Civil Liberties Case Briefs

8/12/2019 Civil Liberties Case Briefs

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14THAmendment- Due Process of Law

Sheppard v. Maxwell

!tat!on"#$4 %.S. ###

&elevant 'acts"Samuel Sheppard was convicted of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his

pregnant wife. Sheppard challenged the verdict on the grounds that he did not receive a fair trial. Sheppard

continually maintained his innocence throughout his trial, and alleged that the trial judge permitted prejudicial

evidence to be brought in. The Ohio District Court that heard his initial challenge found in his favor, but the

Sith Circuit Court of !ppeals reversed the ruling. Sheppard appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted

certiorari.

(ssues"The legal "uestion presented was whether there is a particular contetual or publicity-oriented level or

threshold in which the introduction of prejudicial evidence or information can interfere with a defendant#s $ifth

!mendment due process right to a fair trial.

Hold!n)"The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Sheppard.

&eason!n)" The Court found that Sheppard was not afforded a fair trial. The Court principally found that the

fact that the media broadcasted Sheppard#s confessions, in addition to the proven collaboration between the

prosecution and the media, inflamed the jurors# minds against Sheppard and did not allow him to receive a fair

trial. The Court found that the trial judge erred by not postponing the proceedings until a time when the matter

bowed out of the media, or to have at least changed the trial venue. %ustice Clar&e asserted that, '(hile we

cannot say that Sheppard was denied due process by the judge#s refusal to ta&e precautions against the influence

of pretrial publicity alone, the court#s later rulings must be considered against the setting in which the trial held

)n light of this bac&ground, we believe that the arrangements made by the judge with the news media caused

Sheppard to be deprived of that *%udicial serenity and calm to which +he was entitled.

onclus!on"This case was significant because the Court found that prejudice can be broad, and encompass

activities between the prosecution and the media, rather than only being the introduction of evidence found

outside the court.

*!tlow v. +ew ,or

/$ %.S. /0 1203

'acts" itlow was convicted for publishing the '/eft (ing 0anifesto under a state statute that prohibited

advocating overthrowing or overturning organi1ed government by force, violence or other unlawful means.

Procedure" The Court of !ppeals upheld itlow#s coviction.

(ssue" Did the 2st !mendment#s right of free speech apply to states3 (ere itlow#s 2st !mendment rights

were violated3

Hold!n)" 4es, 5o


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&at!onale" The freedom of speech and of press are the fundamental personal rights and liberties that are

protected by the due process clause of the 26th !mendment from impairments by the states. Secondly,

although the speech involved in this case did not have any effects, the state can still punish utterances

endangering the foundations of organi1ed government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. !lso,

the Court respected the judgment of the state legislature that such speech was dangerous.

(MP&TA+5" $ist case to recogni1e that the 2st !mendment protections applied to the states

7sing words to epress opposition to the !merican government is generally accepted, but what about symbols

or emblems3 Does the right to free speech include a right to epress views and communicate ideas via means

other than literal speech3 The Supreme Court was as&ed to decide this in the case of Stromberg v. California

and they ruled that use of a flag to communicate ideas was, indeed, covered by the Constitution#s protections for

free speech.

Strom6er) v. al!forn!a

7ac)round ")t was once common for state and local governments to regulate people#s speech8 not until 29:;

did the Supreme Court begin applying $irst !mendment restrictions to them. California law, for eample, made

it a felony if anyone< displays a red flag, banner or badge or any flag, badge, banner, or device of any color or

form whatever in any public place or in any meeting place or public assembly, ... or on any house, building or

window as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organi1ed government or as an invitation or stimulus to

anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character is guilty of a felony.

Stromberg, a female member of the 4oung Communist /eague, supervised a children=s camp where a red flag

was raised in a daily ceremony. The children saluted the flag and pledged allegiance 'to the wor&ers# red flag,

and to the cause for which it stands, one aim throughout our lives, freedom for the wor&ing class. Stromberg

was arrested, tried, and convicted. !n appeals court upheld her conviction, so she appealed to the Supreme

Court.

Dec!s!on" The Supreme Court reversed Stromberg#s conviction. This was considered a problematic case

because the jury was instructed to convict if they found the defendant guilty on any one of three possible counts

and there was no record of which of them was the deciding factor. Thus, if any of the clauses were found to be

invalid, then the conviction would have to be overturned in order to ensure that justice was done.

This contradicted the state court decision that if any of the counts were valid, then the conviction was also valid

The state court gave the benefit of the doubt to the prosecution8 the Supreme Court gave the benefit of the doubt

to the defendant. >owever, the trial record did show that the prosecutor focused foremost on the first count ?

that Stromberg should be convicted if she were found to have displayed the red flag as an 'emblem ofopposition to organi1ed government. This is what the Supreme Court chose to focus on< can state governments

ban the use of certain symbols, signs, or emblems which epress a message of opposition to organi1ed

government3

)n the majority decision, Chief %ustice >ughes noted that even the state court recogni1ed that this clause was

ambiguous and could be used against patriotic people of one political party engaged in peaceful, legal

opposition to a government controlled by another political party. That, however, would impinge upon political

debate


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The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive

to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the

security of the @epublic is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system. ! statute which upon its face,

and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this

opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the $ourteenth !mendment.

The first clause of the statute being invalid upon its face, the conviction of the appellant, which so far as therecord discloses may have rested upon that clause eclusively, must be set aside.

The Supreme Court accepted the authority of governments to prevent armed insurrection, but did not accept that

preserving the peace could be legitimately achieved at the epense of suppressing views, ideas, and arguments

which opposed the current government ? including those ideas epressed in a non-verbal manner.

Significance< $ree speech rights had long been recogni1ed as covering both spo&en and printed words, but in

this decision the Supreme Court made it clear that the right to free speech wasn#t meaningful if it only covered

literal words. )nstead, the $irst !mendment must be read as covering the communication of ideas or messages

generally. Therefore, emblems, symbols, and other non-verbal epressions of ideas should also be grantedprotection as a form of 'speech. This was one of the first Supreme Court cases dealing with abridgements of

free speech at the state level ? it was only in 29:;, with the itlow v. 5ew 4or& case that they had ruled that

the $irst !mendment covers state as well as federal actions.

+ear v. M!nnesota8 $# %.S. /29 12#13

'acts" 0r. 5ear published a newspaper in 0innesota called the Saturday Aress, which reported certain

"uestionable conduct by the local police and officials, and hinted at a perceived favoritism. !n article claimed

that the police were turning their heads to the criminal actions of a %ewish gangster. 0innesota enacted a statute

that made the publication of malicious, scandalous and defamatory matters in the print media a public nuisance.

(ssues3"(hether a state law authori1ing proceedings to restrain the publication of print media operates within

the bounds of the liberty of press protected by the 2st and 26th

Hold!n)" 5o. The law infringes upon the liberty of the press, guaranteed through the 26th and

unconstitutionally restrains publication.

Procedure"Couny !tty sought injunction. Ct permanently enjoined any further publications containing 0, S

and D material and from further conducting nuisance under the title of The Saturday Aress or any other title.

05 S Ct !ffirmed. 7SSCt @eversed.

&ules3"2st and 26th

&at!onale"/iberty of Speech and Aress are wBi the liberties protected by 2st and 26th from state invasion.

05#s law is not aimed at curing individual or private wrongs, it is aimed at the distribution of scandalous

material harmful to the public. ut, it is not directed just at the distribution of the statements, but also the

continued publication of charges against public officials.


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)ts object and effect is not punishment, but suppression of the offending newspaper or periodical. Suppression

under this law is accomplished by enjoining publication. This law not only suppresses publication of the media

but it also effectively censors the publisher personally.

@estraint against publication is limited to eceptional cases such as when at war ovt may prevent disclosure of

military information8 or decency may be enforced against obscene publications8 or where security of the

community life re"uires protection against incitement to violent action. 5one of the eceptions are presenhere.

/iberty of the press has meant historically that publication has immunity from previous restraints or censorship.

D(SS5+T"05 law does not operate as a prior restraint on publication wBi the meaning of that phrase. )t does

not authori1e administrative control in advance. There is no "uestion that states have the power to denounce

actions deemed a nuisance which threaten morals, peace, and good order.

De:on)e v. re)on8 22 %.S. #0# 12#93

)n 296, about three hundred people attended a meeting organi1ed by the Communist Aarty in Aortland, Oregon,

to support a maritime wor&ers# stri&e. $ewer than 2; percent of them were Communist Aarty members. Spea&er

Dir& De%onge, a party member, spo&e against police shootings of stri&ers and raids on party head"uarters and

wor&ers# halls. >e encouraged attendees to buy party literature, join the party, and gather people to attend

another Communist Aarty meeting the following night.

Aolice raided the orderly meeting, confiscated party literature, and arrested De%onge and three other meeting

organi1ers. De%onge was charged, convicted, and sentenced to seven years in prison under the Oregon criminal

syndicalism statute for helping conduct a Communist Aarty meeting. Criminal syndicalism laws prohibit

advocating or organi1ing a group to use unlawful means to overthrow business owners or government. The

prosecution did not claim that De%onge advocated illegal acts, but did present Communist Aarty literature from

other sources that suggested the party supported such advocacy.

The Supreme Court struc& down the conviction as a violation of the essence of constitutionally guaranteed

personal liberty. The Court ruled unanimously that government may not proscribe **the holding of meetings for

peaceable political action.## The $irst !mendment, as applied through the Due Arocess Clause of the $ourteenth

!mendment, prohibits states from regulating free speech or assembly that does not incite violence or crime. )n

29E9, in randenburg v. Ohio, 9; 7.S. 666 F29E9G, the Court said states may forbid only advocacy of criminal

acts that is directed toward and li&ely to produce imminent illegal action.

antwell v. State of onnect!cut 124;3

'acts of the ase< %esse Cantwell and his son were %ehovah=s (itnesses8 they were proselyti1ing a

predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. The Cantwells distributed religious materials by

travelling door-to-door and by approaching people on the street. !fter voluntarily hearing an anti-@oman

Catholic message on the Cantwells= portable phonograph, two pedestrians reacted angrily. The Cantwells were

subse"uently arrested for violating a local ordinance re"uiring a permit for solicitation and for inciting a breach

of the peace.


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that sets him free. Our government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. $or good or for ill, it teaches the whole

people by its eample. )f the government becomes a lawbrea&er, it breeds contempt for law.

'&55DM ' &5L(*(+

Pe!rce v. Soc!et= of S!sters 1203

'acts of the ase"

Aetitioners challenged Oregon#s Compulsory Iducation !ct that re"uired parents of children between the ages

of eight and siteen to send their child to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held

during the current year. The Society of Sisters operated schools that gave students moral training according to

the teachings of the @oman Catholic Church. The act led to students withdrawing from the religious schools-

costing it a portion of its income.

(ssue" (as it constitutional3

Dec!s!on"

The Court enjoined Oregon from enforcing the Compulsory Iducation !ct because doing so would cause

irreparable harm to the primary schools operated by religious organi1ations.

Ma>or!t= p!n!on" :ust!ce Mc&e=nolds3"

Inforcement of the Compulsory Iducation !ct would lead to the destruction of the petitioners primary schools

These schools serve a valuable function in their communities. The !ct unreasonably interferes with the liberty

of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. )n order to

impose such limitations on the choices of parents, the state must be furthering a legitimate interest. Such is not

the case in this instance as uniformity of children appears to be the only end served.

S!)n!f!cance" This decision asserts the importance of allowing parents to greatly influence their childrens

upbringing. y forcing parents to send their children to public schools, their authority as guardians was

unreasonably restricted.

5verson v. 7d of 5d.8 ##; %.S. 1 12493

'acts< 5% enacted a law that gave School Dist authority to ma&e rules and J#s pertaining to the transportation

of children to and from schools. d of Id authori1ed reimbursement of money paid by parents for bustransportation of their &ids who rode public transit to school. Some of this money was paid for the

transportation of some &ids to parochial schoolsKCatholic.

(ssues3" (hether the 5% statute or the d resolution, authori1ing the reimbursement of ta funds to parents

with students of parochial schools, unconstitutionally regulates the establishment of religion3

Hold!n)"5o, under the facts the 2st !mend does not bar 5% from spending ta funds to pay the bus fares of

parochial students under a general program that reimburses the fares of students who attend other schools. !s a

general program 5% law is neutral in its application.


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Procedure" Tpr filed suit in St Ct challenging the right to reimburse parents of parochial school students. 5%

ct of !pp held that law nor resolution violated State or $ed Const. 7.S.S.Ct. !ffirmed.

&ules3" 1st and 14th Amend.

&at!onale" The 2st !mend was intended to serve as a barrier against ovt intrusion on religious liberty and to

strip ovt of all power to ta, support, or assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of anyreligious individual or group. This is a road meaning.

!t a minimum fed ovt cannot create a church8 cannot pass law to aid one, all8 nor force anyone to go to or

remain away from church or profess belief or disbelief8 nor punish for professing a belief or non-belief8 and

ovt cannot ta to support any religious activitiesBinstitutions or participate in any manner in the affairs of any

religious body. ! (!// must be erected etween Church and State, that wall must be &ept high and

impregnable.

5% can#t use ta funds to support a religious body, but 5% cannot hamper a person#s ability to freely eercise

their own religion.

2st !mend re"uires the state to be neutral in its relations wB groups of religious believers and non-believers, but

not that the state must be their adversary. State power is no more to be used to restrict religion than to favor

them.

D(SS5+T" 2st !mend bars both the introduction of religious education into public schools and it forbids the

collection of public funds for the aid and support of private religious schools. This prohibition is absolute and

cannot be measured by the "uantity of money epended.

Pl?s A" TprG State law and d resolution authori1ing reimbursement to parochial parents constitutes an

authori1ation by the state to 'ta&e by taation private property of some and give it to others to be used for their

private religious purposes8 and both force citi1ens to pay taes to support and maintain parochial schools

Cannot pass laws respecting establishment of religion.

Mcollum v. 7oard of 5ducat!on8 ### %.S. ;# 124$3

'acts" The Champaign County oard of Iducation authori1ed a program of religious instruction in whichoutside religious teachers, paid for by private third parties, were allowed to enter schools once a wee& to

provide religious instruction. Those students not wishing to participate in the program were sent to another

room to continue with their class wor&. !ttendance records were &ept, and those not attending either the classes

or the alternate classroom were considered truant.

(ssue" (hether a school may allow outside groups to send instructors onto school grounds, during the school

day, to provide students with religious instruction.


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Hold!n)" y an L-2 vote, the Court ruled that the practice of allowing outside religious instructors into the

classroom during the school day violates the Istablishment Clause by providing government assistance to

facilitate the mission of sectarian groups.

&eason!n)"The Court found that allowing religious instruction on school grounds, during the school day,

provided assistance to sectarian organi1ations by Hproviding pupils for their religious classes through use of the

State#s compulsory public school machinery.H This arrangement was found to unconstitutionally advancereligion and confer upon it symbolic government endorsement.

Ma>or!t="HTo hold that a state cannot consistently with the $irst and $ourteenth !mendments utili1e its public

school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals does

not, as counsel urge, manifest a governmental hostility to religion or religious teachings.H F%ustice >ugo lac&G

D!ssent"HThe prohibition of enactments respecting the establishment of religion do not bar every friendly

gesture between church and state.H F%ustice Stanley @eedG

@orach v. lauson8 #4# %.S. #;/ 1203

'acts"54 program allowing public schools to release student early so they can receive religious instruction at

religious schools elsewhere. Students must have written parental authori1ation. Churches are re"uired to

provide a wee&ly attendance list of students. The release time does not involve religious instruction nor public

funding.

(ssues3" (hether 54 release program constitutes a law that establishes religion in violation of the 2st

!mendment3

Hold!n)"5o, where a public school 'release time program does no more than accommodate a student option

to attend outside religious instruction, it does not involve the free eercise of religion, nor does it a law

respecting the establishment of religion.

Procedure" !ppellants are Tprs and parents. 54 Ct of !pp upheld law as Const#l8 7.S.S.Ct !ffirmed.

&ules3" 2st !mend prohibits ovt from establishing religion or barring its free eercise.

&at!onale" This is not 0cCollum bBc there during release time a religious leader provided religious instruction.

$urthermore, this law does not involve the free eercise of religion bBc it involves neither compelled attendance

at religious schools nor is religious instruction brought into the public school classroom. Students are left the

discretion whether to participate or not.

oerc!on" There is no evid to support a coercion claim, but there is evid that school authorities are neutral as to

whether a student attends a religious classroom during release time.

$irst !mend provides an absolute bar, but it does not say that each and every case must re"uire a separation

between Church and State. )n !merica all have the freedom to worship as one chooses. ovt cannot show

partiality to any one group. ut when ovt encourages religious instruction or cooperates wB religious


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authorities by adjusting school schedules for sectarian needs, ovt is showing respect for separation of Church

and State.

ovt is not re"uired to show a callous indifference to religious groups bBc that would show a preference to non-

believers over believers. The $irst !mend does not re"uire hostility toward religion.

D(SS5+T" This 54 /aw manipulates its mandatory education laws to assist religious bodies to get pupils, it is

a combination of Church and State.

Pl A" y the influence of the school put behind the release program so students can attend religious instruction,

the program constitutes ovt establishment of religion< public teachers police the programK&eeping tabs on

students8 classroom activities stop while released students are away8 and wBo school support the program would

be ineffective.

5pperson v. Aransas8 #2# %.S. 298 $2 S. t. //8 1 L. 5d. d $ 12/$3.

'acts" !r&ansas FDG adopted a statute in 29:L that prohibited teaching 'the theory or doctrine that man&ind

ascended or descended from a lower order of animals, or using tetboo&s that included material on evolution

The statute was an adaptation of the law at the center of the 'Scopes mon&ey trial in Tennessee. $orrest

@o11ell, the secretary of the !r&ansas Iducation !ssociation, sought to challenge the law as a violation of the

Istablishment Clause of the 7nited States Constitution. @o11ell recruited Susan Ipperson FAG to file a

declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Ipperson had a master#s degree in

1oology and taught 2Mth grade biology in the /ittle @oc& school system.

Ipperson instituted an action in the Chancery Court of the State of !r&ansas and after a brief trial the court

ruled in favor of Ipperson, finding that the law was unconstitutional. !r&ansas appealed to the !r&ansas

Supreme Court and the court reversed, holding that the statute was a valid eercise of the state#s power to

specify the curriculum in its public schools. Ipperson appealed.

(ssue Does a law that forbids the teaching of evolution violate the Istablishment Clause of the $irst

!mendment3

Hold!n) and &ule 'ortas3 4es. ! law that forbids the teaching of evolution violates the Istablishment Clause

of the $irst !mendment. The court reasoned that the overriding factor was that !r&ansas selected from the body

of &nowledge a particular segment which it prescribed for the sole reason that it was deemed to conflict with aparticular religious doctrine8 that is, with a particular interpretation of the oo& of enesis by a particular

religious group. The court held that the right of a state to select thecurriculum for its public schools does not

include the right to ma&e it a crime to teach scientific doctrine or theory based on its conflict with a religious

belief.

D!spos!t!on" %udgment reversed.


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L=nch v. Donnell=

!tat!on" 4/0 %.S. //$ 12$43

&elevant 'acts" The City of Aawtuc&et, @hode )sland had for many years erected an annual holiday display in

a par& owned by a nonprofit group located in the heart of the city#s primary shopping district. The sponsored

display included a variety of festive holiday decorations, including a crNche, Santa#s house, a Christmas tree

and a banner that read 'Season#s reetings. Daniel Donnelly and others objected to the display and the town#s

sponsorship, claiming that the display was religious in nature and unconstitutionally endorsed religion by a

government entity. Donnelly and others brought suit against the City and 0ayor Dennis /ynch, see&ing to have

the display removed and enjoin the City from future religious displays. The Trial Court agreed that the display

promoted religion and issued the injunction, affirmed by the Court of !ppeals. /ynch and the City appealed.

(ssue" Does a City violate the Istablishment Clause of the $irst !mendment, made applicable to the States by

the $ourteenth !mendment, by erecting a crNche alongside other holiday decorations3

Hold!n)"5o, the display did not violate the Istablishment Clause as it had a legitimate secular purpose and is

appropriate given the historic importance of religion in public life. Such displays, even where they contain some

religious representations, are acceptable under the Istablishment Clause so long as do not advance religion or

foster ecessive entanglement between government and religion.

&eason!n)" Chief %ustice urger delivered the opinion for a narrow majority of the Court. >e begin by

ac&nowledging that the Court had previously determined that the Istablishment Clause erected a wall of

separation between church and state, but "uestioned whether the usefulness of the metaphor etending to

practical conse"uences. !s the majority eplained, separation did not re"uire 'callous indifference towards

religion, but rather a two-fold approach whereby government accommodate all religions but was hostile tonone- including the absence of religion. This understanding, Chief %ustice urger eplained, was confirmed by

the $ramers themselves, many of whom sat in early Congresses that paid for and employed chaplains withou

reservation. overnment does not run afoul of the Istablishment Clause through merely ac&nowledging religion

or recogni1ing the importance of religion in public life, so long as government remains sufficiently tolerant and

eschews hostility, an understanding the majority thought confirmed by history. The majority ac&nowledged the

complicated history of the Court#s Istablishment Clause jurisprudence, eplaining that the relevant in"uiry is

whether government actions establish support, or tend to do so, for any particular religion. Other tests for

Istablishment Clause cases, including loo&ing for a secular purpose, the nature of entanglement between

government and religion, and evaluating whether a particular act advances or inhibits religion are all useful

while none- even ta&en together- are dispositive. The Court should loo& at displays in contet, evaluating the

totality of the circumstances rather than focusing on only the religious symbolism of any particular display, as

such a focus would always lead to invalidating the conduct in "uestion. )n this case, the City had a valid secular

purpose in promoting a holiday recogni1ed by Congress and the Iecutive, had epended very little money, and

there was little li&elihood of entanglement. )n sum, any perceived violations were de minimis. Concluding, the

majority pointed out that it would be strange to eclude a symbol of a holiday long recogni1ed and celebrated in

this country as in others, in particular with the variety of public celebrations of Christmas and Christmas

symbols elsewhere.


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oncurrence< %ustice O#Connor concurred, writing separately to clarify her view of the Istablishment Clause

and attempt to harmoni1e the majority opinion with the traditional tests for the Court#s Istablishment Clause

jurisprudence. )n her view, while all factors may be relevant, the &ey here is whether the City intended to

advance the Christian religion or had in fact done so. She concluded that they had not, evaluating this case by its

own particular facts as re"uired for careful considerations of Istablishment Clause cases.

D!ssent" %ustice rennan dissented, joined by %ustices 0arshall, lac&mun, and Stevens. %ustice rennan

highlighted the narrow nature of the Court#s reasoning, having left open the "uestion of religious displays on

government property and whether religious displays are acceptable if not surrounded by other, secular symbols

but nonetheless disagreed with the ultimate conclusion. )n his view, the constitutional problems of government

support for a crNche and with it endorsement of the iblical view of the birth of Christ were not cured by the

inclusion of other displays. @ather, %ustice rennan concluded that the display was of particular value to those

of the Christian faith and conveyed an improper message to non-believers- namely that they did not belong

%ustice rennan accused the majority of cherry-pic&ing historical antidotes to bolster their case, arguing that the

$ramers would not have approved of federal celebration of Christmas. >e concluded that while most arefamiliar with Christmas and the display is relatively harmless, even a small, innocuous step towards establishing

religion is unacceptable under the $irst !mendment. %ustice lac&mun dissented, joined by %ustice Stevens

(hile he agreed with the main dissented opinion, he wrote separately to highlight that the majority had

dismissed established precedent. >e felt the use of a crNche in a public display was doubly-offensive,

constraining believers to ac&nowledge symbolic meanings only while alienating non-believers.

onclus!on" The Court determined that the particular display in "uestion here had a valid secular purpose and

did not serve to advance religion or entangle government with religion. (hile the majority recogni1ed the value

of several established tests for Istablishment Clause cases, they highlighted the specific facts and circumstances

of a mied seasonal display for a publicly recogni1ed holiday and concluded that the $irst !mendment was nobar to such a government-sponsored display.

!t= of Alle)hen= v. AL%8 42 %.S. 09# 12$23

'acts" Cnty permitted the display of a nativity scene on the staircase of the Courthouse, and 0enorah outside

the City-Cnty ldg, during the holiday season. The creche was displayed wBo any secular figurines or

decorations, but a sign referencing '>oly 5ame Society. !long side the city#s decorated -mas tree, the city

allowed an 2L foot menorah, owned by a %ewish group. >owever, the city stored, erected, and removed it each

year.

(ssues3" (hether ovt authori1ed display of religious symbols as part of holiday decorations constituted an

endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint in violation of Ist Cl3

Hold!n)" 4es and 5o.

Procedure" !C/7 and residents filed suit8 D.Ct denied their re"uest for permanent injunction8 Ct !pp

@eversed holding each display violated Ist Cl bBc each has the impermissible effect of endorsing religion by

ovt. 7.S.S.Ct. !ffirm in part FcrecheG and @everse in part FmenorahG.


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&ules3" 2st Ist Cl. ovt may not promote or affiliate itself wB any religious doctrine or organi1#n, discriminate

against people bBc of religious belief or non belief8 nor delegate a ovt power to a religious institution8 and may

not involve itself too deeply in religious institution#s affairs.

&at!onale" Ct#s attention increases when ovt practice has either a purpose or effect that endorses religion

which bans ovt conveying or attempting to convey a favorable religious message.

Ct will not tolerate some ovt endorsement of religion bBc any endorsement is invalid. Deter if ovt use of an

object wB a religious meaning has the effect of endorsing religion based on the message that ovt practice

sends. That "uestion turns on the contet that the object appears8 i.e. specific physical setting. )f a religious

object is displayed wB other secular objects the setting changes the viewer#s understanding of the purpose and

reduces the li&elihood of a message of endorsement.

reche" This display, wB a sign indicating ownership rests wB @oman Catholic Church shows that the ovt is

endorsing a religious message< Cnty supports and promotes the Christian praise to od. ovt may

ac&nowledge 5at#l holiday as a cultural event, but not as a method of endorsing a specific religious practice.

Menorah" Combination of -mas tree, 0ayor#s sign, and display of menorah sends message of secular

celebrations during holiday season. This only goes to show that its display does not create a primary effect of

ovt#l endorsement of religion FArong 2G. On remand : and may be considered.

Al#s !< FCntyG )t is sufficient to validate the display of the creche bBc the display celebrates -mas and -mas is

a national holiday.

F%. JennedyG traditional, historical religious official acts endorse Christianity, therefore the test should be

whether the ovt action proselyti1e as an Ist of religion.

Lemon v. urtBman

&elevant 'acts" This case was heard alongside two others, both of which focused on the provision of public

funds to church-related educational materials. This particular case concerned Aennsylvania state law Fthe

concurrent cases focused on @hode )sland lawG, in particular, the 29EL 5onpublic Ilementary and Secondary

Iducation !ct, which allowed the state to reimburse predominantly Catholic schools for teaching secular

subjects with secular materials paid for by tapayer funds.

(ssue" The prevailing constitutional "uestion was whether the Aennsylvania and @hode )sland statutes violated

the $irst !mendment#s Istablishment Clause by providing tapayer funds in the form of financial aid to

'church- related educational institutions Fsacred institutionsG3

Hold!n)" The Supreme Court unanimously found that the laws did in fact violate the $irst !mendment#s

Istablishment Clause.

Ma>or!t= p!n!on &eason!n)" The Court reasoned asserted the so-called /emon test. 0oreover, it reasoned

that in order for laws to be constitutional, they must be secular in nature and have a 'secular legislative

purpose. /aws may not 'advance nor inhibit the establishment of a particular faith or give weight to a

particular faith via legislation. The Court ruled that by providing tapayer funds to religious Fnamely Catholic

schoolsG, the State inculcated and insulated religious schools from State scrutiny, while nevertheless providing

tapayer funds.


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onclus!on" This case was significant because it produced the /emon Test, which is a test that outlines

re"uirements for legislation that pertain to religion. The test is germane to constitutional issues concerning

legislation that addresses religion and therefore revolves around the Istablishment Clause.

The Lemon Testis a three-pronged test in which a law can eist outside of these prongs, but if any or all of

these criteria are affirmed, the law in "uestion must be deemed unconstitutional. The /emon Test can be

epressed as followseed Their @ising

Qoices, which contained several paragraphs describing unfair treatment of !labama State College student

protestors, two of which specifically mentioned unfair treatment by the police. @espondent /.. Sullivan was

one of three commissioners of the city of 0ontgomery, !labama. One of his main duties was the supervision

of the city police department. !lthough none of the statements made within the advertisement directly named

Sullivan, he argued that, as supervisor of the city police department, he was being accused of allowing the

described treatment of the students.

)t was found that some of the statements contained in the two paragraphs in "uestion were not accurate

descriptions of what had actually occurred and placed the police department in a very unfavorable light.

!dditionally, all witnesses who testified stated that they did not believe the statements in reference to the

respondent.

@espondent Sullivan brought a claim of libel against four of the individuals whose names, among others, were

in the advertisement and against the 5ew 4or& Times for publishing the advertisement.

H!stor=" The trial court found for respondent and awarded him damages of R;MM,MMM against all defendants on

the grounds that the statements in the advertisement were libelous per se +legal injury being implied without

proof of actual damages, false, and not privileged. On appeal, the Supreme Court of !labama affirmed the

decision. Alaintiffs appealed to the 7nited States Supreme Court.

(ssue" Can a public figure receive damages in a civil libel action, if malice is not proven3

&ul!n)"5o. The 7.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case.

&uleCAnal=s!s" The Supreme Court held that petitioner was protected by the $irst and $ourteenth

!mendments. !s such, a public official +respondent was prohibited from recovering damages for a defamatory

falsehood relating to his official conduct unless it could be proven that the statement was made with actual

malice.


14/26

Summar=" @espondent presented no evidence to show petitioner was aware of erroneous statements or was

rec&less in that regard, and therefore could not prove malice. )n the absence of malice, respondent could not

recover damages.

Schad v. 7orou)h of Mount 5phra!m8 40 %.S. /1 12$13

0ount Iphraim#s 1oning ordinance prohibited all commercial uses ecept those specifically listed in theordinance8 one of these omitted uses was live entertainment including the commercial production of plays

musicals, and so forth, as well as nude dancing. Schad and his associates operated an adult boo&store and had an

amusement license for coin-operated booths where patrons could watch films. (hen they added a booth for live

and usually nude dancing, they were convicted and fined for violating the borough#s 1oning ordinance. The

lower court relied on Stevens# majority opinion in 4oung v. !merican 0ini-Theatres, )nc. F29EG that the

**mere fact that the commercial eploitation of material protected by the $irst !mendment is subject to 1oning

and other licensing re"uirements is not sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances.## 5ew %ersey#s

appellate courts upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court voting seven to two reversed the convictions. (hite wrote the majority opinion. rennan,Stewart, 0arshall, lac&mun, and Aowell joined (hite#s opinion. Aowell, joined by Stewart, wrote a

concurring opinion. Stevens concurred with the judgment. urger, joined by @ehn"uist, dissented.

ecause 0ount Iphraim#s 1oning ordinance infringed on protected liberties, a higher standard of scrutiny or

strict scrutiny is called for compared with when 1oning only affects property interests. Thus, the law must be

narrowly drawn and further a substantial government interest. Contrary to the lower courts# position, 4oung v

!merican 0ini Theatres, )nc. F29EG does not control this case, (hite declares, for three reasons. $irst

Detroit#s ordinance restricted only the location of adult theatres and imposed minimal burdens on protected

speech. Second, the restrictions did not affect the total number of adult theatres nor were they banned from the

city. Third, the city provided evidence of the secondary effects of concentrations of adult theatres or boo&stores.0ount Iphraim#s ordinance, in contrast, fails on all three grounds.

The ordinance thus suffers from being overly broad8 it bans all live entertainment, violating the strictures of the

Court#s overbreadth doctrine. 0oreover, the borough#s secondary effects argument is not internally consistent,

because it does not show whether or how live nude dancing would produce more severe social problems than

the films already being shown in the same establishment. $inally, its argument that the ordinance imposes

reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions also falters. The borough did not eplain why live entertainment

would be **basically incompatible## with normal activities in a commercial 1one8 the initial "uestion when

determining the validity of time, place, and manner restrictions.

lac&mun writes in concurrence to emphasi1e that the customary presumption of validity granted 1oning

ordinances **carries little, if any, weight## where a 1oning ordinance **trenches on rights of epression.#

urger, in dissent, however, ta&es the position that an **overconcern about draftsmanship and overbreadth

should not be allowed to obscure the central "uestion## before the Court< the citi1ens of 0ount Iphraim **meant

only to preserve the basic character of their community.##


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M!ller v. al!forn!a8 41# %.S. 10 129#3

'acts"0r. 0iller sent five unsolicited advertising brochures through the mail addressed to a restaurant. (hen

opened the manager and his mother complained to the police. The brochures advertised four adult boo& titles

and an adult movie. Some descriptive language, pictures and drawings of men and women engaged seuallywere displayed.

(ssues3"(hether material, included in a mass-mailing program, soliciting the sale of adult boo&s and movies

can be subjected to state regulation as a criminal offense3

Hold!n)"4es, but limited to where the wor&, ta&en as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in se8 portrays

seual conduct specifically defined by state law in a patently offensive way8 and ta&en as a whole, does not

have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.

Procedure"%ury convicted 0iller of a misdemeanor distribution of obscenity charge. !ppellate Dept Superior

Ct !ffirmed bBc statute was based on and reflected 0emoir test. 7SSCt Qacated and @emanded.

@uleFsG< 2st and 26th !mend

&at!onale< States have an legit interest in prohibiting the dissemination or ehibition of obscene material when

the mode used has a significant danger of offending unwilling recipients or there#s a ris& of eposure to

juveniles.

2st must Define the standard used to iBd obscene material that a state may regulate wBo infringing on the 2st

!mend through the 26th.

@oth - the mailing obscene materials does not rec#v 2st !mend protection. Then in 0emoirs a new three parttest for obscenity was created8 2G dominant theme of prurient interest in se8 :G material is patently offensive to

current community standards8 and G material is utterly without a redeeming social value. Aroblem with

0emoir test< @e"uired proof obscenity was utterly wBo social value, the prosecution had to prove a negative as

an impossible oA in criminal case. This standard is no longer the Const#l standard.

5o state since @oth has been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes obscenity subject to state

regulation.

7nder 7.S. Const 2st !mend limitations on state powers do not vary from community to community, but this

does not mean a fied, uniform national standard of what precisely appeals to the prurient interest or what is

'patently offensive. )f a jury applies the standard of an average person under the current community standards

the material will be adjudged by its impact on an average person and not a sensitive person.

s6orne v. h!o8 420 %.S. 1;# 122;3

The Supreme Court in Stanley v. eorgia F29E9G constitutionally protected the private possession of obscene

materials by individuals in their residences. 5ew 4or& v. $erber F29L:G declared that seually eplicit materials

or performances involving minors, regardless of whether they were obscene or not, had **eceedingly modest, if


16/26

not de minimus## social value compared to compelling state interests in the welfare of minors, and thus did not

warrant $irst !mendment protections.

Osborne#s appeal as&ed whether Stanley trumped $erber< (as the private possession of seually eplicit

photographs of minors constitutionally protected3 Osborne was convicted of violating Ohio#s law, which stated

**5o person shall ... +possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the person#s

child or ward in a state of nudity.## The police armed with a search warrant found four photographs of nudemale adolescents in seually eplicit positions in Osborne#s house. >is trial conviction was affirmed by Ohio#s

appellate courts.

The Supreme Court reversed Aope#s conviction and remanded the case for further consideration. This ruling,

however, did not rest on Osborne#s $irst !mendment arguments, which the majority found **unpersuasive,## but

on due process grounds8 the jury was not properly instructed on the elements of Ohio#s law that had to be

proved. The vote was si to three, with (hite writing for @ehn"uist, lac&mun, O#Connor, Scalia, and

Jennedy. rennen wrote a dissent that 0arshall and Stevens joined.

(hite argues that Stanley does not etend to Aope#s possession of photographs of nude minors bydistinguishing Ohio#s law from eorgia#s law. The latter prohibited the private possession of obscenity because

of eorgia#s concerns that obscenity **would poison the minds of its viewers,## and accordingly was

unconstitutional since the law sought to control a person#s private thoughts. Ohio#s law, in contrast, in order to

protect the victims of child pornography was designed to **destroy a mar&et for the eploitative use of

children## by ma&ing it a crime to possess and view photographs of nude adolescents. !s (hite notes, $erber

made Ohio#s law necessary because the Court#s decision drove the mar&et for child pornography underground8

nineteen other states as a conse"uence passed laws similar to Ohio#s.

(hite also dismissed Aope#s argument that the law was overbroad. Ohio#s Supreme Court had interpreted the

law as limited to the lewd ehibition of or graphic attention to the genitals of nude minors who were neither thechildren nor wards of the persons charged with violating the law. Aersons viewing or possessing **innocuous

photographs of na&ed children,## (hite emphasi1ed, would not be penali1ed under the law.

Mutual '!lm orporat!on v. (ndustr!al omm!ss!on of h!o8 #/ %.S. #; 12103

)n 292, Ohio established a board of censors for motion pictures under the auspices of the state#s )ndustrial

Commission. 0utual $ilm Corporation, after a state court refused its re"uest for an interlocutory injunction to

stop the law#s implementation, appealed to the 7.S. Supreme Court. ! unanimous Court affirmed the lower

court#s decision.

0utual $ilmCorporation operated a motion picture echange, leasing or selling annually roughly five thousand

prints of films to ehibitors in Ohio and 0ichigan. The prints could not be ehibited in Ohio without the censor

board#s approval and all the films were reviewed at the corporation#s epense. The Supreme Court dismissed

0utual $ilm#s contentions that Ohio#s law impeded interstate commerce, violated freedom of speech and

publication under Ohio#s constitution, and delegated legislative power to the board of censors.


17/26

)n this decision the Supreme Court upheld the authority of an administrative body to develop rules and

standards to implement general laws intended to deter the public distribution or ehibition of indecent or

immoral motion pictures. This posture was consistent with the Comstoc& !ct and the power it gave 7.S. postal

officials to declare material obscene and thus unmailable. Of more importance, the Court ruled the censorship

statute did not violate Ohio#s Constitution8 motion pictures did not warrant the same protections of free speech

and publication guaranteed by the Constitution.

The **power of amusement,## the Court concluded, could ma&e motion pictures **more insidious in corruption

by a pretense of worthy purpose . . . a prurient interest may be ecited and appealed to. esides, there are some

things which should not have pictorial representation in public places and to all audiences.## The Court thus

dismissed the notion that freedom of speech, writing, or publication under Ohio#s Constitution included motion

pictures. 0otion pictures **may be mediums of thought,## the Court conceded, but then **so are many things.##

To accept the appellant#s argument would mean **the theater, the circus, and all other shows and spectacles##

would be brought **by li&e reasoning under the same immunity from repression of supervision of the public

press.## %ustice 0cJenna, the opinion author, concluded

Documents

Civil Liberties Case Briefs