CLR Review November 3, 2015 Independent Evaluation Groupdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/pt/... · 100886. For Official Use Only. 2 . CLR Review . Independent Evaluation Group . sector

For Official Use Only

November 3, 2015

CLR Reviewed by: Peer Reviewed by: CLR Review Coordinator

Neeta Sirur, Surajit Goswami IEGEC Consultants

Juan Jose Fernandez-Ansola IEGEC Consultant

Mark Sundberg Manager, IEG Economic Management and Country Programs, IEGEC

CLR Review Independent Evaluation Group

2. Ratings

CLR Rating IEG Rating

Development Outcome: MU U

WBG Performance: Good Fair

3. Executive Summary

i. The Botswana CPS was prepared in the wake of the 2008/09 global financial and economic crisis. For several decades preceding the crisis, the country had experienced consistently high growth and poverty reduction, predicated on diamond exports as well as good governance and sound economic management by successive governments. By 2009, Botswana’s per capita GNI was about $6,100, putting it firmly in the ranks of middle-income countries, albeit with high rates of unemployment due to the economy’s narrow base. Poverty and welfare were also being affected by an ongoing, severe HIV/AIDS epidemic. Moreover, the country was faced with a looming energy crisis, as South Africa’s ESKOM had given notice of its intention to cease electricity exports after 2012.

ii. The global crisis led to a sharp decline in the demand for diamonds, severely affecting

Botswana’s macro balances and the economy as a whole. GDP and GDP per capita fell by 7.7 percent and 8.5 percent respectively in 2009 and were expected to remain negative or low over the CPS period. This gave new urgency to Botswana’s long-term development vision of prosperity for all via economic diversification. The tenth National Development Plan (NDP10) identified a detailed program for economic and social development focused on 4 thematic areas, namely: (i) economy and employment; (ii) social upliftment; (iii) sustainable environment; and (iv) governance and security. The FY09-13 CPS was developed within the framework of NDP10 and aligned with its priorities. However, the clear focus of NDP 10 on poverty reduction was not directly reflected in the CPS.

iii. The CPS represented a substantial reengagement for the WBG in Botswana, after over 15

years of minimal lending. The expanded engagement was predicated on the Government’s anticipation of a more constrained fiscal environment in the medium-term and, perhaps most importantly, its interest in tapping the Bank’s experience and technical knowledge in power generation. The CPS comprised four Focus Areas -- namely, 1) public sector strengthening, 2) HIV/AIDS, 3) infrastructure and 4) environment – within a lending envelope of up to $1 billion. IBRD lending concentrated largely on support for the Morupule B coal-fired power plant ($450 m), two transport projects for $180 m and $100 m respectively (the latter was dropped), and an HIV/AIDS prevention operation ($50 m). WBG interventions under the PSM and environment focus areas consisted mostly of AAA, financed through grants or Bank administrative resources. Some AAA activities were undertaken on a reimbursable basis as well. The CPS laid out the program for the first two years, leaving headroom for additional activities in the outer years, to be specified in the CPS PR. Multi-

1. CPS Data

Country: Republic of Botswana

CPS Year: FY09 CPS Period: FY09 – FY13

CLR Period: FY09 – FY13 Date of this review: November 3, 2015

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sector AAA, e.g., a Public Expenditure Review, was planned for completion in FYs10-11 and could help inform the CPS program for the outer years. However, no other broad diagnostic AAA (e.g., CEM or Poverty Assessment) was planned within the CPS period.

iv. The CPSPR Results matrix included 21 objectives under the four Focus Areas, each of

which was assessed individually to evaluate the impact of the CPS. Based on this evaluation – which determined that only 5 objectives were achieved or mostly achieved, 4 partially achieved and 12 not achieved --the overall development outcome of the CPS program is rated Unsatisfactory (U). 3 out of 4 Focus Areas were also rated unsatisfactory. Although Focus Area 3 (infrastructure) was deemed to be moderately unsatisfactory based on an average of individual ratings, several important outcomes, such as domestic energy generation and lower road transport costs, were not achieved, blunting the overall impact of the CPS program. In many instances, across all Focus Areas, outcomes that were achieved pertained purely to completion of Bank analytical work and the indicators selected either did not measure country impacts or lacked measurable baselines and targets. In some instances, progress towards targets was apparent but these would be achieved only in the post CPS period, given implementation delays. Finally, it is worth noting that links between the Bank-supported program and expected results were not always spelled out clearly, with indicators often at too low a level or too WBG centered to have any appreciable impact on the stated objective.

v. Bank performance is rated Fair (F), taking into account both the design aspects of the CPS

and actual implementation. Considering the Bank’s limited prior knowledge of Botswana and the absence of AAA, the CPS program was framed within national development plan (NDP10) goals and responded to GoB’s expressed demand, particularly in energy. The lack of diagnostic AAA could have been rectified in the early years of the program, but there was no systematic plan apparent in the CPS to undertake core analytical work (except for a PER) to underpin the policy dialogue and shape future CPS lending. As the CLR notes, in deciding to move quickly to support the Morupule B project, the trade-off between risk and reward was appropriate, but there was insufficient attention paid to due diligence and planning for implementation support to the project, despite its large size and obvious reputational risks. Moreover, the Bank did not seek to work directly on poverty (except data collection) despite the importance given to this theme in the NDP10. IBRD lending was concentrated in two areas but similar discipline was not apparent in AAA and grant-financed interventions, which included several thinly spread, small studies and grants, rather than much-needed core diagnostics. Additionally, country ownership may not always have been assured since a number of the AAA/grant activities did not seem to have policy traction and several were cancelled. The results matrix as a whole was overloaded, often imprecise and unduly process-oriented (see iv above). Other weaknesses at the design stage were the failure to explore and exploit the synergies between the Bank and IFC or to undertake broad stakeholder consultations in the country to inform CPS design.

vi. CPS implementation could have been considerably improved in many respects. Perhaps the

most positive feature was the restraint shown by the Bank in paring down some activities and deciding not to introduce new projects for the latter half of the CPS period. Coordination with other external partners was also relatively good. On the negative side, the Bank appears to have severely underestimated Botswana’s need for implementation support, especially with respect to Morupule B, with course corrections occurring only in the last 6 months or so of the CPS period, following a string of serious and (avoidable) difficulties. The CLR candidly acknowledges that the Bank response was tepid when problems arose in key areas such as procurement and that development outcome (DO) and project implementation (IP) ratings were inflated (at least for the Morupule operation) until the last few months of the CPS period. The CLR also states that the task team for Morupule for most of the CPS period was insufficiently experienced for the task and missed important safety and other lapses during plant construction. The team was replaced only in mid-FY13. A senior Bank presence on the ground could have enabled a better response, as flagged in the CPSPR, but a field office was not established until after the CPS period.

vii. IEG concurs with CLR lessons, especially those concerning: (i) undertaking candid risk

assessments and linking them to the intensity of implementation support; (ii) paying greater attention



to due diligence, especially in complex projects involving multiple domestic and external agencies; and (iii) the need for a senior and ongoing presence on the ground through a permanent field office. This latter point is especially relevant where the Bank chooses to engage in a visible, controversial project that can have bearing on the WBG’s reputation. In addition, IEG would like to note a number of additional lessons. First, much greater care should go into developing a realistic, focused results framework, with due attention to the outcome orientation and measurability of chosen indicators. Second, the CPS experience underscores the importance of investing up front in core AAA products for purposes of guiding lending and deepening country knowledge when the Bank initiates a new country engagement. Even quick products, if carefully chosen, can help guide strategy before embarking on lending and a CAS. Third, Bank-IFC collaboration should be given concerted attention by management at both the strategy design and program implementation stages if the potential benefits of existing synergies are to be maximized. This is especially true where core reforms center on industries (energy) where complementarities/synergies are apparent. Finally, safeguard risks need more serious attention at all levels of management given serious risks for the country and reputational risks for the Bank -- particularly in controversial areas such as coal fired plants.

4. Strategic Focus

Relevance of the WBG Strategy: Congruence with Country Context and Country Program. 1. Botswana – a Southern African nation of 1.9 million people -- is an African and global success story. Its per capita GNI of $6,100 in 2009 meant it was firmly in the ranks of middle-income countries at the time of the CPS, reflecting four decades of steady growth, predicated on the export of diamonds. Sound stewardship of the diamond revenues -- including prudent and predictable macroeconomic management and significant investments in economic infrastructure and social services -- by successive Batswana governments helped sustain high real rates of growth (about 9% on average), surpassing even the rapid growth seen in the Asian “Tigers”. Growth was accompanied by a reduction in income poverty, but the ravages of the HIV/AIDS epidemic meant that income and non-income welfare measures (especially pertaining to health) were relatively low Vis a Vis the country’s overall income level. Moreover, the high dependence on mining meant the economy was unable to generate sufficient employment to absorb newly trained youth as well as those exiting a declining agricultural sector, leading to high unemployment and contributing to continued poverty and inequality.

2. The Botswana CPS was prepared in the wake of the 2008/09 global financial and economic crisis. The crisis prompted a sharp drop in the demand for diamonds, causing a 40 percent decline in Botswana’s diamond exports between late 2008 and May 2009 (when the CPS was discussed at the Board) and highlighting the country’s vulnerability to a single export and the need for greater economic diversification. GDP and GDP per capita declined by 7.7 percent and 8.5 percent respectively in 2009 and were expected to remain negative or low over the CPS period. In actual fact, growth rebounded strongly in 2010 and averaged about 7.7 percent per annum for 2010-2013.

3. The impact of the global crisis on Botswana’s fiscal and reserves positions in 2009 gave new urgency to Botswana’s long-term development vision of prosperity for all via economic diversification, laid out in its strategy document, Vision 2016. In line with Vision 2016, the tenth National Development Plan (NDP10) identified a more detailed program for economic and social development, focused on 4 thematic areas, namely: (i) economy and employment; (ii) social upliftment; (iii) sustainable environment; and (iv) governance and security. Within the first of these thematic areas, high priority was given to implementing a large investment effort aimed at creating a strong enabling environment for private sector led growth, especially in tourism, agriculture, energy, manufacturing and financial services. The FY09-13 CPS was developed within the framework of NDP10 and aligned with



its priorities, although the NDP 10 focus on poverty reduction was not explicitly reflected in the CPS objectives or choice of activities. Poverty data were collected with support from the CPS program, however, thus enabling the production of a Social Protection Review and Poverty Assessment in FYs 14 and 15 respectively.

4. The CPS represented a substantial reengagement for the WBG in Botswana, after over 15 years of minimal (if any) lending. The new, expanded engagement was predicated on the Government’s anticipation of a more constrained fiscal environment in the fall-out of the global crisis, its interest in tapping the Bank’s technical knowledge in selected areas (particularly in energy and health) and the availability of new IBRD financial instruments with longer maturities and lower interest rates. Perhaps owing to the WBG’s limited involvement in Botswana prior to this CPS, there is no evidence that the Bank itself conducted any comprehensive country-specific analysis to identify key challenges facing the country and guide the CPS framework. Rather, the CPS drew on government documents and available analyses by other external partners (e.g., IMF, AfDB, UNDP) -- and, especially, expressed demand by the government -- in selecting priorities. An additional factor that the Bank considered was the potential for regional externalities – e.g., implications for regional integration through trade (roads, energy) or demonstration effects (HIV-AIDS). A Public Expenditure Review, was included in the early years of the CPS and could inform CPS programming for the outer years, but a full set of core diagnostics was not planned for.

Relevance of Design and Selectivity

5. The CPS included indicative lending of around $780 million for the first two years of the strategy period, leaving open the possibility of further lending (up to $1 billion in total) to address emerging needs. Despite the large lending envelope, especially in relation to Botswana’s small population of 1.9 million, the CPS program was concentrated in a relatively small number of areas – appropriately, given the lack of a comprehensive analytical basis to support a broader engagement. 6. In terms of sectoral focus, the centerpiece of the CPS was infrastructure and creation of an enabling environment for the private sector, focusing on energy, road transport and business climate improvements. In this regard, the CPS planned for up to $450 million to support the expansion of the Morupule coal-fired power plant to address the country’s looming energy crisis (given the expectation that South Africa’s ESKOM would cease electricity exports after 2012). The CPS also encompassed an Integrated Transport Project ($180.5 million) for road asset management and preservation and AAA to strengthen the business climate and financial sector. Engagement in the Morupule B power generation operation was undoubtedly controversial given substantial pressures from environmental groups and others against new coal sourced energy generation, but would have important benefits for Botswana if successfully implemented. The operation was clearly suited to the WBG’s comparative advantage – potentially, at least, the Bank could help to develop policy, technical, safeguards and institutional aspects, IFC could help to identify and attract private sector partners, and MIGA, for its part, could provide political risk guarantee to a selected private investor. The WBG could also draw on its expertise in other MICs to help Botswana design a low carbon energy growth program for the longer-term. 7. As the preceding suggests, IFC could have played a strong role in energy security as well as in private sector development more broadly. However, the relevance of the IFC Program to the stated CPS goals was negligible and was barely discussed in the CLR. The IFC and IBRD did cooperate in undertaking a Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS) activity on economic diversification and competitiveness, however it is unclear how this has been used by the authorities to improve the business environment. Botswana’s DBR rank actually deteriorated over the CPS period. In addition, none of the other IFC initiatives, such as the MSME program development in a financial institution, a proposed PPP initiative, or a mining sector investment, was linked to any CPS outcomes. 8. Other areas supported under the CPS included public sector management and HIV/AIDs. In the latter area, the Bank had prior experience and partnered with the European Union (EU) to develop



an innovative “buy-down” arrangement wherein the EC would buy down the interest on the $50 million IBRD loan. With regard to public sector management, the main focus was on AAA, including a PER and IDF grants in support of program monitoring and national accounting standards. Overall, the AAA program was responsive to GoB requests and closely linked to lending in most cases. There was not, however, any systematic effort to close analytical gaps through comprehensive ESW such as a CEM or poverty assessment. This would have been useful to inform course corrections and programming for the second half of the CPS period.

Alignment 9. The CPS program was not directly aligned with the WBG’s twin corporate goals of reducing extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity, which were articulated only after the CPS and CPSPR were discussed at the Board. Moreover, there was no explicit discussion in the CPS on poverty reduction per se or its links to the proposed CPS program, despite the importance of the poverty and inequality theme in the GoB’s strategy documents. However, the overall emphasis of the CPS on strengthening economic diversification and private sector development (including labor skills) was supportive of promoting shared growth, particularly the efforts to improve the enabling environment for small and medium-sized businesses. The engagement in energy, at a time when the risk of severe shortages was high, was also critical to PSD/employment as well as the population’s overall welfare and access to basic and social services. Similarly, HIV-AIDS prevention was important in helping avert catastrophic risks for individuals and families.

5. Development Outcome

10. Overview of Achievement by Objective: The CPSPR Results matrix includes 4 focus areas and 21 objectives, many of them with multiple indicators intended to measure outcomes. IEG’s assessment of each of the objectives, by focus area, is described below. Focus Area I: Enhancing Public Sector Effectiveness 11. Objective # 1: This objective aimed to improve local capacity to compile, analyze and disseminate poverty-related statistical information through provision of technical support and training under a TFSCB grant for capacity building and poverty analysis. It comprised two indicators: the first pertaining to conduct, analysis and dissemination of a household survey to analyze welfare and poverty in Botswana; and the second related to training of Batswana researchers and statisticians in the analysis of complex household data sets. Neither of these indicators were met during the CPS period. Substantial delays were encountered in undertaking the household survey and subsequently in cleaning and publishing the data. The CPSPR published in October 2011 indicated that the data would be published imminently, but they were not disseminated until 2013. While the survey itself was conducted in 2009/10 its results were not published until late 2013 (beyond the CPS period). As a result, training could not be undertaken either and the overall rating for this objective is Not Achieved (NA). 12. Objective # 2: The second objective under this focus area sought to improve public expenditure management and promote public financial management reform. It included 3 indicators supported by AAA, particularly a Public Expenditure Review (PER), a PEFA Update and a note on accrual accounting (complemented by IMF analyses). One indicator, pertaining to strengthening the capacity of ministries for program monitoring and evaluation was to have been achieved through an IDF grant, which was cancelled (for reasons not explained). The remaining indicators – pertaining to macroeconomic modeling to feed into a functional Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and improved coordination in the budget process – were both highly process oriented and only partially implemented during the CPS period. Some progress was reported in the CPSPR and CLR with respect to both METF implementation (expected completion in 2016) and on improved coordination with respect to capital and recurrent budgeting –neither, however, was far enough along to assess whether the end outcome of greater efficiency/effectiveness of public spending could be reached. IEG rates this objective as Partially Achieved (PA).



13. Objective # 3: The third objective under the public sector area aimed to strengthen the capacity of about 15 Government ministries to adopt evidence-based management through increased application of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) information, with a focus on monitoring achievement of NDP objectives. The objective, to be supported through an IDF grant, included two indicators -- one pertaining to the M&E systems within the ministries and another focused on equipping CSOs to assess service delivery by the ministries. However, the Bank and GoB opted not to proceed with the IDF grant designated for this purpose, with the result that no progress was achieved in this area and the objective is therefore rated Not Achieved (NA). 14. Objective # 4: The final objective in this focus area sought to strengthen Botswana’s capacity to collect and analyze key national statistics. To further this end, the Bank undertook an assessment of statistics capacity that identified key gaps and recommendations for development. However, the report was not widely disseminated nor acted upon by the GoB, leading to a rating of Not Achieved (NA). Moreover, it is worth noting that the original indicator (completion and dissemination of the assessment) was itself focused on process rather than outcome. 15. Focus Area I is rated Unsatisfactory (U), reflecting the failure to achieve stated outcomes in 3 of 4 results areas, including the important areas of poverty data collection and analysis which were significantly delayed. The CLR does not provide much explanation for the decision to drop the M&E IDF which was to have supported Objective 2 and 3, nor why the objectives were not dropped/modified at CPSPR stage. Moreover, as already noted, the delays in moving forward the MTEF were significant, with the anticipated results expected to be achieved only in 2016. Focus Area II: Fighting HIV/AIDS 16. Objective # 5: This focus area encompassed a single objective – namely, increased effectiveness of HIV/AIDS prevention efforts, with a focus on Batswana youth (aged 15-24) – to be achieved principally through implementation of the HIV/AIDS Prevention Support Project (FY09) and a regional HIV/AIDS strategy for Southern Africa. The objective encompassed specific outcome indicators (including baseline data and targets) to measure progress with respect to abstinence from sexual activity, condom use during intercourse with non-regular partners and male circumcision. Progress was to be measured via the BAIS IV survey, but survey data were not made available in the form necessary to adequately measure progress with respect to the first two indicators (abstinence and condom use). For example, while the target pertained to condom use by the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups, data were available only for the 15-49 years age group. As a result, progress on the targets cannot be verified. However, given the slow start-up of the HIV/AIDS project due to personnel issues and the difficulties inherent in effecting behavioral change, it is likely that the objectives were not achieved within the time frame of the CPS (as noted in the CLR). With respect to the target on male circumcision, project interventions enabled achievement of total cumulative circumcisions of nearly 203,000 by end-2013 versus a target of 262,000 (from a baseline of 52,000). Although data for mid-2013 (when the CPS period ended) are not reported and cannot be verified, it is reasonable to assume that at least partial progress had been achieved. Taking into account the unverified end-CPS status of two of the three outcome indicators and only partial progress on the third, this objective is rated Not Achieved (NA). Focus Area II is therefore rated Unsatisfactory (U). Focus Area III: Increasing Competitiveness – Infrastructure and Investment Climate -- 17. Objective # 6: This objective focused on improving the investment climate, measured through two indicators. The first of these sought an improvement in Botswana’s position on the Doing Business rankings and the second aimed to complete an identification of bottlenecks to domestic and foreign private sector investment. The latter indicator was not only process oriented, but also simply pertained to completion of a WBG study, without any specific reference to its impact on the country. Thus, although it was achieved in a narrow sense, its actual relevance for Botswana’s development was limited in its current formulation. Improvements to Botswana’s DBR rank were to have been achieved



as a result of changes identified through joint Bank-IFC advisory assistance. This indicator was clearly not achieved as Botswana’s ranking on the DBR measures actually deteriorated over the CPS period – to 56th in 2013/14, versus a baseline of 38 in 2009. In light of the above, IEG rates this objective as Not Achieved (NA). 18. Objective # 7: Objective 7, pertaining to completion of a Bank study of skills gaps in relation to labor market demand, was moved from Focus Area II at the CPSPR stage. As with some other indicators, this is purely an output or process measure and one that makes little connection to actual impacts on Botswana’s business environment. The objective was Partially Achieved (PA) in that the study was completed. However, as the CLR candidly points out, policy options had not been agreed, much less implemented in the country, by the end-CPS period. 19. Objective # 8: This objective comprised 4 indicators to assess financial sector strengthening and was added to the results matrix at the CPSPR stage. The main instrument supporting the objective were a Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening Trust Fund (FIRST) grant, which helped Botswana to develop a comprehensive financial sector development strategy and related action plan. Bank AAA complemented the FIRST grant. At the time the objective was introduced, two of the four indicators – namely revision of investment and security regime and amendment of Collective Investment act – had already been accomplished. The remaining two indicators (new pensions and insurance regulations and financial sector strategy and action plan) are rated NA and A, respectively by IEG. With regard to pensions and insurance, new legislation was indeed developed and passed -- but only in 2014, i.e., beyond the end-CPS period. The Financial Sector Development Strategy was accepted and under implementation and was therefore achieved. Overall rating for this objective is Mostly Achieved (MA). 20. Objectives # 9: This objective sought to strengthen public and private sector accounting through training 50 new accountants and developing at least 5 new professional development courses for practicing accountants. The objective was originally included under Focus Area I but slightly reformulated and moved to Focus Area III at the CPSPR stage, given its private sector focus. Both indicators were output measures that were achieved with support from a sizeable IDF grant (about $0.5 million). Despite their output orientation, they seem likely to lead to strengthened public and private sector accounting. The objective is rated Achieved (A). 21. Objectives # 10: This objective sought to enhance corporate finance and reporting through aligning domestic accounting standards with international practice. Support for the activity was provided through a FIRST grant for Accounting and Auditing Legislation. A new law, developed through the grant, was enacted in 2011 and the objective is therefore rated Achieved (A). 22. Objective # 11: Objective 10 sought to improve national capacity for transport management and included indicators for long-term output and performance based road contracts (OPRCs) and reduction in vehicle operating costs on OPRC roads. Two additional indicators pertaining to regional integration and district road management practices were dropped at CPSPR stage, despite their relevance to the overall objective. Of the two remaining indicators, the first was exceeded, with 335 km of roads under OPRCs, versus a target of 250 km. However, there is no information as to actual performance under the OPCRs in improving road maintenance. Achievement of the second indicator was affected by delays in award of roads contracts so that the foreseen reductions in vehicle operating costs could not be achieved. Based on these two indicators, IEG’s rating for the objective is Partially Achieved (PA). 23. Objective # 12: The sixth objective within the Competitiveness focus area (11th overall Focus Areas) pertained to the completion of two studies on the regional investment climate (investment Climate Assessment) and Southern Africa trade and regional integration respectively. Both indicators were introduced only at the CPSPR stage and both are output measures that are not, by themselves, likely to lead to improved regional trade. Moreover, the studies were undertaken by the WBG and there is no evidence of sustained involvement of the GoB or other Batswana actors. The objective is rated as Not Achieved (NA).



24. Objective # 13: The area of this objective – energy security – is arguably the raison d’etre of the CPS, with over half the initial lending envelope devoted to it. Of four indicators included in the CPS, only two were retained at the CPSPR stage. The first of these, pertaining to fully meeting peak demand for electricity via domestic generation, was not achieved due to delays and serious technical issues at the Morupule B power plant being built by a private contractor under supervision and technical support by the GoB, the Bank and AfDB. As the CLR candidly notes, the Bank offered its partial credit guarantee for construction of the plant without undertaking “adequate due diligence of the contractor and the contract itself”. It also suggests that the initial task team deployed by the Bank failed to identify important technical issues until very late in the construction process, and that resources for implementation support may have been inadequate until well after the technical issues had arisen. The second indicator under this objective sought to protect the access of poor households to electricity and to undertake measures to manage demand for electricity. This indicator was largely met through passage of a new tariff policy that balanced Botswana Power Corporation’s financial viability with provisions to make energy more affordable for the poor. Moreover, energy efficiency measures were adopted (such as energy efficient lighting and improvements to energy metering) that can be expected to dampen demand. However, no explicit baseline or target was set in this area, making it difficult to assess the success/impact of the Bank interventions. IEG’s overall rating for this objective is Partially Achieved (PA). 25. Objective # 14: This objective, introduced at CPSPR stage, aimed to support GoB to develop and implement a national broadband strategy, with technical assistance supported through a PPIAF grant. However, slow progress with respect to an ongoing restructuring of the national telecommunications authority led the Bank-GoB to drop the TA operation, with the result that the objective was Not Achieved (NA).

26. Objective # 15: This objective, introduced at the CPSPR stage, focused on assisting the Government to develop agriculture and nature-based tourism through preparation of a policy note to identify strategic solutions and presentation of recommendations. Once again this was poorly conceived process/output-oriented indicator. It was also Not Achieved (NA) as the policy note was not completed.

27. Focus Area III is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU). The strongest aspects of this focus area were relatively smaller interventions in the financial sector and with regard to accounting improvements, where results were supported through grant and AAA support. In the area of regional trade and integration specified results were achieved, but pertained only to completion of Bank reports without any assessment of impact on the ground. Results were partially achieved with respect to energy security but interventions related to the key result of meeting peak demand for energy were not well managed so that the outcome will not be achieved until well after the CPS period. Similarly, in transport, another key area of the CPS, a process step related to award of road contracts was achieved, but the outcome indicator related to lowering vehicle operating costs was not. Other important areas for the diversified growth agenda – broadband coverage, agriculture and tourism – also failed to achieve specified outcomes. Focus Area IV: The Environment 28. Objective # 16: This objective focused on reducing human-wildlife conflict (HWC) in northern Botswana and on the provision of training for employment in ecotourism. With regard to HWC, the matrix included a specific (if ambitious) target of reducing conflict incidents by a third, albeit without presenting a baseline measure in the results matrix. This target was not met. In fact, the CPS period saw an increase of HWC over the CPS period: incidents with elephants rose from 99 in 2009 to 315 in 2013, while incidents with lions went from 84 to 162 over the same period. Eco-tourism employment training also suffered setbacks and delays, so that the first batch of training began only after the CPS period had ended. This objective is rated Not Achieved (NA).



29. Objective # 17: Introduced into the results matrix at CPSPR stage, this objective sought to begin implementation of Botswana’s low carbon growth strategy through the identification of at least one low-carbon energy alternative or a carbon capture and storage project. This was accomplished through financing from the AfDB, but the CLR does not clarify what role the Bank played in its achievement. The CPSPR indicates that a Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Trust Fund Grant was made available to Botswana and was likely instrumental in the completion of a CCS project feasibility study, mentioned in the CLR. On this basis, the objective is rated as Achieved (A). 30. Objective # 18: This objective aimed at supporting Botswana to participate more fully in the global carbon market as evidenced by identification of new carbon programs. However, the indicator did not include either a baseline or target and the CLR did not report on any progress. As a result, this objective is rated Not Achieved (NA). 31. Objective # 19: This objective, supported through a regional Groundwater and Drought Management project, aimed to make key technical officers and policy-makers aware of the importance of groundwater management. The CPSPR results matrix did not, however, include either a baseline or target for this awareness training. Moreover, a footnote indicated that the outcome could not be measured by the end of the CPS period, begging the question of why it was introduced into the results matrix. Regardless, the objective was not verified in the CLR and is thus rated as Not Verified (NV). 32. Objective # 20: Focused on water resource conservation and management, this objective (added at CPSPR stage) was supported through Phases 1-3 of the Water and Wastewater Fee Based Services Arrangement (FBSA) between the Bank and GoB. It comprised two indicators – establishment of a Water Resources Council and Regulator and expansion of the Water Utilities Council to assume nationwide responsibility for water delivery. Although these indicators measure outputs rather than outcomes, they could plausibly lead to improved water resource conservation and management. The objective is rated Achieved (A). 33. Objective # 21: The last objective under the environment focus area sought to increase understanding of the impact of climate change variability for Botswana and to ensure the development of policy options for adaptation. Progress was made with the completion of a climate change modeling exercise and preparation of a policy note based on its findings. However, policy options were never developed and the FBSA for Climate Change Adaptation was never operationalized. The objective achieved outputs but no outcomes, and is therefore rated Not Achieved (NA). 34. Focus Area IV is rated Unsatisfactory (U). Of the six objectives included in this focus area, the CPS program was successful in supporting institutional changes in the water sector, which should yield improvements in water quality/availability and financial sustainability (although this outcome was not specifically cited or measured). A second outcome that was achieved pertained to completion by the Bank of studies in support of low carbon growth. The remaining four objectives were not achieved, with actual reversals occurring in the area of reduced HWC. Overall Assessment and Rating 35. Based on the preceding evaluation of the individual objectives included in the Results Matrix for this CPS, the overall rating on development outcome is Unsatisfactory (U). As summarized in the table below, specified outcomes were assessed as Not Achieved in 3 out of 4 Focus Areas. Moreover, although Focus Area III was deemed to be partially achieved based on an average of individual ratings, several important outcomes, especially in domestic energy generation and lower transport costs, were not achieved, severely blunting the overall impact of the CPS program. Moreover, objectives related to regional transport linkages were dropped at the CPSPR stage. In many instances, across all Focus Areas, outcomes that were achieved pertained to Bank analytical work and the indicators selected either did not measure country impacts or lacked measurable baselines or targets. In some instances, progress towards targets was apparent but these would likely be achieved only in the post CPS period.



Finally, it is worth noting that links between the Bank-supported program and expected results were not always spelled out clearly, increasing the difficulty of assessing the contribution of the Bank.

Objectives CLR Rating IEG Rating

Focus Area I: Enhancing Public Sector Effectiveness

U U

Objective 1: Improved capacity to compile, analyze and disseminate poverty-related statistical information

NA NA

Objective 2: Improved public expenditure management / Public Financial Management Reform

MA PA

Objective 3: Enhanced capacity of Government to adopt evidence-based management through increased application of monitoring and evaluation information

NA NA

Objective 4: Improved National Statistical Capacity

NA NA

Focus Area II: Fighting HIV/AIDS MU U

Objective 5: Increased effectiveness of HIV/AIDS prevention efforts

PA NA

Focus Area III: Increase Competitiveness – Infrastructure and the Climate for Investment and Growth

MS MU

Objective 6: Improved investment climate MA NA

Objective 7: Skills mismatch is identified and policy options agreed to reduce the gap

PA PA

Objective 8: Government Financial Sector Development strategy adopted with action plan to address identified constraints

A MA

Objective 9: Strengthened accountancy profession to enhance corporate finance and reporting

A A

Objective 10: Improved compliance with the International Federation of Accountants standards

A A

Objective 11: Improved national capacity in transport management

PA PA

Objective 12: Improve regional trade A NA

Objective 13: Improved energy security PA PA

Objective 14: Improved broadband access NA NA

Objective 15: Selected strategic challenges in agriculture and nature-based tourism identified and policy options presented to the government

NA NA



Focus Area IV: The Environment MU U

Objective 16: Reduced human-wildlife-conflict (HWC) incidence in targeted hotpot areas in northern Botswana

NA NA

Objective 17: Low carbon growth strategy under implementation

A A

Objective 18: Enhanced capacity to participate in the global carbon market

NA NA

Objective 19: Objective: Improved ground water management (regional project)

MA NV

Objective 20: Improved water conservation and management

A A

Objective 21: Increased understanding of implications of increased climate variability for Botswana with appropriate policy options for adaptation developed

PA NA

6. WBG Performance

Lending and Investments 36. As noted at the outset, the WBG program was largely confined to AAA or trust funded activities in the period preceding the FY09-13 CPS. As such, there were no ongoing IBRD operations at the start of the CPS period. The CPS program foresaw four new IBRD operations for the first two years of CPS implementation, with the possibility of further lending in the outer years of the CPS as determined through an annual business planning process. The total envelope for the four identified IBRD operations was $780 million, with provision for up to $220 million more for any new lending operations in the outer years of the CPS (FYs12-13). In addition, A GEF project on Wildlife Conflict Management and Biodiversity Conservation for Improved Rural Livelihoods Project for an estimated US$5.5 million was to be delivered in FY10. 37. Actual IBRD lending was substantially less than had been anticipated -- amounting to $615.06 million. This reflected a decision not to proceed with one transport operation (Mmamabula IPP), which had been allocated $100 million of the IBRD envelope, and a reduction in size of the Morupule B project. The latter project, originally estimated at US$450 million, was delivered as a two-part package, including a standard IBRD SIL for $136.4 million and an accompanying Partial Credit Guarantee of $242.66 million, which extended the maturity and lowered the debt service on an export finance loan to BPC to finance the plant construction. The HIV/AIDS and Integrated Transport projects remained essentially unchanged in size, and went ahead as planned. No new operations were identified for the outer years of the CPS. Although the CLR provides no explanation, it seems to suggest that GoB demand for Bank services was quite limited. 38. On overage, for the period FY09-13, IBRD committed resources were disbursed at a lower rate than for the AFR region and Bank wide. The average disbursement ratio for Botswana’s investment operations during the CPS period was 6.6 percent, as compared to 22.2 percent and 23.4 percent for the AFR region and the Bank wide. These low disbursement ratios reflect start-up delays related to the unfamiliarity of Botswana officials with the Bank’s (complex and sometimes cumbersome) reporting, procurement and financial management requirements and processes. The CPSPR also reports that implementation was also affected by staff turnover and capacity constraints within implementing agencies.

39. Notwithstanding the low disbursement ratios, the Botswana portfolio was less risky than the AFR Region and Bank wide portfolios. During FY09-13, the Botswana portfolio had 11 percent of the



projects at risk, as compared to 23 percent and 20 percent for the AFR Region and the Bank wide respectively. On a commitment basis, the Botswana portfolio also performed better with 8.3 percent of the commitments at risk as compared to 24.5 percent for the AFR region and 17.6 percent for the Bank wide. IEG did not rate any projects as no ICRs were prepared during the CPS period. According to management assessments, two out of the three projects in the portfolio were making moderately satisfactory or better progress towards achieving their development objectives. In contrast, the Morupule B Generation and Transmission Project (P112516) progress towards achieving its objective was unsatisfactory.

40. At the inception of the review period, there was one IFC investment project, with a $20.0 million net commitment, to develop the MSME portfolio in a bank. During the review period, IFC committed another US$6.8 million through two investments in a copper mining project. The CLR made no comments on the IFC portfolio. The Greenfield mining project is still being developed and is too early to evaluate. IEG reviewed the IFC investment in the bank and rated it Mostly Successful. IFC Performance is rated Poor. The IFC program was weak with only one investment project active at the end of the review period. In addition, the design and implementation of the IFC program failed to contribute to the pursuit of any of the CPF Objectives.

Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services 41. A program of analytic work and advisory activities and services including 8 Economic and Sector Work (ESW) reports and 10 Technical Assistance (TA) tasks was delivered between FY09 and FY13. While some of these were mentioned in the text of the CPS or CPSPR, neither document (nor the CLR) included a comprehensive description of the AAA program or clearly identified the links with CPS objectives and/or the lending program. Several of the ESW and nearly all of the TA tasks were financed through grants/TFs. Moreover, some TA (e.g., in the water sector) was carried out under fee-based arrangements, which appears to have helped ensure country ownership of the AAA, leading, in turn, to better follow-up and impact. An example of this is seen in the water sector. Judging from the results for AAA interventions discussed in the preceding section, this does not always seem to have been the case for AAA financed through Bank or TF resources. The impact of the overall program of AAA is hard to assess, and the CLR does not attempt to make a comprehensive assessment.

42. IFC had no advisory service (AS) project approved before the review period that was implemented during the review period. During the CPS period, IFC approved two new AS projects amounting to over US$940 thousand of total funds. Based on IFC documents, one of them to develop the MSME portfolio in a bank (implemented along with the investment project indicated above) closed after successful implementation. The other project on investment climate improvement was dropped. The IEG has not reviewed either of the two advisory services projects.

Results Framework 43. IEG concurs with the CLR that the results matrix had a number of shortcomings that severely limited its utility in evaluating the impact of the CPS program. Overall, the matrix lacked appropriate focus, encompassing a multiplicity of objectives and results indicators, with near-equal weight given to core program elements and peripheral ones. In a majority of instances, clear linkages were not made either between the Bank-supported interventions and the broader country objectives, or, in some cases, between the results indicator and the corresponding Bank intervention(s). The indicators, themselves, were frequently related to process or output (e.g., report/study completed) rather than eventual outcomes. In several instances, they were also poorly formulated, lacking baseline and target measures. Moreover, as the CLR also notes, in at least two cases, work undertaken by the Bank or another donor was itself listed as an outcome. Finally, it is clear that the framework also suffered another significant weakness from not incorporating the IFC interventions into the objectives of the program at CPS inception or progress report stage.



Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination 44. The Bank coordinated closely with other development partners in a number of areas. For example, financial sector reforms were closely coordinated with the IMF, the AfDB was an important partner for the Morupule B project and the energy sector more broadly. The European Union was also a close partner with respect to the public sector management agenda. However, without a field office presence in Botswana, the Bank did not play a broader coordination role, focusing its interactions with external partners around the interventions included in the CPS. Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues 45. The Morupule B Generation and Transmission project, a Category A project, triggered various safeguards policies on Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Pest Management (OP 4.09), Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37), and Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7.50). The project was designated a Corporate Risk Project and has, therefore, been monitored by regional and corporate management. Nonetheless, the project remained in “problem project” status, as evidenced by the write-up in the last ISR before project closure in late 2014. The CLR as well as a number of external sources reported that construction of the power plant had been plagued with a number of problems, especially surrounding worker safety, environmental challenges and community health. With respect to safety, concerns focused on the adequacy of Health, Safety, and Environment (HSE) standards following two fatal accidents in 2011, and yet another one in 2012, in addition to several worker injuries. As reported in the last ISR and the CLR, an action plan on HSE was agreed, including hiring an external firm to assist in this area. The firm came on board following the project’s mid-term review. However, following the commissioning of the first three units in 2012, a number of technical deficiencies became apparent, including steam leaks, cracking of air ducts, vibrations, noise, etc. A Bank safeguards mission in October 2012 identified serious weaknesses in project management and quality control. Subsequent to the mission, the Bank hired an independent engineering company to review the project. Its report, finalized in December 2012, and the Bank team's additional visit in November and December 2012, resulted in identification and recommendation of a number of corrective measures in the areas of health, safety, and environmental mitigation; project management; technical problems; and operations and maintenance of the operating units. Moreover, the original contractor was replaced in early 2015. However, given that the Partial Credit Guarantee (PCG) for the operation is still ongoing, IEG does not have an ICR to validate the overall assessment of safeguards compliances. And the CLR does not provide details on how the risks associated with the project were planned to be handled, in light of its Category A designation. It does, however, suggest that the Bank did not do adequate due diligence and that the original task team was insufficiently experienced to handle a project of this type and complexity. Ownership and Flexibility 46. The CPS lending program was demand-driven in some respects, responding to GoB demand for Bank support, especially in energy. However, it appears that the Bank leveraged this demand to develop a broader program using grants and AAA – for which GoB ownership may have been weaker. Although it is difficult to assess definitively, a review of program implementation and results suggests that the GoB was more committed to working with the Bank in some areas of the program (energy, water, transport and HIV/AIDS) than others (e.g., public sector management, environment, statistical capacity development). Slow start-up and implementation, however, may in some cases have been a product of inexperience with Bank operations rather than lack of commitment to project objectives. There is no evidence in either the CPS or the CPSPR that wide stakeholder consultations on the CPS program were held with civil society, private sector representatives, academic or others. Consultations that occurred during CPS implementation were largely focused on the Morupule B project, given the high reputational risks associated with it.



47. The CPS program was designed in a flexible manner, taking into account that the CPS’s relatively large lending program and broader engagement in multiple sectors represented a new phase in the GoB-Bank relationship. For example, the Bank dropped the Mmamabula IPP project at Government’s request and added new reimbursable advisory services to support investment climate improvements at the CPSPR stage. Similarly, headroom (albeit unused) was left available for possible new projects to be included in the latter half of the CPS period. WBG Internal Cooperation 48. Bank-IFC cooperation in the design/development of either the CPS or the CPSPR appears to have been very limited. Neither document includes references to IFC’s program in Botswana nor consciously explores areas of complementarity -- and there is nothing to suggest that this changed during CPS implementation. Barring specific reasons to the contrary, there should have been considerable scope for Bank-IFC cooperation in key sectors such as energy security and transport as well as investment climate strengthening, given the public-private nature of these interventions. The potential for Bank-IFC cooperation on the Mmamabula IPP project was touched on briefly in the CPS, but the project was dropped from the CPS program. Some cooperation was noted during the CPS implementation period, most notably with respect to an FY12 RAS on economic diversification and competitiveness. IFC also supported a Botswana bank in developing capacity for lending to SMEs. Risk Identification and Mitigation 49. The CPS appropriately identified four main risks to the program – namely: (i) credit risk, associated with the macroeconomic impact of the global crisis on diamond exports; (ii) reputational risk, associated mainly with support for the coal-fired Morupule B power plant; (iii) commitment risk, associated with the newness of the expanded GoB-WBG relationship; and (iv) implementation risk, due to government’s unfamiliarity with Bank processes and procedures. The first of these did not materialize as diamond exports and the economy rebounded in 2010 and remained strong throughout the CPS period, allowing Botswana to maintain healthy fiscal and external balances. The commitment risk is difficult to assess accurately – as mentioned in the section above on ownership, results suggest that the Government was more committed to some aspects of the program than others. Bank actions to cancel or reformulate some activities helped to mitigate this risk, but a number of outcomes were nevertheless not achieved – even some activities introduced at mid-term failed to achieve the results specified. 50. As with all large energy generation projects (especially coal-fired energy), reputational risks remained high throughout the CPS period, surrounding the Morupule project in particular. Inter alia, these included newspaper reports of corruption in the contract award, reports of safety problems responsible for several worker injuries and 3 deaths and temporary closures of the power station during construction due to allegations of environmental contamination. Moreover, there were important technical and quality problems with the construction of the plant, which were not foreseen as a risk. The communications strategy, which was at the core of the Bank’s plan to mitigate these risks, was likely insufficient to address the types of risks which materialized. Rather, as the CLR acknowledges, there needed to be much more attention paid to provision of intensive supervision support and a concerted effort to deploy very senior staff on the project. This was done only in the last 6-8 months of the CPS period following a safeguards mission in October 2012. Intensive implementation support and training of government counterparts on Bank processes would also have helped address the implementation risks (slow start-up, excessive delays) that arose in other projects. While both the CPS and CPSPR identified the importance of intensive support, the additional resources required were not made available for most of the CPS period. Overall Assessment and Rating 51. Bank performance is rated Poor (P), taking into account both the design aspects of the CPS and actual implementation. Considering the Bank’s limited prior knowledge of Botswana and the



absence of AAA, the CPS program was framed within NDP goals and responded to GoB’s expressed demand, particularly in energy. The lack of diagnostic AAA could have been rectified in the early years of the program, but there was no systematic plan apparent in the CPS to undertake analytical work to underpin the overall policy dialogue or shape future CPS lending. As the CLR notes, in deciding to move quickly to support the Morupule B project, the trade-off between risk and reward was appropriate but there was insufficient attention paid to due diligence and planning for implementation support to the project, despite its large size and reputational risks. Moreover, the Bank did not seek to work directly on poverty (except data collection) despite the importance given to this theme in the NDP. IBRD lending was focused in two areas but similar discipline was not apparent in AAA and grant-financed interventions, which included several small and thinly spread interventions, rather than core products aimed at deepening country knowledge and supporting the lending program. Additionally, country ownership may not always have been assured since a number of the AAA/grant activities did not seem to have policy traction and several were cancelled. The results matrix as a whole was overloaded, often imprecise and unduly process-oriented. Other weaknesses at the design stage were the failure to explore and exploit the synergies between the Bank and IFC or to undertake broad stakeholder consultations in the country to inform CPS design. 52. CPS implementation could have been considerably improved in many respects. Perhaps the most positive feature was the flexibility shown by the Bank in adjusting the program to accord with changes in GoB demand, including the restraint shown in deciding not to introduce any new projects for the latter half of the CPS period. Also, coordination with other external partners was good, in the areas of Bank engagement. On the negative side, the Bank appears to have severely underestimated Botswana’s need for implementation support, especially with respect to the Morupule operations, with course corrections in this area occurring only very late in the CPS period, following a string of (avoidable) difficulties. Indeed, the CLR candidly acknowledges that the Bank response was tepid when problems arose in key areas such as procurement and that development outcome (DO) and project implementation (IP) ratings were inflated (at least for the Morupule operation) until the last few months of the CPS period. The CLR also suggests that the initial Morupule task team was insufficiently experienced for a project of this complexity, but that a change was only made in the last six months of the CPS period, after a safeguards mission noted significant technical flaws. A senior Bank presence on the ground could have enabled a better response. The need for a field office was in fact flagged in the CPS PR, but not acted on until after the CPS period. Moreover, contrary to the CLR’s assertion that AAA was effective, the actual outcomes suggest the impact was variable. While some AAA appears to have been well received and acted on (especially fee based and reimbursable services), there is little evidence that some other reports had any appreciable impact on the ground, at least within the CPS time frame and a number of activities were canceled. Finally, the near-absence of Bank-IFC collaboration during CPS implementation was noticeable.

7. Assessment of CLR Completion Report

53. The CLR is a well-organized, substantive and informative document, with a generally candid assessment of the CPS design, implementation and outcomes. The CLR table with ratings by pillar (focus area), objectives, and overall development outcome on page 3 exemplifies good practice and should be emulated in other CLRs. Also of particular note is its analysis of the Bank response to issues arising in the Morupule B project where it clearly describes implementation and design issues and recognizes important strengths and shortcomings in the Bank’s role vis a vis the project. In this regard, it appropriately identifies the safeguards and fiduciary issues that affected the project and comments on the actions taken (or not taken) by the Bank to address them The CLR draws its framework of analysis from the CPS Progress Report, and provides evidence on program indicators to the extent feasible given the problems of specificity on many indicators. There are areas, however, where it could have made a greater effort to more clearly identify the Bank-supported activities leading to specified outcomes (e.g., with respect to water sector management). Moreover, in many instances it includes results achieved or actions taken after the formal end of the CPS period (i.e., after June 2013), thus altering the perception on achievement of outcomes. Given the limited attention paid to



IFC activities in the CPS and CPS PR, the CLR includes only a single paragraph on IFC activities over the CPS period. The lessons drawn in the CLR are well thought through and discussed further below.

8. Findings and Lessons

54. IEG concurs with CLR lessons, especially those concerning: (i) undertaking candid risk assessments and linking them to the intensity of implementation support; (ii) paying greater attention to due diligence, especially in complex projects involving multiple domestic and external agencies; and (iii) the need for a senior and ongoing presence on the ground through a permanent field office. This latter point is especially relevant where the Bank chooses to engage in a visible, controversial project that can have bearing on the WBG’s reputation. In addition, IEG would like to note a number of additional lessons. First, much greater care should go into developing a realistic, focused results framework, with due attention to the outcome orientation and measurability of chosen indicators. Second, the CPS experience underscores the importance of investing up front in core AAA products (PER, Poverty Assessment, CEM, Energy sector strategy, etc.) to deepen country knowledge and guide lending when the Bank initiates a new country engagement. Even quick products help guide strategy before embarking on lending and a CAS. Third, Bank-IFC collaboration should be given concerted attention by management at both the strategy design and program implementation stages if the potential benefits of existing synergies are to be maximized. This is especially true where core reforms center on industries (energy) where complementarities/synergies are apparent. Finally, safeguard risks need serious attention at all levels of management given risks for the country and reputational risks for the Bank -- particularly in controversial areas such as coal fired plants.

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17


Annex Table 1: Summary Achievements of CAS/CPS Objectives Annex Table 2: Botswana Planned and Actual Lending, FY09-14 Annex Table 3: Analytical and Advisory Work for Botswana, FY11 - FY14 Annex Table 4: Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY09-FY14 for Botswana (in US$ million) Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Botswana, FY09-Present Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Botswana, FY11-14 Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Botswana and Comparators, FY09-14 Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for the Botswana, FY09-14 Annex Table 9: List of IFC Investments in Botswana

Annex Table 10: List of IFC Advisory Services for Botswana Annex Table 11: Net Disbursement and Charges for Botswana, FY09-14 Annex Table 12: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Botswana Annex Table 13: Economic and Social Indicators for Botswana, 2009 - 2013

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Annex Table 1: Summary Achievements of CPS Objectives

CPS FY09-FY13 / Focus

Area 1: Enhancing Public Sector Effectiveness

Actual Results (as of current month/year)

IEG Comments

1. CPS Objective: Improved capacity to compile, analyze and disseminate poverty-related statistical information

Indicator: Poverty related household survey data documented and archived Baseline: No Target: Yes (2010)

Core welfare Indicator Survey was conducted in 2009/2010 but the data was not disseminated until 2013.

Source: CLR

Indicator: At least 5 statisticians and researchers trained in poverty analysis of household survey data Baseline: No Target: Yes (2010)

No statisticians were trained.

Source: CLR The proposed indicator lacked baseline and target.

2. CPS Objective: Improved public expenditure management / Public Financial Management Reform

Indicator: Macroeconomic model to analyze and forecast fiscal variables in use at the MFDP Baseline: No Target: Yes (2010)

Some elements of macroeconomic modeling are used in producing Medium Term Fiscal Forecasts. Government adopted a PFM strategy in 2010 and implementation is underway. Full roll out of MTEF is expected in 2016. Government is gradually introducing accrual accounting.

Source: CLR

Indicator: Greater coordination between the various elements of budgeting - recurrent and capital budgets and personnel management Baseline: No Target: Yes

There are some improvements in national budgeting process due to ongoing PFM reforms by MFDP, including the work plans in macro-fiscal policy & planning, national budgeting, accounting and reporting, strategic planning, legal & institutional framework national debt, liabilities and guarantee management.

Source: CLR

Indicator: PFM system further strengthened in key dimensions, including openness and accountability in public procurement. Baseline: Target:

Government adopted a PFM strategy in 2010 and implementation is underway. Full roll out of MTEF is expected in 2016. Government is gradually introducing accrual accounting.

Source: CLR The proposed indicator lacked a baseline and target.

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IEG Comments

CPS Objective: Increased capacity of the Botswana Institute of Accountants (BIA) to effectively carry out its functions as a professional accountancy body

Indicator: At least 50 nationals have passed Part-1 (intermediate level) examinations by June 2011. Baseline: No Target: Yes

Dropped Source: CLR The objective and the indicator were dropped at the CPSPR stage.

Indicator: At least 5 continuing Professional Development (CPD) courses are developed. Baseline: No Target: Yes

Dropped Source: CLR The objective and the indicator were dropped at the CPSPR stage.

CPS Objective: Evaluation of improvement in the degree of compliance with the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) by the completion of the project

Indicator: Baseline: Target:

Dropped Source: CLR The objective was dropped at the CPSPR stage. No indicator to measure the achievement of the objective was proposed at the CPS stage.

3. CPS Objective: Enhanced capacity of Government to adopt evidence-based management through increased application of monitoring and evaluation information

Indicator: At least 15 ministries have functional results based M&E systems in place Baseline: No Target: Yes (2011)

Not achieved as the IDF grant for monitoring and evaluation work was cancelled.

Source: CLR

Indicator: At least 60 percent of trained CSO (Civil Society Organizations) are using scorecards to assess the effectiveness of service delivery Baseline: No Target: Yes (2011)

Not achieved as the IDF grant for monitoring and evaluation work was cancelled.

Source: CLR

4. CPS Objective: Improved National Statistical Capacity

Indicator: Report on “strengthening national statistical capacity and

The World Bank assessment of statistics capacity was completed but follow-up was limited.

Source: CLR The proposed indicator lacked a target date and

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IEG Comments

policy analysis” completed and disseminated Baseline: No Target: Yes

represents an output measure.


Area 2: Fighting HIV / AIDS


IEG Comments

Major Outcome Measures

5. CPS Objective: Increased effectiveness of HIV/AIDS prevention efforts

Indicator: Proportion of youth aged 15-19 and 20-24 reporting no sexual activity Baseline: 78.4% (Age 15-19) and 30.8% (Age 20-24) Target: 85% (Age 15-19) and 50% (Age 20-24) (2013)

Final Data from BAIS IV Survey was not made available to team.

Source: CLR The baseline and targets were introduced at the CPSPR stage. Proposed baseline lacked a date.

Indicator: Proportion of youth aged 15-19 and 20-24 reporting condom use during the last sexual encounter with a non-regular partner in the past 12 months Baseline: 89% (Age 15-19) and 85% (Age 20-24) Target: 95% (Age 15-19) and 95% (Age 20-24) (2013)

Preliminary BAIS IV data show condom usage during last sexual encounter for people aged 15-49 was only 79.5%. There is no certainty as whether increases for ages 15-19 and 20-24 were actually achieved.

Source: CLR The baseline and targets were introduced at the CPSPR stage. Proposed baseline lacked a date. The CLR lacks information on whether the indicator was met for the Age 15-19 and Age 20-24 cohorts. The CLR only reports on the Age 15-49 cohort.

Indicator: Number (cumulative) of male circumcision procedures performed in selected facilities Baseline: 52,000 (2008) Target: 262,000 (2013)

Total cumulative male circumcisions reached 202,808 by December 2013.

Source: CLR The indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage.

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CPS FY11-FY14 / Focus Area 3: Increase

Competitiveness – Infrastructure and the Climate for Investment

and Growth


Comments


6. CPS Objective: Improved investment climate

Indicator: Improved Doing Business (DB) Rankings Baseline: Target:

At the beginning of the CPS period in 2009 the DB ranking in Botswana was 38. As of 2015, Botswana’s ranking was 74.

Source: CLR The proposed indicator lacked baseline. The indicator was proposed at the CPS stage and it was later not included in the results matrix at the CPSPR stage. However, the indicator was later reported in the CLR.

Indicator: Remaining key bottlenecks to greater domestic and international foreign direct investment identified. Baseline: No Target: Yes

Dissemination and discussion of analytical work by the Bank helped identify the remaining bottlenecks.

Source: CLR

7. CPS Objective: Skills mismatch is identified and policy options agreed to reduce the gap

Indicator: Skills gap / labor market study completed Baseline: No Target: Yes

The Bank completed the skills gap analysis in FY14 and the report was presented to Government in December 2014. However, policy options have not yet been agreed.

Source: CLR The proposed indicator represents an output measure. The objective had originally been included under Focus Area 2 at the CPS stage and it was later placed under the Focus Area 3 at the CPSPR stage.

8. CPS Objective: Government Financial Sector Development strategy adopted with action plan to address identified constraints

Indicator: New pension and insurance regulations developed Baseline: No Target: Yes

Training on the regulations and prudential rules were provided to the Non-bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA) in 2012. In addition, the revised Botswana pension and insurance laws were approved in 2014 by the Parliament. In this sense, the Pension and Provident Act was endorsed under the new name of the Retirement Act. Finally, a Diagnostic Report on Cell Captive Insurance was delivered in 2012.

Source: CLR The indicator and the objective were introduced at the CPSPR stage.

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and Growth


Comments

Indicator: Financial sector development strategy finalized with action plan to address identified constraints Baseline: No Target: Yes

Financial sector development strategy developed with Bank Assistance. The CLR reports that the Government and the Bank of Botswana are implementing many of the recommendations.

Source: CLR The indicator and the objective were introduced at the CPSPR stage.

Indicator: Investment and securities regulatory regime revised Baseline: No Target: Yes

The Bank, via AAA, supported the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA) to revise the investment and securities markets regulatory regime.

Source: CLR The indicator and the objective were introduced at the CPSPR stage. The indicator had already been achieved when it was introduced at the CPSPR stage.

Indicator: Collective Investment Undertaking (CIU) Act revised Baseline: No Target: Yes

The Bank, via AAA, supported the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA) to amend the Botswana Collective Investment Undertakings Act.

Source: CLR The indicator and the objective were introduced at the CPSPR stage. The indicator had already been achieved when it was introduced at the CPSPR stage.

9. CPS Objective: Strengthened accountancy profession to enhance corporate finance and reporting

Indicator: National qualifications developed and at least 50 nationals have passed Part 1 (intermediate level) examinations Baseline: No Target: Yes (June 2011)

The CLR reports that the indicator was achieved.

Source: CLR The indicator is an output measure that is likely to lead to a strengthened accountancy profession. The CLR does not provide an outcome measure for this indicator.

Indicator: At least 5 Continuing Professional Development (CPD) courses are developed. Baseline: No Target: Yes

The CLR reports that the indicator was achieved.

Source: CLR The indicator is an output measure that is likely to lead to a strengthened accountancy profession. The CLR does not provide an outcome measure for this indicator.

10. CPS Objective: Improved compliance with the International Federation of Accountants

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and Growth


Comments

Indicator: Enactment of Accountancy Profession Legislation Baseline: No Target: Yes

The Accountancy Act and the Financial Reporting Act became effective in April 2011

Source: CLR The objective was reformulated at the CPSPR stage (October 2011). The indicators was proposed at the CPR stage and had already been achieved when it was introduced.

11. CPS Objective: Improved national capacity in transport management

Indicator: Number of districts that have successfully adopted modern method of road assessment management protocols. Baseline: Target:

Dropped Source: CLR The proposed indicator lacked baseline and target. The indicator was dropped at the CPSPR stage.

Indicator: Successful integration of the north-south (A1) and east-west (A2) national into the regional corridors of Southern African sub region road network. Baseline: No Target: Yes

Dropped Source: CLR The indicator was dropped at the CPSPR stage.

Indicator: At least 250km of roads under long-term output and performance-based road contracts (OPRC) for rehabilitation and maintenance by 2014. Baseline: No Target: Yes

As of 2014, the number of kilometers under OPRC contracts was 335km.


Indicator: Average vehicle operating costs per vehicle-Km on OPRC roads falls by 8% by 2014 Baseline: No

The indicator has not been achieved owing to delays in contracting. The CLR reports that the indicator should be achieved during 2016 when all the roads under contract will be improved as originally planned.


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and Growth


Comments

Target: Yes

12. CPS Objective: Improve regional trade

Indicator: Annual value of regional trade flows Baseline: Target:

Dropped Source: CLR The indicator was proposed at the CPS stage and it lacked a baseline and a target. The CPS noted that this was a regional objective. The indicator was dropped at the CPSPR stage.

Indicator: Regional Investment Climate Assessment completed Baseline: No Target: Yes

The business environment in Southern Africa completed in December 2012 by World Bank.

Source: CLR This indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage and the CPSPR notes that the indicator corresponds to a regional objective. The Bank proposed interventions were not commensurate with the CPS objective and the proposed indicator was an output measure.

Indicator: Southern Africa Regional Trade and Integration Study Completed Baseline: No Target: Yes

Regional Trade and Integration Sector Study by African Development Bank, World Bank, and African Union completed in December, 2011.

Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan-Transport Sector (SADC) completed in August, 2013.

Source: CLR This indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage and the CPSPR notes that the indicator corresponds to a regional objective. The Bank proposed interventions were not commensurate with the CPS objective and the proposed indicator was an output measure.

13. CPS Objective: Improved energy security

Indicator: Net electricity generation by type Baseline: Target:


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25




and Growth


Comments

Indicator: Total public expenditure on energy Baseline: Target:


Indicator: Domestic generation capacity as % of peak demand Baseline: 18% Target: 102% (FY13)

As of FY13, the indicator had not been achieved owing to delays in the construction of the Morupule B power plant.


Indicator: Measures to address social issues and demand management implemented Baseline: No Target: Yes

Government adopted a tariff policy that balanced Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) financial viability with provisions aimed at making energy affordable for the poor. Demand dampening measures were also implemented including installation of more energy efficient lighting and better metering of energy.


14. CPS Objective: Improved broadband access

Indicator: Broadband strategy developed and adopted Baseline: No Target: Yes

The TA was dropped due to lack of progress when government was re-structuring the Botswana Telecommunications Authority.

Source: CLR The objective was introduced at the CPSPR stage.

CPS Objective: Expanded export potential through energy

Indicator: Total energy exported Baseline: Target:

Dropped Source: CLR The proposed indicator lacked baseline and target. The objective and indicator were dropped at the CPSPR stage.

Indicator: Royalties and fiscal revenues from coal and coal use for exports Baseline: Target:

Dropped Source: CLR The proposed indicator lacked baseline and target. The objective and indicator were dropped at the CPSPR stage.

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and Growth


Comments

15. CPS Objective: Selected strategic challenges in agriculture and nature-based tourism identified and policy options presented to the government

Indicator: Policy Notes completed Baseline: No Target: Yes

Not achieved Source: CLR The objective and the indicator were introduced at the CPSPR stage.


Area 4: The Environment Actual Results

(as of current month/year) Comments


16. CPS Objective: Reduced human-wildlife-conflict (HWC) incidence in targeted hotpot areas in northern Botswana

Indicator: Number of wildlife conflict incidents in the targeted hotspot areas Baseline: Not provided Target: Reduced by 33%

Incidents with elephants increased from a baseline of 99 in 2009 to 315 by June 30, 2013. Incidents with lions increased from 84 to 162 for the same period.

Source: CLR The proposed indicator lacked a baseline and target at the CPS stage. The target was introduced at the CPSPR stage.

Indicator: Number of people employed in eco-tourism Baseline: Not provided Target: Increased by 75

For eco-tourism employment, training activities were delayed until 2013 and the first round of training is only now underway. Overall about 170 people will be trained but so far no one has completed the training and found employment.

Source: CLR The proposed indicator lacked a baseline and target at the CPS stage. The target was introduced at the CPSPR stage.

17. CPS Objective: Low carbon growth strategy under implementation

Indicator: At least one low-carbon (Coal Based Methane - CBM) reserve or non-carbon (Concentrated Solar Power - CSP) energy alternative has been identified, or a Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) pilot project has been identified. Baseline: No Target: Yes

A feasibility study on a concentrated solar power (CSP) plant was completed with financing from the African Development Bank (AfDB). Work is ongoing on the feasibility of a coal based methane (CBM) project and on a Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) project.

Source: CLR The objective and the indicator were introduced at the CPSPR stage.

18. CPS Objective: Enhanced capacity to participate in the global carbon market

Indicator: Number of new carbon programs identified

The CLR reports that no information is available.

Source: CLR

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Baseline: Not provided Target: Not provided

The proposed indicator lacked baseline and target.

19. CPS Objective: Improved ground water management (regional project)

Indicator: Number of key technical officers and policy makers aware of groundwater management and its importance over total number questioned Baseline: Not provided Target: Not provided

Project closed with all major contracts being completed. SADC Water Division was to continue to use the products to raise awareness within the SADC Member States and direct outreach to the Member States and leverage the application of these in member countries

Source: CLR and Botswana Team. This indicator was introduced at the CPSPR stage. The CPSPR noted that this indicator corresponds to a regional objective. The indicator lacked a baseline and target. The CLR does not report on whether progress was made for the proposed indicator.

20. CPS Objective: Improved water conservation and management

Indicator: Water Utilities Corporation (WUC) assumes water delivery nationwide Baseline: No Target: Yes

Water Utilities Corporation (WUC) took over nationwide management of water delivery.

Source: CLR The proposed indicator is an output measure that is likely to lead to improved water conservation and management. No outcome indicator provided.

Indicator: Water Resources Council and Regulator established Baseline: No Target: Yes

Both the Water Resource Council and the Regulator were established. A National Water and Waste Water Policy was also approved by Cabinet in 2012 and will be submitted to Parliament for approval this year.

Source: CLR The proposed indicator is an output measure that is likely to lead to improved water conservation and management. No outcome indicator provided.

21. CPS Objective: Increased understanding of implications of increased climate variability for Botswana with appropriate policy options for adaptation developed

Indicator: Climate impacts modeled by end 2010 Baseline: No Target: Yes

Climate change modeling was completed and a climate change policy note completed. Policy options were never developed however, and the Climate Adaptation Fee Based Service was never undertaken.

Source: CLR The proposed objective and indicator were introduced at the CPSPR stage (October 2011). The target date (2010) pre dates the CPSPR.

Indicator: Policy options for climate adaptation developed and adopted by end 2012 Baseline: No

A policy note has been completed. However, policy options were never developed and the Climate Adaptation Fee Based Service was never undertaken.

Source: CLR The proposed objective and indicator were introduced at the CPSPR stage.

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Target: Yes

Annex Table 2: Botswana Planned and Actual Lending, FY09-14

Project ID

Project name Proposed

FY Approval

FY Closing

FY Proposed Amount

Approved IBRD

Amount

Outcome

Rating

P102299 HIV/AIDS Project* FY09 2009 2015 50.0 50.00 LIR: MS

P112516 Morupule B FY09 2010 2014 450.0 136.40 LIR: U

P102368 Integrated Transport FY09 2009 2020 180.5 186.00 LIR: S

P110332 Mmamabula IPP Project FY10-11 Dropped Dropped 100.0 Dropped N/A

Total Planned 780.5 372.40

P116784 BW-Morupule B Generation Project (Guarantee) 2010 242.66 N/A

Total Unplanned 242.66

Total Planned and Unplanned during FY11-14 615.06 Source: Botswana CPS, CPSPR and AO as of 5/12/15 *LIR: Latest internal rating. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory.

Annex Table 3: Analytical and Advisory Work for Botswana, FY11 - FY14

Proj ID Economic and Sector Work Fiscal year Output Type

P112498 BW-PER FY10 Public Expenditure Review (PER)

P119403 Botswana Fiscal Sustainability Analysis

FY10 General Economy, Macroeconomics, and Growth

Study

P112779 FIRST #7085: Accounting Oversight Board FY12 Not assigned

P119494 BW-Skills and Competitiveness FY12 Sector or Thematic Study/Note

P122980 BW-Prog.DPR (Policy Notes) FY12 Development Policy Review (DPR)

P128132 Botswana #10194 Pension & Insur Cap Bldg FY12 Not assigned

P124915 BW-First TF#10043 Fin. Sector Devt Strat FY13 Not assigned

P128521 Botswana: #10098 Captive Cell Insurance FY13 Not assigned

P121396 BW-First-9055 Enhanc. of Cap. Mkt FY14 Not assigned

P127409 BW: Social Safety Net Review FY14 Not assigned

P131909 Support to Botswana Innovation Hub FY14 Not assigned

P132761 Botswana:#10246 Account Oversight AuthII FY14 Not assigned

Proj ID Technical Assistance Fiscal year Output Type

P114230 BW - Water Sector Reform - FBS FY09 Institutional Development Plan

P118005 BW- ICA follow up FY10 Model/Survey

P118525 BW-SD Policy Notes FY10 How-To Guidance

P118391 BW-Accrual Accounting Guide FY11 How-To Guidance

P118526 BW-Climate Change Policy Note FY11 How-To Guidance

P119338 BW-Water Sector Reform Phase 2 FY11 Institutional Development Plan

P112779 FIRST #7085: Accounting Oversight Board FY12 TA/IAR

P128132 Botswana #10194 Pension & Insur Cap Bldg FY12 TA/EPD

P124915 BW-First TF#10043 Fin. Sector Devt Strat FY13 TA/IAR

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29


Proj ID Economic and Sector Work Fiscal year Output Type

P128521 Botswana: #10098 Captive Cell Insurance FY13 TA/IAR

P121396 BW-First-9055 Enhanc. of Cap. Mkt FY14 TA/IAR

P127409 BW: Social Safety Net Review FY14 TA/IAR

P131909 Support to Botswana Innovation Hub FY14 TA/IAR

P132761 Botswana:#10246 Account Oversight AuthII FY14 TA/IAR Source: AO Table ESW/TA 1.4 as of 5/11/15

Annex Table 4: Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY09-FY14 for Botswana (in US$ million)

Project ID

Project name TF ID Approval

FY Closing

FY Approved

Amount

P112516 Botswana - Morupule B Generation and Transmission Project

TF 13099 2013 2015 1.20

P095617 Northern Botswana Human Wildlife Coexistence Project TF 96337 2010 2016 5.50

P113845 PPIAF: Pre-Feasibility Study for New Rail Link TF 92670 2009 2012 0.49

P105663 Strengthening Monitoring and Evaluation Capacity of the Vision 2016 Council of Botswana

TF 92626 2009 2012 0.18

P103833 Strengthening Botswana Institute of Accountants TF 92533 2009 2012 0.49

P095617 Northern Botswana Human Wildlife Coexistence Project TF 57046 2007 2009 0.32

Total 8.17

Source: Client Connection as of 5/11/15

Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Botswana, FY09-Present

Exit FY Proj ID Project name Total

Evaluated ($M) IEG Outcome IEG Risk to DO

None

Total 0.0 Source: AO Key IEG Ratings as of 4/30/15

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Botswana, FY11-14

Region Total

Evaluated ($M)

Total Evaluated

(No)

Outcome % Sat ($)

Outcome % Sat (No)

RDO % Moderate or

Lower Sat ($)

RDO % Moderate or

Lower Sat (No)

Botswana None None Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

AFR 21,079.9 438 70.7 65.4 39.9 36.4

World 128,251.8 1,490 82.3 70.2 64.1 50.9 Source: AO IEG Bank and Borrower Performance as of 4/30/15 * With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Botswana and Comparators, FY09-14

Fiscal year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average

Botswana

# Proj 2 3 3 3 3 2 2.7

# Proj At Risk 0 0 1 1 0 0.3

% Proj At Risk - - - 33.3 33.3 - 11.1

Net Comm Amt 236 372.4 372.4 372.4 372.4 236.0 326.9

Comm At Risk - - - 50.0 136.4 - 31.1

% Commit at Risk - - - 13.4 36.6 - 8.3

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30


Fiscal year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average

AFR

# Proj 582 597 644 627 567 621 606.3

# Proj At Risk 150 152 133 127 128 138 138.0

% Proj At Risk 25.8 25.5 20.7 20.3 22.6 22.2 22.8

Net Comm Amt 29,334.3 35,438.5 38,884.9 40,416.8 42,653.1 49,146.6 39,312.4

Comm At Risk 7,322.0 9,703.1 8,269.7 6,504.6 14,310.8 16,548.2 10,443.1

% Commit at Risk 21.3 21.3 21.3 16.1 33.6 33.7 24.5

World

# Proj 1,925 1,990 2,059 2,029 1,965 2,049 2,002.8

# Proj At Risk 386 410 382 387 414 412 398.5

% Proj At Risk 20.1 20.6 18.6 19.1 21.1 20.1 19.9

Net Comm Amt 135,706.0 162,975.3 171,755.3 173,706.1 176,206.6 192,614.1 168,827.2

Comm At Risk 20,857.8 28,963.1 23,850.0 24,465.0 40,805.6 40,933.5 29,979.2

% Commit at Risk 15.4 17.8 13.9 14.1 23.2 21.3 17.6 Source: AO Projects at risk by Year as of 4/30/15

Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for the Botswana, FY09-14

Fiscal Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Overall Result

Botswana

Disbursement Ratio (%)

.. 1.00 14.90 6.40 10.50 5.80 6.43

Inv Disb in FY .. 2.40 55.90 20.40 31.40 15.60 20.95

Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY

.. 236.00 375.50 319.60 299.30 267.80 249.70

AFR


23.80 24.00 19.40 21.40 22.40 23.10 22.35

Inv Disb in FY 3,564.20 4,251.00 4,703.10 5,260.30 5,649.30 6,142.20 4,928.35


14,954.70 17,704.10 24,298.40 24,595.00 25,165.90 26,533.20 22,208.55

World


26.50 26.90 22.40 20.80 20.60 20.80 23.00

Inv Disb in FY 18,062.50 20,928.80 20,933.50 21,048.70 20,509.00 20,756.30 20,373.13


68,133.50 77,760.80 93,516.50 101,239.10 99,582.40 99,848.40 90,013.45

* Calculated as IBRD/IDA Disbursements in FY / Opening Undisbursed Amount at FY. Restricted to Lending Instrument Type = Investment. Source: AO as of 5/11/15

Annex Table 9: List of IFC Investments in Botswana Investments Committed in FY09-FY15

Project ID

Cmt FY

Project Status

Sector Greenfield

Code Project Size

Net Loan

Net Equity

Net Comm

32736 2013 Active Copper Mining

E 4,198 1,998 1,998

29378 2010 Active Copper Mining

G 11,928 4,761 4,761

Sub-Total 16,126 - 6,759 6,759

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31


Investments Committed pre-FY09 but active during FY09-FY15

Project ID CMT FY

Project Status

Sector Greenfield

Code Project

Size Net Loan

Net Equity

Net Comm

25538 2007 Closed Commercial

Banking E 20,000 13,500 6,500 20,000

Sub-Total 20,000 13,500 6,500 20,000

TOTAL

36,126 13,500 13,259 26,759 Source: MIS Extract as of End December 2014

Annex Table 10: List of IFC Advisory Services for Botswana Advisory Services Approved in FY09-15

Project ID

Project Name Impl

Start FY Impl

End FY Project Status

Primary Business

Line

Total Funds, US$

564749 AMSMETA ABCH BW. 2012 2015 Closed A2F 940,113

599475 Botswana Investment Climate Reform Program 2014 2016 Dropped IC -

Sub-Total 940,113

Advisory Services Approved pre-FY09 but active during FY09-15

Project ID

Project Name Start FY End FY Project Status

Primary Business

Line

Total Funds, US$

None

Sub-Total -

TOTAL 940,113 Source: IFC AS Data as of June 30, 2014

Annex Table 11: Net Disbursement and Charges for Botswana, FY09-14

Period Disb. Amt. Repay Amt. Net Amt. Charges Fees Net Transfer

Jul 2008 - Jun 2009 -

477,444.2 (477,444.2) -

40,721.7

(518,165.96)

Jul 2009 - Jun 2010

2,377,000.9

477,444.2

1,899,556.7 -

162,136.6

1,737,420.09

Jul 2010 - Jun 2011

53,825,774.2

477,444.2

53,348,329.9

58,065.0

839,562.5

52,450,702.43

Jul 2011 - Jun 2012

20,360,824.69

477,444.22

19,883,380.47

473,569.50

390,042.02

19,019,768.95

Jul 2012 - Jun 2013

30,314,848.51

477,444.22

29,837,404.29

704,119.52

419,786.68

28,713,498.09

Jul 2013 - Jun 2014

14,316,049.63

3,122,431.62

11,193,618.01

645,867.08

459,595.93

10,088,155.00

Report Total 121,194,497.88

5,509,652.72

115,684,845.16

1,881,621.14

2,311,845.42

111,491,378.60

Source: World Bank Client Connection 5/11/15

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32


Annex Table 12: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Botswana

Development Partners 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Australia 0.52 0.68 2.89 1.51 2.51

Austria 0.01 .. .. .. ..

Belgium 0.18 0.2 0.03 -0.08 -0.09

Canada 1.31 1.49 1.18 0.95 1.36

Denmark 0.06 0.54 .. .. -0.01

Finland 0.58 0.18 0.54 0.33 0.44

France 1.04 6.46 0.68 0.53 0.51

Germany 2.08 2.44 2.03 0.33 0.54

Ireland 0.02 0.02 0.04 .. ..

Japan -2.61 10.71 -0.09 1.05 2.54

Korea .. 0.01 .. .. 0.01

New Zealand .. .. .. .. 0.04

Norway 1.83 0.63 0.5 0.46 0.18

Poland .. .. .. .. ..

Portugal 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.08

Spain 0.06 .. .. .. ..

Sweden 2.95 4.68 2.11 7.16 6.42

United Kingdom 0.92 1.06 1.56 0.9 1.23

United States 214.4 76.97 78.48 50.17 75.39

DAC Countries, Total 223.39 106.08 90.04 63.37 91.15

AfDB (African Dev. Bank) .. .. 1.06 1.51 1.05

AfDF (African Dev.Fund) -3.57 -1.82 -2.89 -3.04 -3.19

BADEA 10.06 0.02 0 1.06 0.41

EU Institutions 32.29 39.28 15.32 0.3 13.92

GEF .. 1.36 1.69 1.22 1.97

Global Fund 0.03 2.05 0.34 0.65 1.59

IAEA 0.32 0.46 0.11 0.29 0.25

IBRD .. .. .. .. ..

IDA -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48

IFAD .. .. .. 0.21 ..

Nordic Dev.Fund -0.21 -0.2 -0.21 -0.33 -0.34

OFID 11.89 5.16 .. 4.48 -2.62

UNAIDS 0.67 0.65 0.73 0.74 1.07

UNDP 1.12 1.17 0.47 0.66 0.41

UNFPA 1.89 1.43 1.38 1.46 1.39

UNHCR 0.98 0.66 2.94 .. 0.1

UNICEF 1.2 0.79 0.85 0.76 0.73

WHO .. .. 0.8 0.64 0.88

Multilateral, Total 56.19 50.53 22.11 10.13 17.14

Israel .. 0.01 .. .. 0.01

Kuwait (KFAED) -0.5 -0.58 7.87 0.21 -0.02

Russia .. .. .. 0.07 ..

Thailand 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.07

Turkey .. 0.01 0.08 .. 0.03

Non-DAC Countries, Total -0.42 -0.47 8 0.36 0.09

Development Partners Total 279.16 156.14 120.15 73.86 108.38 Source: OECD Stat, [DAC2a] as of 5/11/15

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33


Annex Table 13: Economic and Social Indicators for Botswana, 2009 - 2013

Series Name

BWA

Sub-Saharan

Africa (developing

only) World

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 2009-2013

Growth and Inflation

GDP growth (annual %) -7.7 8.6 6.0 4.8 9.3 4.2 4.0 1.9

GDP per capita growth (annual %) -8.5 7.6 5.1 3.9 8.4 3.3 1.3 0.7

GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 11,990.0 12,790.0 14,240.0 15,200.0 16,570.0 14,158.0 3,096.1 13,360.5

GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) (Millions) 5,330.0 5,700.0 6,840.0 7,640.0 8,080.0 6,718.0 1,424.2 9,880.2

Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 8.0 6.9 8.5 7.5 5.9 7.4 5.7 3.5

Compositon of GDP (%)

Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.8 15.2 3.1

Industry, value added (% of GDP) 32.1 35.7 40.2 34.7 37.3 36.0 28.7 26.8

Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 64.7 61.6 57.0 62.4 60.1 61.2 56.0 70.1

Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 34.9 33.6 31.4 35.9 33.5 33.9 20.1 21.8

Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 20.2 26.8 31.0 22.6 33.3 26.8 18.3 22.3

External Accounts

Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 34.8 38.5 44.4 42.4 54.3 42.9 30.3 28.7

Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 51.9 49.7 51.2 58.3 54.3 53.1 32.4 28.7

Current account balance (% of GDP) -11.1 -6.4 -0.6 -3.4 11.8 -1.9 .. ..

External debt stocks (% of GNI) 17.3 13.6 15.7 17.2 16.6 16.1 24.1 ..

Total debt service (% of GNI) 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 1.3 0.6 1.5 ..

Total reserves in months of imports 17.8 13.2 11.6 10.5 11.3 12.9 5.4 14.0

Fiscal Accounts /1

General government revenue (% of GDP) 33.3 29.4 29.0 29.4 28.6 29.9 .. ..

General government total expenditure (% of GDP) 45.3 36.2 31.8 29.2 27.8 34.0 .. ..

General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP) -12.0 -6.8 -2.8 0.3 0.8 -4.1 .. ..

General government gross debt (% of GDP) 15.8 17.6 16.7 14.9 13.4 15.7 .. ..

Social Indicators

Health

Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 46.3 46.4 46.7 47.0 47.4 46.8 55.9 70.5

Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months) 96.0 96.0 96.0 96.0 96.0 96.0 71.3 83.6

Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) 62.7 63.8 64.0 64.3 .. 63.7 29.1 63.0

Improved water source (% of population with access) 96.6 96.8 96.8 96.8 .. 96.8 63.0 88.7

Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 41.3 39.9 39.1 37.1 36.3 38.7 64.9 35.8

Education

School enrollment, preprimary (% gross) 18.2 .. .. 16.1 .. 17.1 18.3 51.1

School enrollment, primary (% gross) 106.0 .. .. 108.2 .. .. 99.0 108.2

School enrollment, secondary (% gross) .. .. .. .. .. .. 41.2 72.4

Population

Population, total (Millions) 1.95 1.97 1.99 2.00 2.02 1.99 888.74 6,964.19

Population growth (annual %) 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 2.7 1.2

Urban population (% of total) 56.0 56.2 56.5 56.7 56.9 56.5 35.7 52.0 Source: DDP as of 4/14/15 *International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015

Documents

CLR Review November 3, 2015 Independent Evaluation Groupdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/pt/... · 100886. For Official Use Only. 2 . CLR Review . Independent Evaluation Group . sector