Eloisa Merchandising Inc. v. BDO672 SCRA 533June 13, 2012

FACTS: Respondent BDO extended a credit accommodation to petitioner Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. (EMI)and it was secured by a real estate mortgage (REM) over its properties. BDO filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure before the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC. A notice was issued setting the auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Hence, petitioners filed a complaintfor the annulment of REM. BDO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action but it was denied. BDO then filed its answer. The petitioners failed to appear twice during the pre-trial conference despite notice. Hence, the case was also dismissed twice. The case was once again dismissed due to inaction of petitioners for unreasonable length of time. Petitioners appealed to the CA but it affirmed the trial courts dismissal. Hence, the petition for review under Rule 45. Petitioners contend that the only reason for the trial courts dismissal of the case was the failure of their counsel to move to set the case for pre-trial. However, Section 1, Rule 18 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, imposing upon the plaintiff the duty to promptly move to set the case for pre-trial, had been repealed and amended by A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC which took effect on August 16, 2004. This amendment to the rule on pre-trial now imposes on the clerk of court the duty to issue a notice of pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial conference.ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case against the petitioners is proper.RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative.Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, it is the duty of the plaintiff, after the last pleading has been served and filed, to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial. On August 16, 2004, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures) took effect, which provides that within 5 days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly moveex partethat the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial. When the above guidelines took effect, the case was already at the pre-trial stage and it was the failure of petitioners to set the case anew for pre-trial conference which prompted the trial court to dismiss their complaint. While under the presentRules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently. This case had been at the pre-trial stage for more than two years and petitioners have not shown special circumstances or compelling reasons to convince us that the dismissal of their complaint for failure to prosecute was unjustified.

The petition is dismissed.

Shimizu Phil Contractors v. Magsalin674 SCRA 65June 20, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Shimizu filed a case against Magsalin along with FGU Insurance as surety due to Magsalins breach of their subcontract agreement. FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied. FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint which was admitted naming the other three respondents as third-party defendants. The RTC issued a notice setting the case for hearing but the FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the hearing on the ground that the third-party defendants had not yet filed their answer and it was granted. Only one of the third-party defendants filed an answer. Petitioner was, however, not served with a copy of such answer.The RTC issued an order of dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioner to prosecute. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, it elevated the case before the CA but it affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE: WON the dismissal of petitioners complaint is proper.RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.The dismissalorder of the RTCis void. It simply states its conclusion that the case should be dismissed fornon prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based. Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the dismissalorder shows that itis an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. As a prejudicial dismissal, the dismissalorderis also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that the petitioners complaint can no longer be refiled on the principle ofres judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of adjudication on the merits. Hence, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.The dismissal of the complaint is likewise not warranted as the dismissal was not in accordance with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for themotu propriodismissal of a case for failure to prosecute. The fundamental test fornon prosequituris whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute. In this case, the parties own narrations of facts demonstrate the petitioners willingness to prosecute its complaint. Indeed, neither respondents FGU Insurance nor the third-party defendant was able to point to any specific act committed by the petitioner to justify the dismissal of their case.

The petition is granted.

Suico Industrial Corp v. Lagura-Yap680 SCRA 105September 5, 2012

FACTS: Respondent PDCP Bank, now Prime Media Hodlings, Inc. acquired the real estate properties of petitioner due to the latters failure to redeem it when the properties were foreclosed by the bank. The enforcement of a writ of possession obtained by PDCP Bank from the RTC Mandaue City, Branch 28 was, however, enjoined by an injunctive writ obtained by the petitioners from the RTC, Mandaue City, Branch 56, where they filed an action for specific performance, injunction and damages. The bank elevated the case before the CA and it declared the trial court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed writ, as it interfered with the proceedings of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, the RTC Branch 28. During the cases scheduled pre-trial conference, the petitioners counsel asked for a resetting to allow him more time to prepare the required pre-trial brief. This was opposed by PDCP Bank and AADC, which filed a motion for the cases dismissal and it was granted by respondent Judge Lagura-Yap on the ground that although petitioner Elizabeth was in court, there was no pre-trial brief submitted by petitioners and such failure has the same effect as failure to appear in the pre-trial under Section 6 of Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court.ISSUE: WON the failure to file a pre-trial brief within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court constitutes sufficient ground for dismissal of an action.RULING: The Court ruled in affirmative. Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The effect of their failure to do so is provided in Section 5 of Rule 18 the failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Under Section 6, Rule 18, the failure to file a pre-trial brief when required by law produces the same effect as failure to attend the pre-trial. On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court clearly had a valid basis when it ordered the dismissal of the petitioners action. Consistent with the mandatory character of the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this purpose before the Court, and when a party "fails to appear at a pre-trial conference, (he) may be non-suited or considered as in default." The obligation "to appear" denotes not simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical presentation by a party of ones self, but connotes as importantly, preparedness to go into the different subjects assigned by law to a pre-trial.

The petition is dismissed.

PRE-TRIALTolentino v, Laurel666 SCRA 561February 22, 2012FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against herein petitioners for the recovery of the possession of the western portion of a parcel of land owned by the former. Petitioners averred that the subject property was owned by the Republic and they were occupying the same by virtue of a Fishpond Lease Agreement entered with the Department of Agriculture. Thus, their stay over the property is lawful. Petitioners were declared in default, for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. However, the trial court set aside the default order and reset the pre-trial conference. Despite several resetting of the pre-trial conference of which petitioners were notified, petitioners failed to appear. Hence, the trial court issued an order allowing respondents to present their evidenceex parte,instead of declaring petitioners in default. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Aggrieved, petitioners challenged the trial court's decision before the CA but it affirmed the RTC decision. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but it was denied by the CA. Hence, the petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45. Petitioners maintain that they were denied their day in court, because they were not allowed to present their evidence before the trial court which resulted in the denial of their right to due process.ISSUE: WON petitioners right to due process is denied.RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. In the case at bar, the trial court gave petitioners every chance to air their side and even reconsidered its first order declaring petitioners in default. Notwithstanding, petitioners and their counsel failed to take advantage of such opportunity and disregarded the legal processes, by continuously failing to appear during the pre-trial of the case without any valid cause. Clearly, when the trial court allowed the respondents to present evidenceex partedue to the continued failure of the petitioners to attend the pre-trial conference, it did so in accordance with Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and with due regard to the constitutional guarantee of due process. Plainly, petitioners cannot complain that they were denied due process. What the fundamental law prohibits is total absence of opportunity to be heard. When a party has been afforded opportunity to present his side, he cannot feign denial of due process.

The petition is dismissed.

Tanoco vs Sagun674 SCRA 32 June 20, 2012FactsOn 4 March 2010, complainant filed a verified Complaint against respondent judge for undue delay in rendering judgment. Complainant alleged that on 6 May 2009, a case for ejectment was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and raffled to respondents sala. On 13 October 2009, pretrial was concluded, and the parties were directed to file their position papers. On 23 November 2009, the plaintiff in the ejectment case filed her position paper. As of the date of the filing of the Complaint, no position paper had been filed by the defendant therein. Neither had any decision been rendered by respondent on the case, in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which mandates that ejectment cases should be decided within thirty (30) days from the submission of the position papers of the parties or upon the lapse of the period to do so.

IssueWON there was undue delay by the respondent?

RulingDelay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge, which under Section 1(b) of the same Rule is punishable with suspension from office, without salary and other benefits, for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P 10,000, but not exceeding P 20,000. Considering that the instant administrative charge is only the third against respondent judge (the first has been dismissed, while the second is still pending), and considering his relatively long tenure in the judiciary starting in 1997, he may be reasonably meted out a penalty of P 5,000 for being administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.

Chinkoe vs Republic702 SCRA 677 July 31, 2013

FactsThe case stems from two separate civil cases for a collection of sum of money by the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) against Chiat Sing Cardboard Inc and Filstar Textile Industrial Corporation. The case was heard and submitted for mediation but during the hearings the counsels for the Republic were not present, both from BOC and from the office of the Solicitor General (SG). Although there was one representative from the BOC that appeared during the pre-trial hearing but he was not prepared and only suggested for the postponement of the pre-trial and suggested that upon nonappearance of counsels of the Republic the court may dismiss the case for ---. However, on the rescheduled pre-trial hearing they still did not appear. Hence the court dismissed the case for failure to appear during the pre-trial and upon motion of defendants..

Issues WON the dismissal due to non-appearance of counsel during pre-trial was proper?

RulingThe rule is clear enough that an order of dismissal based on failure to appear at pre-trial is with prejudice, unless the order itself states otherwise. The questioned Order of the trial court did not specify that the dismissal is without prejudice. There should be no cause for confusion, and the trial court is not required to explicitly state that the dismissal is with prejudice. The respondent is not then left without a remedy, since the Rules itself construes the dismissal to be with prejudice. It should be considered as adjudication on the merits of the case, where the proper remedy is an appeal under Rule 41. Regrettably, the respondent chose the wrong mode of judicial review. In not dismissing the petition for certiorari outright, and in not ruling that such remedy is the wrong mode of judicial review, the CA committed grave and reversible error.

Benavidez vs Salvador712 SCRA 238 December 11, 2003

FactsThe controversy arose from a complaint for sum of money with damages and prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment by Salvador against Benavidez. However, Benavidez filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia stating that she had filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Salvador with the RTC in Rizal. The motion to dismiss was denied. A pre-trial was scheduled but Benavidez and counsel failed to appear despite due notice. Salvador was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC ruled in favour of Salvador.

Issue:

WON the RTC was correct in allowing the other party to present evidence ex parte due to non-appearance at pre-trail?

RulingIt is clear that the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidenceex parteand the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.

Serrano vs Ambassador Hotel, Inc690 vs 226 February 11, 2013

FactsThe case stems from an intra-corporate dispute between Serrano and Ambassador Hotel when Yolanda Chan brought to the Presidents attention the alleged acts of misappropriation. A case was filed by Chan against Serrano with the RTC regarding Board Resolutions dismissing Serrano, among others. The RTC sustained the legality of Board Resolutions.

Meanwhile, Serrano who did not receive her wages and other monetary benefits filed a complaint before the labor arbiter. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of Serrano. On appeal, NLRC modified the award of retirement pay. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration but was dismissed.

Issue:WON the the judgment rendered by the Court should have dismissed the separate petition of the respondent from the decision of the CA?

RulingBy the doctrine ofres judicata, "a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit."40To apply this doctrine in the form of a "bar by prior judgment," there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action as between the first case where the first judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred.

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

Guzman v. Guzman693 SCRA 318March 13, 2013

FACTS:Petitioner filed with the MTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, a complaint for ejectment against her children. The MTC found the petitioner to be the lawful owner of the land with a right to its possession since the respondents had no vested right to the land because they are merely the petitioners children to whom no ownership or possessory rights have passed. The respondents appealed to the RTC arguing that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, to which the RTC rejected the respondents arguments based on Section 33(2) of BP Blg. 129. RTC, however, still ruled for the respondents and set aside the MTC ruling. It took into account the petitioners transfer of rights in the respondents favor, which, it held, could not be unilaterally revoked without a court action. It also noted that the petitioner failed to allege and prove that earnest efforts at a compromise have been exerted prior to the filing of the complaint.Later on, petitioner received a copy of RTC decision, then file her first motion for reconsideration due to lack of required notice and hearing. Another motion for reconsideration as filed by petitioner but the same was denied on the ground that it was filed out of time. The third motion for reconsideration was file, which the trial court denied with finality. This prompts the petitioner to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. However, the appellate court dismissed the petition. It noted that a Rule 42 petition for review, not a Rule 65 petition forcertiorari, was the proper remedy to assail an RTC decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

ISSUE:Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the petitioners petition forcertiorari.

RULING:The petition lacks merit. The RTC decision became final and executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. It is elementary that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Thus, the RTC decision, even if allegedly erroneous, can no longer be modified.

Heirs of Miranda vs. Miranda700 SCRA 714July 8, 2013

FACTS:Petitioners, all surnamed Miranda, filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Specific Performance against the heirs of Pedro Miranda, the heir of Tranquilino Miranda, and the spouses respondent Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Sps. Pablo and Aida Miranda. Petitioners did not file any appeal, hence the decision became final and executory. Later, the respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a Break-Open and Demolition Order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property, which was denied. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment, which was granted. Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal. Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied it. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA, but the CA denied it otherwise on the ground that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for revival of judgement.

RULING:The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. An action for revival of judgment may be filed either in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general. In this case, respondent filed the Petition for Revival of Judgment in the same court which rendered the Decision dated August 30, 1999.

RCBC vs. Serra701 SCRA 124July 10, 2013

FACTS:Serra and petitioner RCBC entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy, wherein Serra agreed to lease his land to RCBC for 25 years and granted RCBC the option to buy the land and improvement within 10 years. Later, RCBC informed Serra of its decision to exercise its option to buy the property. However, Serra replied that he was no longer interested in selling it. RCBC filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Serra (in the RTC Makati which initially dismissed the complaint, but later reversed itself and ordered Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC.Serra appealed to the CA. On the meantime, Serra donated the property to his mother, and was later on sold it to one Liok. A new land title was issued in favor of Liok. Thus, RCBC filed a Complaint for Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra before the RTC of Masbate City.

ISSUE:Whether the court a quo erred in holding that petitioner RCBC is barred from having its January 5, 1989 decision executed through motion, considering that under the circumstances obtaining in this case, RCBC was unlawfully prevented by respondent from enforcing said decision.

RULING:The petition has merit. The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.

Smart Com. Inc., vs. Aldecoa

705 SCRA 392September 11, 2013

FACTS:Petitioner entered into a contract of lease4with Florentino Sebastian in which the latter agreed to lease to the former a piece of vacant lot. Respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint against petitioner for abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. In its Answer/Motion to Oppose Temporary Restraining Order with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner raised special and affirmative defenses. In the end, petitioner sought the dismissal of respondents Complaint, the denial of respondents prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the award of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages in the amounts which the court deem just and reasonable; and the award of attorneys feesand litigation expenses as may be proven at the trial. Respondents then contested petitioners allegations. Respondents likewise filed their Opposition to petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment. The RTC issued its Order granting petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing respondents Complaint. On appeal, the appellate court ruled in favor of the respondent, declaring the cellular based station a nuisance. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE:Whether the summary judgment is proper.

RULING: In Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, the Court discussed extensively when a summary judgment is proper: For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment.A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment called for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

COCOFED v. REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,663 scra 514January 24, 2012

FACTS:During the Martial Law regime, then President Marcos issued several Presidential Decrees and the most relevant among these is which permitted the use of the Fund for the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares of the stock of the bank it acquired free to the coconut farmers. The rest of the Fund was deposited to the UCPB interest free. During the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1 which created the PCGG which was empowered to file cases for sequestration in the Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock in the UCPB registered in the name of over a million coconut farmers held in trust by the PCA. The Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were deprived of their rights when a summary judgement has been issued.

HELD:The court ruled that it cannot stressed enough that the Republic as well as herein petitioners were well within their rights to move, as they in fact separately did, for a partial summary judgment. Summary judgment may be allowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is, as shown by affidavits and like evidentiary documents, no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue, as distinguished from one that is fictitious, contrived and set up in bad faith, means an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence.[90]Summary or accelerated judgment, therefore, is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation. Moreover, COCOFED et al. even filed their ownMotion for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that there are no more factual issues left to be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan.This act of filing a motion for summary judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section 26, Rule 130 which declares that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.Viewed in this light, the Court has to reject petitioners self-serving allegations about being deprived the right to adduce evidence.

Sps. VILLUGA and MERCEDITA VILLUGA, v. KELLY HARDWARE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY INC.,677 SCRA 131July 18, 2012FACTS:Petitioners made purchases of various construction materials from respondent corporation which has not been paid up to the present time, both principal and stipulated interests due thereon. Respondent made several demands, oral and written, for the defendants to pay all their obligations but they fail and refuse to comply with, despite demands made upon them, to the damage and prejudice of respondent. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the corporation which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.ISSUE:Whether or not there should be a summary judgment against petitioners. HELD:The petition lacks merit. The court ruled that Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays.25Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties. In the present case, it bears to note that in its original Complaint, as well as in its Amended Complaint, respondent did not allege as to how petitioners' partial payments of P110,301.80 and P20,000.00 were applied to the latter's obligations. In fact, there is no allegation or admission whatsoever in the said Complaint and Amended Complaint that such partial payments were made. Petitioners, on the other hand, were consistent in raising their affirmative defense of partial payment in their Answer to the Complaint and Answer to Amended Complaint. Having pleaded a valid defense, petitioners, at this point, were deemed to have raised genuine issues of fact. On the basis of the foregoing, petitioners' defense of partial payment in their Answer to Second Amended Complaint, in effect, no longer raised genuine issues of fact that require presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Hence, the summary judgment of the RTC in favor of respondent is proper.

FIRST LEVERAGE AND SERVICES GROUP, INC v. SOLID BUILDERS, INC.,675 SCRA 407July 2, 2012

FACTS:The petition arose from a Complaint for Annulment of Promise to Sell, Mandamus and Prohibitory Injunction filed with the RTC of Manila by herein petitioner First Leverage and Services Group, Inc. (First Leverage) against PNB Republic Bank (PNB Republic). In its Amended Complaint,3wherein itimpleadedherein respondent Solid Builders, Inc. (Solid Builders) as additional defendant. Solid Builders filed its Amended Answer asserting, in the same manner as PNB Republic. After Pre-Trial Conference was concluded, First Leverage filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Resolution of Case Based on Admissions and Stipulations of Facts of the Parties. The RTC rendered a decision granting said motion.ISSUE:Whether or not the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by petitioner is valid.HELD:The Court reiterates the ruling of the CA that what has been rendered by the RTC is not a judgment on the pleadings. Rather, it is a summary judgment.Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings.16In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise an issue. In the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist i.e., facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.20In the present case, a perusal of the Amended Answer as well as the Pre-Trial Brief filed by Solid Builders would readily show that it denied the material allegations in First Leverage's Complaint and that defenses were raised to refute these allegations. Stated differently, Solid Builders' pleadings tendered factual issues. Hence, the CA correctly held that the RTC rendered a summary judgment and not a judgment on the pleadings.

SPOUSES JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANNETTE B. CRISOLOGO, v JUDGE GEORGE E. OMELIO682 SCRA 154OCT 0 3 2012FACTS:Petitioners obtained a favorable judgment which had become final and executor. Accordingly, a Writ of Execution was issued for the satisfaction of said final judgment. Subsequently, a Notice of Sale was issued by Sheriff Robert M. Medialdea, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court on the subject properties. However, the properties involved were already acquired by JEWM prior to the finality of judgment. Aggrieved with the said decision, JEWM filed a complaint for Cancellation of Lien, with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction.ISSUE:Whether or not Judge Omelio committed gross ignorance of the law for granting the contentious Motion to Render Judgment Granting Plaintiff the Relief Prayed for.

HELD:This case concerns the cancellation of liens on the transfer certificates of title, involving issues which can be comprehended by the judge based on a cursory examination of the verified application and its supporting documents. During the hearing, both counsels were given the opportunity to argue their case before JudgeOmelio.27 Neither counsel raised the issue of authenticity of the titles, subject of the case. Both counsels were in agreement with regard to the facts: (a) that there were several liens over the properties;28 (b) that the property held by JEWM was a derivative title in satisfaction of the first lien;29 and (c) that the Sps. Crisologo were executing JEWMs property based on the second lien.30 With no factual issues or disputes, the issues raised by counsels before Judge Omelio were purely legal in nature, which could be resolved from an examination of the verified application and its supporting documents. A clear and unmistakable right to the issuance of the writ of injunction in favor of JEWM could easily be gathered from examining the submitted pleadings and their supporting documents. For this reason, we find Judge Omelio not guilty of gross ignorance of the law in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction without requiring the parties to present testimonial evidences during the hearing.

SOFIO V. VALENZUELA666 scra 55February 15, 2012

FACTS: RESPONDENTS ALBERTO, GLORIA, REMEDIOS, AND CESAR, ALL SURNAMED VALENZUELA, ARE BROTHERS AND SISTERS. THEY ARE THE CO-OWNERS OF A PARCEL OF AGRICULTURAL LAND DESIGNATED AS LOT NO. 970-B AND LOCATED IN BARANGAY AYUNGON, VALLADOLID, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, CONTAINING AN AGGREGATE AREA OF 10.0959 HECTARES. UNKNOWN TO THE RESPONDENTS, PETITIONER ROLANDO SOFIO AND HIS BROTHER, CO-PETITIONER RUFIO SOFIO, HAD OBTAINED PERMISSION TO FARM THE ABANDONED AREA FOR FREE FROM SOCORRO VALENZUELA, THE RESPONDENTS MOTHER, ON CONDITION THAT ROLANDO WOULD RETURN THE PORTION ONCE THE OWNERS NEEDED IT.IN 1985, AFTER THE PETITIONERS REFUSED GLORIASDEMAND FOR THE RETURN OF THE 1.8 HECTARES, SHE LODGED A COMPLAINT AGAINST ROLANDO WITH THE BARANGAY CHAIRMAN OF AYUNGON, VALLADOLID, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, AND THE MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER (MARO). THE PARTIES DID NOT REACH AN AMICABLE SETTLEMENT.ON JULY 8, 1988, EMANCIPATION PATENTS (EPS) WERE ISSUED TO ROLANDO AND RUFIO COVERING THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF TILLAGE.ON OCTOBER 5, 1990, THE RESPONDENTS BROUGHT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) A COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PETITIONERS,[9]SEEKING THE CANCELLATION OF THE EPS, RECOVERY OF POSSESSION, AND DAMAGES, ALLEGING THAT THE PETITIONERS CULTIVATION OF THEIR LAND HAD BEEN ILLEGAL BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT CONSENTED TO IT. HON. GIL A. ALEGARIO (PARAD) ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS. THE PETITIONERS APPEALED TO WIT THE DARAB GAVE A FAVORABLE RULING TO THE PETITIONERS. THE RESPONDENTS ELEVATED THE DARABS DECISION TO THE CA. THE CA DECREED THAT THE PETITIONERS DID NOT ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM AND THE RESPONDENTS; AND THAT THE DARABS RELIANCE ON THE RICE AND CORN LAND TENURE SURVEY WAS UNFOUNDED.THE DECISION OF MAY 27, 1998 BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY ON OCTOBER 27, 1998 AFTER THE PETITIONERS NEITHER MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION NOR APPEALED BYCERTIORARITO THE COURT.ON FEBRUARY 6, 2002, THE PETITIONERS, REPRESENTED BY NEW COUNSEL, FILED IN THE PARAD A MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 27, 2001, AND MOTION TO RECALL WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED JANUARY 23, 2002 ALLEGING THEREIN THAT THEY HAD LEARNED OF THEMAY 27, 1998 DECISION OF THE CA ONLY ON DECEMBER 11, 2001 THROUGH THEIR RECEIPT OF THE NOVEMBER 27, 2001 ORDER OF THE PARAD GRANTING THE RESPONDENTSEX PARTEMOTION FOR EXECUTION.WHEN PARAD DENIED THE MOTION, THE PETITIONERS THEN FILED IN THE CA A MOTION TO RECALL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION TO WHICH THE CA DENIED. HENCE, PETITIONERS APPEAL BY PETITION FOR REVIEW ONCERTIORARI.ISSUE: WON CAs DENIAL OF THEIR MOTION TO RECALL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT DENIED THEM FAIR PLAY, JUSTICE, AND EQUITY.HELD: THE COURT RULED THAT THERE IS NO CAUSE TO DISTURB THE DECISION OF THE CA PROMULGATED ON MAY 27, 1998 AS THE DECISION HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.THE COURT WILL NOT OVERRIDE THE FINALITY AND IMMUTABILITY OF A JUDGMENT BASED ONLY ON THE NEGLIGENCE OF A PARTYS COUNSEL IN TIMELY TAKING ALL THE PROPER RECOURSES FROM THE JUDGMENT. TO JUSTIFY AN OVERRIDE, THE COUNSELS NEGLIGENCE MUST NOT ONLY BE GROSS BUT MUST ALSO BE SHOWN TO HAVE DEPRIVED THE PARTY THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. GIVEN THIS DOCTRINE, THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE ARE: (A) THE CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS; (B) THE SO-CALLEDNUNC PRO TUNCENTRIES THAT CAUSE NO PREJUDICE TO ANY PARTY; (C) VOID JUDGMENTS; AND (D) WHENEVER CIRCUMSTANCES TRANSPIRE AFTER THE FINALITY OF THE JUDGMENTS RENDERING EXECUTION UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE.THE COURT STRESSED THAT THE OBJECT OF A JUDGMENTNUNC PRO TUNCIS NOT THE RENDERING OF A NEW JUDGMENT AND THE ASCERTAINMENT AND DETERMINATION OF NEW RIGHTS, BUT ISONE PLACING IN PROPER FORM ON THE RECORD, THE JUDGMENT THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY RENDERED, TO MAKE IT SPEAK THE TRUTH, SO AS TO MAKE IT SHOW WHAT THE JUDICIAL ACTION REALLY WAS, NOT TO CORRECT JUDICIAL ERRORS, SUCH AS TO RENDER A JUDGMENT WHICH THE COURT OUGHT TO HAVE RENDERED, IN PLACE OF THE ONE IT DID ERRONEOUSLY RENDER, NOR TO SUPPLY NONACTION BY THE COURT, HOWEVER ERRONEOUS THE JUDGMENT MAY HAVE BEEN.BASED ON SUCH DEFINITION AND CHARACTERIZATION, THE PETITIONERS SITUATION DID NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ANUNC PRO TUNCAMENDMENT, CONSIDERING THAT WHAT THEY WERE SEEKING WAS NOT MERE CLARIFICATION, BUT THE COMPLETE REVERSALIN THEIR FAVOROF THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE DARAB DECISION.

BIR VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION705 SCRA 430September 30, 2013FACTS: PETITIONER FTC IS THE MANUFACTURER/PRODUCER OF CIGARETTE BRANDS WITH TAX RATE CLASSIFICATION BASED ON NET RETAIL PRICE PRESCRIBED BY ANNEX "D" OF R.A. NO. 4280. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1997, THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CIGARETTE BRANDS WERE SUBJECT TO AD VALOREM TAX PURSUANT TO THEN SECTION142 OF THE TAX CODE OF 1977, AS AMENDED. HOWEVER, ON JANUARY 1, 1997,R.A. NO. 8240 TOOK EFFECT WHEREBY A SHIFT FROM THE AD VALOREM TAX (AVT)SYSTEM TO THE SPECIFIC TAX SYSTEM WAS MADE AND SUBJECTING THE CIGARETTE BRANDS TO SPECIFIC TAX UNDER SECTION 142 THEREOF, NOW RENUMBERED AS SEC. 145 OF THE TAX CODE OF 1997.FOR THE PERIOD COVERING JANUARY 1-31, 2000, PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY PAID SPECIFIC TAXES ON ALL BRANDS MANUFACTURED AND REMOVED IN THE TOTAL AMOUNTS OFP585,705,250.00.ON FEBRUARY 7, 2000, PETITIONER FILED WITH RESPONDENTS APPELLATE DIVISION A CLAIM FOR REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF ITS PURPORTEDLY OVERPAID EXCISE TAX FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY 2000 IN THE AMOUNT OFP35,651,410.00.THE CTA RENDERED A DECISION IN CTA CASE NO. 6612 GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE REFUND OF THE AMOUNT OFP355,385,920.00 REPRESENTING OVERPAID EXCISE TAX FOR THE PERIOD COVERING JANUARY 1, 2002 TO DECEMBER 31, 2002.ON CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION, TAX COURT RULED WITH A SEMBLANCE OF FINALITY THAT THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE REFUND CLAIMED.THE COMMISSIONER APPEALED THE AFORESAID DECISIONS OF THE CTA. THE PETITION QUESTIONING THE GRANT OF REFUND IN THE AMOUNT OFP680,387,025.00 WAS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 80675, WHEREAS THAT ASSAILING THE GRANT OF REFUND IN THE AMOUNT OFP355,385,920.00 WAS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 83165. THE PETITIONS WERE CONSOLIDATED AND EVENTUALLY DENIED BY THE CA. THE APPELLATE COURT ALSO DENIED RECONSIDERATION IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED 1 MARCH 2005.ISSUE: WON THERE IS A FLAW IN THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SECTION 145 OF THE TAX CODE AND RR 17-99.HELD: THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT RR NO. 17-99 IS INDEED INDEFENSIBLY FLAWED. THE LEGALITY OF REVENUE REGULATION NO. 17-99 IS THE ONLY DETERMINATIVE ISSUE RESOLVED BY THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION WHICH WAS THE VERY SAME ISSUE RESOLVED BY THE CA IN THE CONSOLIDATED CA-G.R. SP NOS.80675 AND 83165 AND EXACTLY THE SAME ISSUE IN CTA NOS. 6365, 6383 AND 6612.FROM THE FOREGOING COGENT REASONS, THE COURT RULED THAT CA-G.R. SP NO. 83165 SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION.1WPH IT HELD THAT THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY IN THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION IN G.R. NOS. 167274-75 CONSIDERING THAT THE PROPRIETY OF THE CA HOLDING IN CA-G.R. SP NO.83165 FORMED PART OF THE CORE ISSUES RAISED IN G.R. CASE NOS. 167274-75, BUT UNFORTUNATELY WAS LEFT OUT IN THE ALL-IMPORTANT DECRETAL PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT. THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE CORRESPONDINGLY CORRECTED.TO REITERATE, THE CTA SIMPLY FOLLOWED THE ALL TOO FAMILIAR DOCTRINE THAT "WHEN THERE IS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND THE BODY THEREOF, THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION CONTROLS IRRESPECTIVE WHAT APPEARS IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION. VEERING AWAY FROM THE FALLO MIGHT EVEN BE VIEWED AS IRREGULAR AND MAY GIVE RISE TO A CHARGE OF BREACH OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.THE CTA IS ORDERED TO ISSUE A WRIT OF EXECUTION DIRECTING THE RESPONDENT CIR TO PAY PETITIONER FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION THE AMOUNT OF TAX REFUND OFP355,385,920.00 AS ADJUDGED IN CTA CASE NO. 6612.

UE VS. UEEA657 SCRA 637September 14, 2011

FACTS: PETITIONERUNIVERSITYOF THE EAST(UE)IS AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION DULY ORGANIZED AND EXISTING UNDER PHILIPPINE LAWS. ON THE OTHER HAND, RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION(UEEA)IS A DULY REGISTERED LABOR UNION OF THE RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF UE. PRIOR TO SCHOOL YEAR(SY)1983-1984, THE 70%INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS FROM TUITION FEE INCREASES AS MANDATED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 451 (P.D. NO. 451), AS AMENDED, WAS DISTRIBUTED BY UE IN PROPORTION TO THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF ACADEMIC AND NON-ACADEMIC PERSONNEL.HOWEVER, THE 70% INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS FROM THE TUITION FEE INCREASE WAS DISTRIBUTED BY UE TO ITS COVERED EMPLOYEES BASED ON A NEW FORMULA OF PERCENTAGE OF SALARY STARTING SY 1994-1995.

UEEA, OBJECTED THE MANNER OF DISTRIBUTION AND FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST UE FOR NON-PAYMENT/UNDERPAYMENT OF THE RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES SHARE OF THE TUITION FEE INCREASE. IN ITS CONTENTION, UE ASSERTED THAT THE CLAIM OF THE UEEA WAS ALREADY BARRED SINCE IT WAS FILED THREE (3) YEARS FROM THE TIME ITS SUPPOSED CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED.

LA RULED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS AND CONCLUDED THAT UE WAS LEGALLY BOUND TO KEEP AND MAINTAIN THE ESTABLISHED PRACTICE OF DISTRIBUTING EQUALLY AMONG ITS EMPLOYEES THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS FROM THE TUITION FEE INCREASES PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE AFORESAID TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT DATEDOCTOBER 18, 1983AND THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XX, SECTION 5 OF THE UE-UEEA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.

UE INTERPOSED AN APPEAL BEFORE THE NLRC BUT WAS DISMISSED. A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS THEREAFTER FILED, NLRC DENIED THE MOTION WITH A WARNING THAT NO FURTHER MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHALL BE ENTERTAINED. NONETHELESS, ONSEPTEMBER 20, 2004, UE FILED A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND ADMIT A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, INCORPORATING THEREIN ITS SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. ALLEGING THAT THE NLRC RESOLUTION WAS NOT VALID FOR FAILURE TO PASS UPON AND CONSIDER THE NEW AND VITAL ISSUES RAISED IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESCRIBED FORM FOR NLRC RESOLUTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 13, RULE VII, NLRC NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE. NLRC GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION, AND REVERSED ITS EARLIER RULING.

AGGRIEVED, UEEA FILED A PETITION BEFORE THE CA. THE CA DECLARED THAT SINCE THE SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS A PROHIBITED PLEADING, IT DID NOT INTERRUPT THE RUNNING OF THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. ACCORDINGLY, THE RESOLUTION DATEDAUGUST 24, 2004 HAD ATTAINED FINALITY AND COULD NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT, EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION WAS MEANT TO CORRECT WHAT WAS PERCEIVED TO BE AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF FACT OR LAW. UE FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE CA DECISION BUT IT WAS DENIED .HENCE, THIS APPEAL.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT UEs SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION(MR)BEFORE THE NLRC IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING.

HELD:

THE COURT RULED THAT INDEED SECOND MR AS A RULE, IS GENERALLY A PROHIBITED PLEADING. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT DISCOUNT INSTANCES WHEN IT MAY AUTHORIZE THE SUSPENSION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE SO AS TO ALLOW THE RESOLUTION OF A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, IN CASES OF EXTRAORDINARILY PERSUASIVE REASONS SUCH AS WHEN THE DECISION IS A PATENT NULLITY.

ON THE CONTENTION OF THE PETIOTIONER THAT THERE EXIST EXTRAORDINARY PERSUASIVE REASONS WARRANTING THE ALLOWANCE OF THE SECOND MR ON THE GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT IS A MONEY CLAIM ARISING FROM EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; HENCE, IT PRESCRIBES IN THREE (3) YEARS., SC AGREES WITH UE AND HOLDS THAT UEEAS RIGHT TO QUESTION THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS FOR SY 1994-1995 HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED. ARTICLE 291 OF THE LABOR CODE PROVIDES THAT MONEY CLAIMS ARISING FROM AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP MUST BE FILED WITHIN THREE (3) YEARS FROM THE TIME THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED. IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED WHEN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS BASED ON PERCENTAGE OF SALARY OF THE COVERED EMPLOYEES WAS DISCUSSED IN THE TRIPARTITE MEETING HELD ONJUNE 19, 1995.UEEA DID NOT QUESTION THE MANNER OF ITS DISTRIBUTION AND ONLY ONAPRIL 27, 1999DID IT FILE AN ACTION BASED THEREIN.HENCE, PRESCRIPTION HAD SET IN.

LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES VS. COMELEC652 SCRA 798February 15, 2011

FACTS: ON 18 NOVEMBER 2008, THE SUPREME COURTEN BANC,BY A MAJORITY VOTE, STRUCK DOWN THE SUBJECT 16 CITYHOOD LAWS FOR VIOLATING SECTION 10, ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.ON 31 MARCH 2009, THE SUPREME COURTEN BANC, AGAIN BY A MAJORITY VOTE, DENIED THE RESPONDENTS FIRST MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.ON 28 APRIL 2009, THE SUPREME COURTEN BANC, BY ASPLITVOTE, DENIED THE RESPONDENTS SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. ACCORDINGLY, THE 18 NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND WAS RECORDED, IN DUE COURSE, IN THE BOOK OF ENTRIES OF JUDGMENTS ON 21 MAY 2009.HOWEVER, AFTER THE FINALITY OF THE 18 NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION AND WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTIONAL AND COMPELLING REASON, THE COURTEN BANCUNPRECEDENTEDLY REVERSED THE 18 NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION BY UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CITYHOOD LAWS IN THE DECISION OF 21 DECEMBER 2009.

UPON REEXAMINATION, THE COURT FINDS THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION MERITORIOUS AND ACCORDINGLY REINSTATES THE 18 NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION DECLARING THE 16 CITYHOOD LAWS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

ISSUE: WON THE TIE VOTE OF THE COURT EN BANC ON THE SECOND MR CONSTITUTES DENIAL.

HELD: THE COURT RULED THAT SINCE THE COURT WAS EVENLY DIVIDED, THERE COULD BE NO REVERSAL OF THE 18 NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION,FOR A TIE-VOTE CANNOT RESULT IN ANY COURT ORDER OR DIRECTIVE. THE JUDGMENT STANDS IN FULL FORCE. UNDENIABLY, THE 6-6 TIE-VOTE DID NOT OVERRULE THE PRIOR MAJORITYEN BANCDECISION OF 18 NOVEMBER 2008, AS WELL AS THE PRIOR MAJORITYEN BANCRESOLUTION OF 31 MARCH 2009 DENYING RECONSIDERATION.THE TIE-VOTE ON THE SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS NOT THE SAME AS A TIE-VOTE ON THE MAIN DECISION WHERE THERE IS NO PRIOR DECISION. HERE, THE TIE-VOTE PLAINLY SIGNIFIES THAT THERE IS NO MAJORITY TO OVERTURN THE PRIOR 18 NOVEMBER 2008 DECISION AND 31 MARCH 2009 RESOLUTION, AND THUS THE SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MUST BE DENIED.

SECTION 7, RULE 56 OF THE RULES OF COURT PROVIDES:SEC. 7.PROCEDURE IF OPINION IS EQUALLY DIVIDED. WHERE THE COURTEN BANCIS EQUALLY DIVIDED IN OPINION, OR THE NECESSARY MAJORITY CANNOT BE HAD, THE CASE SHALL AGAIN BE DELIBERATED ON, AND IF AFTER SUCH DELIBERATION NO DECISION IS REACHED, THE ORIGINAL ACTION COMMENCED IN THE COURT SHALL BE DISMISSED; IN APPEALED CASES, THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM SHALL STAND AFFIRMED; ANDON ALL INCIDENTAL MATTERS, THE PETITION OR MOTION SHALL BE DENIED.THEEN BANCRESOLUTION OF 26 JANUARY 1999 IN A.M. NO. 99-1-09-SC, READS:A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURTEN BANCOR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THEEN BANCOR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION.IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTIONFOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED.

BIR VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION705 SCRA 430FACTS: PETITIONER FTC IS THE MANUFACTURER/PRODUCER OF CIGARETTE BRANDS WITH TAX RATE CLASSIFICATION BASED ON NET RETAIL PRICE PRESCRIBED BY ANNEX "D" OF R.A. NO. 4280. IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1997, THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CIGARETTE BRANDS WERE SUBJECT TO AD VALOREM TAX PURSUANT TO THEN SECTION142 OF THE TAX CODE OF 1977, AS AMENDED. HOWEVER, ON JANUARY 1, 1997,R.A. NO. 8240 TOOK EFFECT WHEREBY A SHIFT FROM THE AD VALOREM TAX (AVT)SYSTEM TO THE SPECIFIC TAX SYSTEM WAS MADE AND SUBJECTING THE CIGARETTE BRANDS TO SPECIFIC TAX UNDER SECTION 142 THEREOF, NOW RENUMBERED AS SEC. 145 OF THE TAX CODE OF 1997.FOR THE PERIOD COVERING JANUARY 1-31, 2000, PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY PAID SPECIFIC TAXES ON ALL BRANDS MANUFACTURED AND REMOVED IN THE TOTAL AMOUNTS OFP585,705,250.00.ON FEBRUARY 7, 2000, PETITIONER FILED WITH RESPONDENTS APPELLATE DIVISION A CLAIM FOR REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF ITS PURPORTEDLY OVERPAID EXCISE TAX FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY 2000 IN THE AMOUNT OFP35,651,410.00.THE CTA RENDERED A DECISION IN CTA CASE NO. 6612 GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE REFUND OF THE AMOUNT OFP355,385,920.00 REPRESENTING OVERPAID EXCISE TAX FOR THE PERIOD COVERING JANUARY 1, 2002 TO DECEMBER 31, 2002.ON CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION, TAX COURT RULED WITH A SEMBLANCE OF FINALITY THAT THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE REFUND CLAIMED.THE COMMISSIONER APPEALED THE AFORESAID DECISIONS OF THE CTA. THE PETITION QUESTIONING THE GRANT OF REFUND IN THE AMOUNT OFP680,387,025.00 WAS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 80675, WHEREAS THAT ASSAILING THE GRANT OF REFUND IN THE AMOUNT OFP355,385,920.00 WAS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 83165. THE PETITIONS WERE CONSOLIDATED AND EVENTUALLY DENIED BY THE CA. THE APPELLATE COURT ALSO DENIED RECONSIDERATION IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED 1 MARCH 2005.ISSUE: WON THERE IS A FLAW IN THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SECTION 145 OF THE TAX CODE AND RR 17-99.

HELD: THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT RR NO. 17-99 IS INDEED INDEFENSIBLY FLAWED. THE LEGALITY OF REVENUE REGULATION NO. 17-99 IS THE ONLY DETERMINATIVE ISSUE RESOLVED BY THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION WHICH WAS THE VERY SAME ISSUE RESOLVED BY THE CA IN THE CONSOLIDATED CA-G.R. SP NOS.80675 AND 83165 AND EXACTLY THE SAME ISSUE IN CTA NOS. 6365, 6383 AND 6612.FROM THE FOREGOING COGENT REASONS, THE COURT RULED THAT CA-G.R. SP NO. 83165 SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION.1WPH IT HELD THAT THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY IN THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION IN G.R. NOS. 167274-75 CONSIDERING THAT THE PROPRIETY OF THE CA HOLDING IN CA-G.R. SP NO.83165 FORMED PART OF THE CORE ISSUES RAISED IN G.R. CASE NOS. 167274-75, BUT UNFORTUNATELY WAS LEFT OUT IN THE ALL-IMPORTANT DECRETAL PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT. THE FALLO OF THE JULY 21, 2008 DECISION SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE CORRESPONDINGLY CORRECTED.TO REITERATE, THE CTA SIMPLY FOLLOWED THE ALL TOO FAMILIAR DOCTRINE THAT "WHEN THERE IS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND THE BODY THEREOF, THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION CONTROLS IRRESPECTIVE WHAT APPEARS IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION. VEERING AWAY FROM THE FALLO MIGHT EVEN BE VIEWED AS IRREGULAR AND MAY GIVE RISE TO A CHARGE OF BREACH OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.THE CTA IS ORDERED TO ISSUE A WRIT OF EXECUTION DIRECTING THE RESPONDENT CIR TO PAY PETITIONER FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION THE AMOUNT OF TAX REFUND OFP355,385,920.00 AS ADJUDGED IN CTA CASE NO. 6612.

Torres v. PAGCOR661 SCRA 621December 14, 2011

FACTS: Petitioner Torres was dismissed from service from allegedly committing padding of anomalous SM jackpot receipts. Petitioner filed with the CSCa Complaintagainst PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within the period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law. CSC Denied petitioners appeal for appeal had already prescribed. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.Petitioner filed with the CA seeking to set aside the twin resolutions issued by the CSC.The CA Dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE: whether the CA erred when it affirmed the CSC's dismissal of the appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary period.

Held: No. a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007.Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission,such letter reconsiderationdid not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.

Alivia v. PACTOR & GAMBLE650 SCRA 400June 6, 2011

FACTS: Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G. Petitioners filed a complaintagainst P&G for regularization, service incentive leave pay and other benefits with damages. The complaint was later amendedto include the matter of their subsequent dismissal. Petitioners filed a complaintagainst P&G for regularization, service incentive leave pay and other benefits with damages. The complaint was later amendedto include the matter of their subsequent dismissal. The NLRC likewise dismissed the same. The CA affirmed the decision of LA and NLRC.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it did not find public respondents to have acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the judgement.

HELD: Yes. As a rule, the Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court is constrained to wade into factual matters when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record.In the present case, we find the need to review the records to ascertain the facts.

Natividad v. Mariano697 SCRA 63June 3, 2013

FACTS: Ernesto filed with the PARAD a petition6for ejectment and collection of back lease rentals against the respondent. The PARAD granted Ernestos petition and ordered the respondents to vacate the subject property and to pay the lease rentals in arrears. The respondents did not appeal the decision despite due notice.Thus, the PARADs decision became final and executory espondents, , filed Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground of excusable negligence.T he respondents claimed that their inexperience and lack of knowledge of agrarian reform laws and the DARAB Rules of Procedure prevented them from appearing before the PARAD in due course. Parad Denied their first and second petition for none of the grounds for the grant of a petition for relief exist and technical grounds. Respondents appealed to DARAB and he DARAB granted the respondents appeal and reversed the PARADs decision. Ernesto appealedthe decision to the CA via a petition for review. The CA denied Ernestos petition for review for lack of merit. Ernesto filed the present petition after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration.

Issue: whether Ernesto had sufficient cause to eject the respondents from the subject property.

HELD: The court denied the petition. A preliminary matter, the court reiterate the rule that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions of law.A question that invites a review of the factual findings of the lower tribunals or bodies is beyond the scope of this Courts power of reviewand generally justifies the dismissal of the petition.The Court, as a rule, observes this Rule 45 proscription as this Court is not a trier of facts.The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower tribunals or bodies whose findings, when duly supported by substantial evidence and affirmed by the CA, bind this Court.

Bordomeo v. CA691 SCRA 269February 20, 2013

FACTS: The petitioners submit that of the six groups of employees classified under the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution issued by Regional Director Macaraya, They further submit that the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the first group of employees, including themselves, had only been partially satisfied because no backwages or separation pay from March 16, 1995 onwards had yet been paid to them; that the reduced award granted to the second group of employees was in violation of the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution; that no writ of execution had been issued in favor of the other groups of employees; and that DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas thus committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to fully execute the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders. IPI counters that the petition forcertiorarishould be dismissed for being an improper remedy, the more appropriate remedy being a petition for review oncertiorari.ISSUE: WON the certiorari is proper.HELD: Firstly, an appeal by petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of theRules of Court, to be taken to this Court within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order raising only questions of law, was the proper remedy available to the petitioners. Hence, their filing of the petition forcertiorarion January 9, 2004 to assail the CAs May 30, 2003 decision and October 30, 2003 resolution upon their allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA was improper. The averment therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not warrant the filing of the petition forcertiorari, unless the petition further showed how an appeal in due course under Rule 45 was not an adequate remedy for them. By virtue of its being an extraordinary remedy,certioraricannot replace or substitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, like an appeal in due course.43We remind them that an appeal may also avail to review and correct any grave abuse of discretion committed by an inferior court, provided it will be adequate for that purpose.It is the adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines whether a special civil action forcertiorarican be a proper alternative remedy.

Pia v. Gervacio, Jr.697 SCRA 220June 5, 2013

Facts: Respondent Dr. Roman Dannug (Dannug), as Dean of the College of Economics, Finance and Politics (CEFP) of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), filed a complaint against Zenaida Pia (Pia) who was then a professor at PUP. He claimed that Pia was directly selling to her students a book at a price of P120 per copy, in violation of Sec. 3, Art. X of the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers and several memoranda issued by PUP officials against the sale of books, articles or any items by any faculty member directly to their students, and such books were over-priced as well. Pia argued that her students were not forced to buy such books and denied as well the other claims of Dannug.

The case was deemed submitted for resolution after preliminary conference and the parties submission of their respective memoranda. The Office of the Ombudsman declared Pia guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service with the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay, approved by herein respondent Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. Pias motion for reconsideration was denied so she filed a petition for review with the CA; even before she could have filed the petition, respondents Dannug and Carague (former PUP President), implemented the penalty of suspension imposed by the Ombudsman. Then the CA affirmed the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman. Pias motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition for review.

Issue: WON Dannug and Carague erred in implementing the Office of the Ombudsmans decision during the time that Pias period to appeal had not yet expired?

Ruling:No. The Court finds no irregularity in Dannug and Caragues implementation of the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman despite the fact that Pia then still had the remedy of an appeal before the CA.

As stated in Administrative Order No. 14-A, amending Sec. 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

Decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal as clearly held by the Court in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH. Pias complaint against Carague and Dannugs immediate implementation of the penalty of suspension imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman deserves no merit.

Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. NLRC704 SCRA 24August 28, 2013

Facts: Petitioner Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. lost to NLMS-Olalia to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees of respondent company, Stayfast Phils., Inc. in the certification election. Petitioner appealed the order of the Med-Arbiter certifying NLMS-Olalia as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of respondent company to the Secretary of Labor and Employment which eventually restored the Med-Arbiters order. Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the SC which was dismissed. Then petitioner filed its own notice of strike after NLMS- Olalia went on strike. Such was opposed by respondent company; conciliation-mediation stage in the NMCB followed which led petitioner to withdraw its notice of strike. However, petitioners members staged a sit-down strike demanding for a fair and equal treatment as respondent company allegedly continued to discriminate against them. Respondent company terminated petitioners members for not explaining their violation of its rules. Then, petitioner staged another strike and filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, union busting and illegal lockout against respondent company and its General Manager in the NLRC which the Labor Arbiter dismissed. Petitioner appealed but NLRC dismissed such as well as its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which was also dismissed; hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: WON the petitioners petition for certiorari is the correct remedy?

Ruling: No. Petitioners petition for certiorari is a wrong remedy; the correct remedy was to appeal.

The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal. Petitioner cannot mask its failure to file an appeal by petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by the mere expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. In this case, petitioner received the Decision dated July 1, 2002 on August 2, 2002 and, under the rules,had until August 19, 2002 to file an appeal by way of a petition for review in this Court. Petitioner let this period lapse without filing an appeal and, instead, filed this petition for certiorari on October 1, 2002.

Gagui v. Dejero708 SCRA 533October 23, 2013

Facts: Respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo obtained a favorable decision in their separate complaints for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay, refund of transportation expenses, and attorneys fees against PRO Agency Manila, Inc. and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes. The issued Writ of Execution and subsequent Alias Writ of Execution were returned unsatisfied. Respondents filed a Motion to Implead respondent Pro Agency Manila, Inc.s Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment Debtors, including petitioner as its Vice-President/Stockholder/Director, which was granted. Another two (2) Alias Writs of Execution were issued which resulted to the garnishment of petitioners bank deposit and levying of her two (2) parcels of land respectively. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the third Alias Writ of Execution followed by a Supplemental Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution which were both denied. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which was likewise denied; the CA affirmed NLRCs ruling. Petitioner filed two (2) Motions for Reconsideration which were both denied. Hence, this Petition for Review.

Issue: WON the Petition for Review was filed on time?

Ruling:Yes. The Petition for Review was filed on time.

The SC agree with petitioner that starting from the date she received the Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration, she had a "fresh period" of 15 days within which to appeal to the SC. The matter has already been settled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,as follows:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

Since petitioner received the CA Resolution denying her two Motions for Reconsideration only on 16 March 2011, she had another 15 days within which to file her Petition, or until 31 March 2011. This Petition, filed on 30 March 2011, fell within the prescribed 15-day period.

Quiao v. Quiao675 SCRA 642July 4, 2012

Facts: Respondent Rita Quiao (Rita) obtained a favorable judgment from the RTC in her complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido Quiao (Brigido) on October 26, 2000. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided for under the pertinent provisions of the Rule on Legal Separation. The trial court granted respondents motion for execution. The RTC issued a Writ of Execution which was partially executed on July 6, 2006. The next day, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification before the RTC asking it to define the term Net Profits Earned which it did in its Order dated August 31, 2006. Aggrieved by the Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Then, RTC issued another Order dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted: the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006. Unsatisfied with the trial courts Order, petitioner filed this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on February 27, 2007. Issue: WON the decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006?

Ruling:Yes. The decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.

InNeypes v. Court of Appeals,the SCclarified that tostandardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, it held that it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. It explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals bycertiorarito the Supreme Court.The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. In other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision or final order in question final and executory.In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October 10, 2005.The petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal.On December 16, 2005, or after67 days had lapsed, the trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution; and on February 10, 2006, or after123 days had lapsed, the trial court issued a writ of execution.Finally, when the writ had already been partially executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after270 days had lapsed, filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net profits earned.From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTCs Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially executed.Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has become final and executory.A judgment becomes final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period.Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became final.

Diaz v. People 691 SCRA 139February 18, 2013

Facts:

The RTC found accused Victorio P. Diaz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of twice violating Sec. 155, in relation to Sec. 170, of RA No. 8293 (COunterfeiting and imitation of Levi's Jeans).Diaz appealed, but the CA dismissed the appeal on July 17, 2007 on the ground that Diaz had not filed his appellants brief on time despite being granted his requested several extension periods.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred When in applied rigidly the rule on technicalitis and override substantial justice by dismissing the appeal for late filing of appellant's brief.Ruling: The usage of the word may in Section 1(e) of Rule 50 indicates that the dismissal of the appeal upon failure to file the appellants brief is not mandatory, but discretionary. Verily, the failure to serve and file the required number of copies of the appellants brief within the time provided by the Rules of Court does not have the immediate effect of causing the outright dismissal of the appeal. This means that the discretion to dismiss the appeal on that basis is lodged in the CA, by virtue of which the CA may still allow the appeal to proceed despite the late filing of the appellants brief, when the circumstances so warrant its liberality.

Escalante vs People688 SCRA 362January 9, 2013

Facts:On May 23, 2003, the RTC rendered a judgment finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of violation of election gun ban and illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. The CA affirmed the decision. Peitioner's motion for reconsideration was partly by the CA.

Issue:Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the appeal despite the fact that one of the essential elements of the violation of election gun ban is present.

Ruling:Petition dismissed.The instant certiorari action is merely being used by the petitioner to make up for his failure to promptly interpose an appeal from the CAs June 24, 2008 Decision and March 4, 2009 Resolution. "However, a special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure petitioners failure to timely file a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari will not lie as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by ones own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.

Atilano vs Asaali680 SCRA 3452013

Facts:THe RTC ordered petitioners to settle their obligations to ZACI. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court, imputing grave abuse of discretion upon the RTC for failing to consider Section 43, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court which substantially provides for the proceedings that should be conducted when a third person allegedly indebted to a judgment debtor denies the debt. However, the CA dismissed their petition outright on the following grounds: (1) failure to attach certified true copies of the assailed RTC Decision and Order; (2) only three out of four petitioners signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping; (3) the IBP Official Receipt Number of the counsel for petitioners was outdated, violating Bar Matter No. 287; and (4) deficiency in the docket and other fees in the sum of P 1,530.00.

Issue:petitioners maintain that the CA's outright dismissal of their petition on procedural grounds, despite substantial compliance, and the RTC Decision directing them to pay private respondent the amount of their alleged unpaid stock subscriptions to ZACI, are tantamount to a denial of due process of law.

Ruling:Petitioners were total strangers to the civil case between ZACI and respondent, and to order them to settle an obligation which they persistently denied would be tantamount to deprivation of their property without due process of law.Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties.

PNB v. Roque665 SCRA 572013

Facts:On January 23, 2006 or six (6) days after its receipt of the December 19, 2005 Resolution of the RTC Malaybalay City, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated May 3, 2006. PNB received the said order on June 19, 2006. PNB then filed a Notice of Appeal[14] on June 27, 2006, alleging among other matters, that the docket and other lawful fees therefore had been paid through PNB's Manager's Check, payable to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC Malaybalay City in the amount of P3,330.00. The respondents filed a motion to disallow the notice of appeal on the grounds of the late filing of the same and of the petitioner's failure to pay the appeal fees. The trial court in a Resolution dated November 7, 2006,disallowed the notice of appeal because of the petitioner's failure to pay the required docket fees within the reglementary period, resulting in the non-perfection of the appeal.

Issue:Whether or not the perfection of appeal should be liberally construed.

Ruling:The petitioner failed to advance any compelling, valid and justifiable reason for us to liberally construe the rules on the perfection of appeal.Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. The requirement of the law under Section 4, Rule 41 is clear. The payment of appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure but an essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. The requirement of the law under Section 4, Rule 41 is clear. The payment of appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure but an essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.

LIM, JR., vs. Sps. LAZARO .700 SCRA 547July 3, 2013

FACTS:Lim, Jr. filed a complaint5 for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC, seeking to recover from Sps. Lazaro the sum of P2,160,000.00, which represented the amounts stated in several dishonored checks issued by the latter to the former. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment application and upon the posting of the required P2,160,000.00 bond. In this accord, three (3) parcels of land situated in Bulacan which is registered in the names of Sps. Lazaro, were levied upon. In their Answer with Counterclaim, Sps. Lazaro averred that Lim, Jr. had no cause of action against them since Colim Merchandise and not Lim, Jr., was the payee of the fifteen (15) Metrobank check and the PNB and Real Bank checks were not drawn by them. While they admit their indebtedness to Colim, Sps. Lazaro alleged that the same had already been substantially reduced. They likewise argued that no fraud should be imputed against them as the aforesaid checks issued to Colim were merely intended as a form of collateral. Hinged on the same grounds, Sps. Lazaro equally opposed the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Subsequently parties entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis under the following terms: (a) that should the financial condition of Sps. Lazaro improve, the monthly installments shall be increased in order to hasten the full payment of the entire obligation; and (b) that Sps. Lazaros failure to pay any installment due or the dishonor of any of the postdated checks delivered in payment thereof shall make the whole obligation immediately due and demandable. Subsequently, Sps. Lazaro filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of preliminary attachment annotated on the subject TCTs. It ruled that a writ of preliminary attachment be cancelled as decision is good as final judgement. Consequently, it ordered the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the writs annotation on the subject TCTs. Lim, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which wa sdenied prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the CA. ca affirmed rtc decision.ISSUE: WON the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted.

HELD:Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper. Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had already been approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the obligations there under have yet to be fully complied with particularly, the payment of the total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaros properties should have continued to subsist since the decision is not yet final as the compromise agreement has not been complied with.

GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON699 SCRA 352June 25, 2013

FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility. Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law. The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in dismissing the injunction and TRO against the enforcement of TPOHELD:In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining. Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner. As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined. The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined

SPOUSES DEMOCRITO and OLIVIA LAGO v. JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR665 SCRA 247February 8, 2012

FACTS:Subject of this disposition is the motion for reconsideration of the Courts January 17, 2011 Decision, filed by respondent Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., finding him guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposing upon him a fine in the amount of P25,000.00. Disciplinary action was meted on him for (1) assuming jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2009-905 without the mandated raffle and notification and service of summons to the adverse party and issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO); (2) setting the case for summary hearing beyond the 72-hour required by the law in order to determine whether the TRO could be extended; and (3) issuing a writ of preliminary injunction without prior notice to the complainants and without hearing.n He expla