Columbia Pictures vs. CA - August 28, 1996 (Full Text)

8/10/2019 Columbia Pictures vs. CA - August 28, 1996 (Full Text)

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 110318. August 28, 1996]

COLUMBIA PICTURE, INC., ORION PICTURE CORPORATION, PARAMOUNTPICTURE CORPORATION, T!ENTIET" CENTUR# $O% $ILMCORPORATION, UNITE& ARTIT CORPORATION, UNI'ERAL CIT#TU&IO, INC., T"E !ALT &INE# COMPAN#, ()* !ARNERBROT"ER, INC.,petitioners, vs. COURT O$ APPEAL, UN"INE"OME 'I&EO, INC. ()* &ANILO A. PELIN&ARIO, respondents.

& E C I I O N

REGALA&O,J.+

Before us is a petition for review on certiorariof the decision of the Court ofAppeals[1]promulgated on July 22 1!!2 and its resolution[2]of "ay 1# 1!!$denying petitioners% motion for reconsideration &oth of which sustained theorder[$]of the 'egional (rial Court Branch 1$$ "a)ati "etro "anila datedNovem&er 22 1!** for the +uashal of ,earch -arrant No. */0#$ earlier issued perits own order[]on ,eptem&er 1!** for violation of ,ection 3 of 4residential5ecree No. ! as amended otherwise )nown as the 65ecree on the 4rotection of7ntellectual 4roperty.8

(he material facts found &y respondent appellate court are as follows9

Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureauof 7nvestigation for violation of 45 No. ! as amended and sought its assistance intheir anti0:lm piracy drive. Agents of the NB7 and private researchers made discreetsurveillance on various video esta&lishments in "etro "anila including ,unshine;ome owned and operated &y 5anilo A. 4elindariowith address at No. 3 "ayfair Center "agallanes "a)ati "etro "anila.

?n Novem&er 1 1!*/ NB7 ,enior Agent @auro C. 'eyes applied for a searchwarrant with the court a quoagainst ,unshine see)ing the seiure among others ofpirated video tapes of copyrighted :lms all of which were enumerated in a listattached to the application and television sets video cassettes andor laser discrecordings e+uipment and other machines and paraphernalia used or intended to &e

used in the unlawful eDhi&ition showing reproduction sale lease or disposition ofvideograms tapes in the premises a&ove descri&ed. 7n the hearing of theapplication NB7 ,enior Agent @auro C. 'eyes upon +uestions &y the court a quoreiterated in su&stance his averments in his adavit. ;is testimony wascorro&orated &y another witness "r. 'ene C. Baltaar. Atty. 'ico


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(he search warrant was served at a&out 19 p.m. on 5ecem&er 1 1!*/ to,unshine andor their representatives. 7n the course of the search of the premisesindicated in the search warrant the NB7 Agents found and seied various videotapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures:lms owned or eDclusively distri&uted &yprivate complainants and machines e+uipment television sets paraphernaliamaterials accessories all of which were included in the receipt for properties

accomplished &y the raiding team. Copy of the receipt was furnished andortendered to "r. 5anilo A. 4elindario registered owner0proprietor of ,unshine ;ome.

A "otion for reconsideration of the ?rder of denial was :led. (hecourt aquogranted the said motion for reconsideration and Fusti:ed it in thismanner9

67t is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted :lms from which thepirated :lms were allegedly copies =sic> were never presented in the proceedingsfor the issuance of the search warrants in +uestion. (he orders of the Courtgranting the search warrants and denying the urgent motion to lift order of searchwarrants were therefore issued in error. Conse+uently they must &e set aside.8 =p.1$ Appellant%s Brief>[]

4etitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting privaterespondents% motion for reconsideration thus lifting the search warrant which it hadtherefore issued to the Court of Appeals. As stated at the outset said appeal wasdismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. ;ence thispetition was &rought to this Court particularly challenging the validity of respondent

court%s retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs.Court of Appeals, et al.[3]in dismissing petitioners% appeal and upholding the+uashal of the search warrant &y the trial court.

I

7nceptively we shall settle the procedural considerations on the matter of andthe challenge to petitioners% legal standing in our courts they &eing foreigncorporations not licensed to do &usiness in the 4hilippines.

4rivate respondents aver that &eing foreign corporations petitioners shouldhave such license to &e a&le to maintain an action in 4hilippine courts. 7n sochallenging petitioners% personality to sue private respondents point to the fact that

petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of eDclusive rights of distri&ution inthe 4hilippines of copyrighted motion pictures or :lms and also to the appointmentof Atty. 'ico =1> and =2> 'ule 1 of the 'ules of theBoard of 7nvestments. As foreign corporations doing &usiness in the 4hilippines,ection 1$$ of Batas 4am&ansa Blg. 3* or the Corporation Code of the 4hilippinesdenies them the right to maintain a suit in 4hilippine courts in the a&sence of alicense to do &usiness. Conse+uently they have no right to as) for the issuance ofa search warrant.[/]
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7n refutation petitioners Gatly deny that they are doing &usiness in the4hilippines [*]and contend that private respondents have not adduced evidence toprove that petitioners are doing such &usiness here as would re+uire them to &elicensed &y the ,ecurities and EDchange Commission other than averments in the+uoted portions of petitioners% 6?pposition to Hrgent "otion to @ift ?rder of ,earch-arrant8 dated April 2* 1!** and Atty. 'ico


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As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle su&Fectto such modi:cations as may &e necessary in view of the particular issue or of theterms of the statute involved it is recognied that a foreign corporation is 6doing86transacting8 6engaging in8 or 6carrying on8 &usiness in the ,tate when andordinarily only when it has entered the ,tate &y its agents and is there engaged incarrying on and transacting through them some su&stantial part of its ordinary or

customary &usiness usually continuous in the sense that it may &e distinguishedfrom merely casual sporadic or occasional transactions and isolated acts.[1]

(he Corporation Code does not itself de:ne or categorie what acts constitutedoing or transacting &usiness in the 4hilippines. Jurisprudence has however heldthat the term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements andcontemplates to that eDtent the performance of acts or wor)s or the eDercise ofsome of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of thepurpose and su&Fect of its organiation.[13]

(his traditional case law de:nition has evolved into a statutory de:nitionhaving &een adopted with some +uali:cations in various pieces of legislation in our

Furisdiction.

or instance 'epu&lic Act No. [1/]provides9

,EC(7?N 1. Denitions an! scope of this Act.I =1> D D D and the phrase 6doing&usiness8 shall include soliciting orders purchases service contracts openingoces whether called 6liaison8 oces or &ranches appointing representatives ordistri&utors who are domiciled in the 4hilippines or who in any calendar year stay inthe 4hilippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or moreparticipating in the management supervision or control of any domestic &usiness:rm entity or corporation in the 4hilippines and any other act or acts that imply acontinuity of commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that eDtentthe performance of acts or wor)s or the eDercise of some of the functions normally

incident to and in0progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the purposeand o&Fect of the &usiness organiation.

4residential 5ecree No. 1/*![1*]in Article 3 thereof de:nes 6doing &usiness8to include soliciting orders purchases service contracts opening oces whethercalled 6liaison8 oces or &ranches appointing representatives or distri&utors whoare domiciled in the 4hilippines or who in any calendar year stay in the 4hilippinesfor a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more participating inthe management supervision or control of any domestic &usiness :rm entity orcorporation in the 4hilippines and any other act or acts that imply a continuity ofcommercial dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that eDtent theperformance of acts or wor)s or the eDercise of some of the functions normally

incident to and in progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the purposeand o&Fect of the &usiness organiation.

(he implementing rules and regulations of said presidential decree conclude theenumeration of acts constituting 6doing &usiness8 with a catch0all de:nition thus9

,ec. 1=g>. K5oing Business% shall &e any act or com&ination of acts enumerated inArticle 3 of the Code. 7n particular Kdoing &usiness% includes9
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DDD DDD DDD

=1#> Any other act or acts which imply a continuity of commercial dealings orarrangements and contemplate to that eDtent the performance of acts or wor)s orthe eDercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in the progressiveprosecution of commercial gain or of the purpose and o&Fect of the &usiness

organiation.

inally 'epu&lic Act No. /#2[1!]em&odies such concept in this wise9

,EC. $. Denitions. I As used in this Act9

DDD DDD DDD

=d> the phrase 6doing &usiness shall include soliciting orders servicecontracts opening oces whether called Kliaison% oces or &ranches appointingrepresentatives or distri&utors domiciled in the 4hilippines or who in any calendar

year stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred eight=y> =1*#>days or more participating in the management supervision or control of anydomestic &usiness :rm entity or corporation in the 4hilippines and any other actor acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements andcontemplate to that eDtent the performance of acts or wor)s or the eDercise ofsome of the functions normally incident to and in progressive prosecution ofcommercial gain or of the purpose and o&Fect of the &usinessorganiation9 "rovi!e! however (hat the phrase 6doing &usiness8 shall not &edeemed to include mere investment as a shareholder &y a foreign entity indomestic corporations duly registered to do &usiness andor the eDercise of rightsas such investors nor having a nominee director or ocer to represent its interestsin such corporation nor appointing a representative or distri&utor domiciled in the

4hilippines which transacts &usiness in its own name and for its own account.

Based on Article 1$$ of the Corporation Code and gauged &y such statutorystandards petitioners are not &arred from maintaining the present action. (here isno showing that under our statutory or case law petitioners are doing transactingengaging in or carrying on &usiness in the 4hilippines as would re+uire o&tention ofa license &efore they can see) redress from our courts. No evidence has &eenoLered to show that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or anyother speci:c act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact &usiness in the4hilippines.

Accordingly the certi:cation issued &y the ,ecurities and EDchangeCommission[2#]stating that its records do not show the registration of petitioner :lmcompanies either as corporations or partnerships or that they have &een licensed totransact &usiness in the 4hilippines while undenia&ly true is of no conse+uence topetitioners% right to &ring action in the 4hilippines.


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Although ,ection 1=g> of the 7mplementing 'ules and 'egulations of the?mni&us 7nvestments Code lists among others I

=1> ,oliciting orders purchases =sales> or service contracts. Concreteand speci:c solicitations &y a foreign :rm or &y an agent of such foreign :rm notacting independently of the foreign :rm amounting to negotiations or :Ding of the

terms and conditions of sales or service contracts regardless of where the contractsare actually reduced to writing shall constitute doing &usiness even if theenterprise has no oce or :Ded place of &usiness in the 4hilippines. (hearrangements agreed upon as to manner time and terms of delivery of the goods orthe transfer of title thereto is immaterial. A foreign :rm which does &usinessthrough the middlemen acting in their own names such as indentors commercial&ro)ers or commission merchants shall not &e deemed doing &usiness in the4hilippines. But such indentors commercial &ro)ers or commission merchants shall&e the ones deemed to &e doing &usiness in the 4hilippines.

=2> Appointing a representative or distri&utor who is domiciled in the4hilippines unless said representative or distri&utor has an independent status i.e.it transacts &usiness in its name and for its own account and not in the name or forthe account of a principal. (hus where a foreign :rm is represented in the4hilippines &y a person or local company which does not act in its name &ut in thename of the foreign :rm the latter is doing &usiness in the 4hilippines.

as acts constitutive of 6doing &usiness8 the fact that petitioners are admittedlycopyright owners or owners of eDclusive distri&ution rights in the 4hilippines ofmotion pictures or :lms does not convert such ownership into an indicium of doing&usiness which would re+uire them to o&tain a license &efore they can sue upon acause of action in local courts.

Neither is the appointment of Atty. 'ico I:lms or video cassettes I of which D D D is the owner of copyright or the owner ofeDclusive rights of distri&ution in the 4hilippines pursuant to any agreement=s>&etween D D D and the respective owners of copyright in such cinematographicwor)=s> to initiate and prosecute on &ehalf of D D D criminal or civil actions in the4hilippines against any person or persons unlawfully distri&uting eDhi&iting selling

or oLering for sale any :lms or video cassettes of which D D D is the owner ofcopyright or the owner of eDclusive rights of distri&ution in the 4hilippines pursuantto any agreement=s> &etween D D D and the respective owners of copyright in suchwor)s.[21]

tantamount to doing &usiness in the 4hilippines. -e fail to see how eDercising one%slegal and property rights and ta)ing steps for the vigilant protection of said rights
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particularly the appointment of an attorney0in0fact can &e deemed &y and ofthemselves to &e doing &usiness here.

As a general rule a foreign corporation will not &e regarded as doing &usiness inthe ,tate simply &ecause it enters into contracts with residents of the ,tate wheresuch contracts are consummated outside the ,tate.[22]7n fact a view is ta)en that a

foreign corporation is not doing &usiness in the state merely &ecause sales of itsproduct are made there or other &usiness furthering its interests is transacted there&y an alleged agent whether a corporation or a natural person where suchactivities are not under the direction and control of the foreign corporation &ut areengaged in &y the alleged agent as an independent &usiness.[2$]

7t is generally held that sales made to customers in the ,tate &y an independentdealer who has purchased and o&tained title from the corporation to the productssold are not a doing of &usiness &y the corporation.[2]@i)ewise a foreign corporationwhich sells its products to persons styled 6distri&uting agents8 in the ,tate fordistri&ution &y them is not doing &usiness in the ,tate so as to render it su&Fect toservice of process therein where the contract with these purchasers is that theyshall &uy eDclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it manufacturesand shall sell them at trade prices esta&lished &y it. [2]

7t has moreover &een held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging anattorney to represent it in a ederal court sitting in a particular ,tate is not doing&usiness within the scope of the minimum contact test.[23]-ith much more reasonshould this doctrine apply to the mere retainer of Atty. 5omingo for legal protectionagainst contingent acts of intellectual piracy.

7n accordance with the rule that 6doing &usiness8 imports only acts infurtherance of the purposes for which a foreign corporation was organied it is heldthat the mere institution and prosecution or defense of a suit particularly if thetransaction which is the &asis of the suit too) place out of the ,tate do not amount

to the doing of &usiness in the ,tate. (he institution of a suit or the removal thereofis neither the ma)ing of a contract nor the doing of &usiness within a constitutionalprovision placing foreign corporations licensed to do &usiness in the ,tate under thesame regulations limitations and lia&ilities with respect to such acts as domesticcorporations. "erely engaging in litigation has &een considered as not a sucientminimum contact to warrant the eDercise of Furisdiction over a foreign corporation.[2/]

As a consideration aside we have perforce to comment on private respondents%&asis for arguing that petitioners are &arred from maintaining suit in the4hilippines. or allegedly &eing foreign corporations doing &usiness in the4hilippines without a license private respondents repeatedly maintain in all theirpleadings that petitioners have there&y no legal personalityto &ring an action

&efore 4hilippine courts.[2*]

Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the 'ules of Court are lac) oflegal capacity to sue[2!]and that the complaint states no cause of action. [$#]@ac) oflegal capacity to sue means that the plaintiL is not in the eDercise of his civil rightsor does not have the necessary +uali:cation to appear in the case or does not havethe character or representation he claims.[$1]?n the other hand a case isdismissi&le for lac) of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiL is not the realparty0in0interest hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. [$2](he term
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6lac) of capacity to sue8 should not &e confused with the term 6lac) of personalityto sue.8 -hile the former refers to a plaintiL%s general disa&ility to sue such as onaccount of minority insanity incompetence lac) of Furidical personality or anyother general dis+uali:cations of a party the latter refers to the fact that theplaintiL is not the real party0 in0interest. Correspondingly the :rst can &e a groundfor a motion to dismiss &ased on the ground of lac) of legal capacity to sue[$$]whereas the second can &e used as a ground for a motion to dismiss &ased onthe fact that the complaint on the face thereof evidently states no cause of action.[$]

Applying the a&ove discussion to the instant petition the ground availa&le for&arring recourse to our courts &y an unlicensed foreign corporation doing ortransacting &usiness in the 4hilippines should properly &e 6lac) of capacity to sue8not 6lac) of personality to sue.8 Certainly a corporation whose legal rights have&een violated is undenia&ly such if not the only real party0in0interest to &ring suitthereon although for failure to comply with the licensing re+uirement it is notcapacitated to maintain any suit &efore our courts.

@astly on this point we reiterate this Court%s reFection of the commonprocedural tactics of erring local companies which when sued &y unlicensed foreigncorporations not engaged in &usiness in the 4hilippines invo)e the latter%ssupposed lac) of capacity to sue. (he doctrine of lac) of capacity to sue &ased onfailure to :rst ac+uire a local license is &ased on considerations of pu&lic policy. 7twas never intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous esta&lishments ornationals in case of &reach of valid o&ligations or violations of legal rights ofunsuspecting foreign :rms or entities simply &ecause they are not licensed to do&usiness in the country.[$]

II

-e now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive application to the present

controversy of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,et al. promulgated on August 1! 1!**[$3]that for the determination of pro&a&lecause to support the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement casesinvolving videograms the production of the master tape for comparison with theallegedly pirated copies is necessary.

4etitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant is addressed to thediscretion of the court su&Fect to the determination of pro&a&le cause in accordancewith the procedure prescri&ed therefor under ,ections $ and of 'ule 123. As ofthe time of the application for the search warrant in +uestion the controllingcriterion for the :nding of pro&a&le cause was that enunciated in #urgos vs. Chief of$ta%[$/]stating that9

4ro&a&le cause for a search warrant is de:ned as such facts and circumstanceswhich would lead a reasona&ly discrete and prudent man to &elieve that an oLensehas &een committed and that the o&Fects sought in connection with the oLense arein the place sought to &e searched.

According to petitioners after complying with what the law then re+uired thelower court determined that there was pro&a&le cause for the issuance of a searchwarrant and which determination in fact led to the issuance and service on5ecem&er 1 1!*/ of ,earch -arrant No. */0#$. 7t is further argued that any
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search warrant so issued in accordance with all applica&le legal re+uirements isvalid for the lower court could not possi&ly have &een eDpected to apply as the&asis for a :nding of pro&a&le cause for the issuance of a search warrant incopyright infringement cases involving videograms a pronouncement which wasnot eDistent at the time of such determination on 5ecem&er 1 1!*/ that is thedoctrine in the 20th Century Foxcase that was promulgated only on August 1!

1!** or over eight months later.

4rivate respondents predicta&ly argue in support of the ruling of the Court ofAppeals sustaining the +uashal of the search warrant &y the lower court on thestrength of that 20th Century Foxruling which they claim goes into the veryessence of pro&a&le cause. At the time of the issuance of the search warrantinvolved here although the 20th Century Foxcase had not yet &een decided,ection 2 Article 777 of the Constitution and ,ection $ 'ule 123 of the 1!* 'ules onCriminal 4rocedure em&odied the prevailing and governing law on the matter. (heruling in 20th Century Foxwas merely an application of the law on pro&a&lecause. ;ence they posit that there was no law that was retrospectively appliedsince the law had &een there all along. (o refrain from applying the 20th Century

Fox ruling which had supervened as a doctrine promulgated at the time of theresolution of private respondents% motion for reconsideration see)ing the +uashal ofthe search warrant for failure of the trial court to re+uire presentation of the mastertapes prior to the issuance of the search warrant would have constituted gravea&use of discretion.[$*]

'espondent court upheld the retroactive application of the 20th CenturyFoxruling &y the trial court in resolving petitioners% motion for reconsideration infavor of the +uashal of the search warrant on this renovated thesis9

And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively it must &e noted that in the2#th Century oD case the lower court +uashed the earlier search warrant it

issued. ?n certiorari the ,upreme Court armed the +uashal on the ground amongothers that the master tapes or copyrighted :lms were not presented forcomparison with the purchased evidence of the video tapes to determine whetherthe latter is an unauthoried reproduction of the former.

7f the lower court in the Century oD case did not +uash the warrant it is ?ur viewthat the ,upreme Court would have invalidated the warrant Fust the sameconsidering the very strict re+uirement set &y the ,upreme Court for thedetermination of Kpro&a&le cause% in copyright infringement cases as enunciated inthis 2#th Century oD case. (his is so &ecause as was stated &y the ,upreme Courtin the said case the master tapes and the pirated tapes must &e presentedforcomparison to satisfy the requirement of &probable cause.',o it goes &ac) to the

very eDistence of pro&a&le cause. D D D[$!]

"indful as we are of the rami:cations of the doctrine of stare !ecisisand therudiments of fair play it is our considered view that the 20thCentury Foxrulingcannot &e retroactively applied to the instant case to Fustify the +uashal of ,earch-arrant No. */0#$. ;erein petitioners% consistent position that the order of thelower court of ,eptem&er 1!** denying therein defendants% motion to lift theorder of search warrant was properly issued there having &een satisfactorycompliance with the then prevailing standards under the law for determination of
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pro&a&le cause is indeed well ta)en. (he lower court could not possi&ly haveeDpected more evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrantother than what the law and Furisprudence then existing an! (u!icially accepte!re+uired with respect to the :nding of pro&a&le cause.

Article of the Civil Code provides that 6=l>aws shall have no retroactive eLect

unless the contrary is provided. Correlatively Article * of the same Code declaresthat 6=F>udicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of thelegal system of the 4hilippines.8

Jurisprudence in our system of government cannot &e considered as anindependent source of law it cannot create law.[#]-hile it is true that Fudicialdecisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legalsystem of the 4hilippines still they are not laws. Judicial decisions though not lawsare nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean and it is for this reason that theyare part of the legal system of the 4hilippines. [1]Judicial decisions of the ,upremeCourt assume the same authority as the statute itself.[2]

7nterpreting the afore+uoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light

of the a&ove dis+uisition this Court emphatically declared in Co vs. Court ofAppeals, et al.[$]that the principle of prospectivity applies not only to originalamendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars &ut also and properlyso to Fudicial decisions. ?ur holding in the earlier case of "eople vs.

)ubinal[]echoes the rationale for this Fudicial declaration vi*.9

5ecisions of this Court although in themselves not laws are nevertheless evidenceof what the laws mean and this is the reason why under Article * of the New CivilCode 6Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shallform part of the legal system.8 (he interpretation upon a law &y this Courtconstitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date that the law was originallypassed since this Court%s construction merely esta&lishes the contemporaneous

legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to eLectuate. (he settled rulesupported &y numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maDim 6 legisinterpretation legis vim obtinet8 I the interpretation placed upon the written law &ya competent court has the force of law. D D D &ut when a doctrine of this Court isoverruled and a diLerent view is adopted the new !octrine shoul! be applie!

prospectively, an! shoul! not apply to parties who ha! relie! on the ol! !octrinean! acte! on the faith thereof. D D D. =,tress supplied>.

(his was forcefully reiterated in $pouses #en*onan vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[]where the Court eDpounded9

D D D. But while our decisions form part of the law of the land they are also su&Fectto Article of the Civil Code which provides that 6laws shall have no retroactiveeLect unless the contrary is provided.8 (his is eDpressed in the familiar legalmaDimum lexprospicit, non respicit the law loo)s forward not &ac)ward. (herationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. (he retroactive application of alaw usually divests rights that have already &ecome vested or impairs theo&ligations of contract and hence is unconstitutional =rancisco v. Certea $ ,C'A3 [1!31]>. (he same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospectiveeLect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. D D D.
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(he reasoning &ehind $enarillos vs. +ermosisima[3]that Fudicial interpretation ofa statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed since theCourt%s construction merely esta&lishes the contemporaneous legislative intent thatthe interpreted law carried into eLect is all too familiar. ,uch Fudicial doctrine doesnot amount to the passage of a new law &ut consists merely of a construction orinterpretation of a pre0eDisting one and that is precisely the situation o&taining in

this case.

7t is conse+uently clear that a Fudicial interpretation &ecomes a part of the lawas of the date that law was originally passed su&Fect only to the +uali:cation thatwhen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a diLerent view is adopted and moreso when there is a reversal thereof the new doctrine should &e appliedprospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine andacted in good faith.[/](o hold otherwise would &e to deprive the law of its +uality offairness and Fustice then if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior tosuch adFudication.[*]

(here is merit in petitioners% impassioned and well0founded argumentation9

(he case of 2#th Century oD ilm Corporation vs.Court of Appeals et al. 13 ,C'A3 =August 1! 1!**> =hereinafter 2#th Century oD> was ineDistent in 5ecem&er of1!*/ when ,earch -arrant */0#$ was issued &y the lower court. ;ence it &ogglesthe imagination how the lower court could &e eDpected to apply the formulation of2#th Century oD in :nding pro&a&le cause when the formulation was yet non0eDistent.

DDD DDD DDD

7n short the lower court was convinced at that timeafter conducting searchingeDamination +uestions of the applicant and his witnesses that 6an oLense had &een

committed and that the o&Fects sought in connection with the oLense =were> in theplace sought to &e searched8 =Burgos v. Chief of ,taL et al. 1$$ ,C'A *##>. 7t isindisputa&le therefore that at the time of the application or on 5ecem&er 11!*/ the lower court did not commit any error nor did it fail to comply with anylegal re+uirement for the valid issuance of search warrant.

D D D. =->e &elieve that the lower court should &e considered as having followed there+uirements of the law in issuing ,earch -arrant No. */0#$. (he search warrantis therefore valid and &inding. 7t must &e noted that nowhere is it found in theallegations of the 'espondents that the lower court failed to apply the law as theninterprete! in -/. ;ence we :nd it a&surd that it is =sic> should &e seenotherwise &ecause it is simply impossi&le to have re+uired the lower court to apply

a formulation which will only &e de:ned siD months later.

urthermore it is unFust and unfair to re+uire compliance with legal andor doctrinalre+uirements which are ineDistent at the time they were supposed to have &eencomplied with.

DDD DDD DDD


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D D D. 7f the lower court%s reversal will &e sustained what encouragement can &egiven to courts and litigants to respect the law and rules if they can eDpect withreasona&le certainty that upon the passage of a new rule their conduct can still &eopen to +uestionM (his certainly &reeds insta&ility in our system of dispensing

Fustice. or 4etitioners who too) special eLort to redress their grievances and toprotect their property rights &y resorting to the remedies provided &y the law it is

most unfair that fealty to the rules and procedures then o&taining would &ear &utfruits of inFustice.[!]

-ithal even the proposition that the prospectivity of Fudicial decisions importsapplication thereof not only to future cases &ut also to cases still ongoing or not yet:nal when the decision was promulgated should not &e countenanced in the Furalsphere on account of its inevita&ly unsettling repercussions. "ore to the point it isfelt that the reasona&leness of the added re+uirement in 20th Century Foxcallingfor the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted :lms for determination ofpro&a&le cause in copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clari:cation.

7t will &e recalled that the 20th Century Foxcase arose from search warrant

proceedings in anticipation of the :ling of a case for the unauthoried sale orrenting out of copyrighted :lms in videotape format in violation of 4residential5ecree No. !. 7t revolved around the meaning of pro&a&le cause within theconteDt of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and seiures asapplied to copyright infringement cases involving videotapes.

(herein it was ruled that I

(he presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted :lms from which the pirated:lms were allegedly copied was necessary for the validity of search warrantsagainst those who have in their possession the pirated :lms. (he petitioner%sargument to the eLect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of

application may not &e necessary as these would &e merely evidentiary in natureand not determinative of whether or not a pro&a&le cause eDists to Fustify theissuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. (he court cannot presume thatduplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that itowns.

(he application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets whichallegedly were engaged in the unauthoried sale and renting out of copyrighted:lms &elonging to the petitioner pursuant to 4.5. !.

(he essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least su&stantialsimilarity of the purported pirated wor)s to the copyrighted wor). ;ence the

applicant must present to the court the copyrighted :lms to compare them with thepurchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether thelatter is an unauthoried reproduction of the former. (his lin)age of the copyrighted:lms to the pirated :lms must &e esta&lished to satisfy the re+uirements ofpro&a&le cause. "ere allegations as to the eDistence of the copyrighted :lms cannotserve as &asis for the issuance of a search warrant.


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or a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the factual antecedentsof 20thCentury Fox the pertinent portions of the decision therein are +uotedhereunder to wit9

7n the instant case the lower court lifted the three +uestioned search warrantsagainst the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for

the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations ofapplicant NB7 and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of aparticular :lm have &een committed. (hus the lower court stated in its +uestionedorder dated January 2 1!*39

6According to the movant all three witnesses during the proceedings in theapplication for the three search warrants testi:ed of their own personal)nowledge. et, Atty. Albino 1eyes of the #3 state! that the counsel orrepresentative of the 4wentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the vi!eocassettes that were pirate!, so that he !i! not have personal 5nowle!ge of theallege! piracy. 4he witness #acani also sai! that the vi!eo cassettes were pirate!without stating the manner it was pirate! an! that it was Atty. Domingo that has5nowle!ge of that fact.

6?n the part of Atty. 5omingo he said that the re0taping of the allegedly piratedtapes was from master tapes allegedly &elonging to the (wentieth Century oD&ecause according to him it is of his personal )nowledge.

6At the hearing of the "otion for 'econsideration ,enior NB7 Agent Atty. Al&ino'eyes testi:ed that when the complaint for infringement was brought to the #3,the master tapes of the allege!ly pirate! tapes were shown to him an! he ma!ecomparisons of the tapes with those purchase! by their man #acani. 6hy themaster tapes or at least the lm reels of the allege!ly pirate! tapes were not shown

to the Court !uring the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of thatbare statement of the #3 agent on the witness stan!.

6Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the :ling ofcriminal cases under 4.5. ! the copyright infringement law and although what isre+uired for the issuance thereof is merely the presence of pro&a&le cause thatpro&a&le cause must &e satisfactory to the Court for it is a time0honored preceptthat proceedings to put a man to tas) as an oLender under our laws should &einterpreted in strictissimi (urisagainst the government and li&erally in favor of thealleged oLender.

DDD DDD DDD

6(his doctrine has never &een overturned and as a matter of fact it had &eenenshrined in the Bill of 'ights in our 1!/$ Constitution.

6$o that lac5ing in persuasive e%ect, the allegation that master tapeswere viewe! by the #3 an! were compare! to the purchase! an! sei*e! vi!eotapes from the respon!ents' establishments, it shoul! be !ismisse! as notsupporte! by competent evi!ence an! for that matter the probable cause hovers in


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that grey !ebatable twilight *one between blac5 an! white resolvable in favor ofrespon!ents herein.

6But the glaring fact is that KCocoon% the :rst video tape mentioned in the searchwarrant was not even duly registered or copyrighted in the 4hilippines. =AnneD C of?pposition p. 12 record.> ,o that lac)ing in the re+uisite presentation to the

Court of an alleged master tape for purposes of comparison with the purchasedevidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seied from respondentsthere was no way to determine whether there really was piracy or copying of the:lm of the complainant (wentieth Century oD.8

DDD DDD DDD

4he lower court, therefore, lifte! the three 789 questione! search warrants in theabsence of probable cause that the private respon!ents violate! ".D. :-. As foun!by the court, the #3 agents who acte! as witnesses !i! not have personal5nowle!ge of the sub(ect matter of their testimony which was the allege!

commission of the o%ense by the private respon!ents. ?nly the petitioner%scounsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the searchwarrants stated that he had personal )nowledge that the con:scated tapes owned&y the private respondents were pirated tapes ta)en from master tapes &elongingto the petitioner. ;owever the lower court did not give much credence to histestimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapeswere not shown to the court during the application8 =7talics ours>.

(he italicied passages readily eDpose the reason why the trial court thereinre+uired the presentation of the master tapes of the allegedly pirated :lms in orderto convince itself of the eDistence of pro&a&le cause under the factual milieupeculiar to that case. 7n the case at &ar respondent appellate court itself o&served9

-e feel that the rationale &ehind the afore+uoted doctrine is that the pirated copiesas well as the master tapes unli)e the other types of personal properties which may&e seied were available for presentation to the court at the time of the applicationfor a search warrantto determine the eDistence of the lin)age of the copyrighted:lms with the pirated ones. (hus there is no reason not to present them =7talicssupplied for emphasis>.[#]

7n :ne the supposedpronunciamentoin said case regarding the necessity forthe presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted :lms for the validity ofsearch warrants should at most &e understood to merely serve as a guidepost indetermining the eDistence of pro&a&le cause in copyright infringement cases where

there is !oubt as to the true nexus between the master tape an! the pirate!copies. An o&Fective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead tono other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to &e a sweepingand inGeDi&le re+uirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. )u!icial!ictashould always &e construed within the factual matriD of their parturitionotherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with thevice of overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generaliation.


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7n the case at &ar NB7 ,enior Agent @auro C. 'eyes who :led the application forsearch warrant with the lower court following a formal complaint lodged &ypetitioners Fudging from his adavit[1]and his deposition[2]did testify on matterswithin his personal )nowledge &ased on said complaint of petitioners as well as hisown investigation and surveillance of the private respondents% video rentalshop. @i)ewise Atty. 'ico who was li)ewise presented as a witness during the searchwarrant proceedings.[](he records clearly reGect that the testimonies of thea&ovenamed witnesses were straightforward and stemmed from matters withintheir personal )nowledge. (hey displayed none of the am&ivalence and uncertaintythat the witnesses in the 20th Century Foxcase eDhi&ited. (his categoricalforthrightness in their statements among others was what initially and correctly

convinced the trial court to ma)e a :nding of the eDistence of pro&a&le cause.(here is no originality in the argument of private respondents against the

validity of the search warrant o&viously &orrowed from 20thCentury Fox thatpetitioners% witnesses I NB7 Agent @auro C. 'eyes Atty. 'ico


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?f course as a general rule constitutional and statutory provisions relating tosearch warrants prohi&it their issuance eDcept on a showing of pro&a&le causesupported &y oath or armation. (hese provisions prevent the issuance of warrantson loose vague or dou&tful &ases of fact and emphasie the purpose to protectagainst all general searches.[3#]7ndeed Article 777 of our Constitution mandates in,ec. 2 thereof that no search warrant shall issue eDcept upon pro&a&le cause to &e

determined personally &y the Fudge after eDamination under oath or armation ofthe complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly descri&ing theplace to &e searched and the things to &e seied and ,ec. $ thereof provides thatany evidence o&tained in violation of the preceding section shall &e inadmissi&le forany purpose in any proceeding.

(hese constitutional strictures are implemented &y the following provisions of'ule 123 of the 'ules of Court9

,ec. $.1equisites for issuing search warrant. I A search warrant shall not issue &utupon pro&a&le cause in connection with one speci:c oLense to &e determinedpersonally &y the Fudge after eDamination under oath or armation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly descri&ing theplace to &e searched and the things to &e seied.

,ec. . ;xamination of complainant< recor!. I (he Fudge must &efore issuing thewarrant personally eDamine in the form of searching +uestions and answers inwriting and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on factspersonally )nown to them and attach to the record their sworn statements togetherwith any adavits su&mitted.

,ec. . 3ssuance an! form of search warrant. I 7f the Fudge is thereupon satis:ed ofthe eDistence of facts upon which the application is &ased or that there is pro&a&lecause to &elieve that they eDist he must issue the warrant which must &e

su&stantially in the form prescri&ed &y these 'ules.

(he constitutional and statutory provisions of various Furisdictions re+uiring ashowing of pro&a&le cause &efore a search warrant can &e issued are mandatoryand must &e complied with and such a showing has &een held to &e an un+uali:edcondition precedent to the issuance of a warrant. A search warrant not &ased onpro&a&le cause is a nullity or is void and the issuance thereof is in legalcontemplation ar&itrary.[31]7t &ehooves us then to review the concept of pro&a&lecause :rstly from representative holdings in the American Furisdiction from whichwe patterned our doctrines on the matter.

Although the term 6pro&a&le cause8 has &een said to have a well0de:ned

meaning in the law the term is eDceedingly dicult to de:ne in this case with anydegree of precision indeed no de:nition of it which would Fustify the issuance of asearch warrant can &e formulated which would cover every state of facts whichmight arise and no formula or standard or hard and fast rule may &e laid downwhich may &e applied to the facts of every situation. [32]As to what acts constitutepro&a&le cause seem incapa&le of de:nition.[3$](here is of necessity no eDact test.[3]


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At &est the term 6pro&a&le cause8 has &een understood to mean a reasona&leground of suspicion supported &y circumstances suciently strong in themselves towarrant a cautious man in the &elief that the person accused is guilty of the oLensewith which he is charged[3]or the eDistence of such facts and circumstances aswould eDcite an honest &elief in a reasona&le mind acting on all the facts andcircumstances within the )nowledge of the magistrate that the charge made &y the

applicant for the warrant is true.[33]

4ro&a&le cause does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it importa&solute certainty. (he determination of the eDistence of pro&a&le cause is notconcerned with the +uestion of whether the oLense charged has &een or is &eingcommitted in fact or whether the accused is guilty or innocent &ut only whetherthe aant has reasona&le grounds for his &elief. [3/](he re+uirement is less thancertainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.[3*]

7n 4hilippine Furisprudence pro&a&le cause has &een uniformly de:ned as suchfacts and circumstances which would lead a reasona&le discreet and prudent manto &elieve that an oLense has &een committed and that the o&Fects sought inconnection with the oLense are in the place sought to &e searched. [3!]7t &eing theduty of the issuing ocer to issue or refuse to issue the warrant as soon aspractica&le after the application therefor is :led[/#]the facts warranting theconclusion of pro&a&le cause must &e assessed at the time of such Fudicialdetermination &y necessarily using legal standards then set forth in law an!

(urispru!ence, an! not those that have yet to be crafte! thereafter.

As already stated the de:nition of pro&a&le cause enunciated in #urgos, $r. vs.Chief of $ta%, et al., supra, vis=a=vis the provisions of ,ections $ and of 'ule 123were the prevailing and controlling legal standards as they continue to &e &y whicha :nding of pro&a&le cause is tested. ,ince the proprietary of the issuance of asearch warrant is to &e determined at the time of the application therefor which inturn must not &e too remote in time from the occurrence of the oLense alleged to

have &een committed the issuing Fudge in determining the eDistence of pro&a&lecause can and should logically loo) to the touchstones in the laws thereforeenacted and the decisions already promulgated at the time and not to those whichhad not yet even &een conceived or formulated.

7t is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the 'ules of Court attempt tode:ne pro&a&le cause o&viously for the purpose of leaving such matter to thecourt%s discretion within the particular facts of each case. Although the Constitutionprohi&its the issuance of a search warrant in the a&sence of pro&a&le cause suchconstitutional inhi&ition does not command the legislature to esta&lish a de:nitionor formula for determining what shall constitute pro&a&le cause.[/1](hus Congressdespite its &road authority to fashion standards of reasona&leness for searches and

seiures

[/2]

does not venture to ma)e such a de:nition or standard formulation ofpro&a&le cause nor categorie what facts and circumstances ma)e up the samemuch less limit the determination thereof to and within the circumscription of aparticular class of evidence all in deference to Fudicial discretion and pro&ity. [/$]

Accordingly to restrict the eDercise of discretion &y a Fudge &y adding aparticular re+uirement =the presentation of master tapes as intimated &y 20thCentury Fox> not provided nor implied in the law for a :nding of pro&a&le cause is&eyond the realm of Fudicial competence or statemanship. 7t serves no purpose &ut
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to stultify and constrict the Fudicious eDercise of a courts prerogatives and todenigrate the Fudicial duty of determining the eDistence of pro&a&le cause to a mereministerial or mechanical function. (here is to repeat no law or rule which re+uiresthat the eDistence of pro&a&le cause is or should &e determined solely &y a speci:c)ind of evidence. ,urely this could not have &een contemplated &y the framers ofthe Constitution and we do not &elieve that the Court intended the statement

in 20th Century Foxregarding master tapes as the dictum for all seasons andreasons in infringement cases.

(urning now to the case at &ar it can &e gleaned from the records that thelower court followed the prescri&ed procedure for the issuances of a search warrant9=1> the eDamination under oath or armation of the complainant and his witnesseswith them particularly descri&ing the place to &e searched and the things to &eseied =2> an eDamination personally conducted &y the Fudge in the form ofsearching +uestions and answers in writing and under oath of the complainant andwitnesses on facts personally )nown to them and =$> the ta)ing of swornstatements together with the adavits su&mitted which were duly attached to therecords.

(hereafter the court a quomade the following factual :ndings leading to theissuance of the search warrant now su&Fect to this controversy9

7n the instant case the following facts have &een esta&lished9 =1> copyrighted videotapes &earing titles enumerated in ,earch -arrant No. */0#$ were &eing soldleased distri&uted or circulated or oLered for sale lease distri&ution ortransferred or caused to &e transferred &y defendants at their video outlets withoutthe written consent of the private complainants or their assignee =2> recovered orcon:scated from defendants possession were video tapes containing copyrightedmotion picture :lms without the authority of the complainant =$> the video tapesoriginated from spurious or unauthoried persons and => said video tapes were

eDact reproductions of the :lms listed in the search warrant whose copyrights ordistri&ution rights were owned &y complainants.

(he &asis of these facts are the adavits and depositions of NB7 ,enior Agent @auroC. 'eyes Atty. 'ico


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'eyes personally went to ,unshine ;ome cases have a common factual milieu &oth involve alleged piratedcopyrighted :lms of private complainants which were found in the possession orcontrol of the defendants. ;ence the necessity of the presentation of the mastertapes from which the pirated :lms were allegedly copied is necessary in the instantcase to esta&lish the eDistence of pro&a&le cause. [/]

Being &ased solely on an unFusti:a&le and improper retroactive application ofthe master tape re+uirement generated &y 20th Century Foxupon a factualsituation completely diLerent from that in the case at &ar and without anythingmore this later order clearly de:es elemental fair play and is a gross reversi&leerror. 7n fact this o&servation of the Court in >a Chemise>acoste, $.A. vs.Fernan!e*, et al. supra may Fust as easily apply to the present case9

A review of the grounds invo)ed D D D in his motion to +uash the search warrantsreveals the fact that they are not appropriate for +uashing a warrant. (hey arematters of defense which should &e ventilated during the trial on the merits of thecase. D D D

As correctly pointed out &y petitioners a &lind espousal of the re+uisite ofpresentation of the master tapes in copyright infringement cases as the primedeterminant of pro&a&le cause is too eDacting and impractica&le a re+uirement to&e complied with in a search warrant application which it must not &e overloo)edis only an ancillary proceeding. urther on realistic considerations a strictapplication of said re+uirement militates against the elements of secrecy and speedwhich underlie covert investigative and surveillance operations in policeenforcement campaigns against all forms of criminality considering that the mastertapes of a motion picture re+uired to &e presented &efore the court consists ofseveral reels contained in circular steel casings which &ecause of their &ul) willde:nitely draw attention unli)e diminutive o&Fects li)e video tapes which can &eeasily concealed.[/3]-ith hundreds of titles &eing pirated this onerous and tedious

imposition would &e multiplied a hundredfold &y Fudicial :at discouraging andpreventing legal recourses in foreign Furisdictions.

Piven the present international awareness and furor over violations in largescale of intellectual property rights calling for transnational sanctions it &earscalling to mind the Court%s admonition also in >a Chemise >acoste, supra that I

D D D. Judges all over the country are well advised to remem&er that court processesshould not &e used as instruments to unwittingly or otherwise aid counterfeiters


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and intellectual pirates tie the hands of the law as it see)s to protect the ilipinoconsuming pu&lic and frustrate eDecutive and administrative implementation ofsolemn commitments pursuant to international conventions and treaties.

III

(he amendment of ,ection 3 of 4residential 5ecree No. ! &y 4residential5ecree No. 1!*/[//]which should here &e pu&licied Fudicially &rought a&out therevision of its penalty structure and enumerated additional acts considered violativeof said decree on intellectual property namely =1> directly or indirectly transferringor causing to &e transferred any sound recording or motion picture or other audio0visual wor)s so recorded with intent to sell lease pu&licly eDhi&it or cause to &esold leased or pu&licly eDhi&ited or to use or cause to &e used for pro:t sucharticles on which sounds motion pictures or other audio0visual wor)s are sotransferred without the written consent of the owner or his assignee =2> sellingleasing distri&uting circulating pu&licly eDhi&iting or oLering for sale leasedistri&ution or possessing for the purpose of sale lease distri&ution circulation orpu&lic eDhi&ition any of the a&ovementioned articles without the written consent of

the owner or his assignee and =$> directly or indirectly oLering or ma)ing availa&lefor a fee rental or any other form of compensation any e+uipment machineryparaphernalia or any material with the )nowledge that such e+uipment machineryparaphernalia or material will &e used &y another to reproduce without the consentof the owner any phonograph record disc wire tape :lm or other article on whichsounds motion pictures or other audio0visual recordings may &e transferred andwhich provide distinct &ases for criminal prosecution &eing crimes independentlypunisha&le under 4residential 5ecree No. ! as amended aside from the act ofinfringing or aiding or a&etting such infringement under ,ection 2!.

(he trial court%s :nding that private respondents committed acts in &latanttransgression of 4residential 5ecree No. ! all the more &olsters its :ndings of

pro&a&le cause which determination can &e reached even in the a&sence of mastertapes &y the Fudge in the eDercise of sound discretion. (he eDecutive concern andresolve eDpressed in the foregoing amendments to the decree for the protection ofintellectual property rights should &e matched &y corresponding Fudicial vigilanceand activism instead of the apathy of su&mitting to technicalities in the face ofample evidence of guilt.

(he essence of intellectual piracy should &e essayed in conceptual terms inorder to underscore its gravity &y an appropriate understandingthereof. 7nfringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned andoccupied &y the owner of the copyright and therefore protected &y law andinfringement of copyright or piracy which is a synonymous term in this connectionconsists in the doing &y any person without the consent of the owner of the

copyright of anything the sole right to do which is conferred &y statute on theowner of the copyright.[/*]

A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original and it is no defense that thepirate in such cases did not )now what wor)s he was indirectly copying or did not)now whether or not he was infringing any copyright he at least )new that what hewas copying was not his and he copied at his peril. 7n determining the +uestion ofinfringement the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted wor) is animportant consideration. (o constitute infringement it is not necessary that the


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whole or even a large portion of the wor) shall have &een copied. 7f so much ista)en that the value of the original is sensi&ly diminished or the la&ors of theoriginal author are su&stantially and to an inFurious eDtent appropriated &y anotherthat is sucient in point of law to constitute a piracy. [/!](he +uestion of whetherthere has &een an actiona&le infringement of a literary musical or artistic wor) inmotion pictures radio or television &eing one of fact[*#]it should properly &e

determined during the trial. (hat is the stage calling for conclusive orpreponderating evidence and not the summary proceeding for the issuance of asearch warrant wherein &oth lower courts erroneously re+uire the master tapes.

7n disregarding private respondent%s argument that ,earch -arrant No. */0#$is a general warrant the lower court o&served that 6it was worded in a manner thatthe enumerated seia&le items &ear direct relation to the oLense of violation of ,ec.3 of 45 ! as amended. 7t authoried only the seiur=e> of articles used orintended to &e used in the unlawful sale lease and other unconcerted acts inviolation of 45 ! as amended. D D D.8[*1]

?n this point #ache an! Co., 7"hil.9, 3nc., et al. vs. 1ui*, et al .[*2]instructs andenlightens9

A search warrant may &e said to particularly descri&e the things to &e seied whenthe description therein is as speci:c as the circumstances will ordinarily allow=4eople vs.'u&io / 4hil. $*> or when the description eDpresses a conclusion offact I not of law I &y which the warrant ocer may &e guided in ma)ing thesearch and seiure =i!em. dissent of A&ad ,antos).> or when the things descri&edare limited to those which &ear direct relation to the oLense for which the warrant is&eing issued =,ec. 2 'ule 123 'evised 'ules of Court>. D D D. 7f the articles desiredto &e seied have any direct relation to an oLense committed the applicant mustnecessarily have some evidence other than those articles to prove the saidoLense and the articles su&Fect of search and seiure should come in handy

merely to strengthen such evidence. D D D.

?n private respondents% averment that the search warrant was made applica&leto more than one speci:c oLense on the ground that there are as many oLenses ofinfringement as there are rights protected and therefore to issue one searchwarrant for all the movie titles allegedly pirated violates the rule that a searchwarrant must &e issued only in connection with one speci:c oLense the lower courtsaid9

D D D. As the face of the search warrant itself indicates it was issued for violation of,ection 3 45 ! as amended only. (he speci:cations therein =in AnneD A> merelyrefer to the titles of the copyrighted motion pictures:lms &elonging to private

complainants which defendants were in controlpossession for sale leasedistri&ution or pu&lic eDhi&ition in contravention of ,ec. 3 45 ! as amended. [*$]

(hat there were several counts of the oLense of copyright infringement and thesearch warrant uncovered several contra&and items in the form of pirated videotapes is not to &e confused with the num&er of oLenses charged. (he searchwarrant herein issued does not violate the one0speci:c0oLense rule.


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7t is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with theregistration and deposit re+uirements under 4residential 5ecree No. ! asprere+uisites for invo)ing the court%s protective mantle in copyright infringementcases. As eDplained &y the court &elow9

5efendants0movants contend that 45 ! as amended covers only producers who

have complied with the re+uirements of deposit and notice =in other wordsregistration> under ,ections ! and # thereof. A&sent such registration as in thiscase there was no right created hence no infringement under 45 ! asamended. (his is not well0ta)en.

As correctly pointed out &y private complainants0oppositors the 5epartment ofJustice has resolved this legal +uestion as far &ac) as 5ecem&er 12 1!/* in its?pinion No. 1!1 of the then ,ecretary of Justice weightand respect.

DDD DDD DDD

5efendants0movants maintain that complainant and his witnesses led the Court to&elieve that a crime eDisted when in fact there was none. (his is wrong. As earlier

discussed 45 ! as amended does not re+uire registration and deposit for acreator to &e a&le to :le an action for infringement of his rights. (hese conditionsare merely pre0re+uisites to an action for damages. ,o as long as the proscri&edacts are shown to eDist an action for infringement may &e initiated.[*]

Accordingly the certi:cations[*]from the Copyright ,ection of the National @i&rarypresented as evidence &y private respondents to show non0registration of some ofthe :lms of petitioners assume no evidentiary weight or signi:cance whatsoever.

urthermore a closer review of 4residential 5ecree No. ! reveals that evenwith respect to wor)s which are re+uired under ,ection 23 thereof to &e registeredand with copies to &e deposited with the National @i&rary such as &oo)s includingcomposite and cyclopedic wor)s manuscripts directories and gaetteers andperiodicals including pamphlets and newspapers lectures sermons addressesdissertations prepared for oral delivery and letters the failure to comply with saidre+uirements does not deprive the copyright owner of the right to sue forinfringement. ,uch non0compliance merely limits the remedies availa&le to him andsu&Fects him to the corresponding sanction.

(he reason for this is eDpressed in ,ection 2 of the decree which prefaces itsenumeration of copyrighta&le wor)s with the eDplicit statement that 6the rightsgranted under this 5ecree shall from the moment of creation su&sist with respect


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to any of the following classes of wor)s.8 (his means that under the present stateof the law the copyright for a wor) is ac+uired &y an intellectual creator from themoment of creation even in the a&sence of registration and deposit. As has &eenauthoritatively clari:ed9

(he registration and deposit of two complete copies or reproductions of the wor)

with the National @i&rary within three wee)s after the :rst pu&lic dissemination orperformance of the wor) as provided for in ,ection 23 =4.5. No. ! as amended> isnot for the purpose of securing a copyright of the wor) &ut rather to avoid thepenalty for non0compliance of the deposit of said two copies and in order to recoverdamages in an infringement suit.[*3]

?ne distressing o&servation. (his case has &een fought on the &asis of and itsresolution long delayed &y resort to technicalities to a virtually a&usive eDtent &yprivate respondents without so much as an attempt to adduce any credi&leevidence showing that they conduct their &usiness legitimately and fairly. (he factthat private respondents could not show proof of their authority or that there wasconsent from the copyright owners for them to sell lease distri&ute or circulatepetitioners% copyrighted :lms immeasura&ly &olsters the lower court%s initial :ndingof pro&a&le cause. (hat private respondents are licensed &y the

Documents

Columbia Pictures vs. CA - August 28, 1996 (Full Text)