THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner, vs. IACCriselda Cheesman without the knowledge of her husband whom she had been separated sold to Padilla a property which Criselda alleged to have bought from her own funds during their marriage. Hence, the tax declarations for the property were issued in her name only and she assumed exclusive management and administration of said property. Thirty days after the sale, Thomas brought against his wife and Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. An answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the property said was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith. The parties ultimately agreed on the rendition by the court of a summary judgment declaring "the sale executed by . . . Criselda Cheesman in favor of . . . Estelita Padilla to be valid," dismissing Thomas Cheesman's complaint and ordering him "to immediately turn over the possession of the house and lot subject of . . . (the) case to . . . Estelita Padilla . . . Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court assailing among others the declaration of the court that the sale to Estelita Padilla was valid despite the lack of consent thereto by him, and the presumption of the conjugal character of the property in question pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code. His contention was found to be without merit by the Appellate Tribunal and affirmed the summary judgment. Once more, Thomas Cheesman availed of the remedy of appeal, this time to this Court. Here, he argues that it was reversible error for the Intermediate Appellate Court 1)to find that the presumption that the property in question is conjugal in accordance with Article 160 had been satisfactorily overcome by Estelita Padilla; 2) to rule that Estelita Padilla was a purchaser of said property in good faith.

Held: Both the Trial court and the appellate court reached the same conclusions: that (1) fraud, mistake or excusable negligence existed in the premises justifying relief to Estelita Padilla under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, or (2) that Criselda Cheesman had used money she had brought into her marriage to Thomas Cheesman to purchase the lot and house in question, or (3) that Estelita Padilla believed in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the exclusive owner of the property that she (Estelita) intended to and did in fact buy all of which are conclusions or findings of fact and these determinations of fact will not be disturbed. Question of facts as distinguished from a question of law which exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" "there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to this Court. As everyone knows or ought to know, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence. The creation of the Court of Appeals was precisely intended to take away from the Supreme Court the work of examining the evidence, and confine its task to the determination of questions which do not call for the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses. The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals is, to be sure, subject to certain exceptions, none of which however obtains in the case at bar.

ORTIGAS & CO. LTD. PARTNERSHIP, petitioner, vs. VelascoOrtigas in this case filed a petition for Judge Velascos removal from the Judiciary for his grievous transgressions of quite elementary procedural and jurisdictional rules. Some of the said transgressions are that he dismissed Ortigas appeal pronouncing its notice of appeal as a mere scrap of paper because Ortigas allegedly had no material interest in the litigation. Judge Velasco also threw out the appeal of the Office of the Solicitor General. He branded the appeal "sham" because said Office had "not filed any formal opposition to the petition and neither has it introduced and/or formally offered any evidence to warrant its dismissal, etc.," and declared that the appeal was tardily attempted. He authorized the immediate execution of the judgment rendered by him just twenty-one (21) days earlier (on September 23, 1992), directing reconstitution of Molina's title. In that Order he opined that, on the ostensible basis of cited precedents. Ortigas' appeal was "frivolous and interposed only for purposes of delay;" hence, immediate execution was warranted not only by Molina's advanced age, but also to "prevent wastage of (her) income," "avoid the possibility of . . . judgment becoming illusory or to "prevent further damage" to her or "minimize damage unduly suffered by . . . (her)." Held:A rule of long standing and uniform application is that dismissals by Regional Trial Courts of appeals from their judgments are allowed "where the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time herein provided. It has no power to disallow an appeal on any other ground, e.g., that it is frivolous, or the case has become moot, etc. The reason is obvious: otherwise, "the way would be opened for courts . . . to forestall review or reversal of their decisions by higher courts, no matter how erroneous or improper such decisions should beNow, it is axiomatic that execution of judgments pending appeal is allowed only as an exception to the general rule that only judgment which have become final and executory may be executed. The element that gives validity to an order of execution pending appeal, it will be noted, is the existence of good reasons, to be stated in a special order. The discretion to authorize immediate execution, is sound discretion, which so authorizes it only where there are good reasons therefor. Insofar as immediate execution is premised on the theory that Ortigas' appeal was "frivolous and interposed only for purposes of delay," such rationalization is indefensible for the reasons already stated relative to the Judge's disallowance of Ortigas' appeal.

Bugarin v PalisocThe court in this ejectment case declared respondents as the rightful possessors of the properties in dispute and ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay to private respondents the rentals. Petitioners appealed to the RTC while private respondents moved for execution pending appeal. RTC affirmed the MeTC decision so petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution which was denied and granted instead private respondents' motion for execution for failure of petitioners to post a supersedeas bond. Petitioners then filed a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of Execution while private respondents filed a Motion to Issue a Special Order of Demolition since petitioners refused to vacate the premises. The RTC declared the decision denying petitioners' appeal final and executory, and remanded the records of the case to the MeTC without acting on the motions. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The court granted the motion for Special order of demolition. Petitioner filed a motion to quash but was denied. Hence, this petition where petitioners raise the lone error thatIssue: Are the Orders of the MeTC proper?Held: Under Section 19, 10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the court's duty to order the execution is practically ministerial. The defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. Once the Regional Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review. Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In said petition, which is still pending, petitioners contended that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted that the latter court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits in the instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that "there should be no appeal." Clearly, petitioners' petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and executory.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NLRCBienvenido filed an illegal dismissal case against St. Martin Funeral Home which alleged that he had misappropriated its payment for value added tax. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of St. Martin Funeral Home declaring that since Bienvenido was a volunteer worker, there was no employer-employee relationship that existed between the parties, and therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. After the motion for reconsideration of the herein petitioner was denied, it filed before the SC the instant petition for certiorari but SC remanded the case to the CA.Held:All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Habaluyas v Japson

Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Second Division of the Court promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of respondent Judge granting private respondents' motion for new trial.

ISSUEWhether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced thatno motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsiderationmay be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court.Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Courtas the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed,a motion for extension of time to file the record on appealmay be filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days. If the court denies the motion for extension, the appeal must be taken within the original period (Bello vs. Fernando, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 135), inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal (Reyes vs. Sta. Maria, November 20, 1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said motion after the expiration of the period for appeal provided it was filed within the original period. All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the merits.

NYK v NLRCPrivate respondent Publico was sewer of petitioner corporation. On May 7, 1997, Publico went home early despite refusal of petitioner because she was not feeling well. The next day, she notified petitioner that she was still recovering from her sickness. On May 9, 1997, however, Publico was refused entry for work and later informed of her dismissal. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both ruled the dismissal illegal. A special civil action for certiorari was then filed in the Court of Appeals by petitioner, but the same was dismissed outright because it was not accompanied by a certified true copy of the assailed NLRC decision, but by a certified xerox copy of the assailed NLRC decision. ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in refusing to rule on the correctness of the NLRC's findings that private respondent was illegally dismissed?Held: Petitioners raise factual questions which are improper in a petition for review on certiorari. Findings of facts of the NLRC, particularly in a case where the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are in agreement, are deemed binding and conclusive upon this Court. Hence, petitioners' bare allegations of abandonment cannot stand the unswerving conclusion by both quasi-judicial agencies below that private respondent was unlawfully dismissed. We find no reason to deviate from the consistent findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that there was no basis to find that Virginia abandoned her work. Indeed, factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, both bodies being deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdictions, when sufficiently supported by evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered binding on this Court. As long as their decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the process of their deduction from the evidence proffered by the parties, all that is left is for the Court to stamp its affirmation and declare its finality. No reversible error may thus be laid at the door of the Court of Appeals when it refused to rule that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in holding that private respondent was illegally dismissed.