Civil Liberties Union

8/11/2019 Civil Liberties Union

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1/2Digest by: Alexis Bea

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary

FACTS:

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 whichallowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to holdother government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject tolimitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring thatsuch law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLUon the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of theConstitution which provides:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and

their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this

Consti tut ion, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.

They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other

profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any

contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the

Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,

including government-owned or controlled corporations or their

subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of

their office.

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,

the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government arethose provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a

Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is

an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.


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HELD:

No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit thePresident, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from

holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in

those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to

posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law

and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members

(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general

rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions

which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding

thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting

the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries

may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the

government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple

offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of

the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the

1987 Constitution itself.

Ulpiano Sarmiento III v Salvador Mison

FACTS:

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was

appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon


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Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers,

and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it

appears that Misons appointment was not submitted to the Commission on

Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution,

heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of

the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the

unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed confirmation by the

Commission on Appointment.

HELD:

No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as one of those

officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987

Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.

These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and

consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and otherofficers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise

provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;


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Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the

President alone.

The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which

require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not requireconfirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs

does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284

Petition: special civil action for certiorari and prohibition

Petitioner: Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Respondent: Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, Gen. Panfilo M. Lacson, Gen. Edgar B. Aglipay, and Gen.Angelo Reyes

Ponente: Kapunan, J.

Date: 15 August 2000

Facts:

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, likerobberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive,

ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purposeof crime prevention and suppression.

In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police ChiefSuperintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000[1] (theLOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called TaskForce Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed underthe leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.

In a Memorandum issued on January 24, 2000, President Ejercito Estradainvoked his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the


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Ruling:

1. No, the petitioner failed to sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing inthe case.

2. Yes, it is justiciable.

3. No, President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacyclause of the Constitution.

4. No, the deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clausenor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.

Ratio:

1. The petitioner failed to sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in the case.

The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothingmore is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an

interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Furthermore, the petition was signed by the National President of IBP without the

formal board resolution, therefore it should be taken as his interest alone.

Assuming he was duly authorized, the petitioner wasnt able to show any specificinjury which it suffered or will suffer due to the governmental act.

*However, the Court has discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the

requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. When the issues raised

are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of

procedure.

2. It is justiciable. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,

the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met of the

limitations respected, is justiciable.

3.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines. There is

a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full

discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the

exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The President may call


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the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion whenever

it becomes necessary.

4. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy

clause. Local police forces are in charge of visibility patrols, and the Marines render nothingmore than assistance required in conducting the patrols.

Separate opinion: Puno

Went over numerous cases to prove that In sum, this Court brushed aside thepolitical question doctrine and assumed jurisdiction whenever it foundconstitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers conferred upon theLegislature.

On the issue of the exercise by the President of his powers as Commander-in-Chief vis-a-vis the political question doctrine: the function of the Court is not tosupplant but merely to check the Executive; to ascertain whether the Presidenthas gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise thepower vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. Judicial inquiry isconfined to the question of whether the President did not act arbitrarily. Using thisyardstick, the Court found that the President did not.

On the issue WON the actions of the President to call out the armed forces berevoked: Absence of provision to grant Court the power to review the exercise ofcalling out the armed forces by the President does not render this Courtincapable to pass upon the validity of the exercise.

Notes:

Requisites of Judicial Review:

(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case


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(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question

(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity

(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

Marcelino v Cruz

FACTS:

Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the

prosecution finished presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On thesame date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time within whichto submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando Cruz, Jr., gavethem 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a memoranda.On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision,his decision bears the same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation of thedecisions was scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that the courtcan no longer promulgate judgment because by January 1976, the 3-month period (90day period) within which lower courts must decide on cases had already lapsed, thus,the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.

HELD:


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Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last dayof filing of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-month periodbegins to run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge Cruzmade a rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The date of rendition is the dateof filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge Cruz was able to rule on the

case within the 3-month period because November 28, 1975 was merely the 85th dayfrom September 4, 1975.The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could notserve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon the effectivity of thisconstitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided orresolved from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice, the SupremeCourt is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is mandatory, its merelydirective. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such provision as

mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warnedlower court judges to resolve cases within the prescribed period and not take this liberalconstruction as an excuse to dispose of cases at later periods.

Co v Electoral Tribunal

FACTS:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samarwas held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in thesecond legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and

Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimedthe duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.


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The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent alleging that JoseOng, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the seconddistrict of Northern Samar.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared respondent Ong is a

natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for votingpurposes.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang,Northern Samar.2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority in the exercise of itspowers.

HELD:

1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a natural born Filipino anda resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. The respondent traces his natural borncitizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenshipof the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be aFilipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and fatherwere Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless hefirst formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlikeother persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his

father which he could possibly have chosen.

2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Thesame issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the ConstitutionalConvention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of theConstitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent,was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.


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Perfecto v Meer

FACTS:

In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto topay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. Afterpaying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instancecontending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reasonthat imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?

HELD:

Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries ofjudges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Twoparamount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the IncomeTax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not includesalaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was theprevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have beentransplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved(in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federalprinciple was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.


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This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes.Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties.Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicialsalary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salaryand the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that the taxation must be

resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceiveand block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishablecharacter of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and thereforewaivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in thepublic interest (Evans vs. Gore).

Endencia and Jugo v David, etc.

Doctrine: A law that violates a constitutional provision shall be declared invalid andunconstitutional even if the legislature validated it through declaring that the said law shall

be construed as notto violate the constitutional inhibition.

Petition: Appeal from a judgment of lower court

Plaintiff & Appellees: Pastor M. Endencia & Fernando Jugo

Defendant & Appellant: Sturnino David (Collector of BIR)

Pontente: Justice Montemayor

Short version:

Taxes were collected from the petitioners who are both members of the judiciary by the

BIR. They are asking the appellant for a refund of the taxes collected arguing that sec.13 of

R.A. 590, which states that no salary received by any public officer shall be exempted from

the income tax, is unconstitutional as Sec 9, Art VIII of the constitution states that

compensation of members of the SC and all judges shall not be diminished during their

continuance in office. The SC affirmed the decision appealed from, stating that should there

be a conflict between a legislature and the constitution, the law will have to give way and

has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.


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Facts:

1. Sec. 13 of R.A. 590 states that no salary received by any public officer shall be exempted

from the income tax, payment of which was declared not to be a diminution of his

compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. Tax was hence collected by the BIR

from Justice Pastor Endencia and Justice Fernando Jugo as follows:

J.

Endencia

Associate

Justice; Court

of Appeals

1951 PHP 1,744.45

J. Jugo Associate

Justice; Court

of Appeals

January

1950

October

1950

PHP 2,345.46

Associate

Justice;

Supreme

Court

October

December

1950

2. A joint appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila declared Sec 13 of R.A. 590

unconstitutional as it violates Sec 9, Art VII of the constitution which explicitly states

that [members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts] shall receive

such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their

continuance in office.

3. The SC ordered the defendant to refund the income tax collected. The defendants

appealed from the decision of the lower court.

Issue:

1. Is Sec 13 of R.A. 590 unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. Sec. 13 of R.A. 590 is unconstitutional


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Ratio:

Contention Supreme Court

The law declared that tax payment is notto

be a diminution of the compensation fixed

by the constitution.

First, it is not within the sphere of the

legislature to interpret or ascertain the

meaning of the phrase which shall not bediminished during their continuance in

office (Sec 9, Art VII of the constitution).This act of the legislature invades the

fundamental principles of separation of

powers.

In upholding Perfecto v Meer, the SC

reiterated that taxing the salary of a judicial

officer in the Philippines is a diminution of

such salary as his salary is actually

decreased every year.

Hence Sec 13 of RA 590 is not

unconstitutional

The Legislature may not legally provide in a

law that it be interpreted in such a way that

it may not violate a constitutional provision.

Since Sec 13 of RA 590 violates the

constitution, it is held invalid and

unconstitutional.

Opinions:

Justice Bautista Angela (concurring)

- The provision that that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered

not tobe a diminution of his compensation fixed by the constitution or by law is an

invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary.

Chief Justice Paras (concurring and dissenting):

- Referred to dissent of Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto v Meer where the intent of the

drafters of the constitution was considered saying, when the framers of the


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Constitution fixed those salaries, they must have taken into consideration that the

recipients were paying income tax thereon. There was no necessity to provide

expressly that said salaries shall be subject to income tax because they knew that

already so provided. On the other hand, if exemption from any tax on said salaries

had been intended, it would have been specifically [provided],

- Disagrees that no legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a

provision of the constitution.

Magtoto vs. Manguera

FACTS:

No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera ofthe Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02) andJudge Judge Onoftre A. Villaluz of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-37424) declarede admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases (Clemente

Magtoto in GR L-37201-02; and Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt, Inocentes De Luna,Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo Suarez, Manuel Manalo, Alberto Gabion,and Rafael Brill in GR L-37424). District Judge Asaali S. Isnani of Court of First Instance(Branch II) of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L-38928), on the other hand, declaredinadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case (Vicente Longakit and JaimeDalion), although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and tocounsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before the effectivityof the 1973 Constitution. Petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court.


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ISSUE:

Whether the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in Section 20,Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively.

HELD:

Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a personunderinvestigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed ofsuch right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confessionobtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should begiven effect only when the right already existed and had been violated. Consequently,because the confessions of the accused in GRs L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 weretaken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in accordance with the rules then in

force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence althoughthey were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to beinformed of such right," because, no such right existed at the time. The argument thatthe second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added byRepublic Act 1083 enacted in 1954, which reads that "In every case, the persondetained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon hisrequest, to communicate and confer at anytime with his attorney or counsel," impliedlygranted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right, isuntenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to beinformed ofthe cause of his detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to claim the

right to communicate and confer with counsel at any time. The historical background ofSection 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution shows that the new right granted thereinto a detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of hisconfession being declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given aprospective and not a retroactive effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to thisconstitutional guarantee to counsel would have a great unsettling effect on theadministration of justice in this country. It may lead to the acquittal of guilty individualsand thus cause injustice to the People and the offended parties in many criminal caseswhere confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and in


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accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance of counsel. TheConstitutional Convention could not have intended such a disastrous consequence inthe administration of justice. For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent personis convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.

Calderon vs. Carale

FACTS:

Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code(PD 442) was approved. Section 13 thereof provides that the Chairman, the DivisionPresiding Commissioners and other Commissioners of NLRC shall all be appointed bythe President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. President

Aquino appointed respondents as the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC.

Carale filed a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality and legality ofrespondents permanent appointments. Calderon insists that the appointments must besubmitted to the CA for confirmation. He also posits that RA 6715 is not anencroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Section 16, Art. VII,of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commissionon Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to thosementioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the

Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powersof the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission onAppointments of appointments extended by the President to government officersadditional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the


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Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission onAppointments

HELD:

No. In Sarmiento III vs. Mison case, the Court stated that there are four (4) groups ofofficers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, are: First, the heads ofthe executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers ofthe armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whoseappointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of theGovernment whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, thosewhom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower inrank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government

whose appointment are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the Presidentmay be authorized by law to appoint.

Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence ofSection 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" ofappointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by lawto appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among theofficers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointmentsrequires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments ofrespondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is

unconstitutional because:

1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitutionby adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments; and

2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of theConstitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments onappointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President.


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It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately,not unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departurefrom the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Commission on

Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidential

appointments, leading to may cases of abuse of such power of confirmation.

Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided that the Presidentshall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appointthe heads of the executive departments and bureau, officers of the Army from the rankof the colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, andall other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwiseprovided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint..

The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission onAppointments over presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987

Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of members ofthe Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicialor legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional convention or Congress sitting asa constituent (constitutional) assembly may then consider either a return to the 1935Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how thelegislature or the executive would want it interpreted.

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