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Colombia and the FARC Full Circle?
Following the death of Mono Jojoy, the guerrillas military
chief, many analysts,
including the president himself, predicted that it was the
beginning of the end for
the FARC. However, just over three months later, FARC head
Alfonso Cano gave
a New Year address posted on Anncol which claimed that the FARC
wouldmultiply their actions in every sense in 2011. Although Cano
left the door open
for a negotiated settlement, provided that the governments
efforts to introduce
the ley de restitucin de tierrasand the ley de victimas were
taken seriously
by congress, it is clear that the real motive of the address was
to state
emphatically that the FARC are anything but finished. Since the
New Year there
have been numerous FARC attacks, the most serious of which were
the three in
Neiva (Huila) at the beginning of January, which caused
extensive damage to
property but miraculously neither killed nor seriously injured
anyone, and
another in San Vicente del Caguan where nine people were
killed.
That the FARC are weakened is beyond doubt, as is demonstrated
by the poor
planning and lack of resources for the Neiva attacks, as well as
continued
desertions. However, to say that they are finished would
certainly be premature.
The FARC have suffered continuous setbacks over the course of
the past ten
years but somehow they dont seem enough to break them. The
complexity of
the Colombian conflict is such that the old adage of the straw
that broke the
camels back is simply not appropriate here.
The conflict in Colombian long ceased to be a relatively
straightforward case of
war between a state and left wing rebels. The involvement of the
FARC in drug
trafficking has complicated the conflict to such an extent that
today it seemsunlikely that one problem will be solved without the
other. Throw into the mix a
variety of continued paramilitary activity in illegal land
grabs, displacements,
drug trafficking and other organised criminal acts, and you have
a seriously
complicated conflict. In this scenario, where competition for
control of lucrative
drug routes has become more competitive, and where the
guerrillas are facing a
sustained onslaught from the state security services, FARC
numbers have
dropped to an estimated 8,000-10,000 combatants half of what
they were a
decade ago.
But the FARC is nothing if not adaptable and, as income from
kidnapping anddrug trafficking has dwindled, evidence obtained from
memory sticks and hard
drives seized during the raid that killed Mono Jojoy, apparently
revealed
extensive reliance by some FARC fronts on revenues coming from
illegal gold
mining. The FARC either mines the gold itself or extracts a tax
from small-scale
local miners, who are almost always operating illegally. However
the illicit gold
trade is not the exclusive preserve of the guerrillas, as new
criminal gangs have
emerged from the remnants of demobilised paramilitaries who are
also involved
in this trade. Group such as LosRastrojos, and theAguilasNegras,
are reported
to have formed tentative alliances with the FARC in
resource-rich areas. As the
price of gold nears record levels, the main problem now for the
Colombian
government is this emerging alianza diablica between the FARC
and the
http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2010/Septiembre/Paginas/20100926_01.aspxhttp://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/13632-farc-to-redouble-actions-in-2011.htmlhttp://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/articulo-244342-presunto-guerrillero-deserta-de-farc-y-se-entrega-militares-de-ehttp://www.economist.com/node/18013780?story_id=18013780&fsrc=rsshttp://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2010/Septiembre/Paginas/20100926_01.aspxhttp://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/13632-farc-to-redouble-actions-in-2011.htmlhttp://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/articulo-244342-presunto-guerrillero-deserta-de-farc-y-se-entrega-militares-de-ehttp://www.economist.com/node/18013780?story_id=18013780&fsrc=rss
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newly-labelled BACRIM (bandas criminales) such as the Rastrojos
and Aguilas
Negras.
In an interview for BBCs Hardtalk, Santos claimed that as a
precondition for any
peace talks with the FARC they had to make a serious gesture
towards peace
such as releasing all their hostages. It is not clear, however,
what effect a peaceagreement would have on the conflict, nor to
what extent a deal with the FARC
would help or hinder the wider fight against paramilitaries and
drug trafficking.
The FARC announced at the end of December that they would free
five of their
longest-held hostages and, although the details of the release
are still being
hammered out, it is expected to take place soon.
With several progressive laws already passed (health reform,
labour
formalisation), and others pending (ley de victimas and ley de
tierras), the
government appears, at least on the surface, to be serious in
its attempt to
tackle the conflict from all angles. As well as acknowledging
the new challenge of
BACRIM as the most pressing challenge for his administration,
Congress gave
President Santos decree powers in order to cope with the two
million flood
victims and the extensive rebuilding of infrastructure that has
become necessary
after months of heavy rains. Santos has also named a new
Attorney-General,
Vivianne Morales, who in a joint statement with the President,
announced
tackling impunity as her main goal.
Critics however, argue that President Santos is a canny
politician, and much
more PR-savvy than his brash and brazen predecessor. He may be
just making
the right noises to boost Colombias world image and to maintain
levels of
foreign investment, which are only benefitting upper middle
class and eliteColombians. They argue that human rights violations,
displacement, and land-
grabs have not diminished during his first six months in office.
It is difficult,
however, not to feel that the chance of Colombia leaving behind
decades of
conflict hinges on the success (or failure) of the ley de
tierras. Here prospects
are not good. In a talk at Canning House a few weeks ago,
Colombian Finance
Minister Juan Carlos Echeverry claimed that agriculture was
going to be one of
the drivers of the Colombian economy over the next ten years and
that his
government didnt like talk of land reform, preferring instead
agricultural
reform. This suggests that, while the government may allow some
limited
reallocation of land in order to increase production, it has no
intention of tacklingthe profound social inequalities inherent in
the system of land tenure.
In any case, redistributing more than two million hectares of
land would be a
complicated process, not least in terms of how the process would
be funded
something critics say the government has been vague about. But,
given that the
unequal distribution of land in Colombia something that dates
back to the
arrival of the Spanish conquistadors was the original reason
revolutionary
groups such as the FARC took up arms, it would be good a place
to start. Unless
real progress is made on the ley de tierras, prospects for peace
seem remote.
http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/judicial/articulo-247770-farc-bacrim-alianza-diabolicahttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9382222.stmhttp://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/articulo-248057-operativo-de-liberacion-se-retrasa-hasta-miercoles-de-otra-semanhttp://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/ley-tierras-ley-victimas-tendran-capitulo-restitucion-desplazados/144198.aspxhttp://www.elespectador.com/impreso/judicial/articulo-247770-farc-bacrim-alianza-diabolicahttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9382222.stmhttp://www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/articulo-248057-operativo-de-liberacion-se-retrasa-hasta-miercoles-de-otra-semanhttp://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/ley-tierras-ley-victimas-tendran-capitulo-restitucion-desplazados/144198.aspx
