CHURCHLAND 3:FUNCTIONALISM (317-321)

FUNCTIONALISM:MIND =

INFORMATION PROCESSING

FUNCTIONALISM

1] Metaphysical basis of Cognitive Science

2] Functional objects/concepts: chair, heart, wing, Beethoven’s 5th

3] Main metaphor (from computing):mind/brain = software/hardwaretranslation: mind relates to brain as software relates to hardware

1. Heir to Behaviorism(p. 317,see pp. 309-11 for behaviorism)

Behaviorism:

1) Stimulus 2) Response

Functionalism:

1) environmental effects [stimulus]

+ 2)other mental states

3) bodily behavior

2. Functional Isomorphism (pp317-18)

[Functionalism accommodates Multiple Instantiation]

Animal, alien (or computer) made of different substance than we are could have same mental state/s as us, if s/he (it) has state/s with same function.

[Think of chairs/stoves/etc. made of very different materials with different designs.]

3. Essence of mental (p. 318 top left)

What makes a mind a mind is

its function—not its substance.

[Core idea:

each type of

mental state/process/ability/etc.

is some sort of

information state/process/ability/etc.]

4. Token Identity Materialism (p. 318)

[type/token = kind/instance]

Type identities: H2O = water mind = brain;

consciousness = brain processToken identities: that chair = steel structure

this mind = this brain that mind = that computerthis pain = this brain process

that pain = that hydraulic process

5. Methodological Autonomy (p. 318)

Just as Software Engineering(design and construction of software)

is distinct from Computer Engineering (design and construction of computer) So too Psychology (study of brain function)

is distinct (hence autonomous) from Neuroscience (study of brain biology,

chemistry, physics, etc.)

Arguments against Functionalism

1. Inverted Qualia Argument (318-19)Qualia = qualities of consciousness

Red may look to me like green looks to you, etc., though we both call red “red” (are functionally identical).

Different qualia may have same function, so functionalism is incomplete: it does not tell us what each other’s experience is like.

Arguments against Functionalism

2. Absent Qualia Argument (319-20)If we built a robot that was functionally like a

human, how do we know it has any qualia at all?

Suppose, for instance, the robot was controlled by a building full of experts via a radio link—are we really to think that somehow the robot (+ experts) actually has (have) consciousness?

“ZOMBIES”

Arguments against Functionalism

3. Species Specific Identities (320-21).

Temperature is a single property that is instantiated differently in a solid, a liquid, a gas, or a vacuum. BUT there are still type identities:

e.g, temp in a gas =

mean kinetic molecular energy

By Analogy: perhaps

Consciousness in a human = brain process