CivilLawDigests

7/30/2019 CivilLawDigests

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BASBAS v. SAYSON

G.R. No. 172660, 24 August 2011

Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS

On September 2, 1976, respondent Beata Sayson and her husband Roberto Sayson, Sr. filed a

Petition for Registration of an agricultural land located in Cagbatang, Balagtas, Matag-ob, Leyte.

The said application was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines and herein petitioners

Eugenio Basbas, Teofilo Aras and Rufino Aras. On March 22, 1979, the Court of First Instance of

Leyte rendered a Decision adjudicating to the spouses Sayson said agricultural land and

approving its registration under their names.

The oppositors filed their appeal to the CA. The appellate court affirmed in toto the Decision of

the CFI. This CA Decision became final and executory on August 21, 1985 and, accordingly, a

Writ of Possession was issued on November 21, 1985, which was never implemented.

The following year or on September 17, 1986, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2496 was

issued to the spouses Sayson pursuant to the March 22, 1979 CFI Decision. An Alias Writ of

Possession was issued on April 6, 1989 but this could also not be implemented in view of the

refusal of Eugenio Sr. and his son Eugenio Basbas, Jr. (Eugenio Jr.). Claiming that the land they

occupied is not the same land subject of the CFI Decision, they demanded that a relocation

survey be conducted.

The RTC approved the Commissioner's Report on the relocation survey and ordered the original

oppositors, petitioners Eugenio Sr., Teofilo and Rufino, as well as their co-petitioners herein to

vacate the subject property.

This September 13, 1989 Order was, however, not implemented within the five-year period

from the time it became final. Hence, respondent Beata and her son Roberto Sayson, Jr.


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(Roberto Jr.), as successor-in-interest of the late Roberto Sr., filed on August 18, 1995 a

Complaint for Revival of Judgment before the RTC of Ormoc City.

ISSUE

Whether or not the respondents are entitled to revival of judgment in the earlier land

registration case and recover the subject property.

RULING

Yes.

While we note that the present action for revival of judgment is not an action for recovery, the

September 13, 1989 Order sought to be revived herein ordered the petitioners, among others,

to vacate the subject property pursuant to the final and executory judgment of the CA affirming

the CFI's adjudication of the same in favor of respondents. This Order was issued after the

failure to enforce the writ of execution and alias writ of execution due to petitioners' refusal to

vacate the property. To this Court's mind, respondents' purpose in instituting the present

action is not only to have the CA Decision in the land registration case finally implemented but

ultimately, to recover possession thereof from petitioners. This action is therefore one which

Roberto Jr., as co-owner, can bring and prosecute alone, on his own behalf and on behalf of hisco-owner, Beata. Hence, a dismissal of the case with respect to Beata pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule

18 of the Rules of Court will be futile as the case could nevertheless be continued by Roberto Jr.

in behalf of the two of them.


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DCD CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 179978, 31 August 2011

Villarama, JR.,J.:

FACTS

On January 19, 2001, petitioner DCD Construction, Inc., through its President and CEO Danilo D.

Dira, Jr., filed a verified application for registration of a parcel of land situated in Taytay, Danao

City with an area of 4,493 square meters. It was alleged that applicant which acquired the

property by purchase, together with its predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous,

open, adverse, public, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the

property for more than thirty (30) years. Thus, petitioner prayed to have its title judicially

confirmed.

Based on petitioners documentary and testimonial evidence, it appears that the approved

technical description is allegedly identical to that of another lot consisting of 3,781 square

meters. 712 square meters of said lot can be segregated as salvage zone pursuant to DENR

Administrative Order No. 97-05.

On August 22, 2002, the trial court declared that the applicant DCD CONSTRUCTION INC., has a

registerable title to subject lot.

On appeal by respondent Republic of the Philippines, the CA reversed the trial court. The CA

ruled that the evidence failed to show that the land applied for was alienable and disposable

considering that only a notation in the survey plan was presented to show the status of the

property. It was further noted that the earliest tax declaration submitted was issued only in

1988. It was also held that petitioner did not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

ISSUE


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Whether or not the subject lot is indeed alienable and disposable.

RULING

No.

Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms

part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain and (b) that they

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same

under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands

of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of

land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the

State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable

and disposable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the

inalienable public domain. Incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the

land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In support of its contention the land is alienable and disposable, petitioner contends that theDENR-Lands Management Services itself had approved and adopted the notation made by a

certifying officer on the survey plan as its own. Such approval amounts to a positive act of the

government indicating that the land applied for is indeed alienable and disposable.

However, the testimony of the officer from DENR-LMS, Rafaela Belleza, did not at all attest to

the veracity of the notation made by a certifying officer, Ibaez, on the survey plan regarding

the status of the subject land. Hence, no error was committed by the CA in finding that the

certification made by DENR-LMS pertained only to the technical correctness of the survey

plotted in the survey plan and not to the nature and character of the property surveyed.


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In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the notation inserted in the survey plan hardly

satisfies the incontrovertible proof required by law on the classification of land applied for

registration.

The CA likewise correctly held that there was no compliance with the required possession

under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, are mere

conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on

the applicant to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession

was of the nature and duration required by law. The bare statement of petitioners witness,

Andrea Batucan Enriquez, that her family had been in possession of the subject land from the

time her father bought it after the Second World War does not suffice.

Moreover, the tax declaration in the name of petitioners father was issued only in 1994, while

the other in its own name was issued in 2000. Petitioners predecessors-in-interest were able

to submit a tax declaration only for the year 1988, which was long after both spouses Vivencio

and Paulina Batucan have died. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of propertyare not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in

the concept of owner. And while Andrea Batucan Enriquez claimed knowledge of their familys

possession since she was just ten (10) years old although she said she was born in 1932 --

there was no clear and convincing evidence of such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession under a bona fide claim of ownership. She never mentioned any act of occupation,

development, cultivation or maintenance over the property throughout the alleged length of

possession. There was no account of the circumstances regarding their fathers acquisition ofthe land, whether their father introduced any improvements or farmed the land, and if they

established residence or built any house thereon.


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We have held that the bare claim of the applicant that the land applied for had been in the

possession of her predecessor-in-interest for 30 years does not constitute the well-nigh

inconvertible and conclusive evidence required in land registration.

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the

conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.

Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,

therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of

constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his

possession must not be a mere fiction.Actualpossession of a land consists in the manifestation

of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own

property.


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FERNANDO v. ACUNA

G.R. No. 161030, 14 September 2011

Leonardo-De Castro,J.:

FACTS

At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land registered in the names of Jose A. Fernando,

married to Lucila Tinio, and Antonia A. Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez, and located in San

Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. When they died intestate, the property remained undivided. Petitioners

herein are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased registered owners. However,

petitioners failed to agree on the division of the subject property amongst themselves, even

after compulsory conciliation before the Barangay Lupon.

Thus, petitioners, except for the heirs of Germogena Fernando, filed a Complaint for partition

on April 17, 1997 against the heirs of Germogena Fernando. In the Complaint, plaintiffs alleged,

among others, that they and defendants are common descendants and compulsory heirs of the

late spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio, and the late spouses Antonia A. Fernando and

Felipe Galvez. They further claimed that their predecessors-in-interest died intestate and

without instructions as to the disposition of the property left by them. There being no

settlement, the heirs are asking for their rightful and lawful share because they wish to build up

their homes or set up their business in the respective portions that will be allotted to them. In

sum, they prayed that the subject property be partitioned into eight equal parts, corresponding

to the hereditary interest of each group of heirs.

However, respondent Leon Acuna intervened in the action averring that in the Decision dated

November 29, 1929 of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan, the portion of the property

identified as Lot 1303 was already adjudicated to several other persons who are the petitioners

predecessor-in-interest. He likewise claimed that in a 1930 Decision of the Cadastral Court, the

portion identified as Lot 1302 was also already adjudicated to other people as well.


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ISSUE

Whether or not a title registered under the Torrens system, as the subject original certificate of

title is the best evidence of ownership of land and is a notice against the world.

RULING

No.

As the records show, in the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag,

Bulacan had already been divided and adjudicated to spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio;

spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez; spouses Antonio A. Fernando and Felisa

Camacho; spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; and spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud

Wisco from whom respondent Acuna derived his title.

In the decision, it would appear that petitioners ascendants themselves petitioned for the

cadastral court to divide Lot 1303 among the parties to the 1929 case and they were not

allocated all the lots. Still, as the trial court noted, the November 29, 1929 Decision was never

fully implemented in the sense that the persons named therein merely proceeded to occupy

the lots assigned to them without having complied with the other directives of the cadastral

court which would have led to the titling of the properties in their names. Nonetheless, it isundisputed that the persons named in the said November 29, 1929 Decision and, subsequently,

their heirs and assigns have since been in peaceful and uncontested possession of their

respective lots for more than seventy (70) years until the filing of the suit for partition on April

17, 1997 by petitioners which is the subject matter of this case.

Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration

Decree, states that *n+o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registeredowner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Thus, the Court has held that

the right to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a

mere consequence of ownership.


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However, the Court had recognized the jurisprudential thread regarding the exception to the

foregoing doctrine that while it is true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible,

the registered landowner may lose his right to recover possession of his registered property by

reason of laches.

Thus, while a person may not acquire title to the registered property through continuous

adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered owner, the heir of the

latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property and the title

thereto, by reason of laches.

In view of respondents decades long possession and/or ownership of their respective lots by

virtue of a court judgment and the erstwhile registered owners inaction and neglect for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time in pursuing the recovery of the land, assuming

they retained any right to recover the same, it is clear that respondents possession may no

longer be disturbed. The right of the registered owners as well as their successors-in-interest to

recover possession of the property is already a stale demand and, thus, is barred by laches.


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ANGELES v. PASCUAL

G.R. No. 157150, 21 September 2011

Bersamin,J.:

FACTS

Neighbors Regidor Pascual and Pedro Angeles were registered owners of adjacent parcels of

land located in Cabanatuan City. Pascual owned Lot 4 while Angeles owned Lot 5. Each of them

built a house on his respective lot, believing all the while that his respective lot was properly

delineated. It was not until Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, as the highest bidder in the

foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3, caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic

engineer discovered that Pascuals house had encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence,

Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.

In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his own Lot 4 and discovered that Angeles

house also encroached on his lot. Of the 318 square meters comprising Lot 4, Angeles occupied

252 square meters, leaving Pascual with only about 66 square meters. Pascual demanded

rentals for the use of the encroached area of Lot 4 from Angeles, or the removal of Angeles

house. Angeles refused the demand. Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of

possession and damages in the Regional Trial Court in Cabanatuan City.

The RTC disposed the case in favour of Pascual. On appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed the

RTC, but modified the latters ruling.

Accordingly plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to either buy the portion of defendant-appellants

house on their Lot No. 4, or to sell to defendant-appellant the portion of their land on which his

house stands. If buying the improvement will render the defendant-appellants house useless,

then plaintiffs-appellees should sell the encroached portion of their land to defendant-

appellant. If plaintiffs-appellees choose to sell the land but defendant-appellant is unwilling or

unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent from


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the time plaintiffs-appellees made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the

premises. But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the improvement,

then defendant-appellant may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties shall agree

upon the terms of the lease.

ISSUE

Whether or not Angeles is a builder in good faith.

RULING

Yes.

Article 448 of the Civil Code contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith

on land owned by another. The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are

owned by different persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a

builder in good faith. We cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can easily

be drawn from the fact that Angeles insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own

lot. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his

ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title.

With the unassailable finding that Angeles house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles

had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and

obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable.

Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given

to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building

or obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of

Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and

the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.


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GUSTILO v. GUSTILO

G.R. No. 175497, 19 October 2011

Abad,J.:

FACTS

Petitioner Mary Joy Anne Gustilo and respondent Jose Vicente Gustilo III are heirs of their

natural father, the late Atty. Armando Gustilo (they have different mothers), who owned

several properties and was, prior to his death, the president of A.G. Agro-Industrial Corporation

in Cadiz City, Negros Occidental.

On August 31, 1993, following their fathers death, Mary Joy and Jose Vicente entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement, adjudicating between themselves their fathers properties. One

of these was Hacienda Imelda which the MOA assigned to Mary Joy. As it happened, however,

the haciendas title remained in the name of A.G. Agro. Mary Joy immediately took possession

of the land through Mila Barco, her mother and natural guardian, and planted sugarcane on it.

Over three years later or in 1997 Jose Vicente, as president of A.G. Agro, leased Hacienda

Imelda and its farm implements to respondent Tita Sy Young for five agricultural crop years

from 1997-1998 to 2001-2002. Being financially hard up, Mary Joy and her mother were pained

to watch Young take over the land.

When the lease contract was about to expire, however, Mary Joy had her lawyer advise Young

to surrender the land to her. But the latter refused to yield possession and continued to

cultivate the same for sugarcane. This prompted Mary Joy to file an action against Jose Vicente

and Young for recovery of possession of the hacienda, cancellation of the lease contract, and

damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City. Jose Vicente filed a motion to

dismiss mainly on the ground that the Cadiz RTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-

corporate disputes, the proper forum being a specially designated commercial court.


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ISSUE

Whether or not Mary Joys action to recover possession presents an intra-corporate dispute

that belongs to the jurisdiction of a specially designated commercial court.

RULING

It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the

complaint. It can be gleaned from Mary Joys allegations in her complaint that her case is

principally one for recovery of possession. It must be stated that regardless of the actual

condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be

turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession,

can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character

of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he is entitled to remain on the

property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right.

Here, Jose Vicente and Young mainly argued in their Motion to Dismiss that inasmuch as the

subject property is in the name of A.G. Agro, the nature of the claim or controversy is one of

intra-corporate. The Court has ruled in the past that an action to recover possession is a

plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess,independently of title. But where the parties raise the issue of ownership, as in this case, the

courts may pass upon such issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess

the property. This adjudication, however, is not final and binding as regards the issue of

ownership; it is merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession when it is

inseparably connected to the issue of ownership. The adjudication on the issue of ownership,

being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the

property. Also, any intra-corporate issues that may be involved in determining the real owner

of the property may be threshed out in a separate proceeding in the proper commercial court.


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YARED v. TIONGCO

G.R. No. 161360, 19 October 2011

Villarama, JR.,J.:

FACTS

Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, all surnamed Tiongco, were born to Atanacio and Maria Luis

Tiongco. Together they were known as the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco.

The present dispute involves three parcels of land all located in Iloilo City. The lots were

registered in the names of Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, and in the name of Heirs of

Maria Luis de Tiongco.

While all of the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco have died, they were survived by their children

and descendants. Among the legitimate children of Jose were petitioner and Carmelo Tiongco,

the father of respondent Jose B. Tiongco.

Sometime in 1965, petitioner built her house on one lot and sustained herself by collecting

rentals from the tenants of the other lots. In 1968, petitioner, as one of the heirs of Jose, filed

an adverse claim affecting all the rights, interest and participation of her deceased father on the

disputed lots, but the adverse claim was annotated only on the certificate of title covering two

lots.

In 1983, respondent Jose prohibited petitioner from collecting rentals from the tenants. In

December 1983, respondent Jose filed a suit for recovery of possession with preliminary

injunction against several tenants wherein he obtained a judgment in his favor. Respondent

Jose also filed a case for unlawful detainer with damages against petitioner as she was staying

on the first lot. While the RTC, Branch 33, of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Joses favor, the CA

reversed the RTCs decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. As such, respondent Jose never

took possession of the properties. However, Jose averred that he has been paying real property


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taxes on the said properties for more than ten (10) years and that petitioner collected rentals

only because he allowed her.

In 1988, when petitioner inquired at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, she

discovered that respondent Jose had already executed an Affidavit of Adjudication dated April

17, 1974, declaring that he is the only surviving heir of the registered owners and adjudicating

unto himself all three lots. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued transfer

certificate of titles all in the name of respondent Jose.

Based on the records with the Register of Deeds, it also appears that on May 10, 1974, the

same day when the TCTs were issued, respondent Jose sold the said lots to Catalino Torre.

Certificates of title were also issued in the name of Catalino Torre. The former then sold the

properties to Antonio Doronila, Jr., and back again to Jose.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner has a better right over the properties.

RULING

Yes.

The Court agrees with the CAs disquisition that an action for reconveyance can indeed be

barred by prescription. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that an action for

reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years

from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

However, there is an exception to this rule. There is but one instance when prescription cannot

be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land

to be reconveyed. The exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could

not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.


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Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land because

such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before

initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing

right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third

party and its effect on his title. The Court held that where the plaintiff in an action for

reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the action for reconveyance becomes

in effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription.

In this case, petitioners possession was disturbed in 1983 when respondent Jose filed a case

for recovery of possession. The RTC of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Joses favor but the CA

on November 28, 1991, during the pendency of the present controversy with the court a quo,

ruled in favor of petitioner. Petitioner never lost possession of the said properties, and as

such, she is in a position to file the complaint with the court a quo to protect her rights and

clear whatever doubts has been cast on her title by the issuance of TCTs in respondent Joses

name.


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MERCADO v. VALLEY MOUNTAIN MINES EXPLORATION, INC.

G.R. No. 141019

Villarama, JR., J.:

FACTS

Several parcels of land situated at Barangay Sungay, Iruhin, Tagaytay City declared under the

name Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada and Heirs of Juan Desengao were sold by the City

Government of Tagaytay in a public auction held on November 28, 1983, for failure to pay the

real property taxes for several years. The subject lots were sold in favor of Valley Mountain

Mines Exploration, Inc.

To save their property, the heirs of Narciso Olimpiada, through their attorney-in-fact, Rosa

Cabrera Mendoza, executed a Deed of Sale of an Unregistered Parcel of Land With Assignment

of Rights and Assumption of Obligations in favor of Jose Teofilo T. Mercado. The heirs of Juan

Desengao through their attorney-in-fact Primitivo Mendoza likewise executed a similar deed

in favor of Mercado.

On December 7, 1984, Mercado paid the sums of P58,327.82 and P33,841.49 for the five

parcels of land. Consequently, a Certificate of Redemption covering the subject properties was

issued by the Office of the City Treasurer of Tagaytay City. Said office also returned the

purchase price plus interest thereon to VMMEI on December 11, 1984. However, the checks

issued by Mercado in payment of the aforesaid sums when presented for payment to the bank,

were dishonoured.

On April 14, 1986, VMMEI through its counsel wrote then City Treasurer Concepcion C. Daplas

asserting its right to be reinstated as the highest bidder during the public auction sale

considering that no effective redemption was made by the delinquent owners.


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By virtue of the purchase at the tax delinquency sale conducted by the City Government of

Tagaytay, the tax declarations covering the subject properties are now in the name of VMMEI

as the present owner.

ISSUE

Whether or not VMMEI validly acquired rights over the land in dispute.

RULING

Yes.

Petitioners cause of action is predicated on the absence of notice to them as alleged co-

owners. We have previously ruled that it is incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the

notice directly to the taxpayer -- the registered owner of the property -- in order to protect the

latters interests. Although preceded by proper advertisement and publication, an auction sale

is void absent an actual notice to a delinquent taxpayer. As to who is the taxpayer entitled to

notice, it is the declared or registered owner as appearing in the tax rolls or property tax record

cards of the municipality or city where the property is located. In Talusan v. Tayag, the Court

held that for purposes of the collection of real property taxes, the registered owner of the

property is considered the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice oftax delinquency and other proceedings relative to the tax sale. As petitioners failed to show

they are the declared owners as shown in the tax rolls and tax records of respondent City

Government of Tagaytay, the CA did not err in affirming the dismissal of their complaint.


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IN RE: PALAGANAS v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS

G.R. No. 169144, 26 January 2011

Abad,J.:

FACTS

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States

citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she

designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the executor of her will for she had left

properties in the Philippines and in the US.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the

Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his

appointment as special administrator of her estate. On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners

Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the

petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the

U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be

probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and

without the testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they

claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate

occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for

leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties

to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be

probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b)

appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based

executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.


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Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court

of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.

cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC, holding

that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernestos

submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting

of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not

require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be

probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which

refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules

or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines

although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was

executed.

RULING

Yes.

Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same

have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will

can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of

an alienwho is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the

formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities

observed in his country.


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In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of

California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the

reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already

probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is

presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by

Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only

to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local

court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction

over the matter can be established.


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URETA v. URETA

G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS

In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso,

Prudencia, Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge,

and Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonsos

children and their descendants.

Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a

sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. Policronio,

the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling and instead worked on

his fathers lands.

Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato,

Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal

judge, suggested that in order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it

appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4)

Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his

common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in

favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this case.

Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was

given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.

When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as the administrator of his fathers

estate. He was later succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and then by her daughter, Carmencita

Perlas. Except for a portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred to Policronio were


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tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned over the produce of the lands to

Policronio or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate.

Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither

Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands.

On April 19, 1989, Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all

the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by

Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronios eldest son, representing the Heirs of

Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.

After their fathers death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering

the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on

October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.

Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of

Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonsos estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995

issue of the Aklan Reporter.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid.

RULING

Yes.

It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance

of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to

the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir

is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a

designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial


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Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power

of attorney is not necessary.

In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are

affected. The requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not

apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such

transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a

designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.

A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal

representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is

ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is

revoked by the other contracting party.

Therefore, Conrados failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-

Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render

the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against

Conrados co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority.

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