Cognitive Biases and Nonverbal Cue Availability in Detecting Deception

8/12/2019 Cognitive Biases and Nonverbal Cue Availability in Detecting Deception

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O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E

Cognitive Biases and Nonverbal Cue

Availability in Detecting DeceptionJudee K. Burgoon1, J. Pete Blair2, & Renee E. Strom3

1 Center for the Management of Information, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85719

2 Department of Criminal Justice, Texas State University, San Marcos, TX 78666

3 Department of Communication Studies, St. Cloud State University, St. Cloud, MN 56301

In potentially deceptive situations, people rely on mental shortcuts to help process informa-

tion. These heuristic judgments are often biased and result in inaccurate assessments ofsender veracity. Four such biasestruth bias, visual bias, demeanor bias, and expectancy

violation biaswere examined in a judgment experiment that varied nonverbal cue avail-

ability and deception. Observers saw a complete videotaped interview (full access to visual,

vocal, and verbal cues), heard the complete interview (vocal and verbal access), or read

a transcript (verbal access) of a truthful or deceptive suspect being questioned about a mock

theft and then rated the interviewee on information, behavior, and image management

and truthfulness. Results supported the presence of all four biases, which were most evident

when interviewees were deceptive and observers had access to all visual, vocal, and verbal

modalities. Deceivers messages were judged as increasingly complete, honest, clear, and rel-

evant; their behavior as more involved and dominant; and their overall demeanor as more

credible, with the addition of nonverbal cues. Deceivers were actually judged as more credi-

ble than truthtellers in the audiovisual modality, whereas best discrimination and detection

accuracy occurred in the audio condition. Results have implications for what factors influ-

ence judgments of a senders credibility and accuracy in distinguishing truth from decep-

tion, especially under conditions where senders are producing messages interactively.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.2008.00333.x

Cognitive biases, nonverbal cue availability, and deception detection

One of the most well-documented claims in the deception literature is that humans

are poor detectors of deception. A recent meta-analysis reveals that although people

show a statistically reliable ability to discriminate truths from lies, overall

accuracy rates average 54% or only a little above chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).

A primary causal mechanism cited for biased judgments of deception and credibility

is reliance on heuristic social information processinga nonanalytic orientation to

Corresponding author: Judee K. Burgoon; e-mail: [email protected]

This article was accepted under the editorship of Jim Dillard.

Human Communication Research ISSN 0360-3989

572 Human Communication Research 34 (2008) 572599 2008 International Communication Association

HUMAN

COMMUNICATION research


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information processing in which only some informational cues are carefully consid-

ered (Chaiken, 1980; Todorov, Chaiken, & Henderson, 2002). As mental shortcuts,

people invoke cognitive heuristics, simple decision rules that arise from conventional

beliefs and expectations and that are used repeatedly in daily interactions (Tversky &

Kahneman, 1974). These mental shortcuts may yield biased information processing

and faulty judgments of others veracity (Fiedler, 1993).

Four especially salient and potentially interrelated biases are truth bias (the

tendency to overestimate others truthfulness), visual bias (the tendency to place

more reliance on visual than vocal, linguistic, and other forms of social information),

demeanor bias(the tendency to judge some senders communication styles as cred-

ible irrespective of their actual truthfulness), and expectancy violations bias (the

tendency to judge unusual behavior as deceptive). Together, these biases may

account not only for poor detection of deception but also more generally for judg-

ments of communicator credibility.The interrelationships among these biases have not been investigated previously.

It may be that some are subordinate to, or artifacts of, others. The visual bias, for

example, may be the product of demeanor and expectancy violations biases or it may

be a product of other factors such as the information richness of the medium. Thus,

a central objective of the investigation to be reported was to examine the interrela-

tionships among these biases and their ultimate impact on veracity judgments.

A second objective was to test these biases when judgments are applied to the

kinds of message exchange that typify normal, ongoing interaction. The Bond and

DePaulo (2006) meta-analysis, though quite comprehensive, included very few stud-

ies in which the stimuli that were judged when produced under fully interactiveconditions, that is, ones in which senders engaged in ongoing and interdependent

social interaction with the intended targets of their deceit.1 Given that deception

typically is embedded in ongoing interaction rather than judged in isolation, and

given that judgments made of naturalistic interaction differ from those made of brief,

experimentally controlled stimuli (Motley & Camden, 1988), knowledge of how

people make veracity judgments should be founded on the kinds of stimuli they

normally encounter rather than on brief, decontextualized snippets.

That the bulk of experimental stimuli have been less than 60 seconds in length

(see Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003) renders most of the extant liter-

ature mute as to what happens beyond the first minute of interaction. It may be that

as a deceptive episode unfolds, deception becomes more difficult to detect because

deceivers capitalize on the features of interpersonal interaction to regulate their

performances more effectively and thus evade detection (Burgoon & Buller, 2004).

Conversely, messages intended to deceive interlocutors might be more transparent in

their intent and therefore more readily detected as observers gain extended exposure

to the subtleties of deceptions enmeshed in the ongoing conversational context and

they consider simultaneous or serial incongruities in different information streams,

such as when a pleasant face accompanies a strained voice. The Bond and DePaulo

(2006) meta-analysis results suggest such an explanation.

J. K. Burgoon et al. Cognitive Biases and Nonverbal Cue Availability in Detecting Deception

Human Communication Research 34 (2008) 572599 2008 International Communication Association 573


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The issue of what biases influence judgments of a persons veracity under con-

ditions of interactive message production was examined in a factorial experiment in

which the stimuli to be judged were interviewees who had been questioned about

a mock theft. Observers judged a truthful or deceptive interview under one of the

three modalities: text, audio, or audiovisual (AV). The modality manipulation tested

how the addition or deletion of visual and vocal nonverbal demeanor cues affected

judgments. Observers in the text condition had access only to a transcript of an

interview and so had no access to nonverbal demeanor cues. Observers in the audio

condition heard a recorded interview and so had access to both words and voice,

thus exposing them to vocalic demeanor cues and to possible channel discrepancies.

Those in the AV condition watched a videotaped interview and so, in addition to

words and voice, had access to visual nonverbal cues as well as to any discrepancies

among the three channels. Observers judged interviewee communication and

decided if the interviewee was innocent or guilty.Other design features were also introduced to maximize the ecological validity of

the results. The mock theft task, coupled with monetary incentives for success, was

expected to heighten interviewees motivation and arousal and hence produce sam-

ples of behavior more akin to what transpires in higher stakes, real-world deception

than is commonly achieved in laboratory deception experiments. Moreover, decep-

tive interviewees were not constrained to produce outright lies; they could employ

whatever strategies they chose to enact, including ambiguity, concealment, equivo-

cation, and other forms of obfuscation.

Though not the primary thrust, this investigation also has relevance to new

media in that it speaks to how judgments of communicator veracity vary accordingto the medium in which receivers access anothers messages. To the extent that some

media foster or inhibit biased information processing more than others, users may

select media according to how well they suit their impression management aims.

This holds as much for senders who may use media for ulterior motives as for

receivers who are seeking to form the most accurate judgments of others.

Literature review and hypotheses

Everyday truth judgments must often rely on stereotypical knowledge that is

detached from the assessment of authentic cues (Fiedler, 1993). Though cognitive

heuristics often lead to efficient and correct decisions, they can just as easily lead to

biased judgments. The latter case is of interest here. Pared-down processing is espe-

cially common when receivers are unmotivated or have limited cognitive resources

to appraise carefully a senders communicative behavior and so become cognitive

misers, expending the least possible amount of cognitive effort necessary to arrive at

a judgment (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Processing deceptive messages

should be less taxing for observers than for participants, inasmuch as observers

are freed from the complex multitasking that occupies conversational participants

(Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Nonetheless, the tendency to eschew full analytical energy

Cognitive Biases and Nonverbal Cue Availability in Detecting Deception J. K. Burgoon et al.



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should still be present among observers, for whom the consequences of making

erroneous judgments are small. The current experiment centered on the kinds of

biases that might operate in routine, day-to-day judgments of anothers veracity, in

other words, when cognitive miserliness might be most probable.

Truth bias

Of the four biases investigated here, the truth bias is the most cited and docu-

mented one in the deception literature (e.g., Kraut & Higgins, 1984; Levine, Park, &

McCornack, 1999; McCornack & Parks, 1986; OSullivan, Ekman, & Friesen, 1988;

Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance, & Rosenthal, 1979; Zuckerman, DePaulo, &

Rosenthal, 1981). There are at least two different conceptualizations of truth bias.

One is as an a priori belief, expectation, or presumption that reflects the

oft-observed tendency to assume communicators are truthful most of the time

(Clark & Clark, 1977; OSullivan, 2003). This presumption of truthfulness, whichmight be labeled a truthfulness heuristic, finds roots in Grices (1989) principle of

cooperative discourse. It also comports with what Gilbert and colleagues (Gilbert,

Krull, & Malone, 1990; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988) described as a Spinozan

view of human information processing in which all incoming information is ini-

tially tagged as truthful and only subsequently revised if something occasions the

need for appraisal and revision.

The other conceptualization follows common usage for the term bias in psy-

chometric literature and statistics, where a bias represents a departure from the true

state of affairs (e.g., a biased sample statistic over- or underestimates the true mean

value of a population) and therefore is inaccurate by definition. Put in deceptionterms, a truth bias reflects a tendency to judge more messages as truths than lies,

independent of their actual veracity (McCornack & Parks, 1986; Zuckerman,

DePaulo et al., 1981). When judging anothers veracity, it results in an overestimate

of actual number of truths relative to the base rate of actual truthfulness; a lie bias

reflects an underestimate of the same. Conceptualized in this manner, truth biases

may be a byproduct of, or closely aligned with, leniency and positivity biases.

Presence of a truthfulness heuristic and/or truth bias has been amply docu-

mented in a variety of contexts (e.g., Anolli, Balconi, & Ciceri, 2003; Buller, Burgoon,

White, & Ebesu, 1994; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991; McCornack & Parks,

1986; Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 1992; Vrij & Mann, 2001). People rating message

veracity consistently exhibit a tendency to judge most messages as truthful, even

when the base rate of deception is varied (Levine, Kim, Park, & Hughes, 2006; Levine

et al., 1999). The first hypothesis sought to replicate this tendency to err in the

direction of truthfulness when judging message veracity but to extend it to interac-

tive message production with the aforementioned modifications to methods (uncon-

strained, naturalistic, and motivated discourse production by senders; longer stimuli

to judge). These methodological features pose a more stringent test of truth bias in

that motivated, extended discourse could make deception more detectable or intro-

duce statistical error variance that would mitigate judgmental bias. The hypothesis




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posited that observers err in the direction of judging more messages as true than the

base rate of truthful and deceptive stimuli being judged (Hypothesis 1).

Visual and demeanor biases

The visual bias is a tendency to assign primacy to visual information over other

forms of social information (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Noller, 1985; Stiff et al.,

1989). Extensive research on channel reliance has shown systematic differences in

judgments of messages with text only, audio only, video only, and AV delivery

(Burgoon, 1985, 1994; DePaulo, Rosenthal, Green, & Rosenkrantz, 1982; DePaulo,

Zuckerman, & Rosenthal, 1980). Observers attend more closely to facial than to body

or voice cues (Bauchner, Kaplan, & Miller, 1980; Buller et al., 1991; Ekman & Friesen,

1974) despite the fact that facial cues typically are the least diagnostic in identify-

ing deception (Feldman, 1976; Hocking, Bauchner, Kaminski, & Miller, 1979;

Zuckerman, Larrance, Spiegel, & Klorman, 1981).Stiff et al. (1989) advanced two explanations for the visual cue primacy effect: A

distraction hypothesisthat nonverbal visual cues distract from processing diagnos-

tic (reliable) verbal informationand a situational familiarity hypothesisthat reli-

ance shifts primarily to verbal content (as compared to using both verbal and

nonverbal information) when the situation is familiar. Experimental results attested

to a visual primacy effect: Visual cues had a substantial impact on judgments of

truthfulness, vocal cues had a significant though weaker effect, and verbal variations

did not alter judgments. A second experiment also showed that reliance on non-

verbal cues was greater in the unfamiliar than in the familiar circumstance. However,

two design features of the Stiff et al. (1989) study introduce some equivocality to theconclusions. Actors followed a tight script rather than producing the kinds of natural

discourse present in normal deceptive interviews. Also, of the six cues that were

manipulated, gaze aversion and audible pauses are stereotypical cues, whereas adap-

tors, postural shifts, speech errors, and silent pauses can be reliable (though by no

means ever-present) indicators of deceit. Unclear, then, is if ratings of deceptiveness

reflected accurate detection or stereotypic judgments. The current experiment was

designed to untangle and clarify the effects of availability of nonverbal cues, includ-

ing vocal ones, about which Stiff et al. (1989) had no hypotheses. To replicate the

ordering found by Stiff et al., we predicted that judgments of a persons truthfulness

increase ordinally with nonverbal cue availability from text (verbal-only) to audio

(verbal 1 vocal) to AV (verbal 1 vocal 1 visual) presentations (Hypothesis 2).2

These predictions beg the question of exactly why the presence of visual infor-

mation is biasing. After all, visual primacy in itself does not guarantee biased judg-

ments; bias should result only if observers attend to incorrect rather than correct

cues. We believe there are multiple, and not mutually exclusive, causal mechanisms

at work, among them qualitative features of senders communication style. Inter-

personal deception theory (IDT; Buller & Burgoon, 1994, 1996; Burgoon & Buller,

2004) holds that deceivers engage in three classes of strategic communication that

make detection of deceit difficult. Information management concerns the ways in




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Expectancy violations bias

Although the demeanor bias focuses on credibility-inducing behavior, the fourth

bias focuses on suspicion-provoking behavior. Expectancy violations bias is the

tendency to infer deception from abnormal, fishy-looking behavior (Bond et al.,

1992). Expectancy violations theory (Burgoon, 1983; Burgoon & Burgoon, 2001)

postulates that deviations from normative behaviors are arousing and divert atten-

tion to the unexpected act. IDT and many other theories of deception (Afifi &

Weiner, 2004; Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal, & Berryman, 2001; Swets, 2000) assert that

deceptive behavior is often unexpected, anomalous, or deviant. Tests of IDT have

shown that deceptive performances often suffer some initial impairment but

improve over time as deceivers strategically repair their communication (Buller

& Burgoon, 1994; Burgoon, Buller, White, et al., 1999; Burgoon, Buller, & Floyd,

2001), which should mitigate expectancy violations. Thus, evidence of an expec-

tancy violations bias would imply that despite senders efforts to manage theirperformance, they still inadvertently give off signs of deceit that are detected by

receivers.

Any such signs should appear differentially according to which nonverbal and

verbal channels are available to observers. Access to visual, vocal, and verbal cues

could create more expectancy violations because three different channels of infor-

mationvisual, auditory, and verbalare more difficult for senders to coordinate

and may expose observers to more suspicion-arousing channel discrepancies. Vocal

cues can be very reliable indicators of deceit (DePaulo et al., 2003) possibly because

they deviate from customary vocal patterns and escape deceivers self-monitoring.

Text de facto lacks channel discrepancies, but odd verbal behavior might becomemore glaring without the distractions of nonverbal cues. These alternatives led us to

pose as a research question: Does modality interact with deception to produce

judgments of negative expectancy violations (R2)?

Detection accuracy under different modalities

Although detection accuracy reports often combine truth and deception detection

within the same estimates, it is important to distinguish deception detection accu-

racy from truth detection accuracy, which may differ markedly (Burgoon, Buller,

Ebesu, & Rockwell, 1994; Levine et al., 1999; Vrij & Mann, 2001). False alarms

(judging truths as deception) and false negatives (judging deception as truths) can

also be calculated (Green & Swets, 1966). As regards deception detection accuracy, the

picture that emerges so far is of individuals entering communicative situations with

strong proclivities to view others as truthful, to be drawn to visual information more

so than other nonverbal social cues, and, when accessing visual cues, to fall victim to

senders strategic efforts to manage their messages and overall demeanor. The only

bias working to benefit receivers is expectancy violations due to channel discrep-

ancies or to the sheer number of cues that could be at odds with normative social

patterns. The net result of these various biases should be to yield very poor detection

accuracy under the visual modality.




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Text, too, should produce poor detection accuracy, but two countervailing

forcesthe diagnosticity of verbal cues and detachment between sender and

receivershould net it higher accuracy than modalities with nonverbal cues. First,

verbal cues are not inherently inscrutable. Deception ought to be, and is, detectable

from textual features (Vrij, 2000; Zhou, Burgoon, Twitchell, & Nunamaker, 2004).

That said, accuracy may be attenuated somewhat by the fact that untrained detectors

lack familiarity with linguistic clues to deception and tend to favor stereotypical cues

over valid ones (Buller et al., 1994; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985). Second, text fails to

elicit the same sense of connection and involvement with message senders that

happens when nonverbal cues are present (e.g., Burgoon et al., 19992000; Burgoon,

Stoner, Bonito, & Dunbar, 2003; Ramirez & Burgoon, 2004). This detachment may

introduce greater objectivity but also may dampen overall attentiveness to social

information, again causing text-based judgments to suffer some inaccuracy but to

a lesser extent than AV-based judgments.In the middle are judgments based on the combination of vocal and verbal cues.

The voice is a rich source of social information. Its ability to promote involvement

and intimacy often evokes positive responses that could be truth biasing. For exam-

ple, Atoum and Al-Simadi (2000) found that speakers were judged as more honest

and attractive when the speaker could be heard (i.e., in an AV or audio modality)

than when just seen (in a video-only modality). Yet, the voice also lacks many of the

known stereotypical (and incorrect) cues that people rely upon to make veracity

judgments. The absence of stereotypical cues may encourage judges to attend to

more reliable indicators of veracity such as pitch, hesitancies, and response latencies.

Hence, audio-based judgments may attain greater detection accuracy.The Bond and DePaulo (2006) meta-analysis supports these conclusions, report-

ing lowest deception detection accuracy in a visual-only mode, better accuracy with

verbal transcriptions, and best with audio or AV modalities. (Among visual cues,

detectability is worse from the face only or body only than the combination of the

two.) Thus, access to visual cues, especially facial ones, impairs detection. The

authors concluded that detection is better when deception can be heard and worse

when it can be seen.4 Recent experiments in computer-mediated deception point to

similar results under conditions where targets of deception rendered judgments

following extended interaction (e.g., Boyle & Ruppel, 2003; Burgoon et al., 2003).

In the latter study, for example, participants discriminated best between truths and

lies in the audio modality and fared worse when visual cues were present (the face-to-

face modality). Accuracy was lowest in the text condition, where deceivers were

actually rated as more trustworthy than truthtellers. Accordingly, we hypothesized

that deception detection is more accurate with audio (verbal 1 vocal) than text

(verbal-only) or AV (verbal 1 vocal 1 visual) presentations (Hypothesis 4).

As regards truth detection accuracy, the paucity of empirical evidence led us to

pose as a last research question: Does truth detection accuracy vary by modality

(RQ3)? One possibility is that the greater detachment and tempered judgments with

text might result in less accuracy when nonverbal cues are absent than present. This




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speculation coincides with a previous finding that video modalities are better than

text-based modalities at truth detection (Porter, Campbell, Stapleton, & Birt, 2002).

Method

Participants

The sample consisted of 51 undergraduate students at a large university in the

Midwestern United States who received extra credit for participation in a study of

interviews conducted via new media. Each participant was randomly assigned to

a deceptive or truthful interview to judge and to one of the three cue availability

conditions, resulting in 17 observers per condition.

Stimulus materials

The AV, audio, and text files for this study were derived from a mock theft exper-iment conducted by Burgoon and Blair (Burgoon, Blair, & Hamel, 2006; Burgoon,

Marett, & Blair, 2004). In the mock theft study, participants were randomly assigned

to the role of thieves or innocent bystanders. Thieves were asked to take a wallet from

a classroom on an assigned day and then to deceive during an interview about the

theft. Innocents were simply told that a theft would take place in their classroom and

were asked to respond truthfully during the interview. Motivation was induced by

offering participants $10 if they could convince the interviewer of their innocence.

They also could win another $50 if they were the most successful at appearing

credible. (Interviews from a low-motivation condition were excluded from the stim-

ulus pool so that only motivated deception was judged.)Trained interviewers followed a structured interview protocol that began with

some preliminary questions (personal background, education, and work experien-

ces) then turned to the theft. Nine questions were modeled after the Behavioral

Analysis Interview, a procedure that is used routinely in criminal investigations

(Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2001). Questions included items such as, Did

you take the wallet? Do you know where the wallet is now? Walk me through

what happened from the time that you arrived at class until now and What do you

think should happen to [the person who took the wallet]? The theft-related

responses averaged 158 words, clearly enough length to qualify as interactive.

Interviews were videotaped at 30 frames per second with a Prosumer qualityCanon digital camera. It was essential that only high-quality recordings be included

so as to prevent recording artifacts influencing judgments. A total of 17 recordings

(nine innocent and eight deceptive subjects) met the criteria of acceptable video and

audio quality. These videos were then converted into Windows media files for the

audio and AV conditions. The interviews were transcribed for the text condition.

One approach to conducting judgment studies is to present each observer a series

of brief excerpts from multiple interviews. To obtain the advantages of observ-

ing a lengthier and interactive sample of behavior, we opted instead to have each

observer judge a single interview. Like other judgment experiments, comparability




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credibility, a projected trust measure was created consisting of four 7-point

Likert-format scales that asked observers if they would choose the interviewee as

a roommate, job candidate, house sitter for pets, or date for a friend. These four

items were combined into a single trust measure with a reliability of .86.

To assess whether interviewee behaviors violated expectations negatively, partic-

ipants completed seven expectedness and valence measures, taken from Burgoon and

Walther (1990), on the 7-point Likert format. Coefficient alpha reliabilities were .76

and .78. Due to high intercorrelation (r= .84), these measures were also combined

into a unidimensional version.

To assess bias and detection accuracy, the last part of the questionnaire asked

participants to rate, on a 010 scale, how truthful they thought the interviewee was in

answering seven of the questions in the interview and to check off whether they

thought the interviewee was guilty or innocent of taking the wallet. The dichotomous

measure of guilt assessed truth bias, calculated as the aggregate deviation of thedichotomous judgments from the base rate of truthful and deceptive stimuli to be

judged. Judgments were compared to actual guilt or innocence to calculate one

measure of accuracy.5 The truthfulness ratings were averaged together for a mean

truth estimate. The absolute value was a second gauge of bias; the relative differences

across conditions served as a second measure of accuracy.

Results

All hypotheses were tested with alpha set at .05, one-tailed. Power for full-sample

binomial tests was .78; for tests within modalities, it was .45. Power of factorialFtestsand simple effectttests to detect medium effect sizes (Glasss d = .50) was approx-

imately .53 for deception effects and .45 for modality effects (Kraemer & Thiemann,

1987; Lenth, 2006).

Hypothesis 1: Truth bias

Hypothesis 1 predicted that observers err in the direction of judging too many

messages as truthful. On the dichotomous judgments, 67% of the participants indi-

cated that they thought that the interviewee was truthful and 33% judged the inter-

viewee as deceptive. A binomial test confirmed that these estimates were significantly

different from the expected percentages of 53% and 47%, respectively (p= .004, one-

tailed). On the 10-point truthfulness scale, the mean judgment was 7.58 (SD= 1.58),

which was significantly higher (more truthful) than the expected median scale value

of 5.30, t(50) = 5.78, p , .001. These results support Hypothesis 1. Observers

judgments were biased in favor of truth.

Hypothesis 2: Visual bias

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the truth bias observed in Hypothesis 1 would increase

ordinally with the addition of vocal and then visual cues. A planned contrast

revealed an ordinal increase in the proportion of truthful judgments across




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modalities, t(48) = 2.23, p , .05. Judgments of truth (innocence) increased ordi-

nally from 47% with the text presentation to 71% with the addition of vocal cues to

82% with the addition of visual cues. (Binomial tests conducted within each

modality confirmed that judgments of truthfulness in the visual and vocal con-

ditions, respectively, were significantly different than the expected value, p= .003

andp= .043, one-tailed; the text condition did not differ from the expected value.)

A repeated measures analysis of variance on the truthfulness ratings for the three

theft-specific questions produced a near-significant main effect for modality, F(2,

45) = 3.07,p= .056, partialh2 = .12. A planned contrast with lambda coefficients of

21, 0, and 11 was significant, t(48) = 2.46, p = .009, one-tailed. The mean truth

estimates on the 10-point scale were 8.01 (SD = 2.28) for the AV condition, 7.03

(SD = 1.98) for the audio condition, and 6.25 (SD = 2.17) for the text condition.

Taken together, these analyses support Hypothesis 2. Truth bias was greatest when

visual cues were present.

Hypothesis 3 and RQ1: Demeanor biases

Hypothesis 3 predicted that demeanor bias, measured as (a) information manage-

ment, (b) behavior management, and (c) image management, would increase ordi-

nally with the addition of vocal and then visual nonverbal cues. RQ1 asked if these

relationships are moderated by deception. Information management was initially

tested with the composite measure. A 2 3 3 analysis of variance produced a main

effect for modality,F(2, 51) = 5.05,p= .011, partialh2 = .18, which was qualified by

a modality by deception interaction, F(2, 51) = 4.34, p = .019, partial h2 = .16.

Follow-up univariate analyses on the four separate dimensions produced significantmain effects on all dimensions except directness and modality by deception inter-

actions on quality and directness. Although the overall pattern showed the hypoth-

esized ordinal increase (text,M= 4.14; audio,M= 4.59, AV,M= 5.33), the patterns

differed within truth and deception. Under truth, the ordering from highest to lowest

was audio then AV then text. Under deception, AV was higher than text and audio,

as confirmed by a simple effect test using contrast codes of21, 0, and 11,t(21) =

3.33, p = .003. Thus, the general trends conformed to Hypothesis 3ainterviewees

were perceived as increasingly complete, truthful, clear, direct, and relevant with the

addition of nonverbal cuesbut deception moderated results. The patterns for each

of the four dimensions can be seen in Figures 1a through 1d. See Table 1 for all means.

Multivariate analysis of the behavioral management dimensions of involvement

and dominance produced a significant interaction between modality and deception,

Wilksl = .74,F(4, 88) = 3.55,p = .010, partialh2 = .14, and a nonsignificant main

effect, Wilksl = .86,F(4, 88) = 1.74,p = .148, partialh2 = .07. Univariate analyses

also produced significant interactions for both measures and a main effect for dom-

inance. As seen in Figures 1e and 1f, the predicted ordinal increase held true in the

deception condition but not the truth condition. Simple effect tests within deception

were significant for both involvement, t(21) = 3.60,p , .001, one-tailed, and dom-

inance,t(21) = 4.29, p,

.001, one-tailed.




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Modality

AVAudioText

MeanRating

7.0

6.5

6.05.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

Deception

Truth

Deception

(a)Quality

Modality

AVAudioText

MeanRating

7.0

6.0

5.0

4.0

3.0

2.0

1.0

(b)

Deception

Truth

Deception

Quantity

Modality

AVAudioText

7.0

6.5

6.0

5.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

MeanRating

(c)

Deception

Truth

Deception

Clarity

Modality

AVAudioText

MeanRating

7.0

6.5

6.0

5.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

(d)

Deception

Truth

Deception

Directness

Modality

AVAudioText

MeanRating

7.0

6.5

6.0

5.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

(e)

Deception

Truth

Deception

Involvement

Modality

AVAudioText

MeanRating

7.0

6.5

6.0

5.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

(f)

Deception

Truth

Deception

Dominance

Figure 1 Continued on next page.




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The analyses forimage managementproduced a multivariate modality by decep-

tion interaction on the five credibility measures, F(8, 84) = 2.24, p = .032, partial

h2 = .18, and a near-significant main effect,F(8, 84) = 1.78,p= .093, partial h2 = .15.

As with information and behavior management, the deception condition, but not the

truth condition, conformed to the predicted ordinal increase from text to audio

to AV, as confirmed by simple effect tests: character, t(21) = 3.78, p , .001; com-petence, t(21) = 2.60, p = .009; sociability, t(21) = 4.43, p , .001; composure,

t(21) = 2.64, p = .007 (all one-tailed). Deceivers actually earned higher credibility

ratings than did truthtellers under AV. Comparatively, truthtellers earned highest

ratings under audio. A univariate analysis of projected trust produced only a sig-

nificant main effect for modality, F(2, 51) = 18.05, p , .01, partial h2 = .45, and

conformed to predictions.

In sum, perceptions of strategic communication increased with the addition of

nonverbal channels of information when interviewees were deceptive but not when

interviewees were truthful. Truthtellers regularly were judged most favorably in the

audio presentation, that is, when judges had access to verbal and vocal cues. By

contrast, deceiver communication was judged as the most complete, truthful, clear,

direct, relevant, and dominant, and deceivers themselves were judged as the most

trustworthy, sociable, competent, and composed in the AV presentation, that is,

when judges had access to the additional cues. When judges only had verbal infor-

mation, the same deceivers received the lowest ratings. (An exception was that

deceivers earned a higher projective trust rating than truthtellers in both the AV

and the text modalities, indicating that in both of these modalities, receivers are at

risk of being deluded.) These combined results are strongly supportive of deceivers

benefiting from the addition of visual nonverbal cues, in line with the demeanor bias

Table 1 Means and Standard Deviations for All Dependent Measures,

by Modality and Deception

Deception Truth

Text Audio FtF Text Audio FtF

M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD

Truth estimate 6.75 2.38 6.04 1.93 8.63 2.34 5.81 2.01 7.93 1.65 7.48 2.22

Information management 3.93 1.19 3.97 1.03 5.82 1.19 4.35 0.93 5.21 0.91 4.85 1.32

Dominance 3.51 0.87 4.31 0.86 5.09 0.36 4.16 1.05 4.44 0.77 3.96 0.89

Involvement 3.50 0.85 4.75 0.77 5.00 0.87 4.59 1.04 4.48 0.78 4.19 1.00

Expectedness & valence 3.92 1.03 4.26 1.22 5.71 0.69 4.13 1.31 5.17 1.10 4.81 1.29

Character 3.72 1.06 4.53 0.53 5.38 0.94 3.86 0.79 5.31 1.16 4.42 1.59

Sociability 3.75 1.18 4.56 0.82 5.81 0.73 4.89 0.87 5.31 1.04 4.58 0.79

Composure 3.43 1.36 4.60 1.25 5.03 1.01 3.71 0.96 4.80 1.44 4.20 1.11

Competence 3.56 1.50 4.63 0.58 4.88 0.69 4.00 1.50 4.61 1.27 4.11 0.86

Projected trust 2.78 1.37 3.59 0.67 5.03 1.08 2.47 1.13 4.39 1.03 4.50 0.89




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hypothesis. That the pattern was restricted to deceivers implies that deceivers were

more proactive than truthtellers in managing their demeanor.

Research question 2: Expectancy violations bias

RQ2 asked if deception and modality interact to affect expectedness and valence

judgments. Univariate analysis of variance produced a significant modality main

effect on the combined expectedness and valence measure, F(2, 51) = 5.03,

p= .01, partial h2 = .18, and a near-significant interaction effect between modality

and deception, F(2, 51) = 2.78, p = .07, partial h2 = .11. Again, the deception

condition showed the ordinal increase from text to audio to AV, but the truth

condition did not. To truly analyze whether negative violations were perceived,

expectedness needs to be crossed with valence, as shown in Figure 2, where the six

3.50

4.00

4.50

5.00

5.50

6.00

Valence

4.00 4.50 5.00 5.50

Expectedness

Condition

Audio/Deception

Audio/Truth

Text/Deception

Text/Truth

Video/Deception

Video/Truth

Negative Violation Negative Confirmation

Positive Confirmation

Figure 2 Expectedness and valence of deception by modality conditions.




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experimental conditions are arrayed. The left-hand quadrants represent unexpected

behaviors; the right-hand quadrants represent expected behavior. The upper quad-

rants represent positively valenced behaviors; the bottom quadrant represents neg-

atively valenced behaviors. The graph indicates that observers were most favorable

toward deceptive interviewees when they had full visual, vocal, and verbal access,

rating them higher than all other interviewees, including truthtellers, on valence and

expectedness. This result is consistent with the results for demeanor bias. Compar-

atively, ratings were sufficiently low for deceivers in text-based and audio presenta-

tions to qualify as negative violations; truthtellers under text also received ratings

that qualified as negative violations.

Hypothesis 4: Detection accuracy

Hypothesis 4 predicted that detection of deception would be the most accurate in the

audio condition and lower in the text and AV conditions. RQ3 asked if deceptioninteracts with modality to affect accuracy. The results are best understood against the

backdrop of the overall accuracy, which was 47%. By deception condition, only 29%

of actual deceptive interviews were judged as deceptive (71% false negatives) and

63% of truthful interviews were judged as truthful (37% false positives). The overall

accuracy and deception detection rates are markedly different from the 54 and 47%

rates reported in the Bond and DePaulo (2006) meta-analysis, though only the latter

approaches statistical significance (binomial test p= .056, one-tailed).

The dichotomous measure, when analyzed by modality, revealed that observers

in the audio and text conditions were correct in judging 38% of the deceptive

interviewees as guilty, whereas in the AV condition, only 13% of the guilty partieswere correctly judged as deceptive. These differences, however, failed to achieve

statistical significance, x2(2) = 1.61, p = .45. The pattern of means for the overall

accuracy rates (i.e., including truth detection accuracy) conformed to predictions

35% accuracy in text, 59% in audio, and 47% in AVbut also failed to achieve

statistical significance, x2(2) = 1.89, p = .39.

Analysis of the truth estimate data produced a near-significant deception by

modality interaction, F(2, 45) = 2.76, p = .07, partial h2 = .11. Simple effect tests

within each modality produced a significant difference in truth and deception ratings

within the audio condition, t(15) = 1.75,p = .05, one-tailed, but not in the text and

AV conditions (see Figure 3). In fact, the deception condition means were actually

higher than the truth condition means in the latter two conditions. Hypothesis 4 thus

received limited support and RQ3 was answered with a partial yes.

Discussion

This investigation is important in several respects. First, unlike most previous judg-

ment studies, biases and detection accuracy were examined under fully interactive

conditions. Use of lengthier interviews as stimuli availed observers (as well as send-

ers) of the dynamic adjustments that characterize extended discourse and that might




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Observers showed a marked tendency to bias judgments in favor of truth. Com-

pared to the 53% of all stimuli that were actually truthful, observers judged 67% to

be truthful, and the average truth estimate was far above the midpoint of the scale.

These results reinforce what has been a consistent finding in the literature, namely,

that people are highly inclined to trust the communication of others and unlikely to

question those judgments unless faced with some major deviation that triggers

a reevaluation. The current findings extend this conclusion to messages generated

under fully interactive conditions.

According to media richness theory and social information processing theory

(Daft & Lengel, 1984, 1986; Walther & Parks, 2002), differences in availability of

social information in different channels should affect deception detection. Text-

based messages and transcripts only avail the receiver of verbal information (save

for efforts to add in nonverbal information through such features as capitalization

and emoticons). Auditory channels add vocalic cues. AV modalities add kinesic,proxemic, physical appearance, and (sometimes) environmental information. We

hypothesized that observers judging an AV presentation would exhibit the most

visual and demeanor biases, that is, the truth bias would be most aggravated in

the AV condition, and the AV condition would be most associated with strategic

manipulation of message content, style, and overall demeanor. Results bore out our

predictions, especially for deceivers. The truth bias was intensified by modalities that

gave observers access to nonverbal cues. Despite the fact that the same verbal content

was present in all three modality conditions, the addition of nonverbal vocal and

visual cues increasingly led observers to judge senders interview answers as truthful.

Following IDT postulates of strategic communication by deceivers, we also hypoth-esized that observers would succumb to a demeanor bias with increasing availability of

nonverbal social cues. Results confirmed that deceivers (but not truthtellers) overall

communication was judged more favorably on measures of information, behavior, and

image management with increasing availability of nonverbal cues. The communication

of deceptive interviewees was seen as the most complete, honest, clear, direct/relevant,

involved, dominant, credible, trustworthy, expected, and positively valenced in the AV

condition. The demeanor bias is only valid to the extent that an honest-appearing

presentation leads observers to make faulty attributions about anothers veracity; that

is, there must be differences between truthtellers and deceivers or else the bias devolves

to a straight social skills variable in which some people are more skillful communicators

than others. Had we found the same pattern of behavior for both truthtellers and

deceivers, we would have been left with questionable support for the demeanor bias.

However, the repeated interactions between deception and modality and associated

differential patterns across modalities for deceivers versus truthtellers imply that judg-

ments were not exclusively a function of structural modality features per se but also of

the self-presentations that deceivers were able to craft using all the kinesic, physical

appearance, proxemic, and vocalic features at their disposal. Deceivers elicited ordinal

increases in favorability from the text to the audio to the AV condition, whereas truth-

tellers elicited a nonmonotonic pattern such that favorability was highest under audio.




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the demeanor bias results. Such findings could only be obtained if deceivers were

more successful than truthtellers in promulgating an attractive image in the AV

condition and if adding visual nonverbal cues enhanced their demeanor relative to

the exact same performances in the audio and text conditions. At the same time, the

results indicate that abnormal behavior by itself is not the only basis for biased

judgment; behavior that is judged as exceedingly normal and appropriate can also

lead to biased judgment.

The expectancy violations results demonstrate the utility of arraying communi-

cative behavior and modalities according to expectations and evaluations. Yet, they

also raise questions about whether negatively valenced, unexpected behavior should

be regarded as a bias, inasmuch as only the text but not the audio condition pro-

duced detection inaccuracies. Put differently, negative violations can be quite diag-

nostic under the correct conditions (Bond et al., 1992). They can alert receivers to

anomalies that are in fact sound indicators that something is amiss. Like positiveconfirmations, they are only biasing to the extent that observers attend to the wrong,

stereotypic indicators rather than to diagnostic ones. The inaccuracies in the AV

condition are a reminder as well that expected behaviors can also lead to erroneous

judgments.6

Detection accuracy

The generally poor ability of receivers to detect deception in this study is consistent

with previous research. The poor detection accuracy rates overall (47%) and within

the deception condition (29%) suggest that detectability may even worsen when

judging messages generated interactively. Detection accuracy was also somewhatsensitive to modality. On the continuous measure of truthfulness (but not a dichot-

omous one), observers accurately discriminated truthful from deceptive interviewees

when in the audio condition. Their counterparts in the text and AV conditions did

not succeed in making such discriminations. In fact, observers showed a tendency to

regard deceptive interviews as more truthful than truthful ones in the nonverbally

leanest and richest conditions. This pattern of findings supports the hypothesized

accuracy of deception detection when observers have access only to audio (and

verbal) information.

Our findings that truth bias and accuracy vary by modality have important

ramifications for the detection of deception. It appears that false-positive and

false-negative rates can vary by modality without having a large impact on accuracy.

It may be that the biases inherent in different modalities would make certain modal-

ities preferable for different detection tasks. For example, our criminal justice system

values protection of the innocent; therefore, this system would want as few false

positives as possible. The truth bias inherent in the AV condition might reinforce its

desirability for courtroom use. A low false-negative rate might be desired in other

circumstances. For example, a single error in intelligence analysis could have pro-

found implications for national security. Thus, the reduced truth bias found in text

or audio conditions might be preferable for intelligence assessment tasks. In light of




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the high rate of detection accuracy in the audio condition, audio detection may

represent the best of all options and has the further advantage of requiring less

investment in bandwidth for the messages being transmitted. Be it first responders,

police detectives, job recruiters, or friends unmasking lies by friends, use of a voice-

only modality such as the telephone for questioning might prove to be more advan-

tageous than a face-to-face confrontation.

A theory of nonverbal cue availability deception detection

A wealth of empirical evidence now documents that social information processing

and ability to detect deception vary according to access to nonverbal channels of

information. Can a single theory account for these effects? Probably not. Modalities

have multiple influences on sender behavior and receiver perception. That said, we

propose that a strategic communication perspective supplies a partial explanation in

that visual media present receivers with a preponderance of well-practiced andmanaged sender behaviors intended to produce a credible front. The sheer amount

of social information to be processed also can result in erroneous judgments.

Media that only afford access to senders words reduce the processing task for

receivers and include some useful linguistic indicators of deceit, but again the pre-

ponderance of cues is likely to be deliberate, especially if senders are motivated and

have had opportunities to plan, rehearse, or edit their responses. In between are

audio modalities that add to verbal cues a mix of highly diagnostic and less con-

trolled vocal cues. The greater proportion of diagnostic indicators, coupled with

some diminution in the truth bias, would account for the better discrimination

between truth and deception in the audio condition. Observers recognition ofexpectancy-violating deceptive behaviors in this condition is consistent with this

interpretation.

To conclude, deception detection is a complex task that is fraught with cognitive

biases. Nonverbal cues, especially visual ones, lead detectors astray. Detectors can

improve their accuracy by attending more closely to vocal information and relying

upon audio modalities to discriminate between truth and deception. Continued

exploration of when biases are most pronounced and what can mitigate them will

aid not only in better detection of deception but also better understanding of how

humans come to trust the veracity of others.

Notes

1 Interactivity was coded for 50 studies. It was defined as senders not interacting if lying

while alone or to a passive observer; all other cases were deemed interactive. Less than

9% of the pairwise comparisons that were analyzed came from cases where senders

interacted with the person who was to judge their veracity. The vast majority came from

cases where senders told their lies to someone else (58%), such as giving a single reply to

an interviewer, or where they did not interact with anyone (33%). Median length of

sender messages was brief at 52 seconds.




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2 In the Bond and DePaulo (2006) meta-analysis, judgments of truthfulness from within-

study comparisons follow a different ordering, with video-only messages judged as less

truthful than audio-only, AV, or text messages. We surmise that the absence of any

verbal content upon which to base a veracity judgment in the video-only condition

resulted in indecision or neutrality.3 It should be noted that unlike other biases, demeanor bias derives not from a cognitive

proclivity among receivers but rather from features of the senders communication that

systematically elicit biased judgments.

4 Previous meta-analyses and studies (Burgoon, 2005; DePaulo et al., 1980; Zuckerman

et al., 1981) have reported different orderings of conditions.

5 Truth bias has been measured in a variety of ways. For example, Burgoon and colleagues

(Burgoon et al., 1994, 2003; Dunbar, Ramirez, & Burgoon, 2003) have measured bias as

the deviation of receiver estimates of truthfulness from sender reports of actual truth-

fulness such that a positively signed score reflected truth bias and a negatively signed

score, a lie bias. McBurney and Comadena (1992) measured truth bias as the extent towhich the average truthfulness rating across multiple trials of truths and lies fell toward

the high end of the rating scale. Here, we opted for objective comparison to the sample

base rate.

6 Per signal detection theory, bias is generally considered to be independent from

accuracy. That is to say, one can achieve the same accuracy level while showing very

different biases. For example, imagine a sample of materials in which 50% of the

materials are truthful and 50% are deceptive. One could obtain 50% accuracy while

exhibiting either a complete truth bias (e.g., all materials judged as truthful) or

complete deception bias (e.g., all materials judged as deceptive). Thus, varying bias

scores are compatible with a variety of accuracy scores in samples that are roughly

balanced such that increased bias may accompany increased accuracy or decreasedaccuracy (Swets, 2000).

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Les biais cognitifs et la disponibilit des indices non verbaux dans la dtection

du mensonge

Judee K. Burgoon, University of Arizona

J. P. Blair, Texas State University

Renee E. Strom, St. Cloud State University

Rsum

Dans les situations potentiellement trompeuses, les gens se fient sur des raccourcis mentaux afin d'aider

traiter l'information. Ces jugements heuristiques sont souvent biaiss et ont pour rsultat des valuations

errones de l'honntet de l'metteur. Quatre de ces biais (le biais de vrit, le biais visuel, le biais

comportemental et le biais de violation des attentes) furent examins dans une exprience de jugements

qui variait en disponibilit des indices non verbaux et en mensonge. Les observateurs ont vu un entretien

complet enregistr sur vido (accs complet aux indices visuels, vocaux et verbaux), entendu l'entretien

complet (accs vocal et verbal) ou lu une transcription (accs verbal) d'un suspect honnte ou trompeur,

interrog propos d'un faux vol. Ils ont ensuite class l'interview selon des critres d'information, de

comportement, de gestion de l'image et d'honntet. Les rsultats appuient la prsence de chacun des

quatre biais, qui taient le plus vidents lorsque les interviews mentaient et que les observateurs avaient

accs toutes les modalits visuelles, vocales et verbales. Avec l'ajout des indices non verbaux, les

messages des menteurs taient jugs comme tant de plus en plus complets, honntes, clairs et pertinents;

leurs comportements comme tant plus complexes et dominants; leur comportement gnral comme plus

crdible. Les menteurs taient en fait jugs plus crdibles que les personnes honntes dans la modalit la

plus complte (indices visuels, vocaux et verbaux), tandis que la plus grande exactitude dans la

discrimination et la dtection s'est produite chez les gens n'ayant eu accs qu' l'enregistrement audio. Les

rsultats ont des implications pour les facteurs qui influencent les jugements de la crdibilit d'un

metteur et l'exactitude dans la distinction entre la vrit et le mensonge, surtout dans des conditions o

les metteurs produisent les messages de faon interactive.

Mots cls : mensonge, comportement non verbal, communication interpersonnelle, crdibilit,

confiance, modalit, CMO


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Kognitive Befangenheit und nonverbale Hinweisverfgbarkeit beim

Aufdecken von Tuschung




In potentiellen Tuschungssituationen greifen Menschen auf mentale Abkrzungen zurck, die

ihnen helfen, Informationen zu verarbeiten. Diese heuristischen Urteile sind oft befangen und

resultieren in einer fehlerhaften Beurteilung der Aufrichtigkeit des Senders. Vier solcher

Befangenheiten Wahrheitsbefangenheit, visuelle Befangenheit, Verhaltensbefangenheit und

Erwartungsverletzungsbefangenheit untersuchten wir in einem Beurteilungsexperiment mit

variierter nonverbaler Hinweisverfgbarkeit und Tuschung. Beobachter sahen ein

aufgezeichnetes Video (visueller, vokaler und verbaler Zugang), hrten ein Interview (vokaler

und verbaler Zugang) oder lasen ein Manuskript (verbaler Zugang) eines wahrheitsgemen oder

tuschenden Verdchtigen, der bezglich eines Entwendungsdiebstahls verhrt wurde. Danach

beurteilten die Teilnehmer diesen hinsichtlich der Informationen und Verhaltensweisen, des

Imagemanagement und der Wahrhaftigkeit. Die Ergebnisse sttzen die Existenz aller vier

Befangenheiten, die sich am deutlichsten zeigten, wenn Interviewte tuschten und die

Beobachter Zugang zu allen visuellen, vokalen und verbalen Modalitten hatten. Die Botschaft

des Tuschenden wurde als zunehmend vollstndig, ehrlich, klar und relevant, sein Verhalten als

strker involviert und dominant, und sein allgemeines Verhalten als glaubwrdiger beurteilt,

wenn nonverbale Hinweise ergnzt wurden. Tuschende wurden in der AV-Variante sogar als

glaubwrdiger beurteilt als jene, die die Wahrheit sagten. Die beste Unterscheidung und

Entdeckungsgenauigkeit herrschte in der Audio-Kondition vor. Die Ergebnisse zeigen auf,

welche Faktoren die Beurteilung der Glaubwrdigkeit eines Senders und die Genauigkeit bei der

Unterscheidung von Wahrheit und Tuschung beeinflussen; insbesondere unter Bedingungen, in

denen der Sender die Botschaft interaktiv produziert.


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Los Prejuicios Cognitivos y La Disponibilidad de la Clave No Verbal en la

Deteccin del Engao




Resumen

En situaciones potencialmente engaosas, la gente confa en los atajos mentales para ayudarse en

el procesamiento de informacin. Estos juicios heursticos son a menudo tendenciosos y dan

como resultado evaluaciones imprecisas acerca de la veracidad del emisor. Cuatro de esos

prejuicios prejuicio sobre la veracidad, prejuicio visual, prejuicio sobre el comportamiento, y

prejuicio sobre la violacin de expectacin fueron examinados en un experimento de juicio

variando la disponibilidad de la clave no verbal y el engao. Los observadores vieron una

entrevista completa grabada en video (con acceso pleno a las claves visuales, vocales y verbales),

escucharon la entrevista en su totalidad (acceso a lo vocal y verbal), leyeron una transcripcin

(acceso a lo verbal) de un sospechoso veraz mentiroso cuestionado sobre un presunto robo,

luego clasificaron al entrevistado acerca de la informacin, el comportamiento, el manejo de la

imagen y la veracidad. Los resultados respaldaron la presencia de los 4 prejuicios, que fueron

ms evidentes cuando los entrevistados mintieron y los observadores tuvieron acceso a las

modalidades visuales, vocales, y verbales. Los mensajes de los impostores fueron juzgados como

ms completes, honestos, claros, y relevantes; sus comportamientos fueron ms involucrados y

dominantes; y sus comportamientos en general fueron ms crebles, con el aditamento de las

claves no verbales. Los impostores fueron juzgados actualmente como ms crebles que aquellos

que decan la verdad en la modalidad audio visual, mientras que la mayor discriminacin y

certeza de deteccin ocurri en la condicin auditiva. Los resultados tienen implicancias sobrequ factores influyen los juicios sobre la credibilidad del emisor de un mensaje y la certeza para

distinguir la verdad de la mentira, especialmente bajo condiciones en la cuales los emisores

producen mensajes en forma interactiva.

Palabra claves: decepcin, comportamiento no verbal, comunicacin interpersonal,

credibilidad, confianza, modalidad, CMC


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Judee K. Burgoon

J. P. Blair

Renee E. Strom

St. Cloud

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Documents

Cognitive Biases and Nonverbal Cue Availability in Detecting Deception