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10th Annual Conference of the Group of Experts on Amended Protocol IIApril 2013
“Counter-IED in AFGHANISTAN from a German perspective.Lessons learned and best practices“
Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Centre Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command
Colonel (GS) Helmut Heck
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMCurriculum Vitae
Director, C-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMColonel (GS) Helmut Heck
Date of Birth: 3 December 1956Place of Birth: Bitburg/GermanyMarital Status: Married, 2 children
From - To Assignments76 Entry into the Bundeswehr, Signal Intelligence Battalion 940 (Daun)76 - 79 Training to become signals intelligence NCO/officer79 - 83 Education studies at the Bundeswehr University (Munich)83 - 88 Platoon Cdr and Company Cdr, 3 Coy/Signal Battalion 220 (Donauwörth)88 - 91 Departmental Head of Mobile Signal Intelligence at the Army Office (Cologne)91 - 96 Company Cdr, 4 Coy/Signal Battalion 220 and Chief Evaluation, Signal Battalion 22096 - 98 G2 Ops, II (GE/US) Corps (Ulm)98 - 01 Cdr, Signal Regiment 320 (Frankenberg/Eder)01 - 04 Chief Evaluation, Signals and Electronic Intelligence Brigade 94 /Signal Group 93 (Daun)04 - 06 Electronic Warfare Staff Officer, J3 Division, Strategic Reconnaissance Command (Rheinbach)06 - 09 MoD, Army Staff III 5 (Bonn)09 - 12 Director, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Information Centre (Grafschaft-Gelsdorf)Since 2012 Director, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Centre (Grafschaft-Gelsdorf)
8 April 2013 2
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMAgenda
1. The IED Threat
WORLDWIDE
AFGHANISTAN
2. IED Fundamentals
3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training ”Own TTPs”
38 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMAgenda
1. The IED Threat
WORLDWIDE
AFGHANISTAN
2. IED Fundamentals
3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training ”Own TTPs”
48 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM2. The IED Threat
From open internet sources
5
25.12.2011
Madalla, Nigeria
10.05.2012
Damaskus, Syrien
8 April 2013
Djerba, Tunisia Instanbul, Turkey Madrid, Spain Beslan, Russia
London, Great BritainDahab, EgyptMadalla, Nigeria Northwest province,PakistanDamascus, Syria
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM2. The IED Threat
Source: CFC - www.cimicweb.orgJIEDDO - www.jieddo.mil (without IRQ & AFG)
(UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO) 25-MONTH AVERAGES1. IED-Events (per month)-525 INCIDENTS1,
• 272 DETONATIONS • 253 FINDS
-69 CACHES
2. Casualties (per month)319 KILLED 854 WOUNDED
3. Top CountriesColombiaPakistanSyriaIndiaUSA
68 April 2013
1 Incidents includes detonations and finds
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMAgenda
1. The IED Threat
WORLDWIDE
AFGHANISTAN
2. IED Fundamentals
3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training ”Own TTPs”
78 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
RC NORTHRC NORTH
RC EASTRC EAST
RC WESTRC WEST
RC CAPITALRC CAPITAL
RC SOUTHRC SOUTH
RC RC SOUTHWESTSOUTHWEST
BADAKHSHAN
LAGHMAN KONARNURESTAN
TAKHAR
NANGARHARVARDAK
PAKTIA
KHOWST
PAKTIKA
SAMANGAN
KUNDUZ
BAMIAN
GHAZNI
ZABUL
ORUZGAN
BALKH
SAR-E POL
JOWZJAN
FARYAB
BADGHIS
HERAT
FARAH
NIMRUZ
HELMAND KANDAHAR
DAYKONDIGHOWR
PANJSHIR
PARWANKAPISA
BAGHLAN
LOWGAR
KABUL
TKMTKM
IRNIRN
UZBUZB TJKTJK
PAKPAK
CHNCHN
ThreatThreat
High
Considerable
Medium
Low
2. The IED Threat - AFG
Source: C-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM 88 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
IED Trend 2008 – JANUARY 2013
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN
Vorfälle
Trend
4,275
8,05414,394 16,295 14,690 AFG
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
ISAF ANSF ZIV Gesamt0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
ISAF ANSF ZIV Gesamt
200820092010201120122013
Casualties 2008 – JANUARY 2013
Killed Injured/Wounded
2. The IED Threat - AFG
98 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMAgenda
1. The IED Threat
WORLDWIDE
AFGHANISTAN
2. IED Fundamentals
3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training ”Own TTPs”
108 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM3. IED Fundamentals
An attacker is only limited by the components available and his own resourcefulness.
118 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
An IED is a device manufactured and emplaced in an improvised manner, incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary or pyrotechnic substances. It is designed to kill, injure or destroy, harass or distract.C-IED Concept, FMOD, Armed Forces Staff IV 3/V 1 dated 4 December 2007
What is an IED?
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are one of the weapons of choice for an asymmetrically operating enemy. They are still the biggest threat to military forces in an asymmetric scenario.
3. IED Fundamentals
128 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Production of HME Storage of HME
3. IED Fundamentals
13
The enemy is innovative, adaptive and unscrupulous!The enemy is innovative, adaptive and unscrupulous!
• INEXPENSIVE, EASY to build using commercial technology and easy to emplace• IED components readily available throughout the area, no lengthy procurement
processes• Small RISK – Big SUCCESS, precise and lethal• Demoralise the population, create an instable security situation• Turn the population against governmental organisations / ISAF• Unlimited opportunities for production and proliferation
WHY IEDs? Employment and Effects
8 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Power Source
Firing Switch Main Charge
Initiator+
-
Container
An IED usually contains five components. Building an IED
3. IED Fundamentals
148 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Main Charge Commercial Explosives
Military Explosives
Homemade Explosives (HME)
Common Explosives in IEDs
3. IED Fundamentals
158 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
59
2 2 2
18
17
Ammonium nitrate(AN)Ammonium nitrate/Aluminium(ANAL)Potassium Chlorate (PC)
Potassium Nitrate
Urea nitrate
other
In per cent of analysed IEDs
HME Mixtures in Afghanistan
More than 80 per cent of the main charges in Afghanistan are made from homemade explosives (HME). Commercial explosives were found only in a small number of IED incidents.
Main ingredients in HME in Afghanistan:
3. IED Fundamentals
168 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Production Facilities and Smuggling Routes
Match Facility
AN Facility
AN Flow
PC Flow
Urea Facility
3. IED Fundamentals
178 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Vehicle Track
Main Charge
Battery
Receiver
Transmitter
A radio-controlled IED is a command-operated IED (COIED). RCIEDs use a remote controlled firing system consisting of a transmitter and a receiver. The transmitter sends a signal to the receiver. Upon reception of the signal, the firing circuit is completed, the electrical initiator is activated by the power source and the IED is caused to detonate.
Example: Radio Controlled IED (RCIED)Electronic firing switches
The most common RC switch in Afghanistan is based on a modified commercial garage door opener.
Commercial receiver board with self-made decoder board Commercial transmitter
3. IED Fundamentals
188 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Most of the commercial electronic components used in IEDs in Afghanistan are made in China.
They are sold worldwide by several (internet) shops.
Electronic firing switches
3. IED Fundamentals
198 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
2004 2005 2008 2009 2010
RCIED
SIED
VOIED
CWIED
NMCPPLMCPP
ECM equipment
Protection and jamming equipment
Increased use of
RCP and metal detectors
200720062003 2011
INS
2012
RCIEDRC-N
3. IED Fundamentals
2013
208 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMAgenda
1. The IED Threat
WORLDWIDE
AFGHANISTAN
2. IED Fundamentals
3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training ”Own TTPs”
218 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
ENEMY TTPLESSONS
IDENTIFIED
LESSONS
IDENTIFIED
LESSONS
IDENTIFIED ?
?
ENY RCIED Switch Techniques
RCIED Main Switch Type Threat
RCIED Switch Type
RCIED Different Switch
Type Threats
RCIED Switch Type
RCIED Programmable
SwitchType Threats
RCIED SwitchType
ECMresponsive FP against various RCIED threats
responsive• switch type
signal detection
• flexible reaction
• Threat assesment
LESSONS
IDENTIFIED
ECMFP against
RCIED main threat
non programmable“one fits all“
solution
OWN TTPsLESSONS
IDENTIFIED
ECMprogrammable
FP against various RCIED
threats
programmable• signal power• frequency• waveform
LESSONS
IDENTIFIEDConclusion• ENY forces developed their TTPs and proved themselves as flexible and
challenging opponents using various & cunning RCIEDs (uneducated does not mean “dumb“)
• OWN forces strengthen their efforts to further develop flexible ECM techniques and systems to respond to the threat, conduct an effective threat assessment and take the initiative in the “invisible electronic war“
Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Technology
228 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
ENEMY TTP
OWN TTP
LESSONS
IDENTIFIEDLESSONS
IDENTIFIED ?
LESSONS
IDENTIFIED
LESSONS
IDENTIFIED
no ECMno FP against
RCIED
No awareness of the RCIED threat
RCIED Against
vehicles / mounted CF
Target Acquisition• unprotected• predictable
ECMvehicle mounted
ECM FP• mounted
movements• convoys
ECM vehicle
mounted & manpack
ECM FP• mounted/
dismounted movements
• static operations
• EOD/EOR procedures
Countering EOR/EOD • EOR procedures• dismounted patrols
RCIED Against
mounted / dismounted CF
Conclusion• ENY forces reacted immediately to the lack of deployed or ineffective ECM
systems during all operations. They used RCIEDs as the weapon of choice in the RC North.
• OWN forces first misunderstood ECM as a limiting factor (communications etc.) and not as a part of force protection. Then they started deploying ECM systems and implemented ECM into pre-deployment training, leadership training and operations planning.
ENY RCIED Tactics
Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Technology
238 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Fitting selected existing vehicles with demining systems for convoy protection.Advantage
• Improved protection for patrols/convoys• Independence of engineer support (scarce resources:
RC Sys, EOD) time, reduced exposition to hostile reconnaissance
Disadvantage• Additional attachment (cost, driver training)
MRAP Bushmaster (AUS) with mine roller
IFV Bradley (USA) with mine roller
ESV Stryker (USA) with mine roller
ATF Dingo with SPARK OEF+ mine roller
SOUVIM 2 with KALIF mine roller
LEMIR mine roller fitted to armoured multipurpose vehicle
Technology
248 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMTechnology
• Transport case with evaluation equipment
• Can be carried in backpacks during dismounted operations
• Employed to evaluate IED incidents
• Geared to field evaluation needs
258 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMAgenda
1. The IED Threat
WORLDWIDE
AFGHANISTAN
2. IED Fundamentals
3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training ”Own TTPs”
268 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
QualifiedCapability
A
ExtendedCapability
B
Basic Capability
• 5/25 Check• 4 “C“• VP Check
C
EOR Procedures:
4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Methods
278 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
CONFIRM
CLEAR
CORDON
CONTROL
Confirm suspected IED(from a distance, then SWEEP, if required )
Clear the area- no passing the location again, no pushing through or
splitting up,- 200 to 400 m, depending on terrain and vehicles,- continued line of sight to the suspected location/scene of
attack,- 5-25 checkCordon off- self-protection,- no-one must approach the site,- bypass site on foot, if required
Control the situation- report- secure - establish reporting point to receive support forces
4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Methods
Improvised Explosive Device – “4 C’s“ Policy
288 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Short halt (about 2 minutes)- 5-25 check- Communication- All-round security
25 m
5 m
Search for IEDs- Holes- Colours- Cables- Markings- Antennas- Changes
Longer halt- Security areas- Vehicle checkpoints- Situation adapted- Communication
BildSVBIED SITE
Attack- 5-25 check
25 m
5 m
25 m
5 m
4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Methods
Improvised Explosive Device – “5-25 Check”
298 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Note: The GSA capability has manifold applications. The graph only shows C-IED relevant GSA methods used to contribute to the protection against the general IED threat in AFGHANISTAN.
Ground Sign Awareness
ProtectionProtection
DefensiveDefensive
EOR proceduresEOR procedures
Ground Sign AwarenessGround Sign Awareness
OffensiveOffensive
C-IED TrackingC-IED Tracking Combat Tracking
Aerial and Imagery Reconnaissance
Aerial and Imagery Reconnaissance
Personal TracesPersonal Traces Tracking Hostile Forces
4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Methods
308 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMAgenda
1. The IED Threat
WORLDWIDE
AFGHANISTAN
2. IED Fundamentals
3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training ”Own TTPs”
318 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Equipment
Ballistic Underwear
“Future Infantryman” Equipment
• Adapt and enhance personal equipment of every soldier
• Test ballistic underwear
328 April 2013
Version III (only soldiers with direct interface to IdZ*-system)
Version II(vehicle crew, support
troops)
basic equipmentVersion I(HQ staff)
*IdZ (DEU: Infanterist der Zukunft = Future Infantryman
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMAgenda
1. The IED Threat
WORLDWIDE
AFGHANISTAN
2. IED Fundamentals
3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training ”Own TTPs”
338 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Counter-IED Training IAW Joint Training Concept C-IED, Army Office, dated 31 October 2012
4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Training
348 April 2013
4
3
2
1
C-IED personnel in Brig/Div-HQ and special assignment
(C-IED distinctive competencies)
C-IED personnel in Btl-HQ (C-IED advisor)
C-IED personnel in Coy (C-IED/EOC/EOD/IEDD Officer/NCO)
every soldier
QualifiedCapability
ExtendedCapability
BasicCapability
Level Personnel
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Pre-Deployment Counter-IED Training to Date
NationalCounter–IED Courses
- For C-IED Personnel in Staff Assignments - For Instructors at Central Training
Facilities- Operator Course for Counter-IED Devices
Orientation Courses- Orientation for Command Personnel
at BwJFOCOM- Counter-IED Module for Command
Personnel (C-IED Seminar)
4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Training
35
1.1. MissionMission--oriented conflict oriented conflict prevention and crisis prevention and crisis management trainingmanagement training
2.2. CounterCounter--IED training as part of IED training as part of missionmission--oriented conflict oriented conflict prevention and crisis prevention and crisis management training management training
3.3. PrePre--deployment Counterdeployment Counter--IED IED training to datetraining to date
4.4. PrePre--deployment Counterdeployment Counter--IED IED training since 2012 training since 2012
8 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Mission-Oriented CPCM Training Concept In Theatre Training (Outdoor)
4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Training
36
Deployment
8 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
5m
10m
15m
20m
0
25m
30m
35m
40m
45m
50m
55m
60m
65m
70m
75m
80m
5m 10m 15m 20m 25m 30m 35m0
5m
10m
15m
20m
0
25m
30m
35m
40m
45m
50m
55m
60m
65m
70m
75m
80m
6m
7m
8m
7m
2 m (Depth)
,5 m
,5 m
1m
3 m
10 m
10 m
15 m
16 m
,5m
,5m
,5m
,5m
Elevation of the Road and Track (2 feet)
Front
Back
Side
Top View
35 meters
20 feet
20 feet
35 meters
20 feet
20 feet
Entrance for Vehicles (Large enough for MRAP
Entrance for Vehicles (Large enough for MRAP
80 meters
35 meters
80 meters
Car
Mud WallComplex
4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Training
37
Mission-Oriented CPCM Training Concept In Theatre Training (Indoor)
8 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMAgenda
1. The IED Threat
WORLDWIDE
AFGHANISTAN
2. IED Fundamentals
3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training ”Own TTPs”
388 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
ADDITIONAL BEAM EQUIPMENTSensor:- Camera (Stereo RGB)- Detector (GPR/MD)TOOLS:- Culvert-Camera- Grabber- Fork- Water- /Air Spade
4. Organisation
DEU Route Clearance System (RCSys)
398 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
48h
72h – 28d
20h – 100d
VorlAuswK SOP 10371
24h/ 72h/ 7d
National ISAF
72h/ 10d/ 28d
5d/ 30d/ 100d
4. Organisation
408 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMIED Exploitation in Afghanistan
Level 1 – Field Exploitation• Explosive Ordnance Disposal • Military Police • Intelligence
German capability
Level 2 – In Theatre Laboratory• Chemical identification • Electronics identification • Biometrics preservation (DNA, latent prints)
lead nation USA, German participation
Level 3 – Out of Theatre • Technical and scientific investigation• Forensic examination• Tactical assessment
German Capability
418 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
AFG CAPTURED MATERIAL EXPLOITATION (ACME) LABORATORIES
ACME at CAMP MAZAR-E-SHARIF
- Operational Readiness since October 2010.
- Timely Examination of Evidence from RC-N Possible. Optimisation of Attack Analysis.
- DEU Contribution: Two Posts.- Electronics Specialist- Specialist Personnel for Weapons Effects
Technical Technical EvaluationEvaluation
Biometric Biometric Analyses Analyses
VorVor--OrtOrt--UntersUnters.. von Zwischenfvon Zwischenf..
4. Organisation
428 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
Technical Technical EvaluationEvaluation
Biometric Biometric AnalysisAnalysis
Field Field ExploitationExploitation
ASIC
CCIRM
C-IED Advisor
ICC & ICCT
Exploitation
Pre- Deployment
Trg
SOFLE
Targeting
OPLAN
Combat Develop-
ment
4. Organisation
438 April 2013
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
IncidentIncident
Test ProceduresTest ProceduresDevelopment of
Vehicles Development of
VehiclesConstruction
of New VehiclesConstruction
of New Vehicles
TTPTTP
Threat AnalysisThreat Analysis
Aims of ETAV*German Level 3 “Out of theatre exploitation”
448 April 2013*Expert Group for the Technical Analysis of Incidents
Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM
“Counter-IED in AFGHANISTAN From a German Perspective.Lessons Learned and Best Practices”
Colonel (GS) Helmut Heck
Thanks For Your Attention!
458 April 2013