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WORKING PAPERS OF THE
CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Copies Available Through:
Paper #53
April, 1970'
Center for Research on Social Organization
University of Michigan 219 Perry Building 330 Packard Street Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
CIVIL-MILITARY DIFFERENTION IN THE
NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE*
David R. Segal
The University of Michigan
*Paper prepared for the VII World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria, September 1970. I am grateful to Edward Lipson and Jean Schneider for research assistance. I am indebted to Mr. Richard Massar of the Air Force Military Personnel Center, and to Dr. Ernest Tupes of the Air Personnel Laboratory for their cooperation.
INTRODUCTION
Recent literature on military structure posits a
convergence between civilian and military modes of organ-
ization as management skills become increasingly important
for promotion to the upper echelons of the armed forces.
Analysis of careers of generals in the United States Air
Force, which has the most complex technology of the
American armed forces and hence faces the most difficult
organizational task, however, indicates that combat skills
still take precedence over management skills as criteria
for promotion to general officer grade. Such skills serve
as the basis for a "bureaucratic" career in the. military
context.
At the same time, contemporary theories of formal
organization suggest that corporate bodies in the civilian
economy have adopted "post-bureaucratic" structural forms,
and that the bureaucratic model is now inadequate for des-
cribing management careers in this context. Thus, there
seem to be factors mitigating against structural convergence.
These factors have implications for theories regarding
the development of a "military-industrial complex" in the
United States. The power elite model of military-industrial
dominance assumes isomorphic organization in the two realms.
The isomorphism allows for the facile interchange of personnel.
The continued differentiation of the two structures both
through the maintenance of combat skills as the primary
criterion for military promotion and the development of
civilian organization in non-bureaucratic directions makes
formation of a military-industrial complex in structural
terms (as distinct from simple economic exchange) more
difficult.
THE POWER ELITE MODEL.
Much of the discourse on civil-military relations
in the United States during the last decade has been
influenced by C. Wright Mills' power elite model (Mills,
1956). Mills saw power in America as being concentrated
in the hands of the people who control the American armed
forces, the largest corporations, and the governmental
structure. The members of this power elite were purported
to come from similar social origins, to travel in the same
social circles, and to take each others interests into
account in the process of making decisions within their
own organizational spheres.
Historically, Mills saw shifts in the relative import-
ance of the military, corporate and governmental realms. In
the post World War I1 period, he saw the military ascendancy
as the dominant influence in shaping the power elite. Yet
Mills also recognized that in terms of education and social
origin, the military were not really similar to the rest of
the elite, and that the process of promotion through the
military hierarchy produced officers who had given up some
of their civilian sensibilities (cf. Bopegamage, 1969). This
difference between civilian and military members of the power
elite may be seen as an obstacle to the cohesiveness of that
elite, and indeed, Mills postulated that the elite was
"frequently in some tension" and came together "only
on certain coinciding points."
Mills' power elite model has been challenged most £re-
quently on the basis of the position that the military
structure takes in his formulation. Janowitz (1960: 73)
has questioned the utility of asserting structural similarities
between military and civilian managers.
" C . Wright Mills suggests that contemporary military leaders are like corporation managers, and are even, in a sense, managers who are interchangeable among various types of organ- izations, thus creating a power elite. There is little to be learned from a theory which can be reduced to the simple formula that a manager is a manager, regardless of his organ- izational environment."
Other critics have challenged Mills' model not so much
on the grounds of its assertion of homogeneity among
members of the elite, as on the dominant position that
Mills gave to the military leaders (see for example Sweezy,
1969; Aptheker, 1969). In the light of these criticisms,
more recent attempts to demonstrate the existence of a
"power elite" in the United States have in fact come to
view the military as a junior partner in the elite structure,
serving rather than shaping the interests of an assumed
upper-class (see for example Domhoff, 1967).
Ironically, just as the primacy of military leaders
in the American power structure is being denied, trends in
military.organization are seen as producing leaders who
are increasingly similar to the civilian elite as postu-
lated by Mills. At the same time, however, the nature of
civilian organization is seen as moving away from this
same model, thus maintaining the differential between
military and civilian leadership styles.
PATTERNS OF MILITARY MANAGEMENT.
Social theories on the relationship between military
and civilian organizational structure have in an important
sense come full cycle. Military structure served as a
major source of insight for Max Weber's model of rational
organization (Weber, 1924), which in turn has served as
the basis for much of the research carried out on complex
organizations in the civilian context. Until recently,
however, it was generally assumed that because of differ-
ences in skill requirements and technologies, military and
civilian structures had to have different organizational
forms. This notion of differentiation of military from
civilian structures has in fact been a common theme in
social philosophy and theory since at least the third
century B.C., when Plato argued in the Republic that war,
like everything else, required individuals specially adapted
to such activity and devoting their time exclusively to it.
Contemporary research on military organization has
rejected the theme of structural differentiation and rather
has stressed observed areas of convergence between civilian
and military structures. Thus,.Janowitz (1965: 17) has
argued that "to analyze the contemporary military estab-
lishment as a social system, it is ... necessary to assume that for some time it has tended to display more and more
of the characteristics typical of any large-scale nonmilitary
bureaucracy." While this tendency has frequently been. refer-
red to in the literature as the "civilianization" of the
military, the notion .of convergence seems more accurately
to represent the processes involved. The military does
not seem to be adopting organizational strategies from the
civilian arena. Rather, both military and civilian organiza-
tions seem to be adapting to similar environmental conditions,
and making organizational decisions on the basis of similar
organizational principles, with the military frequently
making the adaptation prior to similar changes in civilian
organization. With regard to skill distribution, for
example, Lang (1964:45) has argued that "change in the
military occupational structure appears in certain respects
to have anticipated change in the labor force," while with
regard to organizational structure itself, Grusky (1964:84)
reports- that "comparative analysis of military and civilian
. organization suggests that military organization has reached
a stage of bureaucratic deve1opmen.t which seemingly antici-
pates the future movement of other complex systems."
Recent military sociology, then, asserts the existence
of similarities between military and civilian bureaucratic
organization, with the leadership structure of the military
paralleling the management structure of civilian complex
organizations. "The relatively small group of military
managers, selected by a process of internal recruitment
on the basis of career commitment and demonstrated potential
for higher management, represent the core of the profession."
(Lang; 1964:78) .
BEYOND BUREAUCRACY: THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE.
While students of military organization are basing
their arguments for civil-military convergence on the
increased bureaucratization of the military, contemporary
theories of economic organization are suggesting that the
most adaptive model for modern organization may in fact
not be the bureaucratic model. The notion of bureaucracy
implies hierarchical organization, through which an indivi-
dual is promoted on the basis of demonstrated competence
at tasks deemed important for the fulfillment of organizational
goals. Thus, the successful bureaucratic career is presumed
to be based upon expertise with regard to the specific
product or service that a specific corporate organization
supp.lies. As will be shown below, this model in fact fits
military careers, but seems less appropriate for describing
modern economic organization.
The notion that a bureaucratic career may be dysfunctional
for economic organization is not new in organizational
theory. Two decades ago, Drucker (1950) pointed out that
the job of top management is radically different from the
tasks performed by operating executives, and that bureau-
cratic executive training produces people who are too
narrowly specialized to fill the "generalist" needs of top
management. Unlike the army, Drucker argued, economic enter-
prise required a radical break between junior and senior
management jobs.
Drucker saw the task of top management as primarily
assuming responsibility for the profitability of the enter-
prise. This requires a general knowledge of the various
operations taking place within the corporate structure.
As a secondary function, top management was to assume
responsibility for the organization and coordination of
the enterprise's human resources.
More recent organizational theory places this latter
function first, and minimizes the importance of the former.
Thus, Galbraith (1967), in The New Industrial State, sug-
gests that in the modern, highly specialized economic
system, the task of organizing specialists will be so
complex within a given corporate structure that there will
be specialists on organization. These latter will function
to coordinate the activities of the various "technocratic"
specialties within the enterprise.
A more extreme statement along the same lines appears
in the writings of Bennis and Slater (1968), who suggest
that the rate of change and the development of new organi-
zational problems in the modern economy makes bureaucratic
organization obsolete, The routinized responses of
bureaucratic structures, they argue, do not provide
sufficient organizational flexibility. Rather, they
propose that bureaucratic agencies be replaced by
temporary working groups, bringing together men with
specific skills to solve specific problems, and disbanding
once the problems are solved. The job of top management
in this setting comes to be that of building an organizational
climate where growth and development are culturally induced.
The manager's substantive knowledge about a particular topic
becomes far less important than his understanding and possession
of skills regarding collaboration and coordination.
It is interesting to note that Bennis and Slater see
'this model being manifested most commonly in defense-related
fields, such as the aerospace industry, thus providing a
direct challenge to the "power elite" notion of structural
similarity between the military and their suppliers in the
economy at the level of top management.
TOP MANAGEMENT IN THE AIR FORCE.
I have suggested above that military organizations.
are characterized by elite career patterns that produce
"bureaucratic managers" rather than "management specialists."
The former attain their positions by demonstrating high skill
levels in the specific activities that contribute to the
product or service produced by their organization. They
thus form a highly specialized and mission-oriented
organizational elite. The latter attain their positions
by their ability to organize human work efforts, and their
skills in this regard are presumably transferable from one
organization to another. ere in lies the basis for the
proposition that Janowitz objected to in Mills' model, viz.,
"a manager is a manager regardless of his organizational
environment." We join him in his objection not because the
model is overly simplistic, but because it is wrong.
Let us consider the ranking officers of the United
States Air Force as a case in point. Of the 4 branches
of the armed forces, we would expect the Air Force to fit
the "management specialist" model of elite careers more
closely than do the other branches for three reasons. First,
the Air Force has the most complex military technology of
the armed services, and hence requires a highly differentiated
and specialized personnel structure. Coordination of these
specialties is a major organizational problem. Secondly, as
the newest branch of the armed forces, the Air Force would
be expected to have less commitment to traditional modes of
organization than do the other branches (cf. Segal and Willick,
1968). At the onset of the second World War, the Air Corps
existed only as an auxiliary branch of the Army, and accounted
for less than 10 per cent of the total American military
personnel. The Air Force emerged as an independent branch
in. the post-World War I1 period, and.by. the 19601s,
accounted for over one-third of the total men under
arms. Finally, the Air Force's own.classification of-
its current occupational structure reflects its techno-
cratic nature in that no category for "military-type"
occupations has been retained. This is a marked contrast
to the occupational structure of the Navy, which ranks
second to the Air Force in technological complexity.
Almost half of the personnel in the Navy are classified
in "military-type" occupations (Lang, 1964:43-44).
The American armed forces do in, fact maintain a system
of rotation of assignments for officers in order to develop
appropriate managerial.perspectives. Van Riper and Unwalla
.(1965) have demonstrated, however, that the ranking officers
in the American armed forces have been able to specialize
nonetheless, by rotating assignmen,ts within narrowly defined
realms.
Previous research has shown that a service academy
education is less important for eventual promotion to
general officer grade in the Air Force than it is in the,
Army or the Navy (Segal, 1967) . This would seem. to be.
crucial, because academy training tends to be directed
toward combat and combat-related activities, rather than
toward adminis tra-tion (Van Riper and Unwalla, 1965) . As Table 1 shows, the percentage of academy graduates at
general officer grade in the Air Force decreased at all
levels save that of lieutenant general between 1951 and 1964,
and except for the rank of general, the descent continued between
1964 and 1968.
This decrease in academy-trained generals, however, does
not necessarily portend an increase in managerial orientation
at these ranks. Van Riper and Unwalla (1965) suggest that
what is really crucial is not necessarily an academy training,
but rather a combat orientation. In the case of the Air
Force, sources of recruitment other than the academies may
in fact provide this orientation.
r
Table 1. Per cent of genef'al grade officers in United States Air Force with military academy degrees, by year.
1951 1964 1968 per cent per cent per cent
Officer rank academy - N academy - N academy N -
General 75 4 69 13 69 13
Lieutenant General 31 13 67 33 41' 39
Major General* 55 95 49 162 24 149
Brigadier General* 51 135 23 214 21 204
All General Grades 51 247 38 422 25 405
Source: Air Force Register, Office of the Air Adjutant, 1951, 1964, 1968. *Based on 50% sample.
The specific combat task of the United States Air Force
is to fly aircraft, and if the bureaucratic succession model
I
were applicable to the explanation of promotion to general
officer grade in the Air Force, we womld expect to find a
preponderance of officers with aeronautical ratings (pilot
or navigator) at these grades. As Table 2 shows, the pro-
portion.~£ general officers in grade. in.1968 who hold
aeronautical ratings is higher than- the- proportion who
have academy educations. Indeed, of all generals in
that year, 88 per. cent were rated officers, while only
28 per cent were academy graduates. It is also notable
that at the ranks of major general and brigadier general,
officers initially commissioned through. the aviation cadet
program outnumbered officers commissioned through the service
adademies.
Table 2. Source of commission and aeronautical rating for Air Force generals in grade, 1968..
S.ource of Recruiwent Per Cent
Officer Rank Academy Aviation Cadet Other rated
General 69% 31% 100%
Lieutenant General 41 33 26% 92
Major General* 24 51 25 89
.Brigadier General* 21 60 19 84
Source.: Air Force Register, Office of the Air Adjutant, 1968.
*Based on 50% sample.
It would seem to be the case then. that promotion through
general officer grades in the Air Force is seen as a reward
for the performance of mission-oriented duties, i.e., flying
aircraft, rather then being indicative of managerial skills.
It must be recognized that to an important extent, the
distribution of generals in the Air Force in 1968 reflects
an effect of history upon the organizational life of the
military. These generals for the most part entered the
business of combat aviation in 1934-39. With the involve-
ment of the United States in World War 11, there was a
tremendous expansion of the armed forces, and trained
pilots were moved relatively rapidly through the ranks. It
might be argued that academy trained officers who entered
the service at that time should have been promoted
as rapidly as officers recruited through other programs.
However, the data. indicate that this was not the case. Avia-
tion cadets who were to reach the grade of general by 1968
were on the average commissioned initially in 1938. Academy
graduates who reached the rank of general by 1968 were
initially commissioned on the average three years earlier,
in 1935. Thus, there is evidence that in the aggregate,
aviation cadets moved through the Air Force hierarchy more
rapidly than did academy graduates. One reason for this dif-
ference might well be the differential in aeronautical ratings
between these two sources of commission. Of general grade
officers in 1968, 97 per cent of those who had been initially
commissioned through the aviation cadet program and 91 per cent
of those commissioned through the service academies were rated
officers. If non-rated officers were indeed promoted more
slowly, this difference could well account,for the longer mean-
time it took academy graduates to reach general grade.
If we reject the.proposition that a manager is a manager,
regardless.of organizational. context, we.mus.t at least question
the proposition that a general is a general, reg-ardless of
assignment. Clearly all officers of general officer rank
are not in positions of military management. The. assign-
ment of generals to tasks.is essentially a problem in the
allocation of scarce resources, and in the case of the Air
Force, the resource is ability to handle aircraft. Given
that- a majority of generals are rated officers, and that
the-Air Force would be faced with.a gross surplus of air-
craft if it assigned significant numbers of pilots,to other
duties.,.we wou-ld expect rated generals to spend time "poking
holes in the sky,? rather than performing managerial functions.
Let- us therefore narrow the scope of our.inquiry and focus on
those generals who explicitely. have.been.assigned managerial
functions--the principal commanders and staff officers of the
Air Force.
Table. 3 presents data on the sources of comrnission~of
generals, lieutenant generals,.and major generals who. were
listed in the Air Force Reqister as principal commanders and
staff officers in 1952, 1958, 1962 and 1968. Per cents holding
command pilot ratings are also given.. Nine brigadier generals
who were principal commanders or staff officers during this
period are omitted from these tabulations because of the small
case. base.
Table 3. Per cent of principal commanders and staff officers in the Air Force commissioned through military academies and aviation cadet program, and per cent holding cbmmand pilot rating.
Per cent Per cent Per cent Rank Year N academy aviation cadet - - General 1952 6 67 33
Lieutenant General 1952 14 65 - 35
Major General 1952 8 37 37 75
1958 12 50 25 75
1962 12 41 17 58
1968 14 22 65 71
Source: Air Force Register, Office of the Air Adjutant, 1952, 1958, 1962, 1968.
There appears to be a cohort effect in these data.
There is a steady increase.in.the per cent of generals
who are command pilots between 1952 and 1968. However,
in 1952 and 1958, there are proportionately more command
pilots, at the rank of lieutenant general than at the rank
of general. A future increase in the proportion of pilots
at higher command levels is portended by a decrease in academy
graduates and an increase in aviation cadets in the 1968 cohorts
of major generals and lieutenant generals. These data suggest
that even- for the top management personnel of the Air Force,
combat orientation rather than managerial skill is the crucial
basis for promotion and assignment. Moreover, the preponder-
ance of officers commissioned through the aviation cadet pro-
gram has been increasing in recent years at the grades of
brigadier general and major general, and these grades define
the pool from which top Air Force management will be chosen
in the next few years.
As Table 4 demonstrates, in 1964, the ratio of academy-
commissioned brigadier generals to aviation cadet-commissioned
brigadier generals was less than 1:2. By 1967 it was greater
than 1:3. Similarly at the rank of major general, the ratio
of academy-trained generals to aviation cadet-trained generals
went from 1.2:l in 1964 to 1:2.3 in 1967. Clearly, in the
short run, we can expect an increase in combat orientation
among the top managers of the Air Force.
Table 4. Relative numbers of Air Force generals originally commissioned through service academies and aviation cadet program, by grade, 1964-1967.
Source of original commission, by year
1964 1965 1966 1967
aviation aviation aviation aviation Rank academy cadet academy cadet academy cadet academy cadet
General 10 2 11 - 10 - 10 2
Lieutenant ..General 24 8 19 12 17 14 15 15
.Major "General 67 55 60 56 55 65 38 77
. Brigadier General -4 7 89 . 44 107 39 124 41 133
In the longer run, the picture is somewhat different. The
importance of the aviation cadet program in officer accession
peaked in 1954, when the program produced 6,663 of the 17,193
new line officers acquired that year. Up until that year,
aviation cadets were the single most important source of
line officers in the Air Force, and we would on that basis
expect to find former cadets predominating among Air Force
generals through the mid 1980's. However, at the same time that
the aviation cadet program reached its peak size, the R.O.T.C.
program surpassed it as a source of line officer accession, pro-
ducing 9,210 officers in 1954. The R.O.T.C. program itself peaked
2 years later, producing 13,480 line officers in 1956.
Were rates of retention and promotion equal regardless
of source of commission, we might expect that aviation
cadet dominance at the general officer level, resulting
partly from expansion during World War I1 and partly from
the maintenance of the aviation cadet tradition once estab-
lished (cf. Segal and Willick, 1968), would bereplaced in
the late 1980's as a legacy. of the- Korea period. We know
however that- R.O.T.C. retention rates are low-, and our
expectation is that aviation cadet dominance will not be
succeeded by R.O.T.C. dominance among general officers.
In 1959, however, two new sources of-Air Force
officer accession made their appearance. Two-hundred
and six members of the first graduating class of the Air
Force Academy were commissioned, as were.3 officers from
the new Officer Training School (O.T.S.') program. These
two sources have grown. in import so that in 1965, when
only 172 line officers were commissioned through the aviation
cadet program, O.T.S. was second only to R.O.T.C. as the
major source of manpower, producing 3,571 new line officers.
R.O.T.C. produced 3,760, and the Air Force Academy produced
507.
On the basis of the experience of the other armed
services in the United States, we would anticipate higher
promotion and retention rates among Air Force Academy graduates,
but on the basis of numbers,, O.T,S. dominance of the Air Force
general officer grade in the 1990's may be the legacy of the
Vie'tnam period: The mix of combat versus management training
in the Air Force Academy and in the O.T.S. program, and the
ascent o£ graduates of these programs to positions of command,
wiil determine the management ideology of the United States
Air Force in the early 21st century.
TWO MODELS OF THE POWER ELITE.
Two levels of similarity between'civilian and military
management seem necessary for the social integration of- a
"power elite" as conceptualized by Mills. On the one hand,
we would expect to find similarities between the organization-
al structures within. which civilian and military managers
operate. Civilian and military managers may be seen as
power brokers operating within the same marketplace, with
the corporations playing the role of producer and the military
playing the role of consumer. Cooperation between them, then,
may be seen as a function of their exercising "countervailing
power" from their respective sides of the market (cf. Galbraith,
1952).
Cooperation among countervailing forces is expedited by
organizational isomorphism. Perhaps the most dramatic
demonstration of this proposition with regard to military
organization was the attempt by the United State military
to establish the rank of field marshal1 during World War I1
to parallel that rank in the British and French forces. In
the American case, General Marshall objected to being called
Field Marshal Marshall, and the rank was named General of
the Army instead. The effect, however, was the same. It
established equivalent rank structures at the command
level of the various allied forces, and expedited cooperation.
To the extent that our data on the Air Force reflect
the state of affairs in the other armed services as well,
we are in a position to argue that structural similarities
do not exist between civilian and military bureaucracy in
the United States to the extent that would be necessary to
establish a power elite. If indeed economic enterprise has
moved into a post-bureaucratic era, then military and
civilian structures are more dissimilar than, for example,
the Ford Motor Company and the United Auto Workers, and are
less likely to be engaged in any effective collusion as equal
partners. The differences between the civilian and military
managerial careers can in fact be likened to the differences
between professionals and bureaucrats. While management in
the military context is based upon a bureaucratic career,
management in the civilian context seems to be in the process
of becoming a profession (cf. Van Doorn, 1965). This is not
to argue that there are not large scale economic transactions
within the military-industrial marketplace, but merely to pro-
pose that the two parties are structurally unsuited to being
equal partners in a military-industrial directorate within the
market.
On the other hand, Mills' model requires similarity
and indeed overlap in the informal social networks in which
military and civilian managers operate to complement similarities
in formal organizational structure. As noted above, Mills recog-
nized that ranking military officers came from different social
backgrounds than did ranking politicians or corporate managers.
There has in recent years been a tendency to recruit military
officers from a broader social base than has been the case
historically, and at least one study has suggested that
the social backgrounds of military executives are similar
to those of civilian federal executives (Warner et al., 1963).
This study, however, included all officers down through the
rank of colonel among the military executives, and other
studies suggest that indeed this broadening of the base
has extended up as far as brigadier general, but that above
that grade, the traditional selection criteria are still
paramount (Van Riper and Unwalla, 1965; Segal, 1967).
A second determinant of the structure of acquaintance
networks also mitigates against the establishing of a
cohesive power elite. The context of interpersonal ties
among military men- is explicitely designed to produce primary
relationships (Shils, 1950), on the assumption that- it is
group cohesion rather than ideological commitment that makes
effective soldiers (Shils and Janowitz, 1948). Interpersonal
ties in the post-bureaucratic economic organization, on the
other hand are characterized as more fragmented secondary
re-lationships (Riesman.,. 1950; Bennis and Slater, 1968). I
suggest that this difference in the quality of interpersonal
life between.civilian and military personnel makes the.develop-,
ment of solidary interpersonal networks of civilian and military
managers unlikely.
At the same time, the probability of close interpersonal
networks existing among military and civilian managers is in
part a function of the social homogeneity of these two
groups. This homogeneity, in turn, can be largely defined
in terms of recruitment sources. To the extent that members
of the military elite are recruited from the population of
officers trained in military academies, some differentiation
from business executives trained at civilian colleges and
universities will be maintained. If on the other hand
military manpower requirements are such that officers trained
at civilian institutions and commissioned through R.O.T.C. or
O.T.S. programs are promoted to elite ranks, opportunity exists
for the maintenance of interpersonal ties established in
college, and the existence of a solidary military-industrial
network becomes more likely.
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