cle X.2. of the NPT provides that, "Twenty five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force

IAEA /BULLETIN \ VIENNA, AUSTRIA

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

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IAEABULLETINQUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC

Front cover: Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the words "atomstor peace" have embodied all the hope and promise of nuclearenergy — and raised the spectre of all its peril. At the United Nationsin New York this April, States will once again confront the dualchallenge, as they decide the future of the Treaty on the Non-Prolif-eration of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which since 1968 has beenadopted by more than 170 States. The outcome of the NPT Confer-ence is of major importance to the international community, and tothe IAEA. The Agency's responsibilities include the implementationof nuclear safeguards under agreements that States are required toconclude as NPT Parties for verifying the peaceful nature of theirnuclear activities. Articles in this edition take a close look at the IAEAand its relationship to the NPT, and at some global developmentsinfluencing the future.(Cover design: Ms. Hannelore Wilczek, IAEA)

Facing page: A symbol of South Africa's commitment against the"nuclear sword", this miniature metal ploughshare was crafted usingmaterial from a dismantled nuclear device. The sculpture — pre-sented to the IAEA by South Africa after the country stopped itsformer nuclear weapons prog'ramme — now is on display at IAEAheadquarters in Vienna. (Credit: P. Pavlicek, IAEA)

CONTENTSFeatures

Regional reports

National reports

IAEA safeguards and the NPT: Examining interconnectionsby Jan Priest 12

IAEA technical co-operation: Strengthening technology transferby Paulo M. Barreto I 3

IAEA safeguards in the 1990s: Building on experienceby Bruno Pellaud and Richard Hooper / 14

Atoms for peace: Extending the benefits of nuclear technologiesby Jihui Qian and Aleksander Rogov I 21

Safeguards in the European Union: The New Partnership Approachby Sven Thorstensen and Kaluba Chitumbo 125

Nuclear material accounting and control: Co-ordinating assistance to newly independent Statesby Sven Thorstensen 129

Latin America's Treaty of Tlatelolco: Instrument for peace and developmentby Enrique Romdn-Morey 133

Nuclear co-operation in Africa: Developing expertise and resourcesby Ali Boussaha and Mokdad Maksoudi 137

Nuclear verification in South Africaby Adolf von Baeckmann, Garry Dillon and Demetrius Perricos I 42

US fissile material initiatives: Implications for the IAEAby Fred McGoldrick 149

Departments International Newsbriefs/Datafile / 53

Posts announced by the IAEA / 65

Keep abreast with IAEA publications / 66

IAEA Bulletin Authors and Contributors 1994 / 67

Databases on line / 68

IAEA conferences and seminars/Co-ordinated research programmes / 72

ISSN 0020-6067 IAEA BULLETIN, VOL. 37, NO. 1 (MARCH 1995)

THE IAEA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE NPT

IAEA safeguards and the NPT:Examining interconnections

An overview of the IAEA's verification role and its relationship tothe Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

by Jan Priest In April 1995, the States Party to the Treaty onthe Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT) will meet to review the Treaty's operationand decide upon its extension. Quinquennial re-view conferences have been held ever since theNPT entered into force in 1970, with a view toensuring that the Treaty's purpose and provi-sions are being realized.

However, in the light of the NPT's initial25-year lifespan, the main focus of the 1995conference will be the Treaty's extension. Arti-cle X.2. of the NPT provides that, "Twenty fiveyears after the entry into force of the Treaty, aconference shall be convened to decide whetherthe Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, orshall be extended for an additional fixed periodor periods. This decision shall be taken by amajority of the Parties to the Treaty."

The IAEA is neither the Secretariat of theNPT nor empowered to request States to adhereto it. It does, however, have formal responsibilityin the context of implementing Article III of theTreaty. The IAEA's mandate, expertise, and ex-perience also equip it well to assist in the imple-mentation of other Articles.

At the broadest level, the IAEA provides twoservice functions under the NPT. It facilitatesand provides a channel for endeavours aimed, inaccordance with Article IV.2. of the Treaty, at..." the further development of the applications ofnuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especiallyin the territories of non-nuclear-weapon StatesParty to the Treaty, with due consideration forthe needs' of the developing areas of the world."

Its other major function is to administer inter-national nuclear safeguards, in accordance withArticle III of the Treaty, to verify fulfillment ofthe non-proliferation commitment assumed bynon-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty,

Ms. Priest is Head of the Safeguards and Non-ProliferationPolicy Section in the IAEA Division of External Relations.

" with a view to preventing diversion of nuclearenergy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons orother nuclear explosive devices."

To put this dual function into historical per-spective, it should be remembered that, sinceFermi demonstrated the atom's potential in1942, the basic issue with which humanity hashad to grapple is how to exploit nuclear energyfor human benefit while concurrently building,maintaining, and developing a shield against nu-clear weapons proliferation. The dual nature ofnuclear energy, reflected in the NPT, was alsoearlier very much in the minds of the drafters ofthe IAEA Statute. Hence, the IAEA was createdin 1957 with the twin objectives of promoting thepeaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring,so far as it is able," that assistance provided by itor at its request, or under its supervision or con-trol is not used in such a way as to further anymilitary purpose." (IAEA Statute, Article II.)

In the latter connection, Article III.A.5 of theStatute authorizes the IAEA "to establish andadminister safeguards" in circumstances whenthe Agency itself is the source or channel ofassistance; when parties to any bilateral or multi-lateral arrangements request it to do so, or at therequest of a State to any of that State's activitiesin the field of atomic energy. Article XII sets outthe rights and responsibilities of the IAEA in suchsituations including the right to examine the de-sign of specialized equipment and facilities, in-cluding nuclear reactors to ensure, inter alia, thatthe design will permit effective safeguards appli-cation; the right to require the maintenance andproduction of operating records to assist in ensur-ing accountability for source and special fission-able material, and the right to send inspectors intothe recipient State, with respect to any IAEAproject or other arrangement where the Agency isrequested by the Parties to apply its safeguards.

continued on page 9

IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995


IAEA technical co-operation:Strengthening technology transfer

New strategies and approaches have been initiated to more effectivelysupport and assist countries in safely applying nuclear technologies

hile the transfer of nuclear technologytakes place through various bilateral and multi-lateral channels, the IAEA has long served as thekey international mechanism for scientific andtechnical co-operation in the nuclear field. World-wide, more than 80 countries today receiveIAEA-supported technical assistance, and alto-gether more than 1200 projects are in the IAEA's1995 technical co-operation programme.

The underlying basis for the IAEA's work tofacilitate the peaceful development of nuclearenergy is its Statute, which entered into force in1957 and sets the framework for activities.

When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force in 1970— more than a decade after the IAEA's creation— its provisions reflected these aims. Specifi-cally, Article IV of the NPT states inter alia that" All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facili-tate, and have the right to participate in, thefullest possible exchange of equipment, materi-als and scientific and technological informationfor the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties tothe Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together withother States or international organizations to thefurther development of the applications of nu-clear energy for peaceful purposes, especially inthe territories of non-nuclear-weapon StatesParty to the Treaty, with due consideration forthe needs of the developing areas of the world."

As they have at past NPT Review Confer-ences, parties to the Treaty are expected toclosely consider the IAEA's technical co-opera-tion activities when they meet in April 1995 todecide on the NPT's extension. This article pro-vides an overview of the IAEA's programmesfor assisting the transfer of peaceful nuclear tech-

Mr. Barretto is Director of the Division of Technical C o -o p eration Programmes in the IAEA Department of Techni-cal Co-operation.

nologies. It particularly addresses the pro-gramme's organization, scope, funding, and pol-icy directions. (See the related article on IAEAtechnical co-operation projects and activities,beginning on page 21.)

IAEA mechanisms for technology transfer

Within the IAEA, the Department of Techni-cal Co-operation and two technical departments— the Department of Research and Isotopes andthe Department of Nuclear Energy and Safety —are the main channels for technology transferactivities. Financing of activities undertaken bythese two technical departments is through theIAEA's regular budget. Technical assistanceprovided by the Department of Technical Co-operation is funded largely from extrabudgetaryresources, namely voluntary contributions byIAEA Member States.

Technology transfer through technical de-partments. A range of technology-transfer ac-tivities are carried out by technical departments.They include those within the framework of the:• International Nuclear Information System

(INIS). This system continues to be one of theIAEA's principal channels for disseminatingscientific and technical information. It coversvirtually every aspect of the peaceful uses ofnuclear energy, incorporating a database ofsome 1.8 million records. Participation todayextends to 65 developing and 23 industrial-ized countries, as well as 17 international or-ganizations.

• Meetings and publications. The IAEA holdssome 400 meetings on various topics in nu-clear science and technology each year, in-cluding 10-14 major conferences, symposia,and seminars. In 1994, the meetings attractednearly 2500 participants. Many meetings,

continued on next page


by Paulo M.C.Barretto


1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994

Year

TACF ^ Extrabudgetary Q In-kindfflUNDP

Note: As corrected for inflation using average annual OECD rates

Availableresources for IAEA

technicalco-operation,

1970-94

projects, and programmes of the technical de-partments result in publications and technicaldocuments that are widely distributed withinIAEA Member States.Research centres and laboratories. Aloneamong other international organizations, theIAEA operates its own research and servicelaboratories, which contribute significantly tothe transfer of nuclear technologies. TheIAEA's Seibersdorf Laboratories, near Vi-enna, provide a diverse range of technicalservices for programmes in physics, chemis-try, hydrology, nuclear instrumentation, andagriculture. The IAEA's Marine EnvironmentLaboratory in Monaco carries out studies ofpollution and radioactivity in the oceans,lakes, and other water bodies. It frequentlycollaborates with oceanographic institutesworldwide and undertakes projects in co-op-eration with other international environ-mental programmes and institutions combin-ing nuclear and non-nuclear techniques. TheInternational Centre for Theoretical Physics,in Trieste, Italy, is financed jointly by Italy,UNESCO, and the IAEA. It serves as an im-portant mechanism for the exchange and trans-fer of advanced scientific knowledge and skills.Research contracts. Research work sup-ported by the IAEA is being carried out under1950 research contracts and agreements inmore than 90 developing and industrializedcountries. Most contracts and agreements arecomponents of Co-ordinated Research Pro-grammes (CRPs) through which groups ofscientists in various countries co-operativelyinvestigate problems and their solutions in arange of fields. Over the past 10 years, theIAEA has directly financed research activitiesamounting to nearly US $43 million.

Technology transfer through technical co-operation projects. For 1995, the IAEA's tech-nical co-operation programme — the majorchannel of technology transfer — includes morethan 1200 projects in more than 80 developingcountries. These projects — either at the na-tional, regional, or interregional level — cover awide range of scientific and technical work re-lated to nuclear power; the nuclear fuel cycle;radioactive waste management; food and agri-culture; human health; industry and earth sci-ences; physical and chemical sciences; radiationprotection; safety of nuclear installations; andprogramme direction and support.

Conditions and controls. In view of the tech-nical co-operation programme's scope, size, andnature, specific conditions and controls havebeen established for the implementation of pro-jects. Within the framework established by theIAEA Statute, the delivery of technical assis-tance is regulated by two documents, includingan agreement known by the acronym RSA, thatcontain, inter alia, provisions to ensure the ex-clusively peaceful use of technical assistanceprovided through the IAEA's technical co-op-eration programme, as well as the requirementthat the IAEA's Safety Standards and measuresbe applied to such assistance. Almost all IAEAMembers States receiving technical assistancehave concluded an RSA. After the breakup of theformer Soviet Union and developments in Cen-tral and Eastern Europe, a number of newly inde-pendent States joined the IAEA during 1992-94.Although these countries had not yet signed theRSA, the IAEA responded immediately to re-quests for technical assistance in order to addresssome of the most pressing problems.

Types of assistance. Assistance is providedmainly through three components that supportthe establishment or upgrading of nuclear tech-niques and facilities: experts, equipment, andtraining, which includes fellowships, scientificvisits, and training courses. A particularly impor-tant area is the provision of support to set up orimprove regulatory practices and radiation safetyinfrastructures as a prerequisite for assistance incertain fields of activity.

Since 1970 — when the NPT came into force— more than 17,000 scientists and specialists fromdeveloping countries have been awarded fellow-ships or scientific visits and more than 18,600 par-ticipants have attended training courses. Nearly30,000 experts have been assigned to assist nu-clear-related development in countries worldwide.Project equipment and materials valued at morethan US $290 million have been delivered overthis time period.

Funding and resources. While the costs ofadministration and related support for technical



co-operation projects is fully borne by the IAEAregular budget, the technical assistance actuallyprovided to countries comes from voluntary con-tributions that States directly make through theIAEA or the United Nations Development Pro-gramme (UNDP). About 75% of total resourcesin recent years has come from the IAEA's Tech-nical Assistance and Co-operation Fund(TACF), whose annual target is set by theIAEA's governing bodies. Since 1971, the targethas been increasing, reaching US $58.5 millionin 1994. While all IAEA Member States areencouraged to share in the fund's financing, notall of them do so. Other sources of financialsupport include extrabudgetary income, whichdonor States contribute for specific projects; as-sistance-in-kind, whereby States provide expertservices, donate equipment, or arrange fellow-ships on a cost-free basis; and UNDP funds, forthose UNDP projects involving nuclear scienceand technology.

Since 1970, total new resources available to theIAEA's technical co-operation programme havegrown from about US $4 million in 1970 to morethan $53 million in 1994. (See graph, page 4.)

Technical co-operation and NPT member-ship. In the preparation of the technical co-opera-tion programme, the IAEA does not differentiatebetween States on the basis of their NPT status.Projects are assessed exclusively in terms oftechnical and practical feasibility, national de-velopment priorities, and long-term advantagesto end users.

In practice, the proportion of disbursementsfrom the TACF to non-NPT States has remainedrelatively constant over the years, fluctuating be-tween 16% and 20%. The distribution of theIAEA's Research Contracts evidences similartrends. The situation for sound projects that re-quire additional funding outside the TACF(known as " footnote a" projects) is quite differ-ent. In this case, donor countries have shown aclear preference for financing projects in coun-tries that are parties to the NPT. For non-NPTcountries, the proportion of such disbursementsfluctuates between 2% and 5%. (See graphs.)

Trends and challenges

In terms of overall economic development,and particularly concerning the stage of nucleardevelopment, there are significant differencesamong developing countries. Seventeen of the32 States operating or constructing nuclearpower plants are developing countries. Some ofthem also possess nuclear fuel cycle technologyand facilities, including such sophisticated tech-niques as uranium enrichment, reactor fuel fabri-

Disbursements from the IAEA's Technical Assistanceand Co-operation Fund

30

25

I I NPT parties • Non-NPT parties

1985 86 87 88 89 90Year

92 93 94

Disbursements from extrabudgetary contributions for IAEAtechnical co-operation projects

• NPT parties Non-NPT parties

1985 86 93 94

cation, spent fuel reprocessing, and heavy waterproduction. Some of these countries are alreadyexporting certain nuclear technologies and mate-rials and are providing bilateral assistance toother States in research, development, and appli-cation of nuclear technologies.

Concerning other applications, 38 develop-ing countries operate 85 research reactors ofvarious types and capacities. Nuclear scientificand technological infrastructures have beenformed around these facilities, enabling thesecountries to conduct basic and applied researchand development, radioisotope and radiophar-maceutical production, and other research-re-lated activities. Most developing countries havegained experience in the application of isotopesand radiation in many fields, including agricul-ture, medicine, industry, and hydrology, andmany may be relatively advanced in them. At thesame time, there are States, particularly amongthe least developed countries, where nuclear ac-tivities consist mainly in the introduction of lim-ited nuclear techniques and related training.

In terms of supplying technical assistance tosuch a diverse range of countries, one noticeable

Technicalassistance andNPT membership



trend is that end users are being more clearlydefined and targeted. Whereas techniques oncewere transferred to specialist groups working atresearch establishments of national atomic en-ergy commissions, the training and equipmentfor specific technologies today are increasinglybeing delivered more directly. For example, hos-pital staff are the end users of nuclear medicaldiagnostic techniques, and professionals at watermanagement institutions are the end users forapplications of isotopes in hydrology.

Another trend is the increasing contributionof developing countries to regional IAEA techni-cal co-operation activities, both as hosts for train-ing courses and as providers of experts. Threeregional co-operative agreements now are inplace, for Africa, Latin America, and SoutheastAsia and the Pacific. Regional membership hasgrown steadily and today 54 IAEA MemberStates are participating in these agreements.More than 30 multi-year regional projects are inoperation, and about 40 regional training activi-ties are carried out each year.

A third trend is the growing share of techni-cal co-operation funds for projects in areas ofradioactive waste management, radiation protec-tion, and safety of nuclear installations. This re-flects the needs and interests of many developingcountries. The radiation safety situation, for ex-ample, still needs improvement in many devel-oping countries. In more than a third of theIAEA's Member States, the existing controlmechanisms for radiation safety are deemed in-adequate. A few countries have yet to establishthe appropriate infrastructure. In light of the situ-ation, and the continuing rapid growth in theapplication of nuclear techniques, the IAEA hasinitiated steps to strengthen its assistance in areasof radiation safety. In its planning over the me-dium term, the IAEA further has given highpriority to areas of nuclear safety, radiation pro-tection, and waste management.

Fourth, the IAEA is seeing increasing re-quests for technical assistance of an advancedand more complex nature. In some measure, thisdevelopment reflects the effectiveness of pastsupport. Many developing countries that havereceived IAEA technical assistance have reachedhigh levels of sophistication in the application ofnuclear techniques. They now are seeking sup-port for larger projects — for example, the estab-lishment of a radioisotope production facility,research reactor and/or cyclotron, the treatmentand storage of radioactive wastes, or the eradica-tion of agricultural pests. Such projects will re-quire long-term commitments and, in manycases, complementary bilateral co-operation.

Also worth noting in this connection is thedifferent types of problems countries are facing,

particularly newly independent States of the for-mer Soviet Union. Many of these countries, forexample, face major problems arising from pre-vious programmes in nuclear power and nuclear-related applications. Technical assistance isneeded to replace defunct infrastructures, estab-lish regulatory bodies, train personnel, and sup-port implementation of remedial measures to up-grade nuclear facilities to modern operationaland safety standards while bringing environ-mental problems under control. As a basis forthese activities, the countries need to establishinternationally proven regulatory practices, andthey need to prepare for decommissioning ofsome nuclear facilities. Several initiatives havebeen undertaken by international organizationsincluding the IAEA to address these problems, butmore needs to be accomplished.

Strengthening transfer of technology

Since most of the IAEA's Member Statesalso are parties to the NPT, they understandablyshare some common interests and requirementsthat are specifically reflected in the IAEA's me-dium-term plans and biennial programmes.These plans and programmes take into accountpresent and expected developments in the peace-ful uses of atomic energy.

One important development is the world'sgrowing population, which in turn will influencedemands for more energy, particularly electricity.As there is no global intergovernmental energyorganization, the IAEA will stimulate and, wherenecessary, co-ordinate international efforts re-quired to assess the benefits and problems of vari-ous power options, including nuclear energy.

When considering the IAEA's role in con-tributing to the transfer of nuclear power andrelated activities, it should be recognized that thenuclear industry has made great progress in com-mercializing many technologies and that newsuppliers have appeared on the market, some ofthem developing countries. The IAEA's futurerole should be to find more ways of supportingand assisting buyers and to remove obstacles tofree choice. The IAEA's traditional function ofproviding a forum for information exchange inthis area also may expand if demand for nuclearpower increases and if this increase is followedby expanded development programmes in thefield of power reactor technology and design.Additionally, the IAEA should be ready to re-spond to requests for assistance from develop-ing countries that are considering the nuclearoption, particularly concerning the trainingand development of the necessary humanresources.



The world's people, most of whom live indeveloping countries, also need greatly increasedsupplies of food and fresh water, better healthcare, and greater access to industrial goods. Nu-clear methods that can lead to improvements inthe production and preservation of food, inhealth care, in industrial production, and in theprovision of water supplies are increasing innumber. They are often competitive with othermethods — indeed in some cases they are theonly methods available. The scope for the ex-change of experience in using nuclear methodsand in transferring them to developing countriesis therefore expanding. Non-power applicationsof nuclear energy will remain the area of technol-ogy transfer of greatest interest for most devel-oping countries.

The IAEA's task in the medium term willalmost invariably be to create or strengthen capa-bilities at the national level, primarily through itstechnical co-operation programme. Achievingthis goal will require greater precision in identi-fying those areas where assistance will have themost impact. Special emphasis is being placedon projects that are in line with national develop-ment plans, are of a practical nature, are orientedtowards specific end users, and are intended tohave a significant impact on the country's overalldevelopment. Projects that combine all of thesefeatures have been identified as "model pro-jects" and are intended to serve as beacons forthe direction in which the IAEA's technical co-operation programme is moving.

On the basis of its assessments, the IAEA hasformulated a number of overall objectives for itsactivities over the medium term. One objective isto enhance the transfer of nuclear technology andknow-how to developing countries, and morespecifically to:• ensure, through increased interaction with re-

sponsible governmental authorities, that theAgency's technology-transfer activities are inline with national development plans. Theaim of IAEA assistance will be to strengthenthe relevant national infrastructures so thatthey become self-supporting. Development ofhuman resources, quality control services, andmaintenance of nuclear instrumentation will re-ceive more attention under this strategy;

• help establish and strengthen national nuclearsafety, radiation protection, and waste manage-ment systems as a prerequisite for the develop-ment of nuclear energy programmes, mainlythrough the provision of training and advice;

• give priority to provision of assistance inthe transfer of technology to areas involv-ing basic human needs, such as food andwater resources, health, and energy supply,and to the transfer of techniques contributing

to environmental protection and sustainabledevelopment;

• promote only those nuclear techniques in de-veloping countries which have a clear advan-tage over other techniques, and to this end,compare nuclear and non-nuclear techniques,taking into account the conditions prevailingin the recipient countries;

• co-operate with relevant international organi-zations in establishing appropriate databasesand systematically analyzing the economic,health, environmental, and climatic impactsof various energy options; in particular tocontribute analyses and data concerning nu-clear power to such studies and to make theresults of this work widely available to ex-perts in IAEA Member States;

• promote the exchange of information and in-ternational discussions with interested Mem-ber States, and such parties as the World As-sociation of Nuclear Operators and interna-tional financial institutions, with the aim ofdeveloping new schemes for financing, con-structing, and operating nuclear power plantsin developing countries;

• perform global analyses and strategic studiesof selected aspects of nuclear power and thefuel cycle, including assurance of supply.Another objective is to assist countries in

achieving and maintaining a high level of nuclearsafety worldwide and minimizing the environ-mental impact of all types of peaceful nuclearactivities and applications. More specifically,this entails activities to:• provide international leadership and assis-

tance to national nuclear safety authorities,especially to governmental nuclear regulatorybodies, with a view to detecting and correct-ing safety deficiencies in operating nuclearfacilities and to preventing accidents.

• support the efforts of international and na-tional bodies in reaching a consensus onsafety principles for the design of future nu-clear power plants;

• take the lead in developing an internationaltechnical consensus on the acceptability ofmethods for the management and disposal ofnuclear waste of all kinds, and to help gainpublic confidence in these matters;

• provide expanded international guidance andassistance to national nuclear safety authori-ties to ensure the safety of research reactors,spent fuel management facilities, and installa-tions using radiation sources, with special at-tention to large research reactors and irradia-tion facilities;

• establish a harmonized international ap-proach to all aspects of nuclear safety, includingthe incorporation of recommendations of the



Pledges and income compared with target contributions to theTechnical Assistance and Co-operation Fund by year.

115

105

Pledge Income

TARGET=100%

US$Million

^ | 1970 1975

Non-Zero intercept

1980 1985Year

1990 1994

Patterns ofpledges and

income for theIAEA's Technical

Assistance and

Internationa! Commission on RadiologicalProtection into the IAEA's standards andguides.

Co-operation Fund Financing the needs

What does this changing pattern and redirec-tion of technical co-operation activities mean interms of funding? Surprisingly, the additionalresources required are remarkably small in rela-tion to the importance and magnitude of the tasksahead. Most of the resources could be obtainedfrom fuller contributions to the IAEA's Techni-cal Assistance and Co-operation Fund.

Over the past 5 years, available funds for theIAEA's technical co-operation programme, interms of delivery of services, have fluctuatedaround a rather constant value of about US $40million per year. At the same time, however,there has been a negative trend since 1984 in thereceipt of financial resources, both with respectto pledged contributions and the actual incomereceived to meet the target amount for the TACF.Pledges and payments started to decline after1984, reaching a level of 71.3% of the targetedamount in 1992. The drop in total income waseven more marked with a low of 65.1% of thetarget being registered in 1992. (See graph.) Thistrend has affected the past delivery of services. Infact, over the 1987-94 period, between 6% and20% of the approved IAEA technical co-operationprogramme could not be funded or implemented.

If projected into the IAEA's next programmecycle for 1995-96, the present gap between theTACF target and actual income would amount toabout US $ 13-20 million per year. Consequently,if the pledges and payments were made accord-ing to their designated shares and targetedamount, most of the IAEA's approved technical

co-operation programme for the 1995-96 periodcould be funded.

Bridging technological gaps

As this overview shows, the IAEA under-takes a multitude of activities in line with ArticleIV of the NPT that have substantially contributedto the peaceful use of nuclear energy in develop-ing countries. In fact, for most of these countries,IAEA-supported projects have provided the keyinputs for building the national infrastructuresrequired for the introduction of nuclear tech-niques in the areas of basic human needs, rangingfrom food production and water supplies to pub-lic health and safety.

Over the course of the years, basic policiesand mechanisms for the transfer of nuclear tech-nology to developing countries have evolvedenabling the IAEA to efficiently provide varioustypes of support. In particular, it is worth notingthat the transfer of technology and techniqueshas always ranked highly among the main objec-tives of the IAEA, which also include the estab-lishment of health and safety standards, and thedevelopment and implementation of safeguards.They further extend to such matters as, for exam-ple, the establishment of guidelines and an inter-national convention relating to the physical pro-tection of nuclear materials. As a result, there hasbeen a growth of resources and an extensiveinvolvement of the IAEA's overall efforts intechnology-transfer activities, both under thetechnical co-operation programme and throughactivities of IAEA technical departments.

Moreover, the IAEA has a well-establishedmechanism for considering policy matters, as-surances against nuclear proliferation, and safetyand operational issues related to technical co-op-eration. This process involves the participationof the IAEA's policy-making organs and a num-ber of advisory and technical committees andgroups. By these means, the IAEA can identify,generally in good time, the modifications andtechnical adjustments necessary to maintain theefficiency and quality of its assistance.

At the same time, it is recognized that there isplenty of scope for improvement of technology-transfer activities that contribute to bridging thetechnological gap between industrialized and de-veloping countries. In view of its structure, experi-ence, and control mechanisms against nuclear pro-liferation, the IAEA provides a unique opportunityfor all NPT parties — and in particular for the mosttechnologically advanced of these States — to con-tribute to the further development and utilization ofnuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as envisagedunder Article IV of the NPT. •

8 IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995


continued from page 2This report examines the IAEA's relation-

ship to Articles of the NPT which are fundamentalto the Treaty's non-proliferation, arms control, anddisarmament provisions. As such, it looks closely atthe role and development of the IAEA's nu-clear safeguards and verification system.*

Safeguards and the NPT

If the IAEA Statute provides the basicauthority for the application of safeguards andprovides a framework for such application, legalobligations to invoke safeguards are found else-where, i.e. in instruments through which Statesmake a legally binding commitment not tomanufacture or acquire nuclear weapons and toaccept verification of their compliance with suchundertakings. The first such undertaking wasmade in a regional context through the 1967Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons inLatin America (The Treaty of Tlatelolco).

However, the entry into force of the NPT in1970 was a watershed. Firstly, the Treaty was —and remains — the first global nuclear non-pro-liferation Treaty. Secondly, and stemming fromthis, the Treaty assigns to the IAEA the respon-sibility for verifying, at the global level, throughits safeguards system, that non-nuclear weaponStales fulfil their obligations not to use theirpeaceful nuclear activities to develop any nu-clear explosive devices of any kind. In the firstyears of its existence, the IAEA's technicalmeans of helping to further the non-proliferationobjective — its safeguards — applied only tonuclear plants and fuel which countries obtainedfrom abroad, and then only if the supplier in-sisted on them. For the rest, the country con-cerned was free either to make its own unsafe-guarded plant or fuel and/or to buy them fromless demanding suppliers.

The NPT's entry into force marked a new de-parture in that non-nuclear-weapon States Party tothe new, global instrument were — and are —obliged to conclude a "full-scope" or comprehen-sive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Underthis type of agreement, safeguards are applied to allsource or special fissionable material in all peace-

*Othcr reports in this edition of the IAEA Bulletin, beginningon pages 3 and 21, focus on IAEA technical co-operation andArticle IV of the NPT. Additionally. Article V of the NPTaddresses the dissemination, through appropriate interna-tional procedures, of the potential benefits from any peacefulapplications of nuclear explosions (PNEs). The IAEA isgenerally seen as the appropriate body in this connection.However, the potential for safe and peaceful applications ofnuclear explosions has not been demonstrated and the IAEAis not currently engaged in activities related to PNEs.

ful nuclear activities within the territory of theState, under its jurisdiction, or carried out underits control anywhere. NPT safeguards have fo-cused on nuclear material because, from the out-set, efforts to combat proliferation were based onthe premise that the greatest challenge was theacquisition of weapons-usable material, whetherhighly enriched uranium or plutonium.

Following the NPT's entry into force, theIAEA Board of Governors established a safe-guards committee to advise it on the contents ofsafeguards agreements to be concluded withnon-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty.The committee developed a document entitled"The Structure and Content of Agreements Be-tween the Agency and States Required in Con-nection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons". The IAEA Board of Gov-ernors approved this document in 1972, request-ing the Director General to use it as a basis fornegotiating safeguards agreements under theNPT. The document was published by the IAEAas INFCIRC/153 (Corrected). It has also servedas a basis for the structure and content of othercomprehensive safeguards agreements. Addi-tionally, while the five nuclear-weapon StatesParty to the NPT are not obliged to conclude asafeguards agreement with the IAEA, each ofthem has voluntarily accepted the application ofIAEA safeguards to all or part of their peacefulnuclear activities along the lines ofINFCIRC/153 (Corrected).

Rights and obligations. The conclusion ofan NPT safeguards agreement between a Stateand the IAEA entails, sequentially, negotiationbetween the IAEA and the State on a draft text(usually straightforward because NPT safe-guards agreements follow the standardINFCIRC/153 model); the approval of the draftagreement by the IAEA Board of Governors;signature of the text by the Agency's DirectorGeneral and by the State's representative; andthe registration of the agreement, when it hasentered into force, with the United Nations.Agreements set out the Parties' basic rights andobligations relevant to the application of safe-guards. These include the State's basic non-pro-liferation undertaking to be verified throughsafeguards application; its obligation to maintaina system of accounting and control for all nuclearmaterial subject to safeguards; and an obligationto provide the IAEA with all information rele-vant to the application of safeguards. The agree-ments also include the IAEA's right and obliga-tion to verify a State's compliance with its basicundertaking and, in so doing, to avoid hamperinga State's economic and technological develop-ment. The IAEA is also required to protect suchof the State's commercial, industrial, and other



Total number of States withsafeguards agreement in forceTotal number of States withNPT safeguards agreement inforce'Total number of safeguardsagreements in forceTotal number of NPT safe-guards agreements in force

1975

64

46

106

46

1980

86

69

139

65

1985

96

78

163

74

1990

104

86

177

81

1994

118

102

199

94

' The number o! NPT safeguards agreements in force differs from the number of States havingNPT safeguards agreements in force because in some cases one agreement can apply to morethan one State (e.g. Euratom agreement).

States having NPTand other types of

safeguardsagreements in

force with the IAEA

confidential information that becomes known toit in the course of safeguards implementation.

Detailed safeguards implementation proce-dures are set out in the " subsidiary arrangements"which are tailored specifically to the requirementsof the facilities to be safeguarded. These technicaldocuments — concluded between the IAEA andthe State Party simultaneously with, or subsequentto the conclusion of, a safeguards agreement — aretreated as confidential and are normally accessi-ble only to the IAEA and to the State Party.

A basis for nuclear transparency

NPT safeguards are a form of institutional-ized nuclear transparency through which theIAEA can provide assurance to the internationalcommunity that a State's nuclear activities arebeing used exclusively for peaceful purposes.Thus, through the assurance given, safeguardspromote confidence among States and help tostrengthen their collective security. Safeguardsare a technical means of assuring a political end.

The technical objectives of NPT safeguardsare that the IAEA be able to detect, in a timelymanner, a diversion of one significant quantity(SQ) of nuclear material from a State's peacefulnuclear activities and to ensure that all nuclearmaterial subject to safeguards in the State isdeclared to the Agency. What constitutes a "sig-nificant quantity" is determined by the approxi-mate quantity of any given type of nuclear mate-rial which, taking into account any conversionprocess involved, would be required for themanufacture of a nuclear explosive device. The"timely detection" of diversion refers to themaximum timeframe (determined by the "con-version time" required to convert different typesof nuclear material into components of a nuclearexplosive device) within which the IAEA seeksto detect any diversion from peaceful use.

Safeguards — with their main componentparts of nuclear material accounting, contain-ment and surveillance measures (i.e. the applica-tion of cameras and seals), and on-site inspection— are essentially an audit system. In keepingwith all modern audit practices, they can provideopinions or conclusions but cannot "certify"compliance or predict a State's future intentions.Nor is the IAEA safeguards inspectorate a kindof nuclear police force with enforcement powers.

Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, theIAEA has been able to provide a high level ofassurance of the non-diversion of nuclear materialwhich has been placed under safeguards and toidentify cases where safeguards obligations are notbeing met. At previous NPT conferences, it hasbeen noted with satisfaction that, in carrying out itssafeguards activities under the Treaty, the IAEAhas not detected any diversion of a significantamount of safeguarded nuclear material frompeaceful uses. NPT Parties have also affirmed theirdetermination further to strengthen barriers againstnuclear weapons proliferation and have urgedthe IAEA to take full advantage of its rightsunder safeguards agreements.

All this notwithstanding, major develop-ments have taken place since 1990. They havehighlighted the need to strengthen traditionalapproaches to NPT safeguards implementa-tion; changed the political expectations of thesafeguards system; led to measures designed tomeet those new expectations; and have re-sulted in new kinds of verification functionsfor the IAEA.

Responding to rising expectations

Iraq's violations of its comprehensive safe-guards agreement with the IAEA and of its NPTobligations revealed with painful clarity that al-though the safeguards system remained effectivewith regard to declared nuclear activities, it wasnot effectively equipped to detect undeclaredactivities — primarily because the system suf-fered from a shortage of information about anysuch activities. With the discovery of Iraq's clan-destine enrichment and nuclear weapons pro-grammes, it became very clear that, to work trulyeffectively, the safeguards system needed to beequipped not only to verify declared nuclearactivities in a credible manner but also, to theextent possible, to provide assurance about theabsence of undeclared activities: hence, the ef-forts that the IAEA has since been making — andcontinues to make — to strengthen safeguardsthrough new measures focusing on access to in-formation; to sites: and to the United NationsSecurity Council.



Access to information. The rationale under-lying measures seeking to improve the IAEA'saccess to information is that, the more that isknown about a country's nuclear activities, themore comprehensive the analysis and verifica-tion can be and the greater the degree of assur-ance that can be provided about non-diversionand about the absence of undeclared activities.The starting point is increased provision of infor-mation by the State itself supplemented by infor-mation that the IAEA obtains during its verifica-tion activities and other information available toit from other sources. For example, following thecase of Iraq, information about the design ofnuclear facilities must now be forwarded to theIAEA much earlier than hitherto to enable theAgency to have sufficient time in which to sat-isfy itself that such facilities are only for peacefuluse and also to facilitate safeguards implementa-tion. Additionally, a reporting scheme has beeninitiated, over and above the reporting require-ments in NPT safeguards agreements, for exportsand imports of nuclear material and specifiednon-nuclear material and equipment. This is toenable the IAEA to assess whether import andexport patterns are consistent with other infor-mation available to it about States' nuclear pro-grammes. Efforts are also under way to strengthenand develop the IAEA's information database byincluding within it all available informationwhether derived from open source literature; ob-tained through the Agency's verification activities;provided to the Agency by governments; or ob-tained elsewhere e.g. through commercial satel-lites. Measures to enhance the IAEA's analyticalcapabilities are also being taken.

Access to sites. Under comprehensive safe-guards agreements, inspector access to carry outroutine inspections is limited to "strategicpoints" in declared facilities, such points beingthose to which access is necessary for the imple-mentation of safeguards measures. The Iraq ex-perience showed that access limited in this wayis insufficient to enable the detection of unde-clared activities. Therefore in February 1992, theIAEA Board of Governors affirmed the IAEA'sright, as provided for in safeguards agreements,to conduct "special inspections". In the courseof these inspections, the IAEA has the right tohave access, in keeping with the terms of therelevant safeguards agreement, to the additionalinformation and locations it deems necessary forthe fulfillment of its obligations under that agree-ment. Improved access is also being soughtthrough encouraging States to make voluntaryoffers of access " any time, any place" to nuclearrelated activities.

Access to the UN Security Council. Accessto the United Nations Security Council is of

particular importance when access either to in-formation, sites, or both is not forthcoming. Un-der the IAEA Statute and in safeguards agree-ments, the Agency is obliged to report cases ofnon-compliance with safeguards obligations tothe Security Council. It is then for the Council todecide what action to take. The cases of Iraq andof the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK) each elicited different responses fromthe Council. In terms of the IAEA's responsibil-ity for implementing NPT safeguards, however,the case of the DPRK serves to illustrate theefficacy of some of the measures already taken,since Iraq, to strengthen the safeguards system.

Ongoing development of safeguards. Theprocess of strengthening, and otherwise improv-ing safeguards, was given further impetus by thereport, submitted to the IAEA Director Generalin April 1993 by the Standing Advisory Groupon Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), con-taining recommendations for making safeguardsmore effective and more cost-efficient. Follow-ing consideration of the report by the IAEABoard of Governors, "Programme 93+2" hasbeen established. Its goal is to present to theBoard of Governors in March 1995, i.e. just priorto the 1995 NPT Conference, proposals for amore effective and efficient safeguards systemwith an accompanying evaluation of the techni-cal, legal, and financial implications. It is possi-ble to view the proposals now being developedin terms of clusters relating to the main areas ofreform already undertaken. Thus, they centre onadditional measures to strengthen the IAEA'saccess to information and to sites, and they alsocover proposals for administrative streamlining.(See the article beginning on page 14.)

Support from NPT Conferences. It will beimportant for the 1995 NPT Conference to supportand endorse what the IAEA is seeking to achievethrough its safeguards strengthening measures.Previous NPT conferences have expressed or reaf-firmed the conviction that safeguards play a keyrole in preventing proliferation and have com-mended the IAEA for the way in which safeguardsimplementation has been carried out in accordancewith the principles of the Treaty and the moredetailed provisions of NPT safeguards agree-ments, including the obligations upon the IAEAto respect the interests of the State.

The conferences have also welcomed the sig-nificant contributions made by States Party to theTreaty in facilitating application of safeguardsand have recognized the critical importance ofStates continuing their political, technical, andfinancial support for the safeguards system. Suchcontinuing support will be vital. Safeguardspractices, procedures, and implementation haveevolved progressively since the NPT entered into

IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995 11


force. The post-Gulf War discoveries of clandes-tine enrichment and nuclear weapons pro-grammes in Iraq were a turning point. Providingassurance through effective safeguards that de-clared nuclear material is not diverted will con-tinue to be the major part of safeguards work.

However, the efforts focusing on strengthen-ing the IAEA's ability to detect the existence ofundeclared nuclear material and facilities arebased on the realization that the safeguards sys-tem as it used to be practiced is not enough today.The ultimate success of the collective endeav-ours to strengthen safeguards will depend essen-tially upon the extent to which parties to the NPTare prepared to grant the IAEA the necessaryauthority, co-operation, and resources.

Disarmament and related provisions

Articles VI and VII of the NPT are unlike itsArticle III in that neither of them invest the IAEAwith specific responsibility for their implementa-tion. Indeed, in this respect the onus under Arti-cle VI falls squarely upon the States Parties.

Under Article VI of the Treaty, "Each of theParties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue nego-tiations in good faith on effective measures relat-ing to cessation of the nuclear arms race at anearly date and to nuclear disarmament, and on atreaty on general and complete disarmament un-der strict and effective international control."

Article VII of the Treaty does not impose anyobligation upon States but notes that, lookingtowards the cessation of the nuclear arms raceand nuclear disarmament foreshadowed in Arti-cle VI. "Nothing in this Treaty affects the rightof any group of States to conclude regional trea-ties in order to assure the total absence of nuclearweapons in their respective territories."

It is generally recognized that responsibilityfor implementing Article VI of the NPT fallslargely to its Parties that are nuclear-weaponStates. They have been criticized at previousNPT conferences for insufficient efforts, eitherquantitavely or qualitatively, to stem what isgenerally called "vertical" proliferation.

However, there is no doubt that substantialprogress has been made towards achieving thegoals of Article VI since the end of the Cold War.In the present global detente, the major militarypowers are helping to settle regional conflictsrather than competing in them. Substantial cutshave been made in nuclear arsenals and others —particularly under the START II Treaty — are inprospect. Initiatives have also been taken, andothers may follow, to submit to IAEA safeguardsnuclear weapons material which is deemed to beexcess to defense requirements. In 1993 the UN

General Assembly adopted, without a vote, aresolution calling for the negotiation of a "cut-off" agreement which would ban the productionof fissionable material for weapons purposes.

The nuclear-weapon States Party to the NPTcould make what might be a critical contributionto the prospects of NPT extension by agreeingon, or being party to substantial progress to-wards, a comprehensive nuclear test ban and/oron a cut-off of the production of fissionable ma-terial for weapons purposes. Success in each re-gard does not depend solely on NPT parties thatare nuclear-weapon States because other States— some of which have not acceded to the NPT— are also involved. However, to the extent thatnuclear weapons States continue to emphasizethe importance of nuclear assets to national secu-rity, it is not unreasonable to deduce that thethinking of others could be coloured similarly —in the same way that progress towards nucleardisarmament can reinforce commitment to non-proliferation.

Comprehensive test ban. The measurewhich most NPT parties have put at the top of thearms control agenda for decades — especially atNPT Review Conferences — is a Comprehen-sive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is nowbeing negotiated at the Conference on Disarma-ment in Geneva. The choice of organization toverify compliance with an eventual CTBT willbe a matter for the parties to that Treaty. How-ever, the IAEA has a broad base of experiencewith and expertise in many of the administrativeand technical issues arising in the context of aCTBT. Moreover, there is a good deal of overlapbetween the NPT and a CTBT. Non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT are already defacto parties to a CTBT in that they are prohib-ited from testing any nuclear explosive devices.Such devices cannot be manufactured withoutfissionable material. IAEA safeguards are ap-plied to all source or fissionable material in allpeaceful nuclear activities in a non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, and shouldthus be able to detect any diversion of materialfor the purposes of testing. Violations of a CTBT

— as with violations of safeguards obligations— are likely to involve recourse to the UnitedNations Security Council.

Cut-off agreement. A cut-off in the produc-tion of fissionable material for weapons purposesdoes not in itself seem to be unrealistic. There isalready concern about how to deal with the surplusdirect-use material which will result from the nu-clear disarmament accords already negotiated. Acut-off is also relevant to Article VI of the NPT.

Currently, there is no agreement on an appro-priate negotiating mandate for a cut-off. If agree-ment is reached in the future, however, verifica-



tion of a cut-off would be consistent with theIAEA's mandate and with its NPT safeguardsresponsibilities in NPT non-nuclear-weaponStates. Additionally, a non-discriminatory cut-off agreement of the kind foreshadowed by the1993 UN General Assembly resolution wouldmost logically include placing under effectiveinternational verification, all enrichment and re-processing plants in NPT nuclear-weapon Statesand those in the " threshold States" which are notparty to the Treaty. Taking all these factors intoaccount, it is difficult to see any verificationoption other than through IAEA safeguards; adifferent solution would entail for some new oralternative mechanism — a major and verycostly assignment, not least because verificationat enrichment and reprocessing plants is ex-tremely labour intensive. (See related article onthe cut-off agreement, beginning on page 49.)

Under the nuclear disarmament accords al-ready negotiated or in prospect, verification ofthe actual dismantling of nuclear weapons willhave to fall to the military/industrial sectors.However, IAEA safeguards — and perhaps, spe-cial additional controls administered by theIAEA — can be used to verify the peaceful useor storage of fissionable material derived fromsuch dismantling. Indeed, the United States hasalready unilaterally submitted some of its direct-use material, deemed excess to its defense re-quirements, to IAEA safeguards under its "vol-untary offer" safeguards agreement pursuant tothe NPT. Such measures — and others devisedfor the same purpose — are also consistent withArticle VI of the NPT. Through them, the IAEAcan provide credible assurance to the interna-tional community that the material in questiondoes not find its way into new weapons.

Regional non-proliferation arrangements.Article VII of the NPT reflects the significanceof regional non-proliferation arrangements as ameans through which confidence in and betweenStates of a specific region can be established andnurtured, thereby complementing the global ar-rangements enshrined in the NPT itself.

The Treaty-based nuclear-weapon free zones(NWFZs) already established or in prospect pro-vide for verification arrangements closely linkedwith safeguards implementation pursuant to theNPT. For example, the safeguards agreementswhich States Parties to the Rarotonga Treaty (inthe South Pacific) must conclude with the IAEA" shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope andeffect to, an agreement required in connectionwith the NPT on the basis of the materials repro-duced in document INFCIRC/153(Corr.) of theIAEA". Moreover, most safeguards agreementsbetween the IAEA and the States party to theTreaty of Tlatelolco (in Latin America and the

Caribbean) have been concluded in connectionboth with the Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT.Parties to future NWFZs will no doubt also de-velop specific verification scenarios based ontheir own regional requirements.

As more States become parties to different non-proliferation initiatives, the complementarity be-tween regional nuclear verification arrangementsand the global system which the IAEA implementscould open up further possibilities for effective andcost-efficient verification of compliance with non-proliferation undertakings. In this respect, a bind-ing commitment by the relevant States to keepAfrica nuclear-weapon-free is now a realistic pros-pect, and a draft Treaty, now being negotiated,assigns to the IAEA the responsibility for verifyingcompliance. In the Middle East, the creation of anNWFZ is likely to come about only in the contextof an overall peace settlement. However, there isalready agreement among Middle East States aboutthe potential value of such a zone in their region.There is also recognition of the ability of the IAEAto provide effective verification. Because of theparticular characteristics of the political situation inthe Middle East, however, arrangements for verifi-cation of compliance with a future NWFZ there arelikely to be more far-reaching than those generallycarried out by the IAEA. Parties to a future MiddleEast NWFZ might therefore consider it necessaryto put additional, more intrusive verification ar-rangements in place.

An evolutionary process

In sum, global efforts to prevent the spread ofnuclear weapons, and to reduce existing stockpilesof such weapons, have evolved progressively overthe past 25 years in the light of specific political andtechnological developments. Key factors, duringthe 1990s, have been the end of the Cold War withall the accompanying geo-political obligations.Thus, the 1990s have highlighted the need for ap-propriate responses to new challenges and for moreeffective nuclear verification.

Response mechanisms include efforts to morefully utilize, and where appropriate strengthen, thesafeguards capabilities of the IAEA, which hasspecific verification responsibilities under the NPTand which may be called upon to exercise newfunctions in years to come. Important steps havealready been taken to strengthen IAEA safeguards,but much remains to be done. The success of theseefforts ultimately will depend on the extent towhich States, especially those Party to the NPT, areprepared to grant the IAEA the requisite author-ity, co-operation, and resources to help themmeet the challenges ahead. •


FEATURES

IAEA safeguards in the 1990s:Building from experience

A key element of the NPT, the IAEA's verification systemwill be enhanced to strengthen its efficiency and effectiveness

by BrunoPellaud and

Richard Hooper

hen Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolif-eration of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) meet in NewYork beginning in April 1995 to decide theTreaty's future, one point of focus will be theIAEA's nuclear safeguards and verification sys-tem, the world's first on-site international in-spectorate. Among its provisions, the Treaty re-quires each State Party to conclude a comprehen-sive safeguards agreement with the IAEA cover-ing all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclearactivities within the State.

Since the NPT came into force in 1970, theIAEA has been applying safeguards under" NPT-type" agreements in a growing number ofcountries. Today, most of the IAEA's safeguardsagreements are of this type, making the outcomeof the NPT Review and Extension Conference ofmajor importance to the IAEA and the interna-tional community.

Throughout the 1990s, extensive efforts havebeen directed at reinforcing elements of theIAEA's safeguards system. During 1991-93, forexample, the IAEA Board of Governors con-firmed the right of the Agency to use specialinspections; took decisions regarding the earlyprovision and use of design information of facili-ties under construction or undergoing changes;and endorsed a reporting scheme on imports andexports of nuclear material and exports of speci-fied equipment and non-nuclear material.

The case of Iraq underscored the importanceof following up these initial steps. During 1992,the IAEA carried out technical studies of specificareas of safeguards application that might beimproved, and to identify mechanisms and ac-tivities through which improvements could beachieved. In July 1993. the IAEA launched aprogramme — known as " Programme 93+2" —to develop a solid proposal for a strengthened

Mr. Pellaud is Deputy Director General of the IAEA Depart-ment of Safeguards and Mr. Hooper is Director of the Depart-ment's Division of Concepts and Planning.

and more cost-effective safeguards system. Asintended, the proposal is being submitted to theIAEA Board of Governors in March 1995, inadvance of the NPT Conference itself.

This article summarizes major elements ofthat proposal, while allowing for an overviewand an assessment of possible trade-offs and syn-ergies in what should be a comprehensive andintegrated approach for strengthening safeguardsand improving their cost-effectiveness. Imple-mentation of the overall approach will, of neces-sity, be incremental over time.

Main areas of emphasis

Ideas and proposals in "Programme 93+2"are broad in scope and diverse in nature. Theydeal with both declared and undeclared nuclearactivities. They include possible new measuresfor strengthening safeguards; further efficienciesin how current safeguards activities are carriedout; and alternative procedures and techniquesthat may be more effective in carrying out safe-guards or that maintain the effectiveness of safe-guards but require less effort and lower cost.*

Three main areas of reform are tackled:Access to information. Measures already

taken in this area in recent years are early provi-sion of design information on declared facilities;greater use of data on nuclear activities that areavailable publicly, in-house or otherwise; andthe reporting scheme on export and import ofnuclear material, non-nuclear material, andspecified equipment.

The major new elements contemplated forthis area are:

*Effectiveness reflects the extent to which IAEA verificationsachieve non-proliferation objectives. Efficiency reflects theproductivity of IAEA safeguards, i.e. how well availableresources (staff, equipment, money) are used to fulfil statedobjectives.


FEATURES

• broader information on States' nuclear activi-ties, resulting in greater nuclear transparency;and

• the use of environmental monitoringtechniques.Access to sites and the effectiveness of the

access. Measures already taken are the IAEABoard's expressed positions regarding specialinspections; and voluntary offers by some gov-ernments to accept Agency visits" any time, anyplace".

New developments may comprise proposalsregarding:• routine access at nuclear-related sites beyond

" strategic points";• expanded right to prompt access on short no-

tice or no notice; and• "managed access" to sensitive sites under a

scheme of expanded access.Rationalization and administrative

streamlining. Measures already taken includethe expanded regional use of the IAEA's twosafeguards offices in Toronto and Tokyo; thepartnership agreement with the Euratom Inspec-torate; and the proposal for simplified designa-tion procedures for inspectors.

Further measures might be:• greater use of unattended, remote readout

equipment in lieu of some inspections;• additional regional safeguards offices to save

travel costs and facilitate short notice/no no-tice safeguards;

• multiple-entry visas for inspectors;• expanded capability for inspectors to freely

communicate with headquarters;• retraining of inspectors; and• joint use of equipment and laboratories by the

IAEA and State Systems of Accountancy forand Control (SSAC) of nuclear materials.

Access to information

Expanded declaration. Currently, the Statesubmits a declaration covering only nuclear ma-terials, associated processes (to the extent thatprocess-related information is needed to safe-guard the nuclear material), and nuclear facilitiescontaining or expected to contain declared nu-clear material within a State's territory or underits jurisdiction or control. A broader declarationis considered in "Programme 93+2". This decla-ration, in combination with certain verificationactivities, would make a State's nuclear fuel cy-cle and associated activities more " transparent"."Transparency" would result from a high levelof co-operation between the State and the IAEA.

A broader or expanded declaration of aState's nuclear activities should provide — in

addition to information on all nuclear material —information on all other nuclear and nuclear-re-lated activities of the State. This informationwould include a description and the location ofall nuclear-related processes; production; re-search and development; and training. In addi-tion, the industrial, commercial, and military in-stallations in close proximity to nuclear installa-tions would be identified in the expanded decla-ration. Within the scope of "Programme 93+2",a model expanded declaration is evolving in thecourse of field trials being hosted by a number ofStates.

Information sources. Effective verificationdepends on the availability of reliable informa-tion about nuclear activities in the countries be-ing inspected. Information could come fromIAEA databases and from open sources, e.g. me-dia reports and scientific publications. Internalsources comprise safeguards inspection data; in-formation received on imports and exports ofnuclear material and exports of specified equip-ment and non-nuclear material; and the ex-panded declaration referred to above. Regardingopen sources, the IAEA has established a com-puterized system for storage and retrieval ofsafeguards-relevant information. The system in-corporates selected information from existingIAEA databases on power reactors, research re-actors, and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It alsocontains a broad spectrum of information onStates' nuclear regulations, energy requirements,production and resources, nuclear and nuclear-related programmes, international co-operation,and companies, firms, and organizations work-ing in the nuclear field. The system also consid-ers public commercial information on nuclearmaterial, technologies, facilities, and equipment,including dual-use items.

Environmental monitoring. Environ-mental monitoring techniques could cruciallyenhance the IAEA's ability to detect undeclarednuclear activities. Therefore, "Programme93+2" devotes much attention to this promisingavenue. Through field trials in 11 countries(among those having invited the IAEA for thatpurpose) during 1993-94, substantive progresshas been made in:• evaluating the practicality, effectiveness, and

cost of the use of environmental monitoringunder a range of representative conditions;

• establishing and documenting environmentalsignatures associated with a variety of nuclearactivities (with an emphasis on uranium en-richment, reactor, and reprocessing opera-tions) at both long and short range;

• establishing and documenting sample collec-tion and analytical procedures and qualitycontrol requirements; and


FEATURES

• establishing a "clean room" sample handlingand screening capability at the IAEA'sSeibersdorf Laboratories*; extending the ex-isting network of analytical laboratories toinclude the capabilities for the analysis ofenvironmental samples; and establishing cer-tification requirements for laboratories addedto the network.Any production or manufacturing process

loses some small fraction of the process materi-als to the immediate environment. The extent ofthe losses depends on a wide variety of thingsincluding ihc nature of the process, the material,the control measures to limit losses, and the mi-gration of losses beyond the immediate environ-ment. The processing of nuclear materials is noexception, and even though losses are limited toa level well below that of health and environ-mental concerns, they inevitably occur. Still, nu-clear materials have specific physical properties(e.g., radioactivity) that make it possible to detectand characterize extremely small quantities. Thiscapability — together with the possibility thatspecific signatures can be unambiguously corre-lated with specific nuclear processes — is whyenvironmental monitoring is seen as havingpromise with respect to the detection of unde-clared activities. The goal of the environmentalmonitoring field trials is to demonstrate and,where possible, calibrate the utilization of thesemethods for safeguards application.

Typical sample media are swipe samplesfrom inside and outside buildings, vegetationand soil samples, and hydrological samples (grabwater, high-volume water, sediments, and biota).In field trials under " Programme 93+2". the em-phasis was on short-range monitoring; that is,most samples were collected in the immediatevicinity of nuclear facilities. Currently plannedfield trials do not foresee the collection andevaluation of high-volume air samples or thesampling for gaseous effluents.

As part of the field trials, a sample distribu-tion and reporting protocol has been developedto protect the identity of the samples. All samplesdistributed to the expanded network of laborato-ries are c"oded in a way that does not permittracing of the original sampling point. The sam-ples from the field trials carried out so far havebeen distributed to specialized laboratories inseveral IAEA Member States, including Austra-lia. Canada. Finland. Hungary, the Russian Fed-eration. United Kingdom, and United States.IAEA Member States hosting environmental

*See "Environmental monitoring and safeguards: Reinforc-ing analytical capabilities", by David Donohue. Stein Deron.and Ere in Kuhn in the IAEA Bulletin. Vol. 36. No. 3 (1994).

monitoring field trials have been invited to par-ticipate in the analysis of parallel samples.

The results for some field trials have beenreviewed with representatives of the respectiveMember States. Some findings can be reportedhere:

Field trial in Sweden. In mid-September1993. water, sediment, and biota samples werecollected in Sweden's coastal waters in the vicin-ity of five nuclear facilities. A total of 30 loca-tions were selected for sampling. The samplinglocations were chosen to extend from the outfallof each facility to 20-30 kilometers in each direc-tion along the coast. Results from the trialshowed that the nuclear operations in this coastalarea can be detected in water and sediment sam-ples up to 20 kilometers from the facility depend-ing on local transport and mixing conditions.Nuclear reactor operations could be detected bythe presence of activation products. A minutequantity of plutonium (-10 grams/liter) iso-lated from a high-volume water sample takennear a research facility showed high burn-upisotopes consistent with spent fuel charac-terization studies being conducted there. Sedi-ments from other locations showed only falloutplutonium and were clearly distinct from thosecollected in the vicinity of the facility.

Field trial in South Africa. In early 1994, anextensive environmental sampling field trial wascarried out at the Pelindaba site in South Africa.During this trial, soil, vegetation, and hydrologi-cal samples were collected in and near the facili-ties. Swipe samples were taken inside and out-side the main process buildings of the shut-downprototype enrichment facility (which earlier pro-duced highly enriched uranium), from the semi-commercial low enrichment facility, and fromrelated process buildings. The various types ofvegetation collected showed, at very low levels,evidence of uranium enrichment activities. Theswipe samples gave clear signatures of the ura-nium enrichment processes and enrichment lev-els. In particular, the results obtained on smallparticles showed comparable distributions inuranium-235 enrichments in samples from theprocess area, auxiliary rooms, and outside thebuildings.

Field trial in Australia. In April 1994. envi-ronmental samples were collected at the Austra-lian Nuclear Science and Technology Organiza-tion's Lucas Heights Research Laboratories inAustralia as part of a field trial. Swipes taken inlaboratories related to the production of the ra-dioisotope molybdenum-99 gave clear indica-tions of the different target materials used and ofthe resulting irradiation products. Swipes fromlaboratories involved in metallurgical workshowed uranium-235 signatures of the different


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types of source materials processed. Swipes col-lected in a building that housed R&D installa-tions for centrifuge enrichment dismantled 14years ago clearly revealed the presence of suchactivities.

Field trial in Argentina. Results are avail-able for swipe and vegetation samples taken inMay 1994 during a sampling field trial in andaround the Pilcaniyeu enrichment plant in Ar-gentina. During this field trial, the followingsamples were taken: soil and vegetation samplesat nine locations; water, sediment, and biota sam-ples from a river up- and downstream of thefacility: and swipes in five locations inside proc-ess and general purpose buildings. Results fromparticle analyses on swipes, vegetation, and soilsamples clearly showed the presence of depleted,natural, and low-enriched uranium consistentwith the operation of the facility.

The findings based on these results are con-sistent with the activities declared by the Statesfor these facilities. The results from environ-mental monitoring field trials show that thesetechniques constitute a powerful tool to confirmdeclared activities or to detect the presence ofundeclared nuclear activities. It should be notedthat the sampling methods have proven effective

Scenes from field trials of environmental monitoringactivities for safeguards purposes. Trials have beenconducted in co-operation with a number of States,including Sweden, Argentina, Australia, and South

Afr ica. (Credits: D. Beals; E. Kuhn. IAEA)


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in preventing cross-contamination of the sam-ples. Furthermore, the analytical techniquesavailable in the expanded network of laborato-ries have demonstrated their capability to carryout extremely low-level radiochemical and iso-topic measurements. Data reported by laborato-ries from the analysis of splits from the samesamples are consistent and the results from"bulk" or whole analyses of samples are alsoconsistent with the particle results from the samesamples. The consistency between the resultsfrom "bulk" sample analyses and the more de-tailed particle analyses is important. It indicatesthat "bulk" analyses can be effectively used toscreen samples before committing to the moredetailed and expensive particle level analysis.

Proliferation critical path and associatedrules. As more information becomes availablefor systematic analysis, the IAEA should be inthe position to find out at an early stage anyinstance in which the State's nuclear activitiesbecome inconsistent with the State's declaration.With expert assistance from several of its Mem-ber States, the IAEA is developing a prolifera-tion critical path — which is designed to includeall known pathways for the production of weap-ons-usable material and subsequent weaponiza-tion — to structure both the requirements forinformation and for analysis. The path can berepresented graphically as a series of increas-ingly specific and detailed levels of all processesfor the production of weapons-usable materialand weaponization. The first and top level con-tains the main steps, e.g., enrichment, reprocess-ing, etc. Each block in this level is broken downinto more specific routes or processes. For exam-ple, the enrichment block is broken down intonine possible processes (gas centrifuge, electro-magnetic, aerodynamic, gaseous diffusion, mo-lecular laser, atomic vapour laser, plasma separa-tion, chemical exchange, and ion exchange),which form in this case the second level of theproliferation critical path model.

Each process is then characterized by indica-tors which would be associated with the exist-ence or devejopment of the process, such as spe-cialized equipment, dual-use equipment, nuclearand non-nuclear materials, training, and environ-mental signatures. These indicators represent thethird level of the proliferation critical path. As anexample, some of the indicators related to gase-ous diffusion enrichment would be diffusion bar-riers, gas blowers, uranium hexafluoride. chlo-rine trifluoride. fluorinated compounds and heatreleases in the environment, and large powerlines. The weaponization-related activities,which appear in the top level, comprise suchprocesses as the production of tritium, enrichedlithium and alpha-emitting radionuclides. and the

procurement of high technology equipment suchas X-ray flash photography.

With the help of experts, the proliferationcritical path is being formulated as logically con-nected "if-then" rules. The primary purpose ofthis formulation is to recognize and place infor-mation (e.g., export data) in the appropriateplace(s) of the critical path structure. The criticalpath takes into account the possibility that any ofthe pathways to weaponization might be short-ened through external procurement (e.g., pro-curement of source material, uraniumhexafluoride (UF6), enriched uranium, etc.).

Access to sites

Inspector access has been a key issue sincethe beginning of safeguards. For routine inspec-tions under a comprehensive safeguards agree-ment, access is provided to specific points (called"strategic points") deemed necessary to enablethe IAEA to meet its safeguards obligations re-lated to material accountancy. Wider access is akey for a strengthened safeguards system. Itwould represent an improvement over the cur-rent practice with respect to increased assuranceregarding the absence of undeclared nuclear ac-tivities.

Increased physical access is being assessed inthe field trials to a number of different types oflocations. Firstly, there is access beyond the" strategic points" in safeguarded facilities to anylocation on the facility site. Secondly, there isaccess to locations included in the expanded dec-laration which do not contain nuclear material, orcontain only small amounts exempted from safe-guards, but which contain or have contained nu-clear-related activities. These first two types oflocations include all nuclear and nuclear-relatedlocations identified in the expanded declaration.Thirdly, as an important contribution to in-creased co-operation and transparency, the Statewould seek to facilitate access to other locationson the expanded declaration, i.e. industrial, com-mercial, or military installations in the immedi-ate vicinity of nuclear installations. Finally, thereis access to locations other than those identifiedin the expanded declaration; the request for ac-cess would be prompted by specific informationor by the need to implement a technical measure,e.g. environmental monitoring.

A concept somewhat similar to that of "man-aged access" in the Chemical Weapons Conven-tion is also being tested. This would allow IAEAaccess to sensitive locations while recognizingthe State's right to protect sensitive information.Measures such as shrouding of equipment, dials,and electronic systems are included.


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For effectiveness, this broader access beinginvestigated in the field trials should to the extentpossible be without prior notice to the State. "'Nonotice" is taken to mean no advance notificationregarding the timing, activities, or locations of aninspection. In practice this means that the State isinformed of the IAEA's intention to performsuch an inspection when its inspector arrives atthe entrance to the site in question. A require-ment for the effective implementation of suchno-notice inspections is that States require novisas, or grant multiple-entry visas, for IAEAinspectors while on inspections.

An issue closely related to the "notice" is thetime taken, from arrival at the site, to get to thespecific location to be inspected. In most circum-stances this time period is not critical. There aresome circumstances, however, in which theIAEA may need to reach a location quickly inorder to meet its objectives. In testing the proce-dures for these circumstances, a maximum timeof two hours was used as a target in most trials.

Rational use of resources

Cost analysis of present safeguards. " Pro-gramme 93+2" includes an assessment of thecosts of implementing safeguards as a functionof the magnitude of the technical safeguards pa-rameters (timeliness, significant quantities orSQ, and probabilities of detection). The specificimplementation costs associated with currentvalues of these parameters and the cost sensitiv-ity to changes in the values have been deter-mined. A reasonable range in the value of eachparameter has been defined for this cost assess-ment. In parallel to these studies, the technicalcases are being considered for changes in theseparameters, e.g., for changing the timeliness goalfor metallic plutonium/highly enriched uraniumand for changing the conversion time/timelinessgoal for depleted, natural, and low-enriched ura-nium. The financial aspects, as well as the inher-ent technical merits, are being addressed.

Potential cost savings. The programme alsodeals with the identification and evaluation of anumber of technical and administrative measuresthat have the potential to reduce costs associatedwith the current implementation of safeguards.

Major cost sectors associated with the imple-mentation of safeguards, and thus the areas tar-geted for potential cost savings, are staff, equip-ment, and travel. As the number of facilities andthe quantities of nuclear material under IAEAsafeguards continue to increase, reduction intrained staff is not realistic. However, more effi-cient use of staff and travel resources may beachieved through use of modern technology.

through economies in the way safeguards opera-tions are carried out, b> enlarging existing fieldoffices or establishing new ones, and throughefficient use of office automation equipment.Cost savings in the equipment sector may beachieved through greater standardization and bysharing with the operator the use and costs ofequipment and analytical services. Two exam-ples may be illustrative:

Equipment in unattended mode. The use ofadvanced technology, assay, and monitoringequipment that can be operated in an unattendedmode offers the possibility of reducing the physi-cal presence of inspectors in facilities. As a re-sult, reductions can be realized in terms of in-spection effort; the radiation exposure of inspec-tors; and the level of intrusiveness of inspectionsin the daily routine of the operator. Examples ofsuch cases include the use of bundle counters,core discharge monitors, video surveillance, asystem known as Consulha (Containment andSurveillance for La Hague), and non-destructivemeasurements at mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabri-cation facilities. Other cases where similar meas-ures might be applied include the verification ofinter-bay transfers of spent fuel in on-load reac-tors; verification of transfers of spent fuel todry-storage canisters; verification of receipts, stor-age, and shipments of nuclear material at MOX fuelfabrication facilities; verification of feed to andproduction from enrichment plants; and tankmonitoring and sampling at reprocessing plants.

Mail-in of data. Safeguards criteria presentlyrequire periodic verification of inventories ofsafeguarded nuclear material. In the majority ofcases, the nuclear material, e.g. spent fuel, is keptunder containment and surveillance. Routine in-spections for timeliness are made to service thesurveillance equipment; replace/verify seals; orretrieve non-destructive data collected over a pe-riod of time. Transmission of the safeguards datathrough mail-in by the SSAC/operator, or byremote transmission, offers possible reduction inthe number of interim inspections and, hence,savings in inspection effort.

In 1992-93, the IAEA, through establishedsafeguards support programmes of Finland,Hungary, and Sweden, successfully conductedfield tests for SSAC mailing of surveillancevideo tapes to the IAEA for review and evalu-ation. In principle, this measure could be appliedin all situations where Agency cameras are in-stalled. Alternatively, the data could be retrievedelectronically through remote transmission. Inboth cases, new equipment is required to protectdata during transmission. Remote transmission isthe preferred means for transfer of data betweenfacilities and the IAEA or its field offices wher-ever, inter alia, modern telephone communica-


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tion systems exist. Where this is not the case, themail-in method can be used on an interim basis.

Increased co-operation with State Sys-tems. Co-operation between an SSAC and theIAEA is a necessary condition for achieving ef-fective safeguards implementation. Tradition-ally, the SSAC's role in such co-operation hasmostly been limited to the provision of informa-tion required under the safeguards agreementwith regard to inventories of nuclear material andtheir changes, the securing of access to facilitiesand to nuclear material, and the establishment of anaccountancy system at facility and State levels.

As previously noted, a high level of co-op-eration between the SSAC and the IAEA will beneeded to facilitate the measures implied by in-creased access and transparency. This co-opera-tion could also permit reductions in the costs forsafeguarding declared nuclear material, eventhough the IAEA would need to maintain its ownability to draw independent conclusions. The ex-perience gained in developing the New Partner-ship Approach with Euratom has been useful inthis regard. (See related article, beginning onpage 25.) A model pattern of increased co-opera-tion has been derived by identifying all candidateactivities which an SSAC could perform, eitherby itself or jointly with the IAEA, in order toincrease the efficiency of IAEA verification ac-tivities, and hence to reduce the IAEA's costs orthe extent of its activities. These candidate activi-ties are largely, but not entirely, related toinspections.

Finally, the issue of regional systems for ac-counting and control is being addressed. Thisincludes the examination of criteria that couldcharacterize a regional system in the contextof increased co-operation and from which theinternational community could derive non-pro-liferation assurance. On this basis, guidelines arebeing developed for assessing the degree towhich any particular system possesses these fea-tures. The features being considered include theexistence of a binding non-proliferation agree-ment between the States concerned: the technicaleffectiveness of the relevant system; the numberof States in the system: the independence of theStates within the system: the independence andtransparency of the system: and the legal powersof the system.

Cost savings in traditional safeguards ac-tivities. If an increased assurance about the ab-sence of undeclared activities were to beachieved through some strengthening measures,would it not be possible for elements of thepresent safeguards system (e.g. timeliness in-spections for irradiated fuel) to be done differ-ently, less often, or not at all? The cost savingsand impact on effectiveness of such approaches

indeed deserve serious consideration, since suchsavings could possibly absorb the cost of thestrengthening measures.

Approaches are being designed to be equallyapplicable in all States with comprehensive safe-guards agreements, in terms of generic facilitytypes or broad categories of nuclear material.Approaches are being tested in various field tri-als at light water reactors, fuel fabrication plants,irradiated fuel storage facilities, and research re-actors which address more cost-effective safe-guards on declared material and assurance re-garding undeclared activities. The activities andeffort required to achieve the same level of assur-ance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activi-ties may vary among States due to, for example,differences in their programmes.

Implementing the next steps

The findings of investigations carried out un-der " Programme 93+2" are being reported to theIAEA Board of Governors in March 1995. Thereport will combine into an integrated whole thestrengths of the present system and the enhance-ments brought by new techniques, new informa-tion gathering, and new administrative measures.It will further address the technical, legal, andfinancial implications.

In this context, it is important to keep in mindthat the fundamental legal document of NPTverification [INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)] wasdrafted in such a way as to leave to the IAEAInspectorate many of the details of safeguardsimplementation. To that extent, the drafters in-tentionally built into the related agreements acertain flexibility of interpretation. Accordingly,many measures thus far identified under the pro-gramme may be interpreted as falling within theIAEA's existing authority. Such should be thecase, for example, with the implementation ofshort-range environmental monitoring in the vi-cinity of locations declared by the State as con-taining nuclear material and nuclear activities, aswell as with most of the cost-reduction measuresoutlined here. •


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Atoms for peace: Extending thebenefits of nuclear technologies

Through IAEA-supported projects, beneficial nuclear technolo-gies are contributing to national development goals

r the past 40 years, a disease known asrinderpest, or "cattle plague", has been devas-tating for farmers in Africa, claiming the lives ofmillions of cattle and severely hurting farm pro-duction and income. Especially in the 1980s,serious outbreaks of rinderpest in livestock werereported throughout Africa.

Today, that picture has changed. Out of 18African countries where cattle once were infestedwith rinderpest, only two show signs of the diseasetoday. Instrumental to this remarkable turnabouthas been a Pan-African campaign that incorpo-rated the application of a new nuclear-based test-ing technique developed jointly by the IAEA, Foodand Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UnitedNations, and a laboratory in the United Kingdomin 1987. The application has radically increasedthe effectiveness of vaccination campaigns againstcattle plague, enabling African countries to de-clare themselves free of the disease. Veterinariansin these countries received support from the IAEA' stechnical co-operation programme and anFAOIIAEA co-ordinated research programme.They were supplied with necessary testing kits,equipment, training, and technical support to en-sure the correct use of the technique in nationalveterinary laboratories. Participating laboratoriesthroughout Africa now have acquired the expertiseand skills they need to carry out effective testing.

The project's success is leading to similarwork in other regions of the world. A globalrinderpest campaign has been launched with theaim of eradicating the disease over the next 20years. Under a 4-year IAEA technical co-opera-tion project, the techniques developed throughthe FAOIIAEA's work in Africa will be part ofefforts for rinderpest surveillance and control inWest Asia. Countries there currently are suffer-

Mr. Qian is Deputy Director General of the IAEA Departmentof Technical Co-operation and Mr. Rogov is a staff memberin the department.

ing millions of dollars in losses from animaldeaths. The IAEA regional project aims to helpthese countries eradicate rinderpest by the turnof the century.

The case of rinderpest is just one example ofhow international and national scientists areworking together to bring practical benefits topeople through technology-transfer projects sup-ported by the IAEA. In other fields as well —including medicine, environmental protection,and food preservation, forexample — nearly1300 IAEA-supported projects are making keycontributions around the world. This articlelooks at the kinds of projects co-operatively un-dertaken through IAEA mechanisms to extendthe reach of beneficial nuclear technologies inresponse in increasing demands for technicalsupport and assistance from its Member States.

Evolution of internationalnuclear co-operation

In the early 1950s, the international commu-nity was first becoming aware of the great oppor-tunities that peaceful applications of atomic en-ergy could offer for economic and social devel-opment. It was also becoming apparent that, formost countries, these opportunities could be ma-terialized in a most effective manner throughextensive and concerted international efforts.

In this environment, on 4 December 1954,the United Nations General Assembly unani-mously passed an "Atoms for Peace" resolutionexpressing the hope that an.international atomicenergy agency would be established without de-lay to facilitate the use by the entire world ofatomic energy for peaceful purposes, and to en-courage international co-operation in the furtherdevelopment and practical use of atomic energyfor the benefit of humanity.

At the time when the IAEA was establishedin 1957, only a limited number of countries had

byJihui Qian andAleksanderRogov


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People in manycountries around the

world are seeingbenefits of nuclear

technologies in theirlives, through

IAEA-supported projectsin fields of health care,

water management,agriculture, and

industry, for example.(Credits: J. Aranyossy and

V. Mouchkin. IAEA)

«*»•

knowledge and experience in nuclear research,and especially its practical application. At thefirst International Conference on the PeacefulUses of Atomic Energy, held in Geneva in Au-gust 1955 and attended by scientists and engi-neers from 73 countries, less than half of partici-pating States were able to present reports on nu-clear science or technology and only 12 of theseStates were from developing areas of the world.

In framing the IAEA's Statute, governmentssought to create an international institutionthrough which countries could receive multilat-eral technical assistance on peaceful nuclear re-search and applications. The Statute stipulates arange of conditions for countries to receive suchassistance. These include, inter alia, the useful-ness of the project, including its scientific andtechnical feasibility; the adequacy of plans,funds, and technical personnel to assure the ef-fective execution of the project; and the ade-quacy of proposed health and safety standardsfor handling and storing materials and for oper-ating facilities.

Back in 1957, however, the basis for techni-cal assistance activities was fairly weak. Thesphere of co-operation was relatively limitedcovering mainly nuclear power and aspects of itsfuel cycle, and to a certain extent some aspects ofradiation applications. Very few peaceful nu-clear technologies had reached the level of ma-turity which enabled them to be effectively usedfor practical applications. At that time as well,most developing countries were not yet at thestage where they could effectively apply nuclearscience and technology. It should also be notedthat, in the early years, none of the three partnersinvolved in the technical assistance process —i.e. donor countries, recipient countries, and theIAEA — had neither the required experience noradministrative arrangements for multilateral in-tergovernmental co-operation.

22

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Today, the situation is different. Most IAEAMember States from the developing world havegained knowledge and experience in many fields ofnuclear research and applications, mainly thoserelated to basic human needs. Mechanisms fortechnology transfer have been put into place, andtheir effectiveness is continually reviewed. IAEAactivities cover practically all areas of peacefulapplications of nuclear energy, and interest in re-ceiving technical assistance is growing.

Priorities and needs

What kinds of technical assistance are coun-tries receiving? In terms of total annual disburse-ments through the IAEA's technical co-opera-tion programme, the largest share is for projectsrelated to nuclear applications in food and agri-culture, which accounted for about 22% of dis-bursements in 1994. Nuclear-related methodsare widely used in developing countries in suchareas as plant breeding, soil fertility studies, in-sect and pest control, animal production andhealth, and studies of the fertilizer efficiency andthe fate of agrochemicals and residues. The tech-nology of food irradiation additionally is findingincreasing acceptance as an effective means ofprotecting agriculture products from spoilage,and as a method for controlling pathogens asso-ciated with serious food-borne diseases and formeeting the strict quarantine requirements of in-ternational food trade.

Another major area of interest is the use ofnuclear technologies in physical and chemicalsciences, and in fields of industry and earth sci-ence. This includes the utilization of researchreactors and particle accelerators for scientificstudies, production of isotopes; the application,maintenance and repair of nuclear instrumenta-tion; and the preparation and utilization of radio-pharmaceuticals. Over the 1990-94 period, theshare of total disbursements in this area haveranged between 18% and 25%.

Other areas showing high levels of interestare nuclear applications in industry and earthsciences — including non-destructive testing ofmaterials and products, radiation processing, anddevelopment of water resources, for example —and nuclear-related health care and treatment.Greater support, for instance, is being requestedin the use of nuclear techniques for the diagnosisof many diseases, such as leishmaniasis, Chagasdisease, iodine deficiencies, and sickle cell dis-eases. At the same time, the use of ionizingradiation to treat cancer is drawing more andmore interest. Currently the IAEA has 40 techni-cal co-operation projects associated with radio-therapy in 29 countries. Additionally, nuclear

methods and technologies are used for steriliza-tion of biological tissues and medical supplies,and for nutritional and health-related environ-mental studies.

An area of shifting demand is nuclear powerand safety. While nuclear power programmes inmany countries have been cut back or halted,there is increasing awareness of the needs fornuclear safety and radiation protection. Theshare of disbursements on nuclear power hasdropped from about 12% in the late 1980s to 6%in the 1990s, whereas the share for safety andradiation protection has grown. Projects beingsupported include those related to strengtheningnational infrastructures for radiation protection;occupational safety of radiation workers; safetyof nuclear installations; the safe management,storage, and disposal of radioactive wastes; andnuclear emergency planning and preparedness.

On average over the past 5 years, countrieshave received technical assistance from theIAEA valued at about US $40 million per yearthrough expert services, provision of equipment,and training activities. All told over the past 25years, the cumulative resources available to theIAEA's technical co-operation programmeamount to nearly US $690 million.

Realizing the benefits

As the rinderpest example illustrates, a num-ber of techniques developed and applied with theIAEA's assistance are significantly contributingto the solution of serious problems hamperingsocial and economic development. Some se-lected other cases may help to indicate the num-ber of different ways in which the IAEA's assis-tance can be applied.

Water resources. The assessment and de-velopment of water resources has been a majorarea of IAEA activity for more than 30 years.Nuclear and isotope techniques play a valuablerole in hydrological investigations. Under onecurrent project, in Venezuela, IAEA scientistsare helping local water authorities in Caracasstudy the potential of an aquifer to provide addi-tional water for residential, agricultural, and in-dustrial needs. A rapid increase in the populationof Caracas has led to a deficit of nearly 20% inthe water supply, and more water resources mustbe found. Studies will help Venezuelan authori-ties make decisions concerning the best use ofthe aquifer, and how to protect its water frompollution.

Animal health and productivity. Buffaloesand cattle in Asia are fed mainly with rice strawand native grasses. However, these materials arevery indigestible and have only limited amounts


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of the protein, energy, and minerals needed toprovide a balanced diet. Poor nutrition seriouslycompromises the ability of the animals to pro-duce meat and milk and to provide draughtpower. Through projects jointly supported by theIAEA and United Nations Development Pro-gramme (UNDP), assistance was provided toIndia and Indonesia in using isotopes for investi-gating the efficiency of the processes involved infeed digestion. As a result, the best combinationof local materials for supplementing grass orstraw was determined.

In both countries the effect of the introduc-tion of this feed supplementation method hasbeen very high. For example, in India the amountof milk collected by the largest milk co-operativein 1989 increased by 30%, and the price was 25%less than the price of producing milk by the othermethods of feed supplementation.

Quality control in industry. Non-destruc-tive testing (NDT) techniques are widely ap-plied in industry and manufacturing for qualitycontrol purposes. In Latin America and the Car-ibbean, an IAEA-supported NDT regional pro-ject involving 18 countries was conducted from1983-94. The overall objective was to assistthem in developing an autonomous capability forapplying NDT, largely by providing support inareas of training.

The evaluation review carried out by inde-pendent experts in 1994 showed that the projecthad been instrumental in providing the regionwith a significant technological tool for the ad-vancement of the region's industrialization. Thisenabled the development of local industries andthe displacement of NDT services previouslyprovided from outside the region. The projectmarked a significant change for the region's owntechnological development. In previous years,the input from experts from outside of the regionwas the dominant mode of dissemination ofNDT technology. This was often in the contextof regional courses, with typically one partici-pant from each project country. Gradually, thedominant mode changed from using external ex-perts to using regional experts and furtherevolved to* the use of national experts teachingcourses solely in their respective countries.

Health care. Nuclear and related techniquesplay an especially vital role in health care andtreatment. Among important diagnostic tools is atechnique known as radioimmunoassay. Withthe IAEA's support, more than 250 radioimmu-noassay laboratories have been established orupgraded in Africa, Asia, and Latin America,and supplied with reagents in bulk form. This hasallowed recipient countries to provide reason-able clinical diagnostic services covering impor-tant substances such as hormones, vitamins, en-

zymes and even some tumor markers. The costof each test is less than US 50 cents per patientsample, which on average is ten times less thanthe application of complete commercial kits. Insome countries, where some of the primary re-agents needed are being produced locally, thecost per test is significantly lower. More impor-tant than the lower cost is the fact that manypeople now have access to reliable diagnostictests that play a key role in the improvement oftheir health care and treatment.

Future directions

In its current and planned programmes, theIAEA is placing increasingly more emphasis oncost-effective projects that promise significantsocial and economic benefits, that have a lastingand environmentally sound impact on a coun-try's development, and that clearly demonstratethe value of nuclear applications for end users.The IAEA's Member States have strongly sup-ported this move towards impact-oriented tech-nical co-operation. At an IAEA Technical Co-operation Policy Review Seminar in September1994, for example, governmental representativesprovided the Agency with valuable recommen-dations regarding the practical implementationof projects important to them.

Undoubtedly the major challenge facing theIAEA's technical co-operation programme inyears ahead is the availability of sufficient finan-cial resources to effectively carry out approvedprojects. In terms of its funding base, the IAEAoccupies a place far behind large bilateral andmultilateral agencies. Even so, the trend in con-tributions to the IAEA's technical co-operationprogramme over the past 5 years has been nega-tive, and many sound projects have had to gounfunded. In response to the situation, the IAEAhas taken a number of administrative and pro-grammatic measures intended to stretch its lim-ited resources so as to obtain the best possibleresults.

These efforts are part of steps to improveprogramme efficiency, and to attract greater re-sources enabling the IAEA to enhance its supportfor technology-transfer activities that are notonly operationally sound but visibly effective.As the main channel for global nuclear co-opera-tion, the IAEA possesses an exceptionally highlevel of technical expertise and experience toidentify and carry out a multitude of projects thatcan make a lasting difference to a country's sus-tainable development. •


REGIONAL REPORTS

Safeguards in the European Union:The New Partnership Approach

The IAEA and Euratom are co-operatively applyingNPT-type safeguards in more cost-effective and efficient ways

N,luclear safeguards within Europe have longbeen applied jointly by the IAEA and the Euro-pean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).Over the years, arrangements have been progres-sively devised for common safeguards activitiesinvolving the staffs from the inspectorates ofboth organizations. These have included ar-rangements known as the "observation regime"and "joint team" inspections under which Eura-tom inspectors performed inspection activitiesunder the observation of IAEA inspectors orjointly with them, depending upon the types offacilities being inspected.

Today, a new approach is in place, followingcritical reviews of both the effectiveness andefficiency of the two former arrangements. A"New Partnership Approach" (NPA) betweenthe IAEA and Euratom was agreed in 1992 toimprove the working arrangements for the appli-cation of safeguards within the European Union.The NPA enables both the IAEA and Euratom tomeet responsibilities under comprehensive safe-guards agreements [those that States concludepursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT)] in a more effectiveand efficient manner.

This article highlights the circumstances sur-rounding the birth of the NPA and the status ofits implementation. It particularly looks at ele-ments of the NPA and practical arrangementsthat are being followed for specific types of nu-clear and related facilities. Since elements of theNPA have been put into practice, significant sav-ings have been realized in the allocation of safe-guards inspection resources for Euratom coun-tries, while ensuring effective verification.

Mr. Thorstensen is Director of the IAEA Department ofSafeguards' Division of Operations (C), and Mr. Chitumbois a Section Head in the Division. This article updates infor-mation presented in the authors' paper at the IAEA's Interna-tional Safeguards Symposium 1994, the proceedings ofwhich may be purchased from the IAEA.

Birth of the New Partnership Approach

In the early 1970s, shortly following theNPT's entry into force, the IAEA and Euratomnegotiated an agreement for the application ofsafeguards in the Community's non-nuclearweapon States party to the NPT. Some years ago,they devised the observation and joint-teamworking arrangements. However, these arrange-ments have required a higher level of inspectioneffort than desired and have resulted in unneces-sary duplication.

For example, a review of the inspections atfuel fabrication plants within Euratom — whichaccounted for 60% of Euratom/IAEA inspectionefforts under INFCIRC/193 (the Euratom/IAEAverification agreement) — illustrates the prob-lems. At two mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrica-tion plants, under the joint team approach, theIAEA required 650 and 400 person-days of in-spection (PDIs), and at a uranium fuel fabrica-tion plant, under the "observation" regime, theIAEA required 450 PDIs. (See graph, page 27.)Although these fuel fabrication plants are ex-treme cases, this level of IAEA inspection effortwas much higher than necessary for safeguard-ing such types of facilities.

Another example is the number of samplestaken, transported, and analyzed in the separatelaboratories of the two organizations. In 1990,the IAEA took more than 300 samples for analy-sis during inspections within Euratom, and itmay be assumed that the number taken by Eura-tom was at least equal to that taken by the IAEA.Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that morethan 600 samples were taken for analysis by theIAEA and Euratom, whereas only about half thistotal number was necessary.

The duplication of resources is not limited tothese examples. It also applies to areas such asresearch and development (R&D) and training.In most cases, the IAEA and Euratom are work-ing separately in the R&D field. For example,

by SvenThorstensen andKaluba Chitumbo


REGIONAL REPORTS

Facility type Number of facilities

Light-water reactors without mixed-oxide fuelLow-enriched uranium fuel fabrication plantsMixed-oxide fuel fabrication plantsStorage facilities with unirradiated plutoniumLight-water reactors with mixed-oxide fuelWet storage facilities of irradiated fuelEnrichment plantsDry storage facilities of irradiated fuelOther storage facilities (e.g. UF6 open air facilities)Research reactors and critical assembliesLocations outside facilities

404

346824

1246

128

Types of facilitiescovered by the

New PartnershipApproach

both were developing different video surveil-lance systems.

It was important to reverse this trend, so as togive effect to two of the basic tenets of theINFCIRC/193 agreement, namely, that the IAEAand Euratom should co-operate in implementingsafeguards and should avoid unnecessary duplica-tion of effort.

Developing the New Partnership Ap-proach. Under Article 25 of INFCIRC/193, theIAEA and Euratom established a Liaison Com-mittee which meets as a High Level and a LowerLevel Committee. A Working Group was estab-lished by the High Level Liaison Committee inSeptember 1991. Its task was to examine waysand means by which co-operation and co-ordina-tion between Euratom and the IAEA in the im-plementation of INFCIRC/193 could be en-hanced. The Working Group prepared two re-ports which were submitted to the High LevelLiaison Committee in April 1992. It recom-mended discontinuation of the existing observa-tion and joint team arrangements and the initia-tion of a partnership approach, which shouldallow both the IAEA and Euratom to meet theirresponsibilities under the NPT safeguards agree-ment in the. most effective and efficient manner.Furthermore, the Working Group recommendedimmediate discussions between the two organi-zations on implementation of the recommendedapproach.

On 28 April 1992, IAEA Director GeneralHans Blix and Euratom's Commissioner Car-doso e Cunha met in Brussels and endorsed theWorking Group's recommendations. To this ef-fect, they signed an agreement that provided thenecessary components of a New Partnership Ap-proach (NPA) which would lead to improve-ments in the working arrangements for the appli-cation of safeguards. A Technical Group (Eura-tom and IAEA) was established to work out

practical arrangements and this work has pro-ceeded since July 1992.

Euratom/IAEA Liaison Committee. TheApril 1992 NPA agreement also required there-evaluation of the role of the Liaison Commit-tee and its relationship to its subsidiary bodies.The procedures and working arrangements of theLiaison Committee established under Article 25of the Protocol to INFCIRC/193 have now beenrevised to ensure efficient and effective imple-mentation of safeguards in the non-nuclear-weapon States of Euratom. The arrangementswere agreed upon on 26 November 1993.

Elements of New Partnership Approach.Under the NPA, the IAEA can be cost-effectivewithout delegating the inspection activities andthe responsibilities essential to the fulfillment ofthe objectives of safeguards implementation.(The IAEA performs all the required activities tomeet its safeguards criteria and draws inde-pendent conclusions). This is consistent with theIAEA Director General's statement to the June1992 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors:"We assume that arrangements which would beexpressive of a genuine partnership would beacceptable to our membership, while arrange-ments which would be tantamount to a delega-tion of our safeguards tasks to our partners wouldnot be acceptable. For the Agency, the principalrequirement is that an equal partnership mustguarantee the Agency's access to all necessaryinformation and enable it to draw independentconclusions and obtain the necessary degree ofassurance and thus meet its own safeguardsgoals."

The new approach is based inter alia on op-timization of the necessary practical arrange-ments and the use of commonly agreed safe-guards approaches and inspection planning, pro-cedures, activities, instruments, methods, andtechniques.

Other elements of the NPA are:• increasing common use of technologies to re-

place, to the extent possible, the physical pres-ence of inspectors by appropriate equipment;

• performance of inspection activities on thebasis of the principle " one job, one person",supplemented by quality control measures toenable both organizations to satisfy their re-spective obligations to reach their own inde-pendent conclusions and required assurances;

• use of commonly shared analytical capabili-ties in order to reduce the number of samplesto be taken, transported, and analyzed;

• co-operation in research and developmentand in the training of inspectors with the aimof achieving a reduction of resources spent onboth sides and leading to commonly agreedproducts and procedures.


REGIONAL REPORTS

Examples of practical arrangements

Light-water reactors (LWRs) withoutmixed oxide fuel (MOX). A scheme for a part-nership approach for LWRs without MOX hasbeen agreed which allows both the IAEA andEuratom to meet their responsibilities underINFCIRC/193. The arrangements involve onephysical inventory verification (PIV), three in-termittent inspections (IRIs) at quarterly inter-vals for timeliness purposes, and necessary in-spections for verification of shipments of spentfuel. The quarterly IRIs can be arranged so thatthey can be performed in a technical and competentmanner by one inspector from either organizationor can be equally snared by the organizations.

Surveillance and containment measures withtamper indicating capabilities are used to assistthe IAEA to reach its independent conclusions.Euratom can install and remove the sealed sur-veillance units at interim inspections. Devicesthat indicate locations are fitted to the surveil-lance units to provide authentication of where theunits are installed and removed. Work is underway to develop a tamper indicating device forone system.

Reviews of the results of surveillance willcontinue to be performed by the IAEA and Eura-tom together in Luxembourg. Both Euratom andthe IAEA are making arrangements to acquirethe necessary implementation experience on se-lected LWRs without MOX. In parallel, prepara-tions for full implementation of the proposedarrangements are also under way.

Low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel fabri-cation plants. In LEU fuel fabrication plants, itwas agreed to perform one physical inventoryper year and a certain number of plant-specificinterim inspections. Provided that the inspec-tions and inspection activities are planned andstructured in such a way that the requirements ofthe IAEA are fulfilled, this number would notexceed five routine interim inspections per year.

The development of unattended mode ofmeasurements for LEU fuel assemblies is underdiscussion between Euratom and the IAEA. Thiswould enable 100% coverage of flow verifica-tion of fuel assemblies.

MOX fuel fabrication plants. In one MOXfuel fabrication facility, the continuous presenceof inspectors will be replaced by a presence offour to five days a month while meeting all therequirements for timely detection and flow veri-fication. This will be made possible through theuse of technologies to replace the physical pres-ence of inspectors by appropriate equipment. Areduction of PDIs from about 410 (in 1990-91)to 150 per year is foreseen when all the compo-nents are installed.

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

• 650

- Hi- S||;

- |||;

- ||;

- ||;

- SvJ

450

330300

MOX FFPt MOX FFP2

[^[j Joint team arrangement

Q Observation regime

• New Partnership Approach

LEUFFP LWRs without MOX

MOX = mixed oxide

FFP = fuel fabrication plant

LEU = low enriched uranium

LWR = light-water reactor

Savings under the NPA

The contribution of the NPA has been mainlydue to discontinuation, for practical purposes, ofthe observation and joint team regimes. Effortshave been directed to ensure that inspection ac-tivities are planned to cover only the require-ments of the safeguards criteria. The comparisonof PDIs between arrangements under the obser-vation/joint team arrangements and the NPA forselected facilities shows significant reductions.(See graph.)

Examples of how savings have beenachieved are as follows:• the frequency of inspections of small facilities

is limited to the requirements of the criteria;• the number of inspections in LEU fuel fabri-

cation plants is limited mainly to those re-quired to cover the requirements of the IAEAsafeguards criteria and one inspector is usedfor interim inspections. In one LEU fuel fab-rication plant in Germany, PDIs have beenreduced from 450 to 65 per year;

• the principle of "one job, one-person" is ef-fectively utilized (supplemented with qualitycontrol measures) at PIV inspections;

• the follow-up and balancing of mixes(FBOM) scheme at one MOX fabricationplant has been abandoned (the plant at presentis not fully operating). The FBOM schemerequired high inspection effort and was man-power intensive. As a result, the inspectioneffort requirements in PDIs have been re-duced from about 650 to 330 per year;

• normally one IAEA inspector is sent tb in-terim inspections at one MOX fuel fabricationplant (optimization of resources). The princi-ple of " one job, one person" can be effec-tively utilized, supplemented with quality

Comparative IAEAinspection effortunder the NPA andprevious regimesfor selectedfacilities


REGIONAL REPORTS

control measures. The inspection effort inPDIs has been reduced from about 410 (in1990-91) to 290 in 1993. Further reduction isexpected.Implementation of the NPA, coupled with

the shutdown of two large facilities, has led to asubstantial decrease in IAEA inspection effort inthe States in question. Previously, in 1990-91,the effort was approximately 3000 PDIs per year.This has decreased to about 1200 PDIs per year.In 1995, the remaining facility types are to bebrought under the new arrangements, and thereshould be further improvements in cost-effec-tiveness. The savings in inspection effort haveallowed the IAEA to direct resources to otherareas — for example, for safeguards activitiesinvolving the newly independent States of theformer Soviet Union. (See related article in thisedition, beginning on page 29.)

Selected cost-effective procedures that havebeen developed under the NPA now are beingtested for use in other settings through the fieldtrials of the IAEA's safeguards developmentprogramme (Programme 93+2). (See related ar-ticle in this edition, beginning on page 14.)

Practical arrangements for NPA supportactivities. Through the NPA, the IAEA and Eu-ratom also have agreed on arrangements for thefollowing support activities: optimization of thenecessary practical arrangements and the use ofcommonly agreed inspection instruments, meth-ods, and techniques; and the use of commonlyshared analysis capabilities to encourage co-op-eration in training, R&D, and the use of newtechnology.

Technical effectiveness and co-operation

The technical effectiveness of Euratom'ssystem and organization has enabled the transla-tion of the NPA elements into practical arrange-ments. The IAEA intends to continue to makeuse of Euratom's capabilities to develop and es-tablish optimal practical arrangements, therebyreducing inspection effort while performing ac-tivities required by the safeguards criteria anddrawing its independent conclusions.

The technical effectiveness of Euratom'ssystem can be illustrated by identifying some ofits key features.• Euratom has a fully established system and

organization based on more than 30 yearsexperience.

• Euratom carries out its functions through thecontinuous or intermittent presence of its in-spectors in facilities.

• The range of activities performed by Euratomincludes: inspections to cover physical verifi-

cation activities, flow verifications, verifica-tions at strategic points, and audit activities;destructive and non-destructive assay; estab-lishing historical measurement data; stratifi-cation and sampling plan preparation; mate-rial balance evaluation; application of con-tainment and surveillance systems; transmis-sion to the IAEA of reports (physical inven-tory listing, material balance report, inventorychange report); design information verifica-tion and re-examination; transmission of Eu-ratom's findings to the IAEA under Article 21of the Protocol to INFCIRC/193; and follow-up activities on anomalies and discrepancies

• discovered during inspections.• Other capabilities available in Euratom in-

clude: surveillance review station; seal verifi-cation; calibration of instruments; destructiveanalysis laboratories; computer services; re-search and development; and training.Impact of NPA on the operator of in-

spected facilities. The NPA bring a series ofbenefits to the operator of inspected facilities innon-nuclear-weapon States. They include:• less intrusion for the operator;• reduced time and effort spent by the operator

on safeguards activities and inspection;• common inspection procedures and arrange-

ments, thus minimizing conflicting demandsby the two inspectorates;

• improved planning, thanks to the advancedtransmittal of precise information on pro-gramme activities (production, campaigns,shipments, receipts, etc.) by the operator; theinspectorates thus can better plan effectiveand efficient safeguards activities and inspec-tion scheduling;

• increased co-operation with the operator,which could reduce the presence of inspectorsat the facility.Could elements in the IAEA's New Partner-

ship Approach with Euratom be extended toother areas? It would be possible, as long as thenecessary technical capabilities exist to enablethe IAEA to make use of and maintain inde-pendent conclusions. The IAEA's present activi-ties for improving the overall effectiveness andefficiency of its safeguards system provide anopportunity for such an assessment. •


REGIONAL REPORTS

Nuclear material accounting andcontrol: Co-ordinating assistance

to newly independent States

An overview of IAEA-supported activities to help former Sovietrepublics establish State systems of accounting and control

Nluclear trade and co-operation among Statesare essentially dependent upon effective andcredible safeguards. The disintegration of theformer Soviet Union has resulted, inter alia, inthe emergence of a number of newly independentStates (NIS). Many of them have nuclear pro-grammes. However, the nuclear infrastructure onwhich those programmes once rested is no longerin place and needs to be reconstructed..

The application of IAEA safeguards dependsfor its effectiveness largely on the extent towhich governments ensure that operators keepaccurate, precise and complete records; promptlysend the IAEA the required reports; employ reli-able and accurate equipment for measurementand analysis; take inventories of nuclear materialat the prescribed intervals; and determine, at eachinventory taking, the amount of nuclear materialunaccounted for.

In safeguards agreements pursuant to theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPT), the State is required to establishand maintain a State System of Accounting andControl (SSAC) of nuclear material within itsterritory, jurisdiction or control. Many of the NIShave nuclear programmes that include uraniummining and refining, as well as other types ofnuclear activities. States in this category areArmenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Rus-sia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. (Seetable.)

This article outlines work under way amongthe IAEA, its Member States, and the NIS relat-

Mr. Thorstensen is Director of the Division of Operations (C)in the IAEA Department of Safeguards. This article updatesinformation presented in the author's paper at the IAEA'sInternational Safeguards Symposium 1994, proceedings ofwhich may be purchased from the IAEA.

ing to the establishment and development in theNIS of SSACs of nuclear material. It describesIAEA activities in the NIS, including fact-find-ing missions and technical visits, the successfulattempts to find donor States providing voluntaryfunding and expertise, and the co-ordination oftechnical support between the IAEA and the do-nor States.

IAEA activities in the NIS

The IAEA has a direct interest in mattersrelating to international safeguards and non-pro-liferation. To support NIS non-nuclear weaponStates in meeting national and international obli-gations, either assumed or in prospect, in thefield of nuclear non-proliferation, the IAEA em-barked in 1992 on a number of activities aimedat helping them to establish and/or further de-velop their SSACs.

As in many countries, SSACs are alsocharged with responsibilities in physical protec-tion, import/export control, and regulatory mat-ters. It became logical to incorporate these topicsin the support activities to SSACs for the NISwhere' such assistance would be required. In or-der to cover all of these topics, extensive supportfrom IAEA Member States (donor States) be-came essential.

The work consisted of and continues to con-sist of carrying out fact-finding missions/techni-cal visits; finding interested donor States; andco-ordinating technical support.

IAEA fact-finding missions/technical visits.Beginning in 1992, fact-finding missions havebeen carried out in many NIS. In 1992, they werecarried out in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.In 1993, such missions took place in Armenia,Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, andUzbekistan. Further missions to Azerbaijan,


by SvenThorstensen

29

REGIONAL REPORTS

Nuclear facilities in the newly independent states IAEA fact-finding missions and technicalvisits to newly independent States

ArmeniaBelarus

Estonia

Georgia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Latvia

LithuaniaTajikistan

Ukraine

Uzbekistan

Two WWER nuclear power reactors

Critical assemblies (2)Fresh and spent fuel storageUranium ore refining plant(Two training reactors)Two research reactors (IRT, TTR)R&D facilityCritical assemblyFast-breeder reactor (BN-350)Four research reactors (WWR, pulse graphite, IWG,RA)Low-enriched uranium fuel fabricationR&D facilityCritical assemblyUranium mining, ore refining plantsUranium mining plantsResearch reactor (IRT)Critical assemblyTwo RBMK nuclear power reactorsUranium mining and refining plantsFour RBMK reactors (separate SF storage)16 WWER reactorsTwo research reactors (WWR, training)R&D facilityCritical assemblyUranium ore refining plantTwo research reactors (WWR, pulse type)Several mining and refining plants

Note: All newly independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, with the exception of theRussian Federation which is a declared nuclear-weapon State, have stated their intention eitherto become or to remain non-nuclear-weapon States. Thirteen of these States — Armenia,Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan — are Parties to the NPT Moldova and Turkmenistanhave no known nuclear programmes. The facility in Ukraine identified above as an R&D facilityhas several significant quantities (SQ) of highly enriched uranium

-» ~-:-4 V

\ ~

ArmeniaAzerbaijanBelarusEstoniaGeorgiaKazakhstanKyrgyzstan

LatviaLithuaniaTajikistanUkraineUzbekistan

Fact-finding missions/technical visits

3Planned in 199541

Planned in 19958111

Planned in 1995132

Georgia, and Tajikistan are planned for 1995.(See table.) The objectives of these missionshave been, inter alia, to inquire about the timingof likely accession to the NPT and acceptance oftechnical visits to prepare for the NPT; identifyrelevant contact persons and organizations; andidentify and list needs as regards co-ordinatedtechnical support plans for each individual NIS.

In 1993 and 1994, technical visits were con-ducted to most major facilities in Armenia, Be-larus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Theobjectives of these visits were to obtain informa-tion about the operator's nuclear material flows,quantities, categories, and measurement system;further define lists of needs (i.e. requirementsrelated to non-proliferation) for co-ordinatedtechnical support; identify safeguards equipmentrequirements; and demonstrate the verificationof nuclear material and equipment used.

Technical discussions and demonstrationsalso took place. These visits have been a valuablemeans of supplying the basic information neededfor the IAEA Department of Safeguards to initi-ate preparations for implementing safeguards inthe respective countries, and to familiarize therelevant State and facility officials with theIAEA's procedures and requirements.

Those facilities which may become subject tosafeguards have been identified and associatedinformation concerning nuclear material flowquantities and categories has been obtained. Onthe basis of this information, safeguards equip-

Many of the newly independent States have nuclearprogrammes that include uranium mining and refining.Shown here is uranium mining in Uzbekistan.(Credit K Bergman, IAEA)


REGIONAL REPORTS

Selected training events in newly independent States

Event

SSAC Seminar

Safeguards Seminar

Safeguards SeminarTraining Course onPhysical ProtectionTraining Course on theImplementation of SSACsSeminar on the Organizationof SSACsNuclear Material Accountancyat WWERsSeminar on Nuclear Law

Seminar on the Accountingof Nuclear MaterialSafeguards for UraniumProcessing and Breeder ReactorsTraining Course on Fundamentalsof Material Accounting and Control

Workshop on Analysis Methodsfor SafeguardsPhysical Protection Seminar(Lithuania)Seminar on SafeguardsAccounting Data and Reporting

Location

Kiev, Ukraine

Stockholm, Sweden

Springfield and Dounreay, UKSanta Fe, New Mexico, USA

Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA

Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan

Paks, Hungary

Leiden, Netherlands

St. Petersburg, Russia

Springfield and Dounreay, UK

Ulba, Kazakhstan

Springfield, UK

Stockholm, Sweden

Vienna, Austria

Date

December 1992

March 1993

April 1993May 1993

May 1993

June 1993

November 1993

September 1993

October 1993

November 1993

September 1994

October 1994

October 1994

November 1994

Organizer

Ukrainian State Committeeon Nuclear and RadiationSafety and the IAEASwedish Nuclear PowerInspectorateUK Dept. of Trade and IndustryUS Department of Energy

US Support Programmeto the IAEAAtomic Energy Agencyof Kazakhstan and the IAEAHungarian and Swedish SupportProgrammes to the IAEAOECD Nuclear Energy Agencyand the IAEARussian Ministry of Atomic Energy

UK Dept. of Trade and Industry

US Department of Energy

UK Dept. of Trade and Industry

Swedish Nuclear PowerInspectorateIAEA

merit needs have been identified, budgeted for,and initial purchases made for longer lead timeitems. Estimates of the requirements for inspec-tion resources have been made based upon draftsafeguards approaches prepared or updated forall major NIS facility types.

In discussions with facility operators, IAEAinspection procedures have been reviewed in de-tail, the associated equipment demonstrated, andtechnical requirements documented for surveil-lance equipment installation. At some sites, thenuclear material measurement capabilities of thefacilities have been reviewed with IAEA expertsand compared with international standards tohelp define "equipment needs". Through theseinteractions, the needs of the individual State forassistance with infrastructure development andequipment have also been identified.

Discussions at all levels have also helped toidentify hardware and training needs in the basicSSAC infrastructure, including computers andsoftware for nuclear materials accounting, com-munication systems, and instrumentation usedby State inspectors. Consultations are continuingabout the legal aspects of the NPT and safe-

• guards agreements, and on facility design verifi-cation procedures.

Finding donor States. From the outset, theIAEA recognized that it could not complete thisextensive work alone and would have to relyheavily on voluntary funding and expertise fromits Member States. The IAEA consequentlycompiled and sent to potential donors the lists ofneeds, as discussed with the recipients. Beingaware that some countries had already initiatedsupport activities to one or more NIS or were inthe process of establishing bilateral agreements,the IAEA expected that donor States would con-sider granting additional funds and harmonizetheir support activities in a co-ordinated manner.On the basis of suggestions from some MemberStates, a meeting was called in Vienna on 27-28May 1993 where representatives from Australia,Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Hungary, Ja-pan, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom,the United States, the Commission of the Euro-pean Communities, and the Organization forEconomic Co-operation and Development(OECD) expressed their readiness to help theNIS improve their SSACs in a co-ordinated man-


REGIONAL REPORTS

ner. So far, seven countries have made fundingavailable and have been active or are expectedsoon to participate actively in actual support ac-tivities. Additional countries are ready to becalled upon to assist if the need arises.

Co-ordinated technical support." Co-ordi-nated Technical Support" is the term used todescribe support by the IAEA and donor Statesto the NIS in order to support SSACs at facilityand State levels, including physical protectionand export/import. The " Co-ordinated TechnicalSupport Plan" is approved by the State con-cerned and is intended to be a main tool in help-ing both State and facility authorities in meetingtheir responsibilities. Co-ordination of effortshas since focused on the preparation and sub-sequent implementation of these Plans for eachindividual NIS. They identify the needs to beaddressed, the timescale over which the associ-ated activities are to be conducted, and the areasof intended contribution from each of the donorStates. The Plans contain a phased approach tothe support.

Phase I addresses immediate needs, with em-phasis on support to existing authorities in im-proving legislative infrastructure and on SSACrequirements, in particular in relation to conclud-ing and implementing a safeguards agreementwith the IAEA. Phase II will include completionof the legal infrastructure, improving operators'measurement systems and other components ofmaterial control and accounting, physical protec-tion, and export/import control systems. Train-ing is recognized as an important element in thesuccessful transfer of donor support and is in-cluded with each planned technical activity.

To date, such Plans have been agreed forBelarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, andUkraine; donor States have been identified, andImplementation/Co-ordination Committees withresponsible persons from each of the donorStates and the IAEA have been established. Rep-resentatives of donor States are presently makingfacility visits in order to familiarize themselveswith the areas, as identified in the Co-ordinatedTechnical Support Plan, for which they haveaccepted responsibility. Funds have been made•available to implement the complete Plan forthese States. Plans for the remaining NIS are inthe process of being set up. One donor State hasoffered its assistance to help the remaining NISin setting up the basic infrastructure of theirSSACs; such assistance would contribute toachieving a certain degree of compatibilityamong all NIS. Other donor States have ex-pressed willingness to contribute to the imple-mentation of identified elements of the Plans inone or more of the NIS. The IAEA will contactpotential donor States to solicit funding and ex-

pertise in order to cover the complete Plans forNIS.

Additional assistance. Additional supportby donor States and the IAEA to the NIS hasincluded contributions to SSAC training activi-ties organized by donor States and seminars onthe organization of SSACs in Ukraine andKazakhstan. (See table.) These enjoyed broadNIS participation.

The IAEA and donor States have also givenlegislative assistance to the NIS. This is aimed atestablishing a comprehensive framework of nu-clear law covering all areas of nuclear activity.Examples of recipients of such assistance areKazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. In 1993 inLeiden, Netherlands, the IAEA also co-spon-sored with the Nuclear Energy Agency of theOECD, a Training Seminar for Lawyers andRegulators; a similar seminar also was held in1994.

A co-operative, constructive approach

Soundly established SSACs are fundamentalto a State's ability to benefit fully from the peace-ful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear trade andco-operation among States are essentially de-pendent upon effective and credible safeguards.These, in turn, rely heavily on SSACs.

In newly independent States formed after thedisintegration of the former Soviet Union, thenuclear infrastructure needs to be reconstructedif the new States are to derive maximum benefitfrom the peaceful exploitation of the atom. TheIAEA, together with donor States, has been help-ing the NIS to build up their respective nuclearinfrastructures. Much of the activity relates di-rectly to the establishment of reliable SSACs.The IAEA and donor States are therefore fulfill-ing a vital function in the NIS. Much remains tobe done, but much is already under way.

The co-operative spirit of all parties involvedis very much in evidence; the NIS have been veryopen and have provided IAEA and donor Statesaccess to their nuclear programmes and, to alarge extent, to facilities without a safeguardsagreement in place. Also, donor States, recogniz-ing the common interest in strengthening theSSAC infrastructure in the NIS, have respondedin a very positive manner. •


REGIONAL REPORTS

Latin America's Treaty of Tlatelolco:Instrument for peace and development

Updated in the 1990s, the Treaty for the Prohibition of NuclearWeapons in Latin America sets up a militarily denuclearized zone

Mlore than 30 years ago, in October 1962, theworld witnessed one of the most serious confron-tations to have occurred between two nuclearpowers — the "Missile Crisis". At the time,Latin America viewed the incident from variousangles: it saw international peace and security asbasic necessities, and its own unwillingness to beparty to military conflicts between the majorpowers. At the same time, it saw the importanceof not being prevented from mastering nucleartechnology for peaceful purposes and from ap-plying it to promote the economic developmentof its peoples.

All this was uppermost in the minds of thosewho subsequently became responsible for nego-tiating the text of an historic document: theTreaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons inLatin America, now usually called the"Tlatelolco Treaty" in recognition of the Mexi-can site in which it was opened for signature.

Thirty years ago, the Cold War in a bipolarworld was the frame of reference. The parame-ters then were a devastating world war that, forthe first time, had brought home the horrors in-herent in the military use of nuclear energy andthe incipient awareness worldwide of the bene-fits to be derived from the use of atoms for peace.Latin America was convinced that, faced withthe permanent threat of nuclear confrontationbetween the nuclear superpowers, it must presentto the world a legal instrument. Although novelfor its time, that instrument would be permanentin spirit and would demonstrate that alongsidenational interests there existed interests of theinternational community. These intereststouched, most particularly, those of the world'spopulated regions which, without being parties

Mr. Roman-Morey is Ambassador and Secretary General ofOPANAL, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weap-ons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and a career Diplo-mat of the Foreign Service of Peru. OPANAL's address is(Temfstocles 78) Col. Polanco, Mexico City, Mexico 11560.

to a decision to intervene in a war, would never-theless become involved in one. In Latin Amer-ica, people knew they would face a catastrophicscenario only in the event of a world conflict.The total interdependence in which we live and,above all, the explosive and radiative power ofthe atom when used to destroy show clearly thatwe are not immune to what surrounds us.

Traditionally, Latin America has been an in-exhaustible source of ideas and actions, and in-ternational law has not escaped the effects of thefertile Latin American imagination. LatinAmericans did not invent the wheel, but somegeneral principles of international law that todayserve as a basis for the peaceful co-existence ofnations have Latin American parentage. Simi-larly, in the field of non-proliferation, the regionof Latin America and the Caribbean was the firstto make its voice heard, and it proclaimed itsviews loudly. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki,one thing crucial to the question of non-prolifera-tion was absolutely clear — the undeniable supe-riority of nuclear over conventional weapons.

The Treaty's origins and key elements

It took more than 4 years of constant effortand difficult negotiations to formulate in a legaldocument the obligations of the contracting par-ties within the Latin American region and that ofthe nuclear powers to respect the region's desiredmilitary denuclearized status. On 14 February1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of NuclearWeapons in Latin America was opened for sig-nature at Tlatelolco, Mexico.

Initially, only 18 countries of the regionsigned it. Since then, 28 years have passed, andthe process of consolidating the military denu-clearization regime and its control system inLatin America and the Caribbean is almost com-plete. This has involved the joint efforts of thethree main organs constituting the Agency for

by EnriqueRoman-Morey

IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995' 33

REGIONAL REPORTS

the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean (OPANAL) —namely the General Conference, the Council,and the General Secretariat — and of the GoodOffices Committee. The Committee is a spe-cially created subsidiary body formed by CostaRica, Jamaica, Peru, and Venezuela and chairedby Mexico (the Mexican Government being theDepositary Government of the Treaty). It hasmade an effective contribution to the consolida-tion of the Treaty's zone of application.

The drafters of the Tlatelolco Treaty moldeda conceptually rich international instrument.During the almost three decades that it has beenin force, the Treaty has served as an example forthe international community. Now, in the mo-mentous times of flux in which we are living,Latin America and the Caribbean is more andmore insistently urging the international commu-nity to focus on non-proliferation with the ulti-mate goal of complete disarmament, peace anddevelopment for all.

The end of the Cold War and bipolarismdemands new concepts of security and develop-ment. A number of factors are working tostrengthen multilateral co-operation on a day-to-day basis. These factors include changes in thethinking of the nuclear powers, the resurgence ofdensely populated regions interested in their owneconomic and social development rather than inarmaments, and the unmistakable winds of uni-versal democracy. A new concept — the eco-nomic and social development of nations —must replace the traditional ideology-based con-cept of security and the consequent arms race.For Latin America and the Caribbean, there areother priorities in daily life, such as combatingextreme poverty, supporting health and educa-tion programmes, and developing basic indus-tries such as agriculture and mining, which arethe foundations of development. The region isbecoming aware that those priorities call for theextensive peaceful utilization of the most power-ful form of energy — nuclear energy.

Some elements make the Tlatelolco Treaty aunique legal instrument. They include theTreaty's indefinite duration (Article 31); the fact•that it can be amended at any time and thusadapted in the light of recent developments (Ar-ticle 30); the provision that it " shall not be sub-ject to reservations" (Article 28); the full protec-tion of the Treaty's zone of application throughnegative security assurances, with the nuclearpowers and other States situated outside theLatin American continent undertaking to recog-nize and respect it (Additional Protocols I andII); the definition of "nuclear weapon" (Article5); the commitment of the Contracting Parties to '"use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nu-

clear material and facilities under their jurisdic-tion" (Article 1); and — finally and most impor-tantly— the enshrinement in the Treaty of thegeneral principle of international law that mili-tarily denuclearized zones are not an end inthemselves, but rather a means of achieving gen-eral and complete disarmament (Preamble).

With these elements, the Tlatelolco Treatystands in full agreement with the purposes andprinciples set forth in the Charter of the UnitedNations. The Treaty further recognizes and pin-points a general principle of international law,makes it incontestable and applicable, regulatesit and controls it in such a way as to permit itsupdating and adaptation in the light of new cir-cumstances in the world, ensuring that it is re-spected in a major inhabited part of the planet.The Treaty's letter and spirit may serve as anexample to other populated regions. In this re-spect, Latin America and the Caribbean wel-comes the efforts being made by peoples andgovernments in other regions to establish militar-ily denuclearized zones.

Within this general framework and changingtimes, steps were taken in the 1990s to update theTlatelolco Treaty. The Contracting Parties ap-proved a series of amendments which todaymake it easier for countries in the region to ac-cede fully to the Treaty. Thus:• On 3 July 1990, during the 7th extraordinary

session of OPANAL's General Conference, itwas decided that the words " and the Carib-bean" should be added to the official title ofthe Treaty so that it would cover all the Statesof the Caribbean lying within its zone ofapplication.

• On 10 May 1991, during the 13th session ofOPANAL's General Conference, the zone ofapplication was updated through a recastingof the old Article 25, use being made ofwording similar to that of Article 8 of theamended Charter of the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS), so that all inde-pendent States in the region could join themilitary denuclearization regime. This impor-tant amendment made it possible for Carib-.bean States such as Belize and Guyana toaccede to the Treaty.

• On 26 August 1992, during its 8th extraordi-nary session, OPANAL's General Confer-ence approved amendments to Articles 14,15, 16, 19, and 20 relating to the verificationand control system established by the Treaty.The purpose of these amendments was tostrengthen the verification system— it beingrecognized that the International Atomic En-ergy Agency (IAEA) was the only organiza-tion capable of carrying out special inspec-tions requested by parties to the Treaty—


REGIONAL REPORTS

while upholding the principle that the organsof OP ANAL would continue to be responsi-ble for monitoring the application of theTreaty's control system. It should be empha-sized that, although the approved amend-ments modify the verification system, none ofthe modifications alters the fundamental prin-ciples or the essence of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

Recent accessions and status

These important amendments made it possi-ble for States in the region with significant nu-clear activities to become full members of theTlatelolco system. Thus, during 1994, Argentinaand Chile became members on 18 January, Bra-zil on 30 May and Belize on 9 November. Guy-ana signed and ratified the Treaty on 18 January1995. Most of the Member States have signed theamendments and are engaged in an acceleratedprocess of ratification in accordance with theirvarious national legislative requirements. Ac-cording to the Government of Mexico, the De-positary Government, the amendments are inforce for those States which have signed andratified them and which have formulated thewaiver referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 29 ofthe Treaty.

As of February 1995, the status of theTlatelolco Treaty was as follows:• Of the 33 States making up the regional group

of Latin America and the Caribbean, only onehas not signed the Tlatelolco Treaty. Cuba hasofficially stated its intention to accede to theTreaty and to become a full member of theTlatelolco system in the near future.

• Of the 32 signatory States, only three have notyet completed the ratification process (Guy-ana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia).

• Altogether 29 States of the region are fullmembers of the Tlatelolco system.

• In addition, all the objectives and provisionsof the Tlatelolco Treaty are fully respected bythe United States, the Russian Federation,France, the United Kingdom, China, and theNetherlands, all of which have signed andratified Additional Protocols I and II.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Although OP ANAL's primary task has beento consolidate the militarily denuclearized zone,it has never forgotten that its major future task isto promote access to nuclear technology for ex-clusively peaceful purposes by establishing co-operation programmes and thereby to prevent afurther widening of the gap between developed

and developing countries. It therefore welcomedthe establishment, by the IAEA, of a RegionalCo-operative Arrangement for the Promotion ofNuclear Science and Technology in Latin Amer-ica and the Caribbean (known as ARCAL) andhas indicated through various resolutions of itsGeneral Conference its interest in being repre-sented at ARCAL meetings as an observer. Sincethen, following an agreement in September 1994by ARCAL countries at a meeting in Vienna,OP ANAL has been able to participate as anobserver.

With the universalization of the Treaty'szone of application and its consolidation at theregional level, OP ANAL must expand its activi-ties. This will inevitably also involve a decisionby OP ANAL's Member States to modernize theGeneral Secretariat — something which shouldundoubtedly be done soon. Its links with theIAEA will help OP ANAL to carry out its tasks inaccordance with the undertaking of the Contract-ing Parties — expressed in Article 1 of theTlatelolco Treaty — "to use exclusively forpeaceful purposes the nuclear material and facili-ties which are under their jurisdiction". From thetime that OP ANAL was established — in fact,even before the Tlatelolco Treaty came into ex-istence — the Latin American region has beenreceiving invaluable assistance from the IAEA.It is hoped that such assistance will continue —not in order to duplicate efforts but in order tocombine them in the interests of development.

The programmes implemented during thefirst ARCAL stage have included projects on thedevelopment of nuclear science and technology,the utilization of research reactors, the improve-

Researchers in Braziland other LatinAmerican countries areusing nucleartechniques for studies inareas of medicine,agriculture, and otherfields.


REGIONAL REPORTS

Facts About the Tlatelolco Treaty

Date opened for signature: 14 February 1967

Number of States in Latin American and Caribbeanregion: 33

States Party to the Treaty (29).

Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Bahamas; Barbados;Belize; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominica;Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Grenada;Guatemala; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; Nicaragua;Panama; Paraguay; Peru; St. Vincent and the Grenadines;Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago; Uruguay; Venezuela

States that have signed but not yet fully ratified the Treatyffl.-

Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia

States that have said they will sign the Treaty (1):

Cuba

Depositary Government: Mexico

Responsible Organization: Agency for the Prohibition ofNuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean(OPANAL) in Mexico City.

y

Note: The continental part of the United States and itsterritorial waters are explicity excluded from theTreaty's zone of application.

ment of cereals through mutation breeding, theradioimmunoassay of thyroid hormones, nuclearinformation, and other projects with a high scien-tific and social value for our region. Plannedprojects include those on radiation protection,immunoassay in animal production and health,applications of isotope techniques in hydrology,the production and control of radiopharmaceuti-cals, industrial applications of nuclear technol-ogy, the maintenance of nuclear instrumentation,the control of radiation sources, mutation inductionin relation to other biotechnologies for the im-provement of crops in Latin America, and the im-provement of plant nutrition and of soil and waterresources management using nuclear and othertechniques. These projects will undoubtedly makean important contribution to the development ofagriculture, medicine, and industry in Latin Amer-ica and the Caribbean. It is to be hoped that, al-though each ARCAL country participates only inthe project or projects of particular interest to it,most will participate in the majority of projects.

The ideal that nuclear energy should not bethe privilege of just a few States will be activelypursued through the main and subsidiary organscreated by the Tlatelolco Treaty. For this reason,OPANAL believes in the need to build morebridges between countries that are highly devel-oped as regards nuclear science and technology

and countries that are less developed, so that the21st century does not find us in the midst of anapocalypse of destitution, disease, and hunger onone hand and opulence and full economic andsocial development on the other.

The historic effort of Latin America and theCaribbean to achieve full implementation of theTlatelolco Treaty should serve as an example toother densely populated regions with a growinginterest in attaining similar goals. The day-to-dayactivities of the IAEA — the leading world or-ganization in the nuclear field — and the interna-tional community's efforts directed towards theconclusion of nuclear non-proliferation and dis-armament agreements will help create a world ofmaximum social and economic development inan environment of peace leading to general andcomplete disarmament.

It is our firm conviction that the greatest formof energy known to humanity — nuclear energy— should be used exclusively for peaceful pur-poses. There should be a total prohibition world-wide of its use for military purposes. In otherwords, let us denuclearize war and nuclearizepeace! We are a few months away from the 50thanniversary of the first and, fortunately, onlynuclear holocaust. The best present that human-ity could give itself would be a total and perpet-ual ban on nuclear weapons. •

36 IAEA BULLETIN, U1995

REGIONAL REPORTS

Nuclear co-operation in Africa:Developing expertise and resources

Through a regional co-operative agreement known as AFRA,African countries are working to solve common problems

'uring the past decade, regional activities inthe field of nuclear science and technology haveassumed greater importance in Africa. This isespecially the case in areas of common interest,such as radiation protection and safety, agricul-ture, nuclear medicine, and maintenance of sci-entific instruments. Today, important activitiesare being carried out through a regional mecha-nism known as AFRA, which stands for the Af-rican Co-operative Agreement for Research, De-velopment, and Training Related to Nuclear Sci-ence and Technology.

AFRA is an inter-governmental arrangementestablished at the initiative of several Africancountries and concluded under auspices of theIAEA. In September 1994, the current agree-ment, which entered into force on 4 April 1990,was extended for another 5 years, to the year2000. To date, 19 countries have become mem-bers: Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Mada-gascar, Libya, Morocco, Kenya, Sudan, Ghana,Tanzania, Mauritius, Cameroon, South Africa,Zaire, Ethiopia, Zambia, Niger, and Coted'lvoire.

Since its inception, AFRA has proved to bean important mechanism to promote regional co-operation, to co-ordinate intellectual and physi-cal resources, and to enhance capabilities in thediversified areas of nuclear technology. Coun-tries participating in AFRA aspire to build onachievements attained under national efforts orwith IAEA assistance, so that available re-sources, facilities, and expertise can be most ef-fectively shared and not unnecessarily dupli-cated. Financial support is provided by the IAEAfrom its own budget and from extrabudgetarycontributions made by donor countries and or-ganizations. AFRA countries also provide in-

Mr. Boussaha is Head of the Africa Section in the IAEADivision of Technical Co-operation Programmes, of whichMr. Maksoudi is a staff member co-ordinating AFRA.

kind contributions by, for example, hosting andsupporting training activities.

This article provides an overview of activi-ties being carried out through AFRA in variousfields where nuclear techniques are being ap-plied. It additionally addresses areas in whichcountries are working together with the IAEA tostrengthen their basic national infrastructures re-lated to the safe and effective use of nuclear andrelated technologies."

Addressing issues of development

Food and agriculture. The agriculture sec-tor is the mainstay of the economy of manyAfrican countries and sustains the lives of morethan 80% of the population. Many adverse fac-tors affect development — unfavourable cli-matic conditions, recurrent droughts, insufficientwater resources in the Sahel, North, Eastern andAustral Africa, and accelerating environmentaldegradation, notably desertification, deforesta-tion, declining soil fertility, and erosion.

Analysis of current trends reveals that in or-der to meet the needs of the continent's popula-tion, a 70% increase in crop production up to theyear 2010 will have to be attained through yieldincreases and intensified fanning. This will re-quire an agricultural development strategy thatcombines the imperative of food security withthe rational management of natural resources andprotection of the environment.

Within the agricultural sector, the rearing oflivestock is a key component. On average, whenboth their direct and indirect contributions aretaken into account, livestock account for half ofthe agricultural output and may represent up to25% of the gross domestic product of Africancountries as a whole. The productivity of live-stock greatly affects the livelihood of small hold-ings that constitute the majority of farming sys-tems in sub-Saharan Africa. Besides being a

by AH Boussahaand MokdadMaksoudi


REGIONAL REPORTS

Bringing the benefits ofnuclear techniques in

agriculture to small farmholders is one AFRAObjective. (Credit MCN

Jayasunya, IAEA)

source of draught power, they produce meat,milk, and wool for local populations and, insome countries, for export.

The AFRA programme in food and agricul-ture supports collaborative efforts to use appro-priate technologies to consolidate and improveresearch capabilities for crop and livestock pro-duction. Current projects deal with food preser-vation using irradiation technology, animal re-production and nutrition, and crop improvementby mutation breeding and biotechnology.

Food preservation. Post-harvest losses offoodstuffs in Africa sometimes run as high as

-50%, and the technology of food irradiation isseen as playing ,a potentially valuable role inreducing these losses, especially for grain, vege-tables, root plants and fruits. Several Africancountries have shown keen interest in the use ofthis technology for food preservation and somehave already established pilot food irradiationfacilities to pave the way for the introduction ofthe technology on a commercial scale. This com-mon interest has prompted Algeria, Egypt,Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar,Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Su-dan, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zaire to initiate anAFRA programme based on mutual co-operationand sharing of experience. Activities were initi-ated in 1991 and since then 55 scientists fromthese countries have been trained in basic aspectsof food irradiation technology.

Animal reproduction and nutrition. Al-though many African countries have establishednational laboratories, mainly through IAEA as-

sistance, for studies on animal reproduction andnutrition, many of them realized the need toenhance their facilities. As a result, they initiatedan AFRA programme to use standardized serv-ices for radioimmunoassay (RIA) and for bloodnutrient analysis, and to facilitate co-ordinationand promote the exchange of information andexperience. Eleven countries now are participat-'ing in this endeavour, and their present emphasisis on conducting intensive training courses forscientists. Areas covered include milk produc-tion and reproductive performance of indigenousand crossbred dairy cattle; supplementary feed-ing strategies using locally available feed re-sources; an investigation into the effect of try-panosomiasis on the reproductive performanceof goats; a field study to investigate the influenceof mineral deficiency on fertility of dairy cattleand camels and its impact on productivity; and aproject to develop facilities and sustainable sys-tems for agriculture and animal production indesert conditions.

Plant breeding and genetics. Africa's futurefood production depends to a significant extenton the ability of crops to tolerate difficult soil andwater conditions. The application of radiation-induced mutation techniques combined with se-lected biotechnologies can play an importantrole, and most AFRA States have establishednational capabilities in mutation breeding. Someof them are already using their irradiation facili-ties for routine irradiation of seeds and plantletsin efforts to breed crops that are more resistant todisease or which require little water, for exam-ple. In-vitro culture laboratories are now estab-lished in at least five countries.

IAEA-supported activities have led to someachievements, in particular the development ofimproved varieties of cassava, plantain, and wildAfrican rice. In general, however the results havenot yet been transferred to the end users. Theneed to consolidate experience and to bridge thegap between research laboratories and fannersprompted 12 AFRA countries to establish a re-gional programme for this purpose. So far, theactivities have concentrated on training, andplant breeders from 11 AFRA countries havebeen trained.

Human health. In one form or another, mosthospitals in Africa use radiation and radionu-clides for medical and biological purposes, pri-marily for the treatment of cancer and for medi-cal diagnosis. RIA is currently widely used as adiagnostic technique of thyroid-related hor-mones, a part of efforts to investigate ever-in-creasing thyroid and iodine deficiency disorders.However, its application requires reagents whichare imported by most countries in Africa in theform of prepared kits. The quality of the assays


REGIONAL REPORTS

AFRA training by field of activity, 1991-94 Sources of AFRA funds, and their allocation

Number of trained scientists

0 20 40 60 80 100

Food and Agriculture

Nuclear Medicine

Nuclear Instrumentation

32

Industry

Radiation protection and safety

is often jeopardized by limited access to foreignexchange and by uncertainties associated withimportation procedures and unreliable logistics.

An AFRA project was initiated in 1991 todevelop the capability for the local preparation ofradioimmunoassay reagents. Activities have fo-cused on the introduction of bulk reagent meth-odology, standard RIA practices including qual-ity control, and RIA data-processing proceduresso as to initiate local production of at least someof the simpler primary reagents required.

By now, most of the participating laborato-ries have acquired the technical expertise andestablished the facilities to prepare locally anumber of required reagents. Sixty-four par-ticipants from 10 countries have benefittedfrom training events organized under the pro-ject in bulk reagent methodology, data proc-essing in radioimmunoassay, and the prepara-tion of basic reagents. In addition to theseachievements, a regional external qualityscheme is being set up to pave the way forgradual introduction of early screening ofneonatal hypothyroidism.

Industrial applications. A number of indus-trial applications of nuclear techniques have at-tracted the interest of AFRA States. They includenon-destructive testing (NDT) techniques, widelyused throughout the world in the quality control ofindustrial products, and radiation processing,mainly for radiation sterilization of single-usemedical supplies and Pharmaceuticals.

Several African countries have taken stepsover the past years towards establishing NDTfacilities. However, the infrastructure in the re-

Sources of AFRA funding,

Source

IAEAFranceSpain

Total

1991-94

Budget (US$)

1 402 576404 000129 080

1 935 656

Percentage

72%21%7%

100%

Note:Table does not include "in-kind contributions".

Allocation of funds to AFRA activities from the IAEA's TechnicalAssistance and Co-operation Fund

Sector

Food andagricultureHuman healthIndustryNucleartechnologyinfrastructure*

Total

1991-92

BudgetUS$

99 57050 00097 230

58 150

304 950

%

331632

19

100

1993-94

Budgetus$

552 68660 000

140 890

344 050

1 097 626

%

505

13

32

100

1995-96

Budgetestimates

US$

763 200722 40045 600

1 052 600

2 583 800

%

3028

' 2

40

100

* Includes nuclear instrumentation, radiation protection, waste management, and research reactorutilization

gion is still in general inadequate and NDT serv-ices are performed by foreign companies. WhileNDT training opportunities are regularly avail-able in a few countries (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya,South Africa, and Tunisia), the certification andqualification of NDT personnel relies mainly onprogrammes of the IAEA and other organiza-tions. In 1993, some AFRA countries initiatedNDT activities which included the organizationof several training events on certification andqualification of NDT personnel. They have re-sulted in the training of 40 persons from 9 coun-tries in two NDT techniques (ultrasonic and ra-diographic testing.)

In the field of radiation processing, AFRAStates in 1991 initiated a project on the radiationsterilization of medical supplies and pharmaceu-ticals. Through this project, 30 radiation tech-nologists from eight countries have receivedtraining. No further activities are foreseen in thisfield, however, because of the lack of irradiationprocessing facilities in participating countries.


REGIONAL REPORTS

Hundreds of Africanscientists have received

training through AFRAprogrammes, including

participants in a medicaltraining course on

radioimmunoassay andin courses on nuclear

instrumentation. (CreditsR Ptyasena and V Markovic, IAEA)

Strengthening nuclear infrastructures

Radiation protection and safety. As the useof radioisotopes and radiation technologies hasgrown in AFRA States over the years, so has theIAEA's assistance in areas of radiation protec-tion and radioactive waste management. The ba-sic infrastructure for radiation protection and ra-dioactive waste management requires the settingup of a competent national authority, the estab-lishment of a legislative and regulatory frame-work, and the development of operational serv-ices for the proper enforcement of radiationsafety standards.

However, for various reasons, in a number ofcountries radiation safety infrastructures are stilleither deficient or essentially non-existent,which impedes the development of nuclear tech-nology programmes. As to radioactive wastemanagement, expertise in the region is limited.Although radiation sources and radioactive ma-terials are essentially used in connection with

medical care and in limited research and indus-trial applications, the fate of the generated wastesremains an issue of major concern in the absenceof comprehensive waste management strategies.The issues which need to be addressed includeproper handling of different types of radioactivewastes, adequate treatment and conditioning,and safe disposal. An AFRA programme aims toimprove the managerial capability in the regionto manage radioactive wastes properly; and toharmonize environmental monitoring ap-proaches and measuring methods.

Under a project on waste management initi-ated in 1991, several regional training coursesand workshops were organized which enabledabout 80 scientists to gain practical knowledgeand skills, particularly regarding radioactivespent sources generated from hospitals and re-search laboratories. Current activities include thedesign of a waste processing and storage facilityfor the management of low-level radioactivewastes in line with the needs of most AFRAcountries.

The project on environmental radiationmeasurement and harmonization started in 1993.A mechanism has been established under theproject in close collaboration with the IAEA'sSeibersdorf Laboratories to carry out pro-grammes on quality assurance and intercompari-son of gamma spectrometry data of environ-mental samples. Training of scientists in gammaspectrometry and other analytical techniquesrepresents an important component of the pro-ject; 30 scientists from eight AFRA countrieshave already been trained.

Nuclear instrumentation. Nuclear-relatedactivities in AFRA countries involve specificand often complex equipment and microproces-sor-based electronic instrumentation. Thesetools are often used in an unfavourable workingenvironment (power disturbances, dust, high hu-midity and temperature). Furthermore, most in-struments which are imported are not serviced inthe region owing to lack of suppliers' repre-sentatives. With IAEA support, most AFRAStates have established service and maintenancefacilities well equipped for preventive mainte-nance and repair. However, all of them sufferfrom the turnover of key personnel, shortage ofspare parts and appropriate technical documenta-tion for servicing, and lack of opportunities forexchange of experience with other institutions inthe region.

Fourteen AFRA States decided to adopt aregional approach to consolidate or upgrade theirnational instrumentation and electronics labora-tories for the repair and preventive maintenanceof nuclear and medical equipment, and to de-velop adequate capabilities in the designing and


REGIONAL REPORTS

manufacturing of simple instruments to sustainresearch activities. The proposed approach offersmany advantages, including exchange of experi-ence, cost-effective local training of personnel,shared use of expensive equipment, and imple-mentation of common policies to tackle instru-mentation problems, especially with regard tomaintenance and utilization. Training of elec-tronic engineers and technicians in the field ofrepair of instruments and preventive mainte-nance is given particular attention. Presently, 20technicians from 10 AFRA countries have beentrained to be trainers in their home institutions.

Future activities and prospects

AFRA countries have decided to particularlyintensify their co-operative activities in a numberof areas. One area is food irradiation, wheret ra in ing, demons t ra t ions , workshops , andtechno-economic feasibility studies of the tech-nology will be emphasized so as to enable eachAFRA country to acquire the necessary informa-tion for decision-making.

Another area of special interest is radiother-apy. Costly radiotherapy facilities for curativeand palliative treatment of cancer have been es-tablished in many African countries. However,most of these facilities are not providing optimalservices owing to several factors. These factorsinclude the inadequate supply of indigenous spe-cialists, such as radiotherapists, medical physi-cists, and radiographers, which is limited by thehigh cost of overseas training and the attractivejob opportunities offered by foreign clinics tograduates. A related problem affecting the qual-ity of treatment appears to be the various stand-ards of quality for radiotherapy, which resultsfrom the fact that the practice covers a widerange of techniques and approaches. SeveralAFRA States are now working to introduce aregional quality assurance programme to im-prove their national capabilities for radiotherapypractice, to optimize the utilization of existingradiotherapy facilities by introducing new clini-cal techniques in teletherapy and brachytherapy,and to upgrade and support existing regionaltraining centres to enable them to answer themost pressing needs of the region for trainedpersonnel. These activities should also contrib-ute to increased awareness in countries aboutrational and comprehensive programmes forearly detection of cancer.

Particular attention also is being attached tothe further strengthening of basic infrastructuresto promote nuclear technology development.Considering the increasing number of researchreactors in the region — there are now six opera-

tional and three under construction — someAFRA States intend to adopt a common ap-proach to optimize the utilization of these facili-ties and to enhance their capabilities for safelyand efficiently operating the units.

Assessing achievements. During the first 5years of its existence, AFRA concentrated onlaying down the foundation that can best enableAfrican countries to translate their commitmentto regional co-operation into technically and eco-nomically sound co-operative projects. Its firstphase has successfully established a suitablescientific framework in Africa which enablesAfrican scientists and technicians to share theavailable resources and facilities, to exchangeinformation and experience, and to help thosecountries still in need of expertise in the field ofnuclear science and technology. This achieve-ment contributed a great deal to increasingawareness among AFRA countries that regionalco-operation holds considerable benefits. An-other important result is the better understandingof the infrastructure and the expertise in the nu-clear field that is available in the region. At thesame time, there has been greater appreciation ofthe many constraints and weaknesses that stillprevent nuclear techniques from contributing ef-fectively to the region's social and economicdevelopment.

Modest as they are, these achievements havestrengthened the concept of regional co-opera-tion and self-reliance in the continent. Greateruse is being made of experts and lecturers fromthe region. Moreover , because AFRA hasstrengthened personal contacts and relationshipsbetween African scientists and between their in-stitutions, there are now more and more AFRAcountries offering training opportunities. The re-gion's most developed countries are expected toplay a paramount future role in further consoli-dating the spirit of mutual assistance and re-gional co-operation by opening their availablefacilities to other countries and by financiallysupporting AFRA activities.

AFRA also has greatly contributed towardsthe elimination of some barriers that were pre-venting any institutionalized co-operation in nu-clear science and technology from taking placein the region. During its second phase, from1995-2000, the AFRA programme will continueplacing greater emphasis on building up regionalcapacities, and on improving the programme'soperation, management, and scientific scope.

.It is hoped that through these initiatives,and continuing financial support, the founda-tion for nuclear-related regional co-operationin Africa will not only be strengthened but in-creasingly tailored to the conditions and needsof the region. CJ


NATIONAL REPORTS

Nuclear verification in South Africa

Verifying South Africa's declared nuclear inventory, and thetermination of its weapons programme, was a complex task

byAdolf von

Baeckmann,Garry Dillon, and

DemetriusPerricos

Africa's accession to the Treaty on theNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on10 July 1991 was promptly followed by the sign-ing of a comprehensive safeguards agreement withthe IAEA on 16 September 1991. Four days later,the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolu-tion aimed at ensuring early implementation ofthe • safeguards agreement and verification ofthe completeness of the inventory of South Af-rica's nuclear installations and material.

In November 1991, a team of senior IAEAsafeguards officials specially appointed by theAgency's Director General carried out the firstinspections under the comprehensive safeguardsagreement. The activities to verify the correct-ness of South Africa's declared inventory of nu-clear material extended over several months andinvolved long-established measures. These in-cluded the examination of contemporary operat-ing and accounting records, and analysis of thenature and quantity of nuclear material. SouthAfrica's extensive nuclear fuel cycle made thetask complex, requiring considerable inspectionresources and extensive co-operation from SouthAfrican authorities regarding the provision ofaccess to defunct facilities and historical operat-ing records.

The task was further complicated when, on24 March 1993, State President de Klerk an-nounced that South Africa had developed andsubsequently dismantled a "limited nuclear de-terrent capability" involving the design andmanufacture of seven gun-assembled devices.The news prompted the IAEA to augment itssafeguards team in South Africa with, amongother specialists, nuclear weapons experts. Theteam's assignment was extended to include as-sessing the status of the former nuclear weaponsprogramme and ascertaining that all nuclear ma-

Mr, von Baeckmann is a former Director in the IAEA Depart-ment of Safeguards. Mr. Dillon is a senior staff member ofthe Department now serving as Deputy Leaderof the IAEA'sIraq Action Team, and Mr. Perricos is Director of the Depart-ment's Division of Operations (A).

terial involved in the programme had been recov-ered and placed under safeguards.

Over the months that followed, the teamthoroughly examined detailed records and veri-fied the inventories of nuclear materials in SouthAfrica. As a result, it was able to conclude thatthere were no indications to suggest that theinitial inventory is incomplete or that the SouthAfrican nuclear weapons programme had notbeen completely terminated and dismantled.

This article highlights the IAEA's verifica-tion activities in South Africa and the main ac-tivities associated with its assessment of the ter-mination of South Africa's former nuclear weap-ons programme.

Verifying the correctness of SouthAfrica's declared nuclear inventory

As required under the comprehensive safe-guards agreement, South Africa submitted to theIAEA an initial report of its nuclear programme.The initial report is a comprehensive document andincludes quantitative data on all types of nuclearmaterial, on a facility-by-facility basis. It is ex-panded by attachments which provide detail on thelocation and the number of items of nuclearmaterial contained in each respective facility.

For the IAEA, it was therefore possible — onthe basis of the data contained in the initial reportand subsequent inventory changes — to establishan itemized list of each facility' s nuclear materialinventory. Verification of such itemized lists wascarried out during the first few months of theimplementation of the comprehensive safe-guards agreement. This was done in accordancewith the requirements for physical inventoryverification (PIV) specified in the IAEA 1991-95Safeguards Criteria, using established account-ancy verification measures.

Unlike other States which had entered intocomprehensive safeguards agreements, SouthAfrica had been operating a number of nuclearfacilities, of unique indigenous origin, that pre-


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viously had not been subject to safeguards. De-tails of their design and operation were thus rela-tively unknown to the IAEA at the time thecomprehensive safeguards agreement was con-cluded. (See box.)

This situation made it necessary to devoteconsiderable effort to understanding the facilityprocesses. This would enable establishment ofworkable safeguards approaches for interim im-plementation during the period in which the fa-cility attachment would be negotiated. This proc-ess was facilitated through a joint seminar. Themeeting provided the opportunity for the IAEAto explain the accountancy procedures appertain-ing to a comprehensive safeguards agreement(INFCIRC/153-type) and for the South AfricanState System of Accounting and Control (SSAC)and facility operators to provide insight into thefacilities and their operating procedures.

Since the time of the " initial inspections" inlate 1991, verification activities carried out inSouth Africa have continued to be based on theIAEA 1991-95 Safeguards Criteria. In October1992, a near-simultaneous PIV, involving all SouthAfrican facilities, was successfully carried out. Allquantity goals were attained during that first mate-rial balance period. Similar exercises were car-ried out in August 1993 and October 1994.

As might be expected, it proved necessary to' make a number of corrections to the data in-cluded in the initial report. This resulted from thecontinuing efforts of the SSAC to ensure theaccuracy of the data, errors identified during theinspection process, and corrections to estima-tions resulting from measurements made by fa-cility operators after issuance of the initial report.This latter aspect was particularly relevant in thecase of material recovered as a result of decon-tamination of plant components.

At present, facility attachments are in force forsix facilities and it is intended to complete negotia-tions for the remaining facilities during 1995.

Assessing the completeness of SouthAfrica's declared nuclear inventory

An important aspect of the IAEA's safe-guards implementation in South Africa was theassessment of the completeness of the declarednuclear inventory, which is extensive. The com-plex task was carried out as a separate exerciseby a team of senior members of the IAEA De-partment of Safeguards specifically appointedfor the purpose by the Director General. It re-quired considerable inspection resources and co-operation from the State authorities regarding theprovision of access to defunct facilities and his-torical operating records.

South Africa's nuclear installations

Installations under IAEA safeguards which wereformerly inspected in accordance with anINFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement

• SAFARI-1 research reactor, Atomic Energy Cor-poration, Pelindaba

• Hot cell complex, Atomic Energy Corporation,Pelindaba

• Koeberg nuclear power reactor units 1 and 2,Electricity Supply Commission

Additional installations under IAEA safeguardssince September 1991 in accordance with acomprehensive safeguards agreement(INFCIRC/153-type)

Uranium conversion.uranium hexafluoride (UF6)production plantPilot highly enriched uranium (HEU) enrichmentplant (Y-plant), now defunctHEU storage facilityHEU-UF6 and metal/alloy production plantHEU fuel fabrication plantSemi-commercial low-enriched uranium (LEU)enrichment plant (Z-plant)MLIS laser enrichment R&D facilityLEU fuel fabrication plantNatural uranium/depleted uranium metal plantsDecontamination plantsWaste storage compoundLocations outside facilities

A practical basis was established throughwhich the mutual consistency of the inventoryof nuclear installations and material — andhence their completeness — could be deter-mined. The declared inventory was first evalu-ated with respect to production, imports, andusage. Then the isotopic balance of the inventorywas calculated and compared with its naturaluranium origin.

Through this process, the declared inventorywas found to be consistent with the declaredproduction and usage data, but the calculatedisotopic balance indicated " apparent discrepan-cies" with respect to the highly enriched uranium(HEU) produced by the defunct pilot enrichmentplant (called the Y-plant) and with respect to thelow-enriched uranium (LEU) produced by thesemi-commercial enrichment plant (called theZ-plant). The direction of these " apparent dis-crepancies" could be interpreted to indicate thatan amount of uranium-235 was unaccounted for.

Having regard to the period of time involved(for the Y-plant in particular) and the absence ofaccurate accountancy of the depleted uraniumwaste stream, such "apparent discrepancies"


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As part of its assessment of the status of South Africa'sformer nuclear weapons programme, a team of IAEAinspectors were able to visit all facilities once connectedwith the programme. Shown here are the secured vaultsat the ARMSCOR/Circle facility, where the weapons wereproduced and stored (top and below);the general purposecritical facility that was dismantled near the AECPelindaba site (lower left); and IAEA inspectors outsidethe building (left) over the Kalahari test shaft, which wasrendered harmless (facing page). (Credits: v.Mouchkin, IAEA:AEC>


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were not unexpected. It was, however, consid-ered necessary to continue efforts to further clar-ify them, with priority being given to the Y-plantdata. Further examination of records, particu-larly those covering the recovery of HEU mate-rial following the shutdown of the plant, resultedin a significant reduction of the magnitude of the" apparent discrepancy".

To supplement these activities, an exhaustiveexamination of the performance of the Y-plantover its entire operating history was undertaken.This examination involved the analysis of datafrom several thousand operating records, whichdetailed the plant status, on a daily basis, in termsof availability of separating modules, the feedrate and the assay of feed, product, and tailstreams. Technical documents describing phe-nomena which had affected the plant perform-ance were also studied.

The results of this examination showed thatthe amount of HEU declared to have been pro-duced by the Y-plant was consistent with theplant's production capacity.

On the basis of these studies the IAEA deter-mined that it was reasonable to conclude that theuranium-235 balance of the HEU, LEU, and de-pleted uranium produced by the Y-plant wasconsistent with the natural uranium feed; and thatthe amounts of HEU that could have been pro-duced by the plant were consistent with theamounts declared in the initial report.

The operating records of the Z-plant weresubject to detailed scrutiny which enabled theplant operation to be modelled, on a daily basis,from its very beginning to the day of the initialinventory. A comparison of records showed, fora certain period of plant operation, that theamount of U-235 transferred to depleted uraniumwaste storage as indicated in the operating re-cords was substantially more than that recordedin the accounting records. Further examinationof records and measurement of samples of

South Africa's former nuclear weapons programme:Chronology of the main events

• 1970 — Uranium enrichment project announced• 1971 —Approval for R&D based on gun-assembled device relating to nuclear

explosions for peaceful purposes• 1973 — Investigation into separation of lithium isotopes• 1974

— Prime Minister approves limited programme for development of nuclearweapons as deterrent— First stage of pilot enrichment plant commissioned— Approval for test site development in the Kalahari desert

• 1975 — Work on the Kalahari test shafts commenced• 1976 — Export from the USA of fuel for the SAFARI-1 research reactor stopped.• 1977

— Kalahari test site abandoned— Full cascaded operation of the pilot enrichment plant

• 1978 — First HEU product withdrawn from the pilot enrichment plant• 1979

— First nuclear device completed by the AEC— Decision that ARMSCOR should take over programme from the AEC andproduce all further devices.

• 1980 — Construction of tritium handling laboratory completed• 1981

— ARMSCOR/Circle facilities completed— Approval of the Gouriqua programme for commercial PWR technology devel-opment, as well as possible future tritium and plutonium production

• 1982 — Second device completed• 1985

— Government decision to limit number and type of devices to seven gun-assem-bled devices, to further develop implosion technology and to study more advancedconcepts— Lithium-6 Avlis programme redirected towards lithium-7 production for waterchemistry control in commercial power reactors

• 1987 — Commercial programme for tritium radioluminescent light sources started• 1987-1989 — Completion of four additional devices• 1989-1991 — Construction of facilities at ARMSCOR/Advena central

laboratories• 1989 — Decision to terminate nuclear weapons programme (November).

Gouriqua programme stopped.

• 1990— Pilot enrichment plant ceased operation (February)— Order by State President for destruction of the six completed nuclear devicesand the incomplete seventh device (26 February)

• 1991:— Accession to the NPT (10 July)— All HEU returned from ARMSCOR/Circle to the AEC (14 March to 6September)— Signature and entry into force of the safeguards agreement (16 September);Initial report submitted (30 October)— Start of IAEA ad hoc inspections (November)

• 1993— Destruction of documentation relating to nuclear weapons programme orderedby State President on 17 March; destruction completed on 23 March— State President's announcement to Parliament of the existence and subsequentabandonment of the former nuclear weapons programme (24 March)— Preliminary visit by IAEA team members to the ARMSCOR/Circle facilities(25 March)— Visits of the IAEA team to assess the status of the former nuclear weaponsprogramme (22 April to 4 May. 3-11 June, and 9-13 August).


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stored depleted uranium confirmed that the datarecorded in the accounting records were based oninaccurate nominal values and that the data con-tained in the operating records more correctlyreflected the actual material transfers.

The consequential corrections to the recordsto take account of this finding essentially re-solved the "apparent discrepancy" in the pre-viously calculated isotopic balance for the Z-plant. In addition, some other less prominenterrors and omissions were identified in the initialreport and their correction contributed to the con-clusion that isotopic balance of the Z-plant wassatisfactory.

Ascertaining the status of South Africa'sformer nuclear weapons programme

The inventory of HEU declared by SouthAfrica in its initial report was substantial. TheIAEA recognized that this material could havebeen taken to indicate that a significant compo-nent of the HEU inventory had been recoveredfrom an abandoned nuclear weapons programmeor, less likely, had been accumulated to supply aplanned nuclear weapons programme which hadbeen abandoned prior to its implementation.

South Africa had no obligation to declarewhat had been the past purpose of this material.Equally, the primary task of the IAEA was toascertain that all nuclear material had been de-clared and placed under safeguards; priority wasgiven to this task during 1992.

In addition to the established accountancyverification measures, the IAEA, acting on infor-mation received from Member States, carried outa number of inspections. They included the tak-ing of environmental samples, at a location thatwas later declared to be an unused nuclear weap-ons test facility in the Kalahari desert and at anumber of abandoned buildings (including ageneral purpose critical facility) located just out-side the Pelindaba security fence. The South Af-rican officials were very co-operative in facilitat-ing access to these locations but claimed lack ofdetailed knowledge of their past use.

It is now a matter of record that, on 24 March1993, President de Klerk, in a speech broadcastto the South African Parliament, made a declara-tion that "at one stage, South Africa did, indeed,develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability".

President de Klerk's statement included adescription of the scope and objective of the"capability" and the rationale for its abandon-ment and South Africa's accession to the NPT.

It is significant to note that on the day of thedeclaration, two members of the IAEA teamwere present at the Atomic Energy Corporation

(AEC), Pelindaba. They were carrying out fol-low-up actions directed towards the clarificationof the "apparent discrepancy" in the isotopicbalance of the HEU material produced by theY-plant. On the day after the declaration, thesetwo team members made a preliminary visit to anumber of key facilities concerned with theabandoned nuclear weapons programme.

Over the following 5-month period, the team,augmented by nuclear weapons experts, carriedout inspections at a number of facilities and loca-tions that had been declared to have been involvedin the former nuclear weapons programme. Theobjectives of these inspections were to:• gain assurance that all nuclear material used

in the nuclear weapons programme had beenreturned to peaceful usage and had beenplaced under IAEA safeguards;

• assess that all non-nuclear weapons specificcomponents of the devices had been de-stroyed; that all laboratory and engineeringfacilities involved in the programme had beenfully decommissioned and abandoned or con-verted to commercial non-nuclear usage orpeaceful nuclear usage; that all weapons-spe-cific equipment had been destroyed and thatall other equipment had been converted tocommercial non-nuclear usage or peacefulnuclear usage;

• obtain information regarding the dismantlingprogramme, the destruction of design andmanufacturing information, including draw-ings, and the philosophy followed in the de-struction of the nuclear weapons;

• assess the completeness and correctness of theinformation provided by South Africa withrespect to the timing and scope of the nuclearweapons programme, and the development,manufacture,and subsequent dismantling ofthe nuclear weapons;

• consult on the arrangements for, and ulti-mately to witness, actions at the Kalahari testshafts to render them useless;

• visit facilities previously involved in or asso-ciated with the nuclear weapons programmeand to confirm that they are no longer beingused for such purposes;

• consult on future strategies for maintainingassurance that the nuclear weapons capabilitywould not be regenerated.These objectives were based on the IAEA's

rights and obligations under the safeguardsagreement and on the stated policy of the SouthAfrican Government for full transparency withrespect to the country's former nuclear weaponsprogramme. The IAEA team had extensive dis-cussions with the South African authorities andtechnical staff at the AEC and at the State-ownedarmaments corporation (ARMSCOR) which had

4 6 • IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995

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been responsible for the production phase of thenuclear weapons programme. Detailed briefingswere provided on the various phases of the pro-gramme and on the associated development andproduction facilities. Information on the futuredevelopment of the programme, which had beenenvisaged before the order to dismantle the nu-clear weapons programme intervened, was alsoprovided.

Information from IAEA Member States wasused to confirm that all relevant facilities/loca-tions had been inspected.

On the basis of official documents, pro-gramme records, and information obtainedthrough interviews with principal personnel atthe various facilities and locations involved inthe programme, the IAEA team was able todocument the timing and scope of the nuclearweapons programme. (See box on page 45 for achronology of the main events.)

In the 10-year period up to 1979, all researchand development work on nuclear explosive de-vices was done by the South African AtomicEnergy Board, the forerunner of the AEC. Thiswork resulted in the production of a "non-deliv-erable demonstration device", which was designedin such a way that, if the need arose, it could berapidly deployed for an underground test to dem-onstrate South Africa's nuclear weapons capabil-ity. Its purpose remained that of a demonstrationdevice throughout the programme; it was neverconverted to a deliverable device.

It was in 1979 that the responsibility for thenuclear weapons programme was transferred toARMSCOR, while the AEC was made responsi-ble for the production and supply of HEU and fortheoretical studies and some development workin nuclear weapons technology. ARMSCOR'sprincipal nuclear weapons activities were carriedout in the so-called Circle facilities, located some15 kilometers away from the AEC's estab-lishment at Pelindaba. The Circle facilities wereconstructed during 1980 on the basis of designsprovided by the AEC and were commissioned inMay 1981. The nuclear weapons programmethus established involved:• the development and production of a number

of deliverable gun-assembled devices;• lithium-6 separation for the production of trit-

ium for possible future use in boosted de-vices;

• studies of implosion and thermonuclear tech-nology;

• research and development for the productionand recovery of plutonium and tritium.In September 1985, the South African Gov-

ernment decided to limit the scope of the pro-gramme to the production of seven gun-assem-bled devices, to stop all work related to possible

plutonium devices and to limit the production oflithium-6; however, it allowed further develop-ment work on implosion technology and theo-retical work on more advanced devices.

The first prototype deliverable device hadbeen completed in December 1982, but it was notuntil August 1987 that the first qualified produc-tion model was completed. The delay waslargely due to the implementation of a rigorousengineering qualification programme directedtowards safety and security under a range ofpostulated storage, delivery, and accident scenar-ios. When, in November 1989, the decision wastaken by the Government to stop the productionof nuclear weapons, four further qualified deliv-erable gun-assembled devices had been com-pleted and the HEU core and some non-nuclearcomponents for a seventh device had been fabri-cated. On 26 February 1990, the State Presidentissued a written instruction that, inter alia, allexisting nuclear devices were to be dismantledand the nuclear materials were to be melted downand returned to the AEC in preparation for SouthAfrica's accession to the NPT.

By the time of the IAEA team's visit in April1993, the dismantling and destruction of weap-ons components and the destruction of the tech-nical documentation had been nearly completed.Dismantling records concerning the HEU com-ponents of the weapons were available. Theyprovided sufficient detail to enable theARMSCOR data to be correlated with the corre-sponding data in the nuclear material account-ancy records maintained by the AEC.

The dismantling of the non-nuclear compo-nents of the weapons had been carried out inaccordance with procedures approved by theSouth African authorities. A number of de-stroyed or partially destroyed components hadbeen retained and were shown to some membersof the team in April 1993. Remaining records, inthe form of " build history" logbooks for the com-pleted weapons and the experimental devices, wereexamined and compared with the dismantlinglistings. Identification numbers of remainingcomponents were compared and found to be con-sistent with those shown in the records.

The team carried out an audit of the recordsof the transfer of enriched uranium between theAEC and ARMSCOR/Circle. As a result of thisaudit, the team concluded that the enriched ura-nium originally supplied to ARMSCOR/Circlehad been returned to the AEC and was subject toIAEA safeguards at the time the safeguardsagreement entered into force.

The team visited all facilities identified ashaving connection with the former nuclear weap-ons programme. It is appropriate to record theactive co-operation of the South African authori-


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ties in arranging for access to all facilities that theteam requested to visit — both those facilitieswhich had been provisionally listed by the SouthAfrican authorities as having direct connectionwith the former nuclear weapons programme, orwith peripheral activities, and additional facili-ties identified by the team. The IAEA is not inpossession of any information suggesting the ex-istence of any undeclared facilities connectedwith the programme.

Actions were taken by ARMSCOR to renderuseless the test shafts at the Vastrap (Kalahari)site, in accordance with a plan incorporating spe-cific suggestions made by the IAEA team. Al-though the implementation of this plan met withsome initial practical difficulties, the measures torender the test shafts useless were successfullycompleted in July 1993 and were witnessed byIAEA safeguards inspectors.

The equipment used for uranium metallurgyat ARMSCOR/Circle had been returned to theAEC at the end of the programme. The wholeuranium metallurgy process area atARMSCOR/Circle had been dismantled and de-contaminated. The machine tools used for manu-facturing the HEU and high explosives compo-nents had been decontaminated and are nowavailable for commercial non-nuclear applica-tions. The South African authorities stated thatspecialized equipment supporting the weaponssystems in the form of computerized testingequipment has been rendered useless through thedestruction of the specific software.

General conclusions

Based on the IAEA's extensive verificationactivities in South Africa, a number of generalconclusions have been made.

It was determined that the magnitude of the"apparent discrepancy" in the uranium-235 bal-ance associated with the Y-plant was such that —having regard to the normal uncertainties ex-pected to be involved in the plant historical oper-ating and accounting records — it was reason-able to conclude that the uranium-235 balance ofthe HEU, LEU, and depleted uranium producedby the pilot enrichment plant was consistent withthe uranium feed. Assessment of the productioncapacity of the pilot enrichment plant, on thebasis of operating records and supporting techni-cal data provided to the IAEA team by the AEC,indicated that it was reasonable to conclude thatthe amounts of HEU which could have beenproduced by the plant were consistent with theamounts declared in the initial report.

The IAEA team's audit of the associated re-cords indicated that all of the HEU provided by

the AEC to the nuclear weapons programme hadbeen returned to the AEC and was subject toIAEA safeguards at the time the safeguardsagreement entered into force.

The findings from the team's examination ofrecords, facilities, and remaining non-nuclearcomponents of the dismantled/destroyed nuclearweapons, and from the team's evaluation of theamount of HEU produced by the pilot enrich-ment plant, showed consistency with the de-clared scope of the nuclear weapons programme.

The team found no indication to suggest thatthere remained any sensitive components of thenuclear weapons programme which had not beeneither rendered useless or converted to commer-cial non-nuclear applications or peaceful nuclearusage.

Also, for the Z-plant, it was possible on thebasis of the team's examination of the opera-tional records, sampling, and analyzing of UF6from certain tail containers and the correction ofminor other errors in the initial inventory to con-clude that the amounts of LEU reported as pro-duced by the plant was consistent with the docu-mented operation of the plant.

These general conclusions had strong technicalbases and were significantly supported by the trans-parency and openness of the South African authori-ties with respect to access to information and loca-tions, in particular the stated and demonstratedwillingness of the authorities to facilitate access toany location that the IAEA may identify.

The IAEA's assessment of the completenessof South Africa's inventory of nuclear facilitiesand materials and its assessment of the status ofthe former nuclear weapons programme — as inall cases where a large nuclear programmecomes under safeguards — is not free fromuncertainty.

In the case of South Africa, the results ofextensive inspection and assessment, and thetransparency and openness shown, have led tothe conclusion that there were no indications tosuggest that the initial inventory is incomplete orthat the nuclear weapon programme was notcompletely terminated and dismantled. How-ever, in the future, and without prejudice to theIAEA's rights under the safeguards agreement,the IAEA plans to take up the standing invitationof the South African Government — under itsreiterated policy of transparency — to providethe IAEA with full access to any location orfacility associated with the former nuclear weap-ons programme and to grant access, on a case-by-case basis, to other locations or facilities thatthe IAEA may specifically wish to visit. •


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US fissile material initiatives:Implications for the IAEA

Under two US initiatives, the IAEA would play a greater role insafeguarding fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons

In a comprehensive statement of United Statesnon-proliferation policy on 27 September 1993,President Clinton proposed a number of majornew initiatives to help strengthen US policy andpractice in this area of vital importance to US andglobal security and, more generally, to help rein-force the international nuclear non-proliferationregime. Some of these initiatives can and will becarried out by the United States acting on itsown. Others must be a common effort by theUnited States and other countries if we are tobuild a more secure future for all humankind.Many of the proposed initiatives have importantimplications for the IAEA, and especially for itscrucial role in applying international safeguards.

Key among the initiatives proposed by Presi-dent Clinton are several designed to mitigate thecontinuing threat posed by weapons-usable fis-sile material. This article focuses on two initia-tives in particular: US policy to deal with exist-ing stockpiles of fissile materials including itsintention to submit fissile material excess to USdefense needs to IAEA safeguards, and the pro-posed global treaty banning the production offissile material for nuclear weapons or other nu-clear explosives.

Submitting excess fissile material fromUS weapons to safeguards

The United States has begun a process ofsubmitting US fissile material no longer neededfor the US deterrent or other defense purposes toinspection by the IAEA. As a nuclear-weaponState party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States isnot obligated to place its nuclear activities under

Mr. McGoidrick is the Principal Deputy Director of theOffice of Nuclear Energy Affairs, US Department of State,Washington, D.C.

IAEA safeguards. However, in 1980 the US con-cluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEAwhich makes eligible for safeguards all sourceand fissionable materials in all its nuclear facili-ties except only those facilities associated withactivities of direct national security significance.Historically, the IAEA has typically selected forsafeguarding one to three of the some 230 nu-clear facilities that the US has made eligible forinspections. It is the US intent to place excesshighly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutoniumfrom the US defense program under this US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement.

The Nuclear Weapons Council — an inter-agency US body charged with the responsibilityof determining how much nuclear material isnecessary to meet defense requirements — hasmade some initial decisions on what nuclear ma-terials are excess and therefore eligible for safe-guards. This will be a continuing process, and itis impossible to predict at this stage how long itwill take.

Nuclear materials excess to defense require-ments are located in a variety of facilities, someof which maintain a national security mission.Excess materials will need to be segregated fromnuclear materials retained for defense purposesin order to permit IAEA inspection. They willalso be in a variety of different forms includingresidues, spent fuel, HEU in metal form, andplutonium in oxide and metallic forms. Much ofthe material resulting from the dismantlement ofnuclear weapons will be in the form of nuclearweapons components since the US presently hasno facilities for converting such components intoless sensitive forms.

The US is proceeding in a step-by-step fash-ion. As a first step in September 1994, the UnitedStates placed approximately 10 tonnes in non-sensitive forms of HEU located in Oak Ridge,Tennessee, on the eligible list of the US-IAEAsafeguards agreement. The IAEA conducted itsinitial inspection the same month. The United

byFred McGoidrick


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States informed the Agency that it would notremove such material from safeguards for nu-clear explosive purposes.

The US has submitted several tonnes of plu-tonium in oxide and metallic form located inHanford, Washington, and expects to submit ad-ditional quantities of plutonium at Rocky Flats,Colorado in the near future.

Submitting nuclear weapon components toIAEA safeguards will pose particularly challeng-ing and as yet unresolved issues. If nuclear weap-ons components are to be inspected by the IAEA,the US and the IAEA must devise an inspectionapproach which will provide the IAEA with theopportunity for credible verification of the nu-clear material concerned while at the same timeprotecting sensitive nuclear weapons design in-formation.

The US is conducting two major reviews toaddress the issue of component inspection. In thefirst study, we are examining potential inspec-tion and measurement alternatives to those in-volved" in standard IAEA practices. Such ap-proaches include verification of non-sensitivecharacteristics of weapons components, or con-firmation of sensitive information without suchinformation being revealed to inspectors. At thesame time, a study is under way to examinewhether revealing certain information about nu-clear weapons components, such as mass, wouldinvolve serious proliferation risks.

The results of these studies will be closelyco-ordinated to identify inspection options thatresult in a high level of verification while mini-mizing proliferation risk. The US intends towork closely with the IAEA in assessing theinspection options and in designing procedureswhich will provide a high degree of assurance tothe international community that material re-moved from nuclear weapons and declared ex-cess will not be returned to such use.

US-Russian joint summit statement. In ad-dition to this unilateral step, President Clintonand President Yeltsin issued a joint summit state-ment on non-proliferation on 14 January 1994, inwhich

" They agreed among other things to establisha joint working group to consider steps to ensurethe transparency and irreversibility of the proc-ess of reduction of nuclear weapons, includingthe possibility of putting a portion of fissionablematerial under IAEA safeguards. Particular at-tention would be given to materials released inthe process of nuclear disarmament and steps toensure that these materials would not be usedagain for nuclear weapons."

They also agreed to consider including intheir voluntary safeguards offers with the IAEAall source and special fissionable materials ex-

cluding only those associated with activities hav-ing direct national security significance.

In furtherance of the Presidents' statement,the US Department of Energy and the RussianMinistry of Atomic Energy announced on 16March 1994 their intention to host reciprocalinspections to facilities containing plutonium re-moved from nuclear weapons. The US and Rus-sian sides also registered their intention to con-clude an agreement on the means of confirmingthe plutonium and HEU inventories from nucleardisarmament. They also noted that these inspec-tions would be an important step in the processof establishing a worldwide control regime forfissile materials.

The United States and Russia have estab-lished two working groups to address fissile ma-terial issues. One is a working group on safe-guards, transparency, and irreversibility (STI)which is examining specific measures to im-prove confidence in and increase the transpar-ency and irreversibility of the process of reduc-ing nuclear weapons. At their September 1994summit meeting, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsinagreed that their two governments should alsowork together to:• co-operate on a bilateral and multilateral ba-

sis, including through the exchange of appro-priate information, to prevent illegal trade innuclear materials and undertake measures tostrengthen the regime of control and physicalprotection of such materials;

• exchange detailed information at the nextmeeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commis-sion on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear war-heads, on stocks of fissile materials, and ontheir safety and security;

• direct their joint working group on STI topursue by March 1995 further measures toimprove confidence in and increase the trans-parency and irreversibility of the process ofreducing nuclear weapons;

• facilitate broad co-operation among appropri-ate agencies in both countries to ensure effec-tive control, accounting and physical protec-tion of nuclear materials;

.• facilitate co-operative programmes betweenUS and Russian national laboratories in theareas of safety, physical protection, controland accounting of nuclear materials;The US and Russian steps noted above can

have only a salutary impact on arms control,non-proliferation, and international and regionalpeace and security. Some of these initiativescould also have a major impact on the IAEA asthey will be the first cases in which the IAEAwill play a role in verifying certain aspects of thedisarmament process. Over time they will alsohave an important effect on the costs of IAEA


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safeguards. Some argue that the benefits of safe-guards in nuclear-weapon States are not com-mensurate with the costs. Such safeguards are inthe security interests of all States. We must there-fore find the resources for the application of safe-guards to nuclear materials excess to defense needs.

Proposed treaty on the cut-off ofproduction of fissile material

In his non-proliferation statement of 27 Sep-tember 1993, President Clinton also called for aninternational treaty prohibiting the production ofhighly enriched uranium and the separation ofplutonium for nuclear explosives or outside in-ternational safeguards.

In December 1993, the United Nations Gen-eral Assembly adopted by consensus a resolutionon the prohibition of the production of fissilematerial for nuclear weapons or other nuclearexplosive devices. This resolution, inter alia,• expresses the conviction of the international

community that a nondiscriminatory, multi-lateral and internationally and effectivelyverifiable treaty banning the production offissile material for nuclear weapons or othernuclear explosive devices would be a signifi-cant contribution to nuclear non-proliferationin all its respects;

• recommends the negotiation of such a treatyin the most appropriate international forum;

• requests the IAEA to provide assistance forexamination of verification arrangements forsuch a treaty as required; and

• calls upon all States to demonstrate their com-mitment to the objectives of such a treaty.The United States attaches great importance

to the proposed treaty, and envisages a key rolefor the IAEA in verifying the commitments madepursuant to it. The purpose of such a treaty is tostrengthen international nuclear non-prolifera-tion norms generally, and to give constraints onweapons-usable nuclear material the additionalweight of a binding international commitment.The United States believes the main undertak-ings of such a convention should include com-mitments to:• refrain from producing fissile materials for

use in nuclear explosive devices;• refrain from assisting other States to produce

fissile materials for proscribed purposes; and• accept IAEA safeguards to verify the under-

taking not to produce fissile materials for pur-poses proscribed by the treaty.The United States believes that the treaty

should be open to universal membership, andshould be non-discriminatory in its provisions.The United States does not envisage the treaty as

prohibiting the production of HEU or the separa-tion of plutonium for civil nuclear activities un-der safeguards. Nor does the US see the conven-tion as requiring full-scope safeguards. It would,however, have the important effect of imposinga "cap" on the fissile material available to thetreaty's members — both nuclear weapon Statesand non-nuclear weapon States — for nuclearexplosives.

It is particularly important that the ban onHEU production and plutonium separation fornuclear explosives be credibly verified. TheUnited States sees the IAEA as the appropriateagency to carry out this role. The safeguardsmeasures themselves should be nondiscrimina-tory and applied in a similar manner in all Statesparty to the treaty.

The verification of the basic obligations ofthe cut-off treaty raises a number of significantsafeguards issues. A key question is what facili-ties and materials would be subject to safeguardsunder the treaty. There are various possibilities.

One option would apply safeguards to allreprocessing and enrichment facilities in Statesparty to the treaty as well as the plutonium andHEU products of these plants. One question ishow far through the fuel cycle safeguards shouldfollow the HEU and plutonium. In order to pro-vide credible verification of the basic undertak-ing of the treaty, safeguards would have to applyto these materials at least up to the point of theirirradiation in a reactor. Safeguards would, ofcourse, apply to any reprocessing of the spentfuel.

, A second option would be a more extensiveone in which safeguards would apply to all nu-clear materials in a State party to the cut-offtreaty except the unsafeguarded special fission-able materials produced prior to entry into forceof the treaty. This would not be full-scope safe-guards but would provide a greater level of assur-ance of the undertakings of the cut-off thanwould the first option. It would, however, raisethe cost of verification.

A third approach would be a phased onewhich would start with the first option describedabove and move over time to a more extensiveoption. The broadening of safeguards coveragecould take place according to a predeterminedschedule, or the parties to the treaty could meetperiodically to take a decision on whether and towhat extent safeguards coverage should be ex-panded under the treaty.

It is also possible to consider certain transpar-ency measures to supplement classical safe-guards. For example, State Parties could declarethe location of all nuclear activities in their terri-tories, whether civil or military. Depending onwhich safeguards option is selected and on the


NATIONAL REPORTS

sensitivity of the activity, these declarationscould range from a simple declaration of thelocation and purpose of facilities to detailed re-porting on the nature of the activities and thequantities of nuclear material. Such transparencymeasures would, of course, be a complement to,not a substitute for, IAEA safeguards.

Clearly, States will have to weigh optionssuch as these (and perhaps others) very carefully.Each has profound implications for the IAEA'ssafeguards system, as well as for the resourcesrequired, not only for the IAEA but for the Statesand operators being inspected.

Adequate verification of this treaty will re-quire the IAEA to have the right to carry out itssafeguards responsibilities to ensure against un-declared activities prohibited by the treaty. Spe-cial or challenge inspections under a cut-offtreaty raise certain questions since States willhave sensitive facilities on their territories. Per-haps some form of managed accessibility alongthe lines of that found in the Chemical WeaponsConvention or other approaches should be exam-ined for their applicability to the cut-off treaty.

Several important technical safeguards ques-tions will also arise under a cut-off treaty. Thetreaty, as we envisage it, will prohibit the produc-tion of HEU, plutonium, and uranium-233 fornuclear explosives. It would not, however, pre-vent the production of tritium or the use of HEUfor nonexplosive military uses such as naval re-actors. In the case of tritium production, if safe-guards were applied to HEU fuel in a reactor,inspections would have to be carried out withoutexposing information which States regard ,asclassified.

The IAEA may also be called upon to safe-guard old reprocessing facilities which werebuilt to separate weapons grade plutonium fornuclear weapons programmes and were neverdesigned to facilitate the application of safe-guards. This will place significant demands onthe Agency's ingenuity and resources. TheIAEA will also take on some new tasks such asverifying that certain enrichment and reprocess-ing plants are shut down, and perhaps safeguard-ing enrichment facilities which are producingHEU. These challenges will require the develop-ment of new safeguards approaches.

Another important issue arising from the pro-posed cut-off treaty is what sort of legal instru-mentshould be used to define the Agency's safe-guards rights and obligations in verifying theundertakings of the cut-off treaty. In consideringthis question we must keep two facts in mind.First, the parties to this treaty will be nuclearweapon States, non-nuclear weapon Stateswhich have full-scope safeguards agreements;and non-nuclear weapon States which have cer-

tain unsafeguarded nuclear activities. Second,whatever the legal form or forms of the safe-guards arrangements chosen, the verification ofthe treaty's undertakings must be nondiscrimina-tory in its effect. The safeguards obligations ofnuclear weapon States, NPT parties, and Stateswithout a full-scope safeguards agreement mustbe the same under the treaty.

The United States does hot expect that a cut-off treaty and its associated safeguards arrange-ments will be concluded over night. Many issuesneed to be thoroughly vetted and resolved notonly with respect to the safeguards aspects of thetreaty but also a number of other treaty-relatedissues. Nevertheless, the U.S. strongly favorsmoving forward in negotiating this treaty as ex-peditiously as possible.

The United States and Russia have alreadytaken steps in advance of the cut-off treaty tocease production of fissile materials. Both coun-tries have ceased the production of HEU fornuclear weapons. In addition, in June 1994, USVice President Gore and Russian Prime MinisterChernomyrdin signed an agreement providingfor the shutdown of plutonium production reac-tors and the cessation of the use of newly pro-duced plutonium for nuclear weapons. Underthis agreement all plutonium production reactorsin both countries will cease operations no laterthat the year 2000. The US has ceased productionof plutonium for nuclear weapons and has al-ready shut down its production reactors, and un-der this agreement the Russians have pledged tocease operation of their three remaining produc-tion reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk. In Oc-tober 1990, Russia also has ceased production ofplutonium for nuclear weapons. The US andRussia are now studying ways to develop re-placement sources of heat and electricity to en-able the Russian reactors to shut down on sched-ule. In addition, the two sides are developingprocedures necessary to ensure that plutoniumproduced by these production reactors beforeshutdown will not be used in nuclear weapons.The parties also agreed to strive to reach agreementon the earliest possible total cessation of the pro-duction of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.

We hope that all States producing unsafeguardedfissile material could take similar positive steps inadvance of the conclusion of a cut-off treaty.

There is little doubt that a cut-off treaty, oncein effect will have profound impact on theIAEA's safeguards responsibilities. It willgreatly increase its inspection activities andcould result in a significant increase in the re-sources required for the safeguards function ofthe IAEA. Most importantly, it will greatly ex-pand the Agency's contribution to an effectiveinternational non-proliferation regime. O


-INTERNATIONAL NEWSBRIEFS

Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are meeting at theUnited Nations in New York from 17 April to12 May 1995 to review the Treaty's implemen-tation and decide on its extension. The Con-ference is required to decide on how, and forhow long, the Treaty will be extended: thedecision to extend the Treaty requires theconsent of a majority of the Parties. The NPTentered into force in 1970 for an initial periodof 25 years. During 1993-95, four Prepara-tory Committee meetings were held to dis-cuss organizational arrangements and pre-pare for the Conference itself. Chairman ofthe NPT Conference is Ambassador JayanthaDhanapala of Sri Lanka.

IAEA Director General Hans Blix isscheduled to address the Conference in April.The IAEA has key responsibilities in connec-tion with the NPT, and background papershave been prepared concerning them. Theyinclude papers related to Article III of theTreaty, which grants the IAEA specific re-sponsibilities with respect to the implemen-tation of safeguards, and Article IV, in whichParties encourage technical assistance for thetransfer of technology for peaceful uses ofnuclear energy.

(See the reports in this edition on theIAEA and its relationship to the NPT, begin-ning on pages 2 and 3; and the list of NPTParties on page 64.)

NPT Reviewand ExtensionConferenceopens in NewYork

At its meetings beginning on 27 March 1995,the IAEA Board of Governors was scheduledto consider items related to the strengthening ofIAEA safeguards; safeguards implementationin the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK); measures against illicit trafficking innuclear materials and radioactive sources; andnuclear safety, radiological protection, and ra-dioactive waste management.

Safeguards. Among scheduled items beforethe Board was a comprehensive set of measuresfor strengthening the effectiveness and efficiencyof the IAEA's safeguards system, together withan evaluation of their technical, legal, and finan-cial implications. The Board previously has dis-cussed progress reports on this safeguards devel-opment programme, known as "Programme93+2". (See the article in this edition, beginningon page 14.)

Safeguards in the DPRK. The Board wasset to receive a report from IAEA DirectorGeneral Hans Blix on the Agency's ongoinginspections of the DPRK's declared nuclearfacilities, and the verification measures withrespect to monitoring the freeze of the DPRK'sgraphite-moderated reactors and related facili-ties. The IAEA in late 1994 confirmed thatfacilities subject to the freeze were not in op-eration and that construction had stopped. Inmid-January 1995, an IAEA team visited theDPRK for further technical discussions withDPRK officials concerning the IAEA's verifi-cation measures.

Illicit trafficking. As follow-up to its initialdiscussions on this subject in December 1994,the Board was scheduled to consider proposalsfor intensifying the IAEA's activities related to

illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radio-active sources. The actions are in response to aGeneral Conference resolution in September1994 on the subject, and the subsequent outcomeof a meeting of experts convened by Dr. Blix inNovember 1994. The proposals, which coverboth prevention of illicit trafficking and responseto cases that do occur, includes the developmentof a reliable database of reported incidents;strengthening assistance to States in areas of ra-diation safety; and intensifying activities relatedto physical protection measures, the accountingand control of nuclear material, and analysis ofany confiscated nuclear materials.

Nuclear safety, radiological protection,and radioactive waste management. TheBoard was due to receive a summary of theIAEA's Nuclear Safety Review (a report onrecent developments in nuclear safety and ra-diological protection) and documents of theIAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards(RADWASS) programme, specifically theSafety Fundamentals document entitled "ThePrinciples of Radioactive Waste Management",and the Safety Standard S-l document entitled"Establishing a National System for Radioac-tive Waste Management". It further was to re-ceive a progress report on preparatory work fora convention on the safety of radioactive wastemanagement that took into account views ex-pressed at a meeting of governmental repre-sentatives at the IAEA in late February.

Technical co-operation. At its meetings inDecember 1994, the Board inter alia endorseda report by its Technical Assistance and Co-op-eration Committee (TACC) on the IAEA'stechnical co-operation programme for 1995-

IAEA Board ofGovernorsmeetings


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JointIAEA/EC/WHO

Chernobylconference in

April 1996

IAEAconcludes

environmentalmodelling

study

96. The TACC had recommended the approvalof projects in 1995-96 calling for funds of US$64.4 million, and the approval of the use of US$6.6 million for training courses. In its report,the TACC expressed strong concern over thedecline of pledges and payments for technicalco-operation programmes and urged IAEAMember States to meet the target that had beenset for the Technical Assistance and Co-opera-

tion Fund. It further noted increasing demandsfor higher quality and larger scale projects, andexpressed strong support for the concept ofmodel projects, which are part of IAEA effortsto more closely orient its technical assistance tothe long-term sustainable development goals ofcountries. (See the articles on technical co-op-eration in this edition beginning on pages 3 and21.)

The IAEA, the European Commission (EC),and the World Health Organization (WHO)have announced their joint sponsorship of aninternational conference on the radiological con-sequences of the Chernobyl accident. Entitled"One Decade After Chernobyl: Summing upthe Radiological Consequences of the Acci-dent", the conference is planned in Vienna,Austria, from 8-12 April 1996. It will aim atconsolidating an international consensus on theconsequences of the accident, taking particularaccount of the findings of conferences beingconvened by WHO in November 1995 and bythe European Union, Belarus, Russia, andUkraine in March 1996. An important objectiveof the Vienna conference will be to clearly sepa-

rate the scientific facts of the accident's conse-quences from "myths" and speculation, and toclarify and quantify its radiological health ef-fects, as well as other related health, social,economic, and political consequences.

The health and environmental effects attrib-uted to the 1986 Chernobyl accident have beensubject to extensive scientific examination. Al-though few accidents have been so thoroughlyinvestigated, there still remain widely differingopinions on the accident's real consequences. TheVienna conference is intended to seek a commonand conclusive understanding of the nature andmagnitude of these consequences. It will precedethe International Congress on Radiation Protec-tion, which opens in Vienna on 15 April 1996.

The IAEA has concluded a post-Chernobylresearch project related to the transfer of ra-dionuclides through terrestrial, aquatic, and ur-ban environments. Known as VAMP, for Vali-dation of Environmental Model Predictions,the project was launched as an IAEA Co-ordi-nated Research Programme in 1988 and tookadvantage of data on the transfer of radionu-clides resulting from the Chernobyl nuclearplant accident in 1986. A significant amount ofdata has been gathered by authorities in coun-tries of the former USSR and throughout Cen-tral and Eastern Europe. Previously, the mainsource of information on the biospheric transferof radionuclides was the fallout from atmos-pheric nuclear weapons testing.

VAMP's specific objectives were to pro-vide a mechanism for the validation of assess-ment models using environmental data on ra-dionuclide transfer which resulted from theChernobyl accident; to acquire data from af-fected countries for that purpose; and to pro-duce reports on the current status of environ-mental modelling and the improvementsachieved as a result of post-Chernobyl valida-

tion efforts. The programme at various stagesinvolved the participation of more than 100experts representing altogether 25 countries.

VAMP was able to register a number oftechnical and administrative achievements. Onthe technical side, data sets have been acquiredon a variety of terrestrial and aquatic environ-ments. Studies further were done to test modelsusing these data sets, which led to new insightson the strengths and weaknesses of currentlyused models. They also revealed areas whereknowledge and information is lacking. On theadministrative side, one clear benefit was inproviding a mechanism for developing andmaintaining national capabilities in the area ofradiological assessment, as well as a focal pointfor the exchange of information and resourcesbetween scientists. As the programme devel-oped, for example, an ever-increasing numberof scientists from countries of the former SovietUnion participated in the work, providing valu-able approaches. Overall, a special feature ofthe VAMP programme was the examination ofimportant transfer processes by means of expertreview by modellers and experimenters attend-


INTERNATIONAL NEWSBRIEFS

UN SECRETARY-GENERAL IN VIENNA. IAEA DirectorGeneral Hans Blix hosted the February 1995 meeting of theUnited Nations Administrative Committee on Co-ordination(ACC) which was chaired by UN Secretary General BoutrosBoutros-Ghali (at right with Dr. Blix).

The ACC includes the heads of UN organizations andspecialized agencies within the UN system. The meeting,which was held at IAEA headquarters, included discussions ofissues related to international drug abuse control, populationand development, the environment, and the status of womenin the UN system.

The Secretary-General also directed an ACC Forum onthe Future of the United Nations System convened at theHofburg in Vienna 1 March. In addition to Dr. Blix and otherACC members, the Forum's participants included AustrianChancellor Franz Vranitzky and leaders of international andregional commissions and groups. Discussions focused onthe institutional and managerial strengths and limitations ofthe UN system, in the face of changing requirements arising

from global political and economic developments. The UnitedNations officially marks its 50th anniversary this year.

Photo credit: P. Pavlicek, IAEA

ing the research co-ordination and workinggroup meetings. In light of the programme'sresults and the needs it identified, the IAEA isplanning to organize a follow-up project start-

ing in 1996. Also being prepared is a technicaldocument on the final VAMP results. It willsupplement reports that the IAEA previouslyhas issued on the programme.

Kxperts from more than 18 countries and inter-national organizations will be presenting scien-tific papers at the IAEA's upcoming Interna-tional Symposium on Environmental Impactsof Radioactive Releases. Being convened at theIAEA from 8-12 May, the meeting aims toreview the impacts of radioactive releases thathave caused environmental contamination, andthe progress in developing, applying, and vali-dating methodologies for assessing environ-mental impacts, as well as the methods andcriteria for environmental restoration.

In recent years, there has been increasingconcern over the environmental contaminationthat resulted from the early years of nuclearpower development and also from nuclearweapons programmes. Also recognized is thatreleases from certain industrial facilities can

contain enhanced concentrations of naturallyoccurring radionuclides, and can cause envi-ronmental contamination. Efforts are underway to assess the impact of these releases onhumans and their environment. Examples in-clude national and international programmesfor the assessment of radiation doses in theenvironments of nuclear facilities, weaponstesting areas, and marine waste disposal sites.

At the symposium, papers are being presentedby experts from Denmark, France, United King-dom, Finland, Poland, Ukraine, Russia, India,Sweden, Norway, Germany, Japan, Spain,Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Belarus, and Bel-gium, as well as from the United Nations Sci-entific Committee on the Effects of AtomicRadiation, the IAEA, and the Food and Agricul-ture Organization of the United Nations.

Symposiumonenvironmentalimpact ofradioactivereleases

Countries are showing increasing interest inmapping their natural radiation environments,often turning to the IAEA for technical assistanceand support. In particular, they seek to use ura-nium exploration data and techniques in environ-

mental studies, one aspect of the IAEA's activi-ties related to the nuclear fuel cycle.

During the uranium exploration boom ofthe late 1970s, hundreds of millions of dollarswere expended in the development of geo-

Uraniumexplorationandenvironmentalstudies


. INTERNATIONAL NEWSBRIEFS

chemical and geophysical techniques and incarrying out surveys to locate uranium depos-its. This investment in technology and the datacollected are now being employed to preparemaps, provide environmental baseline data,and define relative health risks over large areas.

As part of its activities, the IAEA is prepar-ing a report on a technical committee meetingon the use of uranium data and techniques forenvironmental studies; specialists from morethan 20 countries participated. A range of IAEA

technical reports issued over the years ongamma radiation surveys in uranium explora-tion and related subjects already are providinga valuable base of information. A number ofthese reports, for example, recently were citedin a project document by the European Union,which is carrying out a study of regionalgamma-ray data in Central and Eastern Europe.The studied region includes Poland, the CzechRepublic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Roma-nia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Slovenia.

Chinese donation to Zanzibar tsetse project

In support of an IAEA technical co-op-eration project in Zanzibar, the Chinese gov-ernment recently donated a minibus for trans-porting project staff and the research servicesof a veterinarian and entomologist.

The project, being carried out with Tan-zania, the assistance of the IAEA and Foodand Agriculture Organization (FAO) of theUnited Nations, and the United States, aimsto eradicate the tsetse fly from Zanzibar usingthe radiation-based Sterile Insect Technique(SIT). The tsetse fly is a vector for humansleeping sickness and for a fatal condition incattle known as Ngana.

SIT is an insect population-control tech-nique involving the use of gamma radiation tosterilize male flies reared under laboratoryconditions that are then released in infestedareas to mate with females, which then pro-duce no offspring. In Zanzibar, aerial releaseof SIT flies conducted since August 1994 hasled to encouraging results. The Chinese con-tributions will be used to transport projectpersonnel, and to support field surveys inwhich entomological and veterinary monitor-ing play essential roles.

Readers interested in receiving regularupdates on this project, through the newslet-ter Tanzanian TseTse Brief, may contact theInsect and Pest Control Section, JointFAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques inFood and Agriculture, P.O. Box 100, A-1400Vienna, Austria.

Shown here is the minibus, which China'sCounsellor Zunqi Liu (fifth from right) pre-sented to senior IAEA officials, including Mr.Jihui Qian (sixth from right) and Mr. PauloBarretto (seventh from right) of the Depart-ment of Technical Co-operation, at a cere-mony in Vienna.


INTERNATIONAL NEWSBRIEFS

As the world moves to commemorate the 50thanniversaries of both the founding of the UnitedNations and the birth of the nuclear arms race,IAEA Director General Hans Blix has urgedgovernmental leaders to take stock of recentradical changes that have seen the economicstrength of nations grow in political importanceand the possession of nuclear weapons decline.Dr. Blix made the remarks in a speech deliveredat the Foreign Ministry in Santiago, Chile, on15 December 1994.

Reviewing developments in the nuclearfield, Dr. Blix noted that the rationale for nu-clear weapons was less strong and their rele-vance to current world conflicts was nil. At thesame time, he said, the atom's peaceful useswere steadily expanding. In areas of non-pro-liferation, he noted that significant progress hadbeen, and continues to be, made, with both theLatin American and African regions helping toset the pace. In Latin America, he observed that

the Treaty of Tlatelolco was expected to comeinto force shortly for the region. He furthernoted developments in areas of nuclear verifi-cation, arms control, and disarmament of im-portance to the outcome of the Review andExtension Conference on the Treaty on theNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)in April 1995.

Commenting on challenges to the UnitedNations system, Dr. Blix said that the pendulumhad swung from expectations of a new interna-tional order to moral indignation over the lackof effective action in national and regional con-flicts around the world. He suggested that therewas a need for more nuanced judgment aboutthe performance of the United Nations, andabout the ways and means for strengthening thesystem.

The full text of the Director General'sspeech may be obtained from the IAEA Divi-sion of Public Information.

The UN at 50:DirectorGeneral'sperspective

How environmental changes are affecting theworld's water resources drew the close atten-tion of more than 250 scientists at a recentsymposium organized by the IAEA and theUnited Nations Educational, Scientific, andCultural Organization (UNESCO).

The Symposium on Isotopes in Water Re-sources Management was convened in Vienna20-24 March 1995 and included the participa-tion of hydrologists, hydrogeologists, geo-chemists, and other scientists from nearly 70countries and international organizations.Growing exploitation of available water re-sources and renewed concerns over the conser-vation of water quality and pollution are heav-ily influencing the work of hydrologists. Iso-tope techniques are recognized as a valuable,and in some cases indispensable, tool for prac-tical hydrological investigations when properly

integrated with other methods. Through a num-ber of technical co-operation and research pro-grammes, the IAEA is assisting environmentaland water authorities in its Member States in-terested in applying isotope and related tech-niques for water studies.

Symposium sessions covered a range ofresearch activities and isotope applications inthe development of water resources and relatedenvironmental disciplines. They included stud-ies'of surface waters, sedimentology, ground-water; and geothermal waters; the impact ofenvironmental change on global, regional, andlocal hydrological processes and water re-sources; mathematical models of hydrologicalsystems; and the progress and development ofisotope methods, including isotope analyses.Proceedings of the symposium will be publish-ed by the IAEA.

Symposium onIsotopes inWaterResourcesManagement

I echnological advances increasingly are influ-encing the work of researchers dedicated to theimprovement of crops and plants. Many of theleading professionals in the field will be meet-ing in Vienna 19-23 June 1995 at the Interna-tional Symposium on the Use of Induced Mu-tations and Molecular Techniques for Crop Im-provement, jointly organized by the IAEA andFood and Agriculture Organization (FAO) ofthe United Nations. Major objectives are to

help bridge the gap between practical plantbreeding and state-of-the-art laboratory tech-niques, and to stimulate discussion on crop-re-lated problems worldwide and their possiblesolutions. Although advanced plant breedingtechniques are being used in some developingcountries, the transfer of technology has beenslow. More information may be obtained fromthe Joint FAO/IAEA Division at IAEA head-quarters in Vienna.

FAO/IAEAsymposium onplant breedingand cropimprovement


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Participants at thenuclear information

seminar in Manila.

South Africa and the Philippines:Nuclear information seminars

South Africa and the Philippines separatelyhosted recent seminars organized by the IAEAin co-operation with the countries' atomic en-ergy authorities.

In Johannesburg, from 24-26 January 1995,about 150 nuclear communicators, journalists,and government officials from seven Africancountries attended a regional nuclear informa-tion conference. The conference, which wasofficially opened by Mr. R.F. (Pik) Botha,South African Minister of Mineral and EnergyAffairs, featured sessions on South Africa'snuclear programme; public information andnuclear energy issues; nuclear safety and radio-logical protection; regulatory controls; and nu-clear non-proliferation.

In Manila, from 29 November to 1 Decem-ber 1994, more than 100 participants from thePhilippines and six other Asian countries at-tended a regional seminar on peaceful applica-tions of nuclear energy for Asia and the Pacific.Topics included nuclear power developmentpolicies; risks and benefits of nuclear power;public information on nuclear energy; and ra-diation facts and practical nuclear applications.

The seminars were the latest in a seriesbeing organized by the IAEA Division of Pub-lic Information within the framework of anextrabudgetary programme being financed byJapan.

Canada: Fission day

Canada — where 22 nuclear plants today areproviding more than 17% of the nation's elec-tricity — is celebrating its 50th anniversary offission in September 1995. The country's firstreactor, known as ZEEP, achieved the firstnuclear chain reaction in Canada on 4 Septem-ber 1945. In collaboration with other nationalorganizations, the Canadian Nuclear Society isplanning to mark the occasion with on a tech-nical symposium on 4-5 September 1995.More information may be obtained from theCanadian Nuclear Society, Education and Pub-lic Affairs Committee, 144 Front St. Suite 725,Toronto, Ontario MSJ2L7 Canada.

Germany: CO2 savings

The German Nuclear Forum reports that thecountry's nuclear power plants have helpedavoid emissions of more than 150 million ton-nes of carbon dioxide in 1994. That amountrepresents one-sixth of the country's total emis-sions of carbon dioxide last year from allsources. Germany has 21 nuclear plants thattogether generate about 30% of the country'selectricity.

Since the start of commercial nuclear powerin Germany in 1961, the Forum says that Ger-man nuclear power plants have generated morethan 2100 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity.If that amount had been generated by fossil-

REGiONAL SEMINAR ONPEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OFNUCLEAR ENERGY FOR ASIA


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fired plants instead, the Forum estimates thatmore than two billion tonnes of carbon dioxidewould have been emitted. More information maybe obtained from the German Nuclear Forum,Heussallee 10, D-5300 Bonn, Germany.

Japan: Seismic safety

Although the devastating Kobe earthquake inJanuary 1995 did not affect the safe operationof Japan's nuclear power plants, governmentalnuclear authorities nonetheless took preventivemeasures afterwards to ensure the maintenance ofthe country's high seismic safety standards. Thesteps included safety reviews of plants by nuclearutilities, re-examination of design standards andguidelines, and reviews of accident preventionmeasures at all nuclear facilities. Atoms in Japan,the magazine of the Japan Atomic IndustrialForum, reports in its January edition.

The report notes that Japan's nuclear powerplants are built on foundations of strong rock,and are designed and constructed to sustainearthquakes of the highest magnitudes. Plantsare designed to shutdown automatically duringearthquakes that exceed set limits. During theKobe earthquake, for example, seismic metersat the Mihama nuclear power plant registeredonly one-tenth of the set limit. The plant's twounits, as did six other units at nuclear plantswithin 200 kilometers of the epicenter, re-mained in safe operation despite the earth-quake, which registered 7.2 on the Richterscale. The Kobe earthquake was the most dam-aging in Japan since the 1940s.

United States: Energy outlook

Coal, natural gas, and uranium are projected toremain the top three producers of electricity inthe United States into the next century. In itsAnnual Energy Outlook, the US Energy Infor-mation Administration (EIA) estimates energyand electricity needs to the year 2010. The EIAforesees slower growth in electricity demandover the next 15 years, largely attributed toexpected energy efficiency measures. Coalplants, which now generate more than half ofthe nation's electricity, are expected to remainthe dominant source, with nuclear power re-taining its second-place ranking until about theyear 2010, when natural gas is projected toproduce a higher share. Nuclear generation isprojected to increase through the year 2006,with the growth attributed to the improved per-formance of existing plants and the expected

operation of units now under construction.More than 100 nuclear power plants currentlyproduce about 21% of the nation's electricity.More information about the Annual EnergyOutlook may be obtained from the EIA, Officeof Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, US De-partment of Energy, Washington, DC 20585.

Bolivia, Croatia, Myanmar &Zimbabwe: Full-scope safeguards

Comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreementswith Bolivia and Croatia have entered intoforce. The Bolivia agreement took effect on 6February 1995, and the Croatia agreement on19 January 1995. Bolivia's agreement wasconcluded in connection with the Treaty for theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons in LatinAmerica (Tlatelolco Treaty) and the Treaty onthe Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT). Croatia's agreement was pursuant to theNPT.

Two other States — Myanmar and Zim-babwe — have negotiated NPT safeguardsagreements with the IAEA recently. The agree-ments have been submitted to the IAEA Boardof Governors for approval.

India: Number 10 coming on line

India's tenth nuclear power plant, Kakrapar-2,located about 275 kilometers north of Bombay,achieved criticality in January 1995, reportsNucNet, the newswire of the European NuclearSociety. The 220-megawatt plant is a pressur-ized heavy-water reactor; the first unit at thesite went into operation in May 1993.

India has four other units under construc-tion — two at Kaiga, south of Bombay, and twoat Rajasthan. Nuclear's share of electricity pro-duction in India is about 2%.

Japan's Mihamanuclear plant.


. NATIONAL UPDATES

Algeria, Argentina & Marshall Islands:NPT members

Algeria, Argentina, and the Marshall Islands areamong the newest members of the Treaty on theNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Algeria informed the IAEA earlier this yearthat it had deposited its instrument of accession tothe NPT with the Depositary Governments on 12January 1995. In welcoming the announcement,IAEA Director General Hans Blix described Al-geria's decision as a "significant and positive"development that would also add impetus to ef-forts to declare the whole of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Normal procedure foreseesthe conclusion by States joining the NPT of acomprehensive safeguards agreement with theIAEA covering all nuclear materials. IAEA safe-guards already are being applied at Algeria's twonuclear research reactors under proceduresagreed with Algerian authorities.

Also in January 1995, Argentina (on 10January) and the Marshall Islands (on 30 Janu-ary) acceded to the NPT, reported the US ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency. Argentinaalso is a member of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,which establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zonein Latin America and the Caribbean, and is aparty to the Quadripartite Agreement, underwhich the IAEA applies comprehensive safe-guards in Brazil and Argentina, which haveestablished a common system for nuclear veri-fication. (See page 64 for a list of NPT Parties.)

Belgium: Emergency response

Belgium's Study Centre for Nuclear Energy(SCK) is organizing a training course on off-site emergency response to nuclear accidents inco-operation with the Commission of the Euro-pean Communities. The course, the fifth of aseries, is being held at SCK in Mol from 26-30June 1995. More information about the coursemay be obtained from SCK, Boeretang 200,B-2400 Mol, Belgium.

Romania: Going nuclear

Romania expects to start generating its firstkilowatts of electricity with nuclear power laterthis year. The first unit at the Cernavoda nuclearpower station, where altogether five units arebeing built jointly with Canada, could be con-nected to the electricity grid as early as June orJuly, based on construction progress reports.The units are all Candu pressurized heavy-

water reactors in the 600-megawatt net powerrange.

United Kingdom: New IMO code

1 he London-based International Maritime Or-ganization (IMO) has announced its issuance ofthe new edition of the International MaritimeDangerous Goods (IMDG) Code regulating seatransport. The new edition incorporates amend-ments that entered into force in January 1995by which the classification, labelling, and pack-aging of dangerous goods is standardizedacross all modes of transport. It further in-cludes a Supplement on the new Code of SafePractice for the Carriage of Irradiated NuclearFuel, Plutonium, and High-Level RadioactiveWastes in Flasks on board Ships.

The new IMDG code is available in com-puterized as well as book form. More informa-tion is available from the IMO, 4 Albert Em-bankment, London SE1 7SR, United Kingdom.

Spain: Power needs

Spain's nuclear power plants are helping thecountry keep pace with rising electricity de-mand, especially in industrial sectors, the Span-ish Atomic Forum reports. Average electricityconsumption rose by almost 4% in 1994. Meet-ing just over one-third of that demand were thecountry's nine nuclear plants. Fossil-fired unitssupplied nearly 50% and hydropower about18% of total electricity in 1994. More informa-tion may be obtained from the Spanish AtomicForum, Boix y Morer 6, E-28003 Madrid, Spain.

Ukraine: Media competition

Two organizations in Ukraine seeking unbi-ased news reports on the Chernobyl nuclearpower station have invited international jour-nalists to enter their published stories in a 1995media competition, NucNet reports. Awardsinclude cash prizes ranging in value from US$200 to US $1000 for the best articles andphotos; prizes will be paid in Ukrainian cur-rency based on national bank exchange rates.Winners also will receive diplomas from thetwo organizing bodies, namely the Union ofJournalists of Ukraine, and the Department ofExternal Relations at the Chernobyl plant.More information may be obtained from theUnion, 27A Kreshchatik Str., Room 21, Kiev252001 Ukraine, or the Chernobyl plant, Room406, Chernobyl, Kiev Region 255620, Ukraine.


BRIEFLY N O T E D

IAEA APPOINTMENTS. Dr. James Dargieand Dr. Manase Peter Salema have been ap-pointed as Director and Deputy Director, re-spectively, of the Joint Division of NuclearTechniques in Food and Agriculture of theIAEA and Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO) of the United Nations. Located at IAEAheadquarters in Vienna, the Joint Division con-ducts programmes in fields of animal produc-tion and health, agrochemicals and residues,food preservation, insect and pest control, plantbreeding, and soil fertility, irrigation, and cropproduction. Dr. Dargie, an FAO staff memberfrom the United Kingdom, first joined the JointDivision in 1982 as head of the Animal Produc-tion and Health Section. Dr. Salema, from Tan-zania, has been a technical officer in the JointDivision's Section for Soil Fertility, Irrigation,and Crop Production since 1991.

A CENTURY OF X-RAYS. Since Roentgendiscovered X-rays in 1895, science has notbeen the same. In celebration of the X-ray's100th anniversary year, a number of organiza-tions are uniting their activities at a CentenaryCongress in Birmingham, United Kingdom,from 12-16 June 1995. The Congress — whichis expected to attract about 3000 participantsfrom around the world — will feature presen-tations on the history of radiology, the latestdevelopments in diagnostic imaging, radio-therapy, radiation biology, medical physicsand technology, and nuclear medicine. Com-plementing the scientific programme will be atechnical and historical exhibition on radiol-ogy. More information may be obtained fromMs. Catherine Parry, Congress Co-ordinator,British Institute of Radiology, 36 PortlandPlace, London, WIN 4AT, United Kingdom.

RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS.The National Radiological Protection Board(NPRB) in the United Kingdom has publisheda slide set for use in lectures on radiation pro-tection standards. The set is based on a broad-sheet published in the NRPB's "At a Glance"series of information leaflets. The broadsheetshows how scientists develop standards bybringing together knowledge of radiation riskand studies of attitudes to risk among workersand the public. It summarizes the recommenda-tions of the International Commission on Ra-diological Protection and NRPB advice on ra-diation protection standards for workers andthe public, as well as for the protection ofpatients during the medical use of radiation.

Other slide sets have been published on issuesincluding radon (a new edition of the accompa-nying broadsheet has just been issued); medi-cal radiation; transport of radioactive materi-als; nuclear emergencies; non-ionizing radia-tions; and ultraviolet radiation. More informa-tion may be obtained from the NRPB, Pressand Public Information Group, Chilton, Did-cot, Oxon OX11 ORQ, United Kingdom.

HANDBOOK ON NUCLEAR COMMUNI-CATIONS. A new book from the IAEA —entitled Nuclear Communications: A Hand-book for Guiding Good Communications Prac-tices at Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities — offersinformation professionals a valuable resourcefor responding to everyday questions about nu-clear energy and its fuel cycle. Written from aninternational perspective, the handbook fea-tures descriptive overviews of specific issuesand topics, ranging from electricity productionto fuel reprocessing and waste management.As importantly, it covers essential elements ofeffective public communications that havehelped nuclear communicators respond toquestions from the media and the public con-cerning safety and environmental aspects ofnuclear fuel cycle activities. Featuring colourphotographs and other illustrations, the hand-book is available for purchase from the IAEAor any of its sales agents. See the "KeepAbreast" section of the IAEA Bulletin for or-dering information.

NUCLEAR FUTURES. Two recent publica-tions take a close look at the future of nuclearpower. One, which examines the statisticalside, foresees a slight but steady growth ofnuclear power generation around the worldover the next 15 years, with most capacityadditions in Asia and Eastern Europe. The fore-cast comes from the US Energy InformationAdministration (EIA) in its latest edition of theWorld Nuclear Outlook. Overall, however, theEIA regards the future of commercial nuclearpower as "uncertain" throughout most of theworld. The uncertainty is largely attributed topublic concerns about the nuclear safety, whichhave led to extensive and costly safety-relatedmeasures, the EIA states. In addition to reportson nuclear power's status and projections, theWorld Nuclear Outlook includes reports on thenuclear fuel cycle and uranium market devel-opments, the operating and maintenance costsfor US nuclear plants, and comparisons withother nuclear forecasts from selected organiza-


BRIEFLY N O T E D

tions. The other publication explores the politi-cal dimensions of nuclear energy. Written byTerence Price, the first Secretary General of theUranium Institute, Political Electricity: WhatFuture for Nuclear Energy examines how dif-fering political structures in various countrieshave led to a variety of responses to nuclearenergy development. The book specificallyanalyzes issues of economics, nuclear prolif-eration, radiation, reactor safety, and the dis-posal of nuclear waste. More information aboutthe World Nuclear Outlook may be obtainedfi'oiii the EIA, Office of Coal, Nuclear, Elec-tric, and Alternate Fuels, US Department ofEnergy, Washington, DC 20585; and aboutPolitical Electricity from the Uranium Institute,12th Floor, Bowater House, 68 Knightsbridge,London SW1X 7LT, United Kingdom.

RADIATION INDEX. In a new report, Advis-ing the Public About Radiation Emergencies,the US-based National Council on RadiationProtection and Measurements suggests the useof a "radiation index" to improve public under-standing of radiation matters. The index wouldfacilitate the comparison of radiation expo-sures from various sources, the report states.During emergencies, an index could providepeople with the information they need to forman independent judgment of the situation, andafford journalists a better opportunity to ex-plain radiation exposures in a familiar context.The report further addresses various aspectsrelated to the availability and dissemination ofinformation sources about radiation issues thatwould be useful to members of the public.More information may be obtained from theCouncil, 7910 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 800,Bethesda, Maryland 20814-3095 USA.

TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATE-RIALS. About 38 million package shipmentsof radioactive materials are made worldwideeach year, most of them for medical and indus-trial uses. How these shipments are made, andunder what types of safety standards, is de-scribed from technical perspectives in a recentbook, Transport for the Nuclear Industry, theproceedings of the Third International Confer-ence on Transport for the Nuclear Industry,held in the United Kingdom in June 1994.Topics covered include operational experienceof national and international shipments, regula-tory aspects of sea transport, package designand manufacture, and safety and approval ofpackages, vehicles and shipments. Papers fea-

tured include a report on the implementation ofthe IAEA's regulations for the transport of ra-dioactive materials, which specify safetystandards. More information may be obtainedfrom Nuclear Technology Publishing, P.O.Box 7, Ashford, Kent TN23 1YW, UK.

SILVER ANNIVERSARY FOR INIS. Thisyear marks the 25th year of service for theIAEA's International Nuclear InformationSystem (INIS), the world's most comprehen-sive database on literature covering the peace-ful applications of nuclear technologies. INISstarted operations in 1970, and today includesmore than 1.5 million records. See the IAEABulletin's section "Databases on Line" formore information about INIS and otherIAEA computerized information sources.

NUCLEAR LIABILITY. A new report fromthe Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organiza-tion for Economic Co-operation and Develop-ment (NEA/OECD) takes a detailed look at thestatus and prospects of the international regimefor the liability and compensation of nucleardamage. The regime is embodied in severalinternational conventions under the auspices ofthe IAEA and NEA/OECD. The report de-scribes the basic elements of the existing con-ventions, the question of insurance coverage,and typical legislation in selected countries.Also discussed is the need to modernize andbroaden the scope of the international liabilitysystem, including addressing problems in theexisting conventions. More information aboutthe report — entitled Liability and Compensa-tion for Nuclear Damage: An InternationalOverview — may be obtained from theNEA/OECD, Le Seine St. Germaine, 12, boule-vard des lies, 92130 Issy-les Moulineaux, France.

"NUCLEAR WOMEN". Women scientistsand professional leaders instrumental to thebirth and development of nuclear energy arethe heart of a book (in German only) byJonathan Tennenbaum, a scientific advisor inWiesbaden, Germany. Entitled Die weiblicheTechnik, the book clironicles the contributionsof Marie Curie, Irene Joliot-Curie, Ida Nod-dack, Marta Goeppert-Mayer, Lise Meitner,Elisabeth Rona, Ellen Gieditsch, MargueritePercy, Chien-Shiung Wu, and Dixy Lee Ray,among others. More information may beobtained from the publisher, Dr. BoettigerVerlags-GmbH, Postfach 1611, D-65006Wiesbaden.


ArgentinaBelgiumBrazilBulgariaCanadaChinaCubaCzech RepublicFinlandFranceGermanyHungaryIndiaIranJapanKazakhstanKorea, Rep. ofLithuaniaMexicoNetherlandsPakistanRomaniaRussian FederationSouth AfricaSlovak RepublicSloveniaSpainSwedenSwitzerlandUnited KingdomUkraineUSA

World total*

In

No. of units

2716

222

44

572149

48192121

292419

125

3515

109

430

INTFF

operation

Total net MWe

9355 527

6263 538

15 7551 194

1 6482310

59 03322 559

1 7291 593

38 02970

7 2202 370

654504125

19 8431 8421 632

6327 101

10 0022 985

11 90912 67998 784

337 820

^NATIONAL DATAFILE

Under construction

No. of units

1

1

1122

4

526

7

1

154

4

162

55

* The total includesTaiwan, China where six reactors totalling 4890 MWe are in operation.Mote: Data as of April 1

LithuaniaFrance

BelgiumSlovak Republic

HungarySloveniaSweden

Rep. of KoreaSwitzerland

BulgariaSpain

UkraineFinlandJapan

GermanyCzech RepublicUnited Kingdom

United StatesCanada

ArgentinaRussia

NetherlandsSouth Africa

MexicoIndia

Nuclear powerstatus around

Total net MWe the world

692

1245

881906816

1 824

5815

1 0102 3925 645

5 770

654

3003 1553 375

1 552

1 1885 7002 330

44 369

994.Updated data will be issued by the IAEA Power Reactor Information System in April 1995.

.... - ~

2117.3%

14.2%12.5%

5.1%4.5%

3%1.9%

43.3%43.3%

42%40.3%

37.9%36.9%

36%32.9%32.4%

30.9%29.7%

29.2%26.3%

2%

58.9%53.6%

87.2%77.7%

Note: Percentages are as of endDecember 1993. Other countries

generating a share of their electricityfrom nuclear power include Pakistan

(0.9%, estimated); Kazakhstan (0.5%);China (0.3%); and Brazil (0.2%).Additionally, the nuclear share of

electricity production was 33.5% inTaiwan. China.

Nuclear shareof electricitygeneration inselectedcountries


N P T P A R T I E S STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NPT NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

1. IRELAND (1 July 1968)2. NIGERIA (27 September 1968)3. DENMARK (3 January 1969)

4. CANADA (8 January 1969)

5. CAMEROON (8 January 1969)

6. MEXICO (21 January 1969)

7. FINLAND (5 February 1969)

8. NORWAY (5 February 1969)9. YUGOSLAVIA (4 March 1969)

10. ECUADOR (7 March 1969)

11 MAURITIUS (8 April 1969)

12. BOTSWANA (28 April 1969)

13. MONGOLIA (14 May 1969)

14. HUNGARY (27 May 1969)

15. POLAND (12 June 1969)16. AUSTRIA (27 June 1969)

17. ICELAND (18 July 1969)18. BULGARIA (5 September 1969)19. NEW ZEALAND (10 September 1969)

20. SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (24 September 1969)

21. IRAQ (29 October 1969)22. SWAZILAND (11 December 1969)

DECADE OF THE 1970s

23. NEPAL (5 January 1970)24. SWEDEN (9 January 1970)

25. IRAN (2 February 1970)26. AFGHANISTAN (4 February 1970)

27. ROMANIA (4 February 1970)

28. PARAGUAY (4 February 1970)

29. ETHIOPIA (5 February 1970)

30. MALTA (6 February 1970)31. CYPRUS (10 February 1970)

32. MALI (10 February 1970)33. JORDAN (11 February 1970)

34. LAOS (20 February 1970)

35. TOGO (26 February 1970)

36. TUNISIA (26 February 1970)

37. BURKINA FASO (3 March 1970)

38. COSTA RICA (3 March 1970)

39. PERU (3 March 1970)

40. MALAYSIA (5 March 1970)

41. JAMAICA (5 March 1970)

42. LIBERIA (5 March 1970)43. SOMALIA (5 March 1970)

44. GREECE (11 March 1970)

45. MALDIVES (7 April 1970)

46. GHANA (5 May 1970)

47. LESOTHO (20 May 1970)

48. BOLIVIA (26 May 1970)

49. HAITI (2 June 1970)

50. KENYA (11 June 1970)

51. LEBANON (15 July 1970)

52. ZAIRE (4 August 1970)

53.SAN MARINO (10 August 1970)

54. URUGUAY (31 August 1970)

55. GUATEMALA (22 September 1970)

56. MADAGASCAR (8 October 1970)

57. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

(25 October 1970)

58. MOROCCO (27 November 1970)

59. SENEGAL (17 December 1970)

60. HOLY SEE (25 February 1971)

61. CHAD (10 March 1971)

62. BURUNDI (19 March 1971)

63. TONGA (7 July 1971)

64. DOMINICAN REPUPLIC (24 July 1971)

65. CAMBODIA (2 June 1972)

66. EL SALVADOR (11 July 1972)

67. FIJI (14 July 1972)

68. PHILIPPINES (5 October 1972)

69. BENIN (31 October 1972)

70. THAILAND (2 December 1972)

71. AUSTRALIA (23 January 1973)

72. NICARAGUA (6 March 1973)

73. COTE D'lVOIRE (6 March 1973)

74. HONDURAS (16 May 1973)

75. SUDAN (31 October 1973)

76. GABON (19 February 1974)

77. SIERRA LEONE (26 February 1975)

78. WESTERN SAMOA (17 March 1975)

79. REPUBLIC OF KOREA (23 April 1975)

80. BELGIUM (2 May 1975)

81. GERMANY (2 May 1975)

82. ITALY (2 May 1975)

83. LUXEMBOURG (2 May 1975)

84. NETHERLANDS (2 May 1975)

85. GAMBIA (12 May 1975)

86. RWANDA (20 May 1975)

87. LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA (26 May 1975)

88. GRENADA (2 September 1975)

89. VENEZUELA (25 September 1975)

90. SINGAPORE (10 March 1976)

91. JAPAN (8 June 1976)

92. SURINAME (30 June 1976)

93. BAHAMAS (11 Augustl976)

94. GUINEA BISSAU (20 August 1976)

95. PANAMA (13 January 1977)

96. SWITZERLAND (9 March 1977)

97. PORTUGAL (15 December 1977)

98. LIECHTENSTEIN (20 April 1978)

99. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CONGO

(23 October 1978)

100. TUVALU (19 January 1979)

101. SRI LANKA (5 March 1979)

102. YEMEN (1 June 1979)

103. INDONESIA (12 July 1979)

104. BANGLADESH (31 August 1979)

105. CAPE VERDE (24 October 1979)

106. ST. LUCIA (28 December 1979)

DECADE OF THE 1980s

107. BARBADOS (21 February 1980)

108. TURKEY (17 April 1980)

109. EGYPT (26 February 1981)

110. SOLOMON ISLANDS (17 June 1981)

111. PAPUA NEW GUINEA (13 January 1982)

112. NAURU (7 June 1982)

113. VIETNAM (14 June 1982)

114. UGANDA (20 October 1982)

115. SAO TOME & PRINCIPE (20 July 1983)

116. DOMINICA (10 August 1984)

117. EQUATORIAL GUINEA (1 November 1984)

118. ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES

(6 November 1984)

119. SEYCHELLES (12 March 1985)

120. BRUNEI DARUS-SALAM (26 March 1985)

121. KIRIBATI (18 April 1985)

122. GUINEA (29 April 1985)

123. BHUTAN (23 May 1985)

124. ANTIGUA & BARBUDA (17 June 1985)

125. BELIZE (9 August 1985)

126. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

OF KOREA (12 December 1985)

127. MALAWI (18 February 1986)

128. COLOMBIA (8 April 1986)

129. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (30 October 1986)

130. SPAIN (5 November 1987)

131. SAUDI ARABIA (3 October 1988)

132. BAHRAIN (3 November 1988)

133. QATAR (3 April 1989)

134. KUWAIT (17 November 1989)

DECADE OF THE 1990s

135. MOZAMBIQUE (4 September 1990)

136. ALBANIA (12 September 1990)

137. ZAMBIA (15 May 1991)

138. TANZANIA (31 May 1991)

139. SOUTH AFRICA (10 July 1991)

140. LITHUANIA (23 September 1991)

141. ZIMBABWE (26 September 1991)

142. ESTONIA (7 January 1992)

143.LATVIA(31 January 1992)

144. SLOVENIA (7 April 1992)

145. UZBEKISTAN (2May 1992)

146. CROATIA (29 June 1992)

147. AZERBAIJAN (22 September 1992)

148. NAMIBIA (2 October 1992)

149. NIGER (9 October 1992)

150. MYANMAR (2 December 1992 )

151. CZECH REPUBLICU January 1993)

152. SLOVAK REPUBUCd January 1993)

153. ST. KJTTS & NEVIS (22 March 1993)

154. ARMENIA (15 July 1993)

155. BELARUS (22 Julyl993)

156. GUYANA (19 October 1993)

157. MAURITANIA (23 October 1993)

158. KAZAKHSTAN (14 February 1994)

159. GEORGIA (7 March 1994)

160. KYRGYZSTAN (5 July 1994)

161. BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA (15 August 1994)

162. MOLDOVA (11 October 1994)

163. TURKMENISTAN (29 September 1994)

164. UKRAINE (5 December 1994)

165. ARGENTINA (10 January 1995)

166. ALGERIA (12 January 1995)

167. MARSHALL ISLANDS (30 January 1995)

NPT NUCLEAR -WEAPON STATES

1. UNITED KINGDOM (27 November 1968)

2. UNITED STATES (5 March 1970)

3. RUSSIAN FEDERATION (5 March 1970)

4. CHINA (9 March 1992)5. FRANCE (3 August 1992)

Notes: The NPT opened for signature on 1 July 196S.

Dates in parentheses denote the day the State deposited

its instrument of ratification, accession, or succession to

the NPT with the Depositary Governments, namely the

United States, United Kingdom, and Russian Federation.

Taiwan, China deposited an instrument of ratification on

27 January 1970.

Status of listing as of 1 March 1995. Listing based on

information reported by an NPT Depositary

Government.


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POSTS ANNOUNCED BY THEHEAD ("95-003). Department of Administra-tion. This P-5 post requires an advanced univer-sity degree in business management or otherrelevant field, and at least 15 years of experi-ence in management consulting or similar ex-perience. Also required are excellent presenta-tion and communication skills, particularly indrafting in English. Successful direct experi-ence in management. Closing date: 25 May1995.

ANALYTICAL CHEMIST (95-004). Depart-ment of Research and Isotopes. This P-2 postrequires a university degree in chemistry, par-ticularly in analytical chemistry, with speciali-zation in modern trace element analytical meth-ods. Also required is at least two years of postgraduate training or relevant experience. Clos-ing date: 25 May 1995.

INDUSTRIAL CHEMIST (95-005), Depart-ment of Research and Isotopes. This P-3 postrequires a Ph.D. or equivalent in applied chem-istry or radiochemistry, with at least six yearsof relevant research/technical experience in in-dustrial applications of radioisotopes such asnucleonic control systems, radiography, trac-ers. Closing date: 25 May 1995.

ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOCHEMIST(94-006), Department of Research and Iso-topes. This P-2 post requires a university degreein nuclear chemistry or radiochemistry within aminimum of 2 years additional experience inradiochemistry and /or isotopic analysis, in par-ticular with actinide elements. Also required isa sound knowledge of radionuclide tracer andradiochemical separation techniques as well asinstrumental radionuclide measurement meth-ods including alpha and gamma spectrometryand liquid scintillation. Closing date: 25 May1995.

REGIONAL EXPERT FOR ASIA/PA-CIFIC (95/701). Department of Research andIsotopes. This P-3 post requires a universitydegree in veterinary science or equivalent anda Ph.D. in animal reproduction, nutrition orclosely related field. Also required is 6 years ofexperience at the national level on animal pro-duction and health research. Expertise in immu-noassay techniques (including RIA and ELISA)and knowledge of small-farm livestock produc-tion systems in the tropics. Closing date: 25May 1995.

NUCLEAR FUEL SPECIALIST/UNITHEAD (95/007). Department of Nuclear En-ergy and Safety. This P-5 post requires a Ph.D.or equivalent in nuclear, chemical, mechanicalor metallurgical engineering, physics, chemis-try or metallurgy. Also required is a minimum

of 15 years of experience in the area of fuelperformance and technology, at least 5 years ofwhich should include proven experience atmanagerial level. Closing date: 31 Max 1995.

MEDICAL OFFICER (95/008). Departmentof Administration. This P-4 post requires amedical degree and current medical registration(license). Also required is 10 years of broadclinical experience and training and experiencein occupational medicine or equivalent. Closingdate: 31 May 1995.

UNIT HEAD (95/009), Department of Safe-guards. This P-5 post requires an advanceddegree in chemistry, physics, engineering orelectronics/instrumentation or the equivalent.At least 15 years combined research, industrial,and safeguards experience in the nuclear fuelcycle, processing of nuclear materials, nuclearmaterial accounting and/or destructive/non de-structive anlysis. Also required is experience insafeguards related activities including inspec-tion planning, execution, data analysis andpreparation of inspection reports and state-ments. Progressively more responsible supervi-sory or management experience. Closing date:31 May 1995.

SENIOR TRAINING OFFICER (95/010),Department of Safeguards. This P-4 post re-quires a university degree or equivalent in nu-clear science, administration or education.Also required is at least 10 years of combinedexperience in the nuclear industry of which aminimum of 4 years must be as an internationalor national safeguards inspector. The candidatemust have demonstrated ability to manage thelearning situation effectively in relevant safe-guards technical fields and be able to applybasic Safeguard philosophy and regulations tovarious course elements. Closing date: 31 May1995.

TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION RE-GIONAL EXPERT (95/702), Department ofResearch and Isotopes. This P-4 post requiresan advanced university degree in hydrology,geochemistry or an associated field, and at least10 years of experience in isotope hydrology andmanagement of hydrological field projects inarid and/or semi-arid regions. Also required isgood knowledge of the Agency's technical co-operation programmes in developing countri-ess. Closing date: 31 May 1995.

BUDGET ANALYST (95/011). Department ofAdministration. This P-2 post requires a univer-sity degree in business administration or equiva-lent and at least two years of relevant experience.Also required is excellent knowledge of PC ap-plications. Closing date: 31 May 1995.

AUDITOR (95/013). Office of the DirectorGeneral. This P-2 post requires a universitydegree in accounting, business administrationor other related fields, and at least two years ofworking experience in auditing, accounting orfinancial administration. Also required is theability to work with PC spreadsheet softwarepackages. Closing date: 31 May 1995.

READER'S NOTE:

The IAEA Bulletin publishes short summariesof vacancy notices as a service to readers inter-ested in the types of professional positions re-quired by the IAEA. They are not the officialnotices and remain subject to change. On afrequent basis, the IAEA sends vacancy noticesto governmental bodies and organizations in theAgency's Member States (typically the foreignministry and atomic energy authority), as wellas to United Nations offices and informationcentres. Prospective applicants are advised tomaintain contact with them. Applications areinvited from suitable qualified women as wellas men. More specific information about em-ployment opportunities at the IAEA may beobtained by writing the Division of Personnel,Box 100. A-1400 Vienna, Austria.

ON-LINE COMPUTER SERVICES. IAEAvacancy notices for professional positions, aswell as application forms, now are availablethrough a global computerized network that canbe accessed directly. Access is through the In-ternet Services. The vacancy notices are locatedin a public directory accessible via the normalInternet file transfer services. To use the serv-ice, connect to the IAEA's Internet addressNESIRS01.IAEA.OR.AT (161.5.64.10). andthen log on using the identification anonymousand your user password. The vacancy noticesare in the directory called pub/vacancyjyosts.A README file contains general information,and an INDEX file contains a short descriptionof each vacancy notice. Other information, inthe form of files that may be copied, includesan application form and conditions of employ-ment. Please note that applications for postscannot be forwarded through the computerizednetwork, since they must be received in writingby the IAEA Division of Personnel.


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EGKB NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS USA HOTLINE 800-251-9750ORTEC • BERTHOLD • BA1 • LABSERCO

100 Midland Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0895 U.S.A. • (800) 251-9750 or (615) 482-4411 • Telex 6843140 EGGOKRE • Fax (615) 483-0396AUSTRIA BELGIUM CANADA FRANCE GERMANY ITALY JAPAN NETHER- UK PRC(01)942251 (02)2516010 1800)268-2735 (01)47.81.4106 (089)926920 (02)27003636 (43)2111411 LANDS (0734)773003 (01)5124079

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.IAEA BOOKS KEEP ABREAST.

Reports and Proceedings

Nuclear Power Option, Proceedings SeriesNo. 946, 2490 Austrian Schillings,ISBN 92-0-100395-1

Measurement Assurance in Dosimetry,Proceedings Series No. 930. 1900 Austrianschillings, ISBN 92-0-100194-0

Advanced Nuclear Power Systems: Design,Technology, Safety and Strategies for theirDevelopment, Proceedings Series No. 931,1520 Austrian schillings, ISBN 92-0-101894-0

Radiation and Society: ComprehendingRadiation Risk, Proceedings SeriesNo. 959, 640 Austrian schillings,ISBN 92-0-102194-1

International Nuclear Safeguards 1994:Vision for the Future, Proceedings SeriesNo. 945 vol. 2, 2000 Austrian schillings,ISBN 92-0-104494-1

Classification of Radioactive Waste,Safety Series No. 950, 200 Austrianschillings. ISBN 92-0-101194-6Design of Spent Fuel Interim StorageFacilities, Safety Series No.116,240Austrian schillings, ISBN 92-0-104994-3

Operation of Spent Fuel Interim StorageFacilities, Safety Series No. 117, 240Austrian schillings, ISBN 92-0-105094-1

Calibration of Dosimeters Used inRadiotherapy, Technical Reports Series No.374,360 Austrian schillings, ISBN 92-0-104894-7

Reference books/statistics

IAEA Yearbook 1994,500 Austrianschillings, ISBN 92-0-102394-4

Energy, Electricity and Nuclear PowerEstimates up to 2015, Reference Data SeriesNo. 1, ISBN 92-0-102694-3 (IAEA-RDS-III4)

Nuclear Power Reactors in the World,Reference Data Series No. 2, ISBN92-0-101794-4 (IAEA-RDS-2/14)

Nuclear Research Reactors in the World,Reference Data Series No. 3. ISBN92-O-IO3793-7(lAEA-RDS-3/14)

Radioactive Waste Management Glossary,200 Austrian schillings, ISBN 92-0-103493-8

Convention on Nuclear Safety, Legal SeriesNo. 16, 400 Austrian schillings. ISBN92-0-102294-8

The Law and Practices of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency 1970-1980,Supplement I to the 1970 edition of LegalSeries No. 7, Legal Series No. 7-5/, 2000Austrian schillings, ISBN 92-0-103693-0

HOW TO ORDER IAEA SALES PUBLICATIONS

IAEA books, reports, and other publications may be purchased from sales agents orbooksellers listed here or through major local bookstores.

ARGENTINAComision Nacional de Energi'a Atomica.Avenida del Libertador 8250RA-1429 Buenos Aires

AUSTRALIAHunter Publications, 58A Gipps Street,Collingwood, Victoria 3066

BELGIUMService Courrier UNESCO202, Avenue du Roi, B-1060 Brussels

CANADAUN1PUB4611-F Assembly DriveLanham, MD 20706-4391, USA

CHILEComision Chilena de Energi'a NuclearVenta de Publicaciones,Amunategui 95, Casilla 188-D, Santiago

CHINAIAEA Publications in Chinese;China Nuclear Energy Industry Corp.Translation Section,P.O. Box 2103. BeijingIAEA Publications other than in Chinese:China National Publications Import &Export Corp., Deutsche AbteilungP.O. Box 88, Beijing

FRANCEOffice International de Documentation etLibrairie, 48, rue Gay-LussacF-75240 Paris Cedex 05

GERMANYUNO-Verlag, Vertriebs-und VerlagsGmbH, Dag Hammarskjbld-Haus,Poppelsdorfer Allee 55, D-53115 Bonn

HUNGARYLibrotrade Ltd.. Book Import,P.O. Box 126, H-1656 Budapest

INDIAOxford Book and Stationary Co..17. Park Street, Calcutta-700 016Oxford Book and Stationary Co..Scindia House, New Delhi-110 001

ISRAELYOZMOT Literature Ltd.,P.O. Box 56055. IL-61560 Tel Aviv

ITALYLibreria Scientifica Dott. Lucio di Biasio- AEIOU", Via Coronelli 6.1-20146Milan

JAPANMaruzen Company, Ltd. P.O. Box 5050,100-31 Tokyo International

NETHERLANDSMartinus Nijhoff International,P.O. Box 269. NL-2501 AX The HagueSwets and Zeitlinger b.v..P.O. Box 830. NL-2610 SZ Lisse

PAKISTANMirza Book Agency, 65, ShahrahQuaid-e-Azam, P.O. Box 729. Lahore 3

POLANDArs Polona, Foreign Trade Enterprise.Krakowskie Przedmiescie 7,PL-00-068 Warsaw

ROMANIAIlexim, P.O. Box 136-137, Bucharest

RUSSIAN FEDERATIONMezhdunarodnaya KnigaSovinkniga-EA, Dimitrova 39SU-113 095 Moscow

SLOVAK REPUBLICAlfa Publishers, Hurbanovo namestie 3,SQ-815 89 Bratislava

SOUTH AFRICAVan Schaik Bookstore (Pty) Ltd,P.O. Box 724, Pretoria 0001

SPAINDfaz de Santos, Lagasca 95,E-28006 MadridDiaz de Santos. Balmes 417,E-08022 Barcelona

SWEDENAB Fritzes Kungl. Hovbokhandel,Fredsgatan 2, P.O. Box 16356,S-103 Stockholm

UNITED KINGDOMHMSO Publications Centre,Agency Section, 51 Nine Elms Lane,London SW8 5DR

UNITED STATES OF AMERICAUNIPUB4611-F Assembly DriveLanham, MD 20706-4391, USA

YUGOSLAVIAJugoslovenska Knjiga, Terazije 27,P.O. Box 36, YU-11001 Belgrade

Orders and requests for informationalso can be addressed directly to:Division of PublicationsInternational Atomic Energy AgencyWagramerstrasse 5. P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna. Austria


IAEA BULLETIN 1994Authors and Contributors

(Vol.36, Nos. 1-4)

ADAMOV, E.O. The "second nuclear area":A perspective from Russia, No. 1, p. 41

AHMED, J. Radon in the human environment:Assessing the picture, No. 2, p. 32

BAKSHI, K. Viewpoints: Future directions forinternational safeguards, No. 3, p. 16

BERGMAN, C. Radiation applications and wastemanagement: Taking the final steps, No. 1, p. 36Technology transfer for safe management of ra-dioactive waste: Tailoring the approaches, No. 4,p. 46

BIAGGIO, A. Nuclear co-operation in SouthAmerica: The Brazilian-Argentine common sys-tem of safeguards, No. 3, p. 30

BLIX, H. Viewpoints: Future directions for in-ternational safeguards, No. 3, p. 16

BOLOGA, A. Radioecological research of theBlack Sea: Report from Romania, No. 2, p. 36

CASTELINO, J. Health and the environment:Examining some interconnections, No. 4, p. 10

CHAN, C. Technology transfer for safe man-agement of radioactive waste: Tailoring the ap-proaches, No. 4, p. 46

COLTON, J. Fellowships in nuclear scienceand technology: Applying the knowledge, No. 4,p. 55

CUARON, A. Nuclear applications for health:Keeping pace with progress, No. 4, p. 2

DARGIE, J. Animal health: Supporting Af-rica's campaign against rinderpest, No. 3, p. 48

DERON, S. Environmental monitoring andsafeguards: Reinforcing analytical capabilities,No. 3, p. 20

DONOHUE, D. Environmental monitoringand safeguards: Reinforcing analytical capabili-ties, No. 3, p. 20

FATTAH, A. The interface between nuclearsafeguards and radioactive waste disposal:Emerging issues, No. 2, p. 22

FISCHER, D. Viewpoints: Future directionsfor international safeguards, No. 3, p. 16

FJELD, C. Human health and nutrition: Howisotopes are helping to overcome "hidden hun-ger", No. 4, p. 18

FLAKUS, F.N. International convention onnuclear safety: A legal milestone, No. 3, p. 36

FRANK, N. Electron beam processing of fluegases: Cleaning the air, No. 1, p.7

GEIGER, R. Animal health: Supporting Af-rica's campaign against rinderpest, No. 3, p. 48

GONZALEZ, A. Radiation safety: New inter-national standards, No. 2, p. 2Biological effects of low doses of ionizing radia-tion: A fuller picture, No. 4, p. 37

IYER, R. Nuclear and radiation applications in

industry: Tools for innovation, No. 1, p.2

JANKOWITSCH, O. International conven-tion on nuclear safety: A legal milestone, No. 3,p. 36

JEGGO, M. Animal health: Supporting Af-rica's campaign against rinderpest, No. 3, p. 48

KONSTANTINOV, I.O. Monitoring wearand corrosion in industrial machines and systems:A radiation tool, No. 1, p. 16

KRUGER, P. Radiation technologies for wastetreatment: A global perspective, No. 1, .11

KUHN, E. Environmental monitoring and safe-guards: Reinforcing analytical capabilities, No. 3,p. 20

LARRIMORE J. International symposium onsafeguards: Mirror of the times, No. 3, p. 9

LAUERBACH, R. Experts without frontiers:Building expertise for the transfer of nuclear tech-nologies, No. 4, p. 51

LINSLEY, G. Sea disposal of radioactivewastes: the London Convention 1972, No. 2, 12The interface between nuclear safeguards andradioactive waste disposal: Emerging issues, No.2, p. 22

LOAHARANU, P. Food irradiation in develop-ing countries: A practical alternative, No. 1, p. 30

LOPEZ-LIZANA, F. Environmental monitor-ing and safeguards: Reinforcing analytical capa-bilities, No. 3, p. 20

MACHI, S. Nuclear and radiation applicationsin industry: Tools for innovation, No. 1, p. 2

MARKOVIC, V. Electron beam processing offlue gases: Cleaning the air, No. 1, p.7

MARZO, M. Nuclear co-operation in SouthAmerica: The Brazilian-Argentine common sys-tem of safeguards, No. 3, p. 30

MIRCHEVA, H. Health care and research:Clinic trials in cancer radiotherapy, No. 4, p. 28

NAIR, G. Health and the environment: Examin-ing some interconnections, No. 4, p. 10

NETTE, P. Radiation dosimetry in health care:Expanding the reach of global networks, No. 4, p.33

ORLOV, V.V. The "second nuclear area": Aperspective from Russia, No. 1, p. 41

OUVRARD, R. Environmental monitoring andsafeguards: Reinforcing analytical capabilities,No. 3, p. 20

PARR, R. Health and the environment: Exam-ining some interconnections, No. 4, p. 10Human health and nutrition: How isotopes arehelping to overcome "hidden hunger", No. 4, p.18

PELLAUD, B. Safeguards in transition: Status,challenges, and opportunities, No. 3, p. 2

PETTERSSON, B.G. Radiation applicationsand waste management: Taking the final steps,No. l,p. 36

PHILLIPS, G. Radiation technologies for wastetreatment: A global perspective, No. 1, p. 19

RAFFO, ANA Nuclear co-operation in SouthAmerica: The Brazilian-Argentine common sys-tem of safeguards, No. 3, p. 30

RAO, S.M. Radiation technologies for wastetreatment: A global perspective, No. 1, p. 11

REYNAUD, A. Experts without frontiers:Building expertise for the transfer of nuclear tech-nologies, No. 4, p. 51

SAIRE, D. Safety standards for radioactivewaste management: Documenting internationalconsensus, No. 2, p. 17Technology transfer for safe management of ra-dioactive waste: Tailoring the approaches, No. 4,p. 46

SIGURBJOERNSSON, B. Nuclear tech-niques for food and agricultural development:1964-94, No. 3, p. 41

SJOEBLOM, K.L. Sea disposal of radioactivewastes: the London Convention 1972, No. 2, 12

SKORNIK. K.Education and training in radiation protection andnuclear safety: Bridging the gaps, No. 2, p. 27

SVENSSON, H. Radiation dosimetry in healthcare: Expanding the reach of global networks, No.4, p. 33

SWINWOOD, J.F. Radiation technologies forwaste treatment: A global perspective, No. 1, p.11

TAKATS, F. Environmental monitoring andsafeguards: Reinforcing analytical capabilities,No. 3, p. 20

TSYPLENKOV, V. Technology transfer forsafe management of radioactive waste: Tailoringthe approaches. No. 4, p. 46

VALKOVIC, V. Accelerators in science and in-dustry: Focus on the Middle East and Europe, No.l ,p.24

VOSE, P. Nuclear techniques for food and ag-ricultural development: 1964-94, No. 3, p. 41

WAITE, T.D. Radiation technologies for wastetreatment: A global perspective, No. 1, p.l 1

WARNECKE, E. Safety standards for radioac-tive waste management: Documenting interna-tional consensus, No. 2, p. 17

WEDEKIND, L. International symposium onsafeguards: Mirror of the times, No. 3, p. 9

ZATOLOKIN, E.V. Monitoring wear and cor-rosion in industrial machines and systems: A ra-diation tool, No. 1, p. 16

ZYSZKOWSKI, W. Accelerators in scienceand industry: Focus on the Middle East andEurope, No. 1, p. 24


ON LINE DATABASESOF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

PRIS

Database namePower Reactor Information System

(PRIS)

Type of databaseFactual

ProducerInternational Atomic Energy Agency

in co-operation with29 IAEA Member States

IAEA contactIAEA, Nuclear Power Engineering

Section, P.O. Box 100A-1400 Vienna, AustriaTelephone (43) (1)2360

Telex (1)-12645Facsimile +43 1 234564

Electronic mail viaBITNET/INTERNET to ID:NES@IAEA 1 .IAEA.OR. AT

ScopeWorldwide information on power

reactors in operation, under construc-tion, planned or shutdown, and data

on operating experience withnuclear power plants in IAEA

Member States.

CoverageReactor status, name, location, type,supplier, turbine generator supplier,plant owner and operator, thermal

power, gross and net electricalpower, date of construction start,

date of first criticality, date of firstsynchronization to grid, date of com-mercial operation, date of shutdown,

and data on reactor core charac-teristics and plant systems; energyproduced: planned and unplannedenergy losses: energy availability

and unavailability factors; operatingfactor, and load factor.

AGRIS

Database nameInternational Information System for

the Agricultural Sciences andTechnology (AGRIS)

Type of databaseBibliographic

ProducerFood and Agriculture Organization of

the United Nations (FAO) inco-operation with 172 national,

regional, and international AGRIScentres

IAEA contactAGRIS Processing Unitc/o IAEA, P.O. Box 100A-1400 Vienna, AustriaTelephone (43) (1)2360

Telex (1)-12645Facsimile +43 1 234564

Electronic mail viaBITNET/INTERNET to ID:[email protected]

Number of records on line fromJanuary 1993 to date

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NDIS

Database nameNuclear Data Information System

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Type of databaseNumerical and bibliographic


in co-operation with the UnitedStates National Nuclear Data Centre

at the Brookhaven NationalLaboratory, the Nuclear Data Bank

of the Nuclear Energy Agency,Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development inParis, France, and a network of 22

other nuclear data centres worldwide

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RNDS@IAEA 1 .IAEA.OR.AT

ScopeNumerical nuclear physics data filesdescribing the interaction of radiation

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related bibliographic informationfrom the IAEA databases CINDA

and NSR; various other types of data.

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producer on magnetic tape

AMDIS

Database nameAtomic and Molecular Data

Information System (AMDIS)

Type of databaseNumerical and bibliographic


in co-operation with the InternationalAtomic and Molecular Data Centrenetwork, a group of 16 national data

centres from several countries.

IAEA contactIAEA Atomic and Molecular Data

Unit, Nuclear Data SectionElectronic mail via

BITNET to: RNDS@IAEA 1;via INTERNET to ID:

PSM@RIPCRS01 .IAEA.OR.AT

ScopeData on atomic, molecular,

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CoverageIncludes ALADDIN formatted data

on atomic structure and spectra(energy levels, wave lengths, and

transition probabilities); electron andheavy particle collisions with atoms,ions, and molecules (cross sections

and/or rate coefficients, including, inmost cases, analytic fit to the data);sputtering of surfaces by impact ofmain plasma constituents and selfsputtering; particle reflection from

surfaces; thermophysical andthermomechanical properties of

beryllium and pyrolytic graphites.

Note: Off-line data and bibliographicretrievals, as well as ALADDIN

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For access to these databases, please contact the producers.Information from these databases also may be purchased from the producer in printed form.INIS and AGRIS additionally are available on CD-ROM.

INIS

Database nameInternational Nuclear Information

System (INIS)

Type of databaseBibliographic


in co-operation with 87 IAEAMember States and 16 otherinternational organizations

IAEA contactIAEA, INIS Section, P.O. Box 100,

A-1400 Vienna, AustriaTelephone (43) (1) 2360 2842

Telex (1)-12645Facsimile +43 1 234564

Electronic mail viaBITNET/INTERNET to ID:

[email protected]

Number of records on line fromJanuary 1976 to datemore than 1.5 million

ScopeWorldwide information on the

peaceful uses of nuclear science andtechnology; economic and

environmental aspects of other energysources.

CoverageThe central areas of coverage arenuclear reactors, reactor safety.nuclear fusion, applications of

radiation or isotopes in medicine.agriculture, industry, and pest

control, as well as related fieldssuch as nuclear chemistry, nuclear

physics, and materials science.Special emphasis is placed on the

environmental, economic, andhealth effects of nuclear energy, aswell as. from 1992. the economic

and environmental aspects ofnon-nuclear energy sources. Legaland social aspects associated withnuclear energy also are covered.

ON C D - R O M5000 JOURNALS

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6 COMPACT DISCS

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Call +44 (0)81 995 8242 TODAY!

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IAEA.UPCOMING CO-ORDINATED RESEARCH PROGRAMMES.

Use of ELISA for epidemiology and control of foot-and-mouth disease and bovinebrucellosis in Latin AmericaTo evaluate a liquid phase blocking ELISA to detect the presence of antibodies againstfoot-and-mouth disease in infected or vaccinated animals and to evaluate a competitiveELISA for the diagnosis ofBrucella abortus in cattle which has the capability to distinguishthe antibody response caused by vaccination as opposed to that of natural infection.

Study of the impact of food irradiation to reduce post-harvest food losses in AfricaTo generate date on reduction of post-harvest losses of foods by the application of foodirradiation.

Validation of personal computer and gamma camera interface, and software fordata processing of clinical studiesTo validate and further improve the Agency's IBM personal computer interfacing unitconnected to gamma cameras and appropriate application software for data and imagingprocessing of clinical studies, which will be widely used for upgrading analogue gammacameras and replacing old types of nuclear medicine computers in the world.

Use of isotopes for analyses of flow and transport dynamics in groundwatersystemsTo use isotope data for improved quantitative understanding of groundwater systemsand for estimation of relevant physical parameters as regards flow and mass transportdynamics.

Radioactively labelled DNA-probes for crop improvementTo establish an international network for the production and free distribution of DNAprobes and other DNA resources for the most important crops of developing countries.

A molecular and genetic approach to develop sexing strains for field applicationin fruit fly Sterile Insect Technique programmesTo optimize and field test existing sexing strains in medfly, isolate and evaluate alternativesexing genes, use the molecular approach to genetic sexing, and to develop geneticsexing systems in other fruit flies, specifically Cactrocera and Anastrepha.

Market development of irradiated food in Asia and the PacificTo generate data thus facilitating wider commercialization and consumer acceptance offood irradiation in the region of Asia and the Pacific.

Radionuclide-based molecular techniques in diagnosis of blood-borne diseasesTo develop expertise in the Asia-Pacific region in the use of radionuclide-based moleculartechniques or diagnosis of blood-borne disease's.

Diagnosis of Chagas disease using nuclear techniquesTo develop a standardized immunoradiometric assay for Chagas diseases using recom-binant and purified antigens, and validate the assay using radionuclide-based moleculartechniques.

These are selected listings, subject to change. Morecomplete information about IAEA meetings can beobtained from the IAEA Conference Service Section atthe Agency's headquarters in Vienna, or by referring tothe IAEA quarterly publication Meetings on AtomicEnergy (See the Keep Abreast section for orderinginformation.) More detailed information about the IAEA'sco-ordinated research programmes may be obtainedfrom the Research Contracts Administration Section atIAEA headquarters. The programmes are designed tofacilitate global co-operation on scientific and technicalsubjects in various fields, ranging from radiationapplications in medicine, agriculture, and industry tonuclear power technology and safety.

IAEA.SYMPOSIA & SEMINARS.

MAY 1995Seminar on Management of AgeingResearch Reactors,Hamburg, Germany (8-12 May)

Symposium on Environmental Impactof Radioactive Releases,Vienna, Austria (8-12 May)

JUNE 1995Symposium on the Use of InducedMutations and Molecular Techniquesfor Crop Improvement,Vienna, Austria (19-23 June)

AUGUST 1995Seminar on the Advancements in theImplementation of the New BasicSafety Standards,Vienna, Austria (14-18 August)

Symposium on Tomography inNuclear Medicine, Present Status andFuture Prospects,Vienna, Austria (21-25 August)

Seminar on the Requirements for theSafe Management of RadioactiveWaste, Vienna, Austria(28 August-1 September)

SEPTEMBER 1995International Conference onAdvances in Operational Safety ofNuclear Power Plants,Vienna, Austria (4-8 September)

Second FAO/IAEA Seminar for Africaon Animal Trypanosomiasis: Vectorand Disease Control Using NuclearTechniques, Tanzania (4-8 September)

IAEA General Conference,Vienna, Austria, (18-22 September1995)

OCTOBER 1995International Symposium on Electricity,Health and the Environment:Comparative Assessment in Support ofDecision Making, Stockholm,Sweden,(31 October - 3 November)

NOVEMBER 1995Regional Seminar for Asia and thePacific on Radiotherapy Dosimetry:Radiation Dose in Radiotherapy fromPrescription to Delivery,Bangkok, Thailand(28 November -1 December)

72 IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995 95-00136

IAEABULLETIN

Published quarterly by the Division ofPublic Information of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency, P.O. Box 100,A-1400 Vienna, Austria.Tel: (43-1) 2360-1270Facsimile: (43-1) 234564

DIRECTOR GENERAL: Dr Hans BlixDEPUTY DIRECTORS GENERAL:Mr David Waller, Mr Bruno'Pellaud,Mr Boris Semenov, Mr Sueo Machi,Mr Jihui QianDIRECTOR, DIVISION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION:Mr David Kyd

CHIEF EDITOR: Mr Lothar H WedekindEDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:Mr Rodolfo Quevenco, Ms Juanita Perez,Ms Brenda BlannLAYOUT/DESIGN: Ms Hannelore WilczekCONTRIBUTORS TO DEPARTMENTS:Ms S. Dallalah. Ms L Diebold,Ms A.B de Reynaud, Ms R. SpiegelbergPRODUCTION SUPPORT:Mr P. Witzig. Mr R. Kelleher, Ms I. Emge,Ms H. Bacher, Ms A. Primes,Ms M. Swoboda, Mr W. Kreutzer,Mr G. Demal, Mr A. Adler,Mr R. Luttenfeldner, Mr F. Prochaska,Mr P. Patak, Mr L Nimetzki

Language EditionsTRANSLATION SUPPORT: Mr J. Rivals.Ms E. FritzFRENCH EDITION: Mr S Drege, translation;Ms V. Laugier-Yamashita, copyeditingSPANISH EDITION: Equipo de Servicios deTraductores e Interpretes (ESTI), Havana,Cuba, translation; Mr L. Herrero, editingCHINESE EDITION: China Nuclear EnergyIndustry Corporation Translation Service,Beijing, translation, printing, distribution

The IAEA Bulletin is distributed withoutcharge to a limited number of readers withan interest in the IAEA and the peaceful usesof nuclear energy. Written requests shouldbe addressed to the Editor. Extracts fromIAEA material contained in the IAEA Bulletinmay be freely used elsewhere providedacknowledgement of their source is made. Ifthe attribution indicates that the author of anarticle is not a member of the IAEA staff, per-mission to republish other than for the pur-pose of review must be sought from theauthor or originating organization.

Views expressed in any signed article orin advertisements appearing in the IAEABulletin do not necessarily representthose of the International Atomic EnergyAgency and the IAEA accepts no respon-sibility for them.

AdvertisingAdvertising correspondence should beaddressed to the IAEA Division ofPublications, Sales and Promotion Unit,P.O. Box 100. A-1400 Vienna, Austria.

IAEAMEMBER STATES

1957

AfghanistanAlbaniaArgentinaAustraliaAustriaBelarusBrazilBulgariaCanadaCubaDenmarkDominican RepublicEgyptEl SalvadorEthiopiaFranceGermanyGreeceGuatemalaHaitiHoly SeeHungaryIcelandIndiaIndonesiaIsraelItalyJapanKorea. Republic ofMonacoMoroccoMyanmarNetherlandsNew ZealandNorwayPakistanParaguayPeruPolandPortugalRomaniaRussian FederationSouth AfricaSpainSri LankaSwedenSwitzerlandThailandTunisiaTurkeyUkraineUnited Kingdom

of Great Britainand Northern Ireland

United States of AmericaVenezuela

Viet NamYugoslavia

1958BelgiumCambodiaEcuadorFinlandIran. Islamic Republic ofLuxembourgMexicoPhilippinesSudan

1959Iraq

1960ChileColombiaGhanaSenegal

1961LebanonMaliZaire

1962LiberiaSaudi Arabia

1963AlgeriaBoliviaCdte d'lvoireLibyan Arab JamahiriyaSyrian Arab RepublicUruguay

1964CameroonGabonKuwaitNigeria

1965Costa RicaCyprusJamaicaKenyaMadagascar

1966JordanPanama

1967Sierra LeoneSingaporeUganda

Eighteen ratifications were required to bring the IAEA's Statute into force.had ratified the Statute.

1968Liechtenstein

1969MalaysiaNigerZambia

1970Ireland

1972Bangladesh

1973Mongolia

1974Mauritius

1976QatarUnited Arab EmiratesUnited Republic of Tanzania

1977Nicaragua

1983Namibia

1984China

1986Zimbabwe

1991LatviaLithuania

1992CroatiaEstoniaSlovenia

1993ArmeniaCzech RepublicSlovakia

1994Former Yugoslav Republic

of MacedoniaKazakhstanMarshall IslandsUzbekistanYemen

By 29 July 1957. the States in bold face

Year denotes year of membership. Names of the States are not necessarily their historical designations

For States in italic, membership has been approved by the IAEA General Conference and will take effect once therequired legal instruments have. been deposited.

The tnternattonal Atomic Energy Agency, which came intobeing on 29 July 1957, is an independent intergovern-mental organization within the United Nations System.Headquartered in Vienna, Austria, the Agency has morethan 100 Member States who together work to carry outthe main objectives of IAEA's Statute: To accelerate andenlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health,and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure so faras it is able that assistance provided by it, or at its requestor under its supervision or control, is not used in such away as to further any military purpose.

IAEA headquarters, at the Vienna International Centre.

Until now, one of the biggestproblems with reading personalexposure doses has been the size ofthe monitoring equipment. Which isprecisely why we're introducing theElectronic Pocket Dosimeter (EPD)"MY DOSE mini™" PDM-Series.

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the Aloka EPDs can go anywhereyou go. Which may prove to bequite a sizable improvement, indeed.

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Range

0.01 - 99.99 /£v1 - 9.999 pSv0.01 - 99.99 mSv1 - 9,999 ^Sv0.01 - 99.99 mSv0.001 - 99.99 mSv

ApplicationHigh sensitivity, photonGeneral use. photonGeneral use. photonLow energy, photonNeutronWith vibration & sound alarm, photon

SCIENCE AND HUMANITY

V/////ALOKA CO.. LTD

6-22-1 Mure. Mitaka-shi. Tokyo 181. Japan

Telephone: (0422) 45-5111

Facsimile: (0422) 45-4058

Telex: 02822-344

To: 3rd Export SectionOverseas Marketing Dept.

Ann: N.Odaka

Safety, convenience and a varietyof styles to choose from.

PDM-107

PDM-102

rasa

PDM-173

U. U U n»8v

PDM-303

ADM-10

Documents

cle X.2. of the NPT provides that, "Twenty five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force