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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008
ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE, ALEJANDRO ARDIMER, ELEUTERIO SACIL, WILFREDO JUEGOS, PETRONILO CARCEDO and CESAR PACIENCIA, petitioners, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION, EQUITABLE-PCI BANK and HELPMATE, INC., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision1 dated 24 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79912, which affirmed the Decision dated 22 January 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002 finding that Helpmate, Inc. (HI) is a legitimate independent job contractor and that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed from work; and the Resolution2 dated 31 October 2006 of the same court denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank),3 a banking entity duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws, entered into a Contract for Services4 with HI, a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of providing janitorial and messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The contract was impliedly renewed year after year. Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr.,5 Leonilo Dayday,6 Modesto Aguirre,7 Alejandro Ardimer,8 Eleuterio Sacil,9 Wilfredo Juegos,10 Petronilo Carcedo,11 and Cesar Peciencia12 were among those employed and
assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the Visayas.13
O 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City separate complaints14 against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for separation pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Their complaints were docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 07-1381-2001 and raffled to Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez (Labor Arbiter Gutierrez) for their proper disposition. Subsequently, on 22 August 2001, the petitioners15 amended their complaints to include a claim for 13th month-pay.
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties still failed to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered that they submit their respective position papers.
In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. It was HI that paid petitioners’ wages, monitored petitioners’ daily time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised direct control and supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had committed against its employees.
HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners were its employees, part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for
Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI and, instead, bidded out its janitorial requirements to two other job contractors, Able Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to new work assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the same. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or constructively, thus, petitioners’ complaints before the NLRC were without basis.
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez focused on the following issues: (a) whether petitioners were regular employees of HI; (b) whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment; and (c) whether petitioners were entitled to their money claims.
On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties’ position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code.16 HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners. According to Labor Arbiter Gutierrez:
[T]he undisputed facts show that the [herein petitioners] were made to perform not only as janitors but also as messengers, drivers and one of them even worked as an electrician. For us, these jobs are not only directly related to the main business of the principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in the conduct of respondent Equitable-PCI Bank’s principal business. Thus, based on the above, we so declare that the [petitioners] are employees of respondent Equitable-PCI Bank. And having worked with respondent Equitable-PCI Bank for more than one (1) year, they are deemed regular employees. They cannot, therefore, be removed from employment without cause and without due process, which is wanting in this case. Hence, the severance of their employment in the guise of termination of contract is illegal.17
In the dispositive portion of his 7 January 2002 Decision, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez awarded to petitioners the following amounts:
I. – CESAR PACIENCIA
a) Backwages
July 15, 2001 to January 8, 2002
= P190.00 per day
= 5 months and 6 days
= 136 days x P190.00
= P25,840.00
b) Separation PayJune 10, 1996 to July 15, 2001= 5 years=P190.00 x 26 days x 5 years / 2
=P12,350.00
c) 13th Month Pay= P190.00 x 26 days
= P 4,940.00
Total P43,130.00II – Dominador Suico, Jr. (did not file Amended Complaint)
a) BackwagesJuly 15, 2001 to January 15, 2002same as Paciencia
= P25,840.00
b) Separation PayFeb. 2, 1999 to July 15, 2001= P190.00 x 26 days x 2.5 years / 2
= P 6,175.00
Total = P32,015.00III – Roland Mosquera (did not file Amended Complaint)
a) Backwages(same as Paciencia)
= P25,840.00
b) Separation PayMarch 8, 1998 to July 15, 2001= P190.00 x 26 days x 3 yrs. / 2
= P7,410.00
Total = P33,250.00IV – Petronillo Carcedo a) Backwages (same as Paciencia)
= P25,840.00
b) Separation PaySept. 16, 1984 to July 15, 2001= P190.00 x 26 days x 17 yrs. / 2
= P41,990.00
c) 13th Month Pay = P 4,940.00
= P190.00 x 26 daysTotal = P72,770.00V – Rolando Sasan, Sr. a) Backwages(same as Paciencia)
= P25,840.00
b) Separation PayOctober 1989 to July 15, 2001= P190.00 x 26 days x 12 yrs. / 2
= P29,640.00
c) 13th Month Pay= P190.00 x 26 days
= P 4,940.00
Total = P60,420.00VI – Leonilo Dayday a) Backwages (same as Paciencia)
= P25,840.00
b) Separation PayFeb. 8, 1983 to July 15, 2001= P190.00 x 26 days x 18 yrs. / 2
= P44,460.00
c) 13th Month Pay= P190.00 x 26 days
= P 4,940.00
Total = P75,240.00VII – Eleuterio Sacil a) Backwages(same as Paciencia)
= P25,840.00
b) Separation PayJune 2, 1992 to July 15, 2001= P190.00 x 26 days x 9 yrs. / 2
= P22,230.00
c) 13th Month Pay= P190.00 x 26 days
= P 4,940.00
Total = P53,010.00VIII – Mario Juntilla a) Backwages(same as Pacencia)
= P25,840.00
b) Separation PayOctober 7, 1987 to July 15, 2001= P190.00 x 26 days x 14 yrs. / 2
= P34,580.00
c) 13th Month Pay= P190.00 x 26 days
= P4,940.00
Total = P65,360.00IX – Wilfredo Juegos
a) Backwages(same as Pacencia)
= P25,840.00
b) Separation PayJuly 23, 1990 to July 15, 2001= P190.00 x 26 days x 11 yrs. / 2
= P27,170.00
c) 13th Month Pay= P190.00 x 26 days
= P 4,840.00
Total = P57,950.00X – Modesto Aguirre a) Backwages (same as Paciencia)
= P25,840.00
b) Separation Pay
= Jan. 5, 1992 to July 15, 2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 9.5 yrs. / 2
= P23,465.00
c) 13th Month Pay = P190.00 x 26 days
= P 4,940.00
Total = P54,245.00XI – Alejandro Ardimera) Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
= P25,840.00
b) Separation Pay= Jan. 20, 1990 to July 15, 2001= P190.00 x 26 days x 11.5 yrs. / 2
= P28,405.00
c) 13th Month Pay= P190.00 x 26 days
= P 4,940.00
Total = P59,185.00
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondents Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate, Inc. to pay jointly and solidarily the complainants as follows:
1. Cesar Paciencia - P 43,130.00
2. Dominador Suico, Jr. - 32,015.00
3. Roland Mosquera - 33,250.00
4. Petronilo Carceda - 72,770.00
5. Roland Sasan, Sr. - 60,420.00
6. Leonilo Dayday - 75,240.00
7. Eleuterio Sacil - 53,010.00
8. Mario Juntilla - 65,360.00
9. Wilfredo Juegos - 57,950.00
10. Modesto Aguirre - 54,245.00
11. Alejandro Ardimer - 59,185.00
TOTAL - P606,575.0018
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC, 4th Division, stationed in Cebu City. Their appeals were docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002. In support of its allegation that it was a legitimate job contractor, HI submitted before the NLRC several documents which it did not present before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. These are:
1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing Amended Articles of Incorporation, and General Information Sheet Stock Corporation of HI showing therein that it increased its authorized capital stock from P1,500,000.00 to P20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999 with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets of P20,939,935.72 as of 31 December 2000;
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00582 registered under the name of HI showing that it has a parcel of land with Market Value of P1,168,860.00 located along Rizal Avenue (now Bacalso Avenue), Cebu City, and
4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI showing that it has a commercial building constructed on the preceding lot located along Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City with market value of P2,515,170.00.19
The NLRC promulgated its Decision on 22 January 2003 modifying the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in "labor-only contracting."
On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that:
The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows that barely eight (8) days from 15 July 2001 when the complainants were placed on a temporary "off-detail," they filed their complaints on 23 July 2001 and amended their complaints on 22 August 2001 against the respondents on the presumption that their services were already terminated. Temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal. x x x.20
The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrez’s award of backwages and separation pay, but affirmed his award for 13th month pay and attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the 13th month pay, to the petitioners.21 Thus, the NLRC decreed in its 22 January 2003 Decision, the payment of the following reduced amounts to petitioners:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez dated 7 January 2002 is MODIFIED, to wit:
Ordering respondents Helpmate, Inc. and Equitable PCI Bank to jointly and severally22 pay the complainants of their 13th month pay and attorney’s fees in the aggregate amount of Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Two and 00/100 (P43,472.00), broken down as follows:
1. Aguirre, Modesto - P 5,434.00
2. Ardimer, Alejandro - 5,434.003. Carcedo, Petronilo - 5,434.004. Dayday, Leonilo - 5,434.005. Juegos, Wilfredo - 5,434.006. Juntilla, Mario - 5,434.007. Paciencia, Cesar - 5,434.008. Sacil, Eleuterio - 5,434.00
TOTAL P43,472.0023
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 1 July 2003.24
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79912.
In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners:
As to the question of whether or not, as a legitimate independent job contractor, respondent HI illegally dismissed the petitioners. We rule in the negative.
It is undisputed that the contract between respondent HI and its client E-PCIBank expired on July 15, 2000. The record shows that after said expiration, respondent HI offered the petitioners new work assignments to various establishments which are HI’s clients. The petitioners, therefore, were not even placed on "floating status." They simply refused, without justifiable reason, to assume their new work assignments which refusal was tantamount to abandonment. There being no illegal dismissal, petitioners are not entitled to backwages or separation pay.26
The fallo of the 24 April 2006 Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the NLRC, Fourth Division, in NLRC Case No. V-000145-2003 promulgated on June 22, 2003.27
Petitioners now come before us via the instant Petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE NLRC 4TH DIVISION’S DECISION AND GRAVELY ERRED IN:
I. ACCEPTING AND APPRECIATING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENTS DURING APPEAL, ALL EXISTING DURING THE TIME THE NLRC RAB 7’S TRIAL, CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S PREVIOUS ESTABLISHED DECISIONS.
II. REVERSING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THE FACTUAL FINDING OF NLRC RAB 7 THAT THE RESPONDENT HI WAS LABOR ONLY CONTRACTOR.
III. RULING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THAT THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL COMPLAINTS WERE PREMATURELY FILED.28
Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the procedural issues raised by petitioners.
Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal. This is not a novel procedural issue, however, and our jurisprudence is already replete with cases29 allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.30
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases.
The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.31
In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 we again emphasized that:
[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.
The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are mandated by the Labor Code to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC, and Bristol Laboratories Employees’ Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners’ protestations against the documentary evidence submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:
Section 3. – Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Notably, certified true copies of these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court33 were furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.34
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence to the documentary evidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect, petitioners cannot now be heard to complain about these documentary evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side. It is also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It is not the denial of the right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation of due process of law. Petitioners herein were afforded every opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration of the adverse judgment against them. They had every opportunity to strengthen their positions by presenting their own substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the NLRC, and even before the Court of Appeals. It cannot win its case by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of the adverse parties’ evidence.
We now proceed to the resolution of the substantive issues submitted by petitioners for our consideration, particularly, whether HI is a labor-only contactor and E-PCIBank should be deemed petitioners’ principal employer; and whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment.
Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out to a contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal.35 A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.36
In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal.37 In labor-only contracting, the following elements are present:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility; and
(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.38
In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting,39 we elucidated in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission,40 that it is not enough to show substantial
capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, etc. Other facts that may be considered include the following: whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer’s power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor’s workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode and manner or terms of payment.41 Simply put, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered.42 Each case must be determined by its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered.43
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
We take note that HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Certificate of Registration44 Numbered VII-859-1297-048. The said certificate states among other things:
"CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
Numbered VII-859-1297-048
is issued to
HELPMATE, INCORPORATED
330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City
for having complied with the requirements as provided for under the Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing Rules and having paid the registration fee in the amount of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) per Official Receipt Number 9042769, dated October 16, 1997.
In witness whereof, and by authority vested in me by the Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing Rules specifically Department
Order No. 10 series of 1997, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Official on this 23rd day of December 1997."45
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the presumption that it was issued in the regular performance of official duty.46 In the absence of proof, petitioner’s bare assertion cannot prevail over this presumption. Moreover, the DOLE being the agency primarily responsible for regulating the business of independent job contractors, we can presume in the absence of evidence to the contrary that it thoroughly evaluated the requirements submitted by HI as a precondition to the issuance of the Cerificate of Registration.
The evidence on record also shows that HI is carrying on a distinct and independent business from E-PCIBank. The employees of HI are assigned to clients to perform janitorial and messengerial services, clearly distinguishable from the banking services in which E-PCIBank is engaged.
Despite the afore-mentioned compliance by HI with the requisites for permissible job contracting, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez still declared that HI was engaged in prohibited labor-only contracting because it did not possess substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account or responsibility. Both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, and we agree.
"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations, tools, equipments, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted out.47 An independent contractor must have either substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others. The law does not require both substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, etc.48 It is enough that it has substantial capital. In the case of HI, it has proven both.
We have expostulated that once it is established that an entity such as in this case, HI has substantial capital, it was no longer necessary to adduce further evidence to prove that it does not fall within the purview of "labor-only" contracting.49 There is even no need for HI to
refute the contention of petitioners that some of the activities they performed such as those of messengerial services are directly related to the principal business of E- PCIBank.
In any event, we have earlier declared that while these services rendered by the petitioners as janitors, messengers and drivers are considered directly related to the principal business of a bank, in this case E-PCIBank, nevertheless, they are not necessary in the conduct of its (E-PCIBANK’s) principal business.50
HI has substantial capital in the amount of P20,939,935.72. It has its own building where it holds office and it has been engaged in business for more than a decade now.51 As observed by the Court of Appeals, surely, such a well-established business entity cannot be considered a labor-only contractor.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative employee’s conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the so-called "control test."52
The presence of the first requisite for the existence of an employer-employee relationship to wit, the selection and engagement of the employee is shown by the fact that it was HI which selected and engaged the services of petitioners as its employees. This is fortified by the provision in the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank which states:
Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have exclusive discretion in the selection, engagement, investigation, discipline and discharge of its employees.53
On the second requisite regarding the payment of wages, it was HI who paid petitioners their wages and who provided their daily time records and uniforms and other materials necessary for the work they performed. Therefore, it is HI who is responsible for petitioner’s claims for wages and other employee’s benefits. Precisely, the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank reveals the following:
Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall be responsible for the salaries, allowances, overtime and holiday pay, and other benefits of its personnel including withholding taxes.54
As to the third requisite on the power to control the employee’s conduct, and the fourth requisite regarding the power of dismissal, again E-PCIBank did not have the power to control petitioners with respect to the means and methods by which their work was to be accomplished. It likewise had no power of dismissal over the petitioners. All that E-PCIBank could do was to report to HI any untoward act, negligence, misconduct or malfeasance of any employee assigned to the premises. The contract of services between E-PCIBank and HI is noteworthy. It states:
[HI] shall have the entire charge, control and supervision over all its employees who may be fielded to [E-PCIBank]. For this purpose, [HI] shall assign a regular supervisor of its employees who may be fielded to the Bank and which regular supervisor shall exclusively supervise and control the activities and functions defined in Section 1 hereof. x x x.55
All these circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its account, under its own responsibility, according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of E-PCIBank. Where the control of the principal is limited only to the result of the work, independent job contracting exists. The janitorial service agreement between E-PCIBank and HI is definitely a case of permissible job contracting.
Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice in private, as well as in government institutions and industries, of hiring an independent contractor to perform special services,56 ranging from janitorial, security and even technical services, we can only conclude that HI is a legitimate job contractor. As such legitimate job contractor, the law creates an employer-employee relationship between HI and petitioners57 which renders HI liable for the latter’s claims.
In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular employees of E-PCIBank regardless of how long they were working for the latter.58
We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank, petitioners cannot insist to continue to work for the latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank did not constitute illegal dismissal since, first, petitioners were not employees of E-PCIBank; and second, they were pulled out from said assignment due to the non-renewal of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time they filed their complaints with the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not even dismissed by HI; they were only "off-detail" pending their re-assignment by HI to another client. And when they were actually given new assignments by HI with other clients,59 petitioners even refused the same. As the NLRC pronounced, petitioners’ complaint for illegal dismissal is apparently premature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 24 April 2006 and Resolution dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170232 December 5, 2006
VETTE INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC., KENNETH TAN, ESTRELLA CHENG, LUISITO RAMOS, YVETTE TAN, KESSENTH CHENG, VEVETTE CHENG and FELESAVETTE CHENG, petitioners, vs.SUI SOAN S. CHENG a.k.a. CHENG SUI SOAN, respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 170301 December 5, 2006
SUI SOAN S. CHENG a.k.a. CHENG SUI SOAN, petitioner, vs.VETTE INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC., KENNETH TAN, ESTRELLA CHENG, LUISITO RAMOS, YVETTE TAN, KESSENTH CHENG, VEVETTE CHENG and FELESAVETTE CHENG, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1 assail the Decision2 dated September 22, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88863 entitled, "Vette Industrial Sales, Company, Inc., Kenneth Tan, Estrella Cheng, Luisito Ramos, Yvette Tan, Kessenth Cheng, Vevette Cheng, and Felesavette Cheng, Petitioners versus Hon. Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 173, and Sui Soan S.
Cheng a.k.a. Cheng Sui Soan, Respondents." Also assailed is the Resolution3 dated October 27, 2005 denying petitioners’ motion for partial reconsideration and respondent Sui’s motion for reconsideration.
In his Complaint4 for specific performance and damages filed against Vette Industrial Sales Company, Inc., Kenneth Tan, Estrella Cheng, Luisito Ramos, Yvette Tan, Kessenth Cheng, Vevette Cheng, and Felesavette Cheng (petitioners) and docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105691, Sui Soan S. Cheng a.k.a. Cheng Sui Soan (Sui) alleged that on October 24, 2001, he executed a Deed of Assignment,5 where he transferred his 40,000 shares in the company in favor of Kenneth Tan, Vevette Cheng, Felesavette Cheng, and Yvette Tan (Petitioners-Assignees). To implement the Deed of Assignment, the company acknowledged in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),6 that it owed him P6.8 million pesos, plus insurance proceeds amounting to P760,000.00 and a signing bonus of P300,000.00. Thereafter, he was issued 48 postdated checks but after the 11th check, the remaining checks were dishonored by the bank. Sui also claimed that petitioners did not remit to him the insurance proceeds, thus breaching their obligation under the MOA which entitled him to moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
In their Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,7 petitioners alleged that Sui sold his shares for only P1.00 per share which they already paid; that the MOA was unenforceable because it was executed without authorization from the board of directors; that the MOA was void for want of consideration; and that petitioner Kenneth Tan executed the MOA after Sui issued threats and refused to sign the waiver and quitclaim.
After the issues were joined, pre-trial was set on July 3, 2003.8 However, the case was first submitted for mediation but it was referred back to the court for continuation of the proceedings when no settlement was arrived at during mediation.
Sui thereafter filed a Motion to Set Pre-trial9 on December 16, 2003. Petitioners received the motion but they did not attend because there was no notice from the Court setting the pre-trial date. On December 29, 2003, petitioners received two orders from the trial court. The first Order10 allowed Sui to present evidence ex-parte, while the second
Order11 revoked the first order after the trial court noted that "what was set for consideration on December 16, 2003 was merely a motion to set pre-trial." Thus, the trial court reset the pre-trial on January 15, 2004 but it was postponed and moved to May 21, 2004. On said date, Sui and his counsel, Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer), failed to appear. Consequently, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice on the part of petitioners to present and prove their counterclaim and set the hearing for reception of evidence on June 22, 2004.12
Atty. Ferrer filed a Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration13 of the order of dismissal, explaining that he arrived late for the hearing because he had to drop by his office to get the case folder because he had just arrived from South Cotabato where he served as Chief Counsel in the Provincial Board of Canvassers for Governor Datu Pax Mangudadatu and Congressman Suharto Mangudadatu.
The trial court required petitioners to file their Comment on the Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration. In their Opposition,14 petitioners asserted that the motion for reconsideration be denied outright because (1) Sui did not comply with the three-day notice rule which is mandatory under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court considering that petitioners received the manifestation and motion for reconsideration only one day prior to the date of hearing of the motion for resolution, thus the same must be treated as a mere scrap of paper; (2) the trial court did not comply with Section 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules15 when it acted on the manifestation and motion of Sui despite the latter’s failure to submit proof of receipt by petitioners of the manifestation and motion; (3) the negligence of counsel binds the client, thus, when Atty. Ferrer arrived late for the hearing, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint; and (4) the explanation of Atty. Ferrer is unacceptable because traffic gridlocks are daily events in the metropolis, thus, Atty. Ferrer should have left his place early.
In his Reply,16 Sui averred that the motion complied with Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules17 and that the setting of the hearing of the motion on May 28, 2004 was within the three day period for it was filed on May 25, 2004. He added that the same was not heard because the trial court allowed petitioners to file a comment on the manifestation and motion for reconsideration, which was received by the latter prior to the said setting.
In an Order dated December 16, 2004,18 the trial court granted Sui’s motion for reconsideration and set aside the dismissal of the complaint, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, prescinding with such ruling and in the interest of substantial justice, plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED and the order dated May 21, 2004 is hereby lifted and set aside with the warning that any delay in this proceedings will not be countenanced by the Court.
Set pre-trial anew on February 15, 2005.
Notify the parties.
SO ORDERED.19
The trial court cited Ace Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,20 which held that since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided – the dismissal of an appeal on purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result to unfairness.
The Motion for Reconsideration21 filed by petitioners was denied by the trial court22 hence they filed a Petition for Certiorari23 with the Court of Appeals which granted the petition, thus:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the writ applied for is partly GRANTED. The assailed orders must be, as they hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE, and another hereby issued dismissing the instant complaint, but "without prejudice." This means that the complaint can be REINSTATED. On the other hand, petitioners are hereby given leave to present before the Trial Court evidence of their counterclaim. Without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.24
The Court of Appeals noted that both Atty. Ferrer and Sui were not in attendance at the pre-trial conference; that Section 5 of Rule 18
mentions only the effect of the failure to appear on the part of "the plaintiff" but is silent on the effect of failure of the party’s counsel to appear at the pre-trial; that the Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration25 mentioned only the reasons why Atty. Ferrer was absent without stating that he was fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, or to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, or to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents; and that there was no explanation for Sui’s nonappearance. Thus, based on these circumstances, the Court of Appeals held that dismissal of the case is proper but without prejudice to the filing of a new action.26
Both parties moved for reconsideration but the same were jointly denied in a Resolution dated October 27, 2005.
Hence, these consolidated Petitions.
In G.R. No. 170232, petitioners raise the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT CHENG IN CIVIL CASE NO. 03-105691 WITH PREJUDICE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE BASIC RULES ON PRE-TRIAL.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE MISTAKE OR NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL AS BINDING ON THE RESPONDENT HIMSELF.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE DE LOS
REYES VS. CAPULE (102 PHIL. 464) AND SUAREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS (220 SCRA 274) CASES.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING RESPONDENT’S MANIFESTATION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED MAY 21, 2004 FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AS A MERE SCRAP, AND A USELESS PIECE, OF PAPER AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE ORDER DATED MAY 21, 2004 OF THE TRIAL COURT AS ALREADY FINAL IN VIEW OF THE PROCEDURAL INVALIDITY/DEFECTIVENESS (I.E. IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTIONS 4 AND 6 OF THE RULES) OF RESPONDENT’S MANIFESTATION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED MAY 21, 2004.
In G.R. No. 170301, Sui raises the following issues, thus:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE NON-APPEARANCE OF PETITIONER IN THE PRE-TRIAL MAY BE EXCUSED FOR A VALID CAUSE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CASE OF ACE NAVIGATION CO. INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS IS SQUARELY APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE.
The core issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. 03-105691 and in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted Sui’s motion for reconsideration to set aside the order of dismissal of the complaint.
The judge has the discretion whether or not to declare a party non-suited.27 It is, likewise, settled that the determination of whether or not an order of dismissal issued under such conditions should be maintained or reconsidered rests upon the sound discretion of the trial judge.28 The next question to be resolved is whether there was grave abuse of discretion of the trial judge. We hold that there was none.
The case of Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone29 discussed the propriety of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, thus:
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion." An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically.
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy thereto such as when an error of judgment as well as of procedure are involved. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in certain exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.30 (Emphasis supplied)
Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case; where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of his
jurisdiction.31 Thus, we now discuss whether the trial court granted the motion for reconsideration of Sui and reinstated the complaint without basis in law. Citing the case of Ace Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,32 the trial court held that rules of procedures are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and must be relaxed if its strict and rigid application would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Thus, it lifted and set aside its order of dismissal in the interest of substantial justice, which is the legal basis for the trial court to grant the motion for reconsideration of Sui.
We have repeatedly warned against the injudicious and often impetuous issuance of default orders.33 While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the attainment of justice and the protection of substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, as in the instant case, should no longer be subject to cavil.34
When the Court of Appeals held that the case is dismissible because Sui did not attend the pre-trial conference, it failed to consider the explanation of Atty. Ferrer that Sui executed a "Special Power of Attorney" in his behalf and that he was not absent on the scheduled pre-trial but was only late.
Under Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules,35 the non-appearance of a party at the pre-trial may be excused when there is a valid cause shown or when a representative shall appear in his behalf, and is fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. Although Sui was absent during the pre-trial, Atty. Ferrer alleged that he was fully authorized to represent Sui. Moreover, it is not entirely accurate to state that Atty. Ferrer was absent during the pre-trial because he was only late, the reasons for which he explained in his Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration. The circumstances attendant in the instant case compel this Court to relax the rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice.
Petitioners claim that the motion for reconsideration of Sui was procedurally defective because it was not served three days before the date of the hearing and no proof of service was given to the court, in violation of Sections 4 and 6 of Rule 15. Petitioners also aver that they received the Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration of Sui on May 27, 2004 but the hearing was scheduled on May 28, 2004. Thus, it is nothing but a scrap of paper because it violated the three-day notice rule.
We are not persuaded.
In the instant case, we find that the purpose of a notice of hearing had been served. In Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals,36 we enumerated the exceptions to the rule on notice of hearing, to wit:
The Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the clerk of court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are as follows:
"x x x Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in cases (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."
The present case falls under the first exception. Petitioner was not informed of any cause of action or claim against it. All of a
sudden, the vessels which petitioner used in its salvaging business were levied upon and sold in execution to satisfy a supposed judgment against it. To allow this to happen simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement – which, as already said, was satisfactorily explained – would be a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.
A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due process intended to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is permitted time to study and answer the arguments in the motion.
Circumstances in the case at bar show that private respondent was not denied procedural due process, and that the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been served. On the day of the hearing, Atty. Desierto did not object to the said Motion for lack of notice to him; in fact, he was furnished in open court with a copy of the motion and was granted by the trial court thirty days to file his opposition to it. These circumstances clearly justify a departure from the literal application of the notice of hearing rule. In other cases, after the trial court learns that a motion lacks such notice, the prompt resetting of the hearing with due notice to all the parties is held to have cured the defect.
Verily, the notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding. For the foregoing reasons, we believe that Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that the Motion for Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper.37 (Emphasis supplied)
When the trial court received Sui’s Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, it did not immediately resolve the motion. Instead, it allowed petitioners to file their comment and also leave to file a rejoinder if Sui files a reply.38 These circumstances justify a departure
from the literal application of the rule because petitioners were given the opportunity to study and answer the arguments in the motion.
Petitioners’ claim that Sui failed to attach proof of service in violation of Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rule, must fail. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,39 we held, thus:
Nonetheless, considering the question raised in the appeal of the government and the amount involved in this case, we think the Court of Appeals should have considered the subsequent service of the motion for reconsideration to be a substantial compliance with the requirement in Rule 15, §6. In De Rapisura v. Nicolas, the movant also failed to attach to his motion for reconsideration proof of service of a copy thereof to the other party. Nonetheless, this Court held the failure not fatal as the adverse party had actually received a copy of the motion and was in fact present in court when the motion was heard. It was held that the demands of substantial justice were satisfied by the actual receipt of said motion under those conditions.40
Petitioners admitted that they received a copy of Sui’s Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, they had the opportunity to oppose the same. Under these circumstances, we find that the demands of substantial justice and due process were satisfied.
It is the policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities.41 It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.42
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated September 22, 2005 and the Resolution dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88863 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 03-105691, lifting its previous order of dismissal is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 176129 August 24, 2011
Heirs of RODOLFO CRISOSTOMO (EUPROCINIA, ROYCE and IRISH CRISOSTOMO), Petitioners, vs.RUDEX INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the October 6, 20062 and January 5, 20073 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95920, which dismissed outright the petitioners’ Petition for Review dated September 13, 2006 for being filed one day beyond the 15-day extended period granted by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Euprocinia, Royce, and Irish, are the wife and children, respectively, of the late complainant, Rodolfo Crisostomo, who died during the pendency of the case. 4
The respondent, Rudex International Development Corporation, is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.5
On December 17, 2001, the Crisostomo spouses were offered a house and lot at Patricia South Villa, a subdivision developed by the respondent in Anabu II-F, Imus, Cavite. After seeing the model house on Block 8, Lot 3, the Crisostomos decided to buy the property priced at ₱833,000.00 on installment basis. On the same day, they paid ₱10,000.00 as down payment and signed a Reservation Agreement. On December 21, 2001, the couple paid an additional ₱50,000.00, executed a promissory note, and issued 36 postdated checks to cover
the monthly amortizations on the property. The Crisostomos were then given a Key Acceptance, Walk Through, and Final Turnover Certificate.6
On February 10, 2002, the Crisostomo family moved in to their new house; however, they started to notice several construction defects on the house and inadequate facilities in the subdivision. Thus, on March 22, 2002, the late Rodolfo asked his wife Euprocinia to discontinue paying their monthly amortizations and to ask for a rescission of the contract. On May 17, 2002, Rodolfo personally delivered a letter of complaint to the respondent, wherein he rescinded their Contract to Sell, demanded the refund of all the payments he had made, and reiterated that he would no longer pay the monthly amortizations.7
On May 27, 2002, Rodolfo filed a Complaint8 for violation of Presidential Decree Nos. 1344 and 957, and Board Resolution No. 579 of 1995, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
In view of respondent’s failure to answer the Complaint, it was declared in default on November 26, 2003.9
The HLURB conducted an ocular inspection in Patricia South Villa on March 12, 2003 and found Rodolfo’s allegations to be supported by its findings. The HLURB held that under Section 20 of Presidential Decree No. 957, its findings justified the right of Rodolfo to demand rescission of his contract with the respondent. Thus, on July 7, 2003, the HLURB issued its Judgment by Default,10 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the rescission of the contract to sell as valid and ordering the respondent to refund the total payments in the amount of P71,650.00 with interest at 12% per annum from the filing of the complaint until full payment.
After full payment, complainant is directed to peacefully surrender the subject property in favor of the respondent.
Further, respondent is directed to pay complainant P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay this Board P10,000.00 by way of administrative fine for violation of Section 20 in relation to Section 38 of P.D. 957.11
On August 26, 2003, the respondent asked the HLURB to review12 its July 7, 2003 Decision. It alleged that Rodolfo’s allegations were concocted to get out of their contract because he could no longer pay his monthly amortizations on the property. On August 17, 2004, the HLURB rendered a Decision13 on respondent’s Petition for Review, to wit:
Wherefore, the decision of the office below is hereby modified to read as follows:
Wherefore premises considered, judgment is hereby rescinding the reservation agreement of parties and subject to legal compensation or offsetting, ordering respondent to refund the total payments in the amount of P71,650.00 with interest at legal interest from the time of the filing of the complaint; ordering complainant to turn over possession of the unit to the respondent and ordering complainant to pay respondent reasonable compensation for the use of the unit in the amount of P4,000.00 per month until possession of the unit is turned over to the respondent.
Further, respondent is directed to pay complainant P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay this board P10,000.00 by way of administrative fine for violation of section 20 in relation to section 38 of P.D. 957.14
This was appealed15 by the petitioners, who substituted Rodolfo upon his death, to the Office of the President. On November 18, 2005, the Office of the President decided16 in their favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners dated August 23, 2004 is hereby reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered:
a. Declaring the contract of sale entered into between the parties as rescinded;
b. Appellants are hereby ordered to turn over possession of the property to the Appellee;
c. Appellee is hereby ordered of refund to the appellants the latter’s total payment in the amount of P71,650.00 with interest at 12% per annum from June 10, 2002 (time of the filing of the complaint);
d. Appellee is likewise ordered to pay appellants P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. Appellee is ordered to pay appellants P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
f. Appellee is ordered to pay administrative fine in the amount of P10,000.00.17
The respondent asked for a reconsideration18 of this decision and on May 9, 2006, the Office of the President granted respondent’s motion and reinstated the August 17, 2004 decision of the HLURB.19
The Office of the President, in resolving the issue of whether it properly deleted the previous award of rentals by the HLURB, held that "P.D. [No.] 957 does not authorize oppression of perceived unscrupulous subdivision developers, each time a home buyer cries foul or alleges any infirmity on the former."20 Agreeing with the respondent that the deletion of the award of rentals would result in unduly enriching the petitioners, the Office of the President held:
By staying at the questioned premises for free and without compensation, to the prejudice of [respondent], it is clear that [petitioners] unduly enriched themselves at the expense of another.
Rental payments are legally supported by virtue of the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Eventhough the same is not prayed for by herein appellee, it could still be recognized and awarded by our Office considering that said issue, or award thereof, is inextricably linked to the issues involved as well as the facts proven in the case, and it is necessary for a just and equitable determination of the case.21
The petitioners sought for a reconsideration22 of this Order,23 but this was denied by the Office of the President on August 2, 2006.
On September 15, 2006, the petitioners filed their Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. However, this was dismissed outright in a Resolution24 for being filed out of time, the deadline being September 14, 2006. The Court of Appeals said that the petitioners were already granted a 15-day extension and yet no justification or reason was given to explain why they still filed beyond the extended period. The Court of Appeals held:
We have no more jurisdiction to entertain the Petition much less to alter the judgment which has become final and executory. We only have the power to dismiss the appeal in the absence of exceptional circumstances to warrant such delay.25
The petitioners sought reconsideration of this dismissal but the Court of Appeals found their motion to be "bereft of merit."26
The petitioners are now before us, seeking not only that we give their petition due consideration, but also that we declare the HLURB August 17, 2004 Decision as null and void. They submit the following issues for our resolution:
5.1. AN APPEAL IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE COURTS SHOULD PROCEED WITH CAUTION, SO AS NOT TO DEPRIVE THE PETITIONERS OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL, PARTICULARLY, IF THE APPEAL IS MERITORIOUS.
5.2. THE HLURB APPEAL BOARD HAS NO JURISDICTION MODIFYING THE JUDGMENT OF HLURB PROPER GRANTING RELIEF WHICH WAS NOT PRAYED FOR ALLEGED IN THE PLEADINGS, AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED.
5.3. THE HLURB APPEAL BOARD HAS NO JURISDICTION WHEN IT MODIFIED THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT OF HLURB PROPER, AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LIKEWISE HAS ACTED, IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT AFFIRMED EN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE HLURB APPEAL BOARD.27
Discussion
We shall limit our discussion to the core issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review filed by petitioners before it, on the ground that the petition was filed late.
The petitioners are claiming that their one-day delay in filing their petition before the Court of Appeals constitutes excusable negligence in the absence of an intent to delay the administration of justice. The petitioners explained that their petition was ready as early as September 13, 2006, with only the annexes to be attached. Their counsel assigned her secretary to arrange and attach these annexes but without their counsel’s knowledge, the secretary did this in a vacant room outside their office. The following day, the secretary, a single mother of two small children, failed to report for work because she had to take her kids to a doctor as they had been sick since she found them home, abandoned by their nanny, the night before. It was only late in the afternoon that the secretary remembered that she forgot to leave instructions about the petition in their office.28
The petitioners are asking that this Court exercise its equity jurisdiction since their delay was neither intended nor prejudicial to respondent.29
Ruling of this Court
We grant the petition.
This Court has explained that the purpose in limiting the period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. Where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners, a one-day delay does not justify their petition’s dismissal.30
In Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales v. Pennisi,31 this Court elucidated on the rules on reglementary periods, to wit:
The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception, unintended lapses are disregarded so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. The purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies.32 1avvphil
In Samala v. Court of Appeals,33 we said:
The rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Even the Revised Rules of Court envision this liberality. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts.34
In this case, the last day for filing the petition for review was on September 13, 2006. The petitioners entrusted the drafting of their petition with their counsel, who in turn entrusted the attaching of the required annexes to the petition with her secretary. The secretary resigned from her job sometime later to avoid giving her employer "problems for unexpected absences in the future."35 Aside from this, the petitioners also submitted an Affidavit36 from the secretary, who narrated her ordeal that day and why she was not able to inform her employer of the whereabouts of the petition. A certification from the doctor of one of the secretary’s children was also submitted to prove that the secretary indeed brought her children to the doctor on September 14, 2006, the deadline for filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
In light of the foregoing, we are inclined to give the same consideration in this case pursuant to the rules on justice, equity, and fair play.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 6, 2006 and January 5, 2007 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 95920 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. CA-G.R. SP No. 95920 is ordered REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 142628 February 6, 2007
SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and HEIRS OF PETRA CAPISTRANO PIIT, Petitioners, vs.HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), DAR REGION X DIRECTOR, ROSALIO GAMULO, FORTUNATO TELEN, EMERITA OLANGO, THERESA MONTUERTO, DOMINGO H. CLAPERO, JOEL U. LIM, JENEMAIR U. POLLEY, FIDELA U. POLLEY, JESUS BATUTAY, NICANOR UCAB, EMERIA U. LIM, EMILITO CLAPERO, ANTONINA RIAS, AURILLIO ROMULO, ERWIN P. CLAPERO, EVELITO CULANGO, VILMA/CRUISINE ALONG, EFREN EMATA, GREGORIO CABARIBAN, and SABINA CANTORANA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The principal issue presented for resolution is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction to annul final judgment of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
The antecedent facts:
Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de Oro City which measured 123,408 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62623. Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. (Springfield) bought Lot No. 2291-C with an area of 68,732 square meters, and Lot No. 2291-D with an area of 49,778
square meters.1 Springfield developed these properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision.2
On May 4, 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice of Coverage,3 placing the property under the coverage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. There being an opposition from the heirs of Petra Piit, the case was docketed as DARAB Case No. X-305. On August 27, 1991, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Abeto A. Salcedo, Jr. rendered a decision declaring the nature of the property as residential and not suitable for agriculture.4 The Regional Director filed a notice of appeal, which the Provincial Adjudicator disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous.5 The decision became final and executory6 and Springfield proceeded to develop the property.7
The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from judgment of the DARAB Decision, docketed as DARAB Case No. 0555. In its Decision dated October 5, 1995, the DARAB granted the petition and gave due course to the Notice of Coverage. It also directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to proceed with the documentation, acquisition, and distribution of the property to the true and lawful beneficiaries.8
The DARAB also issued an Order dated May 22, 1997, ordering the heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries the amount of Twelve Million, Three Hundred Forty Thousand, Eight Hundred Pesos (P12,340,800.00), corresponding to the value of the property since the property has already been developed into a subdivision.
On June 13, 1997, Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 40, a petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 and all its subsequent proceedings. Petitioners contend that the DARAB decision was rendered without affording petitioners any notice and hearing.9
On motion filed by the farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC issued an Order dated June 25, 1997, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.10
On July 2, 1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44563.11 Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in a different color. According to petitioners, what it sought before the RTC is an annulment of the DARAB Decision and not certiorari, as the DARAB Decision is void ab initio for having been rendered without due process of law.12
In the assailed Decision13 dated July 16, 1998, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is a co-equal body.14
However, on January 12, 1999, the CA ordered the elevation of the DARAB records before it, declaring that it "overlooked the fact that petitioners likewise applied for a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the DARAB decision which they claim to be patently void."15 Forwarded to the CA were the records of the original case filed with the DARAB-Region X, and it appearing that the petition for relief from judgment and its pertinent records were forwarded to the DARAB Central Office, the CA issued another Resolution on December 20, 1999,16 requiring the DARAB Central Office to forward the records of the case. But after receipt of the records, the CA simply denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration per Resolution17 dated February 23, 2000 without specifically resolving the issues raised concerning the prayer for a writ of prohibition.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR ERROR OF LAW IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY TO JUSTIFY ITS CONCLUSION DIVESTING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION VESTED BY LAW OVER CASES WHERE THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION WAS NOT EXPRESSLY GRANTED TO ANY OTHER COURTS [SIC] OR TRIBUNAL, IN EFFECT, MODIFYING THE APPLICABLE LAW ON THE MATTER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS IRREGULARLY DISMISSED PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AFTER IT HAD RESOLVED TO ENTERTAIN PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AND TO REVIEW THE DARAB PROCEEDINGS, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
III
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, BEING THE HIGHEST TEMPLE OF RIGHTS, AND TO AVOID SERIOUS MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AND NEEDLESS DELAYS, IS MOST RESPECTFULLY URGED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION FILED IN CA-G.R. SP No. 44563 IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS CONCURRENT JURISDICTION, AS IF THE PETITION WAS ORIGINALLY LODGED BEFORE IT.18
Petitioners argue that under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, there is no provision that vests with the CA jurisdiction over actions for annulment of DARAB judgments. Petitioners, however, contend that the RTC may take cognizance of the annulment case since Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 vests the RTC with general jurisdiction and an action for annulment is covered under such general jurisdiction. According to petitioners, "this is but a logical consequence of the fact that no other courts were expressly given the jurisdiction over such actions."19 Petitioners further argue that the CA was in error when it summarily ignored their application for a writ of prohibition, as it was necessary to restrain the DARAB from enforcing its void decision; and even if the DARAB decision was valid, the writ of prohibition could have enjoined the execution of the DARAB decision since there have been changes which will make the execution unjust and inequitable.
In their Joint-Comments, the farmer-beneficiaries and the DARAB (respondents) refute petitioners' allegation that they were not afforded due process in the DARAB proceedings, stating that petitioners were impleaded as a party thereto, and in fact, they attended some of the hearings although their counsel was absent. Respondents also adopt the CA's ruling that the RTC is not vested with any jurisdiction to annul the DARAB decision.
As stated at the outset, the main issue in this case is whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB.
Note must be made that the petition for annulment of the DARAB decision was filed with the RTC on June 13, 1997, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Thus, the applicable law is B.P. Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, enacted on August 10, 1981.
It is also worthy of note that before the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 129, a court of first instance has the authority to annul a final and executory judgment rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same court. This was the Court's ruling in Dulap v. Court of Appeals.20 Yet, in subsequent cases,21 the Court held that the better policy, as a matter of comity or courteous interaction between courts of first instance and the branches thereof, is for the annulment cases to be tried by the same court or branch which heard the main action.
The foregoing doctrines were modified in Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo,22 where the Court expressed that pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the doctrine of non-interference between concurrent and coordinate courts should be regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.
With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129,23 the rule on annulment of judgments was specifically provided in Section 9(2), which vested in the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the CA) the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs. Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129 also vested the CA with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." As provided in paragraph 16 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing B.P. Blg. 129, the quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the CA are those, which under the law,
R.A. No. 5434,24 or its enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the CA.
Significantly, B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any power of the RTC to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. However, in BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,25 the Court ruled that the RTCs have jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the decisions of the National Water Resources Council, which is a quasi-judicial body ranked with inferior courts, pursuant to its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, in relation to acts or omissions of an inferior court. This led to the conclusion that despite the absence of any provision in B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC had the power to entertain petitions for annulment of judgments of inferior courts and administrative or quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking. This is also in harmony with the "pre-B.P. Blg. 129" rulings of the Court recognizing the power of a trial court (court of first instance) to annul final judgments.26 Hence, while it is true, as petitioners contend, that the RTC had the authority to annul final judgments, such authority pertained only to final judgments rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking with such inferior courts.
The foregoing statements beg the next question, i.e., whether the DARAB is a quasi-judicial body with the rank of an inferior court such that the RTC may take cognizance of an action for the annulments of its judgments. The answer is no.
The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory powers and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on December 26, 198827 specifically provides for the manner of judicial review of its decisions, orders, rulings, or awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision, order, award or ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari, except as provided in the next succeeding section.
Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or Adjudicator appealed from, shall be immediately executory.
Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly provides for an appeal from the DARAB decisions to the CA.28
The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.29
Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to entertain the same.
This brings to fore the issue of whether the petition for annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA. As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It does not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano,30 the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts." This was reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals,31 where the Court ruled that that the CA is without jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of judgment of a final decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Recent rulings on similar cases involving annulments of judgments of quasi-judicial bodies are also quite instructive on this matter.
In Cole v. Court of Appeals,32 involving an annulment of the judgment of the HLURB Arbiter and the Office of the President (OP), filed with the CA, the Court stated that, "(U)nder Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment is confined to decisions of the
Regional Trial Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction x x x." The Court further ruled, viz.:
Although the grounds set forth in the petition for annulment of judgment are fraud and lack of jurisdiction, said petition cannot prosper for the simple reason that the decision sought to be annulled was not rendered by the Regional Trial Court but by an administrative agency (HLU Arbiter and Office of the President), hence, not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. There is no such remedy as annulment of judgment of the HLURB or the Office of the President. Assuming arguendo that the annulment petition can be treated as a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the same should have been dismissed by the Court of Appeals, because no error of judgment was imputed to the HLURB and the Office of the President. Fraud and lack of jurisdiction are beyond the province of petitions under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as it covers only errors of judgment. A petition for annulment of judgment is an initiatory remedy, hence no error of judgment can be the subject thereof. Besides, the Arbiter and the Office of the President indisputably have jurisdiction over the cases brought before them in line with our ruling in Francisco Sycip, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated on March 17, 2000, where the aggrieved townhouse buyers may seek protection from the HLURB under Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise known as "Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree."33 (Emphasis supplied)
In Macalalag v. Ombudsman,34 the Court ruled that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions covers "annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner." Thus, the Court concluded that judgments or final orders and resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases cannot be annulled by the CA, more so, since The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, and the right to appeal is not to be considered granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.
While these cases involve annulments of judgments under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, still, they still find application in the present case, as the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on annulment of judgments are identical.
Consequently, the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such authority.
Further, petitioners are also asking the Court to take cognizance of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of prohibition, which they claim was not acted upon by the CA, citing the Court's action in Fortich v. Corona35 where the Court took cognizance of the petition previously filed with the CA due to compelling reasons. The Court is not persuaded to do so.
Fortich involved a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), which was leased as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte Philippines, Inc. for a period of 10 years. During the existence of the lease, the DAR placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million. When the NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association) filed an application for conversion due to the passage of Resolution No. 6 by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon and Ordinance No. 24 by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, reclassifying the area from agricultural to industrial/institutional, the same was disapproved by the DAR Secretary and instead, the property was placed under the compulsory coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program for distribution to all qualified beneficiaries. This prompted Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon to file an appeal with the OP, while NQSRMDC filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
The OP then issued a Decision dated March 29, 1996 reversing the DAR Secretary's decision and approving the application for conversion. Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denied the DAR's motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days, and it was also declared that the OP
Decision dated March 29, 1996 had already become final and executory.
Because of this, the farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike on October 9, 1997, protesting the OP's decision. In order to resolve the strike, the OP issued a so-called "Win/Win" resolution on November 7, 1997, modifying the decision in that NQSRMDC's application for conversion is approved only with respect to the approximately 44-hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department of Agriculture, while the remaining approximately 100 hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.1awphi1.net
A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court36 was then filed with the Court, which was contested by the Office of the Solicitor General on the ground that the proper remedy should have been to file a petition for review directly with the CA in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In resolving the issue, the Court recognized the rule that the Supreme Court, CA and RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. However, due to compelling reasons and in the interest of speedy justice, the Court resolved to take primary jurisdiction over the petition in the interest of speedy justice, after which the Court nullified the act of the OP in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, as it was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
It must be stressed at this point that the Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.37 The Court finds no compelling circumstances in this case to warrant a relaxation of the foregoing rule. The Fortich case is not analogous with the present case such that the Court is not bound to abandon all rules, take primary jurisdiction, and resolve the merits of petitioners' application for a writ of prohibition.
In the present case, the assailed DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 granting the petition for relief from judgment and giving due course to the Notice of Coverage was made pursuant to a petition for relief from judgment filed by the DAR, albeit petitioners are contesting the validity of the proceedings held thereon. On the other hand, in Fortich, the OP's "Win/Win" resolution dated November 7, 1997 was made motu proprio, as a result of the hunger strike staged by the farmer-beneficiaries.
Further, the OP's "Win/Win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997 in the Fortich case is a patently void judgment since it was evident that there was already an existing final and executory OP Decision dated March 29, 1996. In this case, the assailed DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 appears to be regular on its face, and for its alleged nullity to be resolved, the Court must delve into the records of the case in order to determine the validity of petitioners' argument of lack of due process, absent notice and hearing.
Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues.38 The question of whether the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995 is null and void and enforceable against petitioners for having been rendered without affording petitioners due process is a factual question which requires a review of the records of this case for it to be judiciously resolved.
The Court notes that the CA, indeed, failed to resolve petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of prohibition, which, significantly, focuses on the alleged nullity of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995. On this score, the CA found that the application for the issuance of the writ of prohibition was actually a collateral attack on the validity of the DARAB decision. But, a final and executory judgment may be set aside in three ways;39 and a collateral attack, whereby in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof,40 is one of these. This tenet is based upon a court's inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records.41 Despite recognizing the need to resolve petitioners' application for the writ of prohibition in its Resolution dated January 12, 1999, the CA nonetheless summarily denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated February 23, 2000,42 leaving the matter hanging and unresolved.
At first, the Court considered resolving the merits of petitioners' motion for reconsideration concerning their application for a writ of prohibition against enforcing the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995. Thus, in a Resolution dated June 5, 2006, the Court directed the CA to transmit the records of DARAB Case No. 0555, which was previously required by the CA to be forwarded to it per Resolution dated December 20, 1999.43 However, as of even date, the CA has not complied with the Court's Resolution. Withal, upon re-examination of the issues involved in this case, the Court deems it more judicious to remand this case to the CA for immediate resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration, re: their application for the writ of prohibition.
Moreover, the radical conflict in the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and the DARAB as regards the nature of the subject property necessitates a review of the present case. In this regard, the CA is in a better position to fully adjudicate the case for it can delve into the records to determine the probative value of the evidence supporting the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and of the DARAB. In addition, the CA is empowered by its internal rules to require parties to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary to promote the ends of substantial justice, and further order the transmittal of the proper records for it to fully adjudicate the case. After all, it is an avowed policy of the courts that cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better.44
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to resolve petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of prohibition in their Motion for Reconsideration.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the records be remanded forthwith to the Court of Appeals.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170404 September 28, 2011
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs.JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON, [Deceased], JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 117, Pasay City, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
While there are remedies available to a party adjudged in contempt of court, same may only be availed of when the procedures laid down for its availment are satisfied.
By this Petition for Certiorari,1 petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) assails the Order2 dated November 25, 2005 issued by the now deceased Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon (Judge Gingoyon) of Branch 117, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (respondent court) citing him in direct contempt of court, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.
SO ORDERED.3
Essentially, petitioner prays for this Court to declare the assailed Order void and that Judge Gingoyon abused his discretion in citing
him in contempt, as well as in denying his motion to fix the amount of bond.
Antecedent Facts
This case stemmed from a Civil Complaint4 filed by petitioner against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr. (Mina), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0401 in the RTC of Pasay City for abatement of nuisance. In the said case, petitioner sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the "basketball goal" which was permanently attached to the second floor of Mina’s residence but protrudes to the alley which serves as the public’s only right of way.
Mina was declared in default5 hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.
After trial, Judge Gingoyon, in his Decision6 dated October 21, 2005, declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked "locus standi." Citing Article 701 of the Civil Code, Judge Gingoyon ruled that the action for abatement of nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual like the petitioner.
In the same Decision, Judge Gingoyon also opined that:
Plaintiffs must learn to accept the sad reality of the kind of place they live in. x x x Their place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to laze around or doing their daily household chores.
Thus, residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys. The alleys become the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts of things to entertain them or pass the time, their wash area or even a place to cook food in. Take in a few ambulant vendors who display their wares in their choice spots in the alley and their customers that mill around them, and one can only behold chaos if not madness in these alleys. But for the residents of the places of this kind, they still find order in this madness and get out of this kind of life unscathed. It’s because they all simply live and let live. Walking through the alleys daily, the residents of the area have
become adept at [weaving] away from the playthings that children at play throw every which way, sidestepping from the path of children chasing each other, dodging and [ducking]from awnings or canopies or clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach [on] the alleys. Plaintiffs appear to be fastidious and delicate and they cannot be faulted for such a desirable trait. But they can only do so within their own abode. Once they step outside the doors of their home, as it were, they cannot foist their delicacy and fastidiousness upon their neighbors. They must accept their alleys as the jungle of people and the site of myriad of activities that it is. They must also learn to accept the people in their place as they are; they must live and let live. Unless they choose to live in a less blighted human settlement or better still move to an upscale residential area, their only remaining choice is for them to live in perpetual conflict with their neighbors all the days of their lives.7
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision. In his Motion for Reconsideration,8 he took exception to the advice given by Judge Gingoyon thus:
The 12th and 13th paragraphs of the assailed decision, though only an advice of the court, are off-tangent and even spouses illegality;
Since when is living in cramped tenements become a license for people to invade the alleys and use the said alley for doing all sorts of things, i.e., as wash area or cooking food? In effect, this court is making his own legislations and providing for exceptions in law when there are none, as far as nuisance is concerned;
The court might not be aware that in so doing, he is giving a wrong signal to the defendants and to the public at large that land grabbing, squatting, illegal occupation of property is all right and justified when violators are those people who live in cramped tenements or the underprivileged poor, as the court in a sweeping statement proclaimed that "residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys;"
For the enlightenment of the court, and as was proven during the ex-parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, Edang estate comprises properties which are subdivided and titled (plaintiffs and defendants have their own titled properties and even the right of way
or alley has a separate title) and not the kind the court wrongfully perceives the place to be;
Moreover, the court has no right to impose upon the herein plaintiffs to accept their alleys as a jungle of people and the site of myriad of activities that it is. For the information of the court, plaintiffs have holdings in upscale residential areas and it is a misconception for the court to consider the Pasay City residence of the plaintiffs as a blighted human settlement. Apparently the court is very much misinformed and has no basis in his litany of eye sore descriptions;
Undersigned is at quandary what will this court do should he be similarly situated with the plaintiffs? Will the court abandon his residence, giving way to illegality in the name of live and let live principle?
Nonetheless, what remains bugling [sic] is the fact that the court in his unsolicited advice knows exactly the description of the alley where the complained nuisance is located and the specific activities that the defendants do in relation to the alley. The court should be reminded that the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and where else can the court gather these information about the alleys aside from the logical conclusion that the court has been communicating with the defendant, off the record, given that the latter has already been in default.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner requested the respondent court to hear his motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2005.10
In an Order11 dated November 11, 2005, Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing on November 18, 2005, a date chosen by petitioner,12 and directed him to substantiate his serious charge or show cause on even date why he should not be punished for contempt.13 Judge Gingoyon also opined that:
This court, more specifically this Presiding Judge, has not seen the faintest of shadow of the defendant or heard even an echo of his voice up to the present. Plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz is therefore directed to substantiate his serious charge that he "has been communicating with the defendant off the record, given that the latter has already been declared in default". He is therefore ordered to show cause on November 18, 2005, why he should not be punished for contempt of
court for committing improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to degrade the administration of justice.14
On November 18, 2005, petitioner, however, did not appear. Judge Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an Order15 in open court to give petitioner another 10 days to show cause. The Order reads:
In his Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz specifically prayed that he is submitting his Motion for Resolution and Approval of this court today, Friday, November 18, 2005, at 8:30 A.M. Fridays have always been earmarked for criminal cases only. Moreover, long before plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration, this court no longer scheduled hearings for November 18, 2005 because there will be no Prosecutors on this date as they will be holding their National Convention. Nevertheless, since it is the specific prayer of the plaintiff that he will be submitting his motion for resolution and approval by the court on said date, the court yielded to his wish and set his motion for hearing on his preferred date.
When this case was called for hearing today, plaintiff did not appear. The court waited until 9:45 A.M. but still no appearance was entered by the plaintiff or any person who might represent himself as an authorized representative of the plaintiff. Instead it was the defendant and his counsel who appealed and who earlier filed an Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.
x x x x
In view of the failure of the plaintiff to appear in today’s hearing, the court considers the motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution. As for the Order of this court for the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, the court [motu proprio] grants plaintiff last ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. After the lapse of the said period, the court will resolve the issue of whether or not he should be cited for contempt. x x x16
In his Compliance17 to the Show Cause Order, petitioner maintained that the alleged contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand on for the same were based on the circumstances of the instant case. He even reiterated his insinuation that Judge Gingoyon communicated with Mina by posing the query: "…where then did this
court gather an exact description of the alley and the myriad of [sic] activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiff’s evidence so exacting as the description made by this court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his Decision dated October 21, 2005."18
On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order19 finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court. The Order reads:
Ferdinand Cruz was ordered to substantiate with facts his serious charge that the Judge "has been communicating with the defendant off the record". But instead of presenting proof of facts or stating facts, Cruz simply shot back with a query: "Where then did this court gather an exact description of the alley and the myriad activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiff’s evidence so exacting as the description made by this court…" By this token, Cruz adamantly stood pat on his accusation, which now appears to be wholly based on suspicion, that the Judge has been communicating with the defendant off the record.
The suspicion of Ferdinand Cruz may be paraphrased thus: The only way for the Judge [to] know the blight in his place in Pasay City is for the Judge to communicate with the defendant. It is only by communicating with the defendant and by no other means may the Judge know such blight.
Blinded by his suspicion, Cruz did not consider that as State Prosecutor, the Judge was detailed in Pasay City in 1991 and that he has been a judge in Pasay City since 1997. The nuisance that Cruz complained of, or the blight of his place, is not a unique feature of that particular place. It is replicated in many other places of the city. Indeed, it is but a microcosm of what is prevalent not only within the urban areas within Metro Manila but also in many other highly urbanized areas in the country. Judges are no hermits that they would fail to witness this blight. Cruz did not care to make this allowance for the benefit of preserving the dignity of the court.
Cruz’s open accusation without factual basis that the judge is communicating with the defendant is an act that brings the court into disrepute or disrespect; or offends its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority. It constitutes contempt of court. (People vs. De
Leon, L-10236, January 31, 1958). x x x By alleging that the judge communicated with the defendant, Cruz is in effect charging the judge of partiality. Since there is not an iota of proof that the judge did the act complained of, the charge of partiality is uncalled for and constitutes direct contempt (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil.86; Malolos vs. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113).
WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.
SO ORDERED.20
An Order of Arrest21 was issued against the petitioner on even date.
On December 1, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest (Ex-Parte Motion)22 with the respondent court. In said Ex-Parte Motion, petitioner averred that:
x x x x
2. To date, undersigned has already filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court;
x x x x
The respondent court denied the Ex-Parte Motion in its Order23 dated December 1, 2005 based on petitioner’s failure to attach the alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The respondent court held that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Meanwhile, Judge Gingoyon was slain on December 31, 2005. In a Resolution24 dated February 1, 2006, this Court directed the incumbent Judge of Branch 117, RTC of Pasay City, Judge Jesus B. Mupas, to submit a comment on the petition "inasmuch as direct or
indirect contempt pertains to the misbehavior or disrespect committed towards the court and not to judges in their personal capacities."25
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A.
WHETHER x x x PETITIONER [IS] GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.
B.
WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT HAS ENOUGH FACTUAL BASIS FOR CITING PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT.
C.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO FIX BOND.26
The issues may be summed up as follows: whether the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court and whether abuse of discretion was committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion.
Petitioner contends that the alleged contumacious remark is merely a fair observation or comment and a logical conclusion made based on the detailed description given by the respondent court of what has been happening in the alley subject of the civil case. Petitioner avers that no other conclusion can be had except that Judge Gingoyon was communicating with the defendant off the record, since the exact description of what was happening in the alley was not adduced in evidence during trial. Further, petitioner contends that fair and logical conclusion founded on circumstances of the case cannot be considered contemptuous.
Petitioner likewise insists that the respondent court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to fix bond, therefore violating due process.
Our Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge wherein proceedings are pending is considered direct contempt.
"[C]ontemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt."27 "[A] pleading x x x containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending x x x has been held to be equivalent to ‘misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same’ within the meaning of Rule 71, § 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, constitutes direct contempt."28
Based on the abovementioned facts and consistent with the foregoing principles set forth, we agree with the finding of respondent court that petitioner is guilty of direct contempt of court.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner with the respondent court contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant off the record, which is considered as a grave offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis. In fact, when asked to adduce proof of the allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but repeatedly argued that it is his "fair observation or conclusion."29
Petitioner vehemently stood by his suspicion and repeated the allegation in the Compliance to the show-cause Order dated November 11, 2005 which he filed with the respondent court. The allegation was repeated despite Judge Gingoyon’s outright denial of communicating with the defendant and explanation in the Order30 dated November 25, 2005 that Judge Gingoyon was familiar with the area as he was detailed in Pasay City since 1991 as State Prosecutor, and thereafter, as judge since 1997.
Instead of showing proof of the alleged communication between Judge Gingoyon and the defendant off the record, petitioner stubbornly insisted that there is nothing contumacious about his
allegation against the Judge as he was just giving his fair and logical observation. Clearly, petitioner openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing without factual basis. Suffice it to say that this accusation is a dangerous one as it exposes Judge Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from office.
On the other hand, a careful perusal of the description as provided by Judge Gingoyon in the Decision shows but a general description of what is normally seen and what normally happens in places such as Edang Street, to wit: "x x x place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to laze around or [do] their daily household chores x x x. The alleys become the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts of things to entertain [themselves] or pass the time, their wash area or even a place to cook food in x x x. Ambulant vendors who display their wares in the alley and their customers that mill around them; x x x children chasing each other, dodging and [ducking] from awnings or canopies; x x x clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach [on] the alleys x x x."31
The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The accusation in the Motion for Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by the petitioner to the respondent court is derogatory, offensive and malicious. The accusation taints the credibility and the dignity of the court and questions its impartiality. It is a direct affront to the integrity and authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of public respect and confidence, which ultimately affects the administration of justice.
Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still not a valid defense in cases of contempt. "Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced."32
Moreover, the charge of partiality is uncalled for, and there being no scintilla of proof that Judge Gingoyon did the act complained of, petitioner’s act amounts to direct contempt of court.33
Denial of the Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest is proper; there is no abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court.
Petitioner avers that the respondent court abused its discretion in denying his Ex-Parte Motion. Petitioner insists that the respondent court should have granted his Ex-Parte Motion since he already filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He further avers that respondent court violated his right to due process by fixing the bond only on December 5, 2005 or 10 days after the Orders of contempt and arrest were issued.
Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.
The respondent court was well within the bounds of its authority when itdenied petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion.
A person may be adjudged in direct contempt of court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court34 without need of a hearing but may thereafter avail of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition.35
Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Remedy therefrom. – The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, we find that the respondent court properly denied petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof that he already filed a petition for certiorari. Notably, the Ex-Parte Motion was filed with the respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00 A.M.36 and therein petitioner stated that he already filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court. However, perusal of the records would show that the Petition for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the same day but at 1:06 P.M.37 Clearly, when the motion was filed with the respondent
court, it cannot be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly filed with this Court. Significantly, the records show that respondent court was furnished a copy of the Petition for Certiorari by registered mail and which was received only on December 5, 2005.38 It is therefore clear that at the time that petitioner filed the Ex-Parte Motion with the respondent court, he has not yet availed of the remedy of certiorari. In fact, it was only after filing the Ex- Parte Motion with respondent court that petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. This explained why no proof of such filing was presented by petitioner to the respondent court thus prompting it to declare that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.39 Petitioner thus cannot attribute abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion. To reiterate, at the time the said Ex-Parte Motion was filed and acted upon by the respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to the remedy prayed for. Clearly, the respondent court did not commit error, nor did it overstep its authority in denying petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion.
All told, we take a similar stand as Judge Gingoyon and affirm the Order adjudging petitioner guilty of direct contempt. However, as to the penalty imposed upon petitioner, we find the fine of P2,000.00 commensurate with the acts committed.
We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts.1âwphi1 "A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (‘inferior’) courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition."40 For the guidance of the petitioner, "[t]his Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive."41 Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases.42 "However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution
and immemorial tradition."43 Unwarranted demands upon this Court’s attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, "[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented."44 In consequence, the instant petition should have been filed with the CA as there is no allegation of any special or compelling reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court. However, to avoid further delay, we deem it practical to resolve the controversy.
Finally, it must be pointed out that on April 28, 2010, we directed petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel45 within 15 days from notice. Petitioner failed to comply hence we directed him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with in our Resolution dated September 6, 2010.46 Still, petitioner failed to comply hence he was fined P1,000.00 in our Resolution dated January 17, 201147 which was increased to P3,000.00 in our Resolution of June 29, 2011. Consequently, petitioner is hereby directed to pay said fine of P3,000.00 otherwise he would be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Order dated November 25, 2005 of Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City finding petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz guilty of direct contempt is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P2,000.00. In addition, petitioner is ordered to PAY a fine of P3,000.00 for his repeated failure to heed the directives of this Court. Petitioner is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 123050 January 20, 1999
SUICO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, SPS. ESMERALDO and ELIZABETH SUICO, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT BANK INC., respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
On January 19, 1987, petitioner Suico Industrial Corporation, represented by Esmeraldo Suico, its president, secured a loan of P2,500,000.00 payable in five (5) years, from respondent Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PDCP Bank). As security thereof, petitioner spouses mortgaged their two (2) real estate properties situated at Mandaue City, Cebu covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 18324 and 23116. Sometime in 1991, petitioners obtained a second loan of P2,000,000.00 payable in five, (5) years, and secured it with the same real properties, which was granted respondent PDCP Bank.
For failure to pay the balance of the loan amounting to P3,900,000.00 as of 1993, respondent PDCP Bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. It was adjudged as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale dated February 29, 1993 was duly issued by the Sheriff of Mandaue in its favor. Petitioner failed to redeem the said properties. After expiration of the one (l) year redemption period, ownership over the properties were consolidated and Nos. 34988 and 34987 were correspondingly issued in the name of respondent PDCP Bank.
On November 16, 1994, respondent PDCP Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 28 an "Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession" 1 which was granted in an order dated December 8, 1994. 2 On December 15, 1994, a writ of possession 3 was thereafter issued. However, the writ could not be enforced because on December 9, 1994, petitioners filed a "Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction and Damages (with Prayer for Restraining Order)" 4 before the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56 seeking to enjoin respondent PDCP Bank from selling the mortgaged properties and from taking physical possession over the same during the pendency of the case.
On January 17, 1995, RTC Branch 56 issued an Orders 5 granting the injunction sought for by petitioners (therein plaintiffs). It likewise deferred resolution of the motion to dismiss petitioner' complaint filed by respondent PDCP (therein defendant). Pertinent portions of the order state that:
During the hearing of the plaintiffs' application for preliminary injunction, plaintiffs presented Esmeraldo Suico who testified that per arrangement with the certain Mae Siy and Fajardo, former officers of the Defendant Bank, Plaintiff were supposed to intentionally default in their payments and eventually consolidate title in Defendant. In exchange, Defendant was supposed to allow a repurchase of the property by plaintiffs or their recommendee at Five Million Pesos (P5,000, 000.00).
Also presented was Raul Perez, Asset Clerk of the Assessor's Office of Mandaue City, who testified that it was indeed herein Plaintiffs-spouses who facilitated the transfer of the lots to Defendant whose two representatives, even showed up to inquire if Plaintiffs had been at Perez' office.
After careful consideration of the evidence so far submitted, this Courts is convinced that there is indeed was an arrangement between herein plaintiffs defendant as adverted to by Plaintiffs. This conviction by the Court however will naturally be influenced by
whatever evidence the parties will present in the course of the trial of this case.
The Court also realizes that a denial of the prayer for preliminary injunction will result in irreparable damage to plaintiffs as a consequence of the dislocation of their family and business and possible loss of the properties under litigation should Defendant decide to dispose of the same.
On the other hand, maintenance of status quo thru injunction will hardly prejudice the Defendant bank whose name the properties have been already titled. Furthermore, Defendant's interest will be amply protected not only by the injunction bond which the Court will issue but also because the passage of time will certainly enhance the value of the properties.
Foregoing considered, the Court in the interest of justice and equity, hereby GRANTS the injunction prayed for and accordingly orders the Defendant, its representatives and assigns (enjoined) from disposing of the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 18324 and 23116 including improvements found therein or taking physical possession of the same until further orders from this Court.
Bond hereby fixed at fifty thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
Resolution of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is deferred pending further of evidence.
SO ORDERED. 6
On January 18, 1995, RTC Branch 56 issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, providing therein:
Whereas, on December 13, 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Mandaue City, issued a Restraining Order in the above-entitled case, enjoining
the defendant PDCP Bank, its attorneys, agents or its duly authorized officer or persons acting for and their behalf from selling the mortgaged properties described in the complaint to person not recommended by plaintiffs and from taking physical possession over the same pending resolution of the prayer for issuance of permanent injection.
Whereas, after hearing, this Court on January 17, 1995, issued an Order expanding the restraining order dated December 13, 1994, issued by RTC Branch 28 into an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, upon plaintiffs' posting a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 conditioned for the payment of damages which the defendant may suffer by reason of the issuance of the injunction.
Whereas, the bond as required was duly filed and approved by the Court on January 18, 1995.
Whereas, you Private Development Corporation of the Philippines now known as PDCP Bank, your representative and assigns are hereby ordered not to dispose of the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 18324 and 23116 including improvements found therein or take physical possession of the same until further orders from this Court. 7
The Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated January 17, 1995) and the Motion to Dismiss (petitioners' complaint) both filed by respondent PDCP bank were denied by RTC Branch 56 in an Order dated June 21, 1995. 8
In its petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction filed with the Court of Appeals on June 26, 1995, respondent PDCP Bank prayed that the Order dated January 17, 1995 granting the writ of preliminary injunction be set aside, declared void and without any further force and effect. It likewise prayed that the Sheriff of Mandaue City be ordered to implement the writ of possession.
On August 28, 1995, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the challenged decision 9 which ruled that RTC Branch 56 exceed its jurisdiction when issued the writ of injunction against the enforcement of the writ of possession granted by RTC Branch 28. It ratiocinated in this wise:
In a petition for Certiorari, the court must confine itself to the issue of whether or not the respondent court lacked of exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion (San Pedro vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 145). Here, the respondent Regional Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of injunction complained of.
Well-settled is the rule that no courts has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction. . . . (Rafael Aquino, Sr., et al. v. Judge Julito B. Valenciano, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-93-746, December 27, 1994, 239 SCRA 428; Prudential Bank v. Gapultos, No. 41835, 19 January 1990, 181 SCRA 159; Darwin v. Tokonaga, G.R. No. 54177, 27 May 1991, 197 SCRA 442; Santos v. Bayhon, G.R. No. 88643, July 1991, 199 SCRA 525).
Here, the respondent court issued an injunction against the enforcement of the writ of possession granted by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28. This cannot be done. It was the ministerial duty of the trial court to grant such writ of possession.
Said the Supreme Court.
. . . With more reason, a purchaser can demand writ of possession after the expiration of the redemption period. Thus, in F. David Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of Asia & America, we held:
It is settled the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the
property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of the title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act 3135 as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of the title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.' (Aurora Gonzales Vda. de Zaballero, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al G.R.No. 106958, February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA 810, F. David Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of Asia & America, 184 SCRA 294)
Much as We sympathize with the private respondents, it was clearly petitioner's right to ask for the writ and to acquire possession of subject properties and its improper for the respondent court to stay implementation of the said writ.
As to the other reasons advanced by petitioner, as stressed by private respondent, the same are questions of the fact better left for respondent court's determination, at this stage of the litigation below.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned Order of January 17, 1995 is SET ASIDE. Cost against private respondents.
SO ORDERED 10
The motion for reconsideration having been in a Resolution dated December 12, 1995 11 petitioners filed this instant certiorari petition praying that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by RTC Branch 56 be upheld so that a trial on the merits of the case may ensure.
The focal point of inquiry is whether or not RTC Branch, 56 can enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession issued by RTC Branch 28.
Petitioners alleged in their complaint for specific performance, injunction and damages filed before RTC Branch 56 that they had agreed on a plan with respondent PDCP Bank to intentionally default in their payments so that a foreclosure of mortgage can be effected and title to the parcels of land would eventually be consolidated in the name of respondent PDCP Bank. Thereafter, respondent PDCP Bank was supposed to allow them to purchase the properties for P5,000,000.00 thru the latter's recommended buyer. The recommendees of petitioners rejected by respondent PDCP Bank. The Selling price thereof was increased thereby preventing petitioners from redeeming the properties. In this regard, petitioners sought to enjoin the respondent PDCP Bank from selling the said mortgaged properties to persons not recommended petitioners and from taking physical possession thereof during the pendency of the case.
Thus, petitioners now seek to uphold the propriety of the writ of injunction issued by RTC Branch 56 enjoining the enforcement of the writ of possession granted by RTC Branch 28.
The petition does not deserve merit.
First. RTC Branch 56 acted with grave abuse of discretion for having issued the writ of injunction which prevented the implementation of the writ of possession issued by RTC Branch 28. The issuance of the writ of injunction was not proper in the absence of any legal right on the part of petitioners to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession in favor of respondent PDCP Bank.
We espoused in Arcega v. Court of Appeals 12 that:
For the issuance of the writ·of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 13
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 14 Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. 15 The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is no ground for an injunction. 16
When petitioners failed to pay the balance of the loan and thereafter failed to redeem the properties, title to the property had already been transferred to respondent PDCP Bank. Respondent PDCP Bank's right to possess the property is clear and is based on its right of ownership as a purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale to whom title has been conveyed. l7 Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 and Section 35 of Rule 39, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property. 18 Respondent PDCP Bank has a better right to possess the subject property because of its title over the same. 19
Furthermore, petitioners undertook a procedural misstep when it filed a suit for specific performance injunction and damages before RTC Branch 56 instead of a petition to set aside the sale and cancellation of the writ of possession as provided under Section 8 Act 3135:
Sec. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings: in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petitioner that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession canceled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Number Four hundred and ninety six, and if it finds the
complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety six; but the order of the possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal. 20
Second. Indeed, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to grant such writ of possession.
In Sulit v. Court of Appeals, 21 the rule was applied in this manner:
No discretion appears to be left to the Court. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8, and it cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession since, under the Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte. 22 Such recourse is available to a mortgage, who effects the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage even before the expiration of the period of redemption provided by law and the Rules of Court. 23
This is stated also in A. G. Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 24
A writ of possession is generally understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property, 25 such as when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed. 26 In this regard, the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. 27 As such, the Court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment. 28
Third. The statute books are replete with jurisprudence to the effect that trial courts have no power to interfere by injunction with the orders or judgments issued by another court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. 29 In this regard, RTC Branch 56 therefore has no power nor authority to nullify or enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession issued by RTC Branch 28.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 28, 1995 and the Resolution dated December 12, 1995 of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
