Upload
others
View
1
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Closure of NRC Evaluation of BTP 5-3 to EstimateTNDT, RTNDT(u), and Upper-Shelf Energy
Simon C. F. Sheng Sara LyonsSenior Materials Engineer Reliability And Risk AnalystNRR/DE/EVIB NRR/DRA/[email protected] [email protected]
NRC-Industry Annual Materials Information Exchange MeetingMay 23-25, 2017Rockville, Maryland, USA
Background
• January 30, 2014 – AREVA letter with an attached PVP paper (PVP2014-28897) claims that Position 1.1(4) regarding RTNDTof BTP 5-3 is sometimes non-conservative for A508-2 forgings.
• June 4, 2014; February 19, 2015; June 2, 2015; and January 19, 2016 – NRC and industry each updated its assessments of all BTP 5-3 positions regarding TNDT, RTNDT, and USE in the NRC/EPRI annual materials issue information exchange meeting.
• September 23, 2015 – EPRI and PWROG provided MRP-401 (BWRVIP-287) and PWROG-15003-NP for information.
• NRC closure memo dated 4/11/2017 (ML16364A285).2
BTP 5-3 Evaluation Objectives
• Assess the potential impact on safety due to the issues raised by AREVA.
• Evaluate the ways to account for the BTP 5-3 non-conservatism under the current deterministic framework.
• Perform risk-informed evaluation to justify revision/non-revision.
3
BTP 5-3 Positions B1.1(1) and B1.1(2) Regarding TNDT
Under the current framework based on Margin:
Margin = 2(σi2 + σΔ
2)1/2
The NRC staff’s approach: Determine σi considering (1) the σ from the database of estimated and true TNDT values, and (2) the σ from the database of estimated and true “Charpy parameter” based on the Charpy V-notch Curve.Reference: NRC TLR-RES/DE/CIB-2014-011 (ML15268A086).
Conclusion: An acceptable approach is to use a σi of 20° in the margin calculation if the TNDT determined by Position B1.1(1) or B1.1(2) is the RTNDT. 4
BTP 5-3 Position B1.1(3) Regarding Charpy Parameter
Under the current framework based on Margin:
The NRC staff’s approach: (1) Determine σi considering the σ from the database of estimated and true “parameter” based on the Charpy V-notch Curve, or (2) determine a new “mean” and σi from the same database.References: MRP-401 (BWRVIP-287) and NRC TLR-RES/DE/CIB-2014-011 (ML15268A086).
Conclusion: An acceptable approach is (1) to use a σiof 20°F in the margin calculation for plates and non-Rotterdam forgings and 60°F for Rotterdam forgings, or (2) to use a mean and σi based on a regression analysis. 5
BTP 5-3 Position 1.1(4) Regarding RTNDT Based on Charpy Data at a Single Temperature
Under the current framework based on Margin:
The NRC staff’s approach: Determine σi considering the σ from the database of estimated and true RTNDT.Reference: NRC TLR-RES/DE/CIB-2014-011 (ML15268A086).
Conclusion: An acceptable approach is to use a σi of 0°F in the margin calculation for plates and 30°F for forgings.
6
BTP 5-3 Position 1.2 Regarding USE
Under the current framework based on 65% of the longitudinal USE:
The NRC staff’s approach: Reexamine NRC regulations on USE for guidance on establishing generic USE values. References: (1) MRP-401 (BWRVIP-287), (2) NRC TLR-RES/DE/CIB-2014-011 (ML15268A086), and (3) the June 25, 1990 memo from C.Z. Serpan (RES) to C.Y. Cheng (NRR).
Conclusion: No revision is needed because Ref. 3 evaluated and accepted the current position, and NRC did not automatically use the mean ± 2σ approach to derive generic values for material properties important to RPV evaluations.
7
Risk-Informed Evaluation to Justify Revision/No Revision
Objective: to determine whether implementation of the deterministic margin meets the NRC criteria for new regulations.1. Pressurized thermal shock (PTS) evaluation for 72 EFPYs:
The NRC staff’s approach:Use past probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) results• Select plants based on margin adjusted RTPTS values.• Apply current licensing basis (CLB) material information with CLB
fluence extrapolated to 72 EFPYs.• Add extra margin in RTPL to account for BTP 5-3 non-
conservatism. Reference: NUREG-1874, especially Fig.3.12 (ML070860156).
8
Risk-Informed Evaluation to Justify Revision/No Revision
The PTS evaluation for 72 EFPYs:The NRC staff’s PFM results:
Conclusion: Small change in TWCF values suggests no revision. DRA proceeded risk-informed evaluation to completion.
9
Plant Name Initial RTNDTAdjustment (∆)
TWCF w/o BTP 5-3 Non-
conservatism
TWCF with BTP 5-3 Non-
conservatism
Change in TWCF Values
IP-2(plate)
18.5 °F (1x ∆) 3.16x10-9 9.00x10-9 5.84x10-9
37 °F (2x ∆) 2.46x10-8 2.14x10-8
Palisades(plate)
18.5 °F (1x ∆) 2.67x10-10 8.51x10-10 5.84x10-10
37 °F (2x ∆) 2.58x10-9 2.31x10-9
WB-1(forging)
90.7 °F (1x ∆) 6.59x10-16 2.87x10-12 2.87x10-12
136 °F (1.5x ∆) 7.70x10-11 7.70x10-11
NA-1(forging)
90.7 °F (1x ∆) 2.52x10-14 3.00x10-12 2.97x10-12
136 °F (1.5x∆) 7.81x10-11 7.81x10-11
Risk-Informed Evaluation to Justify Revision/No Revision
2. Pressure temperature (P-T) limit evaluation for 72 EFPYs:
The NRC staff’s approach:Perform PFM analyses (no past results could be used)• Define bounding PWR and BWR plants based on RVID2
information.• Apply RVID2 material information with 32 EFPY fluence
extrapolated to 72 EFPYs.• Use P-T limit transients and actual transients.• Specify a σi of 20°F in the PFM input for plates and non-
Rotterdam forgings and 60°F for Rotterdam forgings to account for BTP 5-3 non-conservatism.
Reference: NRC memo dated 12/22/2016 from RES to NRR (ML16357A271). 10
Risk-Informed Evaluation to Justify Revision/No Revision
Pressure temperature (P-T) limit evaluation for 72 EFPYs:
The NRC staff’s PFM results (actual transient):
11
ReactorType
LoadingCondition
Material Type
Considerationof BTP 5-3
Non-conservatism
Conditional Probability of Failure, CPF
Frequency ofLoading
Condition, F(events/yr)
TWCF= CPF x F
(/yr)
PWRActual
Cooldown
Plate
No 4.9×10-7 1.0 (a) 4.9×10-7
Yes 6.3×10-7 1.0 (a) 6.3×10-7
Rotterdam Forging
No 8.8×10-9 1.0 (a)8.8×10-9
Yes 2.2×10-7 1.0 (a)2.2×10-7
BWRs
100°F/hour Cooldown Following Saturation
Curve Plate
No 1.5×10-7 1.0 (a) 1.5×10-7
Yes 2.6×10-7 1.0 (a) 2.6×10-7
No 0.0×10+00 1.0 (a)0.0×10+00Plant
Procedure Leak Test Yes 9.0×10-15 1.0 (a)
9.0×10-15
Risk-Informed Evaluation to Justify Revision/No Revision
Pressure temperature (P-T) limit evaluation for 72 EFPYs:
The NRC staff’s PFM results (actual transient):- Continued from Slide 11
Note: The BWR results for 40°F/hour leak test are much higher. However, they are still two orders of magnitude lower than 1x10-6.
Conclusion: Small change in TWCF values suggests no revision. DRA proceeded risk-informed evaluation to completion.
12
Risk-Informed EvaluationDefine Regulatory Framework
• 10 CR 50.109 Backfitting: Imposition of a different regulatory staff position
• Safety Goal Screening per the Regulatory Analysis Guidelines in NUREG/BR-0058, Rev. 4:
Risk-Informed EvaluationFive Principles
Maintains Sufficient
Safety Margins
Performance-Measurement
Strategies Used to Monitor Change
Meets Current
Regulations
Consistent with
Defense-in-Depth Philosophy
Integrated Decision Making
Acceptably Small
Increases in CDF (if any)
Risk-Informed Decision Making
Risk-Informed EvaluationMeets Current Regulations
• The BTP 5-3 issue relates to a non-conservatism in the current staff position
• The staff’s analyses justifies the current guidance based on an extremely small change in predicted TWCF estimates
Risk-Informed EvaluationDefense-in-Depth
• There is no change in plant design or operations
• Changes to the robustness of the RPV is minimal, given existing:– RPV surveillance programs– ISI programs for flaw detection
Risk-Informed EvaluationSafety Margins
• Staff assessment demonstrated that:– PTS events are associated with
an extremely small risk of RPV failure– RPVs exposed to the P-T limit
transient are associated with an extremely small risk of RPV failure
Risk-Informed EvaluationAcceptable Increase in Risk
• Conservative risk estimate:LERF = CDF = TWCF
•
• PTS evaluation and P-T Limit evaluation resulted in ΔCDF estimates well below 1E-6/RY
Risk-Informed EvaluationPerformance Measurement
• ISI programs are sufficient to identify any future need to revisit this assessment
• No change is proposed
• 40 years of operating experience for U.S. fleet of plants which applied BTP 5-3 to their RPV plates and forgings
Conclusion, Impact on Operating Plants, and Next Step
Closure Memo Conclusion:The change-in-risk associated with not pursuing a backfitrelated to the BTP 5-3 non-conservatism for PTS and P-T limits is consistent with the guidance in NUREG/BR-0058.
Positions in BTP 5-3 can still be used in PTS and P-T limits evaluations up to 72 EFPYs.
Impact on Operating Plants:None for 72 EFPYs.
Next Step:Formal processing of the BTP 5-3 revision by NRO.
20