Cicero's Ideal in His de Republica

Cicero's Ideal in His de RepublicaAuthor(s): W. W. HowSource: The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 20 (1930), pp. 24-42Published by: Society for the Promotion of Roman StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/297383 .

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CICERO'S IDEAL IN HIS DE REPUBLICA4.

By W. W. HOW.

Any attempt to sketch Cicero's political ideals from his own treatises de Republica and de Legibus has to confront two difficulties, one of which at least is real and insuperable. This obstacle is that both treatises are in their present condition so defective or fragmentary that we have to judge Cicero's ideal from a torso, not a complete work. The six books On the Republic were clearly finished and published just before Cicero started for Cilicia in 5I B.C.; 1 but though the bulk of the first three books has becn recovcred from the Vatican palimpsest, of the last three we have only the Somnium Scipionis and the mercst fragments, so that on education and, above all, on Cicero's specific remedy for the evils of the day, the' moderator rei publicae,' 2 we havc to reconstruct his views from two or thrce isolated notices accidentally preserved. The de Legibus was begun as soon as, or before, the Republic was finished,3 but was discon- tinued during Cicero's proconsulate and the Civil War (5I-48 B.C.).

Probably Cicero was again at work on it in 46 B.C.,4 but he does not includc it in the list of his published works given in the de Divinatione (ii, I-4) early in 44 B.C. and may never havc finished it. Apparently there were once at least five books in the work, 5 but only three have been preserved, and the third very imperfectly. We have, it is true, the general introduction (Book I) and the' ius divinum ' (Book II) complete, but in the third book, on the constitution, we have merely the outline of a code, whilc the detailed discussion of such vital points as the principal magistracics (consulate, praetorship, dictatorship and proconsulate) has perished. Other important topics, such as law and law courts (III, 47-8) and the legal powers of the magistrates (III, 49) as well as the whole subject of education (III, 29-30), are reserved for later books.

The second difficulty, the assumption that all Cicero's theorctical treatises are mere transcripts from Grcek originals is more apparent than real. It is caused by the misapplication of Cicero's own description of the philosophical works he poured forth in 45 B.C. to all his theorctical trcatiscs. In a letter to Atticus (xii, 52), written while he was hastily composing the Academica and the de Finibus (May and June, 45 B.C.) he says ''A7otypocpoc sunt, minore labore fiunt,

I ad Farn. viii, I, 4; ad Att. vi, I, 8 2, 3. 2ad Att. viii, II, I. 3 In ii, 42, there is a clear reference to the death

and funeral of Clodius (January 20, 52 B.C).

4 ad Famn. ix, 2, 5.

5Macrobius (vi, 4, 8) quotes Cicero 'in quinto de legibus.'



CICERO'S IDEAL IN HIS DE REPUBLICA. 25

verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo.' Now it is doubtless true that the summaries of the doctrines of opposite schools given by Cicero in the de Finibus are mere transcripts, just as the similar resume of Epicurean criticisms in the de Natura Deorum (Book I, 25 f.) is taken from Philodemus or his source, as is shown by the papyri from Herculaneum.I The description may also be used fairly enough of the first two books of the de Officiis, which Cicero compiled in a month and avowedly took from Panaetius.2 Nevertheless, even in these books Cicero twice asserts that he is no mere translator of Panaetius,3 at times criticises him for omissions 4 and adds numerous illustrations from Roman history.5 And in the third book Cicero, though he doubtless made what use he could of the summary, sent him by Athenodorus Calvus 6 of the brief notes of Posidonius, 7 and of the work of Hecaton, 8 distinctly lays claim to independence 9 and gives Roman examples in abundance. 1 0 In fine, even the de Ofticiis, completed though it was in two months, was not a mere transcript of Greek authors.

In any case the de Republica and the de Legibus stand in quite a different position from these rather hasty effusions. In them Cicero distinctly claims to speak with authority1" on the ground that he combined both theory and practice, thus excelling his predecessors who, with the exception of Demetrius of Phalerum, 12 were either mere theorists or, if practical, devoid of skill in exposition. And Scipio, the exponent of Cicero's theories in the Republic, promises, and is expected, to supplement and correct what he derived from Greek treatises by the use of Roman maxims and his own great political experience (de Republica i, 36-7). Further the de Republica and de Legibus are in no sense hasty compositions. On the de Republica Cicero spent much time and labour. He was actively engaged in writing it as early as May, 54 B.C.; 13 six months later he has not only planned a work in nine books, but after completing two of them has transferred the dialogue from Scipio and his circle to himself and his friends, though he subsequently reverted to the original setting. 14 There is then a strong presumption that in a work so studied and deliberate, 15 occupying the leisure of some eighteen months, Cicero is no mere plagiarist but rather that, freely as he used Greek authors, the selection and combination at least are his own, as well as the lcssons drawn from Roman history and from his own political experience.

1 Diels, Doxographi Graeci pp. IZI-3z, and 529-50; J. B. Mayor, Cic. de nat. deor. i, p. xlii,f.

2 ad Att. xvi, I I, 4 ; de Off. iii, 7, f. 3 de off. i, 6; ii, 6o. 4e. g. of a definition of ' officium' (i, 7), or of

comparisons of honesta ' (i, I5Z, I6I) or of utilities (ii, 86-88).

5 de Off. i, z5-6; 37-40; 76-8; ii) 26-9;

45-5 ; 57-60; 72-6. 6 ad Att. xvi, IsIv 4; 14, 4.

I de Off. iii, 8. 8 Ib. iii) 63, 89. 9 Ib. iii) 34-

' lb. iii, 58-89 and 99-I I 5.

1de Rep. i, I3, de Leg. iii, I4. 12 de Leg. ii, 66, iii, I4. 13 ad Q. F. ii, iz, i; ad Att. iv, I4. 14 ad Att. iv, i6, z ad Q.F. iii) 5, I. 15 ad. Q.F. ii) iz, I, ' spissum sane opus et

operosum.'



26 CICERO'S IDEAL IN HIS DE REPUBLICA.

It will make the extent and character of Cicero's debt to his predecessors clearer if we consider in turn the schools and writers to whom he professes allegiance or obligation. And first of Plato. For Plato Cicero professes unbounded admiration,1 from Plato he takes the titles, the general plan and many striking features of both works, e.g. the general argument about justice and injustice,2 and the pictures of the truly just and unjust men,3 or again, the emphasis laid on education4 and on the influence of music. 5 Further, Cicero translates whole passages from Plato, e.g. the transition from democracy to tyranny,6 and borrows the argument at the end of the de Republica (vi, 27-8) from the Phaedrus, and many features in the Somnium Scipionis from the vision of Er at the end of the Republic. Yet, after all, many of the resemblances are as superficial as they are obvious, e.g. the fact that in the Laws but not in the Republic Cicero, like Plato, speaks in his own person and confines the conversation within one long summer's day, 7 or in the Republic has a considerable audience besides the actual interlocutors. Again, Cicero on occasion, as in his panegyric of the law he is about to propose, distinctly claims independence of Plato,8 and would seem to have criticised at least by implication Plato's views on education and on the community of goods and of women. 9

And the differences are as clear as, and more profound than, the resemblances. I do not merely mean that at bottom Plato's interest is philosophic and speculative, Cicero's practical and political, but that there are the clearest differences of scope and aim. The two treatises of Plato are divided not only by an interval of time, but by a still greater divergence in character. Even if we do not accept the St. Andrews doctrine that the Republic embodies the ideals of Socrates, the Laws those of Plato himself, there is a world of difference between the poetry of the Republic and the prose of the Laws. Yet both are in strong contrast with Cicero's works. The Republic is obviously a purely ideal Utopia; but even the state envisaged in the Laws, widely as it differs from the Republic, has nothing approach- ing historical existence. On the other hand Cicero's Republic is no philosophic fiction but is real and historical, as he repeatedly insists, 10 being in fact the old Roman constitution purged and purified. And the Laws of Cicero are not a distinct treatise, modifying a generation later the unrealisable ideals of his earlier manhood, but merely give in detail the laws suitable to the state which he had recently described in the Republic. 1 1

Ide Leg. iii, i; cf. ii, 14. 2 de Rep. iii, 8, f. 3 de Rep. iii, 27, cf. Plat. Rep., 361-2.

4 de Rep. iv, 3, f. ; de Leg. iii, 29.

5 de Rep. iv, I2; de Leg. iii, 32; ii, 38 j ct. Plat. Rep- 424 C.

6 de Rep. i, 66-8 from Plato Rep. 562, as also de Leg. ii, 45, from Plato, Laws, 955 E.

l de Leg. ii, 69, cf. Laws, 683 c. 8 de Leg. ii, I7; cf. Laws, 7I8 F.

9 de Rep. iv, fr. 4 and 5. '0 de Rep. ii, 3, zz, 5 I .

1 de Leg. i, zo; ii, Z3; iii, 4 and 17.




Cicero's debt to the Peripatetic School is much harder to estimate. He speaks in the highest terms of their contributions to political philosophy, 1 but nevertheless inclines to regard them as a mere branch of the School of Plato.2 The fact is that of the Aristotle now extant, the mature Aristotle who taught and organised his school, Cicero knew little or nothing. Conversely, the Peripatetics he uscd and quotcd are now lost. Cicero cites the dialogues written by Aristotle in earlier life, notably that on philosophy, 3 translating one whole passage,4 and in the Hortensius makes the freest use of Aristotle's Protrepticus.5 We may then reasonably suppose that Cicero used Aristotle's dialogues on Justice,6 and on the Statesman, though proof is impossible. Similarly we may fairly infer from the way in which the name of Theophrastus is coupled with that of Aristotle I that much of the Peripatetic doctrine in Cicero is derived from him, though the only points on which he is specifically quoted are the historical existence of Zaleucus, 8 and the powers of the magistrates. 9 Dicaearchus is joined with Aristotle and Theophrastus as an authority on law and politics, ' 0 and was unquestionably studied by Cicero as early as 60 B.C.11 and as late as 45 B.C. 12. And in the Republic (ii, 8, 9) Cicero took from him not only a geographical error (ad Att. vi, 2, 3) but a general attack on the Greeks for clinging so closely to the sea. From him, too, may well come Cicero's preference for the practical life over the philosophic. 13 But it remains clear that Cicero, though he makes good use of the Peripatetics, is no slavish disciple of the School.

From the Stoics Cicero seems to have borrowed the views that the Universe is the true home and country of man and is ruled by reason, 14 and that Law is right reason and the true following of Nature. 15 Probably his chief authority is Panaetius the friend of Scipio. 17 Not only did Cicero use him in the de Finibus (iv, 79) and the de Natura Deorum,28 but he also derived from him the bulk of the first two books of the de Offlciis (u.s.). And in the Republic (I, I5 and 34) Panaetius is extolled for his knowledge of politics as well as of celestial phenomena, while in the Laws (iii, I4) he is regarded as the more famous of the only two Stoics who have written on the powers of magistrates. It is, however, unreasonable to infer dependence on Panaetiusl 8 wherever Cicero is following Greek authorities, as in the defective third book of the Republic, the frag-

1 Cf. de Leg. iii, I+; de Div. ii, 3; de Fin., iv. 5, 6i. 2 So above, and cf. de Off. i, 2; iii, 20. 3 de Nat. Deor. i, 33; ii, 42, f. Bywater, in 7.P.

vii, 65-87. 4 de Nat. Deor. ii, 95; cf. de Off. ii, 56. s Cf. Bywater, in ,.P. ii, 55-63 ; Jager, Aristoteles

6o f. 6 de Rep. iii, 12.

7de Leg. i, 38, iii, 14; de Div. ii, 3. "de Leg. ii, 15. 9 de Leg. iii, 13.

1 0 de Leg. iii, I4- 11 ad Att. ii, 2, z; i6, 3. 12 ad Att. xiii, 31-3-

13de Rep. i, 3; iii, 4-6; ad Att. ii, I6, 3. 14de Rep. i, i9 and 56. s de Rep. iii, 33; de Leg. i, I8-I9; ii, 8. 6 de Rep. i, 34.

17 de Nat. Deor. ii, I I8; cf. ad Att. xiii, i8. 18With Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mittleren

Stoa, p. 67 f., cf. Loercher in 2abrb. der klass. Altert. I62 (1913), p- I Z9 f-




mentary fourth book or the first book of the Laws. Indeed the criticisms of Greek writers and customs preserved in the fragments of Book iv, e.g. of Plato's communism, I of Polybius's low cstimate of Roman education, ! or again of paederasty and the laxness of the gymnasia,3 and of the license in the abuse of statesmen allowed in comedy,4 indicate considerable independence of view. Again, the fact that Cicero in the Laws5 hopes to commend the foundation of his political principles to all schools of thought, CxcCpt the Sceptics of the Academy and the Epicureans, points, not to the servile following of a single authority, but to a selection from a wide range of rcading.

Large as may be Cicero's debt to Panaetius, his obligations to another member of the Scipionic circle, Polybius, are probably greater and certainly clearer. True, he is only mentioned thrice in the Republic, as the friend of Scipio (I, 34), as the best authority for early chronology and particularly for the length of Numa's reign (II, 27), and as censuring the lack of public education at Rome (IV, 3). But his influence pervades the first two books of the Republic. Cicero's date for the foundation of Rome (751 B.C., Cf. II, i8) agrees with that quoted from Polybius by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (I, 74). He avowedly follows him on Numa (II, 27), and abbreviates his account of the elder Tarquin.6 We may then conclude that in his account of early Rome Cicero is following the retrospect of Roman history inserted by Polybius in his sixth book. Nor is his debt less, it would seem, on the theoretic side. Cicero, like Polybius, 5 distinguishes threc good forms of government with three perversions, monarchy prone to degenerate into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, democracy into ochlocracy. No doubt this view was the common property of later Greek publicists and may be traced back to Aristotle8 or even to Plato. 9 But when we find that Cicero shares with Polybius his preference for dealing with real and not imaginary states,' (0 and for the mixed form of constitution, 1I because it alone is comparatively stable and enduring, 12 and that both find their ideal realised in the constitution of the earlier Roman republic 1 3, which is superior to the mixed constitutions of Sparta and Carthage, l we cannot reasonably refuse to see in Polybius Cicero's main authoritv in the first two books of the Republic. It is true that Cicero spoils the symmetry of the order of constitutions in Polybius by insisting that, as at Rome, tyranny may be followed by popular government, 15 and he clearly dissented from Polybius's censure of Roman education ;1 6 but the

I de Rep. iv, 5. 2 ib. iv, 3- 3 ib. iv, 4. 4 ib. iv, I I-I2. 6 ix 37-9.

6 de Rep. ii, 35; cf. Pol. vi, I Ia. 7 Cic. de Rep. i, 42 f; ii, 65; cf. Pol. vi, 3, 4. 8 Etb. viii, lO; Polit., p. 1279.

Poi't. 30Z f. 10 Cic. de Rep. ii, 3, ZI, 5I ; cf. Pol. vi, 47- I de Rep. i, 45; ii, 41, 65; cf. Pol. vi, 3. 12 de Rep. i, 69; cf. Pol. vi, io. 13 de Rep. ii, 66 ; cf. Plol. vi, I i. 14 de Rep. ii, 4z-3 ; cf. Pol. vi, 48.

s de Rep. i, 65, 68. ib.iv, 3.




resemblances are many and the differences few. Yet, much as Cicero built on Polybius, he cannot be regarded as a servile or uncritical adherent. On the contrary, he clearly believed that the teaching of Polybius was confirmed by his own reading of history and his own political experiences. I

In the portion of Cicero's work, which deals with laws in detail (de Legibus ii and iii), Greek writers naturally fade into the back- ground. They are not neglected ; indeed it is here that Cicero inserts the great catalogue of authorities already noticed, and insists that the topic of magistracies has been investigated both by Theophrastus and, more accurately, by Diogenes the Stoic. 2

Nor does he neglect Attic laws, especially those of Solon.3 But the main substance of these books comes from a source sparingly used in the Republic -Roman law, beginning with the XII Tables,5 and the opinions of famous jurists, such as the Scaevolae.6 Yet though Cicero bases his constitution solidly on Roman law and custom, he contributes in these books much original material and exercises an independent judgment.7

The constitution oatlined in the second book of the Republic, of which further details are supplied in tne Laws (Books ii and iii),

is clear enough. Cicero, after distinguishing three good forms of constitution and their perversions (v.s.), expresses an academic preference for monarchy over the other simple forms,8 though he qualifies his preference by the reflection that the people will not long bear the loss of liberty involved in monarchy, 9 and that the natural perversion of monarchy is tyranny, the worst form of rule, utterly destructive of any commonwealth.' ( But hc has no doubt at all that the only practical ideal and the only stable constitution is the mixed form of government, 1 1 best illastrated by Rome, as is shown from her early history. Indeed, so completely docs Scipio find his

1 Unfortunately, when I was writing this paper, I was unable to consult Reitzenstein's articles on ' Die Idee des Principats bei Cicero und Augustus ' in the Nachrichten der Gesellsckaft der Wissenschaften zu Giltingen for 1917, pp. 399 f., 481 f. I now find that he there emphasizes, as I have done, Cicero's debt to Polybius (pp. 404 f.), but accounts for his divergencies from the Greek historian by the supposition that he is following Pantetius (pp. 407 f.), who had criticised Polybius. This theory he rests paTtly on the mention of Panaetius (de Rep. i, 34) and on the favourable account of the Rhodian democracy (p. 408; cf. dc Rep. i, 47, iii, 48), but more on the serious differences between Cicero and Polybius. Cicero, unlike Polybius, does not regard human weakness as the main cause of the origin of society (de Rep. i, 39), repeatedly declares monarchy to be the best of the simple forms of government (de Rep. i, 54; 69; ii, 43; iii, 47), and ascribes tyranny to a different, cause (de Rep. ii, 5S; cf. i, 68). This theory is

to my mind, attractive rather than convincing, as I incline to ascribe the chief differences to Cicero's own political reflection. Purther,. I agree in the main with Heinze's criticisms of the general position of Reitzenstein (Hern.es 59, pp. 73-94) indeed, Reitzcnstein himself modified his views in deference to Heinze's criticisms (IIernes 59, pp. 356 f.).

2 de Leg. iii, 13-4. 3 de Leg. ii, 59; 64; cf. de Rep. ii, 59. 4 Cicero cited the xii Tables in de Rep. iv, 12,

and the books of the augurs and pontiffs as well as the Tables in de Rep. ii, 54.

de Leg. ii, 58-64; iii, 44. 6 lb. ii, 47 f.

Cf. C. W. Keyes in Amnerican Journ. Phil. xiii, 309-23.

8i, 54; 64; 69; ii, 43 ;- iii, 47-

i43 47; 'ii, 43; 50, cf. Heinze in Hermes, 59, p. 88.

oti, 44; ii,47; iii, 43- i, 45; 69 ; ii, 4I ; 65-




ideal in early Rome, 1 that one of the interlocutors, Tubero, com- plains that he is giving no theory of an ideal state but a mere panegyric of Rome, and Scipio fully admits that he has used Rome as a pattern or model.2

In his account of the kings of Rome Cicero keeps to the ordinary traditional lines, but he prefixes two illuminating remarks, the first historical, the second geographical. First, he takes from Cato a just contrast between Greek constitutions, which either, like those of Crete and Sparta, are the work ot a single legislator, or, like that of Athens, have suffered many changes. each phase being the work of one man, e.g. Draco, Solon, Cleisthenes,3 and the Roman which was a gradual growth, the product of many minds, the ripe fruit of time and experience.4

Secondly, Cicero points out the striking advantages of the site of Rome. It escapes the evils of a situation on the sea, the obvious danger of sudden and unforeseen attack by enemies or pirates, and the subtler peril that maritime intercourse may lead to the neglect of arms and agriculture and the preponderance of commerce and luxury, thus corrupting manners and undermining the stability of the constitution. These snares, fatal to Carthage and Corinth, and indeed to the mass of Greek cities, which both in the motherland and in colonies clung to the coast, Rome escaped. Yet, being on the banks of a navigable river, she had the facilities for import and export necessary to a great imperial city, while her hills made her situation healthy and secure, safety being further assured by her walls and citadel.

In his account of the kings Cicero follows tradition in ascribing to Romulus the creation of the Senate and the auspices, to Numa the completion of the religious system, and to Servius Tullius the Comitia Centuriata. He insists, however, that though the People had some liberty, and the Senate, as at Sparta, authority in counsel, vet the power of the king was supreme6 and tyranny first arose, not in the way described by Plato, but through the misuse of royal power by Tarquin.7 On the fall of the monarchy there followed that Republic which was Cicero's ideal. Here (de Rep. II, 5S6-9) it is but briefly sketched; details must be supplied from the third book of the Laws. The essentials are given in a single sentence of the de Republica (ii, 56), describing the early Republic but setting a standard for later times to imitate.8 'Tenuit igitur hoc in statu senatus rem publicam . . ., ut in populo libero pauca per populum, pleraque senatus auctoritate . . . gererentur, atque uti consules potestatem haberent tempore dumtaxat annuam, genere ipso ac iure

1 The book, at least in its present state, ends with the decemvirate.

2 ii, 64-6; cf. ii, 3; 22; 5'. 3 Cf. Ar. Atb. Pol., 41. 4 d Rep. ii, 2-3; cf. ii, 37.

.5 Cf. Thuc. i, 7. 6 dc Rep. ii, 5o.

7Ib. 51. 8 Ib. 55 ad fin.



CICERO'S IDEAL IN HIS DE REPUBLICA. 3 1

regiam.' Here we have three elements. (i) The People has its liberty and (2) the consuls their imperium, limited in time to a year, but in essence and in law royal ; and yet (3) the Senate is the main- spring of the machinc, a true aristocracy through wlhose influence and authority the main business of the state is carried on. 1 A great safeguard of the aristocracy was the requirement that the acts of the popular assembly must be ratified by the Patrcs,2 while popular liberty was increased and secured against both consuls and Senatc by the creation of tribunes of the plebs.3 Supplementary details must be taken from the concise code in the Laws (Book iii, 6-Ii). Unfortunately the explanatory commentary has only been preserved for the last half of the code, so that of such vital institutions as the principal magistracies, except the tribunate and the censorship, we have only a skeleton outline. It is, however, clcar that Cicero retains without much formal change the whole system of the Roman Re- public. The People is to keep its formal sovereignty, i.e. to have its old established rights of making laws, electing magistrates and serving as a final court of appeal.4 Even the obsoletc distinction between populus and plebs, and the double form of Comitia is still retained. s Cicero does not, however, in the Laws insert the requirement that decisions of the Comitia must be ratificd by the Patres, though in the Republic (ii, 56) he regards it as the chief safeguard of the aristocracy. Perhaps he held that the additional powers given to the Senate6 and the censors, and the system of auspices gave adequate protection to the constitution. 8 Certainly, though hc thought democracy the worst form of government, `' and equality of rights unjust as well as inexpedient, 1 0 he slhows rather a nervous anxiety to maintain the liberties, real or imaginary, of the Pcoplc. Thus, though the whole history of the later Republic, and especially the turbulence of the Gracchi, Saturninus and Clodius, 1 1 had shown the danger of tribunician license, Cicero, in spitc of his own bitter experience and the outspoken opposition of his brother, approves Pompey's restoration of the tribunes' powers, holding the popular demand for it irresistible. 12 Similarly, though he clearly disliked the ballot, frankly denounced by Quintus and Atticus, hc proposes not its abolition, but a futile compromise, which would retain the ballot but destroy its secrecy. 13 In fine, Cicero would make tew formal changes in the People's rights and powers. But, of course, to Cicero the true Roman People was not the plebecula urbana, still less the hirelings who might dominate some chance assembly,14 but the whole

1 Cf. ' sed tamen omnia sumina cuim atictoritatc a principibus cedente populo tenebantur' and (le Rep. ii, 55 ; 6i.

2Ib. 56. 3 Ib. 58. 4 de Leg. iii, iO-I 1. 5 lb. iii, 9-IO. 6 de Leg. iii, io.

lb. iii, 46-7- 8 de Leg. ii, 31 f. de Rep. ii, 26. 9 de Rep. iii, 45-7- 0 de Rep. i 43-4; ii, 39.

" de Leg. iii, 20 f. 1 2 Ib. 26. 13 Ib- iii, 33-9. 1 4 pro Sest. i09 f.




of Italy, duly convened. It is a constant disappointment to him that the Italians will not take their proper part in Roman politics.

The magistracy, too, of Cicero's ideal state is that familiar to him at Rome, with but few reforms. Of the tribunes I have already spoken; in the minor magistracies there is no noticeable change, except their definite subordination to the Senate. 1 The most striking point is Cicero's insistence on the royal character of the consul's imperium. 'Uti consules potestatem haberent . . . gencre ipso ac iure regiam '.2 'Regio imperio duo sunto . . . militiae summum ius habento, nemini parento ; ollis salus populi suprema lex esto.'3 This is high constitutional doctrine, true of that early Rome which Cicero is describing in the Republic, tenable of the Rome of Polybius4- though there, as in Cicero's ideal, the balance is preserved by the compensating powers of Senate and People-but quite untrue of Rome after the Gracchi. Cicero, however, is bent on restoring the earlier and sounder Republic, as he shows in the Laws (iii, 9), by retaining for use in emergency the dictatorship in its old form, save that the Senate's assent is required for the nomination. The only substantial innovation he makes in the old magistracy is in the censorship. Censors are not to vacate their office after eighteen months, but to retain it throughout the quinquennium, and there is to be no break in the succession of censors.5 Further, besides their customary duties,5 Cicero would assign to them a general guardianship of the laws, similar to that of the Greek vo,Fo?u'Xoxex,

and in particular the custody of laws and decrees, and the duty of passing a preliminary judgment on the conduct of the annual magistrates at the close of their year of office. 6

Though, as we have seen, the People is to be free and the magistracy strong, to Cicero the Senate is the keystone of the constitution. This comes out most clearly, not in the rather meagre outlines given in the Republic (ii, 56) and Laws (iii, io), but in the great political manifesto embodied in the speech for Sestius, especially in the description of the constitution wisely prescribed by our ancestors.7

' Ita magistratus annuos creaverunt, ut consilium senatus rei publicae praeponerent sempiternum, deligerentur autem in id consilium ab universo populo, aditusque in illum summum ordinem omnium civium industriae ac virtuti pateret. Senatum rei publicae custodem, praesidem, propugnatorem conlocaverunt ; huius ordinis auctoritate uti magistratus et quasi ministros gravissimi consili esse voluerunt.'

Note the contrast between the transient magistrate and the permanent Senate, and the insistence that the Senate is to be composed of ex-magistrates,8 who have been freely chosen by the whole

'de Leg. iii, 6. 2 de Rep. ii, 56. 3 de Leg. iii, 8. 4 PoL Vi, I2t.

5 de Leg. iii, 7. 6 de Leg. iii, 46-7. 7 pro Sest. 137- 8 de Leg. iii, 27.




people for merit. It is to be no narrow Roman oligarchy, but representative of all that is best in the whole of Italy, merit and not birth, being the passport to it. In the Laws (iii, io and 28) Cicero insists that it must be an example to all-' is ordo vitio vacato ceteris specimen esto.' Doubtless the best security for this was what he postulates, free election for merit from and by the whole of Italy, but he also provides against bribery at elections, 1 and puts great trust in a reformed system of education, such as he had sketched in a lost book of the Republic (iv), and promises to complete in the Laws. 2 When once this ideal Senate has been constituted, all will be easy. The magistrates will defer to its authority and act as its agents,3 working generally through the Senate, and bringing but few things before the people. Hence its decrees are to be as valid as laws. 5 This will promote the concord and well-being of the state, for the Senate will respect the dignity of the equestrian order, and preserve and increase the liberties and well-being of the People.

This is no ignoble ideal. It is a return to that better Rome, which Polybius at least believed to exist during the Punic Wars, in which the mutual interdependence of Magistrates, Senate and People, and the nice balance of their powers, secured the permanence of the mixed constitution, giving the Magistrates executive power, the Senate authority, and the People liberty as well as the right to make laws and act as a final court of appeal. The few innovations proposed by Cicero, the ejOi6vox of magistrates and the guardianship of laws entrusted to the censors, 6 or the increased powers of the Senate, I are designed to protect the constitution and are in harmony with its spirit. 8 In two points, however, Cicero diverges from Polybius. To him Rome is Italy and Italy Rome, while in the days of Polybius the Roman state comprised but a third of Italy. And Cicero, unlike Polybius, sees that a state must have a centre of gravity. Polybius balances his three powers, Magistrates, Senate and People as accurately as a skilful juggler; Cicero finds in the Senate the true centre of gravity in the Roman constitution.

This ideal constitution Cicero hoped to establish and preserve by 'concordia ordinum.' But by this he did not mean a mere league between the landed and the monied interests to protect their threatened wealth, but a great union of all the more respectable elements in Italy in defence of the constitution. The equites to whom he appealed were not primarily the Roman financiers but the class to which he belonged by birth, the ' municipales equites,' the small squires and substantial burgesses of the country districts. This is shown by the fact that he often couples ' concordia ordinum ' with

I de Leg. ill, II. 2 de Leg. iii, 29--32. 3 pro Sest. 137- 4 de Rep. ii, 56.

5 de Leg. iii, Io and 28. 6 de Leg. iii, 46-7. 7 de Leg. iii, IO. 8 de Leg. ii, Z3; iii, IZ.



34 CICERO'S IDEAI, IN HIS DE REPUBLICA.

' consensus Italiae ' or ' bonorum,' 1 and in the fourth oration against Catiline (?3. I5 f. 22) insists not only on the reconciliation of the Senate and equites, but also on the unanimity of good citizens of every class in defence of the state. So, when he laments the rift between Senate and Knights in 60 B.C., it is because he regards it as the overthrow of the foundations well and truly laid in 63. ' Duo firmamenta r'ei publicae per me unum constituta evertit; nam et senatus auctoritatem abiecit et ordinum concordiam disiunxit.' 2

Indeed, at all the great crises of his life Cicero puts his trust in the support of good citizens and Italians. This is true of his election to the consulate, of his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, of his exile3 and recall, 4 and of his final opposition to the usurpations of Antony.5 No doubt in furtherance of this concord, Cicero is driven in 6i-60 B.C. to advocate unworthy concessions to the Knights, but his aim is pure and true. The constant danger was the alienation of the Italians by the exclusiveness of the Roman nobility. Cicero, himself a municipal, made it his mission from 63 B.C. to counteract the narrow exclusiveness of the actual Senate, and make it sensible of its true position and responsibilities, and at the same time to arouse the Italians from their indifference to Roman politics and to make them see in the authority of the Senate the sheet-anchor of the Republic.

But the impracticability of Cicero's ideal and the inadequacy of his nostrum for the cure of the Roman Republic from its mortal sickness are but too obvious.

(i) The existing Senate, composed in the main of Roman nobles, always exclusive and often corrupt, could not rise to be a High Parliament of Italy. Indeed, Cicero himself is quite conscious of the contrast between the ideal and the actual, but trusts to a reform of law and education. 6

(z) The true Roman People (i.e. Italy) could not control the Comitia while personal attendance in Rome was required for the exercise of the franchise. Here again Cicero is aware that the city mob or even a handful of hirelings 7 might, and sometimes did, de- termine the action of the Assembly; but he devises no adequate remedy, such as a poll in the country towns. 8 Apparently he hoped that the Italians might be induced to come to Rome for such great occasions as the election of consuls, and that the magistrates, thus really chosen by all Italy, would confine the activities of the Assembly within narrow limits, 9 and trust to the guidance of the reformed Senate.

(3) Though men like Cicero might see the consummation of the

'ad Att. i I4, 4 i6, 6. 2 ad Att. i, I8, 3. ' ad Q.F. i, 2, I6; pro Sest. 36. 4 ad AItt. iv, I, 4; ad Fan,. i 9, i6. 5ad Fain. x, Iz, 4; xii, 4, i and 5, 3; Phil. vii, 23.

6de Leg. iii, 29.

7 pro Sest. IO9.

8 cf. Suet. A4ug. 46.

9de Rep. ii, 56.




narrower local patriotism of hearth and home in the wider sentiment of devotion to the imperial city, 1 the great bulk of the municipals were wholly engrossed in their local interests and patriotisms. They will flock to Rome to support a neighbour,2 or a champion like Cicero himself (v. s.), they will rally in defence of law and order against a Catilinc, or an Antony, but there is for them no magic in the letters S.P.Q.R. So soon as they realise that Caesar is neither anarchist nor tyrant, they do not care to defend the dying Republic against the nascent Empire.3

(4) Even had Cicero been able by a stroke of the pen to recreate the old Roman constitution and to secure for it the devoted loyalty of Italy, he would still have left out of account the most pressing problem of the day, the relation of the central government to the authorities outside Italy, the proconsuls, rulers of wide provinces and leaders of great armies. The Empire succeeded because it solved this problem. In the last year of his life Cicero realised that the loyalty of Italy could not by itself save the Republic, and that its destinies really lay in the hands of the principal proconsuls, and, still more, in those of the armies on whom their power rested. But in the Republic and Laws there is little or no appreciation of this. The text of the provincial regulations only enacts that the provincial magistrates shall go and return as ordered by the Senate and People, shall control themselves and their suites, shall spare the provincials and only wage just wars, and that no one shall hold an official post to promote his private interests. Of these vague enactments only the last, the prohibition of the libera legatio, is explained,4 or has any clear relation to the facts of the time. Possibly the lost commentary might have given some meaning to the meagre text, but there is no direct evidence that Cicero faced the problem of the provinces. And the presumption is all the other way. An early experience as pro- quaestor5 had convinced him that for a politician to be out of sight is to be out of mind, and thenceforth policy, as well as inclination,6 led him to cleave to the Forum. His governorship of Cilicia was to him a distasteful interruption in his career, to be cut as short as the law allowed,7 and though it would be unfair to deny that he realised his responsibilities as governor8 or the standard prescribed in his own Republic, 9 it remains true that he crept to his province as slowly and unwillingly as a small boy going to school and returned as blithely as one coming home for the holidays. Hence it seems unlikely that Cicero had an adequate grasp of the problems presented by the provincial empire of Rome.

Ide Leg. ii, 5. 2 pro Planc. 19-24. 3 ad Att. viii, 13, z ; i6, i. 4 de Leg. iii, i8. 5 pro Planc. 64 f.

6 ad Att. v, II, I; ad Eram. ii, I2, 2.

7 ad Att. v, 2I, 3. 8 ad Att. v, II, 5; 21, 5; vi, 2, 8.

9 ad Att. vi, I, 8.




It mav be answered that Cicero's solution was the ' moderator rei publicac ' portrayed in the lost books of the Republic. In a sense this is doubtless true. This ideal statesman was Cicero's remedy for the evils of the day, and among them, no doubt for the insubor- dination of proconsuls and their armies. But I doubt if these particular evils were prominent to Cicero's mind. Indeed, so far as we can judge from the few fragments left us, he laid stress rather on the decay of manners' and on civil factions and dissensions,2 i.e. on the evils most glaring at Rome itself.

However this may be, we must now face the most difficult problem in the de Republica, the true place in Ciccro's ideal of his ' rector ct gubernator civitatis.' The question is of all the greater interest bccause both F. Mcyer and Ferrero (to name only protagonists) incline to regard Augustus as the pupil of Cicero. But, though they agrec so far, they mean different things.

Ferrero, believing that Cicero desired the appointmcnt of a magistrate, rcpublican but supreme, holds that Augustus rcally meant ' to put the ideas of the de Republica into practice and to preserve the smallest amount of authority essential to secure the continuance of peace and order.' 3 He takes Augustus's professed restoration of the Republic as a scrioas reality andc believes that hie was only driven into the assumption of wider powers by the failurc of Senate and People to play their parts. It is true enough that Augustus professed to regard the Principate as a temporary and exceptional position, but the retention of all militarv power in his own hiands and his successive dynastic schemes suffice to prove the hollowness of his professions, and to show how far he was from con- fining himself to the part assigned by Cicero to his ' moderator rei pablicae.' But the mistake is rather in the estimate of Augustus than in the conception of Cicero's ideal.

E. Meyer, makes an opposite, and in my opinion a more profound, error. He holds that Pompey consciously aimed at a Principatc, similar to that of Augustus,4 and that Cicero gave in the Republic a theoretical description and justification of such a position.5 Let us see how far the known facts bear out these contentions. No doubt Pompey resembled Augustus in declining the role of a frank and open despot, and in wishing to base his power not on the sword but on general consent. lt is also true that the powers enjoyed by Pompey served as a model for those of Augustus, e.g. his ' imperium infinitum ' with pro-praetorian legates under the Gabinian and Manilian laws (67-2 B.c.), his control for five years of the whole corn supply6 (57 B.C.) and finally the union of the consulate in Rome (55 and 52 B.C.) with

1deRep.v, i.

2 de Rep. vi, i.

3 Grandezza, etc., . . . (Eiiu. '1T rtijs.v, i 13'2.

I Caesars Monarchie ind das Principat des Ponmpejus pp- 5 and 176.

op. cit. p. 189. 6 ad Alt. iv, I, 7.




his governorship of Spain, or rather his wvhole position while he remained near Rome to manage it and at the same time governed Spain through his legates as proconsul (54-49 B.C.). But I doubt if all this shows more than that Pompey, while he shrank from the use of open force, was willing to accept any and every power offered him. He had, in my judgment, no clear idea of a Principate, that is of combining the forms of a republic with the retention of all substantial power in his own hands. He had no objection to the temporary assumption of quite un-republican powers; in the last half of 54 B.C. he clearly coveted a dictatorship, 1 and eventually accepted early in 52 the monstrous sole consulate. And, on the other hand, not only his dynastic schemes, but the true coping-stone of the Principate, the union of the tribunicia potestas with the imperium, was derived by Augustus from the example, not of Pompey, but of Caesar.

Indeed, it seems almost absurd to ascribe to Pompey the fore- thought and imagination needed to devise a Principate, when we consider how incapable he was of using the powers actually conferred on him. He was so inconstant or inconsistent as to be the chief violator of his own laws, 2 especially that dealing with the provinces and the rights of magistrates in 52 B.C. ; he entirely failed to keep order in Rome in 57 B.C.,3 and he could not even protect his own agents, notably Gabinius (54 B.C.) and Plancus Bursa (5I B.C.). He often used two voices, his own and that of his creatures, 4 but dissembled so ill as to be readily detected.5 He was quite without the power of envisaging political difficulties beforehand, or of dealing with them when they arose. Meyer himself admits Pompey's political incapacity6 and inconsistency,' but does not see that his lack of foresight and dexterity in politics makes it most improbable that he could have conceived so complex a structure as the Augustan Principate.

Thus one of the two bases of Meyer's theory appears to be unsound. But we are concerned rather with the other, which would make Cicero in the Republic advocate for Rome a Principate of the Augustan type. For this view there is, of course some evidence, real or apparent.

(i) St. Augustine, who had before him the whole of the de Republica, in referring to the lost books, describes them as those in which Cicero speaks ' de instituendo principe civitatis.'8

(2) Cicero himself implies that he had cast Pompey for the part of this ' moderator rei publicae,' and had only been undeceived by the bitter experience of the Civil War. 9

1ad Att. iv, i8, 3; ad Q.F. iii, 8, 4. 2 Tac. Ann. iii, z8. 3 Meyer op. cit. pp. I09 f., 132. 4 ad Att. iv, 1, 7; ad Famn. i, i, 3; 2, 3. 5 ad Att. i, 13, 4; ad Fan,. viii, I, 3.

6 op. cit- pp. 3, 45 f., 52 f-, 8z-

7 op. cit. 240. 8 de Civ. Dei v, I3.

9ad Att. viii IIv I) 2. Meyer, op. cit. I82 f.




(3) He also, both before and after writing the de Republica, speaks of Pompey as ' princeps' or ' princeps civitatis '-in 57-6 B.C., 1in 54 B.C.,2in 52 B.C.,3 and in 49 B.C.4

I will take these points in reverse order. The word ' princeps' had not in Cicero's time acquired its later definite significance. He uses it perhaps of his own position as leader of the Senate against Antony, 5 and of the position Caesar would have held had there been no Civil War,6 while ' principatus' may be held jointly by Pompey, Caesar and Crassuas. 7 Again, several leading nobles are called

principes,'8 while in the Republic itself ' principes ' is regularly used of an aristocracy, such as that of Massilia or of early Rome. 9 In the singular, then,' princeps ' only implies a certain primacy in the state, such as the ' princeps Senatus ' held in the Senate, not yet a definite constitutional position.

Next, we must consider what part Cicero intended that Pompey should play in the state. We have already seen that the position actually held by Pompey fell far short of the Augustan Principate, with its combination of tribunician power and imperium. But the position Cicero would have given him differed yet more widely from that of Augustus. Cicero never seems to have understood that what Pompey needed to buttress up his primacy in Rome was a military force at his back. In 62-60 B.C. he apparently thought that Pompey could be won over to the good cause, if only the Senate would ratify his settlement of Asia and find lands for his veterans. In 57 B.C. he hopes to content him with the control of the corn supply and regards the proposal of Messius to add an army and fleet with maius imperium as intolerable.10 Early in the next year he supports the claims of Lentulus to restore Ptolemy Auletes as against those of Pompey,"l thus again thwarting Pompey's ill-concealed longing for a military command. In fine, though anxious to conciliate Pompey and sensible of the Senate's folly in opposing him, he cannot, or will not, see what Pompey really wants, and so entirely fails to keep Pompey from falling into the hands of Caesar in 60 B.C., while in 56 B.C. by his ill-judged attack on Caesar's lex Campana he directly provoked the renewal of the coalition at Luca.

Again, the reason that made Cicero finally pronounce Pompey unworthy of the part assigned him as ' moderator rei publicae' is neither his long-known political ineptitude, 12 nor his supposed military incompetence, 13 but the conviction that Pompey as well as Caesar

I post Red. in Sen. 4; de Dom. 66; pro. Sest. 84; de Prov. Cons. 4I ; cf. Meyer op. cit. I89.

2 ad Fam. i, 9, I I. 3 pro Planc. 93; ad Fam. iii, II, 3. 4 ad Att. viii, 9, 4. 5 Phil. xiv, I7 f.; ad Fam. xii, 24, 2; but cf.

Heinze in Hermes 59, P- 79- 6 ad Fam. vi, 6, 5.

7 ad Fam. i, 9, 2I. 8in Vat. IO; Phil. xiv, I7; ad Fam. i, 7, 8. 9 de Rep. i, 43-4, and 6s; ii, 55 f.

1 0 ad Att. iv, I, 7. 11 ad Fam. i, i and z. 12 Cf. sup. and ad Att. i, I3, 4; viii, i6, i. 13 ad Att. vii, II, 3; I3, I; Viii, 3, 3-4; i6t I,

ad Fam. vii, 3, 2.




lusted after a power founded on force and unfettered by constitutional shackles, I and, in fine, was intent, not on the safety and wvelfare of the state, but on his own domination.

Further, though Cicero clearly implies that he had once hoped to find in Pompey his ideal ' moderator rei publicae,' 2 he seems actually to have taken as his model not Pompey but Scipio Acmilianus, as appears from the dream of Scipio at the end of the Republic. And the picture that Cicero draws of Scipio, in spite of one reference to a dictatorship, is rather that of the wise guide and leader swaying the people by the prestige of his services to Rome than that of a man whose power rests on force. Indeed, the Pompey destined for the part is rather the Pompey of Cicero's dreams and hopes than the real man, who so constantly disappointed his would-be admirer. As early as 62 B.C. Cicero was hoping to play the Laelius to Pompey's Scipio, ' that is, to form with him a close political alliance, 5 in which Pompey, like Scipio, would supply the military prestige6 and Cicero, like Laelius, the sage political advice. But, sweetly as Cicero piped, Pompey would not dance to his tune.

Thirdly, I come to St. Augustine's description of the lost books of the Republic as being 'de instituendo principe civitatis' (de Civ. Dei v, I3) and to Meyer's reading of them, and indeed of the de Republica in general, as a justification of an Augustan Principate to be held by Pompey. To me it seems obvious that the real, if partially concealed, predominance of the Princeps in all the more important affairs of state is incompatible with the continued life and vigour of that mixed constitution which Cicero formally pronounces the best in the first book of the Republic and so carefully and lovingly portrays in the second, as well as in the Laws. Unless then we are to accuse Cicero of gross inconsistency, or at least of having altered his ideal in the last books of the Republic, we must fit the ideal pilot of the state into the framework of the mixed Roman constitution, and not sacrifice the constitution to an imaginary conception of the statesman. Now the evidence is all against the view that Cicero consciously changed his ideal. In the first book (de Rep. I, 45), in a passage which ends by pronouncing a mixed constitution to be the best, he speaks of a man of almost divine powers being needed to foresee threatening changes and, while holding the reins of government, to direct and control their courses. In the second book (de Rep. ii,

51) he contrasts with the tyrant the ' bonus et sapiens et peritus utilitatis dignitatisque civilis quasi tutor et procurator rei publicae; sic enim appelletur, quicumque crit rector et gubernator civitatis.' Similar ideas are expressed in the longer but fragmentary passage later in the book (de Rep. ii, 67-9). The scanty fragments of the fifth and

1 ad Att. viii, i ,z; ix, 7,3; 10,2 and 6; x, 7, 1. - ad Att. viii, I I, 2. 3 de Rep. vi, i4.

4ad Faii. v, 7, 3. 5ad Att.i, i6, ii; 19,7 ; 20,2.

6 sf. de Rep. i, i8.




sixth books vary the phrases used to describe the ideal statesman, but in no way, so far as I can see, modify the conception. I append for purposes of comparison the best and most complete description of the ' moderator rei publicac ' (ad Att. viii, ii. i). ' Ut enim gubernatori cursus secundus, medico salus, imperatori victoria, sic huic moderatori rei publicae beata civium vita proposita est, ut opibus firma, copiis locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit.' The functions, then, of this ideal statesman are to foresee, to guide and to inspire. He considers, not the momentary whims, but the permanent good of the people, that is the. ' beata civium vita', the U8otyiov6x of the citizens. Politically, I cannot doubt, Cicero

foundc that good in the finely balanced Roman constitution. But Cicero was not so naive as to believe, like Sulla, that if only

you could set up a good constitution it would preserve itself. Hence, among the changes and chances which befall all states and notably the sorely tried republic of his own day, there was need of a pilot to steer the State through its dangers and difficulties. Yet the function of this guide and guardian is, not to alter, but to preserve the constitution, at most adapting it to the needs of the time. If the vaunted restoration of the Republic by Augustus had been a feality and the Principate a temporary expedient, Cicero might have held that it would secure the essential clements of his idcal, liberty for the People, strength for the Magistracy, and authority for the Senate. The actual Principatc he would doubtless have preferred to the open despotism of Caesar, and might have accepted as in some sense the ' res publica,' which in the pro Marcello he exhorts Caesar to restore, in the rebuilding of which he is ready to be a mason if he may not bc an architect, 1 but he would have regarded it at most as the best which the long disorders of the Civil War then permitted, never as the true and pristinc Roman republic, which remained his ideal.

I should conclude, then, that Meyer's view of the ' moderator rei publicae ' is mistaken, because it substitutes for the sound logical principle of reasoning from the known to the unknown the unsound onc of ignoring the known in deference to a preconceived theory. Nor do I think that the words of St. Augustine, ' de instituendo principc civitatis,' are in any way decisive. No doubt it is natural to take them of the foundation of an office, but instituere may just as well mean training or education, and St. Augustine, as well as the mediaeval monk Petrus Pictaviensis 2 who uses the word ' princeps ' in the same connection, may well have substituted for Cicero's phrase the term most familiar to them. For though in the de Finibus (V, i i) Cicero says ' qualem esse in rc publica principem conveniret' and even in the de Republica (i, 34) calls Scipio ' princeps rei

I ad Fam. ix, 2, 5. 2 cf. de Rep. v, 9.



CICERO'S IDEAL IN HIS DE REPUBLICA. 4I

publicae,' 1 yet in writing to his brothler of his own and Aristotlc's treatises he uses ' optimus civis ' and ' praestans vir,' while in the better preserved books of the Republic he seems to avoid the term by the use of such periphrases as ' tutor et procurator rei publicae or rector et gubernator civitatis.':3 There is also clear evidence for the use of similar phrases in books v and vi, e.g. ' moderator rei publicae,' and frequently ' rector ' either alone or with ' patriae ' or ' civitatis.' Thus it would appear that Cicero preferred to call his ideal statesman, ' tutor ' or ' moderator rei publicae ' or

rector civitatis.' A reason for the avoidance of the word ' princeps' in the singular

may be 6 found in Cicero's frequent use of the plural ' principes ' for nobles, and more particularly for a governing aristocracy, 7 such as that of Massilia 8 or of early Rome. 9 It is true that such an aristocracy may degenerate into a plutocracy, 1 0 or even into a tyranny, like that of the Thirty at Athens, 1 1 or the later Decemvirs at Rome, 12 and may be ruined by such excesses, but it should have its share in the government of the State, 1": as the nobles had in early Rome. 9 This use of' principes ' for nobles is also found in a fragment of the sixth book, 14 and may well have deterred Cicero from the use of the singular ' princeps' ; and, even if he did use the term, he cannot have used it in the later definite and technical sense.

I have now finished my criticism of the view that Cicero regarded an Augustan Principate as the ideal constitution for Rome, and gave us in the lost books of his Republic a picture of such a princeps. But if negative criticism is comparatively easy, a positive reconstruction of the ideal statesman is rendered difficult by the scantiness of the extant fragments. He cannot be a purely ideal figure, the 7no?xv6m of Plato and other Greek philosophers; for, though it is true that Cicero in the de Oratore (I, 2II f.) uses ' rector rei publicae ' in this sense along with ' imperator, orator,' etc., 15 the plain references to Pompey16 and to Scipio 17 compel us to suppose that Cicero hadc in view an historical personage. Yet in my opinion Cicero's princeps is an unofficial leader, swaying the state by his wisdom and the prestige of his past services, as did Scipio in his last years, or Cicero himself in the struggle with Antony, not a magistrate however exalted. It is, I think, significant that there is not a word of any such magistracy in the constitution laid down in the Laws. At any rate, Cicero is so far imbued with the leading ideas of Greek philosophy that he is

1 cf. Reitzenstcin in Hermes. 59, p. 359 f. 2 ad (.F. iii, 5, '; cf. de Rep. v, i; de Of'. ii, 83.

de Rep. ii, 51; cf. also i, 45; ii, 67, 69. de Rep. v, 8. de Rep. v, 5, 6, 8 ; vi, I, 13.

6 cf. I-leinze in Hermes 59, p. 77. 7 de Rep. i, 65. 8 de Rep. i, 43-4. 9de Rep. ii, 55-7.

I de Rep. i, 51. I' de Rep. i, 44; iii, 44- 12 de Rep. ii, 62 f. ; iii, 44- 13 de Rep. i, 68-9. '1 de Rep. vi, 2.

1; cf. Heinze in hlermles 59, p. 75. 6 ad Att. viii, I1, 2.

de Rep. vi, i2, etc,




thinking at least as much ethically as politically and considering rather the duties of his ideal statesman than his rights. 1

Cicero regards with equal hatred the mob-rule of a Clodius, the natural precursor of tyranny, 2 and the ' Machtpolitik' of the triumvirate recently renewed at Luca, which he felt was fatal to republican liberty. His aim and purpose is to substitute the rule of law and right for the existing reign of force. He does not exclude a laudable ambition for leadership, but such ' adpetitio principatus ' 4

was only too apt to lead an exalted spirit to crave for excessive or exclusive power, 5 as had been shown, when the de Officiis was written, by the mad ambition of Caesar, who in pursuit of primacy had violated all law, human and divine, 6 and become a mere tyrant.' An ambition so selfish, so reckless of right, could not but lead to faction and civil war. It is utterly alien from the spirit of Cicero's ' rector rei publicae,' who will aim not at his own aggrandisement, but at his country's welfare. In this way he will attain a true primacy, not of power or office, but of merit, a position willingly conceded to him by the other leaders of the state. 8 And the aim of this true leader and guide of the commonwealth is the restoration of that ancient and glorious constitution, which has been perverted by the selfish ambi- tions of leading nobles, and ruined by the general decay of morals. 9

This reform he will promote by example, 1 0 as well as by his wisdom in guiding the state and its chief men. In this way and this way alone can we find a place and function for the ' moderator rei. publicae ' within the bounds of that mixed and balanced Roman constitution which Cicero idealised both in the glowing rhetoric of the speech for Sestius and in the soberer but more definite outlines of the Republic and the Laws.11

I cf. Heinze in Hermes u. s. p. 9I f. 2 de Rep. i, 68; cf. de Leg. iii, zi. 3 ad Att. iv, i8, 2 ; ad Q. F. iii, 5, 4. 4 de Off. i, 13- 5 de Off. i, 64. 6 de Off. i, 26; iii, 82.

de Off. ii, 23; cf. i, I ; iii, I9.

8 cf. Phil. xiv, I7, I8. 9 de Rep. v, i.

'Ode Rep.ii, 69. 11 I have not seen Sprey, de Al. Tullii Ciceronis

politica doctrina (I929), but gather from Pohlenz's

review (in Gnomon 6, pp. 292-7) that he emphasises, as I have done, the connexion between the de Legibus and the de Republica, and holds also that Cicero wished to restore and reinvigorate the old Roman constitution-the ideal Republic of the speech for Sestius-in which there would be no room for the Principate of an individual. Nor have I seen Cicero on the Cosssnsonceealth, translated with notes and introduction by G. H. Sabine and S. B. Smith (Ohio University Press, 1929), but have found the translation and notes of C. W. Keyes in the Loeb series (1928) very useful.



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Cicero's Ideal in His de Republica