible forplacing images on the whiteboard. Onlyone cell should load images at a time. Ifmultiple cells simultaneously load animage onto the whiteboard, the last cellto load will override the others. If a newimage is loaded before the previouswhiteboard is saved, the work on theprevious whiteboard is lost (unlessproperly saved).

•• He decides who is responsible forsaving the work in-progress and howoften it will be saved. Frequency of saveswill depend on the experience of thegroup, the importance of the work, andthe amount of work done since the lastsave operation.

• Each cell should be assigned a color forwhiteboard marking. This allows cellmembers to quickly ascertain who placeda comment or drawing on the whiteboard.Colors can be assigned to drawing toolsas well as text.

• The session leader decides who will beresponsible for clearing the whiteboard

C-E-2

Annex E to Appendix C


at the end of each session. When saving,consider the following:

•• When a whiteboard is saved usingroutine procedures, it is saved to theserver. This can be a problem in the eventof server failure and the whiteboard fileis lost. Therefore, one of the TST cellsin the network should be designated tosave the whiteboard to its personal harddrive. It is easier if this is the same cellresponsible for clearing the whiteboard.

•• Another technique used for protectingthe saved whiteboard is called multi-save.Multi-save is saving the product to theserver twice under two different names.The multi-save technique is implementedusing the suffix of “bu” for back up. Ifthe whiteboard product were calledTST5, for example, then a second copynamed TST5bu would be also saved tothe server. This ensures that a copy ofthe master is available should someoneaccidentally destroy your work.However, the file is still subject to loss ifthe server becomes inoperable.

• Before clearing annotations or imagesfrom the whiteboard, other cells in thesession should be notified and provided

the opportunity to save their own copyof the whiteboard.

4. Advanced Techniques

• Place standard session requirements onthe bottom of the whiteboard. Mostgroups list their requirements on “TextChat” or in a Word document maintainedin a file. By transferring the requirementsto the bottom of the whiteboard, thescreen (whiteboard) does not have to bemoved to access information from otherdocuments.

• A good way to work on slides is tocapture a PowerPoint slide onto thewhiteboard and then have the groupannotate changes. While the group ismaking changes and coming toconsensus, one group member isupdating the slide in the PowerPointprogram on his computer. When thegroup is finished collaborating and allchanges are made to the original slide,the updated slide is captured from thePowerPoint user’s computer and loadedon the whiteboard. Now the group canview the final product to ensure allmembers agree with the changes.

APPENDIX DENGAGEMENT CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

D-1

1. US Army Assets

a. Attack Helicopters. Attack helicopters are employed in a variety of roles. Normally,they are employed by components as organic assets. Army attack helicopters are usuallyemployed as a maneuver unit capable of all normal maneuver force missions. In mostcircumstances, the Army does not consider attack helicopters a CAS system, althoughthey can perform CAS functions when operating in support of another component.

Advantages. Rapid response times and weapons accuracy.

Disadvantages. Inclement weather flying restrictions, speed, limited range and availablemunitions, and vulnerability to adversary fire.

TFARCRIA SNOPAEW

"arboC"F1-HA "57.2,selissimWOT17-MGBnonnacmm02,stekcor

"wobgnoLehcapA"46-HA "57.2,selissimeriflleH411-MGAnonnacmm03,stekcor

"roirraWawoiK"D85-HO "57.2,selissimeriflleH411-MGAnugenihcamlac05,stekcor

b. Missiles. The ATACMS provide long-range, surface-to-surface fire support. TheATACMS are ground-launched missile systems consisting of a surface-to-surface guidedmissile with an anti-personnel/anti-materiel (APAM) warhead.

AH-64 Apache

D-2

Appendix D


Advantages. Range, accuracy, all weather capability, wide area coverage, and rapidresponse time.

Disadvantages. Limited effectiveness against hardened targets.

NOPAEW EGNAR

SMCATA m000,003

c. Rockets. The MLRS provides counter battery fire and suppression of adversary airdefenses, light materiel, and personnel targets. The MLRS is a free-flight, area-fire, artilleryrocket system that supplements cannon artillery fires by delivering large volumes of firepowerin a short time against TSTs. The basic warhead carries improved conventional submunitions.

Advantages. Range, all weather capability, wide area coverage, and rapid responsetime.

Disadvantages. Accuracy and limited effectiveness against hardened targets.

NOPAEW EGNAR

SRLM m000,23

egnaRdednetxESRLM m000,54

ATACMS

D-3

Engagement Capabilities and Limitations

d. Artillery

Advantages. All weather capability, accuracy, and rapid response time.

Disadvantages. Range

NOPAEW REBILAC ERIFFOETAR 1 EGNAR

201M mm501 3 m003,51

1A911M mm501 3 m005,91

6A901M mm551 1 m000,03

891M mm551 2 m001,03

MLRS

1 Rounds per minute.

D-4

Appendix D


2. US Marine Corps Assets

a. Fixed-Wing Aircraft

Advantages. Range, accuracy, and rapid response time.

Disadvantages. Inclement weather flying restrictions and vulnerability to adversaryfire.

M109A6 "Paladin"

F/A-18 "Hornet"

D-5


b. Attack/Utility Helicopters

TFARCRIA SNOPAEW

"IIreirraH"B8-VA -MGA,)BGL(sbmobdediug-resaL221-MGA,elissimkcirevaM56

ffO-dnatStnioJ,elissimmraediS-tceriDtnioJ,)WOSJ(snopaeW

lareneg,)MADJ(snoitinuMkcattAbmobretsulc,sbmob)PG(esoprup

"5,stekcor"57.2,)UBC(stinunonnacmm52,stekcor

"tenroH"D/C/A81-A/F ,elissimkcirevaM56-MGA,BGL48-MGA,elissimeyellaW26-MGA

MRAH88-MGA,elissimMALSPG,sMADJsWOSJ,elissim

"5,stekcor"57.2,sUBC,sbmobnonnacmm02,stekcor

TFARCRIA SNOPAEW

"yeuH"N1-HU rebilac05.,nugenihcammm26.7stekcor"57.2,nugenihcam

"arboCrepuS"W1-HA 411-MGA,elissimWOT17-MGB"57.2,stekcor"5,elissimeriflleH221-MGA,nonnacmm02,stekcor

elissimmraediS

D-6

Appendix D


c. Artillery

AH-1W "Super Cobra"

NOPAEW REBILAC ERIFFOETAR EGNAR

891M mm551 2 m001,03

M198

D-7


3. US Navy Assets


TFARCRIA SNOPAEW

"tacmoT"41-F mm02,sUBC,sbmobPG,BGLnonnac

"tenroH"C/A81-A/F 56-MGA,sUBC,sbmobPG,BGLeyellaW26-MGA,selissimkcirevaM

,selissimMALS48-MGA,selissim,sWOSJ,selissimMRAH88-MGA

stekcor"5,stekcor"57.2,sMADJnonnacmm02

"gnikiV"B3-S "5,stekcor"57.2,sUBC,sbmobPGstekcor

"noirO"3-P sWOSJ

b. Missiles. US Navy TLAMs can be effective interdiction assets and provide a potentemployment option to the joint force. Several variants provide single warhead unitary blastsor multi-effect submunition capabilities. Low risk, accuracy, and range make missiles mostviable in the planning of interdiction contingency operations against stationary, non-hardenedtargets. The TLAM weapon system may require coordination between strike planners in-theater and supporting mission planners out of theater. This is an ongoing process independentof the decision to use the weapon. With proper preplanning, TLAMs are capable of conductingshort-notice strikes, without aircraft support, against targets in heavily defended areas wherethe probability of the loss of manned aircraft is too high. TLAMs are also capable of

F-14 "Tomcat"

D-8

Appendix D


neutralizing adversary air defenses to facilitate a much larger attack by land- and sea-basedairpower. In theater, the associated afloat planning systems suites provide the maritimecomponent commander with the capability to plan new missions or modify selected missionsin the AO.

Advantages. Range, accuracy, and all weather capability.

Disadvantages. Response time.

NOPAEW EGNAR

MALT mk638,1

c. NSFS. US Navy cruisers and destroyers are armed with a 5-inch, 54-caliber, MK 45,lightweight gun which provides accurate naval gunfire against fast, highly maneuverablesurface targets, air threats, and shore targets.

Advantages. Accuracy, rate of fire, and all weather capability.

Disadvantages. Range.

Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile

D-9


4. US Air Force Assets


MK 45

NOPAEW REBILAC ERIFFOETAR EGNAR

45KM hcni5 02-61 selim9.41

TFARCRIA SNOPAEW

"IItlobrednuhT"A01-AO/A 56-MGA,sUBC,sbmobPG,sBGLstekcor"57.2,elissimkcirevaM

nonnacmm03

"recnaL"B1-B sMADJ,sUBC,sbmobPG

"tiripS"2-B sUBC,sbmobPG,sWOSJ,sMADJ

"ssertrofotartS"H25-B ,sbmobPG,sBGL,sMADJ,sMCLAelissimpaNevaH241-MGA,sUBC

"elgaE"E51-F ,sbmobPG,sBGL,sMADJ,sWOSJnonnacmm02,sUBC

"noclaF"61-F ,sUBC,sbmobPG,sMADJ,sBGLmm02,elissimkcirevaM56-MGA

nonnac

"kwahthgiN"711-F sUBC,sbmobPG,sMADJ,sBGL

D-10

Appendix D


5. Special Operations Command Assets


F-16 "Falcon"

TFARCRIA SNOPAEW

"ertcepS"H031-CA ,nonnacmm04,reztiwohmm501nonnacmm02

"ertcepS"U031-CA ,nonnacmm04,reztiwohmm501nonnacmm52

AC-130 "Spectre"

D-11


b. Attack/Utility Helicopters

TFARCRIA SNOPAEW

J6-HA "57.2,elissimeriflleH411MGAedanerg91KMmm04,sdoptekcor

,nugenihcamrebilac05.,rehcnualsnuginimmm26,7

"woLevaP"35-HM mm26.7,nugenihcamrebilac05.snuginim

"kwaHevaP"G06-HM ,snugenihcamrebilac05.812-MX2-UAG,snugenihcam06-Mmm26.7sedivorpdna,snugenihcammm26.7

ehtrofmroftalprevohegnargnoladerifredluohsfotnemyolpme

snopaew

"kwahkcalB"K06M snuginimmm26.7431M

c. SOF Direct Action. One of the many capabilities provided by SOF is the attack ofoperational targets by direct action. SOF are specially trained and equipped units with uniqueskills enabling them to penetrate deep into adversary areas to execute critical missions. Theseunits are rapidly deployable and can be inserted by parachute, boat, submarine, helicopter, oron foot.

Advantages. Range, accuracy, and all weather capability.

Disadvantages. Mission planning and rehearsal time.

MH-60 "Blackhawk"

D-12

Appendix D


SOF may attack operational targets by direct action.

APPENDIX ENOTIONAL TIME-SENSITIVE TARGET CHECKLISTS

E-1

General Considerations

1. Are rules of engagement (ROE) available?

2. Is commander’s guidance available?

3. Are there redundant, secure communications between key nodes in the differentcomponents?

• Secure conferencing telephone?

•• STU-III

•• KY-68

•• Red Phones

• Collaborative tools (such as NetMeeting)

• Are communications established?

• Is e-mail available/established?

4. Are common maps and charts available and posted showing:

• Friendly forces

• Adversary forces

• FSCMs and ACMs

• Kill boxes

• Bullseyes

E-2

Appendix E


Posturing Assets

1. Where is the TST located in thebattlespace?

• Forward line of own troops (FLOT) toFSCL

• FSCL to forward boundary

• Forward boundary & beyond

• Amphibious objective area

• Special operations area

• Rear area

2. What are the command relationships?

• Who is the supporting commander?

• Who is the supported commander?

3. What assets are available for attackingTSTs?

• Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance(ISR) assets

• Attack helicopters

• ATACMS/MLRS

• Artillery

• Fixed-wing aircraft

• Cruise missiles

• NSFS

• SOF

• Space assets

4. What available assets can range the TST?

5. What available asset is most appropriatefor the TST type?

• Ground-based

•• What is the risk of counterfire?

• Aviation

•• Are appropriate weapons loaded?

•• Is suppression of adversary airdefenses required?

•• Is refueling required?

6. Estimate of TST dwell time?

7. Impact on joint targeting coordinationboard plan of re-rolling or diverting attackasset from planned targets?

8. Should TST be attacked, monitored, orexploited?

E-3

Notional Time-Sensitive Targets Checklists

Target Location/Identification

1. Target location–who is the supportedcommander of operational area where targetis located?

2. Does collection management have the mostcurrent PIR/intelligence requirement (IR)?

3. Are PIR/IR adequately defined?

4. Were all the PIR/IR converted into specificorders and requests?

5. Does collection management worksheetmatch the high-payoff target list (HPTL) andmaster air attack plan (MAAP)?

6. Does collection management worksheetmatch accuracy requirements specified in PIR/IR?

7. Are assigned reconnaissance, surveillance,and target acquisition (RSTA) adequate todetect, locate, identify and track targets? Canwe get required information from sensor/platform?

8. Have additional assets from higher,adjacent, or subordinate units been requested/coordinated?

9. Are high-payoff targets (HPTs) adequatelycovered in the collection management plan(CMP)?

10. Are JFC high priority targets sufficientlycovered?

11. Are component HPTs aligned andintegrated IAW campaign guidance?

12. Are sufficient assets available to supportrapid cross-cueing?

13. Are there procedures in place for sensor/platform hand-off?

14. What RSTA assets are available tosupport extended TST tracking?

15. Does collection plan provide flexibilityfor ad hoc or dynamically re-tasking ofcollection assets?

16. Have all collection options beenconsidered?

17. Has immediate post-strike BDA beenrequested on selected targets?

18. Were ad hoc re-taskings for collectionpassed to appropriate authority?

19. Did the component collection managerspass target collection requirements to the joint/theater collection manager?

20. Was the ad hoc re-tasking approved?

21. Were requests for dynamic re-taskingpassed to appropriate authority?

22. Was the CMP approved?

23. Is the CMP easily available to all?

E-4

Appendix E


Deconfliction

1. Is more than one component attacking the same TST?

2. Have components deconflicted airspace requirements internally and externally?

3. Have formal and informal airspace coordination area options been considered?

4. Has a common reference system been identified?

• Grid box

• Kill box

• Bullseye

5. Do all components have the most current version of the system?

6. Has short-notice TST target area deconfliction been accomplished?

7. Are there particular weapon systems considerations?

• ATACMS (fire direction center (FDC) evaluation w/BCD input, as required)?

• Aircraft (combat air patrols, diverts, re-roles, airborne elements of the Theater Air ControlSystem advisories)?

• Helicopter minimum risk route (MRR) considerations?

8. SOF operations conflicts?

• SOF area protection measures?

• Clandestine operations impact?

9. Have activation/deactivation windows been established?

10. Are there any current airspace control order implications?

E-5


Sample Airspace Clearance Responsibilities and Actions for SurfaceForces

1. Request permission from the commander responsible for the target area to attack thetarget.

2. The commander or his representative will:

• Determine whether he has the means to attack the target.

• Determine whether or not to attack the target.

3. Is the airspace clear?

• If clear, clear ground component to attack.

• If not clear, determine whether airspace can be cleared in time.

•• If airspace can be cleared in time, clear ground component to attack.

•• If airspace cannot be cleared in time and target destruction is not deemed a highpriority, notify air control element that the target is deferred.

•• If airspace cannot be cleared in time and target destruction is deemed a high priority,notify the air component and clear ground component to attack when bullseye call isconfirmed.

4. Ground component will notify air component of imminent weapons launch/fire.

5. AWACS, control and reporting centers (CRCs), forward air control posts and/or ABCCCwill broadcast bullseye call.

6. Ground component will launch/fire into a commander’s AO when cleared with thecommander or his representative.

E-6

Appendix E


Operational Assessment

1. Did post-strike collection assets cover theTST? (Either by the current collection planor TST supporting assets.) (Intel)

2. Was initial BDA received within timelimits? (½ hour from ground or air componentdepending on weapon employed and targetdisposition.) (Intel)

3. Was the TST successfully struck? (Referto BDA reporting responsibilities chart)?(BDA reporting schedule should supporttiming requirements.) (Intel)

4. Can the level of damage/destruction to theTST be determined from initial BDA?(Conclusive combat assessment of BDAintelligence source.) (Ops/Intel)

5. Is Phase I BDA (physical damage) analysissufficient for making re-attackrecommendation (if required)? (Ops/Intel)

6. Are indications clear enough for aninformed follow-on decision? (Ops/Intel)

7. If Phase II BDA (functional damage)collection is still required, is the collectiontimeframe supportive of re-attackrecommendation? (Ops/Intel)

8. Does current collection plan account forTST location? (Intel)

9. Does initial combat assessment confirmthat the objectives were met? If yes, then thisTST process is complete. (Ops)

10. Is the criticality of the TST such thatadditional BDA collection must be acquired?(Ops/Intel)

11. Was high priority effort initiated withcommensurate level of support required?(Ops/Intel)

12. Has the collection manager (CM) beenadvised?

13. Will the current collection plan bealtered? Consequences incurred? (Intel)

14. Are all TST data requirements availableto the CM? (Complete and accurate TSTtarget data is a key requirement.) (Ops/Intel)

15. Did combat assessment provide a re-attack recommendation? (Ops/Intel)

16. Coordination process expedited for shortwindow of opportunity. (Intel)

17. What is the impact of changing thecollection management plan?

18. Have possible impacts on next 24–72hours been weighed against anticipatedobjectives? (Ops/Intel)

19. Are collection assets/sensors available forexpedited collection?

20. Did CMs review component and nationalavailability? (Intel)

21. Is this an ad hoc or dynamic re-taskingcollection requirement?

22. Is priority of TST high enough to altercurrent plan. (Ops/Intel)

23. What is the timeframe for re-attack?

24. What is the window of vulnerability,especially for mobile targets? (Ops/Intel)

25. Have weapons options changed?

26. Determine revised target disposition,fixed or mobile, hardened or soft. (Intel)

E-7


27. If re-attack is required, which weapon willsatisfy the requirement?

28. Consider most recent weapons options/developments for best success. (Ops/Intel)

29. What are ATACMS limitations/availability (fixed/soft targets)?

30. Has type and range of target beendetermined? (Ops/Intel)

31. Has aircraft re-role/diversion beenconsidered?

32. What are the impacts on ATO, airspacedeconfliction difficulties, and threatenvironments? (Ops/Intel)

33. Has the CM requested the long-termcollection plan be adapted for additional TSTBDA requirements?

34. Has the requirements list been reviewedand adjusted accordingly? (Intel)

35. Is this a new/revised standing collectionrequirement?

E-8

Appendix E


Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX FJOINT TIME-CRITICAL TARGETS

F-1

1. Joint Time-Critical Targets

Although not currently approved by jointdoctrine, many combatant commands use theterm “time-critical target (TCT)” as a sub-category of TSTs. These TCTs are deemed topose such a threat to friendly forces that theyare afforded distinctive ROE by the JFC.

a. In these instances, a joint TCT may bedefined as: “Those targets, specified by theJFC that require immediate engagementbecause they pose (or will soon pose) asignificant threat to friendly forces. The JFCdetermines those situations, if any, whereimmediate engagement of the TCTthreat outweighs other operationalconsiderations. Component commanders,who first acquire specified TCTs, may bespecifically delegated the authority by the JFCfor immediate engagement responsibilityregardless of assigned area of operations ormission.”

b. Joint TCTs are normally based uponadversary capabilities. In other words, a jointTCT is a target of great immediacy that posessuch a significant threat to the joint force thatit is specifically designated by the JFC for

immediate engagement in order to preventdamage to friendly forces.

c. Attacks against surface joint TCTs arecharacterized by preemptive or reactiveoffensive actions, executed by joint forcecomponent commands, intended to destroyland or sea targets as part of counterair,strategic attack, interdiction, fire support,antisurface warfare, strike warfare, or specialoperations direct action missions.

d. As seen in Figure F-1, TCTs are a smallsubset of TSTs. It is up to the JFC to specifywhich TSTs will be considered as TCTs, andwhat actions are to be taken against them.The TCT guidance from the JFC will bedependent on the current situation, phase ofthe campaign, adversary capability, etc. andmay be changed or updated as needed.

2. Risk Assessment

When required, the JFC specifies those few,exceptional circumstances when joint forcecomponent commanders, who first acquirespecific surface joint TCTs, have authorizationfor immediate engagement regardless of

Joint TCTs Require Immediate Engagement

F-2

Appendix F


assigned AO or mission. In essence, the JFCdetermines those situations, if any, whereimmediate destruction of the surface jointTCT threat outweighs the potential forfriendly casualties, collateral damage, orduplication of effort. Inherently, thisdetermination, to whatever degree, may allowa component to bypass the requirement forinforming, coordinating, deconflicting, andsynchronizing. However, if time allows, theseefforts should be accomplished beforeengagement.

3. Commander’s Guidance

The JFC may issue a statement, similar tothat below, to make command guidance onjoint TCTs clear to component commanders:

“The adversary is known to possess, and hasthe capability to employ nuclear WMD against

the joint force. Accordingly, the followingtarget types are designated joint TCTs:

• Adversary activities deploying WMDfrom known storage areas.

• Known or suspected TBM with WMDpayloads.

These joint TCTs require immediateengagement. Components will inform allaffected agencies when attacking joint TCTs,but they will not delay the attack – therequirement to wait for coordination with otheraffected components is waived. Destructionof these joint TCTs is desired. The JFCaccepts the risk of fratricide, loss of assetsand duplication of effort in attacking thesejoint TCTs. Immediately notify the JFC of alljoint TCT engagements.”

Time-Sensitive TargetsRequire Immediate Response

Time-Critical TargetsRequire Immediate Engagement

Figure F-1. TST/TCT Relationship

“(USCENTCOM) Current Operations works with two categories of targets: time-sensitive and time-critical. Time-sensitive targets call for speed but allow enoughtime to coordinate to clear the airspace. Time-critical targets are like the Scudmissiles during the Gulf War and call for a notice to airmen: ‘Clear the airspace.We are engaging the target now.’”

General Tommy R. Franks, US ArmyCommander in Chief, US Central Command

FA Journal, May-June 2001

APPENDIX GREFERENCES

G-1

The Commander’s Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting is based upon the followingprimary references.

1. Joint Pub 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support toTargeting, (under development).

2. Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, 12 May 1998.

3. Joint Pub 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities, 13 October 1999.

4. Joint Pub 3-55, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)and Target Acquisition (TA), (under development).

5. Joint Pub 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002.

6. Department of Defense Joint Warfighters Test and Evaluation, Time-Sensitive Target (TST)Guide, dated February 2001.

7. US Joint Forces Command, Coherent Joint Fires 2000, Final Report dated January 2001.

8. US European Command, ED 40-16, Crisis Targeting Support Architecture, dated 11 March2001.

9. US Air Forces Europe Air Operations Center briefing, “Time-Sensitive Targeting,” undated.

10. Air, Land, Sea Application Center, Targeting (The Joint Targeting Process and Proceduresfor Targeting Time-Critical Targets), dated July 1997.

11. Air, Land, Sea Application Center, J-Fire (Multi-Service Procedures for the JointApplication of Firepower), dated November 1997.

12. FA Journal, Volume VII, No.3, May-June 2001.

G-2

Appendix G


Intentionally Blank

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

A2C2 US Army airspace command and controlAAMDC Army Air and Missile Defense CommandABCCC airborne battlefield command and control centerACA airspace control authorityACE analysis and control elementACP airspace control planACM airspace control measuresAETACS airborne element tactical air control systemAFATDS advanced field artillery tactical data systemAFFOR US Air Force forcesAI air interdictionAMD PCS TOC air, missile defense planning coordination system

tactical operations centerAO area of operationsAOC air operations centerAOR area of responsibilityAPAM anti-personnel/anti-materialARFOR US Army forcesARSPACE US Army Space CommandASAS all source analysis systemASOC air support operations centerATACMS US Army tactical missile systemATMDE US Army theater missile defense elementATO air tasking orderAWACS airborne warning and control system

BCD battlefield coordination detachmentBDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and controlC4I command, control, computers, and intelligenceCA combat assessment/counter airCALCM conventional air-launched cruise missileCAP combat air patrol/crisis action planningCAS close air supportCFL coordinated fire lineCM collection managerCMP collection management planCOA course of actionCOC combat operations centerCOP common operational pictureCOTS commercial off-the-shelfCRC control and reporting centerCTAPS contingency theater automated planning system

GL-2

Glossary


DAS deep air supportDASC direct air support centerDOCC deep operations coordination cellDOD Department of DefenseDST decision support templateDTF digital target folder

FB forward boundaryFDC fire direction centerFFA free-fire areaFFCC force fires coordination centerFHA foreign humanitarian assistanceFLOT forward line of own troopsFRAGorder fragmentary orderFSCC fire support coordination centerFSCL fire support coordination lineFSCM fire support coordination measures

GCCS Global Command and Control SystemGPS global positioning system

HPT high-payoff targetHPTL high-payoff target listHQ headquarters

I3 integrated imagery and intelligenceIO information operationsIP Internet protocolIPB intelligence preparation of the battlespaceIR intelligence requirementISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

J-2 joint force intelligence directorateJ-3 joint force operations directorateJ-5 joint force planning directorateJAG Judge Advocate GeneralJAOC joint air operations centerJFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJFE joint fires elementJFS joint fire supportJFLCC joint force land component commanderJFMCC joint force maritime component commanderJFSOCC joint force special operations component commanderJIC joint intelligence centerJIPTL joint integrated prioritized target listJISE joint intelligence support elementJOA joint operations area

GL-3

Glossary

JOC joint operations centerJP joint publicationJPG joint planning groupJSST joint space support teamJSTARS Joint Surveillance, Target Attack, Radar SystemJTCB joint targeting coordination boardJTF joint task forceJTL joint target list

LAT latitudeLNO liaison officerLOAC law of armed conflictLOCE linked operational intelligence centers EuropeLONG longitude

MAAP master air attack planMARFOR US Marine Corps forcesMEA munitions effectiveness assessmentMISREP mission fired reportMLRS multiple launch rocket systemMOOTW military operations other than warMRL mobile rocket launcherMRR minimum risk routeMSI multi-spectral imageryMTW major theater of war

NALE naval amphibious liaison elementNAVFOR US Navy forcesNAVSPACECOM US Navy Space CommandNFA no-fire areaNMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence CenterNSFS naval surface fire supportNSL no-strike list

OPCON operational controlOPORD operation order

PIR priority intelligence requirementPRISM planning tools for resource integration,

synchronization, and management

RFA restricted fire areaRFL restricted fire lineRMS requirements management systemROA restricted operations areaROE rules of engagementRSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisitionRTL restricted target list

GL-4

Glossary


SACC supporting arms coordination centerSAM surface-to-air missileSARDOT search and rescue DOTSCN secure conference networkSMA system message alertSOF special operations forcesSOLE special operations liaison elementSOMPF special operations mission-planning folderSPOC space operations centerSROE standing rules of engagementSSC small-scale contingencySTU secure telephone unitSTW strike warfare

TACC tactical air command center (USMC)tactical air control center (USN)

TARBUL target bulletinTBM theater ballistic missileTBMCS theater battle management core systemTCF tactical combat forceTEL transporter, erector, launcherTCT time-critical targetTISD theater integrated situation displayTLAM tomahawk land-attack missileTOC tactical operations centerTST time-sensitive target

UAV unmanned aerial vehicleUB Unified BuildUN United NationsUSCENTCOM United States Central CommandUSEUCOM United States European CommandUSFORKOREA United States Forces KoreaUTM universal transverse mercator

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-5

Glossary

air interdiction. Air operations conductedto destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’smilitary potential before it can be broughtto bear effectively against friendly forcesat such distance from friendly forces thatdetailed integration of each air mission withthe fire and movement of friendly forces isnot required. (JP 1-02)

air tasking order. A method used to taskand disseminate to components,subordinate units, and command andcontrol agencies projected sorties,capabilities, and/or forces to targets andspecific missions. Normally providesspecific instructions to include call signs,targets, controlling agencies, etc., as wellas general instructions. Also called ATO.(JP 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The timely andaccurate estimate of damage resulting fromthe application of military force, eitherlethal or nonlethal, against a predeterminedobjective. Battle damage assessment canbe applied to the employment of all typesof weapon systems (air, ground, naval, andspecial forces weapons systems) throughoutthe range of military operations. Battledamage assessment is primarily anintelligence responsibility with requiredinputs and coordination from the operators.Battle damage assessment is composed ofphysical damage assessment, functionaldamage assessment, and target systemassessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02)

bullseye An established reference point fromwhich the position of an object can bereferenced. (JP 1-02)

close air support. Air action by fixed- androtary-wing aircraft against hostile targetsthat are in close proximity to friendly forcesand that require detailed integration of each

air mission with the fire and movement ofthose forces. Also called CAS. See alsoair interdiction. (JP 1-02)

collateral damage. Unintentional orincidental injury or damage to persons orobjects that would not be lawful militarytargets in the circumstances ruling at thetime. Such damage is not unlawful so longas it is not excessive in light of the overallmilitary advantage anticipated from theattack. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination of theoverall effectiveness of force employmentduring military operations. Combatassessment is composed of three majorcomponents: (a) battle damage assessment;(b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and(c) reattack recommendation. Also calledCA. (JP 1-02)

high-payoff target. A target whose loss tothe enemy will significantly contribute tothe success of the friendly course of action.High-payoff targets are those high-valuetargets that must be acquired andsuccessfully attacked for the success of thefriendly commander’s mission. Also calledHPT. See also high-value target; target.(JP 1-02)

high-value target. A target the enemycommander requires for the successfulcompletion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriouslydegrade important enemy functionsthroughout the friendly commander’s areaof interest. Also called HVT. See also highpay-off target; target. (JP 1-02)

immediate targets. Targets that have beenidentified too late, or not selected for actionin time to be included in the normaltargeting process, and therefore have not

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-6

Glossary


been scheduled. Immediate targets havetwo subcategories: unplanned andunanticipated. (JP 1-02)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt,delay, or destroy the enemy’s surfacemilitary potential before it can be usedeffectively against friendly forces. See alsoair interdiction. (JP 1-02)

joint fires element. An optional staff elementthat provides recommendations to the J-3 toaccomplish fires planning andsynchronization. Also called JFE. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force. Alsocalled JFC. See also joint force. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a forcecomposed of significant elements, assignedor attached, of two or more MilitaryDepartments operating under a single jointforce commander. See also joint forcecommander. (JP 1-02)

joint integrated prioritized target list. Aprioritized list of targets and associated dataapproved by the joint force commander ordesignated representative and maintainedby a joint force. Targets and priorities arederived from the recommendations ofcomponents in conjunction with theirproposed operations supporting the jointforce commander’s objectives andguidance. Also called JIPTL. (JP 1-02)

joint target list. A consolidated list ofselected targets considered to have militarysignificance in the joint operations area.Also called JTL. (JP 1-02)

joint targeting coordination board. A groupformed by the joint force commander toaccomplish broad targeting oversightfunctions that may include but are notlimited to coordinating targetinginformation, providing targeting guidanceand priorities, and refining the jointintegrated prioritized target list. The boardis normally comprised of representativesfrom the joint force staff, all components,and, if required, component subordinateunits. Also called JTCB. (JP 1-02)

joint targeting. The process of selectingtargets within a commander’s AO or adesignated JOA and matching theappropriate component responses to them,considering operational requirements andcapabilities. (Commander’s Handbook forJoint Time-Sensitive Targeting)

joint task force. A joint force that isconstituted and so designated by theSecretary of Defense, a combatantcommander, a subunified commander, oran existing joint task force commander.Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

joint time-critical target. Those targets,specified by the CJTF that requireimmediate engagement because they pose(or will soon pose) a significant threat tofriendly forces. The CJTF determines thosesituations, if any, where immediateengagement of the imminent joint TCTthreat outweighs other operationalconsiderations. Component commanders,who first acquire specified joint TCTs, maybe specifically delegated the authority byCJTF for immediate engagementresponsibility regardless of assigned areaof operations or mission. (Commander’sHandbook for Joint Time-SensitiveTargeting)

GL-7

Glossary

joint time-sensitive target. Refers to a TSTthat requires cooperation and/orcoordination by two or more Services orcomponents to successfully engage.(Commander’s Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting)

kill box. A three-dimensional area referencethat enables timely, effective coordinationand control and facilitates rapid attacks.(JP 1-02)

measures of effectiveness. Tools used tomeasure results achieved in the overallmission and execution of assigned tasks.Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisiteto the performance of combat assessment.Also called MOEs. (JP 1-02)

mission. 1. The task, together with thepurpose, that clearly indicates the action tobe taken and the reason therefore. 2. Incommon usage, especially when applied tolower military units, a duty assigned to anindividual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatchingof one or more aircraft to accomplish oneparticular task. (JP 1-02)

no-strike list. A list of geographic areas,complexes, or installations not planned forcapture or destruction. Attacking these mayviolate the law of armed conflict or interferewith friendly relations with indigenouspersonnel or governments. Also calledNSL. (JP 1-02)

offensive counterair. Offensive operationsto destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemyaircraft, missiles, launch platforms, andtheir supporting structures and systems bothbefore and after launch, but as close to theirsource as possible. Offensive counterairoperations range throughout enemyterritory and are generally conducted at theinitiative of friendly forces. Theseoperations include attack operations, fightersweep, escort, and suppression of enemyair defenses. Also called OCA. (JP 1-02)

on-call targets. Planned targets that areknown to exist in an operational area andare located in sufficient time for deliberateplanning to meet emerging situationsspecific to campaign objectives. (JP 1-02)

planned targets. Targets that are known toexist in an operational area, and againstwhich effects are scheduled in advance orare on-call. Examples range from targetson joint target lists in the applicablecampaign plan, to targets detected insufficient time to list in the air tasking order,mission-type orders, or fire support plans.Planned targets have two subcategories:scheduled or on-call. (JP 1-02)

reattack recommendation. An assessment,derived from the results of battle damageassessment and munitions effectivenessassessment, providing the commandersystematic advice on reattack of targets andfurther target selection to achieveobjectives. The reattack recommendationconsiders objective achievement, target, andaimpoint selection, attack timing, tactics,weapon system and munitions selection.The reattack recommendation is acombined operations and intelligencefunction. Also called RR. (JP 1-02)

restricted target. A target that has specificrestrictions imposed upon it. Actions thatexceed specified restrictions are prohibiteduntil coordinated and approved by theestablishing headquarters. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued bycompetent military authority that delineatethe circumstances and limitations underwhich United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with otherforces encountered. Also called ROE.(JP 1-02)

scheduled targets. Planned targets uponwhich fires will be delivered at a specifictime. (JP 1-02)

GL-8

Glossary


target. 1. An area, complex, installation,force, equipment, capability, function, orbehavior identified for possible action tosupport the commander’s objectives,guidance, and intent. Targets fall into twogeneral categories: planned and immediate.2. In intelligence usage, a country, area,installation, agency, or person against whichintelligence operations are directed. 3. Anarea designated and numbered for futurefiring. 4. In gunfire support usage, an impactburst that hits the target. (JP 1-02)

target of opportunity. A target visible to asurface or air sensor or observer, which iswithin range of available weapons andagainst which fire has not been scheduledor requested. (JP 1-02)

time-sensitive targets. Those targetsrequiring immediate response because theypose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendlyforces or are highly lucrative, fleeting

targets of opportunity. Also called TST.(JP 1-02)

unanticipated immediate targets. Thoseimmediate targets that are unknown or notexpected to exist in an operational area.(JP 1-02)

unplanned immediate targets. Thoseimmediate targets that are known to existin an operational area but are not detected,located, or selected for action in sufficienttime to be included in the normal targetingprocess. (JP 1-02)

weaponeering. The process of determiningthe quantity of a specific type of lethal ornonlethal weapons required to achieve aspecific level of damage to a given target,considering target vulnerability, weaponseffect, munitions delivery accuracy, damagecriteria, probability of kill, and weaponreliability. (JP 1-02)

Developed by OC, Incorporatedfor the

USJFCOM JWFC and OSD JT&E

Documents

Commander's Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting, 22