Close Combat 2

8/8/2019 Close Combat 2

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AgendaAgenda

The Center for Army Lessons Learned Overview

Focused Rotation a Vehicle for Change

Urban Combat Operations, CALL Newsletter No.99-16

Lessons Learned in an Urban Combat TrainingEnvironment (JRTC)

The CALL Homepage and MOUT

Other CALL Products

Questions

The Center for Army Lessons Learned Overview

Focused Rotation a Vehicle for Change

Urban Combat Operations, CALL Newsletter No.99-16

Lessons Learned in an Urban Combat TrainingEnvironment (JRTC)

The CALL Homepage and MOUT

Other CALL Products

Questions


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CALL OverviewCALL Overview

Organization and location.

Mission ~ Collect, analyze, anddisseminate lessons learned, tactics,

techniques, and procedures (TTP) andresearch material to the U.S. Army.

History ~ 1985, 89, 96, 97, 98 and NOW.

Organization and location.

Mission ~ Collect, analyze, anddisseminate lessons learned, tactics,

techniques, and procedures (TTP) andresearch material to the U.S. Army.

History ~ 1985, 89, 96, 97, 98 and NOW.


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Focused RotationA Vehicle for Change

Focused RotationA Vehicle for Change

The TRADOC Trends Reversal Program (T-RAP)identifies negative trends observed at the CTCsand assigns a lead proponent to develop acorrective action plan (TRADOC Reg. 11-13) Oct 96.

The proponent develops a solution set and gives itto a unit to use and validate at a focused rotation.

The proponent then implements a solution acrossthe Army in a way that permanently corrects the

problem.

The TRADOC Trends Reversal Program (T-RAP)identifies negative trends observed at the CTCsand assigns a lead proponent to develop acorrective action plan (TRADOC Reg. 11-13) Oct 96.

The proponent develops a solution set and gives itto a unit to use and validate at a focused rotation.

The proponent then implements a solution acrossthe Army in a way that permanently corrects the

problem.


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Urban Combat OperationsCALL Newsletter No. 99-16

Urban Combat OperationsCALL Newsletter No. 99-16

The idea November of 1997

Soliciting support

CO-OP Infantry School (MOUTProponent)

MOUT Collection Plan and Workshop

Focused Rotation, March 1998

Newsletter development and consensus

The idea November of 1997

Soliciting support

CO-OP Infantry School (MOUTProponent)

MOUT Collection Plan and Workshop

Focused Rotation, March 1998

Newsletter development and consensus


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Urban Focused Pre-RotationAssumptions (as of Nov. 1997)Urban Focused Pre-Rotation

Assumptions (as of Nov. 1997)

1. U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban areasis outdated.

2. The political realities of urban combat have resultedin the use of terms that tend to place limitations on

the conduct of these operations.3. The manpower resources needed to conduct urban

combat is a problem for the U.S. Army. Under thecurrent downsizing agenda, the Army does not havethe soldiers to do the job on a scale of the Russian

experience at Grozny and meet its two regional warmission.

1. U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban areasis outdated.

2. The political realities of urban combat have resultedin the use of terms that tend to place limitations on

the conduct of these operations.3. The manpower resources needed to conduct urban

combat is a problem for the U.S. Army. Under thecurrent downsizing agenda, the Army does not havethe soldiers to do the job on a scale of the Russian

experience at Grozny and meet its two regional warmission.


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Urban Focused Pre-Rotation AssumptionsUrban Focused Pre-Rotation Assumptions

4. Training in villages will not prepare the Army for

combat in the large metropolitan areas.5. U.S. forces currently do not have the special

weapons needed and lack the quantities of weaponsnecessary for urban operations. The weaponshistorically needed to do the job are in many cases

either not in the inventory or not available fortraining in the urban environment.

6. Quantity of supplies is another issue that the Armymust be prepared to address in the urban combatsituation. Previous evidence shows that urban

combat uses an inordinate amount of supplies, fromammunition to bandages.

4. Training in villages will not prepare the Army for

combat in the large metropolitan areas.5. U.S. forces currently do not have the special

weapons needed and lack the quantities of weaponsnecessary for urban operations. The weaponshistorically needed to do the job are in many cases

either not in the inventory or not available fortraining in the urban environment.

6. Quantity of supplies is another issue that the Armymust be prepared to address in the urban combatsituation. Previous evidence shows that urban

combat uses an inordinate amount of supplies, fromammunition to bandages.


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Urban FocusedPre-Rotation Assumptions

Urban FocusedPre-Rotation Assumptions

7. Munitions now in the inventory are not suitablefor urban combat. In past wars the types ofammunition in the inventory worked for allpossibilities.

8. Specialty communications equipment is nowonly available to special units. Thiscommunications equipment is needed now forregular infantry for training and potentialcombat operations.

9. Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated intourban combat training.

7. Munitions now in the inventory are not suitablefor urban combat. In past wars the types ofammunition in the inventory worked for allpossibilities.

8. Specialty communications equipment is nowonly available to special units. Thiscommunications equipment is needed now forregular infantry for training and potentialcombat operations.

9. Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated intourban combat training.


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TA.1 ManeuverTA.1 Maneuver

There is a lack of focus in the movement to theobjective, resulting in significant casualties.

Units lack focus in the use of combined armstactics, techniques and procedures for armor,

aviation, and close air support for urbancombat.

Uncoordinated maneuver and over-watch aremore common in the urban environment.

Marksmanship at all levels is poor, with theexception of Special Operations Units.

There is a lack of focus in the movement to theobjective, resulting in significant casualties.

Units lack focus in the use of combined armstactics, techniques and procedures for armor,

aviation, and close air support for urbancombat.

Uncoordinated maneuver and over-watch aremore common in the urban environment.

Marksmanship at all levels is poor, with theexception of Special Operations Units.


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TA.2 Fire SupportTA.2 Fire Support

Units have problems with allocation ofresources and positioning of fire support assetsin the urban fight.

Units do a poor job using restrictive rule ofengagement in dealing with collateral damageand associated urban combat effects.

Units were not effective in the use of counterbattery fires.

Units did a poor job in the use of precisionmunitions.

Units have problems with allocation ofresources and positioning of fire support assetsin the urban fight.

Units do a poor job using restrictive rule ofengagement in dealing with collateral damageand associated urban combat effects.

Units were not effective in the use of counterbattery fires.

Units did a poor job in the use of precisionmunitions.


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TA.3 Air DefenseTA.3 Air Defense

There is a poor allocation of air defenseartillery assets to support the urban fightoverall.

Attack aviation vulnerability in battle

positions is not taken into consideration inthe operations order planning.

Focusing the correct air defense asset atthe proper place and time in the battle is

poor.

There is a poor allocation of air defenseartillery assets to support the urban fightoverall.

Attack aviation vulnerability in battle

positions is not taken into consideration inthe operations order planning.

Focusing the correct air defense asset atthe proper place and time in the battle is

poor.


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TA.4 Command and ControlTA.4 Command and Control

Units do not effectively locate their commandand control nodes.

Leaders at all levels have problems with rulesof engagement and proportionality.

Sniper teams are not properly planned for orconsidered eyes on the objective.

Wargaming and course of action developmentfor urban combat needs work; this must bemore precise.

Units do not effectively locate their commandand control nodes.

Leaders at all levels have problems with rulesof engagement and proportionality.

Sniper teams are not properly planned for orconsidered eyes on the objective.

Wargaming and course of action developmentfor urban combat needs work; this must bemore precise.


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TA.5 IntelligenceTA.5 Intelligence

The intelligence preparation of the battlefield(IPB) is not specific enough for the urban battle.

The use of psychological operations and civil

affairs operations are not planned well enough.

Identification of decision points and settingconditions for success are not emphasized.

Little thought is given to intelligence collectionor care of civilians on the battlefield.

The intelligence preparation of the battlefield(IPB) is not specific enough for the urban battle.

The use of psychological operations and civil

affairs operations are not planned well enough.

Identification of decision points and settingconditions for success are not emphasized.

Little thought is given to intelligence collectionor care of civilians on the battlefield.


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TA.6 Mobility and SurvivabilityTA.6 Mobility and Survivability

The operations order does not properlyallocate engineer resources for urban fight.

Units are not effective in suppress, obscure,secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.

Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.

Lack of eyes on the objective prevent

obstacle identification.

The operations order does not properlyallocate engineer resources for urban fight.

Units are not effective in suppress, obscure,secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.

Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.

Lack of eyes on the objective prevent

obstacle identification.


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TA.7 Combat Service SupportTA.7 Combat Service Support

Allocation of assets to support the urbanfight is poor.

Re-supply and casualty evacuation are notconducted well.

Urban specific supply items: ladders, kneeand elbow pads, ropes with grappling hooks,as well as specialty weapons and ammunitionneed to be made available.

Speed, not haste, should be the norm inurban operations.

Allocation of assets to support the urbanfight is poor.

Re-supply and casualty evacuation are notconducted well.

Urban specific supply items: ladders, kneeand elbow pads, ropes with grappling hooks,as well as specialty weapons and ammunitionneed to be made available.

Speed, not haste, should be the norm inurban operations.


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ConclusionsConclusions

The world in which the Army will fight in the21st century is even more politically complexand dangerous than just a few years ago.There is a dramatic increase in the lethality of

weapons available to hostile elements. TheUnited States must cope with advancedtechnologies that re-invent themselves inhours, days, and weeks.

The world in which the Army will fight in the21st century is even more politically complexand dangerous than just a few years ago.There is a dramatic increase in the lethality of

weapons available to hostile elements. TheUnited States must cope with advancedtechnologies that re-invent themselves inhours, days, and weeks.


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The Army now faces a dangerousworld without a defined foe. The enemyis nebulous, and the Army is caught

between a highly successful (butincreasingly outmoded) doctrine andthe desire to prepare to meet futureadversaries. Urban combat will be asmall piece of any new doctrine.

The Army now faces a dangerousworld without a defined foe. The enemyis nebulous, and the Army is caught

between a highly successful (butincreasingly outmoded) doctrine andthe desire to prepare to meet futureadversaries. Urban combat will be asmall piece of any new doctrine.


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The Army cannot wait for the next revision

of FM 100-5, Operations, to be completed.

Possibly the best approach is to develop

new TTP for future contingencies andconflicts now. Developing and formalizing

the TTP may generate broader thought that

will lead to the new doctrine.

The Army cannot wait for the next revision

of FM 100-5, Operations, to be completed.

Possibly the best approach is to develop

new TTP for future contingencies andconflicts now. Developing and formalizing

the TTP may generate broader thought that

will lead to the new doctrine.


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The CALL Homepage and MOUTThe CALL Homepage and MOUT

http://call.army.mil

MOUT hot button

Links

Published Articles

CALL/FMSO/Others DOD Urban Operations Journals

SAMS Urban Operations Curriculum

USMC Related Articles

Briefings

http://call.army.mil

MOUT hot button

Links

Published Articles

CALL/FMSO/Others DOD Urban Operations Journals

SAMS Urban Operations Curriculum

USMC Related Articles

Briefings


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Other CALL ProductsOther CALL Products

Newsletters

Handbooks

Special Studies

CTC Bulletins

Newsletters

Handbooks

Special Studies

CTC Bulletins

Trends

Videos

News From the Front

Training Techniques


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Connect


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Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training Environment

Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training Environment

DTLOMS

Doctrine

Training

Leader Development

Organization

Materiel

Soldiers

DTLOMS

Doctrine

Training

Leader Development

Organization

Materiel

Soldiers

Documents

Close Combat 2