Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean

8/7/2019 Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean

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In November 2009, on a dry lakebed in the

desert o northern Mali, United Nations (UN) in-

vestigators ound traces o cocaine amid a Boeing

727s charred and stripped uselage. Its owners had

apparently torched the plane ater it had been dam-

aged, probably to destroy evidence o their identity

and cargo. With a payload capacity o 10 tons ococaine etching a wholesale value o $580 million,

West Aricas emerging cocaine trackers could a-

ord the loss.

The fight path o this 727 may have included

layovers in Gambia, Senegal, Guinea, and Guinea

Bissau, but it assuredly originated rom South Amer-

ica. Its cargo added to the mounting cocaine trac

rom Latin America that transships West Arica on

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Cocaine and Instability in Arica: Lessonsrom Latin America and the CaribbeanBy Davin ORegan

A P U B L I C A T I O N O F T H E A F R I C A C E N T E R F O R S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

The dollar value o cocaine traicked through West Arica has risen rapidly and surpassed all otherillicit commodities smuggled in the subregion.

Experience rom Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrates that cocaine trac contributes to dra-matically higher levels o violence and instability.

Co-opting key government ocials is the preerred modus operandi o Latin American cocaine tra-ckers. Arican governments need to act urgently to protect the integrity o their counternarcoticsinstitutions to prevent this threat rom developing deeper roots on the continent.

H I G H L I G H T S

N O . 5 / J U L Y 2 0 1 0

its way to European consumers. Estimates o annual

cocaine transshipments through West Arica range

between 60 and 250 tons, yielding wholesale rev-

enues o $3 billion to $14 billion.

Beginning in 2006, several West Arican coun-

tries seized extremely large volumes o cocaine

measured in the hundreds and thousands o kilo-gramsin single hauls. These seizures were oten

accidental, indicating that actual trac was likely

much higher. Cocaine departs Venezuela, Colom-

bia, and elsewhere in South America in shipping

containers, on yachts, and by small planes and jets.

South American organized criminal and militant

groups commonly deliver bulk shipments to West

Arican trackers in Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, and


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2

Guinea Bissau, countries that the UN Oice on

Drugs and Crime (UNODC) requently character-

izes as the subregions cocaine hubs. The cocaine

is then repackaged and moved to neighboring coun-

tries beore being transerred to syndicates in Eu-

rope, oten composed o Arican expatriates, who

handle wholesale and retail sales. Seizures in West

Arica have resulted in the arrests o Arican, South

American, European, and other nationals.

While West Arica is the current locus o this

activity, the continent as a whole is an ideal trans-

shipment centerpoor, with limited oversight and

weak policingmaking or a low-cost and low-risk

environment. Since Arica is not a producer or major

consumer o cocaine, some assume that its domes-

tic eects will be minor. Yet evidence o cocaines

destabilizing impact is already emerging. The assas-

sinations o Guinea Bissaus president and the head o

the army in early 2009 were likely linked to cocaine

transshipment. In January 2010, a senior ocer o

Guinea Bissaus Presidential Security Service was ar-

rested in a narcotics sting, prompting senior military

ocials to publicly lament the regular involvement

o security personnel in cocaine transshipment. In

late 2009, Ghana extradited three Malians who

claimed links to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

to the United States on cocaine tracking charges.

The sheer value o the trade poses not only a threat

to security but also real risks o distorting the regions

economy, investment fows, development, and steps

toward democracy.

Cocaine transshipment in Arica is new, but Lat-

in American and Caribbean countries have over 30years o experience dealing with narcotics tracking

and its destabilizing eects. Hard-earned lessons rom

Latin Americas experience, then, hold potentially

invaluable insights or Arica as it engages this new,

pernicious enemy.

NO ORDINARY ILL IC IT COMMODITY

Tracking in illicit goods is common in West A-

rica. Arms, countereit medicine, cigarettes, and crude

oil all move illegally to and through West Arica. Tra-

ckers in the subregion also have a history o smug-

gling heroin around the world. The mule method o

hiring travelers to swallow narcotics in small parcels

and travel by air is probably a Nigerian innovation.

But cocaine is an order o magnitude more se-

ductive than other goods already smuggled across

the subregion. Kilogram or kilogram, it is immensely

more valuable. According to a UNODC assessment

o tracking in West Arica, the estimated value o

cocaine transshipments in 2008 rivaled crude oil or

the most valuable smuggled commodity. Yet the vol-

ume o cocaine trac was comparatively minuscule

compared to the 55 million barrels o oil that were

stolen and transported or the same return.

The yields rom cocaine transshipment also

dwar the subregions ocial resources. During one

incident in January 2008, Malian security ocials

seized 750 kilograms o cocaine ollowing a shoot-

out. This one haul represented 36 percent o Malis

entire 2007 military expenditures. Similarly, the 350

kilograms o cocaine seized on one occasion in Au-

gust 2007 in Benin represented the annual per capita

income o 31,000 Beninois.

Cocaine trac may prove to be a xture in West

Arica. Transshipment has emerged in part because

demand is growing in Europe. According to the UN

International Narcotics Control Bureau, cocaine use

has doubled and tripled in some parts o Western Eu-

rope since 2000. Trackers, it would seem, are not

shiting trac to service preexisting demand but es-

tablishing a new route or a growing market.

Market dynamics also explain why heroin trac

through West Arica has not been nearly as destabi-lizing. West Arica plays a small role in global heroin

trac because consumer markets in North America

and Europe are supplied through the Balkans, Middle

East, and South Asia. Only 167 kilograms o heroin

was recovered in West and Central Arica in 2007, or

less than one-thirtieth the amount o cocaine seized

in just West Arica or the same year. There are grow-

ing concerns, however, that instability in East Arica

Davin ORegan is a Research Associate in the Arica Cen-

ter or Strategic Studies at the National Deense University.

cocaine is an order o magnitudemore seductive than other goodssmuggled across the subregion


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3

is attracting heroin trac (contributing to an esti-

mated 200,000 heroin addicts in Kenya), which may

merge with West Arican cocaine routes.

COCAINE, GOVERNANCE,

AND CORRUPTION

Over the last decade West Arica has emerged

rom widespread instability and beneted rom a pe-

riod o declining violence and growing democracy.

Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cte dIvoire are emerging

rom civil wars. Mali, Ghana, and Benin continue to

consolidate democratic gains. Cocaine trac poses adirect threat to these advances.

Traickers abhor attention. Any state re-

sponsewhether parliamentarians passing laws to

enhance border security or investigators prosecuting

smugglersraises transaction costs and lowers pro-

its. Consequently, trackers will attempt through

co-optation, bribery, and corruption to prevent and

deter a states response in order to protect their pro-

its. Rather than guard cocaine cargoes with heavily

armed security and gunghts, trackers would rather

pay politicians, judges, and police ocers to ignore

their trade altogether. The strategy is to make these

ocials beneciaries early to ensure low costs over

the long term.

In the Caribbean, narcotics traic has been a

major actor in expanding and deepening corruption.

Jamaica has struggled or years against endemic corrup-

tion, clientelist politics, and a lack o checks and bal-

ances within governmenta amiliar combination in

West Arica. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, itsstrategic location between the United States and drug-

producing countries in Latin America attracted rising

cocaine transshipment. By 2003, Jamaica had become

a leading transit country or cocaine destined or the

United States. The quality o governance on the island

soon worsened. Jamaicas ranking on Transparency In-

ternationals Corruption Perceptions Index ell rom

45th in 2002 to 99th in 2009. The sharp drop in public

Cocaine Trafc and Seizures in Kilograms, 20052009


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4

integrity coincides with regular eorts by transnational

and Jamaican criminal groups to corrupt unctionaries

in critical state agenciesparticularly the police and

customspolitical party unctionaries and grass roots,

community organizations.1

Narcotics traicking has penetrated govern-

ment and undermined governance elsewhere in

Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2009, Leonel

Fernndez, president o the Dominican Republic, dis-

missed 700 police and 535 military ocers, including

31 senior leaders, citing links to cocaine trac. In

Mexico, the Zetas, a criminal group renowned or as-

sassinations on behal o drug trackers, was ormed

by ocers who deserted the military. In Brazil, So

Paulos narcotics trackers train their members to

pass Brazils civil service exam, thereby gaining infu-

ence within the government bureaucracy.

As cocaine transshipment grows, West Ari-

cas ragile governance institutions may be urther

weakened. Arican media reports and independent

research already suggest that narcotics transship-

ment proceeds may be nancing political parties and

campaigns in Ghana.2 A Nigerian politician arrest-

ed beore boarding a plane rom Lagos to Germany

with more than 4 pounds o cocaine in his stomach

explained that he needed the unds to inance his

upcoming election campaign. Authorities believe

he may be part o a wider network o smugglers.3 In

Sierra Leone, the minister o transport and aviation

was dismissed ater trial proceedings revealed that

he allegedly provided landing clearance to a planecarrying 700 kilograms o cocaine.4 There are similar

reports o senior level police ocers involved in co-

caine tracking rom Benin, Nigeria, and Ghana.5

C O C A I N E , C R I M E , A N D V I O L E N C E

Narcotics tracking is not intrinsically violent.

Violence within the international trade in cannabis

and Ecstasy, a popular hallucinogen/amphetamine, is

comparatively low. But the overwhelming evidence

rom Latin America and the Caribbean indicates that

where cocaine trac moves, so too do homicide rates

and confict.

I eorts o co-optation and bribery prove unsuc-

cessul, trackers may resort to violence to deter or re-

sist attempts by government authorities to curtail drug

fows and arrest trackers. Tracking groups also use

violence to maintain loyalty and discipline as well as

target other trackers to resolve disputes, enorce agree-

ments or contracts, and protect or acquire market share.

In such environments, violence can spiral. Stud-

ies have shown that when violence within one crimi-

nal activity rises, all crimes can become more violent,

gangs prolierate, and rustrated citizens may resort to

mob justice including lynching suspected criminals.6

Oten, the average age o violent criminals alls and

the prevalence o violent youth behavior grows. In

short, a culture o violence emerges.

Evidence rom Latin America bears this out. The

homicide rate there, the highest in the world, is more

than three times the global average. Guatemalas ho-

micide rate rose 50 percent between 2004 and 2008,

an increase that paralleled cocaine trac. According

to a World Bank report on crime in the Caribbean, the

strongest explanation or the relatively high rates o

crime and violence in the regionand their apparent

rise in recent yearsis narcotics tracking.7

Jamaica has one o the highest homicide rates in

the world, and an estimated 40 percent o all murders

are related to narcotics disputes. Indeed, there are

268 local and transnational gangs in Jamaica alone,

comprising tens o thousands o members. Police

shootings have correspondingly risen sharply while

relations with civilians have suered. Within the last

10 years, almost 2,000 Jamaicans have been killed by

the policeslayings oten ollowed up by the most

cursory o internal investigations.Such conditions can contribute to severe bursts

o violence in Jamaica. In May 2010, authorities at-

tempted to arrest and extradite to the United States a

powerul Jamaican gang leader and reputed drug tra-

cker, Christopher Dudus Coke. Over the course

o 3 days, Jamaican army and police units swept a

subsection o the nations capital in search o the sus-

pect. Their increased presence was met with hostility

the overwhelming evidence romLatin America and the Caribbean

indicates that where cocainetrac moves, so too do homicide

rates and confict


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by gang-controlled neighborhoods. Over 70 people

were killed in clashes and gun battles.

Tracking-associated violence can reach even

more dangerous levels. In Mexico, traickers re-

quently battle one another and the state to protect

and expand their business. Government ocials esti-

mated 9,000 drug-related deaths in 2008, a dramatic

upsurge rom recent years that claimed the lives o

many bystanders. Mexico has surpassed the 1,000

deaths-per-year benchmark used to designate a state

o civil war every year since 1995. This high toll has

occurred despite government expenditures o $2.5

billion per year to reduce drug-related violence and

und the deployment o 45,000 troops.

The upsurge in cocaine-related violence in Mexi-

co ollows a prolonged period in which cocaine trac

was largely ignored by the state, likely due to successul

eorts by trackers to co-opt ocials. Trackers ac-

cumulated much power and infuence, and some be-

came de acto authorities in several regions, eectively

creating ungoverned spaces. When the government

eventually conronted trackers, the groups responded

ercely, revealing that the state no longer held its pre-

sumed monopoly on violence and security.

Cocaine trac has provided a vital nancial re-

source to insurgency groups as well. Recent reports

rom Peru indicate that the military is encounter-

ing resurgent elements o the Shining Path, which

apparently has been able to reconstitute itsel with

proceeds rom cocaine tracking. The 40-year-old

Revolutionary Armed Forces o Colombia (FARC)

rebel group grew substantially during the 1990s when

it began to trac cocaine. Recently, the FARC di-

versied its cocaine trade rom the United States to

Europe by way o West Arica, a presence that could

encourage insurgencies in West Arica and acilitate

trade in strategies and tactics. According to indepen-

dent reports, terrorist and armed groups in West A-ricas Sahel region are entering the drug trade.8 The

same is true in the Niger Delta, where militias have

accepted in-kind cocaine as payment rom track-

ers.9 This permits a move into the wholesale market

and sharply increases revenues.

West Arica today sustains many o the con-

ditions that enabled and anned narcotics-related

violence and conlict in Latin America and the

Caribbean. The subregion hosts many insurgencies

and terrorist groups who may view cocaine trac as

a prime opportunity to access nancial resources.

Likewise, West Aricas already capable trackers

in small arms, cigarettes, and humans may diver-

siy into cocaine. In Latin America, these problems

quickly metastasized into national security chal-

lenges, oten beore the state was able to implement

eective responses.

O B S T R U C T I N G T R A F F I C , P R O T E C T I N G

I N S T I T U T I O N S

In 2009, indications o small-scale cocaine pro-

cessing emerged in Guinea and processing labs were

thought to be active in Ghana. This represents a dan-

gerous evolution beyond cocaine transshipment and

is urther evidence that quick and robust responses

are necessary. Lessons drawn rom Latin Americas

experience oer critical insight into West Aricas

emerging counternarcotics playbook.

Address the Problem Vigorously Now. The

threats posed by cocaine traicking in West A-

rica are daunting, but they will be much harder to

reverse i let unchecked. According to the World

Bank, the Caribbeans rising homicide and crime

rates have exhibited strong inertia eects. This

means that once crime rates are high, it may be

dicult to reduce them. At the same time, crime-

reduction eorts in the short term are likely to have

huge long-term gains.10 Since cocaine traic in

West Arica is still maturing, there is an opportunity

to prevent its expansion. Deterring cocaine trac

is much cheaper, too. I West Arica can prevent

urther expansion o trac, it can avoid the atten-

dant spikes in crime and violence, fight o oreign

investment, prolieration o gangs, overcrowded

prisons, overburdened courts, and the rising deense

and police expenditures seen in Latin America and

the Caribbean.

West Arica today bears many othe conditions that enabled and

anned narcotics-related violenceand confict in Latin America and

the Caribbean


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Thus, West Arican political and civic leaders

should strenuously press responsible government

agencies to accelerate their counternarcotics e-

orts. Unortunately, current indications suggest

that recently devised strategies remain unused and

poorly distributed. In October 2008, the Economic

Community o West Arican States developed a

regional action plan to counter drug traicking

based on ve themes: data collection, law enorce-

ment, legal rameworks, drug abuse prevention,

and political and budgetary support. The action

plan explores speciic challenges and identiies

aims, strategies, lead agencies, and potential part-

ners or addressing them. However, assessments o

country capabilities and needs by the UN Oce

in West Arica did not commence until November

2009 and only in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The

assessments ound that many national agencies in

Liberia were not even aware that the regional ac-

tion plan existed.11 That said, the Liberian govern-

ments collaborative work with U.S. authorities

led to the extradition o several West Arican and

South American nationals attempting to bribe

Liberian ocials to acilitate large-scale cocaine

transshipments in June 2010.

Safeguard the Integrity of Counternarcotics

Institutions. The eectiveness o a governments

ability to marshal resources to prevent and deter

threats is, at bottom, a unction o public integrity.

Advanced training, new military equipment, and

other capacity enhancements will have limited eecti institutions and public ocials remain corruptible.

Institutional integrity at even the highest levels

o government in Latin America has been compro-

mised by the proceeds o narcotics tracking. Per-

ceptions o a political-narcotracking nexus remain

strong among citizens there, according to studies by

the Organization o American States. Recognizing

this, West Aricas leaders should vigorously imple-

ment their regional action plans recommendation

to target corruption among law enorcement and

judicial personnel as a priority impediment to eec-

tive counternarcotics eorts and strengthen oversight

bodies, prosecute oending ocials, and train state

institutions and civil society organizations to monitor

and report corruption.

Credible politicians and elections are also vital

to public integrity. Accordingly, West Arican states

should devise systems to properly restrict, audit, and,

when appropriate, sanction political parties, politi-

cians, and donors who engage in infuence peddling.

A critical component o implementing such a system is

developing the capacity, both within government and

among watchdog groups, or orensic accounting so au-

thorities can trace the intricate money trail involved.

An immediate and simple reorm Arican states can

take is to expand requirements or disclosure o politi-

cal parties and candidates nancial inormation such

as balance sheets and cash fow statements, measures

that have gained widespread support among Latin

Americas citizen groups and business community. This

disclosure inormation should be updated regularly and

made easily accessible so as to help expose suspicious

accumulation o wealth to voters.

Latin Americas experience also underscores

the critical importance o protecting judicial insti-

tutions. Until recently, Guatemalan criminal groups

had extensive infuence within government agencies,

which they exploited to protect their activities. Mur-

ders o uncooperative law enorcement ocials were

not uncommon. In response, Guatemalas legislature

created an independent International Commission

Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), which in

2007 was expanded through a partnership with the

United Nations. The independent commission de-

tailed jurists rom developed and developing countries

to work with Guatemalan counterparts to devise legalreorms and protect jurists and judicial integrity. Sub-

sequent reorms to the tax secretariat and penal code

helped dismantle illegal groups and identiy sources

o obstruction to good governance. As a result, 130

individuals have been convicted and 2,000 police o-

cers, an attorney general, and three supreme court

justices have been dismissed. One ormer president

has been indicted and another exonerated. Attitudes

advanced training, new militaryequipment, and other capacity

enhancements will have limitedeect i institutions and public

ocials remain corruptible


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have since changed and judges, prosecutors, and po-

lice ocers in Guatemalas cities and countryside are

now more able to do their jobs. The CICIG serves as

a possible model in West Arica, whose legislatures

should move to create and adequately empower simi-

lar commissions partnered with international organi-

zations such as the UN Oce on Drugs and Crime

or the Inter-Governmental Action Group against

Money Laundering in West Arica.

Raise Transaction Costs. Tracking cocaine

through West Arica is comparatively cheap. Make

it expensive. Counternarcotics strategies need to o-

cus on raising transaction costs. Arresting track-

ers, prosecuting cases, tracking smuggling routes, and

undertaking other counternarcotics operations are

vital to stemming cocaine trac. Moreover, eorts

that merely hinder the business o moving cocaine

through West Arica make it more arduous, expen-

sive, and unappealing to trackers. The more expen-

sive it is, the less inclined cocaine trackers will be

to use West Arica as a transit route.

Operations that amount to no more than harass-

ment have produced impressive results in the Carib-

bean. From very low levels in 2000, annual cocaine

seizures in the Netherlands Antilles reached 9 tons by

2004. To counter rising trac, Antillean and Dutch

airport security ocers stepped up searches o arriving

and departing passengers. But, rather than arresting

oenders (the low-level mules), police oered them

the opportunity to cooperate. I mules were carrying

less than 3 kilograms o drugs, they were not arrested

but were returned to their point o origin and given

receipts explaining the drug seizures so they would

not ace retribution rom their employers. This tactic

raised the cost o transporting drugs through the An-

tilles. Meanwhile, the number o mules transiting the

Netherlands Antilles dropped 96 percent.12

Eorts to raise costs do not solely entail inter-diction. Nicaragua has had great success reducing

the labor supply or cocaine tracking through its

youth engagement strategy, which oers occupa-

tional alternatives, specialized corrections programs,

and rehabilitation or ormer gang members. The

National Police also work with partners in govern-

ment, the media, the private sector, and civil soci-

ety to implement a Prevention o Juvenile Violence

program. This initiative has stymied the expansion

o Central Americas large transnational gangs,

which play critical roles in transshipment. While

gang members in Honduras, El Salvador, and Gua-

temala number in the tens o thousands, Nicara-

guas tally dropped rom 8,500 in 1999 to 4,500 by

2008. Nicaraguas success comes despite its lower per

capita income relative to its neighbors. Drug tra-

cking is still a problem or Nicaragua, but a country

with limited resources can apply novel approaches

to hamper narcotics tracking.

The corrosive inluence o narcotics traicking

across Arica threatens to become institutionally en-

trenched and poses severe and persistent security chal-

lenges. Such has been the case in many parts o Latin

America and the Caribbean, even where narcotics pro-

duction and abuse have remained low. Applying these

lessons will help Arica minimize the debilitating eects

o this trade and the risks it poses to the continents

recent governance, economic, and stability gains.

N O T E S

1 Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor, National Integrity

Systems Country Study Report: Jamaica 2003, Transparency In-

ternational, 51.

2 Im Not a Cocaine Baron, Daily Guide, April 21, 2010;

Stephen Ellis, West Aricas International Drug Trade, African

Affairs (2009), 192.

3 Cocaine Smuggling Nigerian Politician Held in Lagos,

BBC, May 17, 2010.

4 Tanu Jalloh, Kemoh Sesay Sacked or Police to Arrest,

Concord Times, August 5, 2008.

5 For reports rom Benin, Ghana, and Nigeria, respectively:

Screening Out Morally Unt Crime Fighters, UN Integrated

Regional Information Network, October 29, 2008; Emmanuel Akli,

MV Resurrected Benjamin Cocaine Aair, Ghanaian Chronicle,

April 21, 2010; Idowu Sowunmi, Funding, Operational Problems

Cripple NDLEA, This Day, November 28, 2009.

6 William C. Prillaman, Crime, Democracy, and Develop-

ment in Latin America, Center or Strategic and International

Studies, June 2003, 15.

tracking cocaine through WestArica is comparatively cheap

make it expensive


8/8

8

7 World Bank, Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean, March 2007, i.

8 UN Oce on Drugs and Crime, Security Council Debates Devastating Impact o Drug Tracking, December 9, 2009.

9 Mike McGovern, Conronting Drug Tracking in West Arica, testimony beore the Subcommittee on Arican Aairs, U.S.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2009. See also Ellis.

10 World Bank, 33.

11 Report o the Secretary General on the United Nations Oce or West Arica, UN Security Council, December 31, 2009, 11.

12 World Bank, 98.

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Documents

Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean