Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23002             July 31, 1967

CONCEPCION FELIX VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs.GERONIMO RODRIGUEZ., ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for plaintiff-appellant.Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is an appeal by Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 2565, which she commenced on May 28, 1962, to secure declaration, of nullity of two contracts executed on January 24, 1934 and for recovery of certain properties.

The facts of this case may be briefly stated as follows:

Concepcion Felix, widow of the late Don Felipe Calderon and with whom she had one living child, Concepcion Calderon, contracted a second marriage on June 20, 1929, with Domingo Rodriguez, widower with four children by a previous marriage, named Geronimo, Esmeragdo, Jose and Mauricio, all surnamed Rodriguez. There was no issue in this second marriage.

Prior to her marriage to Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix was the registered owner of 2 fishponds located in the barrio of Babañgad, municipality of Bulacan, Bulacan province. with a total area of 557,711 square meters covered by OCT Nos. 605 and 807. Under date of January 24, 1934, Concepcion Felix appeared to have executed a deed of sale conveying ownership of the aforesaid properties to her daughter, Concepcion Calderon, for the sum of P2,500.00, which the latter in turn appeared to have transferred to her mother and stepfather by means of a document dated January 27, 1934. Both deeds, notarized by Notary Public Jose D. Mendoza, were registered in the office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on January 29, 1934, as a consequence of which, the original titles were cancelled and TCT Nos. 13815 and 13816 were issued in the names of the spouses Domingo Rodriguez and Concepcion Felix.

On March 6, 1953, Domingo Rodriguez died intestate, survived by the widow, Concepcion Felix, his children Geronimo Esmeragdo and Mauricio and grandchildren Oscar, Juan and Ana, surnamed Rodriguez, children of a son, Jose, who had predeceased him.

On March 16, 1953, the above-named widow, children and grandchildren of the deceased entered into an extra-judicial settlement of his (Domingo's) estate, consisting of one-half of the properties allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership. Among the properties listed as conjugal were the two parcels of land in Bulacan, Bulacan, which, together with another piece of property, were divided among the heirs in this manner:

WHEREAS, the parties have furthermore agreed that the fishpond covered by TCT Nos. 13815, 13816 and 24109 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, containing an area of 557,971 sq. m., which is likewise the conjugal property of the deceased and his surviving spouse; 1/2 of the same or 278,985.5 sq. m. belongs to said Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez, as her share in the conjugal property; and 3/4 of the remaining half or 209,239.125 sq. m. are transferred in full ownership to Geronimo Rodriguez, Esmeragdo Rodriguez and Mauricio Rodriguez, share and share alike, while the other 1/4 or 69,746.375 sq. m. of the said remaining half goes in equal shares to Oscar Rodriguez, Juan Rodriguez and Ana Rodriguez.

As a result of this partition, TCT Nos. 13815 and 13816 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-11431 and T-14432 were issued in the names of the said heirs of the deceased.

On March 23, 1953, in a power of attorney executed by the children and grandchildren of Domingo Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez was named their attorney in-fact, authorized to manage their shares in the fishponds (Exh. 4).

On July 2, 1954, the heirs ended their co-ownership by executing a deed of partition, dividing and segregating their respective shares in the properties, pursuant to a consolidation and subdivision plan (PCS-3702), in accordance with which, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez obtained TCT No. T-12910, for the portion pertaining to her (Exh. L), while TCT No. T-12911 was issued to the other heirs, for their shares. This latter title was subsequently replaced by TCT No. 16660 (Exh. M).

On October 12, 1954, the Rodriguez children executed another document granting unto the widow lifetime usufruct over one-third of the fishpond which they received as hereditary share in the estate of Domingo Rodriguez, which grant was accepted by Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez.

Then, in a contract dated December 15, 1961, the widow appeared to have leased from the Rodriguez children and grandchildren the fishpond (covered by TCT No. 16660) for a period of 5 years commencing August 16, 1962, for an annual rental of P7,161.37 (Exh. 5). 1äwphï1.ñët

At about this time, it seemed that the relationship between the widow and her stepchildren had turned for the worse. Thus, when she failed to deliver to them the balance of the earnings of the fishponds, in the amount of P3,000.00, her stepchildren endorsed the matter to their lawyer who, on May 16, 1962, sent a letter of demand to the widow for payment thereof. On, May 28, 1962, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez filed the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila naming as defendants, Geronimo Rodriguez, Esmeragdo Rodriguez, Oscar Rodriguez, Concepcion Bautista Vda. de Rodriguez, as guardian of the minors Juan and Ana Rodriguez, and Antonio Diaz de Rivera and Renato Diaz de Rivera, as guardians of the minors Maria Ana, Mercedes, Margarita, Mauricio, Jr. and Domingo (Children of Mauricio Rodriguez who had also died).

The action to declare null and void the deeds of transfer of plaintiff's properties to the conjugal partnership was based on the alleged employment or exercise by plaintiff's deceased husband of force and pressure on her; that the conveyances of the properties — from plaintiff to her daughter and then to the conjugal partnership of plaintiff and her husband — are both without consideration; that plaintiff participated in the extrajudicial settlement of estate (of the deceased Domingo Rodriguez) and in other subsequent deeds or instruments involving the properties in dispute, on the false assumption that the said properties had become conjugal by reason of the execution of the deeds of transfer in 1934; that laboring under the same false assumption, plaintiff delivered to defendants, as income of the properties from 1956 to 1961, the total amount of P56,976.58. As alternative cause of action, she contended that she would claim for her share, as surviving widow, of 1/5 of the properties in controversy, should such properties be adjudged as belonging to the conjugal

partnership. Thus, plaintiff prayed that the deeds of transfer mentioned in the complaint be declared fictitious and simulated; that the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate" be also declared null and void; that TCT No. 16660 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan be cancelled and another one be issued in the name of plaintiff, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Felix; that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of P56,976.58, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint, and for appropriate relief in connection with her alternative cause of action.

In their separate answers, defendants not only denied the material allegations of the complaint, but also set up as affirmative defenses lack of cause of action, prescription, estoppel and laches. As counterclaim, they asked for payment by the plaintiff of the unpaid balance of the earnings of the land up to August 15, 1962 in the sum of P3,000.00, for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

On October 5, 1963, judgment was rendered for the defendants. In upholding the validity of the contracts, the court found that although the two documents, Exhibits A and B, were executed for the purpose of converting plaintiff's separate properties into conjugal assets of the marriage with Domingo Rodriguez, the consent of the parties thereto was voluntary, contrary to the allegations of plaintiff and her witness. The court also ruled that having taken part in the questioned transactions, plaintiff was not the proper party to plead lack of consideration to avoid the transfers; that contracts without consideration are not inexistent, but are only voidable, following the ruling in the case of Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana (87 Phil. 787); that there was ratification or confirmation by the plaintiff of the transfer of her property, by her execution (with the other heirs) of the extrajudicial settlement of estate; that being a voluntary party to the contracts, Exhibits A and B, plaintiff cannot recover the properties she gave thereunder. Plaintiff's alternative cause of action was also rejected on the ground that action for rescission of the deed of extrajudicial settlement should have been filed within 4 years from its execution (on March 16, 1953).

From the decision of the Court of First Instance, plaintiff duly appealed to this Court, insisting that the conveyances in issue were obtained through duress, and were inexistent, being simulated and without consideration.

We agree with the trial Court that the evidence is not convincing that the contracts of transfer from Concepcion Felix to her daughter, and from the latter to her mother and stepfather were executed through violence or intimidation. The charge is predicated solely upon the improbable and biased testimony of appellant's daughter, Concepcion C. Martelino, whom the trial court, refused to believe, considering that her version of violence and harassment was contradicted by Bartolome Gualberto who had lived with the Rodriguez spouses from 1917 to 1953, and by the improbability of Rodriguez threatening his stepdaughter in front of the Notary Public who ratified her signature. Furthermore, as pointed out by the appealed decision, the charge of duress should be treated with caution considering that Rodriguez had already died when the suit was brought, for duress, like fraud, is not to be lightly paid at the door of men already dead. (Cf. Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.] 481, 498; Sinco vs. Longa, 51 Phil. 507).

What is more decisive is that duress being merely a vice or defect of consent, an action based upon it must be brought within four years after it has ceased;1 and the present action was instituted only in 1962, twenty eight (28) years after the intimidation is claimed to have occurred, and no less than nine (9) years after the supposed culprit died (1953). On top of it, appellant entered into a series of subsequent transactions with appellees that confirmed the contracts that she now tries to set aside. Therefore, this cause of action is clearly barred.

Appellant's main stand in attacking the conveyances in question is that they are simulated or fictitious, and inexistent for lack of consideration. We shall examine each purported defect separately.

The charge of simulation is untenable, for the characteristic of simulation is the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effects or in way alter the juridical situation of the parties. Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. But appellant contends that the sale by her to her daughter, and the subsequent sale by the latter to appellant and her husband, the late Domingo Rodriguez, were done for the purpose of converting the property from paraphernal to conjugal, thereby vesting a half interest in Rodriguez, and evading the prohibition against donations from one spouse to another during coverture (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 1334). If this is true, then the appellant and her daughter must have intended the two conveyance to be real and effective; for appellant could not intend to keep the ownership of the fishponds and at the same time vest half of them in her husband. The two contracts of sale then could not have been simulated, but were real and intended to be fully operative, being the means to achieve the result desired.

Nor does the intention of the parties to circumvent by these contracts the law against donations between spouses make them simulated ones.

Ferrara, in his classic book, "La Simulacion de los Negocios Juridicos" (Sp. trans, 1926), pp. 95, 105, clearly explains the difference between simulated transactions and transactions in  fraudem legis:

Otra figura que debe distinguirse de la simulacion es el  fraus legis. Tambien aqui se da una gran confusion que persiste aun en la jurisprudencia, apegada tenazmente a antiguos errores. Se debe a Bahr el haber defendido con vigor la antitesis teorica que existe entre negocio fingido y negocio fraudulento y haber atacado la doctrina comun que hacia una mescolanza con los dos conceptos.

Se confunde — dice (2) —, el negocio in fraudem legis con el negocio simulado; aunque la naturaleza de ambos sea totalmente diversa. El negocio fraudulento no es, en absolute, un negocio aparente. Es perfectamente serio: se quiere realmente. Es mas, se quiere tal como se ha realizado, con todas las consecuencias que correspondent a la forma juridica elegida. Muchas veces, estas consecuencias con incomodas para una u otra de las partes, aunque serian mucho mas incomodas las consecuencias que lievaria consigo el acto prohibido.

x x x           x x x           x x x

El resultado de las precedentes investigaciones es el siguiente el negocio simulado quiere producir una apariencia; el negocio fraudulente, una realidad; los negocios simulados son ficticios, no queridos; los negocios in fraudem son serios, reales, y realizados en tal forma por las partes para consequir un resultado prohibido: la simulacion nunca es un medio para eludir la ley sino para ocultar su violation. La transgresion del contenido verbal e inmediato de la norma se encubre bajo el manto de un negocio licito, lo cual no altera el caracter del contra legem agere. Tan verdad es, que si se ha redactado una contra-escritura que documentary y declara la verdadera naturaleza del negocio realizado, no queda mas que aplicar pura y simplementela prohibicion.

Tambien el fraude quiere perjudicar la ley, pero emplea para ello medios diversos y sigue distintos caminus. No oculta el acto exterior, sino que lo deja claro y visible, tratando de huir sesgadamente de la aplicacion de la ley merced a una artistica y sabia combinacion de varios medios juridicos no reprobados.

Appellant invokes our decision in Vasquez vs. Porta, 98 Phil. 490, but to no purpose. The mortgage and foreclosure sale involved in that case were typical simulations merely apparent but not really intended to produce legal effects, as approved by the Court's finding that the alleged creditor and buyer at the foreclosure sale "Porta himself ostensibly acknowledged by his inertia in allowing the doctor (alleged mortgagor debtor) to exercise dominical power thereon without any protest on his part." (cas. cit., p. 495). Not only this, but the mortgagor's wife, when her husband died, "found among his papers Porta's cancellation of the mortgage in his favor and the draft of the complaint for foreclosure." Plainly, the precedent cited is here inapplicable.

Were the two conveyances from appellant to her daughter and from the latter to the spouses Rodriguez void ab initio or inexistent for lack of consideration? We do not find them to be so. In the first transaction, the price of P2,500.00 is recited in the deed itself (Exh. A); in the second (Exh. B), the consideration set forth is P3,000.00. Now, Article 1274 of the Civil Code of 1889 (in force when the deeds were executed) provided that —

In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party, the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other. (emphasis supplied.)

Since in each conveyance the buyer became obligated to pay a definite price in money, such undertaking constituted in themselves actual causa or consideration for the conveyance of the fishponds. That the prices were not paid (assuming ad arguendo  that Concepcion Martelino's testimony, to this effect is true) does not make the sales inexistent for want of causa. As ruled in Enriquez de la Cavada vs. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982, "the consideration (causa) need not pass from one (party) to the other at the time the contract is entered into x x x . The consideration need not be paid at the time of the promise. The one promise is a consideration for the other."

What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the fact that they were resorted to in order to circumvent the legal prohibition against donations between spouses contained in Article 1334, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing. That illegal purpose tainted the contracts, for as held by the Spanish Tribunal Supreme in its decision of 2 April 1941.

ha de ser reputado ineficaz, por exigencias includibles del caracter social y moral del Derecho, todo contrato que persiga un fin ilicito o immoral, sea cualquiera el medio empleado por los contratantes para lograr esa finalidad, no justificada por un interes digno de ser socialmente protegido.

The illicit purpose then becomes illegal causa within the terms of the old Civil Code, for as declared by the same Spanish Court in its decision of 14 December 1940 —

toda vez que lo que caracteriza fundamentalmente la ilicitud de la causa es la lesion de un interos general juridica 6 moral.

a ruling reiterated in the decision of 2 April 1941 when the Court ruled:

El concepto de la causa ilicita, tal como la desenvuelve y aplica con gran amplitud y flexibilidad la doctrina moderna, permite cobijar, no solo las convenciones ilicitas por razon de su objeto o de su motivo ... sino tambien multiples convenciones que no encerrando en si ningun elemento de directa antijuricidad son ilicitas por el matiz immoral que reviste la operation en su conjunto x x x .

Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal subject matter or illegal causa, Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code then in force apply rigorously the rule in pari delicto non oritur action, denying all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. And appellant is clearly as guilty as her husband in the attempt to evade the legal interdiction of Article 1334 of the Code, already cited. Wherefore, her present action to reivindicate the, conveyed properties was correctly repulsed by the Court below.

Art. 1306. If the act which constitutes the illicit consideration is neither a crime nor a misdemeanor, the following rules shall be observed:

1. When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he may have given by virtue of the contract, or enforce the performance of the undertaking of the other party;

x x x           x x x           x x x

That Article 1306 applies to cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration or the purpose of the contract was expressly recognized by this Supreme Court in Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 449-450.2

Finally, it cannot be denied that plaintiff-appellant had knowledge of the nullity of the contract for the transfer of her properties in 1934, because she was even a party thereto. And yet, her present action was filed only on May 28, 1962 and after the breaking up of friendly relations between her and defendants-appellees. Appellant's inaction to enforce her right, for 28 years, cannot be justified by the lame excuse that she assumed that the transfer was valid. Knowledge of the effect of that transaction would have been obtained by the exercise of diligence. Ignorance which is the effect of inexcusable negligence, it has been said, is no excuse for laches. (Go Chi Gun, etc., et al. vs. Co Cho, et al., G.R. No. L-5208, Feb. 28, 1955). Even assuming for the sake of argument that appellant held her peace, during the lifetime of her husband, out of legitimate fear for her life, there is no justification for her future to bring the proper action after his death in 1953. Instead, she entered into a series of agreements with herein appellees, the children of her husband by a prior marriage, of partition, usufruct and lease of their share in the fishponds, transactions that necessarily assumed that Rodriguez had acquired one-half of the litigated fishponds. In the circumstances, appellant's cause has become a stale demand and her conduct placed her in estoppel to question the Validity of the transfer of her properties. (Manila, et al. vs. Galvan, et al., G.R. No. L-23507, May 24, 1967; Perez vs. Herranz, 7 Phil. 695-696).

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez. So ordered.

Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.

Footnotes

1Article 1301 of the Civil Code of 1889, in force when the assailed contracts were executed (1934).

2See also Liguez vs. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 581582; Perez vs. Herranz, 7 Phil. 695

Nepomuceno v. CA DigestsNepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Facts:1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.

2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

Rabadilla v CA

A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a

511, 855 hectare land. A condition was however imposed to the effect that:

1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;

2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime

of said Maria Belleza;

3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall

continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;

4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of

Belleza.

In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.

In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the

said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply

with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the

land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.

In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to

the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence,

since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr.

Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.

ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the Will

left by Aleja Belleza.

HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The “near descendants”

being referred to in the will are the heirs of  Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised

property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr.

Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same property was transmitted to Johnny

Rabadilla by virtue of succession.

Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and

obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.

Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his

death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the

decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge

Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear

therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His

failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the property to the estate

of Aleja.

Revilla v CA (G.R. No. 95329)Facts:Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, owned 2 pieces of land with buildings in Manila and 6 parcels of land in his hometown in Bulacan. These properties are worth P30M. In 1978, he executed a 13-page last will and testament, bequeathing all his properties to his 9 nephews and nieces including petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each, he gave 1/10 of his estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be said after his death and for the care of religious images he kept in a chapel in Bulacan.During his lifetime, Don Cayetano sought the probate of his will to which the CFI Manila admitted. However, the City Hall of Manila was burned by fire where the records were also burned. A petition for reconstitution of the records was filed and it was granted.After Don Cayetano died, Heracio Revilla filed another petition of a will wherein he instituted Heracio as sole heir of his uncle’s estate and executor of the will allegedly executed in 1982.  The probate was opposed by Heracio’s 8 brothers and sisters on the grounds that:

-      Since 1978 up to Cayetano’s death, he never informed that he revoked the will executed in 1978-      The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with law and the signature of Cayetano was different from

his usual and customary signature-      Cayetano was of unsound mind when he executed the will-      That the alleged will was executed with undue pressure and influence-      That the 1978 will is void for the reason that it was executed under duress or the influence of fear or

threats-      Cayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraud and he did not

intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fixing his signatureThe trial court disallowed the second will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.

Issue:Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will.

Held:When Don Cayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second will which he supposedly made. He identified his first will and declared that it was his true and only will. He could not have executed a second will because he was sick in the hospital during that time (he stayed there for 2 months) and he could not sign any papers while he was confined in the hospital.During the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. It was placed in a browned envelope stating “Buksan ito pagkalibing ko” to which Cayetano agreed to open. He recognized the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. In the court records, Cayetano declared that he did not execute another last will and testament after the original will had been probated.Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, he did not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only 2months before he testified in the reconstitution proceeding. If the second will already existed on November 27, 1982, it would have been Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate of the first will.Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the alleged date (September 13, 1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then) it must have been procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. Judge Eduardo Bengson had to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his 8 brothers and sisters to visit Don Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that Heracio had placed around their uncle. A videotape, taken during their visit and shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation that Don Cayetano was displeased with his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will.Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize Don Cayetano and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the private respondents, Heracio transferred him from his own house in Manila to Heracio's house in Quezon City.The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and the disinheritance of his 8 other nephews and nieces, justified the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' belief that undue influence was exercised by Horacio over Don Cayetano to make him sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not know to be such) in order to deprive his brothers and sisters of their rightful share in their uncle's estate.There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with Co, Barredo and Lim  ( as witnesses) was a second will revoking the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he would not have denied that he made it. He would probably have caused it to be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will. But apparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature which the petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the private respondents, but from Don Cayetano himself.That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the omission of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and the income thereof to pay for holy masses and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel. That provision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would not have been deleted by Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was to disinherit his nephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid himself. He wanted everything.*Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was executed, the testimonies of the notary public, as well as those of the three (3) instrumental witnesses were not given credit because of major contradictions in testimonies.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 93980 June 27, 1994

CLEMENTE CALDE, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMO AGAWIN and DOMYAAN APED, respondents.

Nestor P. Mondok for petitioner.

Lazaro Padong for private respondents.

 

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review by certiorari of the Decision, dated March 27, 1990, of the Court of appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071, disallowing probate of the Last Will and Codicil executed by Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang, who died on March 20, 1976.

The records show that decedent left behind nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of property. She also left a Last Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972, and a Codicil thereto, dated July 24, 1973. Both documents contained the thumbmarks of decedent. They were also signed by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A. Tolete, then the Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province.

Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province, Br. 36. 2 He died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was duly substituted by petitioner. Private respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the Petitioner filed by Calde, on the following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect that decedent did not know; that decedent was mentally incapacitated to execute the two documents because of her advanced age, illness and deafness; that decedent’s thumbmarks were procured through fraud and undue influence; and that the codicil was not executed in accordance with law.

On June 23, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment on the case, approving and allowing decedent’s will and its codicil. The decision was appealed to and reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals. It held:

. . . (T)he will and codicil could pass the safeguards under Article 805 of the New Civil Code but for one crucial factor of discrepancy in the color of ink when the instrumental witnesses affixed their respective signatures. When subjected to cross-examination, Codcodio Nacnas as witness testified as follows:

Q And all of you signed on the same table?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when you were all signing this Exhibit "B" and "B-1", Exhibit "B" and "B-1" which is the testament was passed around all of you so that each of you will sign consecutively?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who was the first to sign?

A Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang.

Q After Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang was made to sign — I withdraw the question. How did Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang sign the last will and testament?

A She asked Judge Tolete the place where she will affix her thumbmark so Judge Tolete directed her hand or her thumb to her name.

Q After she signed, who was the second to sign allegedly all of you there present?

A Jose Becyagen.

Q With what did Jose Becyagen sign the testament, Exhibit "B" and "B-1"?

A Ballpen.

Q And after Jose Becyagen signed his name with the ballpen, who was the next to sign?

A Me, sir.

Q And Jose Becyagen passed you the paper and the ballpen, Exhibit "B" and "B-1" plus the ballpen which used to sign so that you could sign your name, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And then after you signed, who was the next to sign the document, Exhibit "B" and "B-1"?

A Hilario Coto-ong.

Q So you passed also to Hilario Coto-ong the same Exhibit "B" and "B-1" and the ballpen so that he could sign his name as witness to the document, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that is the truth and you swear that to be the truth before the Honorable Court?

ATTY. DALOG:

He already testified under oath, Your Honor.

COURT:

Witness may answer

A Yes, sir.

For his part, Obanan Ticangan likewise admitted during cross-examination in regard to the codicil that:

Q When you signed Exhibit "D" and "D-1", did you all sign with the same ballpen?

A One.

Such admissions from instrumental witnesses are indeed significant since they point to no other conclusion than that the documents were not signed by them in their presence but on different occasions since the same ballpen used by them supposedly in succession could not have produced a different color from blue to black and from black to blue. In fact, the attestation clause followed the same pattern. The absurd sequence was repeated when they signed the codicil, for which reason, We have no other alternative but to disallow the Last Will and Codicil. Verily, if the witnesses and testatrix used the same ballpen, then their signatures would have been in only one color, not in various ones as shown in the documents. Moreover, the signatures, in different colors as they are, appear to be of different broadness, some being finer than the others, indicating that, contrary to what the testamentary witnesses declared on the witness stand, not only one ballpen was used, and, therefore, showing that the documents were not signed by the testatrix and instrumental witnesses in the presence of one another. . . " (Rollo, pp. 44-46. Citations omitted.)

Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the impugned Decision. His motion was denied by the respondent court in its Order, dated May 24, 1990.

Thus, this appeal by petitioner who now puts in issue the correctness of the respondent court’s conclusion that both decedent’s will and codicil were not subscribed by the witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another, contrary to the requirements of Article 805 of the Civil Code. He contends that:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT BY CONCLUDING BASED ON PURE SPECULATION OR SURMISES AND WITHOUT REGARD TO THE TESTIMONY OF JUDGE TOLETE WHICH IS AN EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANCE THAT THE WILL AND THE CODICIL OF THE LATE CALIBIA LINGDAN BULANGLANG WERE SIGNED BY HER AND BY HER INSTRUMENTAL WITNESSES ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS;

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE

APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY DISREGARDING THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE ATTESTATION CLAUSES OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT AND THE CODICIL OF THE LATE CALIBIA LINGDAN BULANGLANG.

The petition must fail.

The question in the case at bench is one of fact: whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent appellate court erred in concluding that both decedent’s Last Will and Testament, and its Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on separate occasions. As a general rule, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are considered final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this court. In the present instance, however, there is reason to make an exception to that rule, since the finding of the respondent court is contrary to that of the trial court, viz.:

. . . (Private respondents) pointed out however, that the assertions of petitioner’s witnesses are rife with contradictions, particularly the fact that the latter’s signatures on the documents in issue appear to have been written in ballpens of different colors contrary to the statements of said witnesses that all of them signed with only one ballpen. The implication is that the subscribing witnesses to the Will and Codicil, and the testatrix did not simultaneously sign each of the documents in one sitting but did it piecemeal — a violation of Art. 805 of the Code. This conclusion of the (private respondents) is purely circumstantial. From this particular set of facts, numerous inferences without limits can be drawn depending on which side of the fence one is on. For instance, considering the time interval that elapsed between the making of the Will and Codicil, and up to the filing of the petition for probate, the possibility is not remote that one or two of the attesting witnesses may have forgotten certain details that transpired when they attested the documents in question . . . (Rollo, pp. 36-37.)

A review of the facts and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals based its impugned finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary documents in question were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single occasion.

As sharply noted by respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in decedent’s will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in black. This discrepancy was not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses testified that two pens were used by the signatories on the two documents. In fact, two (2) of petitioner’s witnesses even testified that only one (1) ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary documents.

It is accepted that there are three sources from which a tribunal may properly acquire knowledge for making its decisions, namely: circumstantial evidence, testimonial evidence, and real evidence or autoptic proference. Wigmore explains these sources as follows:

If, for example, it is desired to ascertain whether the accused has lost his right hand and wears an iron hook in place of it, one source of belief on the subject would be the testimony of a witness who had seen the arm; in believing this testimonial evidence, there is an inference from the human assertion to the fact asserted. A second source of belief would be the mark left on some substance grasped or carried by the accused; in believing this circumstantial evidence, there is an inference from the circumstance to the thing producing it. A third source of belief remains, namely, the inspection by the tribunal of the accused’s arm. This source differs from the other

two in omitting any step of conscious inference or reasoning, and in proceeding by direct self-perception, or autopsy.

It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to ask whether this is not, after all, a third source of inference, i.e., an inference from the impressions or perceptions of the tribunal to the objective existence of the thing perceived. The law does not need and does not attempt to consider theories of psychology as to the subjectivity of knowledge or the mediateness of perception. It assumes the objectivity of external nature; and, for the purposes of judicial investigation, a thing perceived by the tribunal as existing does exist.

There are indeed genuine cases of inference by the tribunal from things perceived to other things unperceived — as, for example, from a person’s size, complexion, and features, to his age; these cases of a real use of inference can be later more fully distinguished . . . But we are here concerned with nothing more than matters directly perceived — for example, that a person is of small height or is of dark complexion; as to such matters, the perception by the tribunal that the person is small or large, or that he has a dark or light complexion, is a mode of acquiring belief which is independent of inference from either testimonial or circumstantial evidence. It is the tribunal’s self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing itself.

From the point of view of the litigant party furnishing this source of belief, it may be termed Autoptic Proference. 3 (Citations omitted.)

In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court, show in black and white — or more accurately, in black and blue — that more than one pen was used by the signatories thereto. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve petitioner’s claim that both testamentary documents in question were subscribed to in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code.

Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary documents were subscribed and attested to, starting from decedent’s thumbmarking thereof, to the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order. Nonetheless, nowhere in Judge Tolete’s testimony is there any kind of explanation for the different-colored signatures on the testaments.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of respondent Court of Appeals, dated March 27, 1988, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071 disallowing the Last Will and Testament, and the Codicil thereto, of the decedent Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

 

#Footnotes

1 Through its Second Division, composed of Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo (ponente and chairman), Antonio M. Martinez, and Nicolas P. Lapeña.

2 Presided by Judge Artemio B. Marrero. The case was docketed as SPL. PROC. CASE NO. 295.

3 J.H. WIGMORE, A Treatise On The Anglo-American System Of Evidence In Trials At Common Law, Vol. 4, Sec. 1150, pp. 237-8 (1940).

NUGUID VS NUGUID

GRN L-2344 17 SCRA 449

JUNE 23, 1966

SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Rosario Nuguid , single, died in December 30, 1962.She was without descendants but was survived by her parents and siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, her sister filed in CFI a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario on November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said will instituted Remedios as the universal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filed their opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally preterited and as a consequence, the institution is void. The court’s order held that “the will in question is a complete nullity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will void.

Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will.

RULING:

The statute we are called upon to apply in article 854 of the civil code which states:

“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the d and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious

The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament. The one-sentence will institutes petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or bequest are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.

On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the court’s area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated. However if the case is to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The practical conditions: time, effort, expenses and added anxiety, induced us to a belief that we might as well meat head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.