Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character

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Cognitive practices and cognitivecharacterRichard Menary aa ARC Centre for Excellence in Cognition and Its Disorders,Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

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Cognitive practices and cognitive character

Richard Menary∗

ARC Centre for Excellence in Cognition and Its Disorders, Department of Philosophy,Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

The argument of this paper is that we should think of the extension of cognitive abilitiesand cognitive character in integrationist terms. Cognitive abilities are extended byacquired practices of creating and manipulating information that is stored in apublicly accessible environment. I call these cognitive practices (2007). In contrast toPritchard (2010) I argue that such processes are integrated into our cognitivecharacters rather than artefacts; such as notebooks. There are two routes to cognitiveextension that I contrast in the paper, the first I call artefact extension which is thenow classic position of the causal coupling of an agent with an artefact. Thisapproach needs to overcome the objection from cognitive outsourcing: that we simplyget an artefact or tool to do the cognitive processing for us without extending ourcognitive abilities. Enculturated cognition, by contrast, does not claim that artefactsthemselves extend our cognitive abilities, but rather that the acquired practices formanipulating artefacts and the information stored in them extend our cognitiveabilities (by augmenting and transforming them). In the rest of the paper I provide aseries of arguments and cases which demonstrate that an enculturated approach worksbetter for both epistemic and cognitive cases of the extension of ability and character.

Keywords: cognitive practices; cognitive character; extended cognition; epistemicvirtue

1. Introduction

In this paper, I defend an integrationist account of the extended nature of cognitive abilitiesand cognitive character. Pritchard (2010) has recently argued that the extended mind iscompatible with recent work in epistemology. For example, in discussing the by nowclassic case of the memory-impaired Otto and his notebook (Clark and Chalmers 1998),Pritchard (2010) states that as long as Otto is “integrating this information resource intohis cognitive character”, integrated cognitive processes can count towards Otto’s genuinecognitive abilities or capacities1 (145). I argue that the processes which integrate interpretedinformation2 that is stored publicly, in a notebook, for example, and interpreted infor-mation3 which is encoded in the brain are governed by learned or acquired cognitive prac-tices (Menary 2007). These practices often require careful and active structuring andretrieval of information from our environments (and as such are not found exclusively“under the skin”). For example, Otto is epistemically (or cognitively) virtuous becausehe diligently maintains the quality and reliability of the information in his notebook.

ISSN 1386-9795 print/ISSN 1741-5918 online

# 2012 Taylor & Francishttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2012.677851

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∗Email: [email protected]

Philosophical ExplorationsVol. 15, No. 2, June 2012, 147–164

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This practice of epistemic diligence is part of Otto’s cognitive character. Consequently,notebooks, personal computers and so on are certainly resources, but it is the activemanipulation of the information stored in the resource that constitutes the cognitiveprocess and can count towards a genuine cognitive ability.

The argument presents a way of distinguishing between two ways of establishing thatcognition is integrated. The first is what I call artefact extension (AE), which is the idea thatan artefact gets integrated into the cognitive system through the right kind of causal coup-ling (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008, 2010) and which puts it on a functional parwith “in-the-head” cognitive processes (Wheeler 2010). The second is what I call encultu-rated cognition (EnC), which is the idea that our cognitive abilities are transformed by acognitive species of cultural practices, which I call cognitive practices (Menary 2007).What we are able do is augmented and transformed by the acquisition of cognitive practices(Menary 2007, 2010a)4. Based on this view, it is the cognitive practices for creating, main-taining and manipulating information stored in artefacts, such as notebooks, that are inte-grated into our cognitive characters. This is an instance of cognitive niche construction5

and maintenance (Sterelny 2003, 2010), but one that goes beyond a merely embedded orscaffolded account of cognitive abilities. The practices themselves are part of the cycleof cognitive processing on this account and not merely causally supportive of in-the-head processes.

The difference between AE and EnC is that the former is not terribly concerned with theactual practices by which we manipulate publicly available information. As such, it is ofteninterpreted as the claim that artefacts such as notebooks and iphones are part of our cognitivesystems because we are causally connected to them6. Critics have been puzzled by this claim,how could my causal connection to my iphone make it part of my mind? (Adams and Aizawa2001, 2008, 2010) Those in favour of AE rely upon a principle of parity, in which the externalartefacts function in such a way that we ought to call them cognitive (Clark 2008; Wheeler2010). AE thereby becomes a kind of extended functionalism, in which the functions arespecified at an abstract and common-sensical level (Clark 2008; Wheeler 2010).

By contrast, I argue that Pritchard’s (2010) account of integrated cognitive abilities andweak cognitive agency fits well within an EnC framework, primarily because cognitivepractices are reliable belief-forming processes and it is these and not artefacts that are inte-grated into cognitive character. Pritchard’s arguments are more closely aligned to EnC thanthey are to AE; his arguments can be contrasted with those of Vaesen (2011), who presents acase in which an artefact is causally responsible for our beliefs, but is not thereby integratedinto our cognitive character. In cases like these, we are outsourcing complexity and proces-sing to an artefact. This is what I call cognitive outsourcing and it is to be contrasted withcognitive practices and cognitive diligence.

In Section 2, I outline some of the central terms in the debate: system and cognitivesystem, cognitive integration and cognitive practices, ability/capacity and process andtypes of extension. In Section 3, I give a brief account of Pritchard’s arguments andexamples which establish a weak account of cognitive agency, requiring only that anagent’s cognitive abilities are to some extent involved in producing cognitive success(i.e. the reliable formation of true beliefs). In Section 4, I look at the reasons for weakagency being sufficient to account for integrated cognitive abilities and I contrast an AEaccount of the Otto case with an EnC account. I argue that EnC provides a betteraccount of the Otto case, by looking at the actual practice of memory notebook use bymemory-impaired patients in clinical case studies (Sohlberg and Mateer 1989). InSection 5, I examine the role of cognitive diligence in a series of cases parallel to thoseof Pritchard (2010) and Clark and Chalmers (1998). The cases illustrate the importance

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of cognitive practices to the concepts of cognitive ability, cognitive agency and cognitivecharacter. The cases also illustrate the importance of EnC when considering cases ofepistemic and cognitive extension.

In Section 6, I argue that these cognitive abilities to create, maintain, manipulate anddeploy information for cognitive success are what really count when considering integratedcognitive abilities and cognitive character. Consequently, cognitive agency depends uponintegrated cognitive abilities in a different way than it does upon the reliability of artefactsor the environment. I suggest that this may be a problem for an artefact-based account of cog-nitive extension and its relationship to epistemological concerns. However, before I proceedwith the argument, I explain how I understand some of the core concepts in this debate.

2. Preliminary considerations

In this section, I briefly consider what I take to be the core concepts at play when consider-ing the possibility of integrated cognition. These concepts are systems and cognitivesystems, cognitive integration and cognitive practices, ability/capacity and process, andtypes of extension – causal coupling and EnC.

2.1 Systems and cognitive systems

A system is a relatively stable entity that is composed of a set of interacting parts thatexchange energy and sometimes information and matter with an environment. Cognitivesystems are determined by a set of relationships between components. These relationshipsalso determine that something is a system component. One can identify a number ofpotential relationships between components: structural, functional and behavioural.When the system components are structurally related, they may share structural propertiesor they may involve hybrid structures – which are ubiquitous in nature (Dawkins 1982;Turner 2000). System components may have functional relations; for example, one com-ponent may depend upon the functionality of another for its own successful functioning.Given inputs to the system, system components combine to produce behavioural outputs.

The functions of components of a system can differ, with different components perform-ing different functions required for the proper operation of the system. It seems clear that allsystem components must contribute (non-trivially) to the behaviour of the system (Rupert2009). In an integrated system (something of a tautology), components are integrated bythese kinds of relationships. The questions left to ask are whether the system is open(e.g. biological systems) and whether it is unbounded. Very open systems share energy,information and matter with their environments and they are constantly interacting withtheir environments. Organisms are quite clearly open systems. Unbounded systems canbe, potentially, expanded with no limit, although the expansion may be functional ratherthan structural. Cognitive systems are clearly not closed, but it is an unresolved questionwhether they are both open and unbounded. I think that there are good reasons for thinkingthat they are open and unbounded7.

One of the reasons for this is the relationship between neural plasticity and a structuredcognitive and developmental environment. The cognitive system is unbounded because wecan gain new abilities which are not fixed by our evolutionary endowments. Learning toread and write is a wonderful, cognitive, example of the brain’s plasticity. Recent workin cognitive neuroscience (Dehaene 1997, 2007) gives us a very clear picture of how theplasticity of the brain in learning allows for the redeployment of neural circuitry forfunctions that were not specified by biological evolution. In other words, these neural

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circuits acquire new culturally specified functions, functions that have only existed forthousands and not millions of years. However, the functions of the new interconnectedcircuits are dependent upon the cultural practices which determine these functions.Consequently, not only is the brain an open system, but it is also functionally unbounded,and its functions can be extended beyond those that we are endowed with by evolution.As Dehaene (2009) himself puts it, “Writing created the conditions for a proper ‘culturalrevolution’ by radically extending our cognitive abilities” (307).

2.2 Cognitive integration and cognitive practices

Cognitive integration is a position that I have developed over recent years (Menary 2006,2007, 2009, 2010a, 2010b), which takes cognitive systems to be integrated wholes that haveinteracting parts, but these parts can include neural, bodily and environmental components.One way to understand integration is to focus on the coordination dynamics of interactingcomponents of a system. The components here might be processes, or they might bestructures. The global behaviours of a system are a product of the coordinations betweensystem components (which may themselves be complex systems). The system is constitutedby its components and their interactions, and its successful functioning requires all its properparts to be in good working order. We often find this kind of relationship in nature, whereorganisms become deeply integrated with parts of their environment, such that theybecome part of the phenotype (they come under selective pressure). Nature is no strangerto the kind of hybrid integrated system that is at the core of cognitive integration.

The interesting thing about dynamical work on cognition is that the interacting com-ponents of cognitive systems are sometimes located spatially outside the central nervoussystem of an organism. However, because the system components coordinate with oneanother to produce the global behaviour of the system, it does not matter that some ofthe components are not located within the skin of the organism. Cognitive practices as pro-cesses and informational structures can be system components even though they are notunder the skin of the organism. Cognitive practices are just these culturally endowedbodily manipulations of informational structures. The practices are normative, there areright and wrong ways to do them, and they are often encoded as rules or procedures tobe followed (especially for the neonate or the novice). However, once they are internalised,they are enacted without the need for reference to these rules/procedures. Take, for example,the case of writing from the previous subsection.

2.3 Ability/capacity and process

A cognitive process is some activity that allows for the achievement of cognitive success,such as remembering something or perceiving something. One can understand processesin computational terms as the execution of instructions or as performing mathematicaloperations according to an algorithm. Classical cognitive science thinks of cognitiveprocesses in these ways, but one might also think of processes as dynamical, as thespread of activation in a neural network, for example.

Some abilities require a faculty8 that allows performance in some domain. So, one hasan ability to perceive if one has the requisite sense and that sense is functioning normally.Some cognitive abilities might be innate, because they depend upon these faculties, butsome might also be acquired, such as mathematical abilities or the ability to ride a bike.It is likely that most cognitive abilities are mixed; they depend upon sensory and brainfunctions and learning or training. The ability to speak and comprehend a natural languageand the ability to read are hybrid abilities in this way; they depend upon domain general

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faculties such as hearing and seeing, but also on an acquired competence to recognise andunderstand, for example, spoken language and written language. Processes and abilities arerelated in that an ability to do something implies processes that do the causal work requiredfor the exercise of the ability. So, my ability to do multiplication implies that there are theright kinds of processes that can perform mathematical computations. I have deliberatelymade this definition location neutral; it may well be that the processes that performmathematical computations turn out to be cognitive practices – bodily manipulations ofmathematical symbols in a shared environment.

2.4 Types of extension

In what ways do our cognitive abilities become extended?9 By extension, I mean that theexercise of the cognitive ability in question includes some physical cognitive processes thatare not brain bound. A further condition is required: the processes in question must be inte-grated into the processing routines for completing cognitive tasks. The relationship is notmerely one of contingent causality – the process merely aids in completing a cognitivetask. It is a relationship of cognitive integration: part of the core set of processing routinesthat directly lead to completing a task. Here are two ways in which abilities do not getextended:

Cognitive outsourcing: We can simply get someone or something to do the processing forus. This is a clever strategy, but hardly an extension of our cognitive abilities10. It is a kind ofcognitive “outsourcing” without integration into our actual cognitive processing routines.

Offloading complexity: We can offload complex cognitive processes to the world,thereby saving on the costs of complex cognitive processing. This move was popular inthe 1990s and was the original motivation for the concept of an epistemic action (Kirshand Maglio 1994). However, simply dumping information into the environment orperforming actions that support or aid online cognition is embedded and not extendedcognition11. Embedding simply allows that cognition is sometimes supported by aids inthe environment, not that they extend it.

Here are two distinct but potentially compatible ways that extension can be thought of:Causal coupling: It is the coupling of internal cognitive processes with external pro-

cesses. The idea is something close to that of functional integration (or at least it oughtto be). Causal integration between internal processing cycles and external processingcycles is so tight that the external cycles become a dynamical part of the overall processingcycle. This definition is open enough that the processes could be manipulations of environ-mental structures or could be the actual causal dynamics of these structures themselves.Therefore, some processing may be conducted by physical manipulations of environmentalstructures and these manipulations are an extension of cognitive ability. However, causalcoupling is usually explained in terms of functional parity: if external processes arefunctionally equivalent (although physically dissimilar) to internal processes and if theywere done in the head, then we would call them cognitive and then these external processesextend our cognitive abilities; this is usually referred to as the parity principle (Clark andChalmers 1998).

The functional integration via causal coupling is supposed to ward off the threat ofcognitive outsourcing, but this will be a source of some tension in both Clark’s functionalistAE and Pritchard’s extended reliabilism, because causal coupling does not guaranteeintegration into cognitive systems or into cognitive character.

Enculturated cognition: These are cognitive processes best performed by bodilymanipulating information structures. The main extension of our cognitive processes is by


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processes that are part of a cultural practice; this is the position adopted by cognitive inte-gration (Menary 2007)12. Many of these practices involve artefacts such as tools, writingsystems, number systems and other kinds of representational systems. These are notsimply static vehicles that have contents, but are active components embedded in dynamicalpatterns of cultural practices. These practices originate in the world and the practices thatgovern them are also in the world. These artefacts and practices are products of culturalevolution, evolving over faster timescales than biological evolution. Writing systems, forexample, are only thousands of years old, and there is no gene for writing. However, cul-tural practices and representations can get under the skin and transform the processing andrepresentational structure of cortical circuitry (see above and Dehaene 1997, 2009; Menary2010a, 2010b). This is the clearest possible case of the extension of a cognitive ability; theinside is transformed to be more like the outside (as a kind of reverse parity principle).In these cases, the processing routines cross from the world into the brain, our cognitiveabilities are enculturated: we get to be readers and writers, mathematicians and so on bya process of transforming existing cognitive abilities to perform new, cultural, functions.

Before moving on, I would like to make absolutely clear what I take to be the coresenses of the central terms of art. In the cognitive cases, I use integration to indicatewhen there is a process of compositional or functional integration of processes and struc-tures into a system. Similarly, I also use integration to indicate when a reliable cognitiveprocess is integrated into the cognitive character of an agent. However, the concepts ofsystem and character are different; cognitive character concerns reliable belief-formingprocesses, but the concept of a system outstrips that of character. A cognitive systemincludes a wider variety of processes and structures and should not be confused withcognitive character.

I use extension to mean distribution, cognition is distributed across brain, body andworld13. I take it that both AE and EnC accounts of extension are working with this defi-nition and that AE and EnC propose different ways in which extension by functional inte-gration might occur. The second is the egregious interpretation of extension to mean thatcognition is first in the head and then gets extended out into the world – as if cognitioncould “leak” out of the brain as it is sometimes put. I do not hold to the egregious interpret-ation at all and have warned against it for some time (Menary 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010c).

Therefore, throughout this paper, I use integration to indicate an instance of functionalintegration and extension for an instance of the transformation (extension) of cognitiveabilities by a non-brain-bound process. When I am talking about AE extension, I meanthe equivalent of functional integration, but by a different route to EnC. I do not useextension in the egregious sense.

This concludes the preliminary discussion of the central concepts. In the next section, Ioutline Pritchard’s epistemological approach to cognitive ability, character and agency andbegin to assemble the argument for EnC.

3. Pritchard on cognitive ability, character and agency

Pritchard (2010) begins his discussion with a fundamental condition that “Knowledge is theproduct of cognitive ability” (134). This is a condition of adequacy and any epistemologicaltheory should comply with such a condition. For example, it is not sufficient for knowledgeto be produced by some reliable belief-forming process; it must have been produced by acognitive ability of the cognitive agent (Pritchard 2010, 134). The ability condition appliesmore generally across cognitive cases; cognitive success (such as remembering) must havebeen produced by some cognitive ability of the agent. This seems perfectly intuitive; we

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expect cognitive agents to have cognitive success because they have the requisite abilities toperceive, remember and so on. In crediting an agent with cognitive success, we credit himor her with the relevant cognitive ability which played a central part in the cognitive successof the agent (see Pritchard 2010, 135).

In crediting an agent with knowledge we are thus, amongst other things, crediting her withhaving a relevant cognitive ability which played some key part in the production of thetarget true belief. (Pritchard 2010, 135)

Knowledge requires cognitive ability and this cognitive ability has directly led to theformation of a belief. However, there are many examples of true belief formationwithout a corresponding ability and without effort on the part of the agent to form thebelief. Pritchard looks at several cases:

Take the example of Temp, Temp forms his beliefs about the temperature in the room heis in by checking the thermometer. Unbeknownst to Temp, the thermometer is faulty, buta thermostat is manipulated by someone in another room to match the reading on thethermometer every time Temp moves to look at it.

Temp does not “know” what the temperature in the room is because his “reliability doesnot reflect his cognitive ability at all, but merely the helpful assistance of the hiddenhelper” (Pritchard 2010, 135). This is an example of the reliable belief-forming processbeing external to the skin of the cognitive agent.

Now take the case of Alvin, he has a brain lesion; this lesion has the side effect ofrandomly (but reliably) allowing Alvin to perform complex arithmetical sums (Pritchard2010, 136). Again, this is an instance of the reliable production of belief not being dueto a cognitive ability. In this case, the reliable belief-forming process is, as it were,“under Alvin’s skin”, but it, nevertheless, still fails to adequately meet the ability condition.So, what will meet the condition?

As a number of epistemologists have noted, the answer to this question lies in the extent towhich the reliable belief-forming process is integrated within, and therefore a part of, the cog-nitive character of the agent, where an agent’s cognitive character is her integrated web ofstable and reliable belief-forming processes. (Pritchard 2010, 136)

The integration of reliable processes into the cognitive character of an agent adequatelymeets the ability condition. Such a process would not just be a matter of luck or contin-gency. Integration allows for cognitive agency, because one can now credit, to a significantdegree, cognitive success to cognitive agency (Pritchard 2010, 136). This now brings us tothe discussion of cognitive agency.

Pritchard provides two accounts of cognitive agency, one weak and the other strong:(COGA STRONG) S knows that p iff S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable

belief-forming process which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive charactersuch that her cognitive success is primarily creditable to her cognitive agency.

(COGA WEAK) If S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliablebelief-forming process which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive character suchthat her cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency.

The conditions differ in the extent to which cognitive success is creditable to cognitiveagency (Pritchard 2010, 137). Furthermore, this is the test by which one can determinewhether cognitive success is produced by cognitive ability and “whether a reliablebelief-forming process is appropriately integrated within an agent’s cognitive charactersuch that it counts as a bona fide cognitive ability” (Pritchard 2010, 137).


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In Pritchard’s two examples, the cognitive success of Temp and Alvin is not due to theircognitive agency. Temp’s cognitive success is due to the reliability of the occupant of anadjacent room; hence, Temp fails to satisfy either COGASTRONG or COGAWEAK.The source of Alvin’s success is also due to something external to his agency14 (Pritchard2010, 137). So, we would have to say that Alvin’s beliefs were produced by a processwithin the skin that was not integrated into his cognitive character. We can easilyimagine similar scenarios, where an implant or parasite might control belief productionwithout being integrated into our cognitive characters.

However, Temp and Alvin could become aware of why their beliefs are true and exploitthe reliability of the processes by which they are formed. Pritchard thinks that this wouldamount to integration into their cognitive character, because in both cases success is primar-ily creditable to their cognitive agency. This will become important later when we considerthe case of Otto, because Otto’s success is due to his cognitive agency in a different wayfrom that of Temp and Alvin.

The issue which now concerns us is whether the stronger or weaker version of thecondition is the one that should apply across cases like these. Pritchard thinks that thereare a number of examples that militate against the stronger version of the agency condition.

Take the example of Roddy, he sees a sheep in a field and forms the belief that there is asheep in the field. However, Roddy is actually looking at a hairy dog, but there is also asheep in the field, which Roddy cannot see, so his belief is true (but this is by luck).

Take the case of Barney, he sees a barn and forms the belief that there is a barn in frontof him, and there is; however, all the other barns that Barney sees are just facades, but hestill believes them to be barns, so at best his belief is luckily true15.

Jenny16 gets off a train and asks the first person she sees for directions to her destination.This person turns out to be knowledgeable and reliable, and Jenny forms a true belief aboutthe area. However, there is not much cognitive agency on the part of Jenny; her belief isdependent upon the favourability of her epistemic environment – she asked someonereliable.

The environment plays an important role in these cases; according to Pritchard, theenvironments are either epistemically favourable or unfavourable and this makes adifference to the epistemic standing of the beliefs formed by the agents.

The moral thus seems to be that while sometimes the exercise of very little cognitive ability cansuffice for knowledge, equally sometimes the exercise of a great deal of cognitive ability canfail to suffice for knowledge, with in each case the crucial factor being the friendliness of thecognitive environment. (Pritchard 2010, 142)

This favours a weak account of cognitive agency, because this account allows for theinterplay between “the extent of the cognitive ability required for knowledge and the epis-temic favourableness of the environment . . .” (Pritchard 2010, 142). The weak accountallows the extent of cognitive ability to range from quite a lot to not so much and thuscovers cases such as Roddy’s where there is a fair degree of cognitive agency involvedand those such as Jenny where there is not.

Can the weak agency model be applied to cases of cognition other than belief for-mation? It looks likely, when I have my diary close by, it is much easier to remembermy daily schedule, or perhaps a businesswoman is completely dependent upon her personalassistant to remember her daily schedule of meetings. Is this really the model of cognitiveagency that Pritchard is after? The claim is that I do not exhibit much cognitive ability oragency when I have my diary at hand, and the businesswoman does not exercise her ability

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to remember, her assistant does that. This sounds more like the outsourcing or offloadingmodel than either AE or EnC. Is it the case then that for cases of cognition, rather thanfor those of belief formation, a stronger form of agency is required? In the next section, Iargue that this does not have to be the case. Instead, I show how the ability conditionand weak cognitive agency can be consistent with an EnC approach to cognition ingeneral. Then, I go on to show, in Section 6, how an EnC approach to belief formationcan also be consistent with weak cognitive agency.

4. EnC and the ability condition: the case of Otto and Inga

One does not have to embrace cognitive outsourcing. The classic example of extendedcognition involves the memory-impaired character Otto and his notebook. What I showis that this case fits very nicely within an EnC account. Otto’s proceduralised manipulationsof the information structures in his notebook are constitutive of some of the cognitiveprocesses for remembering. Consequently, Otto’s success is to a significant degree credi-table to his cognitive agency and some of his success is due to his significant training inthe manipulation and maintenance of his memory notebook. I now turn to the exampleof Otto and Inga.

First of all take the case of Inga, she hears that there is a cool Rothko exhibition at theMuseum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York and she decides to go there. Inga recalls thelocation of the MOMA from biological memory, which causes her to go to 53rd street. Ingamakes use of a long-standing biological memory that MOMA is on 53rd street. Now, con-sider the case of Otto, he has onset of Alzheimer’s and carries with him a notebook for theretrieval of information. He has all sorts of useful information about places and people,addresses and names, etc. Otto takes his notebook with him wherever he goes and refersto it frequently. Upon being told of the same exhibition as Inga, he decides to go, butOtto retrieves information from his notebook concerning the location of MOMA. Thiscauses him to go to 53rd street.

The AE theorist holds that Otto’s notebook plays the role of dispositional memory inInga, as such the two cases are on a par. We should count the process of Otto’s retrievinginformation from his notebook as a cognitive process (or part of a coupled process) eventhough that process is not located in his brain. This is the case only if Otto’s notebookplays the same role for Otto that biological memory plays for Inga. We might be inclinedto think that the information in Otto’s notebook is reliably available to him and guides hisactions in just the sort of way that beliefs are usually supposed to. The information isavailable and functions just like the information that constitutes non-occurrent beliefs;the only difference is the location of the information.

Do Otto’s beliefs count as knowledge? Pritchard thinks so because the notebook and itsinformation are sufficiently integrated into Otto’s cognitive character to meet the weak con-dition on cognitive agency. However, this is not the whole story. Otto is epistemically vir-tuous; his continuous updating, accessing and deploying of the information in his notebookrequire a high degree of cognitive diligence. Pritchard refers to Otto as epistemically virtu-ous (Pritchard 2010, 145); he wants to remember correctly and he wants to form truebeliefs. However, Otto’s epistemic virtue is not simply due to the reliability of his environ-ment, it is due to his cognitive agency. It is due to this diligence that the information inOtto’s notebook is integrated into his cognitive character. I take cognitive diligence to bedoing the job that Pritchard demands for the Temp and Alvin cases and also for the Ottocase, namely “Recall that we noted above that Temp and Alvin could integrate their reliablebelief-forming processes into their cognitive character, and thereby be in a position to


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acquire knowledge through these processes, by coming to know both that the targetbelief-forming process is reliable and what the source of this reliability was. This is justwhat Otto has done; however, while his (non-extended) memory is failing and so cannotbe trusted, he knows that he can generally trust what the notebook tells him and why”(Pritchard 2010, 145).

The interpretation of this point is important. For when we ask what the reliable belief-forming process is that is integrated into Otto’s cognitive character, we recognise that it isreally the process of writing in the information, updating it and maintaining it and havingcontext-sensitive retrieval methods for deploying it and achieving cognitive success. Theseprocesses are cognitive practices. The notebook itself, qua process, does not do any of thiswork, Otto’s manipulation of the information does. Otto’s cognitive diligence ensures hiscognitive success.

Pritchard recognises the potential problem here when he discusses a similar case whereOtto has a device that simply feeds him information and which he trusts unquestioningly;Pritchard (2010) rightly concludes that “we would not deem Otto’s cognitive success asbeing to any significant degree creditable to his cognitive agency, but rather treat it as credi-table to some feature external to his cognitive agency (i.e. the source of the reliability of thedevice in question)” (145). This seems to intuitively explain why we do not think that thenotebook is part of Otto’s mind. The information and its manipulation are all credited toOtto’s agency, because of the extended cognitive abilities he has, but the abilities areextended by the cognitive processes that he has acquired and it is these that are integratedinto his cognitive character rather than the notebook itself. The notebook might be part ofOtto’s cognitive system for remembering as a structural relationship to both the informationin the notebook and the processes that manipulate that information, but I think that thenotion of cognitive character is not identical to that of cognitive system17.

The interpretation I give here appears to conflict with Clark’s own interpretation of theOtto case. He provides criteria for the inclusion of a resource, like a notebook, in a cognitivesystem as follows:

(1) The resource is reliably available and typically invoked,(2) Information retrieved is automatically endorsed,(3) It should be deemed as trustworthy as something retrieved from biological memory, the

information is easily accessible. (Clark 2010, 46)

The “glue-and-trust” criteria are standardly taken to be the benchmark for AE. Forexample, Palermos (2011) argues that Clark’s criteria of “glue and trust” and causalcoupling “seem jointly to ensure the integration of the external artifacts within one’soverall cognitive mechanism” (756). The diligent application of cognitive practicesappears to conflict with Clark’s criteria. Here, we have a potential point of conflictbetween an artefact-based extension (AE) and a practice-based integration (EnC). Theconflict springs from the apparent need for artefacts and causal coupling to be unconsciousand not based upon the conscious application of routines. Retrieval of information fromthe notebook should be like18 retrieval of information from biological memory, in that itshould be automatic and unconscious, without an intermediate step of endorsing the infor-mation consciously. However, the conflict is an illusion since the cognitive practices asbelief/memory-forming processes are themselves proceduralised and not a matter of con-sciously following instructions. This can be demonstrated by looking at how real-worldclinical patients learn to structure and deploy their memory notebooks.

The Otto case is a thought experiment and as such is not meant to be empiricallydetailed. By contrast, there is a wealth of information about actual clinical practice for

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patients with traumatic brain injuries, dementia and other forms of memory impairment. Inthe rehabilitation of memory disorders, an influential technique is to train patients to incor-porate the use of a memory notebook into their daily routines. In their classic study, Sohl-berg and Mateer (1989) explain how patients with cognitive and memory deficits due tobrain injury are trained to incorporate a set of procedures for deploying a memory book.“In our clinic, systematic use of a functional compensatory memory book system isviewed as a set of rule-governed actions or procedures. Effective memory book use requiresthat the patient consistently and correctly record and refer to information in the book. Theserule-based actions must be acquired and made automatic through structured, sequencedtraining and repetition” (Sohlberg and Mateer 1989, 873).

The patients learn the cognitive practices until they become proceduralised processes ofconsistent and correct recording of and referring to information. This, I suggest, is anexample of cognitive diligence, but cognitive diligence that is proceduralised. Thememory book and the procedures for information recording and retrieval are fully inte-grated into the patient’s cognitive life. “The outcome of instruction needs to be skill acqui-sition with enough fluency or efficiency to allow appropriate skill application in differentenvironments (i.e. spontaneous, independent use of memory notebook across settings)”(Sohlberg and Mateer 1989, 874).

Tate (1997) (a clinical neuropsychologist) argues that “The memory notebook probablylends itself best to approximating the way in which nonbrain-damaged people use theirmemories. Memory notebooks are more than appointment diaries. They are very flexiblewith regards to their contents and are tailored to the individual patient’s everyday require-ments” (913).

For example, a memory notebook might be split into the following sections (Sohlbergand Mateer 1989):

Orientation – narrative autobiographical informationMemory log – diary of daily information and charts recording what the patient has doneCalendar – appointment schedulingThings to do – intended future actionsTransportation – maps, transport schedules and information on frequented places,work, shops, banks and possibly even museums of modern artFeelings log – chart for feelings relative to specific incidents or timesNames – names and identifying information for peopleToday at work – necessary information to complete work duties.

The memory notebook has a complex structure and the information must be constantlyupdated and deployed in everyday behaviours. The practices for updating and retrievinginformation in the notebook can function as declarative and prospective memory (remem-bering to do things that were intended to be done), which are the forms of memory thatthe patients have most difficulties with. The glue-and-trust criteria do not explain whythis is the case. The rule-governed procedures for recording and referring to informationin the notebook, the cognitive practices, do. The actual practices of memory-impairedpatients show how reliable belief-forming processes are integrated into the cognitive char-acter of the agent. Furthermore, the adoption of these, proceduralised, practices allows thepatients to perform cognitive tasks which they would otherwise simply be unable to do –their success is primarily due to cognitive agency, but also to the culturally endowedcognitive practices and the scaffolding by clinicians.

In the next section, I re-evaluate Pritchard’s epistemic cases in terms of the concepts ofcognitive practices (as cognitive abilities) and cognitive diligence.


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5. Cognitive practices and cognitive diligence

In this section, I argue that the EnC account of general cognition can be applied to the kindsof epistemic cases that interest Pritchard. I provide a set of examples of diligent cognitiveagents who employ cognitive practices that epistemically inspect the environment, therebydemonstrating that these are their reliable belief-forming processes. The argument so farhas been that the process of integrating information that is available “internally” and“externally” is governed by learned or acquired cognitive practices (Menary 2007).These practices often require careful and active structuring and retrieval of informationfrom our environments (and as such are not found exclusively “under the skin”). Virtuousepistemic agents diligently maintain the quality and reliability of the information in theenvironment. They create, maintain, check and manipulate that information.

One way of maintaining epistemic diligence is through epistemic inspection: testing theinformation retrieved from the environment against the environment. In other words, it is akind of self-corrective practice, correcting errors and updating information as it arises. Thisrequires a much more interactive conception of cognitive and epistemic agency. Seeing asheep or a barn does not involve a lot of interaction with the environment, inspecting asheep or a barn does. Roddy and Barney just see what is in front of them and form abelief. However, take the parallel cases of Charlie and Chris.

Charlie is a barn inspector; he has checked over many, many barns during his career.When placed in the unfriendly barn facade environment, he is not fooled even on acasual glance by the facade. His ability to inspect and test information and his backgroundknowledge of barns are integrated into his cognitive character.

Chris is a sheep farmer; he has shepherded sheep all his working life. He knows thatwhen you see a hairy shape on the hillside, it could be a sheep or a sheepdog. He cantest this hypothesis by using the standard dog trainer’s whistles and calls to see if thehairy shape responds. His abilities and knowledge concerning sheep and sheep dogs areintegrated into his cognitive character.

Diligent cognitive agents have cognitive abilities for inspecting, testing and correctingthe informational structure of the environment and/or the beliefs they have formed about it.Therefore, they are not dependent upon the favourability of their epistemic environments.One could reformulate the examples so that Charlie and Chris are fooled – perhaps bymaking the barn facades near perfect, or the sheepdog deaf and very sheep like.However, there is still the difference between seeing and initiating an inspection orinquiry, as fallible epistemic agents we may still not form a true belief or may be susceptibleto Gettier style luck, but self-corrective testing is a reliable method of belief formation.

I do not deny that the Roddy and Barney scenarios are possible and, therefore, I do notdeny that they point to a weak account of cognitive agency. The main point that I would liketo make here is twofold. First, diligent cognitive agents like Charlie and Chris have abilitiesand knowledge that they have acquired and which they maintain. They actively engagethese abilities when they achieve cognitive success. They have the same basic facultiesas Roddy and Barney, they can see, but Charlie and Chris also have domain-specificabilities which Roddy and Barney do not – they have acquired cognitive practices forepistemically inspecting the environment. Second, these abilities are deeply entrenchedcognitive characteristics in Charlie and Chris; their livelihoods depend upon exercisingtheir abilities and achieving a high degree of cognitive success because of them. LikeOtto, Charlie and Chris are instances of diligent cognitive agents whose cognitive abilitiesare integrated into their cognitive character. However, these cases also fit with Pritchard’sweak cognitive agency. Their agency is due, at least in part, to the reliability of the processesof inspection – their culturally endowed cognitive practices.

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One further aside before continuing: when can we tell that the right degree of cognitivediligence is being deployed in a situation? We can think of cognitive diligence as a meanbetween cognitive obsessiveness and cognitive laxity. The diligent agent avoids obsessivelychecking the veracity of a judgement even when the evidence clearly points to an outcomeand does not bother to inspect or check the veracity of his or her judgement at all. Contextmatters; sometimes we might want to be very, very careful (bordering on obsessive), and onothers, we might perform only the most cursory of checks19.

Is Jenny sufficiently cognitively diligent? Her case does depend upon the reliability ofthe epistemic source; however, she does not check the reliability of the source; she dependsupon the epistemic favourability of the environment – call her lucky Jenny. If she arrived ina town where the denizens took great delight in giving misinformation to travellers, then shewould be in trouble. Perhaps she might arrive in a culture where it is normal to think that it isimpolite not to try to give directions even if the source does not know anything about wherethe destination is located. Again, we can imagine Jenny being epistemically diligent, byonly approaching people who appear to be local (maybe she is a good judge of character)or diligently reading up on the cultural mores of the place to which she is travelling – callher diligent Jenny. Therefore, diligent Jenny exhibits more cognitive ability for cognitivesuccess – carefully choosing an informant, checking on the nature of the cultural environ-ment to which she is travelling and so on.

An AE account of Otto’s notebook appears to be in a position similar to that of luckyJenny; he depends upon the reliability of the epistemic resource. On the EnC account, Ottodoes not simply rely upon his epistemic source, but he is also the agent who updates, main-tains and controls the information stored in it – he is also diligent. He is a master of therelevant cognitive practices (or at least competent in them). Therefore, Otto is more likeCharlie and Chris or diligent Jenny; he has culturally extended abilities that are integratedinto his cognitive character, and it is from these abilities that he achieves cognitive success.Consequently, Otto, Charlie, Chris and diligent Jenny are all cases better suited to an EnCaccount, but who, nevertheless, fall under Pritchard’s criterion of weak cognitive agency.

Since I have provided parallel cases of epistemic diligence, let me also provide somenon-epistemic cases parallel to those of Otto and Inga. Let me introduce you to Zacharyand Sophie, who share similarities with Otto and Inga, but are also importantly different:

Zachary has normal memory, but has produced a reliable system of restoring andretrieving information in his notebook. He has a complex database of information and hehas developed simple methods for creating, storing and retrieving the entries at will andthen deploying them to complete cognitive tasks such as remembering where he is supposedto be at a particular time and what he is supposed to be doing20.

Sophie has developed amazing techniques of memorisation by using a clever mnemonicsystem of the kind deployed since antiquity. She has organised her knowledge accordingto the spatial layout of a building, with different rooms associated with differentelements of her knowledge. She merely has to imagine moving through the building andvisiting different rooms where she can retrieve memories and facts at will and deployingthem to complete cognitive tasks such as remembering the date of birth of King Henrythe VIII.

Zachary displays cognitive diligence with regard to his cognitive environment (his cog-nitive niche). He has structured and maintained the informational structures that can be cog-nitively deployed (he has not, therefore, simply offloaded complexity onto the environmentor outsourced cognitive load). He has developed cognitive abilities and skills for creating,maintaining and deploying these structures; his cognitive abilities are extended becausethey are enculturated. He is a diligent cognitive agent, actively structuring his cognitive


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niche and thereby becoming more cognitively powerful. Zachary’s abilities are proper partsof, and therefore integrated within, his cognitive character.

Sophie also displays cognitive diligence, but with regard to her inner cognitive niche.She has created, structured and maintained the structures that can be cognitively deployed.She has developed cognitive abilities and skills for creating, maintaining and deployingthese structures; her cognitive abilities are extended because they are enculturated. She isa diligent cognitive agent; she actively structures her inner cognitive niche and therebybecomes a more powerful cognitive agent. Sophie’s abilities are proper parts of, andtherefore integrated within, her cognitive character.

There is real parity between these cases; the cognitive agents diligently structure andmaintain a cognitive niche that requires genuine cognitive abilities on their part. Theabilities are of the same kind: creating, maintaining and deploying structures to completecognitive tasks; they are instances of EnC. These abilities are cognitive practices. Thecognitive abilities, whether they concern manipulating information that is within theskin, or without, are integrated into the cognitive characters of both Zachary and Sophie.Furthermore, this EnC account of cognitive character and agency stands in contrast to anAE account. In the final section, I warn against an outsourcing interpretation of AE andargue that artefacts are not integrated into our cognitive characters.

6. Artefacts and cognitive outsourcing

I have shown that the EnC account makes a stronger case for extension in both cognitiveand epistemic cases, but EnC also explains how reliable cognitive processes are integratedinto cognitive character. That they do so without producing the usual puzzles about how anotebook could be part of my mind is also to their credit. A final point that I raise is thenecessity for AE accounts to avoid the problem of cognitive outsourcing. The cognitive out-sourcing problem is amply illustrated by a case presented by Vaesen (2011)21. Vaesen’s(2011) target is to provide a case which contravenes the normal conditions for credit the-ories of knowledge: knowing that p implies deserving epistemic credit for truly believingthat p. Vaesen argues that extended cognition cases can provide examples of knowledgewithout credit. However, the actual case that he presents is not a case of extended cognition,it is a case of embedded or scaffolded cognition22. While I do not dispute the conclusionthat the case contravenes the credit theory, it is not a case of true belief as a result ofextended cognitive abilities. To see why this is so, let me outline Vaesen’s case.

Vaesen’s (2011) test case is best framed with an opening analogy: “Suppose Franz, ourlousy archer, hits a target, not through skill, but thanks to a bow and arrow set, neatlyinstalled on a tripod, perfectly aimed at the target, and equipped with a simple ‘shoot’ –button. Knowledge might be like this; hitting the target, while all relevant cognitivework was delegated to external aids” (517–8). This is cognitive outsourcing, an intelligentstrategy, but not part of the actual cognitive processing of the task. We should contrastthis with the case of the memory notebook; the notebook itself is a passive storagemedium that must be actively structured and manipulated during the processing of amemory task. The diligent structuring and manipulation are not a case of outsourcing ormere scaffolding, they are instances of EnC. The cognitive abilities in play are enculturatedand thereby extended. Now, contrast the memory notebook case with the following casefrom Vaesen (2011):

SISSICASE: Sissi is a baggage inspector she uses a post 9/11 baggage scanner which period-ically throws up false positives to maintain the alertness levels of the human inspectors. There

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is a significant increase in the alertness levels of inspectors using the post 9/11 scanners. Whenthe inspector clicks on the image of the false positive a message pops up on the screen“false alarm: you were being tested!” If no message appears the inspector knows that theimage is real.

If Sissi notices an image of a bomb on the scanner and no false alarm warning appears, thenshe forms the true belief that the piece of luggage contains a bomb (Vaesen 2011, 523).Vaesen’s (2011) conclusion is that “the most salient causal feature to the effect of truebelief is external to Sissi” (523). Consequently, Sissi does not deserve credit for thebelief, and the success of her belief is attributable to the scanner. Vaesen’s point then isthat Sissi’s cognitive abilities and her cognitive character have not changed, but the waythat the scanner functions has, and it is this new function of the scanner that is causallysalient to her forming the belief. There are two things that I would like to say about this.The first is that at least as Vaesen presents it, this is not a case of extended cognition; itis delegation or at best offloading and is, therefore, an example of embedded or scaffoldedcognition. If the non-neural processes are not integrated into Sissi’s normal processing rou-tines, then her cognitive abilities have not been extended – and here the integration must beconsistent with Pritchard’s criterion of weak cognitive agency. Second, it is not clear to mewhy Sissi should not be given credit for forming the belief, even if her attention is beingscaffolded by the false signal algorithm. She has to recognise bomb-like images (evenfalse ones) and she has to be able to manipulate images to be able to check whether theimage presented is false or not. This requires a fair amount of cognitive diligence onSissi’s part, even if that diligence is being scaffolded or augmented. I suspect that themain stumbling block for credit theories of knowledge is that they take the individual tobe the prime location of belief-forming processes, whereas the processes that produceknowledge are very often distributed across agents and their cognitive niches and some-times across groups working collaboratively.

The ability to manipulate the tool is part of my cognitive character; it is an ability that Ihave to maintain by diligence. The processes inside the tool are not part of my cognitivecharacter in the same way; they are not abilities of mine, they are abilities of the tool. Ido not have to maintain them by epistemic or cognitive diligence. Vaesen’s exampleshows why it is a mistake to think that tools themselves can be part of the cognitivecharacter of an agent.

What if the tool is physically a part of me and connected up with the nervous system andbrain?23 I would not want to rule out bionic eyes and ears and potential silicon implants inbrains. I imagine that they will be able to do low-level sub-personal processing that isrequired to be able to do higher level cognition – one cannot see without sub-personal pro-cesses in the brain. However, I think that it is unlikely that there will be implants that can dohigher level cognition; they are, therefore, merely structural and causal enablers. Pritchardappears to agree with this when he denies that the example of Otto who is reliant on aresource that simply feeds him information without his having any cognitive diligencewould count as a case of cognitive success being due to his cognitive agency.

Cognitive agents are masters of various practices that probe the environment for infor-mation and for updating, maintaining and controlling the information stored in epistemicsources. Consequently, it is really these abilities that are integrated into cognitive characterand which confer epistemic agency. The epistemic resources – notebooks, etc. – are notintegrated into the cognitive character of agents as such, except as the objects of themanipulative abilities of these agents. Consequently, Otto’s notebook is not part of hiscognitive character.


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7. Conclusion

A weak conception of cognitive agency is consistent with the position I have developedhere. However, the position is inconsistent with an AE account of cognitive character –that artefacts can be part of our cognitive character. Cognitive character, as Pritchardrightly notes, involves the integration of reliable epistemic abilities and processes. Thekinds of abilities that we find in the Otto case are more like the actively engaged diligentcognitive agents we find in Charlie, Chris, diligent Jenny, Zachary and Sophie. Artefactsmight play a role in these cases, but likely only as enablers.

An EnC account of cognitive character holds that abilities and processes are encultu-rated and that they transform and extend what the cognitive agent can do. Outsourcingour cognitive abilities to artefacts is an intelligent strategy, but not a case of cognitiveintegration. We need to avoid the outsourcing problem; EnC does so while at the sametime doing justice to the principles of cognitive integration.

AcknowledgementsThis research was supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery grant: Embodied Virtuesand Expertise. The author thanks audiences at the University of Hertfordshire and the epistemologyand extended mind workshop at the University of Edinburgh. The author also thanks DuncanPritchard and Krist Vaesen.

Notes1. I follow Pritchard in talking of abilities rather than of capacities.2. I take interpreted information to be something like a written sentence, or a diagram, or a string of

a code in a computer programme and so on. Natural information may well surround us in theambient array of light or waiting to be discovered in natural relationships such as the numberof tree rings and the age of a tree and so on, but I would not be considering natural informationhere.

3. I just use information for short from here on.4. Hutchins (2011) and Roepstorff, Niewohner, and Beck (2010) have called for an articulation of

enculturated cognition. My account of enculturation is based on prior work on cognitive prac-tices and the transformation of cognition by immersion in cultural practices in ontogeny(Menary 2006, 2007, Chapters 4–7; also see Menary 2008 for an account of cognitive trans-formation by narrative practices and 2010a, 2010b for more on practices and transformation).

5. Many species construct their niches to some extent, beavers and their dams, termites and theirmounds (Laland, Feldman, and Odling-Smee 2003). The niches confer a selective advantage onthe species. Humans are niche constructors par excellence; in particular, they construct cognitiveniches which include tools, representations and systems for cooperative actions (Sterelny 2003).

6. Albeit a kind of reciprocal causal relationship.7. I cannot give a comprehensive set of reasons here, but see Menary (2007) for a book length

argument for why they are open and unbounded.8. I avoid the talk of modules here since their discussion would take us too far afield.9. I have no track of the talk of the mind getting extended from the brain into the world or Adams

and Aizawa’s (2010) weird metaphysics of “cognitive processes extending into tool”. I have noidea what this means or do I know who holds such a position (see Menary 2010c for a discussionof this point).

10. See Menary (2007, 48–50) for a discussion.11. See Rupert (2009), Sterelny (2010) and Menary (2010a) for a discussion.12. But also see Hutchins (2011) and Roepstorff, Niewohner, and Beck (2010), who have indepen-

dently postulated a hypothesis of enculturated cognition. However, the analysis that I give isbased on the account of cognitive practices as cultural practices and cognitive transformationsfrom Menary (2006, 2007, Chapters 4–7) and Menary (2010a, 2010b).

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13. It can also mean that our abilities have been extended, in terms of what we can do now, by theresulting transformation of our abilities – a la Dehaene.

14. Even if it lies under the skin of the agent.15. In this case, Barney’s reliable perceptual faculties cannot discriminate between barns and barn

facades; therefore, his belief is unsafe.16. The original example is due to Lackey (2007).17. See the earlier discussion in Section 2.18. Remember that AE leans on a principle of functional parity.19. If the informational source is very reliable and we know this, Otto would be an example.20. We can imagine that Zachary uses a system that employs some of the methods of the memory

notebook system for memory-impaired patients. While Zachary is not memory impaired, his liferequires him to perform a lot of different tasks and to store and retrieve a lot of information.This is a case of processing that is better done in the world as retrieving and organising theinformation by using the brain alone are just too inefficient.

21. I am not trying to provide a critique of Vaesen’s case against credit theories here, I merely aim toshow that this case is not one of cognitive extension, but of cognitive outsourcing.

22. To be fair to Vaesen, he does point out that this is a very weak form of extended cognition.23. See Pritchard’s (2010) tempo case where Temp now has a thermometer grafted into him

physically.

Notes on contributorRichard Menary works in the Centre for Cognition and Its Disorders and the Department ofPhilosophy at Macquarie University in Australia. His research is primarily in the philosophy ofcognition and cognitive science. He has published numerous books and papers on embodied andextended cognition including Cognitive Integration (2007), and the Extended Mind (2010). He iscurrently working on an empirical and conceptual project on how our brains become enculturated.

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Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character