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recovered but, the part not paid cannot be enforced, except

when such natural obligation is one that is subject to

ratification or confirmation, the partial payment converts it

into a civil obligation (novation or natural obligation byprescription), except when the same is contrary to law,

morals or public order.Guaranty of natural obligation; when considered a civilobligation:

Generally, in principle, a natural obligation cannot beguaranteed because the liability of the guarantor

presupposes that there must be a prior exhaustion of the

property of the principal debtor, and that the debtor after

paying can recover from the principal debtor- and both ofthis cannot legally be done

when the obligation is natural.

However, because of Art. 2052 A natural obligation may be

guaranteed. What really happens is that the guaranty of the

natural obligation changes its character. When the debtor

offers a guarantor for his natural obligation, he impliedly

accepts the coercive remedies to enforce the guaranty, and

therefore, the transformation of the natural obligation into acivil obligation.

Illicit obligations:

Obligations which are contrary to morals and good customsdo not constitute natural obligations, as such any payment

can be recovered except when both are in pari delicto, or

when one was at fault (see arts. 1411 and 1412).

Art. 1424 When a right to sue upon a civil obligation haslapsed by extinctive prescription, the obligor who voluntarilyperforms the contract cannot recover what he has delivered

or the value of the service he has rendered.

Art. 1425 When without the knowledge or against the will of

the debtor, a third person pays a debt which the obligor is

not legally bound to pay because the action thereon hasprescribed, but the debtor later voluntarily reimburses the

third person, the obligor cannot recover what he has paid.

Art. 1426 When a minor between (18 and 21) years of age

who has entered into a contract without the consent of the

parent or guardian, after the annulment of the contractvoluntarily returns the whole thing or price received,

notwithstanding the fact that he has not been benefited

thereby there is no right to demand the thing or price thus

returned.

Note: When a contract is annulled the parties are bound to

make mutual restitution. However, when the ground ofannulment is the incapacity of a person to enter into

contract, such as minority, he is not bound to make

restitution except to the extent that he was benefited. If

there is no benefit he likewise not bound to make

restitution. However, he has a natural obligation to do so,and he make a restitution (voluntarily) he cannot recover

what he has delivered.

Note: The minor cannot recover what he has voluntarily

returned whether or not the other party still has it in his

possession.

Art. 1427 When a minor (between 18 and 21 years of age),

who has entered into a contract (annulable but not yet

annulled) without the consent of the parent or guardian,

voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing

(means consumable) in fulfillment of the obligation, there

shall be no right to recover the same from the obligee who

has spent or consumed it in good faith.

Generally when a contract is annulled, there will be mutual

restitution, except when the party who enters into a contract

is a minor, he is not bound to make restitution of the thing

received by him except to the extent he was benefited. If heis not obliged to make restitution, but he neverthelessreturns the same, he can no longer recover because such

is a natural obligation.

Under this article however, there is no natural obligationcontemplated but a case of a civil obligation under an

annullable contract. Compared to Art. 1426 the contractwas already annulled, but Art. 1427, the contract is not yet

annulled. Hence, the same is valid and is enforceable

unless it is set aside by competent court in an action for

that purpose. Any return made by the minor can be

recovered, except when the creditor or obligee has spent or

consumed it in good faith.

How good faith of creditor established:

Belief of the creditor that the debtor has capacity to deliver

the object of the contract.

Note: If the thing delivered is non-consumable, the debtorcannot recover if the thing delivered is no longer in the

possession of the creditor who has acted in good faith,

either because he has alienated it or it has been lost.

Art. 1428 When, after an action to enforce a civil obligationhas failed, the defendant voluntarily performs theobligation, he cannot demand the return of what he has

delivered or the payment of the value of the service he has

rendered.

Art. 1429 When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a

debt of the decedent exceeding the value of the propertywhich he received by will or by the law of intestacy from the

estate of the deceased, the payment shall be valid and

cannot be rescinded by the payer.

Art. 1430 When a will is declared void because it has not

been executed, but one of the intestate heirs, after thesettlement of the debts of the deceased, pays a legacy in

compliance with a clause in the defective will, the payment

is effective and irrevocable.

PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS

Art. 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time

fixed by law. (1961)

Note: The mere delay in the enforcement of a claim does

not result in any reduction or loss of right, unless the period

required by law for prescription has expired.

Prescription is only a defense and not a basis of right of

action. It must be defensively pleaded otherwise it isdeemed waived if not timely raised or pleaded before or

during the hearing of the case.

Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight

years from the time the possession thereof is lost, unless

the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription

for a less period, according to Articles 1132, and without

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prejudice to the provisions of Articles 559, 1505, and 1133.

(1962a)

Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes throughuninterrupted possession for four years in good faith.

The ownership of personal property also prescribes through

uninterrupted possession for eight years, without need of

any other condition.

With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal

property lost or of which he has been illegally deprived, as

well as with respect to movables acquired in a public sale,fair, or market, or from a merchant's store the provisions ofArticles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be observed.

(1955a)

Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in

good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who

has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived

thereof may recover it from the person in possession of thesame.

If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has

been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a

public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return withoutreimbursing the price paid therefor. (464a)

Art. 1595. Where, under a contract of sale, the ownership of

the goods has passed to the buyer and he wrongfully

neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to theterms of the contract of sale, the seller may maintain anaction against him for the price of the goods.

Where, under a contract of sale, the price is payable on acertain day, irrespective of delivery or of transfer of title and

the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay such price,

the seller may maintain an action for the price although theownership in the goods has not passed. But it shall be a

defense to such an action that the seller at any time before

the judgment in such action has manifested an inability toperform the contract of sale on his part or an intention not

to perform it.

Although the ownership in the goods has not passed, if they

cannot readily be resold for a reasonable price, and if the

provisions of article 1596, fourth paragraph, are not

applicable, the seller may offer to deliver the goods to the

buyer, and, if the buyer refuses to receive them, may notify

the buyer that the goods are thereafter held by the seller asbailee for the buyer. Thereafter the seller may treat the

goods as the buyer's and may maintain an action for theprice. (n)

Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never

be acquired through prescription by the offender. (1956a)

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after

thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for

the acquisition of ownership and other real rights byprescription. (1963)

Art. 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years.

(1964a)

If the action to recover the mortgage debt itself has

prescribed, the action to recover the interest must also

prescribed.

Art. 1143. The following rights, among others specifiedelsewhere in this Code, are not extinguished by

prescription:

(1) To demand a right of way, regulated in Article 649;

(2) To bring an action to abate a public or private

nuisance. (n)

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heiragainst his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly

or impliedly recognize the co- ownership, otherwise

acquisitive prescription may set in.

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within

ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment. (n)

When property is registered in anothers name, an implied

or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true

owner. The action for reconveyance of the title to therightful owner prescribes in ten years from the issuance of

the title. But if fraud has been committed, and this is thebasis of action, not implied trust, the action will be barred

after 4 years.

Art. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within

six years:

(1) Upon an oral contract;

(2) Upon a quasi-contract. (n)

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within

four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff; (2) Upon a

quasi-delict;

However, when the action arises from or out of any act,

activity, or conduct of any public officer involving theexercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law

including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, thesame must be brought within one (1) year. (As amended by

PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)

Note: A petition for quo warranto prescribes in 1 year fromthe date of ouster but when the plaintiff was separated from

his employment for unjustifiable cause it prescribes in 4

years due to an injury to the rights of the plaintiff.

An action base on fraud prescribe in 4 years from discovery

of the fraud.

Art. 1147. The following actions must be filed within one

year:

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(1) For forcible entry and detainer; (2) For defamation. (n)

Art. 1148. The limitations of action mentioned in Articles

1140 to 1142, and 1144 to 1147 are without prejudice to

those specified in other parts of this Code, in the Code ofCommerce, and in special laws. (n)

Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in

this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years

from the time the right of action accrues. (n)

Note: Limitations upon the right of the government to

assess and collect taxes will not be presumed in the

absence of clear legislation to the contrary, and where the

government has not by express statutory provision provideda limitation upon its right to assess unpaid taxes, such right

is imprescriptible.

Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions,

when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise,

shall be counted from the day they may be brought. (1969)

The moment the right or duty occurs, then the right ofaction accrues, and the action can be legally instituted;from that moment, therefore, the period of prescription of

action begins to run.

When an obligation is subject to a suspensive condition,prescription runs only from the happening of the condition.

Where the obligation is without date of maturity, or a note is

payable on demand, prescription begins to run from thedate the note or obligation and not from demand, except

when the liability for the unpaid balance of a subscription toshares of a corporation, here the liability of the subscriber

does not arise until call or demand for payment by the

board of directors, and therefore, prescription would runonly from such demand.

Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of actions whichhave for their object the enforcement of obligations to pay

principal with interest or annuity runs from the last payment

of the annuity or of the interest. (1970a)

Note: The period of prescription in obligations with interest

runs only from the last payment of interest, is applicableonly to cases where the principal debt is already due.

When principal obligation is not yet due, payment of interest

at stipulated intervals does not cause the running of period

of prescription, which will commence only after the maturityof debt.

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demandthe fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment

commences from the time the judgment became final.

(1971)

Art. 1153. The period for prescription of actions to demand

accounting runs from the day the persons who should

render the same cease in their functions.

The period for the action arising from the result of the

accounting runs from the date when said result wasrecognized by agreement of the interested parties. (1972)

Art. 1154. The period during which the obligee was

prevented by a fortuitous event from enforcing his right is

not reckoned against him. (n)

Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when

they are filed before the court, when there is a writtenextrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is

any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

Note: The extinctive prescription is interrupted when the

creditor made a demand before the lapse of the periodfixed by law. A verbal demand upon the debtor is notsufficient to interrupt or renew the prescriptive period.

What is an obligation?

Obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do, or not to do(Art. 1156).

Is it correct to say that the definition is not accurate, in

the sense that there must be another prestation which

is not to give aside from to give, to do or not to do?

The definition is accurate. The obligation not to give

includes not to do.

Is the definition defective because it only pertains tothe debtor side and it lacks the juridical relation in its

entirety?

The definition is not defective. The word obligation itself

pertains to the debtor side, hence it is proper. The

obligation pertains to the debtor and right pertains to thecreditor. A person who has a right can compel the other, but

he cannot be compelled to perform his right. An obligation

may not be waived; but a right may be exercised or not.

Rights and obligations are di fferent matters.

What is the determining factor that the definition underArt. 1156 is a civil obligation?

Because of the phrase juridical necessity

What are the essential elements of obligation?

1. Active subject

2. Passive subject3. Juridical tie (vinculum juris)

4. Prestation

Who are the subjects of an obligation?

1. Active subject (creditor)

2. Passive subject (debtor)

In a contract of lease, who is the active subject; the

passive subject?

Since it is considered a reciprocal obligation (bilateral

contract), both the lessee and the lessor may beconsidered the passive or active subjects, depending on

the aspects of delivery of the property or payment of rent.

In the delivery of the property to the lessor is the passive

subject and the lessee is the active subject. The former is

obliged to deliver the property subject of the lease to the

lessee.

In the case of payment, the lessee is the passive subject,

and the lessor is the active subject. The lessee is obliged topay the amount of rent to the lessor.

In a contract of sale, who is the active and the passivesubject?

In a contract of sale, since it is a reciprocal obligation

(bilateral contract) both the seller and the buyer may be

considered the passive and the active subject depending

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on whether it is for payment of the amount of the thing sold,

and on the obligation to deliver the thing subject of the sale.

What is the reason why a debtor considered a passivesubject?

He is considered a passive subject because in the absence

of demand from the creditor the debtor could just wait, and

let the prescription run in favor of the debtor. If the creditor

does not demand for the performance of the obligation,there will be no compulsion.

There must be proof of demand in writing.

Is there an instance in case of consignation a right may

be exercised?

None. Consignation is a legal obligation. An obligation anda right are two di fferent concepts.

Should an obligation and a right co-exist?

Yes. If someone has an obligation somebody is going to

have a right.

Is there an instance where a right and an obligation

pertain to the same person?

Yes there are is an instance where an obligation and a right

pertain to the same person, such that the person acquiredsuch right as in the case of confusion.

What is the object (prestation) of an obligation?

The object of an obligation is nothing but a particularconduct of the debtor. The thing is not the object of the

obligation; it is his conduct necessary to produce the effectsof the obligation whether it is an obligation to give, to do or

not to do.

It may involve a thing in an obligation to give.

What are the requisites of prestation or object?

1. It must be possible, physically and juridically

2. It must be determinate, or at least determinable

according to pre-established elements or criteria; and3. It must have a possible equivalent in money.

Note: The prestation need not actually be of pecuniaryvalue. The criterion to determine whether an obligation has

a pecuniary value is not limited to the object or prestation

thereof, but extends to the sanction which corresponds to

the juridical duty.

Therefore, the creditors interest need not be economic or

patrimonial; it may be sentimental, moral or ideal. But theobject of prestation must have an economic value or in

case of nonfulfillment, be susceptible of substitution in

money or something of patrimonial value.

What is a juridical tie or vinculum juris?

It is the efficient cause, juridical tie, or legal tie which binds

the parties established either by (any source of an

obligation):

a. law

b. bilateral actsc. unilateral acts (crimes or quasi-delicts)

What obligation has no juridical tie?

Moral obligations has no juridical tie because it is an act of

pure liberality which springs from blood, affection or

benevolence. It is within the domain of morals.

What are the sources of obligations which binds theparties?

1. Law

2. Contracts

3. Quasi-Contracts

4. Delicts5. Quasi Delicts (Art. 1157)

Unilateral Promises; a source of obligation

Generally a unilateral promise before acceptance is not

binding, except by a unilateral declaration of the will withintent to be bound to a particular person.

Is the enumeration exclusive?

Yes. The enumeration is exclusive as provided in the case

of Sagrada Orden vs. Nacoco where the SC rationalized

that (not in the express manner)

Give an instance where 2 or more sources of obligation

exist at the same time?In the case Saludaga v. FEU, April 30, 2008 the court

ruled that the school shall be held liable for damages for

breach of contract in the school s obligation to provide

students with a safe and secure learning atmosphere.

FEU breached the school-student contract for negligenceon its obligation to ensure and take adequate steps to

maintain peace and order within the campus. It found that

FEU had failed to undertake measures to ascertain and

confirm that the security guards assigned in the campuspossess the qualifications required in the Security Service

Agreement between FEU and Galaxy (Security agency).

The Court also ordered Galaxy and its president, Mariano

D. Imperial, to jointly and severally pay FEU damagesequivalent to the amount awarded to Saludaga for acts of

negligence that resulted to FEUs breach of obligation to

its student. Galaxy w a s f o u n d n e g l i g e n t i n t h e s e l ec t i o n a n d supervision of its employees, as supported by

the lack of administrative sanction against Alejandro

Rosete, the security guard who shot Saludaga. Rosete,who was instead allowed to go on leave after the shooting

incident, eventually disappeared.

Hence, contract and quasi delict was applied at the same

incident to hold the above named parties liable.

CU: The security guard shot a movie goer because the

latter tried to hack the former with a bolo. Because of thisincident the heirs of the deceased filed a criminal case

against the security guard. The case was dismissed, as aresult of which the guard incurred expenses for the

payment of his attorney and demands reimbursement from

his employer. In this case, the employer is not liable to

reimburse his employee to reimburse the expenses

incurred by the employee in defending himself primarilybecause there is no law requiring such employer to

reimburse.

The fact that the direct and proximate cause of the

expenses incurred in defending himself was derived from

the performance of his function does not make theemployer liable because there is an efficient intervening

cause which is the filing of the cases based on malicious

prosecution.

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1. Law

Art. 1158 Obligations derived from law are not presumed.

Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special

laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by theprecepts of law which establishes them; and as to what has

not been foreseen, by the provisions of this book.

E.g. The giving of legal assistance to the employee is not a

legal obligation. While it might and possibly be regarded asa moral obligation, it does not at present count with thelegal sanction of any man made law. If the employer is not

legally obliged to give legal assistance to its employee to

provide him with a lawyer, said employee cannot recover

from the employer the amount he paid a lawyer hired byhim.

In obligations arising from law, who has the burden of

proving the same?

Generally, the person who alleges a fact has the burden of

proving the same. However, there are certain facts which

need not be proven. There is no need to allege such facts

because the law presumes the existence of a right and

presumes the existence of a fact.

Who has the burden of proof in obligations arising from

contracts?

The obligee has the burden of proof because in Art. 1158,

as expressly provided, obligations arising from law are notpresumed. This is one instance where there is no

presumption not to allege facts.

The princess of stars:

One of the deceased caused by the sinking of the shipwere buried by a third person and asking later on for

reimbursement from the decedents aunt on the expensesfor the burial.

Here there is an obligation arising from such act base onquasi contract under Art. 2164 (other quasi contracts) and

under such provision only persons obliged to give support

can be compelled to reimburse. In this case, since the auntis not one of those persons obliged to give support cannot

be compelled to reimburse the expenses for burial.

2. Contracts

Art. 1159 Obligations arising from contracts have the force

of law between the contracting parties and should becomplied with in good faith.

Note: This provision presupposes that the contract is valid

and enforceable. The same should not be contrary to law,

morals, good customs, public policy or public order.

E.g. A contract stipulating that non-payment of the loanconsiders the house and lot sold. This is a case of contract

of loan and a promise of sale of a house and lot. Such

contracts are perfectly legal, the agreement is the law

between them, and must be enforced.

E.g. The validity of restraints upon trade or employment is

to be determined by the intrinsic reasonableness of the

restriction in each case, rather than by any fixed rule, andsuch restriction may be upheld when not contrary to public

welfare and not greater than is necessary to afford a fair

and reasonable protection to the party in whose favor it isimposed. The contract in question is not obnoxious to the

rule of reasonableness. While such restraint, if imposed as

a condition of the employment of a day laborer, would at

once be rejected as merely arbitrary and wholly

unnecessary to the protection of the employer, it does not

seem so with respect to an employee whose duties are

such of necessity to give him an insight into the general

scope and details of his employers business. The contractin this case, considering the circumstances, is notunreasonable. It must therefore be enforced. The rule in

this jurisdiction have the force of law between the

contracting parties.

Pre-Contractual Obligations; when binding; gives rise toliability

If the offer by one party is clear and definite, leading the

offeree in good faith to incur expenses in the expectation ofentering into the contract; and the withdrawal of the offer is

without any legitimate cause.

3. Quasi Contracts

Kinds of Quasi Contracts

1. Solution Indebiti

2. Negotorium Gestio

3. Other Quasi Contracts

1. Negotiorum gestio (officious management) Art

2144 Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the

agency or management of the business or property

of another, without any power from the latter, isobliged to continue the same until the termination

of the affair and its incidents, or to require the

person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is

in a position to do so. This juridical relation DOESNOT arise in either of these instances:

1) When the property or business is not

neglected or abandoned

2) If in fact the manager has been tacitlyauthorized by the owner

2. Solutio indebiti (payment not due) Art 2154 If

something is received when there is no right to

demand it, and it was unduly delivered throughmistake, the obligation to return it arises.

3. Other quasi-contracts(support given by strangers

and other Good Samaritans)

4. Acts or omissions punished by law (Delicts)

Under Art. 100 of the RPC provides that every

person criminally liable is also civilly liable.

This however is not absolutely true because there

are certain felonies where no civil liability will ariseeven if convicted of a crime. This is because there

is no private offended party in some crimes.

Basis of Quasi Contracts:

Art. 2142 Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts giverise to the juridical relation of quasi contract to the end that

no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.

The enumeration of the provisions for quasi contracts,

not exclusive:

Art. 2143 The provisions for quasi contracts in this Chapterdo not exclude other quasi contracts which may come

within the purview of the preceding article.

Note: Even if not so provided by law it may be considered

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as falling within the purview of quasi contract when it is

lawful, unilateral and voluntary, and the underlying principle

is that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of

another.

Will there be any liability even if no one has been

unjustly enriched?

In case of negotorium gestio, the owner has the obligation

to reimburse the gestor even if the latter has not beenunjustly enriched.

Therefore it would appear that the principles behind quasi

contracts does not really fall under the principle of unjust

enrichment. The principle behind this obligation is impliedcontracts, which is the consent given by the obligor.

The owner left his house for a short vacation, the very

night they lefts, their house was burned, the neighbors

saved some of their appliances. Is there negotorium

gestio in this case?

The appliances are not under the management of the

gestor and that there must be abandonment and neglect of

the property.

This case therefore falls under other quasi contracts.

Under Art. 104 of the RPC in addition to civil liability,

restitution, reparation of damage caused, indemnification ofconsequential damages.

Note: It is not correct to say that every time a person is

held criminally liable under this source of obligation allthese kinds of liability (restitution, reparation of damage

caused, and indemnification of consequential damages)would arise.

Note: In justifying and exempting circumstances though a

person is not held criminally liable does not necessarily

mean that he is not civilly liable.

In justifying circumstances, generally there would be no civil

liability, except in paragraph 4 where it provides that Anyperson who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act

which causes damage to another, provided that the

following requisites are present: First. That the evil soughtto be avoided actually exists; Second. That the injury feared

be greater than that done to avoid it;

Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful

means of preventing it.

In exempting circumstances, generally there is civil liability

except paragraph 4 where it provides that: Any person who,while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an

injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing

it.

Note: If there is no criminal conviction, this source ofobligation will not arise but may arise from other source of

obligation or quasi delict.

4. Culpa Aquiliana (Quasi Delict)

Is culpa extra contractual an appropriate name for

quasi delict? No.In the case of Gangco vs. MRR (38 Phil 768) obligations

can be classified either from contractual obligations and

extra contractual obligations. As to obligations where the

source is not a contract, it

can called extra contractual obligations.

Therefore culpa extra contractual means negligence

outside of a contract.

If there is negligence outside of a contract does it mean

that it would fall under quasi delict? Not necessarily

because there are 4 other sources of obligations outside of

a contract like negligence arising from law, but the sourcewould be the law.

In quasi contracts, under negotorium gestio, the negligence

of the gestor does not necessarily mean that it would fall

under quasi delict because it would fall under quasicontracts.

Note: The use of the word culpa extra-contractual

nowadays are no longer used by the Supreme Court.

Commonly what is used is the word torts.

Is torts an appropriate term for quasi delict?

Torts as a name is not appropriate because it is more

encompassing as it would include acts which could not bethe basis of an action under quasi delict.

Torts would include malicious act, intentional act, wrongful,

acts punished by law. In these names, it cannot be the

basis of an action for quasi delict. An action for quasi delictcan only arise based on a negligent act or omission.

But the Supreme Court is of the view that malicious acts,

intentional acts, acts punished by law can be the basis ofan action for quasi delict. It is well supported by the history

of the law and the present provisions of the law.

Particularly Under Art. 2176 where it provides that whoever

by act or omission causes damage to another, there beingfault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.

Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing

contractual relation between the parties, is called quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter

(chapter on quasi-delicts).

Under the old civil code, in order for one to be held liable

under quasi delict, the act must not be punished by law.

This phrase no longer appear under the new civil code,therefore even if the act is not punished by law it cannot be

the basis of an action for quasi delict.

Is Fault the same as negligence?

No. Because fault would cover intentional and unintentionalacts.

Compliance with Obligations:

How should these sources of obligations be complied

with? The manner of complying with this sources of

obligations.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and

in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give

everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also

obliged to take care of it with the proper diligence of agood father of a family, unless the law or the stipulation

of the parties requires another standard of care. (1094a)

Art. 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of the thing

from the time the obligation to deliver it arises. However,

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he shall acquire no real right over it until the same has

been delivered to him. (1095)

Art. 1165. When what is to be delivered is a determinatething, the creditor, in addition to the right granted him by

Article 1170, may compel the debtor to make the delivery.

If the thing is indeterminate or generic, he may ask that the

obligation be complied with at the expense of the debtor.

If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same

thing to two or more persons who do not have the same

interest, he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event

until he has effected the delivery. (1096)

Art. 1166. The obligation to give a determinate thingincludes that of delivering all its accessions and

accessories, even though they may not have been

mentioned. (1097a)

Art. 1244. The debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor

to receive a different one, although the latter may be of the

same value as, or more valuable than that which isdue.

In obligations to do or not to do, an act or forbearance

cannot be substituted by another act or forbearance against

the obligee's will. (1166a)

Art. 1246. When the obligation consists in the delivery of an

indeterminate or generic thing, whose quality and

circumstances have not been stated, the creditor cannot

demand a thing of superior quality. Neither can thedebtor deliver a thing of inferior quality. The purpose ofthe obligation and other circumstances shall be taken

into consideration. (1167a)

Art. 1460. A thing is determinate when it is particularly

designated or physical segregated from all other of the

same class.

The requisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the

time the contract is entered into, the thing is capable ofbeing made determinate without the necessity of a new

or further agreement between the parties. (n)

Art. 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the

soil, and the young and other products of animals.

Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind

through cultivation or labor.

Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of

lands and other property and the amount of perpetual or lifeannuities or other similar income. (355a)

Art. 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to

pay the expenses made by a third person in theirproduction, gathering, and preservation. (356)

If the sources of the obligations is the law, then theprovisions of the law would provide how this source of

obligation can be complied with.

If it is a contract then the stipulation provide how the

contract shall be complied with.

If it is an obligation to give, what is the manner of

compliance?

It depends on what is to be given, whether it is a

determinate thing or an indeterminate thing.

Can there be a valid obligation to deliver a generic

thing?

Yes. This may arise from law and not from a contract of

sale. Sale of a car or of a horse cannot be considered a

valid sale. But a testamentary provision in a will which is ageneric thing is valid disposition. The law expressly allowsthis.

A testamentary provision giving an heir a car, is the

testamentary provision allow the heir to reject the

disposition?

He may validly reject or wrongfully reject the disposition.For obligations to deliver a generic thing, the debtor cannot

deliver a thing which is of inferior kind, but neither can the

creditor demand a thing which is of superior quality.

However, what is superior or inferior is a very subjective

determination. What may be superior to me may be inferior

to most of you.

Therefore if the purpose of the testator is to give his car is

to allow the grandson to use the car in competitions, then a

car insufficient to perform in race tracks is improper.

Moreover, aside from the purpose is the value of the estatewhich should not impair the legitime of the estate.

In obligations to give a determinate thing, what is the

manner of compliance?

The primary obligation of a debtor is to give the very same

thing which he promised to deliver.

In an obligation to deliver a Kia Pride, the debtor

offered to deliver a BMW, can the obligation be validlyextinguished?

Yes, though the creditor cannot be compelled to accept, he

may however want to accept. Thus, the obligation will beextinguished.

Is there an exception where a debtor is obliged to

deliver a thing requires a different kind of diligence in

taking care of the thing other than a good father of a

family?

Yes, if the law requires a higher degree of diligence such as

what is required of common carriers. Other than the law, isthe stipulation of the parties would require a higher degree

of diligence. In the absence of a law or a stipulation to that

effect, the diligence of a god father of a family should be

observed.

Kinds of Obligations:

When would an obligation become due?

It depends on what kind of obligation is involved. It is wrong

to say that an obligation becomes due upon demand. Since

there can be no valid demand when the obligation is not yetdue. Therefor demand has got nothing to with an obligation

becoming due.

What kind of obligations become due and demandable

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at once?

1. In pure obligations

2. In conditional obligations if the condition is

resolutory but will be extinguished at thehappening of the event.

3. In obligation with a term or period if resolutory in

character but it will be extinguished at the

happening of the term.

Is there such a thing as suspensive obligation? None. It

only exists in suspensive term or condition.

Is there such a thing as void condition?

There is no such thing as void condition. A condition ismerely an event which may or may not happen. There is

nothing valid or void about conditions.

Void and Valid pertain to obligations. Suspensive,

potestative, etc pertains to conditions.

A pure obligation whose performance does not depend

upon a future and uncertain event or upon a past event

unknown to the parties. Is this statement valid?This is not valid. To be pure it must not be conditional andnot with a term. In the above statement both the future and

uncertain must both concur and this would only exclude a

condition. A term can never be uncertain. It is just a space

of time. An event is certain to happen. Therefore it shouldbe or. If and is used, it would only exclude a condition with

a condition and not those with a term. If or is used it would

exclude obligations with a conditions and also those with a

term.

If in a promissory note, on its face it does not say or itcannot be determined whether it is conditional or pure

obligation. But there is a provision in the note that upon

receipt from the estate there is no assurance that thecreditor will receive in the estate, which presupposes a

conditional obligation. Note however, the court treated it as

a pure obligation because...... (Pay vs. Palanca)

What is the consequence of a pure obligation or a

conditional obligation but resolutory in character?

It is demandable at once, and necessarily the prescriptive

period starts to run from the time the cause of action

accrues. It is wrong to say that a cause of action accruesfrom the time the demand was made. If such be the case

no action shall prescribe.

What are the kinds of conditions?

1. Suspensive

2. Resolutory3. Potestative -

4. Casual

5. Mixed

6. Possible

7. Impossible8. Negative - requires the omission of an act.

9. Positive - requires the performance of an act.

What is the effect of an impossible condition?

If the obligation is with an impossible condition, it shall

annul the obligation. The phraseology is defective, insteadof annulled it should have been void. Annullable

presupposes a valid obligation which is valid until annulled.

This instance is an impossible condition with a suspensive

condition.

May there be a valid obligation with an impossible

condition?

Yes. If the condition though impossible is in the negative,like i will give you 1 million if you dont kill my wife. Negativeimpossible conditions are deemed not written, as such it is

considered as a pure obligation unless there are other

words and phrases which would not make it a pure

obligation.

What are the kinds of impossible conditions?

Legal impossibility and physical impossibility.

Is it proper to say unlawful conditions?

Yes. What is improper is void conditions.

In unlawful or impossible conditions in testamentary

dispositions, what is the effect?

It does not result in a void testamentary disposition. Under

the law in succession, such unlawful or impossible

condition is deemed not written.

The debtor promises to pay if his son does not die ofcancer within 1 year. State the status of the obligation

whether it is valid or not, and if valid state whether the

obligation is due and demandable?

The condition is suspensive negative possible (mixed)

condition. This is a valid obligation. It is due anddemandable depending on what happened to the son.

If the son dies of cancer within 1 year, the obligation does

not arise. But even if the son did not die of cancer within 1year the debtor can be compelled to pay, because in that

moment it is already certain that the son will not die ofcancer within 1 year such as when the son died of a car

accident.

In a condition that B should marry C within 1 year but

after 2 weeks he entered the seminary? Is it certain that

the condition is not longer possible?

No. B may go out of the seminary before the 1 year period

lapsed.

However, if C married D is it possible that the conditionmentioned above is no longer possible?

No. because D may die and B can marry C within the timementioned in the condition.

What is a potestative conditon?

Under 1182, it is a condition that is dependent upon the

sole will of the debtor.

When the condition depends upon the sole will of the

debtor and it is a suspensive condition? Will such bevalid?

It is void. This is because a debtor who can impose a

condition upon his sole will, he will make sure that thesuspensive condition will not happen so that the obligation

will not arise.

A promise to give B his car if A will go to Baguio within

5 days? Is it potestative?

Yes, such is potestative that is dependent upon the sole willof the debtor. It is because whether or not A will go to

Baguio solely depend upon his will.

Is passing the Bar exam a potestative condition?

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Casual or dependent upon chance?

It is neither a potestative nor a casual condition.

The grandfather promises to give his grandson a carupon the latters passing the bar exam. The grandson

passed the bar and demanded the delivery of the car.

But the grandfather refused to deliver the car andargued that he cannot be compelled to deliver the same

because it is a potestative condition.It is not a potestative condition but rather a suspensivecondition. Therefore the grandfather can be compelled to

deliver.

Assuming for the sake of argument that such condition

is a potestative condition, can the grandfather becompelled to deliver because the condition is void?

The grandfather still cannot be compelled because under

1182, it provides that a condition is made by the sole will of

the debtor. In this case it is not the grandson who is the

debtor but rather the grandfather. It is not dependent upon

the sole will of the grandfather. Hence not a potesative

condition. Therefore the obligation is a valid one.

A obliged herself in 2001 to sell to B a house and lot

upon his passing the bar exam. B passed the bar exam

in 2005. However in 2003 A sold the house and lot to Cand this house from 2001 was being rented by D. B

upon passing the bar exam demanded upon A todeliver to him the house and lot pursuant to the 2001

obligation made by A. Who has a better right over this

house and lot? B or C?

As a rule, it is B who has a better right because under Art.1187 the effect of the happening of the condition retroacts

to the time of the constitution of the obligation as if thecondition already happened as early as 2001.

However, as an exception, C may have a better right if Ccan prove that he is a buyer in good faith and for value, he

would have a better right. But it must be noted that in order

to be a purchaser in good faith and for value, such shouldbe registered. As such, C would not be bound by the

agreement made by A and B.

Assuming that B has a better right, B demanded all theproceeds of the rentals from 2001 until 2005, is he

entitled to the rentals?

Since, under Art. 1187 the effect of the happening of the

condition retroacts to the constitution of the obligation,

would presuppose that B may be entitled to the proceeds of

the rents as if he was the owner of the property from 2001.

However, it is submitted that B is not entitled to the rentals

because fruits received in reciprocal obligation (since this isa contract of sale) it is deemed mutually compensated. B is

obliged to pay the price and Ahas the obligation to transfer

ownership. Under the law it is deemed mutually

compensated because, A is entitled to interests on the price

while B is entitled to the rentals, under the law fruitsreceived are deemed mutually compensated.

Is the view that the retroactive effect of Art. 1187 does

not cover fruits?

No. That is why there is a provision that in reciprocal

obligations, the fruits received are deemed mutuallycompensated. There is therefore a retroactive effect. In the

above case, B is entitled to the fruits but due to the

provision on mutual compensation, he shall no longer

receive the fruits.

In conditional obligations, if the condition is

suspensive in character, the happening of the

condition shall give rise to the obligation. Ordinarily ifthe condition did not happen, the obligation will not

arise. When shall the obligation even if the condition

did not happen, it shall give rise to the obligation?

When it was the debtor who voluntarily prevented thehappening of the condition.

However, is there an instance where the debtor who

voluntarily prevented the happening of the condition in

order to give rise to the obligation, still not be

compelled to perform?

Yes, when though he prevented the happening of thecondition, such prevention was made when he was

exercising his right.

In obligation is an obligation with a suspensive term ,

the obligation arise because the term is certain to

arrive, it will only give rise to the demandability of the

obligation.

In suspensive condition, the creditor filed an action,

will the action prosper?

It may prosper for as long as it is not an action for specific

performance because the condition being suspensive,there is yet no obligation that arise. But, the creditor may

file an action for the preservation of his rights, like if the

action is to compel the other party to have the agreement

registered with the appropriate registry of property.

In suspensive conditions imposed on an obligation,what is the effect of any improvement or deterioration

on the thing to be delivered?

In improvements, if the cause of the improvement isthrough nature, such improvements shall pertain to the

creditor.

If in improving the property the debtor spent a sum of

money, the creditor is entitled to the improvements. Under

the law the creditor in this case only has the rights of ausufructuary. The debtors rights is limited to the removal of

the improvement as long as it will not cause damage to the

thing to be delivered.

In obligations with a term or period, may be definite if

there is a day certain. Indefinite periods will arrive, but

dependent on certain events which is certain to happen

but the specific date is not certain.

Another classifications of periods is the source of the

period on whether it is by conventional or voluntary

period (by agreement of the parties), fixed by law, orfixed by the court.

Is a 1 year period of redemption, a period in relation to

obligations?

No. It is a period in the exercise of a right, because who

has a right is not compelled to redeem.

Give examples of period fixed by law?

1. Non payment of taxes

2. In a lease contract, even when the parties did not

fix a period but it provides that the payment of

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rents be paid annually, it is presumed that the

period of rent is for 1 year.

Under Art. 1197 it was provided that if the obligationdoes not fix a period, but from its nature and the

circumstances it can be inferred that a period was

intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof. Whatis the guidelines wherein the court in this instance may

fix the period?The court having power to fix the period presupposes thatthere is a perfected contract. If there is no perfected

contract, the court has no power to fix the period.

What is the procedure for the court to fix a period?

To determine whether there is a period or no period stated

in the contract. If there is, the fixing of the period is notproper under Art. 1197.

Secondly, to determine whether the parties intended that

there be a period, if none, such as when the parties

intended that it be a pure obligation, then the fixing of a

period is not proper under Art. 1197.

Thirdly, even if there is a period intended by the parties, thecourt must also determine whether such period had already

prescribed or not. Such that an action for specific

performance on an obligation which does not yet arise, the

action cannot prosper because the action is premature. Orif a period had already lapsed and the obligation involves

an obligation to do, an action for specific performance can

no longer prosper, but the action for damages shall prosper.

In a contract between the parties it was provided, that

debtor must remit the proceeds upon the sale of thetobacco. Is a period contemplated by the parties?

The argument by the debtor that the estafa case is

premature because the remedy of the creditor if to go tocourt for the latter to fix the period is not proper because

the agreement by the parties is one with a period.

The argument by the debtor that there was no period fixed

by the parties, which would render the provisions of Art.

1197 not to apply, will not prosper. The provisions of theagreement clearly provides for a period which is upon the

sale of the tobacco. Therefore, upon the sale the debtor

can be compelled to remit. There is no need for the court tofix the period (Lim vs. People).

Under Art. 1180 which provides that when the debtor

binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do

so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a

period subject to the provisions of Art. 1197, and assuch the court shall fix the period. In this case, when

will the obligation become due, so that an action for the

court to fix the period may prosper?

The creditor should only go to the court if he knew that the

debtor already has the means to pay. If the debtor already

has the means to pay, go to court to fix the period and uponthe lapse of the period, the obligation become due and

demandable.

When the period is solely dependent upon the will of

the debtor, such is also a judicial period.Under Art. 1191 The power to rescind obligations is implied

in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not

comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and

the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of

damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even

after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become

impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless therebe just cause authorizing the fixing the period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights ofthird persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance,with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

Can the debtor be compelled to perform the obligation

before the arrival of the period, or can the creditor be

compelled to accept the obligation even before thearrival of the period?

In the second scenario the creditor cannot be compelled to

accept the obligation even before the arrival of the period

because the creditor may not want to accept because he

had not place to store the goods which is the subject of the

obligation.

Is a period for the benefit of both the creditor and thedebtor?

No. It is merely a disputable presumption that the period is

both for the benefit of the creditor and the debtor.

If the phrase provided for in the obligation is payableon or before December 31, and no other factor has

been provided for, is it both for the benefit of the

creditor and the debtor?

No such phrase is clearly for the benefit of the debtor. Thisis because the debtor cannot be compelled to perform the

obligation before the arrival of the period.

On the other hand, however, the debtor can compel the

creditor to accept the performance of the obligation evenbefore the expiration of the period.

Is there contracts solely for the benefit solely of thecreditor?

Yes, when there are stipulations that the debtor cannot pay

within 3 months or 2 years. This could be said to be for thebenefit of the creditor because of a scenario where the

creditor has the right to the fruits of the thing subject of the

obligation. This is probably because the creditor wouldwant to harvest first before the returns the thing.

However, the creditor may return it at any time because the

provision is solely for the benefit of the creditor.

A borrowed money from B in January payable at theend of the year. To secure the fulfillment of the

obligation A delivered his car to B and it was stipulated

that B can use the car. After a few months, comeAugust of the same year, the debtor offered to pay the

entire amount to the creditor and also demanded for

the return of his car. Can the creditor be compelled toaccept the payment? Can he be compelled to return the

car?

While the debtor cannot be compelled to pay before thearrival of the period, the creditor cannot also be compelled

to accept the performance of the obligation because of the

principle that a period is both for the benefit of both thedebtor and the creditor.

Base on the facts the above principle finds application in

the present case because the debtor cannot be compelled

pay before the arrival of the period which is the end of the

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year. However, the creditor has an interest in the period

because it was stipulated that he can use the car before the

arrival of the period. Therefore under the facts, the period is

both for the benefit of the debtor and the creditor.

Even assuming that the period is solely for the benefit

of the debtor, before the arrival of the term, is itpossible that the creditor validly demand for the

performance of the obligation?Yes. That can happen if the debtor lost his right to makeuse of the period. Under Art. 1198, a debtor may lose his

right to make use of the period.

Art. 1198. The debtor shall lose every right to make use

of the period:

(1) When after the obligation has been contracted, hebecomes insolvent, unless he gives a guaranty

or security for the debt;

(2) When he does not furnish to the creditor the

guaranties or securities which he has promised;

(3) When by his own acts he has impaired saidguaranties or securities after their establishment,

and when through a fortuitous event theydisappear, unless he immediately gives new ones

equally satisfactory;

(4) When the debtor violates any undertaking, in

consideration of which the creditor agreed to the

period;

(5) When the debtor attempts to abscond.

A borrowed a sum of money from B. To secure the

fulfillment of his obligation he mortgaged his house

and lot. Before the arrival of the period (before theobligation became due), the house was burned due

to a fortuitous event. The day after the creditor

demanded the payment of the debt. Was there a validdemand? Yes.

Can the debtor be compelled to pay?

He lost his right to make use of the period even if the lost

was due to a fortuitous event, unless of course he gives

another security for the debt.

Why would the debtor lost his right to make use of the

period when the lost was due to a fortuitous event and

the same is not imputable to the fault of the debtor?

This is because the creditor would not have left him moneyif not for the security.

In number of Art. 1198, how can the debtor give

another security if the debtor is already insolvent?

If the debtor still has other properties even if he is still

insolvent. Or he may not have any properties, but he can

provide for a guarantor or a secure a mortgage to securethe fulfillment of the obligation.

Kinds of obligations as to multiple prestations: In

multiple prestations where one of the

prestation is impossible to perform even if the other

prestation still are possible to perform, may theobligation be considered to have been extinguished?

It depends on the kind of obligation involved. It may be a

conjunctive obligation, alternative obligation, facultativeobligation.

In conjunctive obligations, the impossibility of

performance of one will not result in the extinguishment

of the obligation because there is another or two or more

other obligations to be performed.

In facultative obligations, it depends on whether there is

already substitution at the time of the impossibility of the

performance of one of the prestation. If before substitution

the impossibility of one of the obligation becomesimpossible to perform due to a fortuitous event, theobligation is extinguished. But if one of the obligation

become impossible to perform due to the fault of the debtor,

the obligation is not extinguished (debatable on the second

scenario).

If in facultative obligation what was lost or becameimpossible to perform was the substitute prestation and

there was no substitution yet at the time of the loss, the

obligation is not extinguished because the due prestation

was the principal prestation.

Conjunctive- and; alternative-or; facultative-debtor has the

right to make a substitution or to perform instead asubstitute prestation.

In alternative obligations, if there was already a

communication of a choice. By then the obligation is

converted into a simple obligation and the one chosen wasthe one impossible to perform especially if it is due to a

fortuitous event. As such, the obligation is extinguished. If

there was already a communication of a choice but what

become impossible was the other prestation which was notchosen, the obligation is not extinguished.

Bs car was lost due to the fault of the debtor, what are

the remedies of the creditor?

It depends on who has the right to choose. If it shows thatthe choice is not expressly granted to the creditor, the

right of choice pertains to the debtor. Under the law it was

provided that the choice is with the debtor, unlessotherwise expressly granted to the creditor.

If the choice is with the debtor, even if it was due to hisfault, he has other prestations to choose from without

being held liable for damages. Anyway, there is yet no

due prestation because the debtor has not yet able to makea choice.

If however in alternative obligations, the first two

prestations become impossible to perform due to the

fault of the debtor, and the remaining prestation

becomes impossible to perform due to a fortuitousevent. Can the debtor be held liable for damages?

The debtor can be held liable if this is the choice of the

creditor. However, if the choice is with the debtor, he

cannot be held liable for damages even if the loss of the

last remaining prestation was due to a fortuitous event.

This is because the debtor diminished the possibility of theperformance of the obligation and secondly he was at fault

therefore he can be held liable for damages under Art.

1170. However, the provisions in Art. 1170 presupposes asimple obligation, and thus not applicable in the present

case to make the debtor liable. Secondly, even if the

obligation has diminished the performance of theobligation imputable to the debtor, he cannot be held liable

because it can be considered as his choosing to make the

first two prestations impossible to perform, and the last

prestation be considered as his choice. The last though

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lost due to fortuitous event, cannot make the debtor

liable.

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of theirobligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and

those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, areliable for damages. (1101)

The horse died due to the fault of the debtor, thistime the creditor has the right to choose. What are therights of the creditor?

He can choose from one of the remaining prestations or

choose the prestatation which was lost due to the fault of

the debtor.

If the creditor choose to demand for the value of theobligation which was lost due to the fault of the debtor, the

debtor can be held liable for damages.

If the creditor chose to compel performance through the

remaining prestations, the debtor cannot be held liable for

damages.

The horse was lost due to the fault of the debtor,

then after the second prestation was also lost due to

the fault of the debtor, and thirdly a book was lost dueto the fault of the debtor. What is the extent of the

liability of the debtor under the foregoingcircumstances? Can the creditor choose for the value

for any of the three prestations?

It depends on who has the right to choose. If the creditor

has the right of choice, he can choose on the value of anyof the three prestations.

But if the choice is with the debtor, the liability will be

based on the value of the prestation which was lost last due

to his fault.

Qualification in Alternative Obligation: If one of the

prestations become impossible to perform due to thefault of the debtor, and the choice is with the creditor:

The creditor can either demand for the value of the

prestation with damages or he can demand for theperformance of one of the remaining prestations

without damages.

Second view: If the creditor can demand for the p e r f o r

m a n c e o f o n e o f t h e r e m a i n i n g prestations,

the creditor may opt to demand for the value of the

thing which was lost due to the fault of the debtor. In

this instance under alternative obligations, it ispossible that the debtor is not the owner of the horse.

In alternative obligations the debtor is not sure whether

he can deliver the horse or not. if the horse wasowned by the creditor, as such he can seek

damages. If the thing lost was owned by the debtor

as a valid premise, the debtor cannot be held liablefor damages. In alternative obligations it must be

remembered that the prestation may either be owned

by the debtor or not.

Facultative obligations

In facultative obligations it is improper to say that there is

only one prestation. For how could it be considered to fall

in obligations with multiple prestations if there is only one

prestation involved. Rather it is better to say that there

is only one prestation due in a facultative obligation. At

any given point in time there can only be one prestation

due unlike the other prestations.

W h e n w i l l t h e o b l i g a t i o n i n f a c u l t a t i v eobligation become due?

If there is already a communication of the substitution.

If the principal prestation before substitution became

impossible to perform due to the fault of the debtor ,

can the creditor demand to perform the substitute

prestation?

No. This is because in facultative obligation, the choice is

always with the debtor.

The remedy of the creditor is to demand for damages.

If before substitution became impossible to perform

due to the fault of the debtor, can the debtor be held

liable for damages by the creditor?

The debtor cannot be held liable for damages because thatwas not the due prestation. The debtor will bear thelost, but he cannot be held liable for damages.

When can the debtor make the substitution?

The debtor can make the substitution at any time.

Can the debtor make the substitution if the

debtor is already in delay?No. Why should the law allow the debtor to makesubstitution is he is already in delay. If he is already in

delay he can already be liable for damages. There isno sense to give him a right if he is already liable for

damages.

If the obligation is already impossible, can the debtor

make a substitution?

No. For how can the debtor make a substitution if theobligation is already impossible, unless it was really the

agreement or the intention of the parties. Otherwise, it is

considered simply as an obligation with a penal clause.Upon non compliance with the obligation, the debtor can be

compelled to perform the other prestation or the accessory

undertaking.

Is the substitute prestation had already been

agreed upon by the parties?

Yes. There can never be a valid facultative obligation

when the substitute prestation has not been agreed upon.Otherwise if the debtor has the right to make a substitution

without the substitute prestation having been agreed upon,it may be prejudicial to the creditor because such will give

the right to the debtor to deliver an inferior prestation.

JOINT AND SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS

A filed an action against B for the recovery of a sum of

money. Would it matter if it is a joint or solidary

obligation?

Yes. There will be an issue because A may file an action

against A as a joint debtor or a solidary debtor. There is a

difference on an action filed against one defendant or anaction filed against a debtor. A defendant may either be a

joint debtor or a solidary debtor. The creditor need not sue

everyone.

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Assuming there is an issue whether the obligation is a

joint or a solidary obligation, who would claim that it is

a joint obligation?

It would be B who would claim that the obligation is joint.The plaintiff A on the other hand who demanded paymentfrom only one of the debtors would definitely claim that the

obligation is a solidary obligation.

What would be an indication in a case which will warnthe examinee on whether the obligation is joint or

solidary?

The extent of the liability is the determining factor that the

obligation is joint or solidary. The question is whether one ofthe debtors can be compelled the entire amount.

A and B sold 1000 sacks of rice to X and Y. X demanded

delivery of 1000 sacks of rice from A and B. A and B

delivered the 1000 sacks of rice to X. Y did not receive

anything out of the 1000 sacks of rice. Can Y still

compel A and B to deliver a portion of the 1000 sacks

of rice. If he can, how many can Y demand?

It is a joint obligation unless from the stipulation of theparties or in the nature, or the law it shows solidarity. Underthe facts, when A and B delivered the 1000 sacks to X it did

not actually extinguished the obligation to Y because he did

not receive anything from the 1000 sacks of rice, therefore

it did not extinguish the obligation.

What obligations are considered solidary?

Art. 927. If two or more heirs take possession of the estate,

they shall be solidarily liable for the loss or destruction of a

thing devised or bequeathed, even though only one ofthem should have been negligent. (n)

Art. 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the

partnership for everything chargeable to the partnershipunder Articles 1822 and 1823. (n)

Art. 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of anypartner acting in the ordinary course of the business of

the partnership or with the authority of co-partners, loss

or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in thepar tnership, or any penalty is incurred , the partnership is

liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or

omitting to act. (n)

Art. 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the

loss:

1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his

apparent authority receives money or property of a

third person and misapplies it; and

(3) Where the partnership in the course of its businessreceives money or property of a third person and

the money or property so received is misapplied by

any partner while it is in the custody of the

partnership. (n)

Art. 1911. Even when the agent has exceeded his authority,

the principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former

allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers. (n)

Art. 1915. If two or more persons have appointed anagent for a common transaction or undertaking, they shall

be solidarily liable to the agent for all the consequences of

the agency. (1731)

Art. 1945. When there are two or more bailees to whom a

thing is loaned in the same contract, they are liable

solidarily. (1748a)

Art. 2157. The responsibility of two or more payees, when

there has been payment of what is not due, is solidary. (n)

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who

are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)

Art. 2146. If the officious manager delegates to another

person all or some of his duties, he shall be liable for the

acts of the delegate, without prejudice to the direct

obligation of the latter toward the owner of the business.

The responsibil ity of two or more officious m a n ag e r s s h a l l b e s o l i d a r y, u n l e s s t h e management

was assumed to save the thing or business from imminent

danger. (1890a)

Art. 94. (FC) The absolute community of property shall be

liable for:

(1) The support of the spouses, their common

children, and legitimate children of either spouse;however, the support of illegitimate children shall be

governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the

marriage by the designated administrator- spouse

for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses,

or by one spouse with the consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spousewithout the consent of the other to the extent that the

family may have been benefited;

(4) All taxes , liens, charges and expenses,

including major or minor repairs, upon the

community property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made

during marriage upon the separate property ofeither spouse used by the family;

(6) E x p e n s e s t o e n a b l e e i t h e r s p o u s e t ocommence or complete a professional or vocational

course, or other activity for self- improvement;

(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they

have redounded to the benefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both

spouses in favor of their common legitimatechildren for the exclusive purpose of commencing or

completing a professional or vocational course or

other activity for self- improvement;

(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those

falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the

support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and

liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of acrime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or

insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered

as advances to be deducted from the share of the d

e b t o r - s p o u s e u p o n l i q u i d a t i o n o f t h e

community; and

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(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses

unless the suit is found to be groundless.

If the community property is insufficient to cover the

foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph(9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid

balance with their separate properties.

Art. 121. (FC) The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common

children, and the legitimate children of either

spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children

shall be governed by the provisions of this Code onSupport;

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the

marriage by the designated administrator- spouse

for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of

gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the

consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by eitherspouse without the consent of the other to the extent

that the family may have benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses,

including major or minor repairs upon the conjugalpartnership property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation

made during the marriage upon the separate

property of either spouse;

(6) E x p e n s e s t o e n a b l e e i t h e r s p o u s e t o

commence or complet e a prof essional, v o

c a t i o n a l , o r o t h e r a c t i v i t y f o r s e l f -improvement;

(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as theyhave redounded to the benefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated or promised by bothspouses in favor of their common legitimate

children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or

completing a professional or vocational course orother activity for self- improvement; and

(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses

unless the suit is found to groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover theforegoing liabili ties, the spouses shall be solidarily liable

for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.

Give an example of an obligation which is solidary by

nature?

The liability of those who figured in vehicular mishapswhere a person is a passenger of one at the time of the

mishap, such passenger hold the owner of the vehicle

under breach of contract together with the driver under thecontract. The owner of the vehicle as well as the driver may

be held liable under quasi delict. There is no basis under

the law which would make them solidarily liable the casebeing based on different causes of action. There is no law

which provides for solidarity, but by the nature of the

obligation they are held solidarily liable.

For contractual obligations, may the partners be

held solidarily liable?

No. because as a rule joint without prejudice that the

partners binding themselves solidarily.

May an insurance company of a vehicle be held

solidarily liable with the owner of the vehicle , thedriver, and the employer of the driver?

No. It is only the owner of the vehicle (Sio Choy) andthe the employer of the driver (San Leon Rice Mill) shouldbe held solidarily liable and not the insurance company.

The basis of the liability of the owner of the vehicle is Art.

2184 which provides that in motor vehicle mishaps, theowner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,

who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of duediligence, prevented the misfortune it is disputably

presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found

guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at

least twice within the next preceding two months. Since the

owner was not in the vehicle Art. 2184 is not applicable. If

the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of

article 2180 may be applicable.

Secondly the basis of the liability of the employer is in Art.

2180 which provides: The obligation imposed by article

2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or

omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one isresponsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scopeof their assigned tasks, even though the former are not

engaged ill any business or industry. But the owner of the

vehicle is not the employer so Art. 2180 is likewise notapplicable.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated in this article shall cease when

the persons herein mentioned proved that they observed allthe diligence of a good father of a family to prevent

damage.

Under the foregoing, the employer and the owner of the

vehicl e are so lidarily l iable as joint tortfeasors. Under the

law: The responsibility of two or more persons who areliable for a quasi-delict is solidarily.

The basis of the liability of the insurer is the insurance

contract while the employer and the owner is torts whichcould not make the insurer be solidarily liable (Malayan

Insurance vs. CA)

For contractual obligations may the partners in a

partnership be hold solidarily liable?

No. As a rule joint unless of course if the partners bind

themselves solidari ly and under certain specific scenarios

or exceptional circumstances under the civil code whichmake them solidarily liable. (See provisions above)

Note: In these scenarios the examinee must be a b l et o d e t e r m i n e u n d e r w h a t s p e c i fi c

circumstances that the debtor may be held solidarily

liable.

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Other word or phrase for solidary?

Joint and collective, joint and several, jointly and

individually.

Ronquillo vs. CAClearly then, by the express term of the compromise

agreement and the decision based upon it, the defendants

obligated themselves to pay their obligation "individually

and jointly".

The term "individually" has the same meaning as " c o l l e

c t i v e l y " , " s e p a r a t e l y " , " d i s t i n c t i v e l y " , respectively or

"severally". An agreement to be "individually liable"

undoubtedly creates a several obligation, 14 and a "severalobligation is one by which one individual binds himself to

perform the whole obligation. 15

In the case of Parot vs. Gemora 16 We therein ruled

that "the phrase juntos or separadamente or in the

promissory note is an express statement making each of

the persons who signed it individually liable for the

payment of the fun amount of the obligation contained

therein." Likewise in Un Pak Leung vs. Negorra 17 We heldthat "in the absence of a finding of facts that the defendantsmade themselves individually liable for the debt incurred

they are each liable only for one-half of said amount

The obligation in the case at bar being described as"individually and jointly", the same is therefore enforceable

against one of the numerous obligors.

A and B, debtors X and Y creditors. X filed an action

against A, the action was dismissed, thereafter X filed

an action against B, may the action be dismissed?

It would depend on what kind of obligation is involved,

whether it is joint or solidary.

If the obligation is solidary, there is more reason that

the action against B should likewise be dismissed since

it joint obligation is solidary.

However, even if A and B are solidarily liable and the

action against A is dismissed, a subsequent actionagainst B may prosper if the defenses is purely personal to

A, like when A is a minor. Therefore it would depend on the

defense raised which is the basis of the dismissal.

If the obligation is joint, the dismissal of the first case

shall not affect the action against the other debtor, because

their obligations are separate and distinct from each other.

What kind of defense is minority? Is it a defense? If itis a defense, Is it partial or total defense?

It depends, if it is a joint or solidary obligation.

If the obligation is joint, it is a defense as to the minor but

not as to B. Their obligation is separate and distinct from

each other.

The same is likewise a defense in solidary obligation. It is

a total if it is the minor is raising the defense. If the oneclaiming the defense is a co- debtor, it is only partial as to

the share of the minor.

Is there a total defense in any kind of obligation

whether joint or solidary and can be invoked by any of

the debtors?

If the obligation is void it it a total defense.

A and B are solidary debtors, A paid the creditors 1

million last year, today A demanded money from B,

how much can A recover from B? Can A recoverinterest?

A may recover 50% of the debt paid. A may recover

interest from the date the obligation became due and not

on the date when he paid the obligation before it was due.

A obliged himself to pay X or Y, X demanded paymentfrom A, thereafter Y demanded payment from A, A

paid Y. May X able to hold A liable?

It depends on the intention of the parties who has the right

to choose.

X may still able to hold A liable despite the fact that X hasalready paid Y if it is under an agreement between X and Y

that X had the right to choose. Then the payment by A to

Y is a payment to a wrong party.

If in their agreement A had the right to choose, then it

does not matter who made the demand because A clearly

can choose to pay the obligation. Then in this casepayment to Y extinguishes the obligation.

If the intention of the parties is not clear as to who has

the right to choose, May X still hold A liable?

X may still hold A liable under the rules on solidaryobligation because if one of the solidary creditors was the

first one to make a demand he shall be the one who hasthe right to choose. Since under the facts, X was the first to

make the demand, X may still hold A liable. This rule is

applied because this would be conducive to the fulfillmentof the obligation (Tolentino)

Uribe: If the rules on solidary obligations is to be applied

then there is no reason to make provisions on other kinds

of obligations. The law should have made all obligations

solidary because the same shall be conducive to thefulfillment of the obligation. Therefore, the view of

Tolentino is incorrect.

The rules on alternative obligations should be applied, and

under this rule, the right to choose is with the debtor. If the

intention is not clear, it is the debtor should be given the

right to choose.

An obligation to pay 1 million pesos is a divisibleobligation?

Not necessarily, because it wo