CJP-2013-14

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Croatian Journal of PhilosophyVol. XIII, No. 37, 2013

Anti-Exceptionalism about PhilosophyTIMOTHY WILLIAMSONFaculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford

I briefl y rehearse the positive conception of philosophy in my book The Philosophy of Philosophy, as an introduction to the symposium on it that follows.

Keywords: Metaphilosophy, metalinguistic, abduction, axiom, thought experiment, counterfactual, imagination, a priori

Philosophers tend to regard philosophy as exceptional amongst disci-plines, just as the practitioners of most other disciplines tend to regard their own as exceptional. No two disciplines are exactly alike, but we should not exaggerate the differences. Philosophy resembles other disci-plines much more closely than many philosophers like to suppose.

It is not the case that philosophical questions differ in kind from questions in all other disciplines. They are not to be interpreted in some special way. Rather, they are normally to be taken at face value. For example, the question ‘What is justice?’ is primarily a question about the nature of justice itself, not about the word ‘justice’ or about our con-cept of justice. Although there are philosophical questions about words and concepts too, they have no special privilege. Philosophers tend to ask about very general and non-contingent matters, but are not alone in doing so. The main aim of philosophy is to know the answers to its questions.

Like mathematics, philosophy is an armchair discipline. The reason is not that observation and experiment are in principle irrelevant to answering philosophical questions. They are always at least indirectly relevant in principle, and sometimes in practice, just as they are in mathematics. However, as the case of mathematics shows, that does not mean that reforming the discipline to concentrate on making ob-servations and carrying out experiments would be an improvement, even if we outsourced that work to the natural sciences. We have ample experience that some problems are most effectively tackled by more theoretical methods.

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An Uncomfortable Armchair:Tim Williamson Against ApriorismNENAD MIŠČEVIĆDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor

The paper addresses Williamson’s original and challenging proposal for understanding of thought experiments (TEs). First, it puts it on the map of positions, describing it as “ordinarism”, the view that sees thinker’s reaction to the thought-experimental question as nothing extraordinary, let alone mysterious. Then, it passes to Williamson’s proposal to use counterfactuals in order to understand TEs, agrees with the main idea, but proposes a more structured view of capacities or “competences” active in the understanding and answering. Intuitions are important, and they are voice of competencies, at least in the good case. Finally, on the nor-mative level, it argues for the view of justifi cation as being structured, containing both a priori and a posteriori elements.

Keywords: intuition, of thought experiments, counterfactuals, ordi na rism, competence

I) Introduction: Putting Ordinarism on the MapWilliamson’s The Philosophy of Philosophy is certainly the most impor-tant book on meta-philosophy published since the turn of the millenni-um. The present paper is an attempt to trace some deep agreements but also discuss some disagreements with it. It has a long history. I remem-ber Tim Williamson giving his lecture in Geneva out of which came his Dialectica 2004 paper on intuitions, and I vividly remember discussing the lecture with him at length a day later at the airport. Then in 2009 and 2010, together with my colleagues, I had the opportunity to discuss the book with Tim at two Dubrovnik IUC conferences; the paper is the result of these discussions, and of teaching his book at seminars and dis-cussion groups in Rijeka and Budapest. So, with a lot of thanks to Tim and to my colleagues, let me turn to the work, concentrating upon the kernel of the book, its program for the methodology of philosophy.1

1 Thanks go to Majda Trobok, Nenad Smokrović, Istvan Bodnar, Mike Griffi n, Gabor Betegh, Edi Pavlović, Tom Stoneham, John Hawthorne and Carry Jenkins.

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Defending Analyticity: Remarks on Williamson’s The Philosophy of PhilosophyMAJDA TROBOKDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Rijeka

In this paper I concentrate on three issues concerning Williamson’s book The Philosophy of Philosophy: the problem of analytic statements being fi rst-order propositions, the issue concerning aposteriority and the con-cerns related to the semantic vs. metasemantic distinction.

Keywords: analyticity, semantic vs. metasemantic distinction

1. Are analytic truths ordinary fi rst-order propositions?The Philosophy of Philosophy is probably the most thought-provoking book on meta-philosophy on the contemporary scene. Personally I found Williamson’s treatment of analyticity, aposteriority and the semantic vs. metasemantic distinction most inspiring and motivating so I shall concentrate in this paper on these issues.1

One of the main themes of The Philosophy of Philosophy is the view that, even though philosophy is an armchair activity, it would be wrong to conclude that philosophical questions are basically conceptual (anal-ogy with mathematics).

Philosophy is supposed to be analogous to mathematics in the sense that mathematics is a science, it is an armchair activity and does not in any useful sense deal with conceptual questions. So, why should not philosophy be the same?

1 I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Williamson for his kind criticisms and inspiring discussion at the two sessions of the IUC meetings in Dubrovnik, dedicated to his book. (I am happy to add that the tradition of discussing Williamson’s work at the IUC Dubrovnik is still continuing and shows no sign of relenting.)

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Are Dispositions to Believe Constitutive for Understanding?NENAD SMOKROVIĆDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Rijeka

T. Williamson argues against the thesis he recognizes as one of the in-ferentialist basic idea that he formulates as understanding/assent link, the claim that the assent to a sentence (believing a thought, at conceptual level) is constitutive for understanding it. This paper aims to show that appropriately articulated dispositional theory, could plausibly account for a weak version of inferentialism.

Keywords: Inferentialism, dispositionalism, massive modularity

IntroductionAmong many topics Timothy Williamson challenges in his book Philo-sophy of Philosophy,1 the issue of the conditions needed for understand-ing words or grasping concepts has one of the central places. The ques-tion concerning this issue is: Are there constraints that as necessary (or even as necessary and suffi cient) conditions determine the under-standing of words, as constitutive parts of sentences, and of concepts, as parts of thoughts? The prevailing and rather commonsensical view is that there are such conditions.2 The clearest cases in which under-standing and its (putative) conditions are tightly connected are those concerning analytic sentences. Let us take simple examples:

Can one understand the word (or grasp the concept) bachelor, or the word (or the concept) vixen without assenting to the sentence

“Every bachelor is an unmarried adult male”, or“Every vixen is a female fox”?

1 Williamson, 2007.2 Jackson, 1998, Boghossian, 2003, and Peacocke, 1992.

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Replies to Trobok, Smokrović, and Miščević on the Philosophy of PhilosophyTIMOTHY WILLIAMSONFaculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford

I reply to critical discussions by Majda Trobok, Nenad Smokrović, and Nenad Miščević on theses and arguments from my book The Philosophy of Philosophy. I take issue with them on matters such as the following. Should philosophical questions apparently about the world be taken at face value, or are they implicitly metalinguistic or metaconceptual? Are there ‘epistemologically analytic’ sentences that one can understand only if one has a (possibly unmanifested) disposition to accept them? Can ‘philosophical intuitions’ be explained as the products of separable domain-specifi c competencies?

Keywords: analytic, a priori, competence, understanding, logic, metaphilosophy, intuition

My exchanges with Majda Trobok, Nenad Smokrović, and Nenad Miščević on themes from The Philosophy of Philosophy, at the Universi-ty of Rijeka, the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, and elsewhere, before and after its publication, have been a source of both intellectual pleasure and intellectual profi t, at least for me and I hope for them too. In replying here to their thoughtful and sophisticated comments, I follow the usual and fruitful practice of focussing on points of dis-agreement. Nevertheless, the possibility of such focus on sharp points rather than blurred regions of disagreement indicates how much back-ground agreement there is between us, on matters both philosophical and metaphilosophical.

Reply to Majda TrobokOne theme of The Philosophy of Philosophy is that philosophical ques-tions are normally to be taken at face value. For example, when meta-

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The Aposteriori Response-Dependence of the ColorsDAN LÓPEZ DE SADepartament de Lògica, Història i Filosofi a de la Ciència & LOGOSUniversitat de Barcelona

The paper proposes and defends the following characterization of re-sponse dependent property: a property is response-dependent iff there is a response-dependence biconditional for a concept signifying it which holds in virtue of the nature of the property. Finding out whether a prop-erty is such is to a large extent a posteriori matter. Finally, colors are response dependent: they are essentially tied to issuing the relevant ex-periences, so that having those experiences does give access to their, dis-positional, nature. Finally, some important contrary views are critically discussed in the paper.

Keywords: color, response-dependence

What is it for colors themselves—as opposed to terms or concepts for them—to be re sponse-dependent? Can their response-dependence—if there is such—be established on apriori grounds?

These are the two questions of this paper. In the fi rst part (§§ 1–4), I present a general characterization of a response-dependent property; in the second part (§§ 5–8), I defend the view that it is aposteriori whether colors are response-dependent, in this sense.

1. The Original Purpose of Response-DependenceThe phrase ‘response-dependence’ occurred in the literature for the fi rst time fi fteen years ago in Mark Johnston’s ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’ (1989).

Some philosophers, including McDowell and Wiggins, had attempt-ed to defend realism about value against those who claimed that value is not a genuine feature of certain things by analogy with secondary qualities, and color in particular.

Consider a view according to which (say) redness is (say) the dispo-sition to produce in perceptually normal humans an experience as of

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The Conundrum of Time TravelANGUEL STEFANOVInstitute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

Time travel is a theme that provokes scientifi c curiosity, as well as philo-sophical speculation. The problems it raises, however, are being tackled by science fi ction only, and are still not resolved by science either theoreti-cally, or practically. My aim here is, fi rstly, to present some curious facts about time travel and to have a look at the nature of different ontological constraints confronting time travel; secondly, to outline three cases for which time travel might be meaningfully contended; and thirdly, to de-fend the “unexpected” claim that human conscious presence in the world is the genuine-and-natural time travel.

Keywords: time travel, paradoxes, consciousness

1. Introductory WordsThe subject about time travel displays both unfathomed theoretical depth, as well as unfaked human curiosity. This peculiarity seems to suppose successful decisions of all the problems the subject provokes. Needless to say, however, the problems concerning time travel are be-ing still tackled by science fi ction only, but resolved by science proper neither theoretically, nor practically. It is worth mentioning, neverthe-less, that the philosophical interest towards time travel is constantly growing. Special issues of philosophical journals and chapters of en-thralling books are being dedicated on the topic.1

The reason for this interest is not exhausted solely by the exotic character of the topic itself. As it has been noted, the answer about the possibility of time travel “depends on one’s view concerning a wide range of other matters, and such views are themselves the subject of major philosophical controversy.”2 The controversy spreads over diverse

1 The Monist, Vol. 88 (July 2005), N 3; Davies, P. (1995), ch.11; Dainton, B. (2001), ch.8; Hawking, S. and L. Mlodinov (2005), ch.10.

2 Varzi, A. (2005), 325.

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Naming and Necessity From a Functional Point of ViewOSAMU KIRITANIDepartment of Research Promotion,Tokyo Women's Medical University

The aim of this paper is to develop a new connection between naming and necessity. I argue that Kripke’s historical account of naming presupposes the functional necessity of naming. My argument appeals to the etiologi-cal notion of function, which can be thought to capture the necessity of functionality in historical terms. It is shown that the historical account of naming entails all conditions in an etiological defi nition of function.

Keywords: naming, necessity, function, history

Saul Kripke began his infl uential lectures, Naming and Necessity (1980), remarking that some connection would be developed between naming and necessity. However, it has been argued that Kripke’s the-ses about naming do not presuppose any theses about metaphysical necessity (Almog 1986; Stalnaker 1997). The aim of this paper is to develop another connection between naming and necessity. I will argue that Kripke’s historical account of naming presupposes the non-meta-physical necessity of naming. My argument will appeal to the etiologi-cal notion of function (Millikan 1984; Neander 1991a, 1991b; Griffi ths 1993; Godfrey-Smith 1994), according to which the function of an en-tity is fi xed by its history. On the etiological view, the human heart has the function to pump blood, since its pumping blood contributed to the survival of our ancestors. I have elsewhere suggested that the etiological notion of function captures the modality of functionality in non-metaphysical terms (Kiritani 2011a, 2011b; see also Nanay 2011). Function attributions have normative force (see Millikan 1989, 2002; Neander 1991a, 1991b; Davies 2001, 2009; Hardcastle 2002; McLaugh-lin 2009): an entity has the function to do F if and only if it ought to do F. This “ought” can be regarded as expressing the necessity of F. The function of the heart is to pump blood, while it is necessary for the

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Parsons’ Mathematical Intuition: a Brief IntroductionIRIS MERKAČDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor

The paper offers one of Parsons’ main themes in his book Mathemati-cal Thought and Its Objects of 2008 (Cambridge University Press, New York): the role of intuition in our understanding of arithmetic. Our dis-cussion does not cover all of the issues that have relevance for Parsons’ account of mathematical intuition, but we focus on the question: whether our knowledge that there is a model for arithmetic can reasonably be called intuitive. We focus on this question because we have some con-cerns about that.

Keywords: mathematical intuition, non-eliminative structuralism, stroke string inscription, Dedekind-Peano axioms.

1. Introduction: Parsons’ Conception of Mathematical IntuitionThis paper gives a brief overview of Parsons’ conception of mathemati-cal intuition and an answer to the question: whether our knowledge that there is a model for arithmetic is intuitive.

The chapters of Parsons’ book Mathematical Thought and Its Ob-jects (2008) roughly correspond to his articles from 1980 to 2004. It is important for its new defences and amendments, which are added in this book. It is not easy to read it, since Parsons’ complicated thoughts are very often interrupted, readopted at later points, interrupted again, and so on. In the following critical discussion we shall be mainly occu-pied with the precise role of “intuition”1 within his specifi c version of structuralism.

Firstly, we explain that Parsons discusses about two different ver-sions of structuralism, i.e., eliminative structuralism and non-elimina-

1 The role of intuition is seen in Parsons’ understanding of arithmetic.

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Moral Applicability of Agrippa’s TrilemmaNORIAKI IWASACenter for General Education,University of Tokushima

According to Agrippa’s trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads to either infi nite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay examines whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There are various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coherent-ism, contextualism, infi nitism, and German idealism. Examining those responses, the essay shows that the trilemma applies at least to rational justifi cation of contentful moral beliefs. This means that rationalist eth-ics based on any contentful moral belief are rationally unjustifi able.

Keywords: Agrippa’s trilemma, regress argument, ethics, founda-tionalism, coherentism, contextualism, infi nitism, German idealism

1. IntroductionAccording to Agrippa’s trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads to either infi nite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay exam-ines whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There are various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coher-entism, contextualism, infi nitism, and German idealism. Examining those responses, I show that the trilemma applies at least to ratio-nal justifi cation of contentful moral beliefs.1 Finally, I point out that rationalist ethics based on any contentful moral belief are rationally unjustifi able.

1 Contentful moral beliefs are moral beliefs which have content. In contrast, empty moral beliefs are moral beliefs which have no content. For example, the belief “it is always moral to act morally” is an empty moral belief.

135


Challenges to Bach’s Pragmatics1

ESTHER ROMERO and BELÉN SORIADepartment of Philosophy I and Department of English and German PhilologyUniversity of Granada

In this paper, we will revise Bach’s classifi cation of contents in what is directly meant. That catalogue was introduced to reach an exhaustive characterization of the contents that may appear in what the speaker means; something that cannot be done just with Grice’s division between what is said and what is implied. However, Bach’s distinction among different types of direct inexplicit contents (explicit, implicit, and fi gura-tive) presents some theoretical problems which we think can be avoided if at least the following is considered. First, within what he calls “local completion”, a more fi ne grained distinction between lexical specializa-tion and local completion proper should be established. We suggest that this can be done by resorting to different senses in which a mandatory demand of pragmatic information may be triggered. Cases of lexical spe-cialization will depend on context-sensitive expressions and will require a new notion for explicit contents: expliciture. Second, we argue that me-tonymy should be considered as an impliciture rather than as a case of fi gurative content, taking into account that supplementation rather than transfer is the pragmatic strategy involved in the interpretation of metonymic utterances. Third, we defend that in metonymic utterances, the impliciture is based on completion rather than expansion and this entails a refi nement of the notion of propositional radical. In this way, our reform leads to a more exhaustive classifi cation, and provides the criteria underlying this catalogue of the ways in which what is directly communicated in an utterance can go beyond sentence meaning.

Key words: pragmatics, speaker’s meaning, propositional radical, implicitures, explicitures.

1 This paper is part of the project FFI2011–26418, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. The proposals presented here have benefi ted from comments and discussions in the Mental Phenomena course (Dubrovnik, 2011). We are most grateful to the audience and especially to Kent Bach for their useful questions and suggestions.

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Kent Bach on Speaker Intentions and ContextJEFFREY C. KINGRutgers University

It is generally believed that natural languages have lots of contextually sensitive expressions. In addition to familiar examples like ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘to-day’, ‘he’, ‘that’ and so on that everyone takes to be contextually sensi-tive, examples of expressions that many would take to be contextually sensitive include tense, modals, gradable adjectives, relational terms (‘local’; ‘enemy’), possessives (‘Annie’s book’) and quantifi ers (via quanti-fi er domains). With the exception of contextually sensitive expressions discussed by Kaplan [1977], there has not been a lot of discussion as to the mechanism whereby contextually sensitive expressions get their values in context, aside from vague references to speakers’ intentions. In a recent paper, I proposed a candidate for being this mechanism and defended the claim that it is such. Because, as I suggested, these issues have been most extensively discussed in the case of demonstratives, I focused on these expressions by way of contrasting the mechanism I pro-posed with others in the literature. In the present work, I simply state what I claim is the mechanism by means of which demonstratives secure semantic values in contexts without defending the claim that it is so. I then consider some claims made by Kent Bach, and arguments for those claims, which would undermine the account I propose of how demon-stratives secure semantic values in context.

Key words: speaker intentions, context, pragmatics, demonstra-tives, demonstrations.

It is generally believed that natural languages have lots of contextually sensitive expressions. In addition to familiar examples like ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘today, ‘he’, ‘that’ and so on that everyone takes to be contextually sen-sitive, examples of expressions that many would take to be contextual-ly sensitive include tense, modals, gradable adjectives, relational terms (‘local’; ‘enemy’), possessives (‘Annie’s book’) and quantifi ers (via quan-tifi er domains). With the exception of contextually sensitive expressions discussed by Kaplan [1977], there has not been a lot of discussion as

169


Good and Bad BachMICHAEL DEVITTThe Graduate Center, the City University of New York

This paper is concerned with Bach’s stand on the “semantics-pragmat-ics” issue. A bit of Good Bach is his skepticism about the evidential role of intuitions. Another bit is his fi rm stand against the widespread con-fusion of what constitutes the meanings of utterances with how hearers interpret utterances. The paper argues at length against two bits of Bad Bach. (1) There is no sound theoretical motivation for his excluding the reference fi xing of demonstratives, pronouns and names from “what-is-said”. (2) His methodology for deciding what is “semantic” is fl awed in three respects: fi rst, in its commitment to the mistaken Modifi ed Occam’s Razor; second, in its placing inappropriate syntactic constraints on con-ventional meanings; and, third, in explaining many regularities in us-age as standardizations rather than conventionalizations. This fl awed methodology has the conservative effect of ruling out new meanings.

Key words: semantics, pragmatics, meaning, communication, in-tuitions, methodology, what is said, Modifi ed Occam’s Razor, dead metaphors, defi nite descriptions, conventions, standardization.

1. IntroductionPaul Grice (1989) made it clear, if it was not already so, that we need to distinguish between two sorts of properties that a particular utter-ance may have. Grice himself distinguished “what is said” from what is “implied, suggested, meant” (1989: 24), giving many interesting exam-ples. A famous one concerns a philosopher who writes a reference for a student. The philosopher says that the student’s English is excellent and his attendance regular but what the philosopher means, his “con-versational implicature”, is that the student is no good at philosophy (33). It is common to distinguish the two sorts of properties using the vexed terms “semantic” and “pragmatic”.1 Thus the problem of drawing

1 These terms have distressingly many uses in the literature, as Kent Bach nicely demonstrates (1999). I shall explain my usage in sec. 2.2; see also 2013b, secs. 3 and 4.

201


Bach’s Constraint on Extending Acquaintance: Some Questions and a Modest ProposalMIRELA FUŠCentral European University

My aim in this paper is to examine how Kent Bach’s theory of singu-lar thought about material objects meets the requirements of transmit-ting de re thought. I identify a certain possible paradox haunting Bach’s move of extending acquaintance in order to widen the scope of singular thought and I attempt to answer this possible paradox. First, I briefl y present the manner in which Bach motivates extended acquaintance and which constraints he puts on it. I then address the problem of the sorites paradox which might lead not only to Bach’s communication-based de re thoughts, but perception-based de re thoughts in general, thus defi ned. Finally, I offer my tentative solution to the problem of extended acquain-tance which consists in introducing two constraints on singular thought, namely (i) the (external) acquaintance constraint and (ii) the (internal) cognitive signifi cance constraint, and two types of representations, namely indexical-iconic representations and indexical-discursive repre-sentations which are together crucial for having a singular thought.

Key words: singular thought, acquaintance constraint, cognitive signifi cance constraint, indexical-iconic representation, indexical-discursive representation.

1. IntroductionKent Bach is one of the prominent advocates of singular thought, in particular, the Acquaintance Theory of singular (or de re) thought.1 In

1 There are three dominant theories of singular thought, namely Acquaintance Theory of singular thought (see Burge 1977, Donnellan 1979, Lewis 1979, Evans 1982, Boer and Lycan 1986, Bach 1987/94, Salmon 1988, Brewer 1999, Recanati 1993, Soames 2003, Pryor 2007), Semantic Instrumentalism (see Harman 1977, Kaplan 1989) and Cognitive Authority or Cognitivism (see Jeshion 2002, 2009, 2010).

217


Replies to My CriticsKENT BACHSan Francisco State University

I thank my critics for time, thought, and effort put into their commentar-ies. Since obviously I can’t respond to everything, I will try to address what strike me as the most important questions they ask and objections they raise. I think I have decent answers to some questions and decent responses to some objections, in other cases it seems enough to clarify the relevant view, and in still others I need to modify the view in question. One complication, which I won’t elaborate on, is that the views under consideration have evolved, or at least changed, over the years, so that my critics are aiming at a moving target, albeit a slowly moving one. Before responding, I will sketch some of the main ideas behind my view, including their unifying motivation, and mention a few key distinctions that are particularly relevant to topics addressed by my critics.

Key words: pragmatics, semantic-pragmatic distinction, linguistic meaning, speaker meaning, expliciture, standardization.

In philosophizing about language and about its use, fi rst and foremost we need to distinguish information that is linguistically encoded (or at least partly determined by such information) and information as-sociated with acts of using language. This roughly corresponds to the semantic-pragmatic distinction.

I take semantics to be concerned with certain properties of linguis-tic expressions, that is, sentences and their constituents. These prop-erties are linguistic meanings and what these meanings determine as a function of context.1 Semantic properties are roughly on a par with syntactic and phonological properties, that is, properties of linguistic types. Also, as is widely held, the semantic properties of complex lin-guistic expressions depend on their syntactic structure and the seman-tic properties of their constituents within this structure. In contrast,

1 The prototypical example is the pronoun ‘I’. As used in a given context, semantic content (reference) relative to that context is the speaker.

251


Vagueness and Mechanistic Explanation in NeurosciencePHILIPP HAUEISInstitute of PhilosophyHumboldt University of Berlin

The problem of fuzzy boundaries when delineating cortical areas is widely known in human brain mapping and its adjacent subdisciplines (anatomy, physiology and functional neuroimaging). Yet, a conceptual framework for understanding indeterminacy in neuroscience is miss-ing, and there has been no discussion in the philosophy of neuroscience whether indeterminacy poses an issue for good neuroscientifi c explana-tions. My paper addresses both these issues by applying philosophical theories of vagueness to three levels of neuroscientifi c research, namely to (i) cytoarchitectonic studies at the neuron level (ii) intra-areal neu-ronal interaction measured by the BOLD-signal of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and (iii) inter-areal connectivity between dif-ferent cortical areas. The rest of the paper explores how this framework can be extended to mechanistic explanations in neuroscience. I discuss a semantic and an ontic interpretation of vagueness in mechanistic ex-planations and argue how both become scientifi cally interesting from the perspective of a philosophy of scientifi c practice.

Key words: Vagueness, mechanisms, neuroscience, explanation, fuzzy boundaries.

IntroductionIn a variety of studies concerning the anatomy of the cerebral cortex, neuroscientifi c researchers report different forms of indeterminacy when describing the boundaries between different cortical areas. In a study that investigated how the folding of the cortical surface predicts structural features of different brain areas, Fischl et. al (2007) notice that the “changes that defi ne the borders between adjacent association cortices (such as 44/45) are considerably more subtle than in primary areas, […], making the precise and repeatable localization of higher

277


Structural Representations and the Explanatory ConstraintMARIA SERBANSchool of PhilosophyUniversity of East Anglia

My aim in this paper is to investigate what epistemic role, if any, do appeals to representations play in cognitive neuroscience. I suggest that while at present they seem to play something in between a minimal and a substantive explanatory role, there is reason to believe that representa-tions have a substantial contribution to the construction of neuroscientic explanations of cognitive phenomena.

Key words: mental representation, explanatory constraint, neuro-scientifi c explanations, structural representations.

1. IntroductionThe concept of mental representation is common currency within con-temporary theories of cognition. One central idea that all these theo-ries share is that cognizing is processing mental representations. This status quo in cognitive science has attracted an increasing interest within philosophy of mind for explaining the relevant notion of mental representation. In brief, the problem is to say what it is for something in the mind to represent something. Two substantive constraints on a philosophical theory of mental representation have been advanced in the literature: the explanatory constraint and the so-called implemen-tation constraint. The former constraint amounts to the task of justify-ing one’s theoretical appeal to notions of representation in explaining cognitive phenomena. The latter constraint claims that the theory of mental representation should be compatible with our best scientifi c stories about what sorts of things actually do the representing in the mind/brain.

My aim in this paper is to explore a specifi c way of cashing out the explanatory constraint for a theory of mental representation which takes seriously the idea that a philosophical theory of representational

293


Ever the Twain shall Meet? Chomsky and Wittgenstein on Linguistic CompetenceTAMARA DOBLERSchool of PhilosophyUniversity of East Anglia

It is a dominant view in the philosophical literature on the later Wittgen-stein that Chomsky’s approach to the investigation of natural language stands in stark contrast to Wittgenstein’s, and that their respective con-ceptions of language and linguistic understanding are irreconcilable. The aim in this paper is to show that this view is largely incorrect and that the two approaches to language and its use are indeed compatible, notwithstanding their distinctive foci of interest. The author argues that there is a signifi cant correspondence in at least fi ve different areas of their work, and that once we pay attention to these there will be less temptation to see Wittgenstein and Chomsky as enemies.

Key words: Wittgenstein, Chomsky, referentialist semantics, use theory of meaning, analytic-synthetic distinction.

1. Chomsky and Wittgenstein: the received viewThere is a general consensus among interpreters of the later Wittgen-stein that Chomsky’s views regarding language, meaning, and use, stand in stark opposition to Wittgenstein’s own views regarding such matters. This is perhaps most explicit in Baker and Hacker’s Lan-guage, Sense, and Nonsense (1984). Baker and Hacker (B&H) deploy what is clearly an idiosyncratic interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later conception of grammar, rules, and linguistic understanding against a range of philosophical and scientifi c theories of language and meaning, including Chomsky’s generative linguistics. The key strategy is to show that such theories reiterate the very mistakes the later Wittgenstein identifi es in his own earlier works,1 to adapt some of the methods and

1 See also Malcolm (1993: 50).

313


A Guide to Binding EconomyANDREI NASTAUniversity of East Anglia

This is an introduction to the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of bind-ing, with a special focus on the so-called principles of linguistic economy. I shall fi rst look at the (syntactic) Binding Principles, and stress some of their limitations. Consequently, additional constraints are needed to complement the robust syntactic generalisations already ensured by the Binding Principles and thus to overcome their limitations. Subsequent-ly, we shall explore the basic mechanisms underlying the reconstruction of Binding Theory under the new set of constraints introduced by the economy principles. It is this variety of principles of economy that is the main theme of the present paper. I spell out the idea of linguistic economy, its ramifi cations as well as its explanatory uses.

Key words: binding, principles of linguistic economy, syntax, se-mantics, pragmatics

1. IntroductionThe present paper is a basic introduction to a way of thinking about binding constructions shaped by the idea(s) of economy. Theorists working in different areas of linguistics have proposed various prin-ciples of economy. We shall look at several such proposals.1

My primary aim here is to make clear the behaviour of economy-governed binding constructions, in syntax, semantics and pragmatics. These approaches are all intended to complete, correct and eventu-ally supersede the standard Government and Binding (GB) approach to binding phenomena, also known as Binding Theory, with its three binding principles or conditions (A, B, and C). Although I present the at least apparent challenges to the Binding Theory, no comprehensive so-lution to these challenges will be offered here. I only sketch the differ-

1 Since the literature is vast, I was obliged to make a somewhat arbitrary selection. There are numerous other linguistic theories of binding that appeal to economy, as the notion is presented here (see references). However, the kinds of framework I selected are not at all arbitrary as I shall suggest below.

341


The Viability of Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of MathematicsJÖRGEN SJÖGRENUniversity of Skövde

CHRISTIAN BENNETUniversity of Gothenburg

Attempts have been made to analyse features in mathematics within a social constructivist context. In this paper we critically examine some of those attempts recently made with focus on problems of the objectivity, ontology, necessity, and atemporality of mathematics. Our conclusion is that these attempts fare no better than traditional alternatives, and that they, furthermore, create new problems of their own.

Keywords: Social constructivism, mathematics, ontology, objectiv-ity, necessity, atemporality.

1. IntroductionRecently, efforts have been made to analyse some problems in the phi-losophy of mathematics within a social constructivist context, notably by Paul Ernest (Ernest 1998, Ernest 2004), and, somewhat later and in more detail, by Julian C. Cole (Cole 2008, Cole 2009, Cole 2013).1 Dif-ferent versions of (social) constructivism fl ourish in the social sciences, including philosophy of mathematics education, but are rare in the phi-losophy of mathematics. A number of philosophers, e.g. John Searle (Searle 1995), Ian Hacking (Hacking 1999), and André Kukla (Kukla 2000), discuss issues of social constructivism, but none of them raise questions concerning philosophy of mathematics, even if Kukla touches upon the fi eld when arguing that logic cannot be a social construction (op. cit., ch. 14). The most elaborated recent conception of social con-

1 Reuben Hersh has conceptions of mathematics that are close to the positions of Cole and Ernest in, e.g., (Hersh 1997), but he calls his position cultural-historical, and we pay no attention to his ideas in this paper.

357


On Practical Reasoning under IgnoranceGEORG SPIELTHENNERDepartment of Philosophy and Religious StudiesUniversity of Dar es Salaam

The purpose of this paper is to present an account of practical reason-ing under ignorance—i.e., reasoning under conditions where the avail-able information is so uninformative that we cannot assign probabilities to the outcomes of our options. The account shows that such reasoning need not rely on implausible principles (e.g. the maximin principle), but can nevertheless be logically valid. Put differently, I attempt to show that we can reason in a logically correct manner even if we do not know what the outcomes of our options are or how likely these outcomes are. The proposed approach is applicable to unidimensional and multidi-mensional practical reasoning, and it is therefore useful for analysing real-life decision problems found in a wide variety of choice situations. Its application requires only that an agent has some basic knowledge of propositional logic. To achieve the aim of the article, I fi rst outline when practical reasoning can be said to be logically valid. Section 2 applies the approach to unidimensional reasoning and Section 3 shows how an agent can build up n-dimensional reasoning under ignorance in a logi-cally correct way.

Keywords: Ignorance, nonprobabilistic decision-making, practical reasoning, reasoning under ignorance, uncertainty, valid practical reasoning.

In this article I am concerned with practical reasoning under ignorance. Some authors dismiss this type of reasoning because they think of it as marginal only. They hold that there are occasions when we can reason under conditions of certainty (i.e. we know, at least for practical pur-poses, of each of our options what the outcomes of our taking it would be), or⎯more commonly⎯that we are facing decision problems under risk. That is to say, these writers appear to believe that in most situ-ations we can say of each of the outcomes of our options how probable they are. The probabilities may be objective (e.g. inferred from existing

375


Experiencer Phrases, Predicates of Personal Taste and Relativism: On Cappelen and Hawthorne’s Critique of the Operator ArgumentDAN ZEMANUniversitat Pompeu Fabra

In the debate between relativism and contextualism about various ex-pressions, the Operator Argument, initially proposed by Kaplan (1989), has been taken to support relativism. However, one widespread reac-tion against the argument has taken the form of arguing against one assumption made by Kaplan: namely, that certain natural language expressions are best treated as sentential operators. Focusing on the only extant version of the Operator Argument proposed in connection to predicates of personal taste such as “tasty” and experiencer phrases such as “for Anna” (that of Kölbel (2009)), in this paper I investigate whether the reasons offered by Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) against various assumptions of the argument failing in the case of modal, temporal, lo-cational and precisional expressions transfer to the case of experiencer phrases to undercut support for relativism about predicates of personal taste. My aim is to show that they don’t. Thus, I fi rst show that their considerations against experiencer phrases such as “for Anna” being sen-tential operators are not decisive. Second, I show that even if granting that such experiencer phrases are not sentential operators, a suitably modifi ed version of the Operator Argument can be defended from the objections they raise.

Keywords: The Operator Argument, predicates of personal taste, experiencer phrases, contextualism, relativism.

In “Demonstratives”, David Kaplan offers the following argument for the introduction of unorthodox parameters in the circumstances of evaluation (with particular focus on time):

If we built the time of evaluation into the contents (thus removing time from the circumstances leaving only, say, a possible world history, and mak-

399


The Structure of Propositions and Cross-linguistic Syntactic Variability1

VASILIS TSOMPANIDISInstitut Jean Nicod &Instituto de Investigaciones Filosófi cas U.N.A.M.

In Jeffrey King’s theory of structured propositions, propositional structure mirrors the syntactic structure of natural language sentences that express it. I provide cases where this claim individuates propositions too fi nely across languages. Crucially, King’s paradigmatic proposition-fact ^that Dara swims^ cannot be believed by a monolingual Greek speaker, due to Greek syntax requiring an obligatory article in front of proper names. King’s two possible replies are: (i) to try to streamline the syntax of Greek and English; or (ii) to insist that English speakers can believe proposi-tions inexpressible in Greek. I argue that the former option entails giving up a neo-Russelian framework, and the latter makes King’s account arbi-trary or trivial. I conclude that the mirroring claim is untenable.

Keywords: Propositional structure, DP hypothesis, philosophy of language, Modern Greek, direct reference, proper names.

Jeffrey King identifi es propositions with certain facts about items in the world and our linguistic representations of them (King 2007; King 2009; King 2013a; King 2013b). One of his main claims is that a propo-sition’s structure mirrors the syntactic structure of natural language sentences that express it. I argue that when we use this claim to indi-viduate propositions cross-linguistically, we end up with a theory that individuates propositions too fi nely, with very important negative con-sequences for the theory’s explanatory aims.

1 I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to Ben Caplan who contributed signifi cantly to the creation of this paper, and the following colleagues for their comments: Eliot Michaelson, Dan Zeman, Carolyn O’Meara, Sara Garcia Pelaez, Giannis Kostopoulos, Brian Joseph, and two anonymous reviewers. Axel Barcelo, Mario Gomez-Torrente, and other participants in UNAM’s Insituto de Investigaciónes Filosofi cas Philosophy of Language Seminar also gave me quite helpful feedback. Parts of this research were supported by a postdoctoral grant from the Becas Posdoctorales programme of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM).

421


Kripke’s Semantic Argument against Descriptivism ReconsideredCHEN BODepartment of PhilosophyPeking University

There are two problematic assumptions in Kripke’s semantic argument against descriptivism. Assumption 1 is that the referential relation of a name to an object is only an objective or metaphysical relation between language and the world; it has nothing to do with the understanding of the name by our linguistic community. Assumption 2 is that descrip-tivism has to hold that, if name α has its meaning and the meaning is given by one description or a cluster of descriptions, the description(s) should supply a set of necessary and suffi cient conditions for determin-ing what α designates; and that it is possible for us to fi nd out such a set of conditions. Emphasizing the sociality, intentionality, conventionality and historicity of language and meaning, this paper rejects Assumption 1, and argues that Assumption 2 is an unfair interpretation of descrip-tivism, and it is not necessary for descriptivists to hold Assumption 2. This paper fi nally concludes that Kripke’s semantic argument against descriptivism fails.

Keywords: Kripke, the semantic argument, Assumption 1, Assump-tion 2, the sociality, intentionality, conventionality and historicity of language and meaning.

1. OpeningTo refute descriptivism, Kripke reformulates its cluster version (CVD for short) refi ned by Wittgenstein and Searle. For him, CVD consists of six theses as follows.(1) To every name or designating expression ‘X’, there corresponds a

cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties φ such that [the speaker] A believes ‘φX’.

(2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.

447


An Argument for a Quasi-Dretskian Approach to Causal ExplanationMARCO MAESTRELLOMcMaster University

In this paper I will present Jaegwon Kim’s causal explanatory exclu-sion principle as described in Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem of Mental Causation (1995) and Fred Dretske’s version of the two ex-plananda strategy as depicted in Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behaviour (1993). I will attempt to demonstrate that Dretske’s theory is not fl awless in its assumptions but that it nevertheless demands a close look in so far as it provides us with a valuable theory for explaining certain events.

Keywords: Dretske, Kim, Davidson, mental causation, causal ex-planation, anomalous monism.

In this paper I will discuss Jaegwon Kim’s causal explanatory exclu-sion principle as described in Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem of Mental Causation (1995) and Fred Dretske’s version of the two ex-plananda strategy as depicted in Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behaviour (1993). This paper is broadly divided into two sections. The fi rst portion describes Dretske’s assumptions and theory, along with Kim’s response to this theory. The second portion includes my response to Kim and a partial re-construal of how much we can salvage from Dretske’s version of this strategy. I will argue that Dretske’s the-ory is not fl awless in its assumptions but that it nevertheless demands a serious look in so far as it provides us with a practical theory for explaining specifi c events. As a terminological side note, I will be using the terms explanandum and explanans when discussing explanations. To clarify: an explanandum is a proposition or fact which is in need of explanation. An explanans is the set of propositions that attempt to explain the explanandum in question.1

1 As described by Samir Okasha (2002: 42–43).

457


The Logical Structure of HopeTIAN-QUN PANDepartment of Philosophy,Nanjing University

When a person hopes something, this means that he or she hopes some proposition will be true. Thus, hope is a type of modality on propositions. Hope logic is the study of the logical structure among propositions with hope modalities. Rational hope is deductively enclosed, consistent, self-affi rmed, etc. These properties can be regarded as axioms of hope logic. An important property of hope is that hope is not necessarily true, but it is hoped that that hope is true. This is a property particular to hope, and it can be regarded as ‘the hope axiom’. Using possible world semantics, different hope logic systems, which are sound and complete with respect to their frames, can be obtained by selecting different hope axioms.

Keywords: Hope logic, hope axiom, mental logic.

1. IntroductionWe live with hope. Different people may have different hopes, and the same person may have different hopes at different stages of life. Hope makes life meaningful. Thus, hope is one of the most important issues contemplated by philosophers.

Hope should be also a topic of interest to logicians and metaphysi-cians. Spinoza gave the following defi nition of hope: ‘Hope is an in-constant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.’(Spinoza 1951: III, Def. XII). Such a defi nition is not correct. People with a hope do have plea-sure, but we could not say that hope is a kind of pleasure. Hope is a de-sired possibility, and the most important point is that hoping is a state of mind. When people hope something, this means that they would pre-fer that some proposition or state of affairs be true, even though it may not necessarily be true. Just as for ‘believe’, ‘know’, ‘doubt’, and so on, the object of ‘hope’ is a proposition (or state of affairs). So, hope is a kind of attitude on propositions (or on states of affairs). Through the addition of the operator of hope, modal hope propositions are formed. However,

463


Unresponsive BachMICHAEL DEVITTThe Graduate Center, the City University of New York

My paper, “Good and Bad Bach”, describes Bach’s position on the seman-tics-pragmatics issue and then makes four objections. The fi rst objection is to Bach’s austere notion of what-is-said. The other three are to Bach’s conservative methodology for deciding what is “semantic”. I object to his “Modifi ed Occam’s Razor”; to his “correspondence” principle that I de-scribe as “the tyranny of syntax”; and to his application of his notion of standardization. Bach’s “Reply to Michael Devitt on Meaning and Refer-ence” is very disappointing. He fails even to mention my objections to his positions on what-is-said and standardization. And he makes hardly any serious attempt to address my objections to his Modifi ed Occam’s Razor and the tyranny of syntax. All my objections still stand.

Keywords: Semantics, pragmatics, meaning, methodology, what is said, Modifi ed Occam’s Razor, dead metaphors, defi nite descrip-tions, conventions, standardization, tyranny of syntax, pragmatic derivations.

1. IntroductionMy paper, “Good and Bad Bach” (“GBB”: 2013c),1 describes Kent Bach’s interesting and distinctive position on the vexed semantics versus pragmatics issue and then makes four objections. The fi rst objection is to Bach’s austere notion of what-is-said. The other three are to Bach’s conservative methodology for deciding what is “semantic”. I object to his “Modifi ed Occam’s Razor”; to his “correspondence” principle that I describe as “the tyranny of syntax”; and to his application of his notion of standardization.

Bach’s “Replies to My Critics” (2013)2 is prompted by several papers including GBB. He begins “Replies” as follows:

1 All unspecifi c citations to my work are to this paper.2 All unspecifi c citations to Bach’s work are to this paper.

1

Croatian Journal of PhilosophyVol. XIV, No. 40, 2014

Empty Thoughts and Vicarious Thoughts in the Mental File FrameworkFRANÇOIS RECANATIInstitut Jean-Nicod

Mental fi les have a referential role—they serve to think about objects in the world—but they also have a meta-representational role: when ‘indexed’, they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. This additional, meta-representational function of fi les is invoked to shed light on the uses of empty singular terms in negative existentials and pseudo-singular attitude ascriptions.

Keywords: Mental fi les, acquaintance, empty names, singular thought, attitude ascriptions, negative existentials.

1. The mental fi le frameworkAn increasing number of philosophers use the mental fi le metaphor to illuminate singular thinking. Different people elaborate the metaphor differently, however.

On my own picture (Recanati 1993, 2006, 2010a, 2011, 2012), men-tal fi les are based on certain relations to objects in the environment; different types of fi le correspond to different types of relation. The rela-tions in question—acquaintance relations—are epistemically reward-ing in that they enable the subject to gain information from the object.1 The role of the fi les is to store information about the objects we are acquainted with—information which our being acquainted with them makes available. So mental fi les are ‘about objects’: like singular terms in the language, they refer, or are supposed to refer. What they refer to is not determined by properties which the subject takes the referent to have (i.e. by information—or misinformation—in the fi le), but through

1 The paradigm is, of course, perceptual acquaintance, but the notion of acquaintance can be generalized “in virtue of the analogy between relations of perceptual acquaintance and other, more tenuous, relations of epistemic rapport” (Lewis 1999: 380–81). The generalized notion of acquaintance covers community-mediated testimonial relations to objects mentioned to us in conversation, etc.

13


The Metaphilosophical Signifi cance of ScepticismNEIL GASCOIGNEDepartment of Politics and International Relations and PhilosophyRoyal Holloway, University of London

The aim of this paper is to contribute to an appreciation of the metaphilo-sophical signifi cance of scepticism. It proceeds by investigating what the differing characterisations of the sceptical threat reveal about the kind of understanding that is being sought; and specifi cally, what this envis-aged understanding connotes concerning how epistemological inquiry is itself conceived. An investigation, that is to say, into how these char-acterisations support or help constitute that conception of inquiry by attempting to keep a relationship with ‘the sceptic’ going on their own terms.

Keywords: Metaphilosophy, epistemological scepticism, Stroud, Sosa, ancient scepticism.

…scepticism is a resting place for reason, in which it may refl ect on its dogmatical wanderings, and gain some knowledge of the region in which it happens to be, that it may pursue its way with greater certainty; but it can-not be its permanent dwelling-place. It must take up its abode only in the region of complete certitude, whether this relates to the knowledge of objects themselves, or to the limits which bound all our knowledge.Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (A760/B788)

IWhen the Hellenistic empiricists averred that all knowledge was de-rived from experience, it seemed natural to their ancient Sceptical op-ponents to wonder how they knew that to be the case. Since this was an assertion made by groups who had otherwise wildly divergent theories about the nature of existence and the form of the good life, it seemed equally natural to those Sceptics to ask how, on any particular occa-


A Generality Problem for Bootstrapping and SensitivityGUIDO MELCHIORDepartment of Philosophy,University of Graz

Vogel argues that sensitivity accounts of knowledge are implausible be-cause they entail that we cannot have any higher-level knowledge that our beliefs are true, not false. Becker and Salerno object that Vogel is mistaken because he does not formalize higher-level beliefs adequately. They claim that if formalized correctly, higher-level beliefs are sensitive, and can therefore constitute knowledge. However, these accounts do not consider the belief-forming method as sensitivity accounts require. If we take bootstrapping as the belief-forming method, as the discussed cases suggest, then we face a generality problem. Our higher-level beliefs as formalized by Becker and Salerno turn out to be sensitive according to a wide reading of bootstrapping, but insensitive according to a narrow reading. This particular generality problem does not arise for the alter-native accounts of process reliabilism and basis-relative safety. Hence, sensitivity accounts not only deliver opposite results given different for-malizations of higher-level beliefs, but also for the same formalization, depending on how we interpret bootstrapping. Therefore, sensitivity ac-counts do not fail because they make higher-level knowledge impossible, as Vogel argues, and they do not succeed in allowing higher-level knowl-edge, as Becker and Salerno suggest. Rather, their problem is that they deliver far too heterogeneous results.

Keywords: Sensitivity, bootstrapping, generality problem, higher-level knowledge.

1. OverviewI will proceed as follows: In section 2, I present Vogel’s argument for his claim that sensitivity accounts of knowledge entail that we can-not have higher-level knowledge that our beliefs are true, not false. In section 3, I analyze Becker’s and Salerno’s objection to this claim. In section 4, I introduce method-relative sensitivity and bootstrapping

49


Hubert Dreyfus and the Last Myth of the MentalTIMOTHY J. NULTYDepartment of Philosophy,University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth

This paper critically evaluates the arguments advanced by Hubert Drey-fus in his debate with John McDowell regarding the nature of skilled coping. The paper argues that there are signifi cant methodological short-comings in Dreyfus’ position. The paper examines these methodological limitations and attempts to clarify the problems by re-framing the issues in terms of intentionality, and the specifi c intentional structures that may or may not be present in skilled coping. The paper attempts to show that the diffi culties facing Dreyfus arise from his implicit adherence to a fi nal myth of the mental. The last myth of the mental is the belief that mental coping is fundamentally different than embodied coping because the former is characterized by mindedness while the latter is not. Drey-fus characterizes the mental as constituted by a kind of interiority while everyday expertise or embodied coping is characterized by exteriority to the exclusion of any type of interiority. I undermine this Cartesian as-sumption in Dreyfus’ position by showing that the criteria and phenom-enological descriptions he uses to characterize embodied coping apply equally to mental coping.

Keywords: Dreyfus, McDowell, intentionality, embodiment, Carte-sian.

1. IntroductionHubert Dreyfus argues that John McDowell’s account of our perceptual openness to the world exemplifi es what Dreyfus calls the “myth of the mental”. Contrary to McDowell’s view, Dreyfus maintains that our ev-eryday expert coping with the world is not permeated with “conceptual mindedness” (Dreyfus 2007a: 361). The strength of Dreyfus’ arguments against the ubiquity of conceptual mindedness depends on the accurate characterization of both minds and the nature of conceptualization.

65


Essentialism: Metaphysical or Psychological?MOTI MIZRAHIPhilosophy Department,St. John’s University

In this paper, I argue that Psychological Essentialism (PE), the view that essences are a heuristic or mental shortcut, is a better explanation for modal intuitions than Metaphysical Essentialism (ME), the view that objects have essences, or more precisely, that (at least some) objects have (at least some) essential properties. If this is correct, then the mere fact that we have modal intuitions is not a strong reason to believe that objects have essential properties.

Keywords: Essence, essential properties, heuristic, inference to the best explanation, metaphysical essentialism, modal intuition, psy-chological essentialism.

1. IntroductionMetaphysical Essentialism (ME) “is the doctrine that (at least some) objects have (at least some) essential properties” (Robertson 2008). More precisely (Paul 2004: 170):

an object O has property P essentially when O must have P in order to be the object that it is. If O has P essentially, then, necessarily, in any world in which O exists, O must have P. (See also Mackie 2006: 1.)

ME, then, is “a theory of the objective, context-independent de re na-ture of objects” (Paul 2004: 170). But why think that objects have an “objective, context-independent de re nature”? In this paper, I am not concerned with how to characterize the distinction between essential properties and accidental properties (see, e.g., Gorman 2005). Rather, I am concerned with whether or not there are strong reasons to believe that objects even have “objective, context-independent de re natures.” In other words, why think that objects have essences? 1 I discuss em-

1 As Robertson (2008) writes, “Accounts of the fi rst sort [i.e., those that suggest that claims of origin essentialism are grounded in a “branching conception of

73


A Defence of the Radical Version of the Asymmetry Objection to Political LiberalismMATT SLEATDepartment of Politics,University of Sheffi eld

This article seeks to make two signifi cant contributions to the debate sur-rounding the asymmetry objection to political liberalism. The fi rst is to distinguish between and explicate moderate and radical versions of the asymmetry objection as two discrete forms that this criticism can take. The second contribution is to defend the radical version of the asymme-try objection as a serious challenge to political liberalism. It does this by arguing that the commitment to reciprocity that underpins the principle of legitimacy can be the subject of reasonable disagreement, which there-fore undermines the asymmetry central to political liberalism between the legitimacy of being able to coerce compliance with principles of right but not principles of the good on the grounds that the latter can be the subject of reasonable disagreement whereas the former cannot.

Keywords: Asymmetry objection, legitimacy, political liberalism, Rawls.

The asymmetry objection has proven to be one of the most serious chal-lenges to the political liberalism of John Rawls and his followers, and remains the subject of much controversy and debate. The objection es-sentially questions the asymmetry between justice and the good that is a fundamental and distinct characteristic of political conceptions of liberalism; specifi cally that it is legitimate to use state power to enforce compliance with principles of the right, such as constitutional essentials or a conception of justice, but not with principles of the good because the latter can be the subject of reasonable disagreement whereas the former cannot. The aim of this paper is twofold: Firstly I want to distin-guish between two different forms of the asymmetry objection, what I call the moderate and the radical versions, which are differentiated by where they understand the source of the asymmetry to be located. The

91


Moral Twin Earth, Intuitions, and Kind TermsHEIMIR GEIRSSONDepartment of Philosophy and Religious Studies,Iowa State University

Horgan and Timmons, with their Moral Twin Earth arguments, argue that the new moral realism falls prey to either objectionable relativism or referential indeterminacy. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment on which the arguments are based relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. First, it builds on Putnam’s well-known Twin Earth example and the conclusions drawn from that about the meaning of kind names. Further, it relies on the intuition that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they would be able to have genuine moral disagreements. I will argue that the similarities with Putnam’s thought experiment are ques-tionable and so the reliance on Putnam-like intuitions is questionable. I will then further argue that even if we accept the intuitions that Horgan and Timmons rely on, the anti-realist conclusion is not warranted due to there being more to the meaning of kind terms than the argument assumes. Once we develop the meaning of kind terms further we can acknowledge both that Earthers and Twin Earthers refer to different properties with their moral terms, and that in spite of that they can have a substantive disagreement due to a shared meaning component.

Keywords: Moral twin-earth, intuitions, disagreements, kind names, moral realism.

Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have written a number of articles where they use their Moral Twin Earth thought experiment to attack the new moral realism (Horgan & Timmons 1990).1 The new moral realism is based on advances made in the philosophy of language. Suppose, the argument goes, that a causal theory of reference of the kind advanced by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, to name two of the usual suspects, is true. Suppose further that moral terms, such as ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘kind’, and ‘just’ are kind terms which reference is determined causally and

1 Later articles include (Horgan & Timmons, 1992a, 1992b, 2000, 2009).

111


A Never-Ending StoryBEN BLUMSONDepartment of Philosophy,National University of Singapore

Take a strip of paper with ‘once upon a time there’ written on one side and ‘was a story that began’ on the other. Twisting the paper and joining the ends produces John Barth’s story Frame-Tale, which prefi xes ‘once upon a time there was a story that began’ to itself. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of understanding Frame-Tale cannot be explained by tacit knowledge of a recursive theory of truth in English.

Keywords: Understanding, recursion, metafi ction.

Take a strip of paper with ‘once upon a time there’ written on one side and ‘was a story that began’ on the other. Twisting the paper and fas-tening the ends produces John Barth’s (1968: 1–2) Frame-Tale, which prefi xes a token of ‘once upon a time there was a story that began’ to itself. Frame-Tale is understood: it’s because I understand it that I’m able to judge, for example, that Frame-Tale is true if it’s a story which began. But explaining this raises a puzzle.

Traditionally, the ability to understand an infi nite number of Eng-lish sentences is explained via tacit knowledge of a recursive theory of truth, with base clauses which state the truth-conditions of atomic sen-tences directly, and recursive clauses which state the truth-conditions of complex sentences in terms of the truth-conditions of their simpler constituents. (In a complete theory, these clauses would themselves be theorems derived from further base and recursive axioms.)

There are two problems with extending this strategy to explaining the ability to understand Frame-Tale. The fi rst problem is that a state-ment of Frame-Tale’s truth-conditions cannot be derived from a recur-sive theory of truth in a fi nite number of steps, so tacit knowledge of such a theory cannot explain the ability of someone with fi nite intellec-tual capacities to understand it. I will argue that this problem cannot be solved, even by adopting a non-recursive theory of truth.

The second problem is that neither ‘once upon a time’ nor ‘there was a story that began’ is associated with an appropriate base clause

121


Consequentializing Moral ResponsibilityFRIDERIK KLAMPFERFaculty of Arts,University of Maribor

In the paper, I try to cast some doubt on traditional attempts to defi ne, or explicate, moral responsibility in terms of deserved praise and blame. Desert-based accounts of moral responsibility, though no doubt more faithful to our ordinary notion of moral responsibility, tend to run into trouble in the face of challenges posed by a deterministic picture of the world on the one hand and the impact of moral luck on human action on the other. Besides, grounding responsibility in desert seems to support as-criptions of pathological blame to agents trapped in moral dilemmas as well as of excess blame in cases of joint action. Desert is also notoriously diffi cult, if not impossible, to determine (at least with suffi cient preci-sion). And fi nally, though not least important, recent empirical research on people’s responsibility judgments reveals our common-sense notion of responsibility to be hopelessly confused and easily manipulated.

So it may be time to rethink our inherited theory and practice of moral responsibility. Our theoretical and practical needs may be better served by a less intractable, more forward-looking notion of responsibility. The aim of the paper is to contrast the predominant, desert-based accounts of moral responsibility with their rather unpopular rival, the consequence-based accounts, and then show that the latter deserve more consideration than usually granted by their opponents. In the course of doing so, I as-sess, and ultimately reject, a number of objections that have been raised against consequentialist accounts of moral responsibility: that it (i) doesn’t do justice to our common-sense theory and practice of responsibility; (ii) ties responsibility too closely to infl uenceability, thereby exposing itself to the charge of counter-intuitivity; (iii) assigns undeserved responsibil-ity (praise, blame) to agents; (iv) confuses ‘being responsible’ with ‘hold-ing responsible’‚ and (v) provides the wrong-kind-of-reason for praise and blame. My negative and positive case may not add up to a knockdown ar-gument in favour of revising our ordinary notion of responsibility. As long as the considerations adduced succeed in presenting the consequentialist alternative as a serious contender to a pre-arranged marriage between moral responsibility and desert, however, I’m happy to rest my case.

Keywords: Moral responsibility, desert, blame, (reasons for) reac-tive-attitudes, consequentialism.

179


A Semantic Theory of Word ClassesPETER GÄRDENFORSCognitive Science, Lund UniversitySydney Technical University

Within linguistics a word class is defi ned in grammatical terms as a set of words that exhibit the same syntactic properties. In this paper the aim is to argue that the meanings of different word classes can be given a cognitive grounding. It is shown that with the aid of conceptual spaces, a geometric analysis can be provided for the major word classes. A uni-versal single-domain thesis is proposed, saying that words in all content word classes, except for nouns, refer to a single domain.

Keywords: Conceptual spaces, cognitive semantics, word class-es, single domain, convexity, noun, adjective, verb, preposition, adverb.

1. Cognitively grounded semantics1

What is it that you know when you know a language? Certainly you know many words of the language—its lexicon; and you know how to put the words together in an appropriate way—its syntax. More impor-tantly, you know the meaning of the words and what they mean when put together into sentences. In other words, you know the semantics of the language. If you do not master the meaning of the words you are using, there is no point in knowing the syntax. Therefore, as regards communication, semantic knowledge is more fundamental than syn-tactic. (I am not saying the syntax does not contribute to the meaning of a sentence, only that without knowledge of the meanings of the basic words there is no need for syntax.)

In Gärdenfors (2014), I connect the semantics of various forms of communication to other cognitive processes, in particular concept for-mation, perception, attention, and memory. As Jackendoff (1983: 3) puts it: “[T]o study semantics of natural language is to study cognitive

1 This article is, to a large extent, a summary of material in Part 2 of Gärdenfors (2014).

195


The Geometry of Offense – Pejoratives and Conceptual SpacesNENAD MIŠČEVIĆUniversity of Maribor, SloveniaCentral European University, Hungary

The meaning of pejoratives can be analyzed along several dimensions in the relevant conceptual space, of the kind put forward by Gärdenfors in his groundbreaking work. The fi rst dimension has to do with neutral, non-evaluative sense: for a given class (group, social kind) K it delin-eates the basic causal-cum-descriptive components that determine the intended reference of the pejorative (say, the social kind “gays” for “fag-got”). The second comprises the evaluative components ascribed to K, together with their associated descriptive bases. The third is a prescrip-tive one, suggesting how badly the target is to be treated. The fourth is expressive of speaker’s negative attitude towards members of K. The last three dimensions suggest that the concept associated with a pejorative is a thick concept, whose non-empty extension, is, however, determined by the fi rst, neutral dimension. It also helps understand the dynamics of pejoratives, including the fi gurative origin and change of valence. The whole account treats pejoratives as negative social kind terms with a hy-brid bases for reference (causal history plus a neutral description). The last section raises the general issue of realism in regard to conceptual spaces, and argues in favor of it, in a dialogue with Gärdenfors.

Keywords: Pejoratives, conceptual spaces, hate speech, Gärden-fors.

1. IntroductionI have known Peter Gärdenfors for several decades; he has been helping us at philosophy department in Zadar in the late eighties, way before the beginning of the Yugoslav war, and he continued with this interac-tion, after most of the analytic people from Zadar moved to Rijeka and Maribor in mid-nineties. The publication of his new (2014) book The Geometry of Meaning, Semantics Based on Conceptual Spaces is a wel-

215


Are Meanings in the Head? The Explanation of Lexical AttritionDUNJA JUTRONIĆUniversity of Split, Croatia

The main question I consider in this paper is: What is the (explana-tory) place of the social in cognitive linguistics? More specifi cally I am mainly occupied with the relationship of mind-internal (individual) and mind-external (social) in cognitive linguistics, particularly in lexical se-mantics that Gärdenfors talks about in the second part of his book The Geometry of Meaning.I argue in this paper that the idea of meaning being basically in the head/mind is fi ne but not really controversial. What is controversial is whether the mental states that are responsible for meaning are at least partly constituted by their relations to the external (social) world. If com-municative acts “as part of the process of building meanings” in any way constitute meanings, then meanings in the head by themselves cannot play the explanatory role it is given to them by cognitivists.I try to prove my point on the example of sociolinguistic analysis of lexi-cal loss in Split dialect arguing that the mechanism of lexical attrition is nicely explained by Gärdenfors’ idea of semantic transformations in the conceptual space but the fi nal explanation of the lexical loss is mind-external and social. It is not only the communicative acts, as a result of the context of use, but more broadly different social factors that are most crucial for the explanation of lexical loss.

Keywords: Individual, social, meanings as conceptual spaces, se-mantic transformations, explanation of lexical loss.

1. IntroductionThe belief that meanings are in the head has been one of the tenets of Cognitive Linguistics (CL). Peter Harder says: “Adopting a mind-internal source of explanation has been a pervasive trend during what may be called the “cognitive era” from 1960 onwards” (2010: 59).

231


Articles as a Lexical Pointing System.Is Unique Identifi ability a Linguistic and Cognitive Universal?MAJA BRALA-VUKANOVIĆFaculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka, CroatiaFaculty for Translators and Interpreters, University of Trieste, Italy

Departing from the observation that traditional philosophical, lexical and foreign language approaches to the article system seem to fail in providing a satisfactory outline of article meaning, this paper aims at proposing an alternative, cognitively based account of the semantics of articles. The proposal is to view these closed-class elements as markers of communicative intention; while being more ‘elliptic’ than open-class lexical items, articles appear to be also more cognitively constrained in the meaning that they lexicalize. In other words, articles are likely to express content that is more ‘cognitively real’, and shared by subfi elds of human cognition other than language. The system of articles (in various languages) is perhaps best understood not as a peculiar phenomenon that exhausts itself in the description of a list of usage rules, as is cur-rently the trend, but rather as a range of possible codings of the sta-tus of nominal reference, whereby different languages choose to express different coding patterns, which can all, crucially, be reconciled with the semantic but also cognitive primitive of ‘pointing’ (as explored by Gärdenfors, 2014: ch. 4). In fi nal analysis it is suggested that pointing on the one hand, and referential (unique) identifi cation on the other, are one and the same communicative universal, with only one distinc-tion: the former is essentially physical and the latter primarily linguis-tic (lexical), but the two actually overlap. Accessing this (overlapping) conceptual content of the formal linguistic element known as ‘article’ means accessing article meaning, and understanding this link provides new hopes for theoretical and methodological representation of article systems (crosslinguistically).

Keywords: Articles, cognitive semantics, determinacy, identifi abil-ity, specifi city.

251


What’s in a Path? On Path Verbs: From Thought to LanguageANITA MEMIŠEVIĆFaculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka, Croatia

The main requirement for Gärdenfors’s “meeting of the minds” is that speakers’ mental spaces are suffi ciently similar. If this requirement is not met, communication cannot take place. This meeting of the minds is not always easy to achieve even among interlocutors who share a mother tongue, and it becomes even more complicated when an interlocutor is speaking in his/her second language. The reason for this is that the “geometries of meaning” of different languages frequently do not match. In this paper the focus is on what happens when two languages, i.e. Croatian and English, conceptualize space in different ways, that is, when they have different geometries of space. We fi rst look at the fi nd-ings of neuroscience, psycholinguistics and cognitive linguistics. Next, we compare Croatian and English and analyze what consequences these differences in the conceptualization of space have for Croatians as L2 speakers of English when it comes to English path verbs. Finally, we look at what crosslinguistic differences between Croatian and English can reveal about the English path verbs.

Keywords: Meeting of the minds, geometry of meaning, Croatian, English, Path, path verbs.

1. IntroductionPath is a constituent element of any motion event. Gärdenfors defi nes it as “continuous series of changes of states” (2014: 160). Talmy offers a somewhat different defi nition and states that it is the path along which the Figure moves in relation to the Ground (Talmy 2001). Regardless of how the defi nition is worded, Path could be imagined as the trail that someone’s footsteps (or tires, in the case of a vehicle) leave on the ground.1

1 Or, in the case of an airplane, as the white line that remains in the sky as the consequence of the exhaust fumes.

269


Comments: The Role of Attention in Lexical SemanticsPETER GÄRDENFORSCognitive Science, Lund UniversitySydney Technical University

This article contains comments on the other papers in this volume. I take up the roles of the world, the mind and the society in my seman-tic theory. I show how semantic differences between languages can be seen as attending to different parts of event structures. The role of the emotion domain in relation to the meaning of pejoratives is discussed. Finally, the idea that articles in language should be seen as an extension of pointing is shown to be congenial with my theory of semantics based on conceptual spaces.

Keywords: Lexical semantics, conceptual spaces, meeting of minds, attention, pointing, cognitive linguistics, verb-framed language, satellite-framed language, pejorative, emotion, defi nite article, in-defi nite article.

I am very grateful for the contributions that my co-symposiasts publish in this volume. Their articles are valuable in themselves, but they also made me think further about my own position concerning what consti-tutes semantics.

I begin with some general comments on semantics that were prompt-ed by Dunja Jutronić’s paper. Then Anita Memišević’s paper made me consider to what extent meanings differ between languages. After that I take up the challenge from Nenad Miščević’s paper concerning the role of emotions for meaning. Finally, Maja Brala-Vukanović’s theory about the role of articles in language nicely complements my own and I make some general remarks concerning the connections between point-ing, articles, the world and the common ground of the speakers. Inter-estingly enough, it turns out that a common theme in the papers is the role of attention in determining the meaning of different expressions. As I discuss below, language is a tool for reaching joint attention by “pointing” to places in our inner worlds.

293


Second-Personal Reasons and Special ObligationsJÖRG LÖSCHKEPhilosophisches InstitutUniversity of Berne

The paper discusses the second-personal account of moral obligation as put forward by Stephen Darwall. It argues that on such an account, an important part of our moral practice cannot be explained, namely special obligations that are grounded in special relationships between persons. After highlighting the problem, the paper discusses several strategies to accommodate such special obligations that are implicit in some of Darwall’s texts, most importantly a disentanglement strategy and a reductionist strategy. It argues that neither one of these strategies is entirely convincing. The last part of the papers sketches a novel ac-count of how to accommodate special obligations in a second-personal framework: According to this suggestion, special obligations might be due to the fact that relationships change the normative authority that persons have over each other.

Keywords: Darwall, second-personal reasons, agent-relative reasons, special obligations.

1. IntroductionImagine that a friend of yours needs help moving house and asks you to come over next Saturday in order to carry some boxes. You might not feel inclined to do so—in fact, you might already have made plans to spend a nice day in the park—but you acknowledge a duty of friendship to cancel those plans and help him. You might even acknowledge what Stephen Darwall calls a second-personal reason to help your friend: A reason that is “grounded in (de jure) authority relations that an ad-dresser takes to hold between him and his addressee” (Darwall 2006: 4) and that depends “on the possibility of the reason’s being addressed person-to-person.” (Darwall 2006: 8). After all, your friend has special authority over you insofar as he can demand actions that not every

309


From Self-Deception to Self-Control: Emotional Biases and the Virtues of PrecommitmentVASCO CORREIAInsituto de Filosofi a da LinguagemUniversidade Nova De Lisboa

‘Intentionalist’ approaches portray self-deceivers as “akratic believers”, subjects who deliberately choose to believe p despite knowing that p is false. In this paper, I argue that the intentionalist model leads to a series of paradoxes that seem to undermine it. I show that these para-doxes can nevertheless be overcome if we accept the hypothesis that self-deception is a non-intentional process that stems from the infl uence of emotions on judgment. Furthermore, I propose a motivational interpre-tation of the phenomenon of ‘hyperbolic discounting bias’, highlighting the role of emotional biases in akratic behavior. Finally, I argue that we are not the helpless victims of our irrational attitudes, insofar as we have the ability—and arguably the epistemic obligation—to counteract motivational biases.

Keywords: Akrasia, emotions, epistemic responsibility, hyperbolic discounting, irrationality, motivational biases, precommitment, self-deception, self-control.

1. IntroductionAudi suggests that “a philosophy of mind that cannot account for [self-deception] is seriously defi cient, and a psychology that says nothing about it is unwarrantedly narrow” (1988: 92). Yet, self-deception poses both a descriptive and a normative challenge. From a descriptive point of view, the diffi culty concerns the very possibility of self-deception, particularly if we accept the infl uential ‘intentionalist’ model (David-son 1985a, Pears 1984, Sartre 1969, Scott-Kakures 1996, Gardner 1993, Bermudez 1997), which maintains that self-deceivers typically get themselves to believe that p is true, knowing all the while that p is

325


A Dialectical View of “Freedom and Resentment”DAVID BOTTINGUniversidade Nova de Lisboa

In this paper I wish to look at the structure of Strawson’s argument in the classic paper “Freedom and Resentment.” My purpose is less to evaluate and criticize Strawson’s paper as to give a dialectical perspec-tive on it in which Strawson and those he is arguing against are given specifi c dialectical roles and the arguments and counter-arguments are designed with specifi c dialectical aims in mind. Specifi c parallels will be drawn between some things that Strawson says and certain ideas in dialectical theory. Despite textual evidence that I will appeal to I do not claim to be reconstructing Strawson’s argument; the understanding of Strawson’s argument that I will be trying to make clear is my own.

Keywords: Compatibilism, incompatibilism, reactive attitudes, dialectics, P. F. Strawson.

1. Second-order moral practice compatibilismIn this paper I will argue that Strawson is most profi tably understood as arguing for what I would like to call second-order moral practice compatibilism. What is second-order moral practice compatibilism?

First-order compatibilists argue that determinism is compatible with free will (in which case I will call them free will compatibilists) or that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility (in which case I will call them responsibility compatibilists) or that determinism is compatible with our moral practices (in which case I will call them moral practice compatibilists).

One may be a free will compatibilist and a moral practice compati-bilist without being a responsibility compatibilist; one who argues that determinism is compatible with free will in the relevant sense of free will, that this sense is not (or may not be) suffi cient to ground claims of moral responsibility, but that our practices are justifi ed anyway on the

343


Pejorative Nouns in Speech Act of Insulting as Expression of Verbal AggressionANETA STOJIĆUniversity of Rijeka

ANITA PAVIĆ PINTARIĆUniversity of Zadar

In this paper we investigate lexical, semantic und pragmatic aspects of pejorative nouns which play an important role as language means of verbal aggression. The basis of study are nouns in the German and Croatian language used in the speech act of insult. The aim of this paper is to describe relative pejoratives, i.e. nouns which have both a neutral and pejorative meaning when used to refer to individuals. The following points will be investigated: semantic fi elds that the relative pejoratives belong to, their use in sentences, as well as similarities and differences between the two languages. The lexical aspect of pejoratives together with their semantic and pragmatic characteristics will be described.

Keywords: Pejorative nouns, verbal aggression, German language, Croatian language

1. IntroductionThe reliance on language as the medium for fulfi lling interpersonal relationships is deeply rooted in philosophy. That is the reason why it increasingly puts language in focus of the study. Until late into the 20th century, the relationship between language and violence was re-garded as an external relationship, as an opposition: violence begins there where language becomes silent. But language and violence do not exclude each other; language use can itself be a form of practicing violence. This was already recognized in the ancient rhetoric. But it was only in the last third of the 20th century that authors like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault—starting out from Friedrich Nietzsche—

357


The Nature of the Literal/Non-literal DistinctionMARTINA BLEČIĆPhilosophy DepartmentUniversity of Rijeka

In this paper I would like to suggest that a cognitive approach to prag-matics does not lead necessarily to the impossibility of a distinction be-tween literal and non-literal contents and interpretations. If my reading is correct, this approach is focused on the cognitive activities that take place in the minds of regular language users and not on models applied to ideal speaker-hearers. If we accept that, then we should also accept that the distinction between the literal and the non-literal is subjective since different language users will, in certain cases, consider differently a linguistic element in regards to its belonging to the literal or non-lit-eral domain. In order to save this dichotomy we need to return partially to a philosophical approach to pragmatics, that is, we need to establish the distinction between the literal and the non-literal on the basis of gen-eralized objective inferential strategies. The proposal is the following: the presence of implicit or explicit inferential communicational processes (explicit and implicit conversational implicatures, as I refer to them) connected to the literal meaning of the uttered words will be the criterion for the non-literal status of a linguistic/communicational element. By applying objective criteria to the subjective inferential processes of actual language users we can retain both the subjectivity of cognitive differ-ences between individual speakers and the objectivity of the distinction between the literal and the non-literal.

Keywords: Literal, non-literal, metaphor, conversational implica-tures, cognitive approach.

1. IntroductionIn this paper I shall present an initial draft of the idea that a cognitive approach to pragmatics, which is focused on the way in which a com-municational act is generated in the mind of the speaker and interpret-ed in the mind of the hearer, does not necessarily lead to the effacement

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