58

Christianity at the Crossroads:E. Y. Mullins, J. Gresham Machen,and the Challenge of Modernism

Sean Michael Lucas

Sean Michael Lucas is the Archives

and Special Collections Librarian at the

Boyce Centennial Library of The South-

ern Baptist Theological Seminary. He

also serves as the Associate Director of

the Center for the Study of the South-

ern Baptist Convention. Mr. Lucas is

completing his doctoral studies at

Wesminster Theological Seminary in

Philadelphia. He has published other

articles and writ ten a number of book

reviews.

IntroductionBy the end of the First World War, reli-gious conflict loomed on the horizon inthe United States. Theological liberals co-operated with denominational loyalists togain control of northern Baptist and north-ern Presbyterian denominational machin-ery.1 As the liberals consolidated theirgains and insulated themselves from criti-cism from the left, they also found them-selves trying to protect their position fromthe theological right. Theological conser-vatives, stirred awake by large-scalechurch union plans of the InterchurchWorld Movement and the AmericanCouncil on Church Union, began toexamine in earnest the naturalistic presup-positions of the liberals. For some conser-vatives, the examination of liberalnaturalism extended to the creation of theworld and the consummation of the age.These conservatives, taking the moniker“fundamentalist,” pledged to do “battleroyal for the fundamentals.” Rallyingaround forceful propagandists such as J.Frank Norris and William Bell Riley, fun-damentalists organized under the bannerof the World’s Christian FundamentalsAssociation. Generally focusing on evolu-tion, Riley and Norris coordinated theattack on naturalism within the Northernand Southern Baptist denominations. Oth-ers, such as William Jennings Bryan, led thefundamentalist crusade against evolutionin the northern Presbyterian Church.2

The attack on theological liberalism, or

modernism, did not come solely from fun-damentalists.3 Other evangelicals of amore scholarly bent were troubled equallyby the challenge of naturalistic modern-ism. E. Y. Mullins, president of The South-ern Baptist Theological Seminary, andJ. Gresham Machen, professor of NewTestament at Princeton Theological Semi-nary, sought to answer the challenge oftheological liberalism for their respectiveconstituencies. That Machen contendedfor traditional forms of orthodoxy is wellknown to historians of American religion.His Christianity and Liberalism (1923) is stillan important window on the issues thattroubled American Protestantism in the1920s. Less well known is Mullins’s ownadamant defense of supernatural Chris-tianity. Typically praised as the “Baptistexponent of theological restatement,”Mullins issued numerous responses tomodernism in the 1920s that rivaledMachen’s better-known writings in inten-sity and thoughtfulness.4

Mullins and Machen did not merelyfocus on their theological opponents. Infact, at the height of the controversy,Mullins and Machen exchanged criticismsof each other’s positions. Though Mullinsdid not respond directly to Machen’sChristianity and Liberalism, Mullins didissue his own critique of modernism inChristianity at the Cross Roads (1924), a cri-tique that bore a striking resemblance toMachen’s own forceful statement. The fol-lowing year, Machen extended his argu-

59

ments from Christianity and Liberalism withthe publication of What Is Faith? (1925).Machen then turned his attention toMullins early in 1926, using many of hisarguments from his own recent book tocritique the Southern Baptist in the pagesof the Princeton Theological Review. Laterthat year, Mullins responded to Machen’scriticisms by reviewing the Princetonprofessor’s What Is Faith? in SouthernSeminary’s Review and Expositor.

The exchange between E. Y. Mullinsand J. Gresham Machen demonstrates sig-nificant differences in the way evangeli-cal theologians met the challenge ofmodernism in the 1920s. Whereas Mullinsbelieved that religious experience pro-vided an unanswerable apologetic forChristianity, Machen argued that thosewho used religious experience as the soleapologetic for the Christian faith weretraveling down a road that was anti-intellectual. In contrast, Machen arguedthat doctrine must provide a basis forreligious experience; one can only believein someone known. Mullins disagreed,charging Machen with bare intellectual-ism and at points ignoring Machen’s care-fully nuanced approach. There werenumerous reasons for this differencebetween Mullins and Machen—differentepistemic starting points, theologicalemphases, and conceptions of the theo-logical task. In the end, Machen was cor-rect to view Mullins’s approach toapologetics involving significant conces-sions to modernism, concessions that werenot worked out by Mullins himself, butwere fleshed out by later Southern Bap-tist theologians.

Machen Confronts ModernismMachen’s confrontation with modern-

ism arose from his protests against Pres-

byterian efforts at ecumenism. After the1920 General Assembly, Machen burstupon the denominational consciousnessthrough three articles written against thePlan of Union, developed by the leadersof the Conference on Organic Union andsponsored by his own PresbyterianChurch. The so-called “Philadelphia Plan”proposed the organic union of all main-line churches into one entity that wouldbe called “The United Churches of Christin America.” This united church wouldbuild on the already established FederalCouncil of Churches, offering more thana “federal” unity in uniting all commun-ions around an abbreviated creed. Whatparticularly drew Machen’s ire was thatthe president of Princeton Seminary,J. Ross Stevenson, presented the plan tothe 1920 General Assembly.5

Machen’s articles in The Presbyterian

charted the argument that he would makein greater detail against modernism inChristianity and Liberalism. In the firstarticle, “The Proposed Plan of Union,”Machen deconstructed the preamble of the“Plan,” demonstrating that the “sharedbelief” of the cooperating denominationsomitted “all of the great essentials of theChristian faith.” He argued also that thePlan relegated the creeds of the churchesto “purely denominational affairs.” TheWestminster Confession was not “a purelydenominational affair” especially for thoselike Machen who believed it was true.Machen extended his critique in “ForChrist or Against Him,” arguing that “thenew union is committed to a denial of theChristian faith. For the Preamble is thor-oughly anti-Christian.” Machen dissectedthe views of one of the chief advocates ofthe Plan, George Richards, the chairmanof the Committee on Deputations for theAmerican Council of Organic Union, in

60

order to support his contention. In thefinal article, “The Second Declaration ofthe Council on Organic Union,” Machensharpened his critique of the preamble toits final form, arguing that the Plan ofUnion “is anti-Christian to the core.” Itwas anti-Christian because “it is simply amanifesto of that naturalistic liberalismwhich is the chief enemy of Christianityin the modern world.” For supporters ofthe plan, doctrine was merely the state-ment of the given age and changeable;likewise, the only doctrines admitted intothe preamble were ones that could beaccepted by “modern naturalism.” Thisplan relegated the full body of theReformed faith, as represented by theWestminster Confession, to the back-ground in the hope that “the importanceof divisive names and creeds and meth-ods will pass more and more into the dimbackground of the past.” Machen invitedthose who desired a broad church to unitein their own church on naturalistic prin-ciples. Naturalism should not be forcedupon confessional Presbyterians in “aunity of organization which covers radi-cal diversity of aim.” Institutional unityshould be gained through confessionalunity; instead, liberals were setting con-fessional unity aside in favor of a unity ofexperience and the vague tenets of natu-ralized religion. The challenge of modern-ism was becoming clear to Machen.Theological modernists sought the controlof Machen’s beloved Presbyterian Church.The challenge of modernism was very realand very personal.6

Machen extended his critique of mod-ernism and the modern church unionmovement in Christianity and Liberalism.7

The key issue of the day was “the relationbetween Christianity and modern cul-ture.” Modernists believed that the way

Christianity may be maintained in theface of “new science,” both physical andhistorical science, was either to adaptChristianity to the naturalism of modernscience or to isolate Christianity fromscientific investigation. Those who chosethe latter course and blithely claimed that“religion is so entirely separate from sci-ence, that the two, rightly defined, can-not possibly come into conflict” actuallyespoused skepticism toward any sort ofknowledge. The former solution involvedreligion making a series of concessions tonaturalism and resulted in “a religionwhich is so different from Christianity asto belong in a distinct category.”8

Machen argued that these modernistsolutions to the relationship betweenChristianity and culture—either conces-sion or separation—were anti-Christianand unscientific. In order to demonstratethe charge that modernism was anti-Christian, Machen arraigned theologicalliberalism against the standard of Chris-tian orthodoxy as set forth by theWestminster Standards. As D. G. Hartrightly notes, Christianity and Liberalism

reads more like a primer in Christiantheology, less like a piece of theologicalpolemic.9 Before Machen expounded spe-cific doctrines, he noted a key differencebetween theological modernism and his-toric Christianity—historic Christianityasserted the priority of doctrine overexperience. Machen carefully clarified therelationship between doctrine and expe-rience—for example, Machen argued thatdoctrine came logically prior to experi-ence, though perhaps not temporally priorto experience, and that right doctrine pro-duced holy experience. Even with theseclarifications, Machen argued strongly forthe priority of doctrine. Christianity wasa testimony based on a factual narrative.

61

This historical narrative was not merely alisting of brute facts, but it also containedthe meaning of these facts. This meaningwas doctrine; thus, doctrine was at the veryheart of the Christian religion. If the liber-als successfully did away with doctrine,they were not merely attacking “Calvin orTurrentin or the Westminster divines,” butthey attacked “the very heart of the NewTestament.” Machen argued that “ulti-mately, the attack [against doctrine] is notagainst the seventeenth century, butagainst the Bible and against Jesus him-self.” Thus, one basic difference betweenChristianity and liberalism was that “lib-eralism is altogether in the imperativemood, while Christianity begins with a tri-umphant indicative; liberalism appeals toman’s will, while Christianity announcesfirst, a gracious act of God.” Liberalismpromoted life, Christianity proclaimed amessage; liberalism held forth experience,Christianity taught doctrine.10

Having defended the priority of doc-trine in the Christian life, Machen exam-ined theological liberals’ views on majordoctrines—God, humankind, the Bible,Christ, and salvation. According toMachen, modernism presented a God whowas one with the world process, a God whowas solely immanent; Christianity wor-shipped “God transcendent.” Modernismoffered a “supreme confidence in humangoodness”; Christianity proclaimed thereality of sinful human nature. Modernismaffirmed Christian experience as its soleauthority; Christianity defended theauthority of the inerrant Scriptures. Mod-ernism esteemed Jesus as an example of aman’s faith in God; Christianity wor-shipped Jesus, the God-man, the object offaith. Modernism presented the atonementas a hortatory example of self-sacrifice;Christian held forth the atonement as a

one-time substitutionary sacrifice for sinand the only way of salvation.11

As result of the vast difference betweennaturalistic modernism and supernaturalChristianity, Machen argued that it isinconceivable that the two religionsshould abide in the same institution. “Aseparation between the two parties in theChurch,” Machen proclaimed, “is the cry-ing need of the hour.” If modernism andChristianity should not coexist withinthe same denomination, they certainlyshould not coexist in an united church likethat proposed by the Plan on ChurchUnion. Those who advocated churchunion on a minimalist creed were not onlysetting aside doctrines that conservativeevangelicals held to be true, but they werealso promoting a dishonest program. Itwas dishonest because churches like thePresbyterian Church established confes-sions as part of their constitutions. Tooccupy teaching or ministerial positionswithin a confessional church while war-ring against that church’s established, con-stitutional positions was a dishonest useof the funds provided by well-meaninglaypeople. As a result, theological liber-als in every denomination should aban-don their churches and form their ownliberal denominations.12

Christianity and Liberalism was releasedby Macmillan in February, 1923. In the fewshort months after its publication, thebook raised a firestorm of protest. Forexample, Gerald Birney Smith of theUniversity of Chicago claimed thatMachen’s work was “futile,” not onlybecause Machen failed to inquire “whyChristian men in such numbers are grow-ing ‘liberal,’” but also because Machensought Christianity through “an author-ity which we are not at liberty to criticize.”Focusing claims of authority in an iner-

62

rant Bible was futile, Smith claimed,because decades of intensive study of theBible have demonstrated that the Bible “isnot the kind of book which ProfessorMachen assumes, and that it cannot beused as he proposes to use it for the settle-ment of doctrinal questions.” Likewise,W. O. Carver, longtime professor of mis-sions at Southern Seminary, railed againstChristianity and Liberalism. Carver claimedthat “the whole book has in it no note ofattraction.” Carver believed that Machenset up straw men and did not engage realmodernists at all. In addition, Machenfailed to reckon with the work of the HolySpirit and was very pessimistic about themodern age. Even more to Carver’s point,he charged Machen with stressing exclu-sion of modernists instead of inclusion ofall “true believers” and with failing to drawmodern science and the social life ofhumankind within his authorial vision.13

Machen pressed on with his attack ontheological liberalism in What is Faith?,

published in 1925. Whereas Christianity

and Liberalism sought to argue that mod-ernism was anti-Christian, Machenclaimed in What is Faith? that modernismwas unscientific. In making the chargethat modernism was unscientific, Machenmeant that, by relying on ineffable reli-gious experiences, theological modernismwas fundamentally anti-intellectual andhence, unscientific. Part of this anti-intel-lectual tendency in theological liberalismwas due to the spirit of the age. Machenwrote, “The depreciation of the intellect,with the exaltation in the place of it of thefeelings or of the will, is, we think, a basicfact in modern life, which is rapidly lead-ing to a condition in which men neitherknow anything nor care anything aboutthe doctrinal content of the Christian reli-gion, and in which there is in general a

lamentable intellectual decline.” The eleva-tion of the emotions or volition and deni-gration of the intellect led, in Machen’sview, to a concomitant exaltation of expe-rience and denigration of doctrine.14

The modernist code word for religiousexperience was “faith.” Modernistsbelieved that faith was an ineffable expe-rience devoid of doctrinal content and thatit was possible to separate faith fromknowledge. Machen argued against thisconception of faith by expoundingReformed doctrine once again. Before dis-cussing the doctrinal knowledge that wasprerequisite for having faith in God,Machen defined the ways the intellect“has been dethroned” in the modern reli-gious situation. Machen’s first examplewas the modernist’s “distinction betweenreligion and theology.” Theology, modern-ists argued, was the “changing expressionof a unitary experience.” As a result, the-ology “can never be permanent, but issimply the clothing of religious experiencein the forms of thought suitable to anyparticular generation.” Hence, the twen-ties saw numerous creeds that attemptedto replace the historic creeds of thechurches. The main difference, Machenargued, between modern-day creeds andthe historic creeds was that “the historiccreeds, unlike the modern creeds, wereintended by their authors or compilers tobe true.” Modern creeds, on the otherhand, were merely meant to be the latestexpression of religious experience thatmay change if religious experiencechanged and that may contradict othercreeds written by other generations. Thisnecessarily led to a devaluing of religiousknowledge in favor of religious experi-ence. However, faith that minimized orsubtracted doctrinal knowledge “is notfaith at all. As a matter of fact, all true faith

63

involves an intellectual element; all faithinvolves knowledge and issues in knowl-edge.” Faith must have doctrinal contentto be true faith.15

For this reason Machen set forth vari-ous doctrines in order to demonstrate hownecessary they were for faith. Against theprevailing pantheism of modern liberal-ism, Machen argued that God is a “freePerson who can act,” who has acted increating the world, in governing all things,and in revealing himself to humankind.Machen described this God as holy andtranscendent, distinct and independentfrom his creation. “It is because we knowcertain things about Him, it is because weknow that He is mighty and holy and lov-ing,” Machen argued, “that our commun-ion with Him obtains its peculiar quality.The devout man cannot be indifferent todoctrine, in the sense in which many mod-ern preachers would have us be indiffer-ent. Our faith in God, despite all that issaid, is indissolubly connected with whatwe think of Him.” Against modernistswho saw Christ as an example of faith,Machen argued that Jesus Christ is theobject of faith. As the object of faith, therewere many things that people needed toknow about Jesus—particularly, his atone-ment and resurrection. Against those whoargued that humankind’s great need wasto have faith in the divine within, Machenargued that faith can only be born from arealization of an individual’s great needas a sinner. Against modernist theologianswho argued that the Cross was an exampleof self-sacrifice, Machen claimed that atthe Cross, Jesus satisfied the wrath of Godand provided salvation for his people.Machen believed that saving faith in Jesus’finished work at the Cross brings God’sjustification to the individual. The justi-fied individual will then produce good

works to the glory of God. However, thiswas the Gospel order—faith in Christ pro-duced works for his glory.16

As a result, the division theological lib-erals made between doctrine and experi-ence was anti-intellectual and unscientific.What was needed, Machen argued, was arecovery of the Christian Gospel, whichhas at its heart doctrinal content. A recov-ery of the Gospel would bring a “greatrevival of the Christian religion; and withit there will come, we believe, a revival oftrue learning: the new Reformation forwhich we long a pray may well be accom-panied by a new Renaissance.” Learningand faith, doctrine and experience, wenthand in hand; Machen believed that bothwere necessary in order to answer thechallenge of modernism.17

Mullins Confronts ModernismThroughout his early career as presi-

dent of the Southern Baptist TheologicalSeminary, E. Y. Mullins supported ecu-menical endeavor. Mullins cooperatedwith northern Baptists and maintainedfriendly relationships with key leaderssuch as A. H. Strong, Shailer Matthews,and William R. Harper. Mullins’s associa-tion with these notable Baptist educatorsled him to join the Baptist TheologicalFaculties’ Union. Mullins also led in Bap-tist ecumenism, serving as president of theBaptist Young People’s Union of Americaand the Baptist World Alliance. He lentcautious support to the Federal Councilof Churches. While it does appear thatMullins later distanced himself from hismore progressive counterparts in theNorth, he shared their concern for wit-nessing to the unity of the church, or atleast, to the unity of Baptists. Thus,Mullins did not share Machen’s concernsabout modernism’s spread through the

64

church union movement in the 1920s.18

Mullins, rather, became concerned aboutthe heterodox direction that many of hisprogressive colleagues were taking dur-ing the second decade of the twentiethcentury. Though Mullins often adaptedprogressive views to state his evangelicalopinions, Mullins’s basic evangelicalismand unwillingness to consider the logicaloutcome of his positions kept him frommoving to heterodox conclusions. As onewriter notes, “Mullins’s theology stoodstill in this decade [the 1910s], while theliberals moved toward scientific modern-ism.” It was this movement by his pro-gressive friends, such as Shirley JacksonCase and Shailer Matthews, to radicalpositions that caused Mullins to protestagainst “modernism.”19

When readers picked up the secondissue of Southern Seminary’s Review and

Expositor for 1923, the lead article wasMullins’s diagnosis of “The Present Situ-ation in Theology.” Reprinted from thepages of the northern Baptist newspaper,the Watchman-Examiner, Mullins assailedmodernism in terms reminiscent ofMachen’s Christianity and Liberalism.Mullins opened by wondering if historicChristianity would survive the attacks ofmodern liberalism. Mullins believed thatthe “new orthodoxy” was a radical formof naturalism that understood everythingin terms of “the law of continuity.” As aresult, “the supernatural is banished” asan explanatory factor and rational natu-ralism was the controlling presupposition.For the new theologians, Jesus’ birth wasviewed as natural; his person as divine“only as are other men;” his mission as areligious sage or prophet; his role as anexample of “the highest degree of trust inGod;” his work as non-miraculous; andhis resurrection and ascension as non-

historical. However, the “new orthodoxy”was profoundly dishonest in that “it ismuch given to the use of the old terms,but with new meanings.” As a result, “itsdenials are even more clear and explicitthan its affirmations” and New Testamentreligion was “completely recast.”20

In order to combat the “new ortho-doxy,” Mullins argued that the dogmaticuse of “the law of continuity” was pro-vincial, subjective and not scientific at all.Modernism was unscientific because itwas disloyal to the facts, particularly “thesupreme fact of all history, Jesus Christ.”By displaying this extreme disloyalty tothe “fact” Jesus Christ, modernists weredisloyal to “the fact of Christ in the NewTestament records, to the fact of Christin history, and to the fact of Christ inthe Christian experience of redemption.”According to Mullins, modernism’s disloy-alty to the fact of Jesus Christ transformedChristianity “into something else entirelydifferent” than the religion “of the NewTestament.” Modernism’s challengedemanded that “it is time for the issue tobe made clear. There are those who will notcare to remain neutral when they seeclearly the present situation. We are boundto witness of the truth if truth is to prevail.If a man has convictions and refuses toexpress them in protest against opposingviews it is practically the same as if hehad no convictions.” Thus, in strains strik-ingly similar to Machen’s own, Mullinsdemanded that modernism be confronted.21

Mullins himself confronted modernismdirectly in Christianity at the Cross Roads.The modern spirit was characterized by“the principle of continuity.” Scienceadapted itself to the modern spirit byemphasizing natural development in allits disciplines. As a result, the reigningautocracy was “scientific absolutism.”

65

Science “has mounted the throne by tram-pling other rights under its feet,” Mullinsclaimed. “It is ruthless in its radicalism, andunlawful in its intellectual processes andmethods. Its influence has extended tomany departments of research besides thephysical.” Science has not been contentinvading other spheres and disciplines;science particularly focused on religion,remaking the Christian religion in its ownnaturalistic image. The only way that sci-ence could do this was by applying the cri-teria and methodology of science toreligion. As a result of this invasion ofreligion’s sphere by science, “conflict andconfusion abound.” If science, philosophy,and religion simply would not oversteptheir bounds, then each could work withthe other in harmony. Each discipline wasautonomous, pursued truth in its own wayand insisted upon “its own rights with itsown sphere.”22

Mullins delineated the “rights” eachdiscipline had. He believed that sciencehad “rights” in the area of nature. Mullinsargued that science “works with the prin-ciple of causality,” explaining events innature through the principle of continu-ity or development. Philosophy’s rightsconsisted in seeking “a single principlewhich will explain the universe.” Philoso-phy took the data supplied by science andattempted to see “the unity of all things”Its principle was “rationality.” Religion,in contrast, was “a personal relation”whose “chief quest is for God and salva-tion from sin.” It sought immortality,deliverance from guilt, and a relationshipwith the divine. Religion operated on theprinciple of “personality.” If science andphilosophy remained in their own spheresand operated according to their ownprinciples, there would be no conflict withreligion.23

Certainly there was overlap betweenthese three spheres. Religion welcomedinvestigation in the arena of facts, but itrefuted science and philosophy’s ten-dency to force their interpretive principlesupon it. “Religion as fact may be theobject of investigation by science and phi-losophy,” Mullins wrote, “But religion asa form of human experience cannot bemade to conform to the criteria and meth-ods of science and philosophy.” The Chris-tian religion insisted on the basic facts ofrevelation and experience. This did notmean, however, that Mullins himselfinsisted upon specific doctrines. Ratherdoctrines arose from the facts of the bibli-cal story and were distinct from thosefacts. Mullins stated, “By the Christian re-ligion, I mean that religion of which JesusChrist is the center and of which the NewTestament is the record. I do not mean anydoctrinal system which has arisen sincethe New Testament was written.” Mullinswent on to write that “while I have theprofoundest appreciation of the need andvalue of correct doctrines, never the lessthe argument of this book is concernedprimarily with facts rather than formalsystems of doctrine.” Facts were distinctfrom doctrine; doctrine derived from facts.An honest restatement of the facts ofChristianity and a reaffirmation of the dis-tinct spheres of science, philosophy, andreligion were necessary to win the dayagainst modernism.24

In order to reaffirm the distinct spheresof science, philosophy, and religion,Mullins demonstrated how science andphilosophy encroached upon religion andreduced it from a supernatural religion toa naturalistic form of moralism. Modernscience forced its doctrine of materialisticcausation and development upon all factsand left no room for supernatural inter-

66

vention of any sort, especially the super-natural intervention of the incarnation.Modern philosophy, with its repeated pleafor a “sound metaphysic,” closed itself offfrom the facts of Christian world-view byinsisting upon a naturalistic and rational-istic world-view. The result was that thesupernatural was ruled out of bounds byrationalistic philosophy, which presidedas the final judge upon all knowledge.Historical criticism rejected any super-natural accounts in the New Testament,particularly “the miraculous, the Messi-anic, the apocalyptic teachings” of theNew Testament. The new field of com-parative religion claimed that the religionof the New Testament was drawn fromGreek and pagan mystery religions. Lack-ing a supernatural origin, the religion ofthe New Testament had neither divineauthority nor any claim upon the lives ofhumankind. All of these—modern science,philosophy, historical criticism, and com-parative religion—reduced historic Chris-tianity from a supernatural to a naturalreligion. However, they did so accordingto principles and methods that were for-eign to religion. Science and philosophyhave a right to their own spheres in orderto seek their own goals; however, whenscience and philosophy trespassed on therights of religion, they were illegitimate.

Alongside this reaffirmation of the dis-tinct spheres of science, philosophy andreligion, Mullins argued for the primacyof the irreducible fact of Jesus Christ inChristian experience and in history. Mod-ern liberalism had no way to meet “thestubborn fact of the sin, guilt, weakness,bondage of man.” Modernism simplyexhorted men with empty phrases. In con-trast, evangelical Christianity proclaimedgood news. Those who experienced thereality of God in Jesus Christ were deliv-

ered from the power and guilt of sin. Thisfact of experience was the most powerfulapologetic for the truth of Christianity.Mullins wrote that the reason Christianscan experience Jesus Christ rested onthe true facts of the New Testament.Mullins concluded his argument by argu-ing that when individuals exercised faithin Jesus Christ, they knew the fact of JesusChrist. This was a fact that cannot beexplained away by theological liberalism,by “scientific absolutism,” or by rational-istic philosophy.25

Mullins continued this line of argumentin his Fall 1925 Convocation Address atSouthern Seminary, entitled, “Christian-ity in the Modern World.” He describedfor his auditors “the supreme conflict ofthe ages” that Christianity faced. Restat-ing the argument of Christianity at the Cross

Roads, he argued that the scientific prin-ciple of continuity was not “opposed tothe ideas of God or religion, or Christ orthe soul or immortality or to Biblical teach-ing” per se. When scientific principles wereapplied in the realm of science, such prin-ciples proved helpful in explicating mys-teries of nature. However, when thisprinciple of continuity was applied toreligion “it has gradually tended towardsthe elimination of all the great spiritualfacts and values” of the Christian religion.As a result, ideas such as personality, God,and immortality, in addition to all tracesof supernaturalism in the New Testament,were done away with by virtue of theconsistent and radical application ofmaterialistic development to the Christianreligion.26

In response to this attack, Mullinsargued that Christians defended theirfaith by insisting, first, “that our faith restsupon facts.” Pleading for a Baconianapproach to the New Testament, Mullins

67

insisted, “Facts must precede worldviews. World-views are built upon facts,not facts on world-views. World-views,therefore, must take their shape from factsas these are established.” By using theinductive method, avoiding the positingof naturalistic presuppositions, humanbeings would come to a measure of thetruth. By insisting upon the facts of theNew Testament, evangelicals should notfollow the advice of “a recent liberalwriter” who claimed that one must “dis-tinguish between changing categories andabiding experiences.” Such advice was“based upon fallacious reasoning.” Mul-lins argued that Christianity was rootedin historical narrative and its subsequenthistory depended on the truth and realityof its beginnings. To rationalize away theresurrection as a category no longeroperative for the modern mind was to doaway with the heart of the Christian reli-gion. Mullins declared, “The resurrectionof Christ is not a changing category ofthought. It is a historical fact. You cannotreproduce the historical fact but you can-not escape the necessity of it.” 27

A second line of defense for Christiansin the modern situation was that religionrepresented, at bottom, “a redemptiveexperience of God’s saving grace throughChrist.” Though theological liberalism andhistoricism challenged biblical Christian-ity, Mullins argued that “religious certaintyis religiously conditioned. In the redeem-ing experience through Christ we find God,and true knowledge. We then return to theScriptures with new confidence and assur-ance.” Science and philosophy could notgrant certainty; only the redeeming expe-rience of Jesus Christ could. Indeed, thispragmatic test was one that Christianitywould always pass—the Christian religionalone could “remake men.” 28

Thus, E. Y. Mullins responded to therelativizing forces of the new historicalconsciousness, which he termed “continu-ity” or “development,” by arguing thatChristians were truly scientific becausethey displayed “loyalty to facts.” Chris-tians alone were loyal to the ultimatefact—the fact of Jesus Christ as experi-enced by the individual. This “fact” couldnot be challenged by science or philoso-phy when these disciplines invaded thesphere of religion. Though science andphilosophy reduced Christianity to anaturalistic religion, and though moderntheological liberalism cooperated with“scientific absolutism” by adapting reli-gion to historicism, Christians could notcower or hide because they knew God byexperience. As Mullins puts it, “If menbelieve they can sweep this ocean out ofits bed, or remove this Matterhorn fromits base, or turn back the current of thisGulf Stream in the ocean of man’s reli-gious life, let them try. But at the same timelet them remember that they are prima-rily fighting not a system of doctrine, orany particular form of doctrinal propa-ganda. They are fighting life itself, at itsdeepest and most significant level; the lifethat is in Jesus Christ, whom men knowas Redeemer and Lord, as the completionand realization of the religious ideal, whois made unto them wisdom, righteous-ness, sanctification, and redemption.”29

Machen and Mullins’s ExchangeMachen judged Mullins’s response to

modernism to be insufficient. When thefirst issue of the Princeton Theological

Review was published for 1926, it con-tained a lengthy review essay entitled“The Relation of Religion to Science andPhilosophy,” in which Machen reviewedMullins’s Christianity at the Cross Roads.

68

Machen opened his review by noting theareas of agreement between Mullins andhimself. Both saw the issue as “betweenChristianity on the one hand and some-thing that is radically opposed to Chris-tianity on the other.” Both insisted on“genuine theism” against the pantheismthat was prevalent in modernism. Bothinsisted on the prevailing supernatural-ism of the Bible. Both insisted on “ground-ing Christianity in historical facts.” Yetwith all this agreement, Machen saw sig-nificant differences between his apologeticapproach and Mullins’s. First, Machendisagreed with Mullins’s separation offact and doctrine. Machen believed that itwas not true “to say that the New Testa-ment presents merely the facts and leavesit to later generations to set forth themeaning of the facts. On the contrary theNew Testament sets forth the meaning ofthe facts, as well as the facts themselves;and it sets forth the meaning of the factsas a result of supernatural revelation.”Machen declared, “From the beginning,the apostles said not merely, ‘Christdied’—that would have been a bare fact—but they said, ‘Christ died for our sins,’and that was doctrine.” The Bible gaveChristians doctrine as well as “facts.”Modernist theologians argued that “theyaccept the facts about Christ and merelypresent a new interpretation of the facts.”By divorcing fact and doctrine in the sameway as the modernist, Machen believedthat Mullins unwittingly played into themodernists’ hands.30

A second, and more central, area of dis-agreement between Machen and Mullinswas Mullins’s “sharp separation betweenthe spheres of science and philosophy andreligion.” Machen believed that this sepa-ration leads “logically into an abyss ofskepticism.” By dividing these spheres,

Mullins could be misconstrued as sympa-thizing with those who argued that theconflict between science and religionmight be solved if religion dealt with the“realm of ideals” and science dealt withthe “realm of facts.” In contrast, Machenargued that there was no real conflictbetween science and religion, “notbecause the Bible does not teach thingswith which science has a right to deal, butbecause what the Bible says about thosethings is true.” One example of this wasthe resurrection. Not only was the resur-rection a religious question, but it was alsoa question that must be answered by“historical science.” For Machen, histori-cal “science can establish, and if it betruly scientific will actually establish, theresurrection of our Lord. Yet the resurrec-tion of our Lord is vitally important forreligion. The Bible then, in recording theresurrection, most emphatically doesteach science; and the separation betweenscience and religion breaks down.” Thedistinctiveness of the various spheres ofreligion, science and philosophy, whichMullins praised, Machen reprobated: “Forour part we hold that the notion of thedistinctiveness of the spheres of scienceand religion, far from being a great recentgain, is one of the chief forms that havebeen assumed by modern unbelief, andthat its increasing prevalence is one of themost disastrous features of our time.” Thisdistinction between science and religionappeared similar to the modernist’sseparation of doctrine and experience andwill lead ultimately to the same “anti-intellectualism which is now attacking theChristian religion at its roots.”31

Machen also disagreed with the wayMullins separated the sphere of religionfrom philosophy. Mullins’s argument thatphilosophy dealt with “rationality” while

69

religion dealt with “personality” seemedobtuse to Machen. “How can religion pos-sibly work with the principle of personal-ity without also working with theprinciple of rationality, which personalitycertainly involves?” Machen asked. Inaddition, it appeared that Mullins’s argu-ments were incoherent. Machen demon-strated the incoherence of Mullins’sposition by using the example of theexistence of a personal God. Historically,the existence of a personal God wasestablished by use of the “theistic proofs.”These proofs belonged to the realm ofphilosophy even though the question wasa fundamentally religious one. Yet Mullinsplaced little importance on the classicproofs for God’s existence, arguing forGod’s existence on the basis of anindividual’s self-authenticating experi-ence of Christ. But by doing away withthe classic intellectual proofs for theexistence of God and by locating certaintyof God’s existence to the vagaries of one’sown heart, Mullins minimized “what theBible (especially Jesus Himself) says aboutthe revelation of God in nature.” Thoughsin obscured that knowledge of God ingeneral revelation, this did not mean thathuman beings could not know somethingabout God. If they did not know Godthrough general revelation, “the fault doesnot lie in philosophy but only in philoso-phers,” Machen wrote. “The evidence forthe existence of a personal God wasspread out before us all the time, but wefailed to discern it because of the intellec-tual effects of sin.” Those who knew theSpirit’s regeneration had the effects of sinremoved. This, however, did not removethe necessity of the theistic proofs orphilosophy in general. Machen wrote,“The experience of regeneration does notabsolve us from being philosophers, but

it makes us better philosophers.”32

Machen continued his argumentagainst the autonomy of the “spheres” byfocusing on Mullins’s claims for religion’sautonomy. In particular, Machen saw inMullins’s separation of doctrine fromexperience and concomitant exaltation ofexperience the same tendency of “present-day anti-intellectualism.” In particular,Machen believed that “it is dangerous toadopt the shibboleths of modern anti-intellectualism in the course of an intel-lectual defense of the Christian faith.”Certainly, Machen agreed with Mullinsthat Christianity was not merely intellec-tual; but even though the intellect wasinsufficient, it was not rendered unneces-sary. There was doctrinal content thatmust be known in order to believe in JesusChrist. In addition to this doctrinal knowl-edge, there must be the illumination ofthe Spirit that takes away the veil fromthe eyes of men or women so that theycould believe. Doctrine must be coupledtogether with experience. Machen pro-claimed, “We are pleading, in other words,for a truly comprehensive apologetic—anapologetic which does not neglect thetheistic proofs or the historical evidenceof the New Testament account of Jesus,but which also does not neglect the factsof the inner life of man.” According toMachen, Mullins neglected the intellectand started down an “anti-intellectualpath.”33

Mullins responded to Machen’s criti-cism by reviewing the latter’s What is

Faith? in the second issue of Review and

Expositor for 1926. Mullins focused in hisbrief review upon Machen’s objection toMullins’s distinction between the spheresof religion, science, and philosophy.Mullins objected first to Machen’s empha-sis upon “intellectualism as the founda-

70

tion of faith.” Mullins believed thatMachen overreacted to the anti-intellec-tualism of the day and posited humanbeings “as bare intellect.” Such bareintellectualism did not offer hope to indi-viduals because “it lacks the necessaryexperience of God’s grace throughChrist.” Not only this, but also intellectu-alism “leads to agnosticism when theinstability of its results appears.” Intellec-tualism could not provide the sort ofknowledge of God that the New Testa-ment offers to believers. Mullins assertedthat the New Testament offered the“knowledge of God [that] comes throughthe experience of God in Christ.”34

In addition to this, Machen failed todistinguish adequately between broadand narrow uses of the word “science.”Machen conflated a broad understandingof science (defined as “the acquisition andorderly arrangement of a body of truth”)with a narrow understanding of science(a scientific discipline such as chemistryor biology). This led to confusion in hisdiscussion of the relationship of scienceand religion. In particular, Machen’s dis-cussion confused exactly what “sciencecan and cannot do. Chemistry is put on aparity with theology, and theology isstripped of its power to explain becauseit is classified as a science.” Science pro-claimed “truth discovered by carefulresearch for physical causes.” Only reli-gion offered truth that explained the firstcause of all things by producing theologyand doctrines that serve as explanationsof the biblical facts. This theology, whenobserved in its own sphere, gave individu-als certain knowledge.35

AssessmentThe exchange between E. Y. Mullins

and J. Gresham Machen demonstrated

significant differences in the way evan-gelical theologians met the challenge ofmodernism in the twenties. In particular,Mullins and Machen differed in twoareas. First, the two theologians differedon the relationship between doctrine andexperience in biblical Christianity. Mullinsmet the challenge of modernism by argu-ing that Christians had an experience thatscience could not understand nor analyze.This experience of Christ proceeded anyreal understanding of facts and even couldtranscend understanding. “Christianitydoes not say renounce reason but onlywaive your speculative difficulties in theinterest of your moral welfare,” Mullinswrote. In order to demonstrate the truthof various doctrines, one did not needintellectual proof; rather, one simplypointed to the reality of Christ in the soul.Doctrines such as the deity of Christ andthe authority of the Scriptures were settledby Christian experience. For Mullins,experience of Jesus Christ preceded doc-trinal understanding.36

Machen argued in opposition thatChristian experience did not precede theintellectual grasp of certain doctrines. Theintellect apprehended certain doctrinalfacts about God, sin, Jesus Christ, and sal-vation; this intellectual apprehension logi-cally provided the basis for experiencingChrist. Even for children, who exercised“child-like faith” in Jesus and who maynot understand the intricacies of Christiantheology, Machen argued that “at no pointis faith independent of the knowledgeupon which it is logically based; evenat the very beginning faith contains anintellectual element.” For Machen, “it isimpossible to have faith in a person with-out having knowledge of the person; farfrom being contrasted with knowledge,faith is founded upon knowledge.” Chris-

71

tianity was not anti-intellectual; rather, itwas based upon intellectual content. Onedid not apprehend Christ experientiallywithout a doctrinal foundation. Thus, therelation of reason and experience was akey difference in the way Machen andMullins responded to the challenge ofmodernism.37

Second, Mullins and Machen differedon the relationship between science andreligion. Mullins tried to meet the chal-lenge of modernism by keeping thespheres of science and religion separate.Science dealt with systematizing physicalfacts of the universe, with matter. Religion,on the other hand, dealt with the person-ality of the individual, with spirit. AsMullins wrote, “The Bible is the inspiredliterature of religion. Science is the unin-spired literature of nature. These twoliteratures move on different levels. Theycan never collide any more than an eagleflying high in the air can collide with alion walking on the earth.” Machen dis-agreed with Mullins at this very point.Machen believed that Mullins’s radicalseparation of science and religion “leadslogically into an abyss of skepticism.”Though the Bible was not a textbook onscience, when the Bible dealt in the realmof science, it “represents the facts as theyare.” Further, the Bible could not beshielded from science, for the doctrines atthe heart of Christianity must be “scien-tifically” appraised. The resurrection andthe doctrine of God’s existence both wereestablished on testimonies that could beappraised by the “science” of history andthe canons of philosophy. In Machen’sview, to claim a special sphere for religioustruths that cannot be examined by sciencewas naïve and anti-intellectual.38

These two differences between Mullinsand Machen point to larger disagree-

ments, ones that shaped and colored thenature of their respective theologies.One disagreement was philosophical innature. Though Mullins disingenuouslyclaimed that “philosophy cannot supplya stable basis for religion,” he wasindebted to the same epistemology—experiential foundationalism—thatshaped liberal theological thought at theend of the nineteenth century.39 Mullinsused insights from historicism, particu-larly as developed in the personalism ofBorden Bowne and the pragmatism ofWilliam James, in order to craft a progres-sive, mediating position. Mullins hopedthat this mediating position would shieldfaith from the corroding acids of the newhistory. Ironically, Mullins’s mediatingposition, though progressive at the turnof the century, appeared “conservative”by the time fundamentalists challengedtheological liberalism in the 1920s. More-over, because Mullins drew upon the samephilosophical tradition as the modernists,he was not able to distinguish his mediat-ing position from his opponents.40

Machen, on the other hand, wasindebted to the Princeton version ofScottish Common Sense Realism. Thoughat times Machen appeared to embrace“ahistorical” positions, declaring thatChristianity was based on “timeless facts”that did not change, Machen’s realism hadmore nuance than some interpreters givehim credit for. He wrestled with the rela-tionship of faith and history throughouthis work in New Testament studies andcame to conclusions that were restrainedfor someone often deemed a “fundamen-talist.” Yet Machen’s theory of knowledgediffered from the position staked out byMullins because Machen emphasized theunconditional nature of truth, a realitythat was not dependent upon individual

72

experience. “A thing that has happenedcan never be made by the passage of theyears into a thing that has not happened,”Machen wrote. “All history is based upona thoroughly static view of facts. Progresscan never obliterate events.”41

These divergent epistemological start-ing points explain the different emphasesthat each theologian employed. BecauseMullins’s theory of knowledge empha-sized the role of experience in providing asure foundation for knowledge, Mullins’stheological endeavor took humankind asits starting point. This led to Mullins’s mostfamous contribution to Baptist theology—the doctrine of “soul competency.” Thoughthe idea of soul competency was muddiedduring the recent controversy within theSouthern Baptist Convention, soul compe-tency meant that “the individual is com-petent to believe and thus to experience thetruth of Christianity.” Though soul com-petency, thus defined, would seem merelyto provide a basis for the free offer of thegospel to all people, Mullins used “soulcompetency” to assert a radical individu-alism from all external authorities. Mullinswrote in Axioms of Religion that “directaccess to God through Christ is the law ofthe Christian life. It is a species of spiritualtyranny for men to interpose the churchitself, its ordinances or ceremonies, or itsformal creeds between the human soul andChrist.” Human beings were free to inter-pret the Scriptures for themselves: “Sincethe Reformation this axiom has foundexpression in nothing more than in theexercise of the individual’s right of privateinterpretation of the Scriptures. It guaran-tees the right of examining God’s revela-tion, each man for himself, and ofanswering directly to God in belief andconduct.” Human beings served as thecenter and the final judge in Mullins’s

theology.42

Machen, in contrast, emphasized thesovereignty of God. Both of Machen’sattacks on theological modernism began bycritiquing the modern approach to God.For Machen, “rational theism, the knowl-edge of one Supreme Person, Maker andactive Ruler of the world, is at the very rootof Christianity.” The knowledge of this Godwas the basis of religion. God has notremained silent but has revealed himselfto his creatures. God took the initiative inthe salvation of humankind by the incar-nation and the crucifixion event; and Godtakes the initiative in the application ofredemption by regeneration. At everypoint along the way, the priority of God’ssovereignty was the center of Machen’stheology.43

Mullins and Machen also conceived ofthe theological task differently. WhereasMullins believed that theological restate-ment was the task for theologians in eachgeneration, Machen viewed himself as theconservator of an interpretative tradition.This was seen most clearly in their con-trasting attitudes on creeds. Mullinsargued that there was a “need for restat-ing its [the Christian religion’s] doctrinesin terms of the living experience of eachgeneration. Human creeds are valuable assuch expressions. But they do not serveall the ends of doctrine. We must everreturn to the Scriptures for new inspira-tion. We must ever ask anew the questionsas to Christ and his relations to the needsof each generation.” If theology was sim-ply the restatement of Christian experi-ence for each generation, and if creedswere the expressions of restated theology,then there is nothing wrong with devel-oping new creeds. Mullins claims that“new creedal statements are put forth toprevent government by the ‘dead hand.’

73

That is why there are so many Baptist con-fessions of faith. No group of Baptists canbind another group by any such statementof beliefs. Creeds tend to become stereo-typed in the course of time. New andvital statements are needed. To keep ourfaith alive we restate it from time to time.”In contrast, Machen argued that theologi-cal advance would come by reformation,not innovation. Doctrines are not a sum-mary of Christian experience but rather“are summary statements of what Godhas told us in His Word.” If doctrines wereto be understood with greater precisionin a later age, Machen doubted that “thedoctrinal advance which it or any futureage might produce would be comparableto the advance which found expression inthe great historic creeds.” Machen did notsee this position as “inimical” to progress;rather, having a creed or confession thatwas viewed as true and that had a long,rich, historic tradition, “removes theshackles from the human mind and opensup untold avenues of progress.” UnlikeMullins, who argued that churches mustinnovate and restate doctrines accordingto present experience of the age, Machenbelieved that churches should return tothe traditions of past generations, particu-larly, the traditions of the Reformed faith.This was only way that churches can make“doctrinal advance.”44

The tension between doctrine andexperience, science and religion, was notsimply one felt at the beginning of thetwentieth century; this same tensionremains to the present day. At the end ofthe twentieth century, the tension betweendoctrine and experience has been resolveddecisively on the side of experience. Twoexamples will suffice. One of the mostpopular books published in the 1990s wasExperiencing God by Henry Blackaby and

Clyde King. In the opening paragraph inthe first chapter, the authors wrote, “Jesussaid that eternal life is knowing God,including God the Son—Jesus Christ.Jesus did not mean that eternal life is‘knowing about God.’ In the Scripturesknowledge of God comes through expe-rience. We come to know God as weexperience Him in and around our lives.You will never be satisfied just to knowabout God. Really knowing God onlycomes through experience as He revealsHimself to you.” Although the authorsemphasized in a later chapter someattributes of God that could be considered“doctrinal,” they set doctrine (“knowingabout God”) and experience (knowingGod) in opposition with the emphasisdecidedly upon experience. Moreover, theattributes of God that the authors set for-ward are divine love, omnipotence andomniscience; no mention of God’s holi-ness, righteousness, or justice is made.Why? Perhaps these latter doctrineswould change the authors’ picture ofGod’s relation to humankind. The reasonGod created humankind was to pursue a“love relationship” with them. Yet itappears that this “love relationship” isdenuded of content, is sentimental andsyrupy, and worst of all, neglects largeportions of the biblical account of disciple-ship. One reason for this imbalanced viewof discipleship is that the authors of Expe-

riencing God resolved the tension betweendoctrine and experience on the side ofexperience. Blackaby and King’s under-standing of discipleship has little doctri-nal content.45

It would not be a far leap from disciple-ship with little doctrinal content to salva-tion with little orthodox doctrinal content.Such was offered as an “evangelical”solution to the problem of world religions

74

by Clark Pinnock, a former professor at aSouthern Baptist Convention seminaryduring the late 1960s. Pinnock argued thatthere is such a category as “pagan saints,”who stand outside the Christian churchbut fear God and seek righteousness.Because God is immanent in the world,because God granted knowledge of him-self through creation, and because Godexercises prevenient grace to all men,Pinnock argued that it is possible for thosewho are “pagan saints” to be saved. Pin-nock wrote, “Faith is what pleases God.The fact that different kinds of believersare accepted by God proves that the issuefor God is not the content of theology butthe reality of faith.” Religions may helpor hinder the individual’s “subjectivefaith”; for Pinnock, objective religion mat-tered very little. If an individual was aBuddhist, “we must not conclude … thathis or her heart is not seeking God. WhatGod really cares about is faith and not the-ology, trust and not orthodoxy.” In bothPinnock and the authors of Experiencing

God, the tension between doctrine andexperience was resolved in favor of expe-rience. For Blackaby and King, the resultis a thin, sentimental view of the Chris-tian life; for Pinnock, the result is some-thing far worse. And yet, there is aconnection between the two positions.46

Indeed, there is a connection betweenthese contemporary positions and Mul-lins’s own views. By so emphasizingexperience, Mullins often sounded no dif-ferent from the theological modernists ofhis own day. That he remained thoroughlyorthodox was due as much to his upbring-ing and denominational context as to histheological speculation. Machen’s evalu-ation of Mullins’s approach to apologeticswas on the mark: “The epistemologicalerror (so we are constrained to regard it)

in certain passages in the book is notaltogether important; for however theconsequences may be avoided (through asalutary inconsistency) by Dr. Mullinshimself, those consequences are likely notto be altogether avoided by others. It isdangerous to adopt the shibboleths ofmodern anti-intellectualism in the courseof an intellectual defense of the Christianfaith.” For over seventy years, SouthernBaptists have harvested the shallow dis-cipleship and vapid theology that resultedfrom sowing Mullins’s theological seedsof experience. It is time to return to theemphases of the founders of the South-ern Baptist Convention, trained in thehardy doctrinal tradition of the Princetontheology. If we do, perhaps God wouldbe pleased to grant us a new Reformationthat will lead to a new Renaissance.47

ENDNOTES1 The best study on theological liberalismis William R. Hutchison, The Modernist

Impulse in American Protestantism (Cam-bridge: Harvard University Press, 1976;reprint, Durham: Duke University Press,1992); See also Daniel D. Williams, The

Andover Liberals: A Study in American

Theology ([1941] New York: Octagon,1970); Sydney Ahlstrom, “Theology inAmerica: A Historical Survey,” in The

Shaping of American Religion, ed. JamesWard Smith and A. Leland Jamison(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1961) 279-308; Stow Parsons, “Religionand Modernity, 1865-1914,” in The Shap-

ing of American Religion, 369-401. The bestcollection of documents is William R.Hutchison, ed., American Protestant

Thought in the Liberal Era (Lanham: Uni-versity Press of America, 1985).

2 Martin Marty, Modern American Religion:

The Irony of It All, 1893-1919 (Chicago:

75

University of Chicago Press, 1986)17, 23-24, 47-62; Bradley Longfield,The Presbyterian Controversy: Funda-

mentalists, Modernists, and Moderates

(New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1991); Barry Hankins, God’s

Rascal: J. Frank Norris and the Begin-

nings of Southern Fundamentalism

(Lexington: University Press of Ken-tucky, 1996); William V. Trollinger,God’s Empire: William Bell Riley and

Midwestern Fundamentalism (Madi-son: University of Wisconsin Press,1990).

3 I am not making a distinction herebetween theological liberalism andtheological modernism; in my viewthe differences between the twoare essentially a matter of semantics,contra William Hutchison, The Mod-

ernist Impulse in American Protestant-

ism. I do, however, recognize adistinction between theological andcultural modernism, as pointed outby D. G. Hart, “When Is a Funda-mentalist a Modernist? J. GreshamMachen, Cultural Modernism, andConservative Protestantism,” Jour-

nal of the American Academy of Reli-

gion 65 (1997) 605-633.It is important to make a further

distinction between modernism,theological or cultural, and moder-

nity. Theological modernism was atheological shift precipitated bythe rise of historicism, the affectsof which are described below; cul-tural modernism was a move awayfrom Victorian moral codes towarda cynical realism best representedby writers such as H. L. Menckenand Sinclair Lewis. In distinctionto these two uses, modernity isan ethos shaped primarily by

Enlightenment faith in reason.Curtis Freeman faults Mullins foraccommodating modernity in histheological formulations; however,it is difficult to point to any theolo-gian after 1750 who did not adaptto modernity, if modernity is under-stood as that ethos shaped byEnlightenment faith in reason. Cf.Curtis W. Freeman, “E. Y. Mullinsand the Siren Songs of Modernity,”Review and Expositor 96 (1999) 23-42;Timothy D. F. Maddox, “E. Y. Mul-lins: Mr. Baptist for the 20th and 21st

Century,” Review and Expositor 96(1999) 87-108.

4 Bill Thomas, “Edgar Young Mullins:Baptist Exponent of TheologicalRestatement,” (Th.D. diss., TheSouthern Baptist Theological Semi-nary, 1963). The best biographicalsource for Mullins is William E.Ellis, “A Man of Books and a Man of

the People”: E. Y. Mullins and the Cri-

sis of Moderate Southern Baptist Lead-

ership (Macon: Mercer UniversityPress, 1985); the best biographicalsource for Machen is D. G. Hart,Defending the Faith: J. Gresham

Machen and the Crisis of Conservative

Protestantism in Modern America

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-sity Press, 1994).

Interestingly, Robison Jamesdraws a parallel between Machenand Mullins in his article, “BeyondOld Habits and on to a New Land”in Beyond the Impasse? Scripture,

Interpretation and Theology in Baptist

Life (Nashville: Broadman, 1992)125-127. Although he does get to theheart of the difference betweenMachen and Mullins—the relation-ship between doctrine and experi-

ence—the discussion is so clumsy asto negate the very point James triesto make. James was corrected byR. Albert Mohler, Jr., in ibid., 249-250.

5 Martin Marty, Modern American

Religion, Vol. 2, The Noise of Conflict,

1919-1941 (Chicago: University ofChicago, 1991) 15-58; Robert A.Schneider, “Voice of Many Waters:Church Federation in the TwentiethCentury,” in Between the Times: The

Travail of the Protestant Establishment

in America, 1900-1960 (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1990)95-121; Samuel Cavert, The Ameri-

can Churches in the Ecumenical

Movement, 1900-1968 (New York:Association, 1968), esp. 112-113;idem, Church Cooperation and Unity

in America: A Historical Overview,

1900-1970 (New York: Association,1970); Eldon G. Ernst, Moment of

Truth for Protestant America (Mis-soula: Scholars Press, 1972); D. G.Hart, “Christianity and Liberalism ina Postliberal Age,” Westminster

Theological Journal 56 (1994) 35-36; D.G. Hart, “The Tie that Divides: Pres-byterian Ecumenism, Fundamental-ism, and the History of Twentieth-Century American Protestantism,”Westmin-ster Theological Journal 60(1998) 85-107; Ned B. Stonehouse,J. Gresham Machen: A Biographical

Memoir (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,1954; reprint, Carlisle: Banner ofTruth, 1987) 240-297, 303-314; Hart,Defending the Faith, 45-47. The reportthat includes the Plan of ChurchUnion is in the Minutes of the Gen-

eral Assembly of the Presbyterian

Church in the United States of America

(1920) 117-122.

76

6 J. Gresham Machen, “Proposed Planof Union,” Presbyterian 90 (10 June1920) 8-9; J. Gresham Machen, “ForChrist or Against Him” Presbyterian

91 (20 Jan 1921) 8-9; J. GreshamMachen, “The Second Declarationof the Council on Organic Union,”Presbyterian 91 (17 Mar 1921) 8, 26;William J. Weston, Presbyterian Plu-

ralism: Competition in a Protestant

House (Knoxville: University of Ten-nessee Press, 1997) 21-48, 59-101.

7 In between Machen’s trip to the 1920General Assembly and the publica-tion of Christianity and Liberalism, hedelivered an informal address to theChester Presbytery Elders’ Associa-tion on November 3, 1921. Thataddress was published in the Prince-

ton Theological Review as “Liberalismor Christianity?” Princeton Theologi-

cal Review 20 (1922) 93-117 andserved as the basis for Machen’swell-known book.

8 J. Gresham Machen, Christianity and

Liberalism (New York: MacMillan,1923; reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerd-mans, 1994) 1, 2, 4-5, 6-7.

9 Machen, Christianity and Liberalism,7; Hart, “Christianity and Liberalism,”329-344; idem, Defending the Faith,65-83.

10Machen, Christianity and Liberalism,23, 27, 29, 44-46, 47. For Machen’sbalance of doctrine and experience,see also Paul Kjoss Helseth, “TheApologetic Tradition of the OPC,”Westminster Theological Journal 60(1998) 109-129, who argued con-vincingly contra Wacker, A. H.

Strong.11J. Gresham Machen, “God Transcen-

dent,” in God Transcendent, ed. NedB. Stonehouse (Grand Rapids: Eerd-

mans, 1949; reprint, Carlisle: Bannerof Truth, 1982) 15-22. Importantly,the shortest chapter in Christianity

and Liberalism is the one on the Scrip-tures, raising questions concerningthe alleged importance of biblicalinerrancy for the Princeton Theol-ogy; see D. G. Hart, “A Reconsid-eration of Biblical Inerrancy andthe Princeton Theology’s Alliancewith Fundamentalism,” Christian

Scholar’s Review 20 (1991) 362-375,contra Thomas H. Graves, “BiblicalAuthority and the Forgotten Spirit,”Review and Expositor 95 (1998) 538-541.

12Machen, Christianity and Liberalism,160-167. D. G. Hart rightly pointsout that Machen’s logic againstchurch union over a minimalistcreed cuts against fundamentalistunions as well; see “The Tie thatDivides,” 85-103.

13Gerald Birney Smith, “A Short andEasy Way of Dealing with Liberals,”Journal of Religion 3 (1923) 541-544;W. O. Carver, Review of Christian-

ity and Liberalism, Review and Exposi-

tor 21 (1924) 344-349.14J. Gresham Machen, What is Faith?

(New York: MacMillan, 1925;reprint, Carlisle: Banner of Truth,1991) 13-14, 18, 23.

15Ibid., 26, 28, 29, 40.16Ibid., 50, 54, 59, 65, 75 (emphasis

his), 91-92, 98, 102, 121, 154.17J. Gresham Machen, “The Modern

Use of the Bible,” in What is Chris-

tianity?, ed. Ned B. Stonehouse(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951)200.

18Ellis, “A Man of Books and a Man of

the People,” 63-64, 73. For Mullins’srelationship with Strong, Matthews,

and Harper, see the correspondencein the Mullins Papers, Boyce Cen-tennial Library, The Southern Bap-tist Theological Seminary.

19Ellis, “A Man of Books and a Man of

the People,” 128; E. Y. Mullins, “TheJesus of ‘Liberal’ Theology,” Review

and Expositor 12 (1915) 174-192. Ithink Ellis is correct in his appraisalof Mullins’s theological develop-ment in the 1910s, which makes hisevaluation of Mullins’s theology inthe 1920s curious. As Mullinsworked through the controversiesof the twenties, Ellis sees Mullinsbecoming more conservative, mov-ing away from his earlier progres-sive positions in an effort tomaintain a mediating position(Ellis, “A Man of Books and a Manof the People,” 185-208; cf. FisherHumphreys, “E. Y. Mullins,” in Bap-

tist Theologians, ed. Timothy Georgeand David Dockery [Nashville:Broadman, 1990] 343-345). How-ever, it seems more likely thatMullins remained essentially staticin his theological development,while other progressive theologiansmoved to more radical positions.This caused Mullins to look quiteconservative in comparison, mask-ing his essentially progressive theo-logical positions.

20E. Y. Mullins, “The Present Situationin Theology,” Review and Expositor

20 (1923) 129-132.21Ibid., 133-137.22Mullins, Christianity at the Cross

Roads (New York: George H. Doran,1924) 17-19, 30, 32-33.

23Ibid., 31-32.24Ibid., 33, 39, 43, 273.25Ibid., 240, 244-253.

77

26E. Y. Mullins, “Christianity in theModern World,” Review and Exposi-

tor 22 (1925) 474, 478, 480.27Mullins, “Christianity in the Mod-

ern World,” 483, 484, 485. The“recent liberal writer” is undoubt-edly Harry Emerson Fosdick. Seehis The Modern Use of the Bible (NewYork: Macmillan, 1924), chap. 4,“Abiding Experiences and Chang-ing Categories.”

Interestingly, W.O. Carverreviewed Fosdick’s Modern Use of

the Bible very positively in Review

and Expositor. Of the chapter, “Abid-ing Experiences and Changing Cat-egories,” Carver wrote, “It will alsobe found that which is most likelyto be a turning point to faith andpeace for many a puzzled soul. Itwill help any who care to do so tounderstand Dr. Fosdick more thananything else he has written.” Andthough he has some minor criticismof the book, particularly when com-pared to his review of Machen’sChristianity and Liberalism, Carvercloses by writing, “In an epiloguethe author bears ‘a personal testi-mony’ of his own experience withthe Bible, after saying: ‘Here, thenends our study where any study ofthe Bible ought to bring us, stand-ing in reverence before our Lord.’Are there any who are unwilling forDr. Fosdick to stand thus in the com-pany of the reverent before ourLord?” (Review and Expositor 22[1925] 257-261). For a very differentview of Fosdick’s book, see Machen,“The Modern Use of the Bible,” inWhat is Christianity?, 185-200.

28Mullins, “Christianity in the Mod-ern World,” 486.

29Mullins, Christianity at the Cross

Roads, 276.30J. Gresham Machen, “The Relation

of Religion to Science and Philoso-phy,” Princeton Theological Review 24(1926) 38, 41, 42.

31Ibid., 45, 46, 47, 50-51; Mullins,Christianity at the Cross Roads, 86.

32Machen, “The Relation of Religionto Science and Philosophy,” 53-55,57-60.

33Ibid., 61, 63, 64.34E. Y. Mullins, Review of What is

Faith?, Review and Expositor 23 (1926)199, 200-202.

35Mullins, Review of What is Faith?,

203-204. Machen makes the samecomplaint about Mullins’s use of the“science”; see Machen, “The Rela-tion of Religion to Science and Phi-losophy,” 51.

36E. Y. Mullins, “The Testimony ofChristian Experience,” in The Fun-

damentals, 4 vols., ed. R.A. Torrey, etal ([1917] Grand Rapids: Baker,1998) 4.319-320, 323; idem, The

Christian Religion in Its Doctrinal

Expression (Valley Forge: Judson,1917) 10-11; idem, “The TheologicalTrend,” Review and Expositor 2 (1905)519.

37Machen, What is Faith?, 94.38Mullins, Christianity at the Cross

Roads, 26; Machen, “The Relation ofReligion to Science and Philoso-phy,” 46-47.

39On the epistemic revolution at theturn of the century, see the follow-ing: Grant Wacker, Augustus H. Strong

and the Dilemma of Historical Con-

sciousness (Macon: Mercer Univer-sity Press, 1985) 27; idem, “TheDemise of Biblical Civilization,” inThe Bible in America: Essays in Cul-

tural History, ed. Nathan Hatchand Mark Noll (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1982) 121-138;Theodore Bozeman, Protestants in an

Age of Science: The Baconian Ideal and

Ante-Bellum American Religious

Thought (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1977); GeorgeMarsden, “The Collapse of Ameri-can Evangelical Academia” in Faith

and Rationality: Reason and Belief in

God (Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1983); idem,“Everyone One’s Own Interpreter?The Bible, Science and Authority inMid-Nineteenth-Century America,”in The Bible in America, 79-100; E.Brooks Holifield, The Gentleman

Theologians: American Theology in

Southern Culture, 1795-1860 (Dur-ham: Duke University Press, 1978);Sydney Ahlstrom, “The ScottishPhilosophy and American Theol-ogy,” Church History 24 (1955)257-72.

40Mullins, Christianity at the Cross

Roads, 172; idem, Why is Christian-

ity True? (Chicago: Christian Cul-ture Press, 1905) 4; Thomas J.Nettles, “Edgar Young Mullins,” inHandbook of Evangelical Theologians,ed. Walter Elwell (Grand Rapids:Baker, 1993) 65; Humphreys, “E. Y.Mullins,” 343-345; Clyde J. Hurst,“The Problem of Religious Knowl-edge in the Theology of EdgarYoung Mullins and Walter ThomasConner,” Review and Expositor 52(1955) 166-182; William Ellis, “EdgarYoung Mullins and the Crisis ofModerate Southern Baptist Leader-ship,” Foundations 19 (1976) 171-185;Leo Sandon, Jr., “Boston UniversityPersonalism and Southern Baptist

78

Theology,” Foundations 20 (1977)101-108; Maddox, “E. Y. Mullins: Mr.Baptist for the 20th and 21st Cen-tury,” 95-97. For one example ofMullins’s use of both Bowne andJames in the same article, see Mul-lins, “The Testimony of ChristianExperience,” passim.

41J. Gresham Machen, “Does Funda-mentalism Obstruct Social Prog-ress?” in What is Christianity? ed.Ned B. Stonehouse (Grand Rapids:Eerdmans, 1951) 244. On Machen’sepistemology, see J. GreshamMachen, The Christian Faith in the

Modern World (New York: Mac-millan, 1936) 87-102; GeorgeMarsden, “J. Gresham Machen, His-tory and Truth,” Westminster Theo-

logical Journal 42 (1980) 157-75;Wacker, Augustus H. Strong, 21-24;D. G. Hart, “Common Sense andPrinceton Mind,” Westminster Theo-

logical Journal 46 (1984) 1-25; PaulKjoss Helseth, “’Right Reason andthe Princeton Mind: The Moral Con-text,” Journal of Presbyterian History

77 (1999) 13-28; idem, “The Apolo-getic Tradition of the OPC,” 109-129.

42Mullins, Axioms of Religion, 94-95;Freeman, “The Siren Songs ofModernity,” 34-37; William D. M.Carrell, “Edgar Young Mullins andthe Competency of the Soul in Reli-gion,” (Ph.D. diss., Baylor Univer-sity, 1993) 98; E. Glenn Hinson,“E. Y. Mullins as Interpreter ofthe Baptist Tradition,” Review and

Expositor 96 (1999) 109-122; JamesDunn, “Church, State, and SoulCompetency,” Review and Expositor

96 (1999) 61-74; Molly T. Marshall,“Exercising Liberty of Conscience:Freedom in Private Interpretation,”

in Baptists in the Balance: The Tension

Between Freedom and Responsibility,ed. Everett Goodwin (Valley Forge:Judson, 1997) 141-150.

43Machen, Christianity and Liberalism,55-56; idem, Christian Faith in

the Modern World, 13-31; idem, “MyIdea of God,” in My Idea of God: A

Symposium of Faith, ed. James New-ton (Boston: Little, Brown, 1926) 37-50; idem, The Christian View of Man

(New York: Macmillan, 1937) 1-83.44Mullins, Christian Religion in Its Doc-

trinal Expression, 10; idem, “Baptistsand Creeds,” in The Axioms of Reli-

gion, ed. Timothy and DeniseGeorge (Nashville: Broadman, 1997)187; J. Gresham Machen, “TheCreeds and Doctrinal Advance,” inGod Transcendent, 158-159, 166.

45Henry T. Blackaby and Clyde V.King, Experiencing God (Nashville:Broadman, 1994) 7-8, 79.

46Clark H. Pinnock, A Wideness in

God’s Mercy: The Finality of Jesus

Christ in a World of Religions (GrandRapids: Zondervan, 1992) 105, 111-112; Hutchison, Modernist Impulse,111-144. See also Molly T. Marshall,No Salvation Outside the Church? A

Critical Inquiry (Lewiston: EdwinMellen, 1993) and Ralph C. Wood,“Whatever Happened to BaptistCalvinism? A Response to MollyMarshall and Clark Pinnock onthe Nature of Salvation in JesusChrist and in the World’s Reli-gions,” Review and Expositor 91(1994) 593-608.

47Machen, “The Relation of Religionto Science and Philosophy,” 63.Though Curtis Freeman deems theview that the founders of the SBCwere Calvinistic an “etiological

myth,” he does not make a signifi-cant case for a variant point of view(Freeman, “E. Y. Mullins and theSiren Songs of Modernity,” 33).