CHmER xv

The 1dea that Indian ~luB1Smn were a separate

nation. oombined With the old .notion of parity between

the f.1uslim League and the Congress, strained IncUa-

Pakistan relations even after 1941. The tUncbmental Goal

of Pc:.W.1stan· 8 iorelsn and defence policies was to secure

external c11plomatlc and military sUpport to neutmUoe

tbe clout of a lar80l' and stronaer India. That is why

PalQStan entered into fore18n m1l1tary alllan~e3 ~ch had

an iml'Qrtant boor1na on the propenslty of the amy to

intervene. Banaladasb also suffers mm a sense of

stratealc vulnerability Qga1nst India and bea SC)~ foreign

diplcmatlc and mlUtary sUpport to \'d.don her stl'ateslo

opt1-ons.

The flQture and the consequences G~ theso Unkages

provide addod dlmmslons to the causes and consenueno~ of

military rule in South l\sis. t,fhat ~re tho ~k1stant and

the U.S. motives 1n entering Into a fOl:\'ilal allianoe? Wore

both the as-des sat1afle4 witb tbe otltcomE)? ~lbat wcwe the

conseQUences of the ralat10nsblp tor Pak1stan's fore.t~

and domeBt1c pollci0S? Is the flaw SGCurlty laIWcemcnt a

mere resurrections of the o~1i1na1 onet Or <bee it bay.

cUftertna X\:~lfleatlonn? Is Pakistan' s desire to ilguar4tt

her nonallatlMtm aenulne? What 10 tho nature of the

Amorican lnterest in Bilngladesbt lias the U.S. l'layed an

lntervantlonlst role 10 Danala40Sb pol1t1cs' Those GrQ

some of the questions \-Ib1ch the fOllowing pages ~u14

seek to answer.

II

R~%fitQdM Si2~¥ 6ql.!5'onsba

Contl'Q,I'Y to the oarUor bel1G.t that Pakistan

aoUSht oxtema1 mWtary atd only after India and Paklston

almost camo to ~ 1ft 1951. reoent pUbUcatlons obOtf how

Pa.k1s~-m sought US m111taJ'y SllPport a&ainst Ind1~ goom

!J.!tt£i.c~ ,w2 a1Di. On 1 Hay 1947 J1nnah told Thomas

. G. wall and Ra-~ A. Hare. two American oUlc1a).s. that

the ~stabllabment of 1\lklstan W1lS esemt1el to prevent the 1. . e~on of Hlnthl Smpar1oU. into the t41ddle East."

Alk1stan ma.de a fomal request for e5lO million to meet her 2

defence nseCle. t'hereaftor. Feftte Khan Noon, the ~Um

teague leader. handed e memomndun to Amer1can offioials 10

IstanbUl w1th a SUS6sstlon that Pakistan des~rved aid

becaase UDlSJee Indla., abo had ret\taed to open diplomatio

relations t11th the SovlGts. After J.lnnnb·o death. Prime

_...... I ••• A .....

1 t",.s. venkataraman1".~.fd~n ~ 1lJ BJlSlmam* ~ (NEM Deln1, .• pp. 1- ..

au., pp. 19.a>.

Mintstel' liaQU9t AU Kban summoned tbe Amer1can

Sl9.mi r4~"ta'm on 24 Septembe't 1949 and tnfosmed him

that emboldened by her Ueasy conQuest tt of Hyderabad and

Junngadh, IndlG \10u1d CVery soon seek an excuse for wsatna

oor on Pakistan" and hoped thtlt the U.s. would "protect J

Pak1eton from lndlnn aggression."

!r!li. VJ:mt,ftmQ t thg • ys~

I\l thouah aware ot Paktstan· s importance as a

atrategtcal' .. y-place<1 Muslim nat!OI'lt tbe U.S. waa 1nltlal1V

rolWltent to commit mUltary Uti wl~hout commensurate

returns. B&lt onoe P41d.stan was willing to pny an attraotive

price. the Amerioan perceptiQn changed. On 19 Octobe~ 1946.

M.A.H. lspaban1 t: tbe Pa1d.stanl Ambasetidol' to tbe u.s., po1r\ted out that 1n an ·emer~cy t Pak1stan 1+ can fom a

base both for military and nil' op'~Qt1ona." Ispnhanl

aWfUlly played the antl.Conunl.1l1st card:

Even the preservation of internal security • • .requ1res not only an efficient polloe but alao ••• a well 1;r'dned end e'lUipped amy_ ,

ThG Americans naturallY took more than n>ut1ne

stock o~ ZSpabanl t 9 orfer •

•• I t ..... __ II ICt ,. I _

.., !.W., p. 51.

4 !W--. p. 61.

, ~ •• p. 62.

At tils point, Q pro-Patdstant poltey coUld

ememe in Washington under iOl1r conCl1tlons. First, the

Britisb would have to convince President Trtrnan that

~klstan oould serve western lnterosta. Second, s~'Pport

for Rlk1atan w.;" contingent on Ind1a· 8 refusal to serve

western st.rate,ey. Third, Paklatan sboUld QiroG to SG~e

American 1nteresto. Fourth. the t1me and the vol1Jlls of

Amartcan mSl1tarv aid. to PaklstgD would depend on the

t'OSiOtVll balance of POWel' and the limit to whlcb Pakistan's 6

nalabbo~s coUld tolerate sueh aJ.<!.

Tbe flrut oonditlor\ was met \'ben Brlta1n. t'blch

bad an 1mportant beal'lt13 on Amertoan pollcy in Soutb Asu;,.

told the U tiS. that Pakistan was bGtter placed to seX'Ve

western strategy ~an ladl.o. blot only could support for

Paklatan elve access to Kashmir. a vital 11stenin6 post

close to the Soviot Union, but it coUld also ne\ltra11s~ the

radlcal lslwnio states 1~ by EaYPtts Nasser and lmnts

Mossadeq. The second <?Ondlt1on ms fulfilled. \-mm India

refusotl to 30ln antl.comaumlst all1ancea. Tb<a lUnodoans

accepted the British adVlce that it would b~ ctundeslrol>le

Gnd 4angerou9 ••• to pemlt the continuanco ot tho ealst,."

disparity 1n military strength between the t\l1() 1bmlnloM ,"

Henceforth. the U.8. would deviate £1"Om past polley and

treat Pa..td.atan as wll as Indla as equals.

81 ............. ..

6 1!1A4.. p. 10.

1 %~&4.. p. 73.

Tho olimate tor u.s .-Rudstnn Co-Opelr3tton \'lnS

thus created. 8y tha mlcS-fUtSe&, influential U.S.

mllitary advisers were t!1rectly att!Ached to the Paklstan!

an,y GHQ at Rawalplnd1 and the Amy PlarmlnB BoaI'd was

ostebUshea. Tbe lnstltl.lt1on of the Amerrican Mtl1t~

SUNGY Mission in FebN.:'\ry 1954 Wf}e followed by that of a

the MUltary Assistanoe Advisory Group (MMG) in OctobOr.

l=tflt.f1li1tU~1:w§!!Q\1tiU

A formal aftJ.matlon of the informal m11S,ta17

relatlollSblp did not tako long in ooming. Tbe y~tual

Defenoe AsG1stance AQreement of 19S4 was the first written

accoX'd. Pakistan also ;So1nec.t SBAi'O out 0'£ a Wish to butld

adtUt10nal security sote8u.ards against India and p~tect

Saat l'akistan. Fortlrled by tbo ~)Cotat1ona of support

against Indla, P'caklstan Joined tho kbGhc.tad Paot, later

callod ~'1ttO. SA Se1')tembe~ i~5. She ~n reportedly

p~pared to fulfil the American need for Q link between

SEM'<> and CENm. Furtbcntlorc. Paklstan even bad a strona 9

wisb. to .join NATO. Tbe U.s 4! .. Pakiatarl .lateral Asraenent

-u ( ]11 .. e

o~ 1959 \1QS tho eUl.mJnat1on of the OOClArtty relationship.

The most significant part of tb1e agre~nt \"11'1S the States

Paldstan .. Un1tedLConrnun1cattoflS Un1t 4areement ot 19 JulY

1959 which eave the U.S. eeRain m111ttar)' tocl11t1as,

lnel~ tbose at Peshawar •

• ~~' far ~!s,*~}ln!§ .€o~

The alllanc es serv-e4 Pak:lstan t S purpose of seCur1ng

support aaa1nst India only to El 11m1ted extent. A SEATO '"-

m~et11l3 afllmed -the neecl tOI" ~n ~y settlement of the

Kashmir questJ.on tbrouell th<! lh1ted r-latlons or by d1rect 10

negotiations. Q att during the 19G5 ~l1r \!1ith Ind1a. tho 11

SEAXO members refused to help ~stan. though lrun and

Tu~oy. tt<1O CENro members. dlcl provide sizable military

assistance. As for the U.S.... shQ imposed an anns ttttlbnrgo

on both tho oombatants. One 'dri.ter even e!ves the lnteJ'est­

ln6 1f debatable Q1l1wnent that tho effeot of. the etalUnnce

was to mCqq,g. Pakistan! military eapab1l1tyD against India.

...... 10

11

l'he U.S. influonce on t.'11lanc1a1 as well as m111tEl17 prioritIes in Pakistan. ensut'e<l 'tlv~t MAP (r~1Uta1"Y ASSistance Prosratnrao) fot'COG also bad a prier claim to the awUablo Ml~...L. ;"esoun:os. as agalnst non-MAP forces. au as Pakistan' s forces deploysd Vis-a.vis Indio and

-Aslam S1ddl~~. lkislan fliagka.,§e,QM!'1tX (l..abore.· 1960). Pi>. 14,...1 •

ihe only tsne!ble 691n for l1bl<1stan fX'om SEATO \1aS the recognitIon of tho llurand LinG, marking hor trontl.w \'11tb Af6IlIlt11strm.

-167-

t(aohmlr ••• the subStantial cuts that 8p-pl1ed in Pakistan in 19&> en f-ore1Sn currency allocations tor military punmaoes abn>aa. Qff~ted loraely the non ... MAP forces. 12

Nor VilS Pald.stan able to wrest conoesSions on

kashmir. It anytb1ns. Ind1s f s attltudG bar4enGd after

Pak10tan .jolned tho alllances. Nebna fl-ankly declar04

that the military relationship \'las a atom of .lnteNentlonn

In the KaGhmlr problQIl and Ind1e. must ftl\tltah\ full liberty

to keep ouch forces and military eqUipment 1n Kashm.1r as

we ~ conslder necessary in View of thiS now threat to

us." l.ike the Indl.ans. the Sov1ets were h!.8bly cMlY&lnec!

at Rlklstants willingness to pmvlde bases tor anti­

CornmWlist activities. The Counsellor of th9 Psk1stan

Embasay 1n Nosco~t was GtDIlloned by KbtuShchcw and mmed

that tho Sovlets would "have to alm our rockets at your 14

baflea as t'1el1 Q Wlless Ame rican plGnes \'WrG prevented fn.m

spying over the u.s.s .R. f1~m Paklstan! terr1tory.

"',IE.' 11",,- t.tr 2rtW..... I J

12

13

14

AlaVi, n. 8. p. 69* .Lamb_ n. 9. p .. 86. Indlats opposition to areat pot,ier lnterSerenco 1n ttle re~ was in ~ull accord with the philosophy of B8ypt 0 Nasser. ~ne the Anslo-Frenoh invasIon of Egypt 1n 1956, India was ntn>n{)ly supportive of NasEWr. Contr'al'11Y! ca~bt in the web of the ~~stem alUGnoes. Pat(ls"an found herself 1n the paradoxical position of support1~ tbe inVaders and actln& against a fellow Islamic country ..

2t.\lf1kar All lh~to. NQ\'( J.3ag:tiooa (London. 1900). p. 110.

· !'l~~AJS!!l!tlV...2.~lQI

1b~e 1a a tal~ tlOlOtmt 01 ,c1~t9!1U!!1 evlClSnce

tbat iiattiatan' G mil.itary alllaDoe with the U.S. p;ave the

lotte!' the clout to intervene in ftltUstants domestlc

po-l1t1co and even ·to GLd the co~s of 1954 all4 19Sa~ 1'0

begin t'1!th.. thore 1s no evidence o£ U.S. "nvol vement ~

Llaeuat All Khants Qsaaas1nation and the institutton of the

rUle by the c1v$.1~ltary l)&1reauon.cy in 1951. Hcn'l"wel'<t

thore is a J)8as1bJ.l1ty that the U.S. kne\1 about it but chose 15 .

not to tam L14~t. Some proof of the Amet'1can 1\'>10 in, tno events of 1954 *1ch bro~t Gh\4. fifobammed into

power does exist. turing the vla1t of Prime M1n1ster

~lobatnmad 411 to the u.S ~ 1ft 1~', Govemol'ooGeneral Oh\4am

MdL-1r!mled sent an urgent meGsnae racal11ng AU to taco

domestiO polltlaQl tro~los.

ibe Ulllted states Government rtt4alnad ••• cal$ Land 7 .... did not sct as tboueh lt had been taken by st1rprlse ••• a secret A1d~ MElfnoue : ••• was han4e<l ov.r to Qen~ A.yul) Khan on 10 Ootobel' 19". Ill: W!X fT. . elQbWna<1 Ali ~ce1ve4 tho veme . eneml's d1~ectl"'e to retum hOttte.: 16

Rcmco.. tbe inference can be drawn that the U.S.

qUiotly conn! vod at ChUlam l>'!ol'lamme4' a ~oup iI in 1954.

lnt~Gt1t1g1Y, ItlkandaF M1l'2a {'JaB despatched to LOlltt>n e't

15 Valkataramanl .. D. 1. P!,h 191. .. 192.·

16·· ~.;. pp. ~7..m ...

a~ound the same time. 61v1n& rise to the bellet that

Ml~. Ghulam and Ayub were acting 1n conjunction. After

sssunina power, Ghulam ~lohemmod dlsmlesed Fazlu1 Haqjs

United b~ont MWstry 1n the east. This took plaee pn1~

alum ._a e(tq£ the ~tual Defenca Asc;istance Agreanent

of 1954 had been signed.

Scmu writers have alloged Q direct llmar100n hanCl

in the 1959 coup. Accordln& to one: author, "the c1vl1

service, the amy and 'the C .1.4. t1 comb"ned to pr'$Vent the

6enerol elections o£ 19sa fJ'Om tatd.na place. t1Ayubf s

brother was later to alleae that the C .1./4.. was dofinitely 11

lnvolved" and that lts ltconnlw.ncoo In the ooUP \'8S

oertain.

It 1s dUfioUlt to provldo dlrect e'11dance of u.s. Involvement in the ooup. But tho cil'Cunatancas lnt11eate

that the U.5. had a role. On' May 1958, during a vis1t to

the U.s.. AyUb entered in his diary that he had

met AJ.1an tblles D.!rector. Centrol Inte111eence ~e.noY...l and ~hanke4 b1m for putting his blbtber (tho Secretary or state) .,. ~ in the picture reaardll13 Sur. 1P.m~_; 19

A~"Ub bad discussed the "prcblem n l4tb ~Ula.."l Dullea

<wen ~rllor. AlthoU8b Ayub did not spell out the problelll,

I'.". II'VtI f n

17

18

it waG elear .fran his diary that the ,fo~hcom1rl& \ 19

elections would br1na "nothing but ~.I.ft Just pno~ to

the coup, it was

inconceivable that the 00 Einbasay the . CIA. Statlon.. and the US t«11tary lsslstanee Advisory QXOQl> rQna1no4 totally in th~ dartc. •• '. 'lll.G Ele~~r .AltDln1Strat1on was. hO'V/ever •• It t:-concemev only vtith ita OWll tJilnodiate requ..1.rementUi and not t<J1th Pakistan's long-tenD prospeots. a> na&loal1y. the U.s. let wenta wfold themselves

alncEt Ayub was s';ImPathGt10 to Amer.S.can 1ntarest8~ Soon

a~~ the <;oup, U.5. DotenQ0 S(JC Mary Nell Me BlotY

'11 s1t~1C1 Rlklstan on 2, October 1950 and had separate

meet1t13s ''11th President iUt"te and Ayub t 4yUb cln1uled

later 'that scme "tr1ends Q bad warned hJ.m about lolJina· a 21

disloyalty end that he had doct<1ed to flth1nk 1t over."

It Ayubfc $<!S!Quelloe of wente is aCQurate, tb1s happened

3v.st ~lben be! wan hostln& the U.S. valence Seoretary. On

2100tobe:r 1958 Mirza was eseed out and sant on e.xUe.

U1UIer the Qlrcumatarices. 1t lallOt 4t.ftleUlt to de&ace that

tbo Amer10ans were the Ittrtends Q to \'bom Ayub had referred. rtcwever. As&htU" Khan1s vQrslon Ls that the a.s,

wae not a pany to mna·s o'usterit \tben Ayub ea1led tl

meotMe of forQ1gn ambassadoJ'S to WOnl tbem about Mlna"s

overtht'OW., tbe

-ill .... ,.... a ' J • " • II •

19 au-, p- m. 20 ru4.. p. 392. 21 lW.. p. 395.

us Ambassador reacted sbal'plY to the newts., •• The reaotion •• _ sU83este4 that the Unlted States had more than normal interest 1n the matter ••• tile coup of 1 Oct()b~ was carried out w1th the kmwledgo of. 1t not eneouraao­ment tro:n tbe 80vernmentfJ of •• '. the t.blte4 States and Great Br1ta1n.~u this vas ••• however. ~t ••• tlNe of the aotion taken by Ayub iOtan three weaks latw. 22

Still, even Asaho.r a&D1tG that the U.S. Ambastador'.

negat1ve reaotion to "ilna's overtnmw did not mec.Q that 2, the U.s. d1sapPl'OVed of the pn> .. U,.S. AYtlb.

Ap3~ frOnt the elrc\11ttata.ntlal evidence of American

lft\fo.lv~ant. U.S. military aid ~t£e.2t.1t broW,lht the coup

n\x)ut bV cbQnslna the balance of ctV11 .. miUtnry n:lat1ona

and 'by dt-a\11ng tho I1ttent1on of ttl e ~y away .tna external

defence to !ntel'ml SQCUI'1t,. A dDcwent ot tbe M\&tual SceUl'tty P:ro£t"aDl~e Q&nltted that

f:vom a ·politloal viewpoint, u.s. mlUtary aid has ~refl3tbened Pak1etan' s anne4 oSN1~es. the . 1t'.rl .. ~t~9 ,itagu1;,tp. A9.: -. no· . and as 0ncourase Pt\ stan 0 partlcipate in col1act1lf0 d~enoe arrangements. 24

It. u.s. "Intel.ligence Etepo:t ft ~laln~d lilOW the

domestic clout of the PaJdst:m amy J.ncreas(!ch

•• • tiJ 1 F ..... ...... L I

2,

24

Mohr:unnmd Asghar lthan •. Q!!!rmlA.1~~1l (New DeUd .• 198,), p, to. A~ anpbaslzEJ8 Ayubts l1nks t11tb the CIA's Allan M' eaif tho~b ~h.\e dOes ilOt mfmta that tAts "tnkeovel' wa9 at -the tnstQnee of the CIA.8 nu.. p. 11.

As Quoted in All. 1'1. 17. p. '2.

Tho PakistaN; """ has. de1lelope4 as -4 . ~~ Dft to the ~1nt that Naaz;cs.. less of ctav~· ·opments. it miGht contS.ilu .• to h~'1e ll£!~ over ec.onomlc deV'elopnsent tor opprnptlitloflB. 2.f

Furtho.-. a ~" of the U.S. &t10%lel Security

CoutlOll ~. ~ulte satisfied abot.tt the Cabinet reshufAe

of 195, Whioh 1)rcuaht· Ayul) and ~1rta into pOlitical

a.aoen&lnoy and noted thAt

~-~~ Ad .=·~ffuis~~~==EC ~ ~, .._ an crea~·. 3 at· . .h in w s -an" .. 26

A U.S •. 1ntel1i~nce ~;pott besr1ng the numbel'

NSC,,'?Ol w:lS olea~ thr.~t. demoer:acy .ill Rddstan ~U1d be :n c:lf.ln&etoUG for U.s.S,ttb,et'esta. Wn9 kind 0: $)'VGxmant:

•• fa liM

2' 26 27

28

I r JR,_ 4t ~ '-4: • n!, . (t •

Venlmttll.'am$1l1. n. 1., p. 390. ~tlel,. added.

~ •• p. 2S6. Emphas1s add04.,

foH." ~ p. 294. A $~ary of the do~ uaent 1'03ds as o ·0,15,

If the people ot pald.~t~ ~1!.~~ 01gnorant and a~tbet1c 'It tfia· me ate ccnsetl\1en.oes miGht not 60 Qltoaether •• ~. tavQUttll>leu • ~$r1-<Wl tnt.ereatt! _Uld bG ~st aet'V'ect by the oonttnUllneeln lJOwer of o lea,4el'"ehlp tlltl'b t\'aS best e~ble of kee~ $n8 HPQP~ dlssat1Sttlctlon ~ll'Om t~ i.nto directions 1nlm1~al to i\mencan oonowne ..

~~j. p. 421. EnapbQs1s added.

'When a less powerful country enters into a

.111tary ntlattonab1p with a rweat power. even in t1£Aes

of peaco the mlUtary leadera in the weake~ country may

develop lntew~t1onlst tendencies. partlcul~lY 11' tho

civil.ian leaders are weak. Tbe more potIJerft1l country may

then fom~late its 0\110 11m of action and cultivate both

clvUlan and m111tnJ'Y leaders in the less poweX'fUl CO"t1tl'y

who may keep popular asp1mttons on leash. A gOvemment

sensitive to public op1nicn 1tt lens l.ikely t.o saNe &reat

power lnterests tba.n the olvU-mUltary oo-alS.tton 01

Pakistan ~mlch assumed powell 1ft 19;q~ Atter that t the

19M coup b~oame a matter of time.

u.s. mil1tary aid also h.ad. :tmpllcat1ona tor

dGmetJt!o dLssentera against military If\lle in Palttstan.,

u*s. mlUtery a1d and t$ln1ns ensured th.nt ordinary peoplG

we~ suppressed throUSh th e so-called 4'antt ... t.:omnamist

counte-r-1nsu~enev# operaelons nun$erm1nde4 by the SE~O

Council representatives. Another implication ot the

counter-insureency co-opel~t1on amcna the SEATO meml)e%'8 WI

that it could be misused to overthrow tho 60vemment of a

country which _8 unlavourabl e to tile treaty POtfens.,

~_~!~UQ!1!

\-1hen a less rowerfUl CQunt~v becomes oxcesslvely

dependent on a s\.\pGr pc)t1er for its seourity. the latt~ 1a

enco\ftead to eatal)Usb .. ~reo1i llnks ~Jltb t.~a mUltary

-174-

leadeN of thea weaker oOWltry. It the e1v111an leaci9"

of the weaker co~t.l7 are unable to rule supreme over

the1r mUitary ooun'Cerparts, the more pOwerful country 1-

not likelY to support tbe olvi11a..'l leaders dur1nS a show­

down. Onco the military leaders come to en.1oY the s~pott

of the PGwel'ful country, they ar.a compelled to ElQoept its

d1ctat go~ fear of losing 1ts sU,pport and their poUt1ca2.

o lout • Tbts 1. tfbat happel'}$d 1n P.r\Jd.atan, M aboMl by tb.

une~l nature of the us..Paklsten ralatlonship. Accord1na

to the Fore1&*' FJ.111tary Ass1attltllOe eo...ordlnat1ng Camd.ttee,

U.s. mlUtary aid to Aak1stan and other such countr1.ea

was guided by

(1) tbe ~l1ti~~l factor. 1nolu~ the relat1ve tloportance to the U.S. of keeping any. &1 yen COt.lltry tree from Soviet-Communist dominatton; •• '. (2) the Military factor, 1nclu<11na ~be location and Geographical chQraoterJ..stlo8 of eaoh country or 81"OUD of countr1ee a114 its 1mpo~nce to' u.s. sttateal0 plans. 29

Anotber Amer10an papor tfaS qutte forthright in

a~tt1n& that tho tools o~ U.S. "foreign polley inolUde .Ii_ . "

mUltsry ass1stance. seoUl'tty treatlea ft and a bo~ of otb~

sl't'angementa. Tho U.S. wa not thG only country us1ha

miUtU'y aid QS an 1nGtJ'Ument 01 national polley.. Alt belrla

very powe~ft&l. the Americana wete natut\nlly sucoaaatul in

aT tt.TIIi ..........

29 Venkataramanl. n. 1, p. U3.

30 AU, n. 17. p. 13.

soc~ oonoessions :rom their al11es which were far

in excess~ of ttaat the Americans gave.

:rho Paklatanl wcample U)~d tully bear tbis out.

Contrary to the stu~ o~ the Mutual Jtssiatanee AdviSOry

Oro\.\)} (HAAG) that Pakistan would re~re 1301.1 mll110n

for the .first ship:nent of the military aid proemmao. tho

U.s. struck to the JCS ~J1_3.m \<Jblch earmarl(ed on-1y

$171 ml1lion. The U .. s .. At 1" Chlet~8 Gl\Planation fol' thJ.s

\t:as that prior COtmDlt;nt had bOerl mac1e to ",gtbll! .b&ah 12r..1<n1t¥ mo1;l<m£.I.* Ay",b's complaint to the MAAC¥ Chlel

tfas I'lported baok tbua;

PatdataD hact never been given a mission or an objeot1ve under lts cozmltments to elthor SEATO or (J.e.tence of the M1ddlo East; • •• Pakistan has nover been consulted in regard. to any strateal0 plann1n& tor the defence or tbo Mlddl$ East... 32

~1mUGr1y. after the 1954 asx"Qe-.nentithe u.s. su.ddenlY' <irl!l?;l ita atte."ltton away ~ the *northern tierft

to Soutbeast Asia. unm1ndtul o~ Pa1d.stanl susoept.f.bJ.llt1ea.

Follow1n& th1s, the u.s. ~t~sed to reveal its untlaternl

plan fer the defence I)f ~outheaat Asia and .ee4 to

fum1sb Pakistan \dth tnt'ormation tl110b was ttolass1tle4

~, .M_ ........... 3 ... ....

J3 no h$gb~ thq Qontldentla1. - SEAtO '$ Cble~ of

Naval OpGt'atlons t'll'Ote that

a J"Otatlon o£ bUb level Cb~J..~8h1p8

~d COIJUDando wo~¥~ ~~'f!.»A

.T~ ~b-e Mille attItude of $.lpeJior.tty ~8 also marked

1ft the (t(llloer'dtlona of the CENlO~ The JCS obseNe4 tn 19S5 that tho ·~Sl RlE!nne~i ;5hss.!tVA! ~C2t, from a tao~,

of experience and ctet~llea i't.nowle6Se of m111tary affalt's.·

&ltwc.tm 19'JO ~ ~ .June 1959 the u.s. ccm.ltte4

a modest t377m1111on for mUltaJ"¥ aid to Pak1$tan ~thout

any blnding aSGuranc() on India. Fo~ a 1/ery small sum., the

AtuenCMs wor-e able to elQJ.st Paktstan! SUpport tor their

antl .. Com)hWl1st ~1101es. Even the purely 1211flAiDi fiurtu.al

sec;uxi.ty agreement. embroSled ~kl$tan in the QPlIJ.l anti-

Commum.st deatsns of the U.SA. As ~ar4a the ~8ha~

_ t. j ,. I I • I

,4

" ~ 37

base.' a V1~~t_ U .g,. SeDatol' oJ)lDe4 tbat tbO' ·NlClstaD1a are $~"'. Fox-less 1mpGltant boe~, " . 39 ht.e4Nds o£ a111lc12s ant siVGll. ft In tact. tbo U.S.

tnfttSrlCa renabecl 80 atrol18 that ~fd.stan was pel"S\&9dU by the &a9l'lOaD," to dlscutSS the partltlOl'WllJ Q~ Kaibdr., a sub~ anathoma to _st RlIlstania. at tbe I1".tto-'9 Swaron Sinab talks of 196,. SimllaJ!'l1. atter tbe 196' ' _:1'. ~ ~G ~ll»t~ to parc1clpate in the farilkM$. '

sunmlttllt11 PNsldent Johnson 01 ~ u.s. p~rs.de4 bia . . ' '40 tal a 4rQmattc telephone call ~o ., .r elso.!t Fmaur. the U-21ne14eat und<mJltne4 lbkls1;an's ~se 1nlOJ'1d

c.apltal ••

!bl. JaaL~,PAtslGm~ JJ&.Uruu7 ~~a1i fhe' U.S.-~ld8tan 1II111tal1' alllanee entailed all

exoh.qe ot GiUtary gB:-SOl'l..ttel between the t~IC count1'1q.

This had a deep t.aspact on the arced toftJes oZ Atklatan..

Artl~e lV(l) of the Ilut\lal aeoutlt, ogreement ot 1954

stated that U.s .. .wtt:t17 ~r$Otmel tn ~stQD ~4

.... t n _ ~ •• " en ...... ----.

opr3l"ate an til part of the &lOOsay of the Unltea states of America mdar the d1rectlon ond cont.rol of ~he Chief 0: the Diplomatic Mlsston atld will have t v ir!.l!i M~fl1 . .. er e ~ ~ -~_:rur_t:a _; e··

ji 3 ~ . are- 1te sta 08 neil ona 8. 41

Such pr1vUege8 symbollcally rnfleoted the extent

of Amer1can lnt1uence in Patdstan. The Amertcan prOBOnCG

introdUced American lcleas and 1ncroaaOd the depend.onco of

the Poklsta.n1 armed forces on those of the u.s. The

l.h1te4 States InfomatJ.on se:vioe

extendGd its operatlons 1n Pakistan under the so-called fJIot1vQtlon (Latel- ft'Oop In1'ormatton) PlOrare ... \iseparate cell wae created in the klst~u' Inte!'-Sexv1oe8 PIt Dlrectorate • 0 handle · e colleot1on and d1strlbution o£ American Journals. bgoks" and .fllms throUllhout the Pal<lstan Amy navy aleS A1~ FOI'Qe... The sQ-calle<! Motivation ~ijramme was an elevation og normal PR to a hlgha" sphere of 1ntelleotual education Ql'ld lndoott'1nat.ton. Xt fomecl en lntegra.l pUt of the ontlre military aid p~aftUnme. 142

Pnktotani ar.my officers viewed the presence of a

lanl9 nwber of American mll.itary personnel ~l1tb favour

because t.bo Amer1eans ~!:m.DQtte.Lt!:Le PaIs&S.tAA' ,0£WI£' In "baH .har.d ta!t.s.'.2b~a1n'9a ~ •. Ama!1ga 1ibe..tmAl1lWll tb@J.Mad~. - But not all ~klstan1s llked the American

~... l ...... ....... " _

41

42

43

presence ublota compromised the national charaot_ of

tho P.akSatan ~y.

Not only did Amer1ca.n military personnel OOIDS to

Pakistan but Paldetan1 military personnel alao went to

the U.S. under the M1Utary Ass1staooe prosramme (r1AP).

The objoctlves 01 thls prnr;.ramme were to br1.na about

political stability In the recipient st~tes and

propagate the Amertoan value system among the!f' leaders ..

To this end, two-way study touJ"s and COUl"SOS wore arrange4

to famll1a.rJ.se the Paldstanis with American military

eQuiJ)ment and oraan11Jatton.

The American oonnection ngturally influenoed the

Paklstani military. For tnmmple. a "1957 visit by a u .. ~. nwloa:' team "proved most uaeftll and resulted in a moc.U.tlca­

tion ana revision of tbe old sl"11abus Q U brinG it 1n line

'11th the trash data 81ven b1 the team. ff Pakistanis 81'8ue

that under the m1Utary exchange programme,

\IIhile tbis is h16bly debatable. the introduoUon

ot u.s. oCitAipmellt naturally enoouft\gcd the Americana to

lntartere in the oraanlsatlonal olltonomy ot tho P.'9Jd.·atan

• 1 J , n.,. • 44 stephen P. cotlen .• :rq~~ .. Jl.i,,1ia~u.R~Wj£.

!!§lgn.~ J}.L~ (!o~ Com .• c eptel', p- m. 45 Khan, n. 43. p. 159. Emphasis added.

atmy. file Amer1cana rsot only b~U&ht new methods 01

orpnlsatlon. but alao controversies on the number of

units to be raised under the agreement. In stratealc

toms ooncepts like tldom1nanoeo rm4 "mUtta~ balan,co,"

~lch had evolved in tho east-west context, oame to

affect Ind'.a-Pnk1sten military ~lnt1ons. Paklstanis

began to barbour axagg~)tod notions of ml11t~

oupc~lol'ity over Ind1a. .I\s an ~my officor sB14: .

g~t.~~1tUn ~ ~ _ 'coUl&l t Qv9been o 1 taB 0 fer to us on Q elntter.

~iW;,;tir~'t . .Anu 4gnq..~g_mU.!LfQ. tlUbQl& 11~-

Tbe Pakistanis aenu1nely believed tbat ~oy could

defeat the Ind1an st}7)y wtth tho new Amertoan el"fUipmentf

In thls conteKt, their study of the American ideas on

tluerUla war was put to pmotlcel use tmen "Opelti't1on

Glbralter" was launched aanlnst the Indian amy 111 1965.

The PaklStaD.1 amy becamo a strong force M't only

externany but !llso 1n thO internal P')11tloal ba1ance of

the COWltxy. In fact .. American mtl1hrv aid enha~ed th.O

amy's conservative domestio role. Besides. the bollef

tbat it (;ould ohrulSo the structure of Pakistani poUt.tCG

throU8h constltutlOMl mforms at thG centre end olvio

action p~l:Wammas tn the countryside ~~s greatlY 1niluence4

by the U .. S. precadent. The military £e" it had all the

• P I fI"" • 1 t •

solutions to the tlls of J1bJdston.. It came to en.jol

total (!\.ltonomy not only 1n oraan1sat1onal mBtte~ but

Glso in PakLstan t s .to ret 60 and defence :po11clea t unlike

its counterpart in India. It was not a oo1no1dance that

Aatericon al11tIU"Y a·tel to Pakistan began in 1954 ~en

Pakistan·$ .t1 rat demooratleally-elcQted go'Vomnent \188

dlsmlased by Govemor .. Genoral GbUlfllO Moba!Dmed. trrbrouah llnks tt with ffthe U.S. defence establishment tt and witb

"Amorican pol1t101ans tbe RikJ.stan.t. m!lltary devGlopeCl a . 41

direct ~put Lnto the Amer1c~n de¢U10l'lo.fJlak1ng prooGaa.·

!!ls,9gaUM QU Given the depgndent nature of Rlk1stan's mil1tary

relat1oneb1p with the U.s., no amount of Pald.stan1

perBWls10n oould make the U.S. sUJ)'Port Pakistan tr1 her

con111ct with Xndla. That is w~ Rlk1s!:an began to

oUlttvat$ China 1n the 19608. Nor <114 Pakistan fum!sh

thQ U.s. \dth even a token f'o~e in the interest of the 48

ant1.comm\U\1st alllsnce. She ~a so diGsnobanted w1th the

Junetioantl aftell the 196' war ~tlth IncUa that 1n 1966 u.s •

.............. ..... - ..... , ., •.. _ 41

48

Seel1etary o£ State ~bert Hcf~ was t.1Mble to

vouch for Rlktstants <bpentlablUty as Qft alll'. Ebutto,

a lea<lf.n& critic of the Amerlcan Q1Uance. arguod that

the U.s. should

"wlthdtaw .its pal'QOnnel £rom the bases}

t,· one \f4th the Nmai!lina MAAO pers()ntle~. tt PaJclstan ought to.! <1e~lare the Mutu~

(lienee Agra&llGnts and the pacts to have beoome non-~st~!~ andlnnal~. withdraw trom C£NfO and. Sr~f-~\l ••• tbl-G ~o~d be a tlmely mark of our BOO lnten ions towardo the Soviet UUon an(t CblnQ." 49

On an May 1960 Uot'e18n Nirl1ater "'rabad HIl9sG\!n'a Ml'lOW.lce ..

ment that th a ~er1olUl ClomrnYDicatlon base at Peaha\~ would

be closed do\<Jtl in July 1969 was arooted Wltb loud approval.

Thus ended th e Q}l1ance. only to be resurreoted 111 a nett

tom in 1919.

'y~3 ... ~.,!!Q1& £D.th,e_&~l 9f ~

Atte~ be flssu:nad power 1n 1m, tbutto pursued a

pGllcy ~hlleb was l?1 tar OJ'J f~m tho ;SOolal1st metorio

and ~nt1-Amer1oM1Sl t4l1eh had matketi h1G olection campaign.

Ho re~rtedly offe1~cl Qwadlar to 'Cbe f..mtar1cans In 1974 in . :0 retum for military aid. Althougb the U.s. lifted the

All-

49 50

B1\ltttO 0 n. 32. p. 1'.6. Soe Franels Fuk~t ~~~,,~oL~f.t)tIru.. A.~ Rru." ld, Sants'1ilOllloa., sGlitamlieFl"9'£tl. p;-.;!j;·-"EhUtfO ola:r,.f1ec! his poSltion thus t

CenQ!n1y the two alliances, (;~ and SUATO" atld the bl1staral paots with the Vn1tetl StIltes, nlQ:\1n l&;u."6el.y vnl1<t,· Sl*. 'Political)., and m111'al'111 they have become lnet.teot1ve... • I do not plan to make any

cont<l. on M"xt !)aae

.. arma embargo of 1911 and 19'15. Paktstan laoke4 the

ttoaooesto buy weapons.. %n 1916 B1l.ttto made anothQl'

fOttCetYl plea tor Itmer1can am. in View 01 the tJIndtan

Ocean c~s1a" and "SoViet l~o.ds into the subcontinent. . '1 the acSjacO'nt Pers1an Gulf antS the Red Sea area .. " IItutto

also po1nte4 out that Inc11a. the J'e3ionrd. powel' after ber

1m viotory. ha4 explodad a wcl~ deVice Qrld continued

to ~1n close to ftloscow. At the sline t1me. he souabt

an independent nuclear deterront 18 Naponee to India-o

nuoloot' euploslon f Paklstan negotiAted th e pUl'Qbaae 01

a nl¥)lear- reprocessin& pl~m' from 1!)anOG wi0b, flowever"

was oanoelle4 by tbe la·tte~ under American preas,,".,

lIlutto '(188 enraae4. thi8 1ssu.e areatly st:ra1t\ed

J'akistants ~latloQS w.tth tbe u.s ... With disastrous

conaOqUGftol)s tor him. nartna a visit to Pakistan 1n 1976

u.s .. Secretat'Y o~ State Klss11lser tried to PGn~4e lIlutto

to drop the quest tor a nuclear bomlJ 1n l"Otum tOft an

attr-notlve conventioMl arme paotcaae.Fat,11ng this,

K1ss1nger threatene4 thilt ttw'. can dBatab111zG 5~O"'" lovem­

ment and make a horrible eXQl."1ple out of you. ft Ihut-'ba4

~ .. "03""0 • It:l::s E. q» • f I " ..

contd-. &om back pase fotmel ohtl.ngea in our own rolatlonsbll* •• " ttl. btla~ .. al underetaruUna wlth tbe \b1tetS States Qafl be kept intact •• , With 8 clear W\deratandlns of each countJ'Yt ., obUiatlons. This wUl require meet1ng Of "lnda. also q,Qf!G .. r,e~l1l0l9i.

Sea Hashal.,n. t(). p .• 161. Fmpba.$la added.

'1 lienS.. n.. l(). p. 167; 52 AS q~ted in Al£. J'h 11, p.l28. RecalUn6 . . \

oalculated that his close W\derotandlng wltb the

Saudls", tha Shab of Il9n ond the conservative GUlt

states itlOuld neutralise Amor1can PNSSure ase1nst him

and prevent tbe ''Islam101ats II in the armed forces from

bateh1ng plots. But once he lost the support 0: tho

people" he \-IaS as, Wlne1'4ble to Amerioan pressure as

Ayub ~'d been.

Thls was bome out by the manner in tmlob, Bl",tto

tell. Fortified by the large crowds In its meat1n3a and

defeated in tbe elections ot 1977_ the Pakistan Natlbnal

A1Uance (PNA) maete a charse of elGctoral l'iaG1rl3 and

" refUse4 to accGPt its defeat. Blutto has made the

al1~t1on that the 0nsui.Q3 PNA aaltatlon was financod bJ4

the Americans who wentual1y msstem1nded the 1fT!1 coup. ~ '~"

He charged that 'by opponent is not the PNA but J~

carter. ft 1I1utto also announced that there \'GS an

•• , I I _c_, • I I •

contd. tl'om back page

"

. l.the PNA 54

Kissinger's threat. GbUlew Hu.c;seln. tbe PPP General Seoretary. daolare4 tha~ the death ot

-Mr. abutto leS nothlng but an internatlonal conspiracy. uSee !..un&t,x, 1).19 Novomber 1993.

The role 01 the StUld1S in the el~loneel'Sn3 01 the P~7A is mther unclear. Accordlna ~o Tariq AU "Saud&. money was instrumental 1n t1l'lt\Nlng tt th e PNA campals.n. See Al1, n. 11. p. 127. Otbers haVe also elata.ed that the saud! Ambassador frequently met thct PNIl leade. during tbe campa1Qn.. But Aqbar Khan otates tha~ once the PNA launched the fls1tatloft after the olectoml 4>' defeat. tIle Saudi Amba$sado~ came to Gee tbe PNA leadeN " "'With a message .from Kina KbaUd(aak1na us to reach a . satt lament With Blutto ••• an4 dl4 his be3t to p$'-auade us to give ·up·Otll" stand abo-.zt rQele~:tlona.« See Khan. n. 22. PI" 112-113. Furtb~l· AsSbar revQala that the Ambassadors of tbe UAE and L bya also tried to par,surlde

/J;,o abandon ita agltation. lbld • i?or de~a~sl see ~~t1kar All ~~~to.. l' lara

international conspiracy to topple him antS hinted at

" the involvement ot the CIA.

lbere is a fair amount of cll\l\ll1stantlal evidence

to show that the U.s. was 1ndeed 1nvolveC! 1n lbutto's

overthrow. Observers ooUld not 1911 to notice the

appointment of OaonlG S. West., an amy specialist. as the

nO\f U.S. envoy to Mlston. Further. the U.s .. stopped the

sale of tear gas to Pakistan to prevent Bbutto f~m deal1n3

firmlY With the saltation. Tho value of tho U.s. dollar.

suddenlY available in large towns. began to fluctuate 1n

the looal market after the al'lno~(!!lent of the electiOns.

The Hw ,Ya£ls Tim.e,J all eged that Bhutto '6 politicol 56

opponentG were flooded wltb a surfeit of American dollars.

OppOsition po11ticians like AsgbU Khan even appeal.ed to

the U.s. government to abandon its nuclear co-operation

~11tb Rikistan. Insofar as th@ role of the PakistaN.

aenerals in the 1m .99Jm. was concerned, thoy had

a InmbeJ" of cont1ngenof plans at th e1z-d1spo sal. f*lost of these were the d1rec~ result of Jli.s~,,'!l.YQlJ'1S§! ~b _tbe ~k'3qn a~p! gorciA- One 0 t Else plana. Opera .lon wee ~am ••• was similar to U.S •• sponSONcl pro3eets in Cbile dur1ng the Allende period ••• Some of the tW1denoe pro~c1ed by Dhutto Md contlxued by PNA leaden 1nd1catec:t that the array had decided to taka over the count~ soon after the Ma,rcb 1971 cleotlons. 51

".. .t.1I

55

56

51

All, n. 17 f p. 130-

K.L. Kamalt...:~;m. A,O.arn.!P.B Stw (Now Delhi. 1982). p. tJa.

Al1. n. 17. p. 134. Later. Bbutto waa to accuse Oenerol Zla of playtna G ~rcmlnent pan 1n

tte¥:1(U). even if it 1s argued that the O.S. bad

no d&m~rQle J.n the 1m couP. there 18 ample e'll$1lC'

of an 1ndwol hand.

xu

:!he J!9,,1. .~e.,gyd1cx. B!l0UQMlli;: lm-lIU lba K1fM fp. tAo. YeS ..

Thls was evident from Q tnt 1n the U.s. poUey

towards Pakistan uteI' the Soviet interventlon 111

A.f&ban1stan. The AmeJ1.catlB feare4 til Soviet drive t~l'ds

tho Arablan SGa and the strateg1c Strait of Homl.\Z tbro~

Pak1Gtan~ The fall oK the Shah of Iran and tbe e)fpeotatlon

of alds,ng the antl.SoV1et Afaban f!!S1eh!ied~ .tram ~klatanJ. .. territory aleo made the latter country important to the

U .8. fhe Carter Actd.n1stration oftere<l aid \'fOrth $400

1f11111on litllcb. bo\..-wer, was ~~ecte4 by Zla as etpaanuta ...

FollowlnS this. tha successor Reagan a~1n1sttatton

eMOtmeod Q .3 .. 2 1>.\11101\ mllltar.v and economic packa4e tor

.. l ,-, 5 • W ,I f. cont4. tn)m back page

eneoultlB1na., ald1n8 and tlk"\DiJ)Ulet~ event. to e~cmato ciVil strife in ordar to overthX'Ov tbe legal aOlle,rraebt·t· An fJnportan,t l*tA d_and. fol" tbo withdrawal ot' Q(1'8 .• 8 agalo3t Maben and Bal\.\Ob leaders. and f-cp the restoration of IlOnnalcy .In B.;llt.Cbt.stan,. was accepted 'by Bbutto., &t Z1a ro.tuSGd to acoet>t 'a settlement. ~~ that tsecesslonists' and t¥'a1toN shoUld not be rel.eased. C01');)urt'ently. ZLa tteppe4 Slutto wlth an ult1matum to roach an aacord w1tb tho PNA 1mme41atelY., thutto o~sed mect1Jias with. the BaUdS. Ambassador and porhaps Wlth Sovlc~ 0140 ida tn AtQhalllstan t. save the. ·slt uatlon. but iil vailh ..

59 Patd.etan.

Baslcally, the Ri!!agan a&UlnlstNtlon carried

Olrterta polley one step forward. Reaaan h1mse1t 59

declared that Pakistan waG "in a VO't'Y strategl0 position."

CartEr'S hman r1ahts policy was no lonaer applicable to

Pak1stan. The state Department d9()lare4 1n 1982 that

"bIlateral ~lat1ona with a friendly country (Pakistan) 60

may be damag$d because of our human r16hts conoern.-

Tbe Amerioan.s e3tabllshed broad-hasad contacts With the

entire P.3k1stan1 anned fones to ensure that a cbango at

the top would not affect the relat1onsh1p.

Besides. even 1f the U.S. d1d not share Patdstan's

perception of tbe Indian threat. it 16nored Indlats proteet

aga1nst tl.S. arms for Rlklstan. In tact. James Buckley. the

...... '9

'9

•• Ii

For 1nst.anc:o, Reasan's paokaae included ml11tU7 hardware S&1Cn 8S hel1copters, m1ss11oo and missile launchers. tanka, amoured personnel carl"1el'a, m&u.'s and the F-16 alroraft.

fbi .f!t~mlf,' 20 June 19B1. Zb1gnlew Brzezinski. Reagan s na<tonal security adviser, assured Zla 1ft 1980 that the u.s. stood fUlly committed to the 1959 Otutual Security) aareement With Pakistan. Brzezinski even of.fered to post Amerlcl\D troops on the Paklstan­Afahan1stan border. Ss.mUa~lYt General Sir Walter Walker. a fonner NAlIO commander ~ recommended "soma 10m of J4arshal Plan" to fsth1s vitally strategio and COl1rsaeous country. n

u.s. Under Socretary 01 state tor Security Aftairs.

admltted J.b th, U.s. House Forelan Attairs Committoe

hear1na on 16 September 1991 that tbe anns deal v4th

Pakistan inclUded one '1eapon system that could bo

employed lUll" aga1n.~lt Lncd1a. In this respoot. the U.S.

made a depa~Uh Il+om tbeearll_ relationship W'ldel'

which it bad avoided explioit supvort against India.

lhi...'aml .. tta MY!i!A Paklstan still consldettG Ind1C1 to be belt prinoipal

adVet&9ry' • Even after the mc.UcaUy altered sLtuation

tol1ow1n8 the Soviet 1ntel'Vent1.on 10 AfShan18tan. Patd.stanl

military officers at the Joint Staff Headquarters main­

tained that "Pakistan's m030r preoccupation was and woUld 61 .

remain India. ft Al1d.~ army oUic~ are suspicious of

India '8 strategic co-op9l"fltlon with the Soviets and faal'

that Ind1a may e:xploit Patc1stan t s d1ftlculttes arising t~1D

tbe At&iW1 crisi0. That 1s why they hCl1fG been 1nslatent on

mWtaXiV SUpi)O~ not only against tbe Soviets but Indla

as well. Gl Yen t.JItese realitles. 1t' is difficult to agt-eo

that Pakistan's m.tlitary acqU1s1t1on is not aimed aaa1nst

India but; bas the purely domest1c purpose 0.1 plbv1d.1n8 a

long lease ot 15.1'e to tbe military re31me. !'

Whil.e the feuo£ India is tho chief detemlnant

of P.:lk1stan t s new seotU'lty relatlonsh1p. the dialika lor

Com:n\.ll1sm oontlnues to operate as a secondary factor.

However. the ma30r departure from the bUnd anti­

Comm~sm of the past 1s the bitter d1senchantment with

the Americans for not 81vtna Paklstan the oxpeoted degree

01 sUJ>PO" .ut 1962.',. 196' and 1m. Pald.stantD have

strone misglvings about the AmerJ.can uadl11nanesa to

tUlly undartttr1te P:ltt1stan t s teni.tor1al tntegr1ty by

~d1n3 the 1959 Executivo Asreanent into a fUll-fledged

treaty. Tbat 1s WhY their sUpport tor the U.S. stand on

Afghanis.tan 1s quaW1ed •.

~!ml~~!MJi...Q~ ,.~ha, i!e~!q~lU

lb,g I~SWl...2' .1lE194 'thore has been a strong su,ggeD'Cion that PakUtan

bas undem1nod her sovereignty by granting banes to the

u.s. in return for arms. aut tl\1s haa been cratego~rJ.cally

reMot1 by both tho sides. A U.S. CongressSonal Stuc1.Y

l\"'lisslon saW' *no e"ldenoo tt that U.s. arms &14 had seeu:ted 62

uAmcrlean milltary basa9 10 Pak1stan." This poJAt wna

reiterated by the testimony of the U.S. Under seoretary ot statet James Buckley t before the House and Senate po-reign

Relations Committees. The Pald.stant Fore1an tuntat~,

Agba Shahs.. revealed after his re91enat1on that "the 6, Americans said they bad newer sought bases ft in Pe.ld.stan •

•• 62

6'

.. tiL .AT. d

'!he u.s.. embassy ntade a flat denlal about basel). See 1b!! ~tl114t 11 March 1992.

~&.I!1D~. 24 February 1992.

~1stan1 statesmen have been even more

emlihat1c Ul the 4cnlel that Pakistan haa &ranted bas.

to the tmited states. or proposes ~o do so. Since there

La little fim evidence to the coatmry. such statement.

cannot be eas1lY set aBide. 21a said 1n1981 that "there 1$ t.lO (It.k}stlon ot* ~lc1ataft ttalv.tna bases on ito terr1to~

\

to tile Un1te4 states. ft Fo~1sn NlnlsteP Agha Shahi. too,

declared eateaortoally that ~le w111 nw~ give them 64

bases-. ft

liol',ever. there aN cOMiderable ambiguities in

PaldJrtants intontions sud statements. One araunent Sa

that by kaepins the st.a."eot of bases open. ZiB is tl'Y1ft8

to t'ltest ooncesslons from the Indlnns and the Soviet ••

In June 1991.., 218 deelare4 tbat there bad been 'ho reqUGst '" 6'

by America nor any ofler by 0.8-tt on basoe. lndt.eatiha

that an ctfO~f once ttade. may be considered. AnothGJ'

stat~mcnt by Z1a that ~&J" present..daY tbf..n1d.n8. ~ the

arant. 6~ m1UtQ~ beloes was 'tnot 8 vU";/ 800<.\ idea n

reinfon:ed the ambJ,gl.l1ty. This tlex1blUty was mad. lIJO~e

.. Itt ......... _1; III-.,u dF.'"

6S

e3q)11e1t \-1ben ?.J.a Bhowed hJJnselt to be unwilllnQ to

pam SUNe11lanoo and base facilities not on the arotm4

that It would und~1ne AiklstanJ. sovereignty but because

·wo novo enougb resources of our OWl and n ,shgUl4 .1lI l1j,lun& .!a .awma.¥ iQt9U1t19n ~Q..J)>>£l1aUUI. Q ACCOJ'dlna

to bim. Paklstan didnft need ftthe U,.S. Rapid 1lepl0yael'it we

@orce, nor for the time beln6 bnv! 6fT' intention 01 lotting

the RDF usc any ~ae$ in Pak18tan.o

Given the lack of clear-out PaJU,stanl statemonts.

Zullikar Khalld of tbe IntJtlttlto of Regional Studi_

sUMestoli that pli\ld.stail may 31ye "electronic 11stenS..ng

posts. ft emeruaney f'ao111tle~ for the U .. S. s1xt.h Fleat at 68

Kamch! and a "joint .facility· near the Iranian border.

SJ.mUar-ly. the ~V'1et <SU1Y, IZ"9$9~ reported that

Pes!lcwlar and Sargodha bad been converted into U.s.

surveillance bases _ A tueber of Rli' bases \'1Quld be·

estab11ahe4 in Pakistan and Karachi \1OUld become the head.-69 . t'Jual't~s of the U.S. Central C01lllnand (C.i!:NTCOf.t) ~ Oth.'

... $ ,

67

69

R.G. Sawhney,

69

II" ... l.., .... i •

!hJ!.~9Gllmt l' Decemb~ 1382.

As quoted in Th.@ Hlnsfllt 7 September 1982. The MIlD alleaed that Ua agr(..~d to the upgrodlr.g of tbe U.S., RJl1 facilities 1n Balucbistan wnna the visit of A,dmlral Holcombl the Commander' of the u.s. Sellentb Fleet to ~Sl'an.. See,,"Foo.us on U.S.-t~1d.etan· _ securIty Rolatlonship". !.ts&t9 .. lSla~~§'it vol. 7. no. 8. November 198"., p_ ~

Profesaol' O~ Kl\1doutov of Ta.~k(Blt Un1vGrn1tyal.;o argued that Pakistan w()u}d soon gl'1e base" to tb. u.s. stnQe the number 0' U.s. Snatruoto.-s in Pak1$tan

contd. on next paae

sO\UlCe~ have reported the constl'uaUon of twent~t., .

b~s. 1n 1hlucblstan. Such lnformation cannot be taken

lightly in view of the frequent vislts of AmeF1can " , ?b personnel to Baluchistan •.

ltl sum. Pak1stsQ is plaY1n8 Q ctUtOU$ eame Of

maSterly ambiguity. aut geopoUtl()al compulsions may

9110\iJ the Americans to ga1.~ a .foothold on Pald.$tan1 iem.. t'o~. Dalucb national1. is a case in POln1h It.t1U:)1l

Qllttanta ba~~ SOUiht Soviet suppon in their btukaway

b1d ~()m Pakistan. They llttle x·ea11se that if the Sov1ot4

tIlOV'G in from the nortb tho Amar1cantJ are sure to OQ~UPY So~hem Iran and the cont13UGus area of ?41uoh1~'tan to

th\'latfC So'V1at oont~l over tho Gulf o11t1elds. To deter

the Sovs.etSt the USA may help the establishment o.f Omatel'

Ball.JChutan 1f the ml11tant l1aluch leaders 11ke lOullr Balesb Ma:cr1 ·~d AtaUllQb Mensal PMt bases to the u.s. on tho'

MOl}:nm ooaat. Ghs\1s l3aksb &.zen~. the modarate Balu.chl 1 Ctl~. tears :precisely th!$. '. • " 5, . J, .,:WI! • I " , . fill'-

eontd.~m b~ek page

had 1ncr-cased ~,t1callY. See !t'~l\~ .. ~~e' 21 Octobw 1983. SOV1~ Ra<U.o rGpo' e' , e cons ruc-tton of: U.S .. bas~ ant!· electrontc, Ustentn& posta.· SGe ~!t...,-,.pt}fli!£me.lt 11 Janual'Y 19S,. Radlo.. TashL(em a so mt\. e a1I:n11ar alle,gat1ontJ ..

1'h1s was the ,"at ot: th~ aut.l1ot'~s conveJ'Sfltlon witb e!1Perts at the Instltuto for Defenco Stud1es and Analyses ... Now llel.hl. ,The ~.int to be n~ted is that a base can\1e ~nted at t.tl a lost moment belON an opel!Qtlon 1$ undG~alten,.. In such a ~naM1celtUf!~lo~., tbere lano n.eec1 £o~ R1~stan t.o e,(pGae bGrseU to pUbl~c scrutStlY 'by bu11dlng a base tor the U.S. and S$k1l'lG. the latte%" to take chBrie.

" .

PiAk1stan 301na:lf the t'SOtlal1gne4 movement .In 1979~

But 1a Pakistan .. a "tlew COl'lYertee tt to nonallgMsnt.

~oUer than holy· and f\nor~ nonal,1gnod than ~e otbeN,/ft

Ibee sho euard her new trt;atus \11th tlJ~alouayft?

It t'~~ ~'ko ~1d.$t!iUl1 stQtement8 at thelr .t!ci

:,!ll,t:}ii, Pakistan dQen cnte!'8G cs a genUinely nonal.lgne4

ooun~y.. 1otta1sn MWstel' Agba Shah! told an Indian

visitor in a,9S1 tba't Pakistan had "embraced nonalSgnment a,s the 00010 concept of fo~J.f3l'l !X'11oy" and bad Ane

72 SQCurit)1 tJ-eaty \i/ltl1 any m~or pow~ .• ft SimilarlY, Z1a

empbatlOll11y stated that Pak1·stan was 'bot res\\Weot1na

the pant rnll1tary .. ald relatloMh1p. ~ An official of

Pak1stM' & U.N. _leslon deelarec1 that Pakistan \'IOUlc1 never

allow "Prole)' status. 30in U.s •. stl\\teg1o plans 1n the 13 : Qult·., or become B f4Er4ber of tbe nlS'.

Pl\1ct1tloners ot dl})lomtlcy seldom do tmat the)"

tsay. Somo og Rlkietsnts aotlons ch sugge3t a 8f1'lt4119 -1ell

to ma1ntatn a dlstanee from 'the u.s.. Paldatan waG careful

•• Qrd' .. ::ifi d I I" ..... "tll

l '

Thls is the G\lbstanoe of statementtJ by Ua and other official epokel3l'Ben \t1ftO "ehenentl.y protest euaa08tJl)~ that Pakistan 1s not nonalf.gne4. See ~ -8mr.c.dI 26 Dece~ll~r 1982. s,eo ~" aban1" Sen ,au, _p~a. The Atshrm ,SllldrQS1i (Ne-# !)elM. 1982),. p. lsrl.,'" -" , ,""

Dml, ? June 1981.

DOt to lnvlte U.S. perstmnol £01' the 1ndtlCtlon of the

F-iS aiJl\')mtt into bar air tO~9. Zln refused to give

the bmartoana tlssultlncee on Patd.otan·8 nuclear E)lbaramme. While u.s. officials charaot~l1sed ttle 1,.2 blll10n anaa

deal fillS a usocul'1ty asslstance" agreement, the i\lktstante

4escrtba4 it 618 an fteoonotalo a14 and militAry esles 14

relationship" 1n puNly ~S2S1m£CJ.t1 terms. Similarly. ttben ZiG Vlslted the USA 1o 1982.

R~a3U .-e·£erred to tho 1101000 anti complementary- relAtion.

ship between the two countries on the Afgban question ant1

stressed the global throat of CommWllan as a rcsUl't of tba

Soviet intoNsntlon 1ft Afghani8t;;_ Contrarily. Zu. put

greater emphasiS on the Ilburtten" of the Afshan reftigeC!s.

1I10r did ~lston allow a large-scale tr'an!lter 01 Q.l1aS to tho AfGban ~~t)!\l!.94Qn. for temr of C~Qtt.n5 Q two .. fI'Ont

situation. DurlDa Zie ts 1982 U.s. vWt. P.rssldaftt Reagan

charaoterised the oecaa1on 98 a ttNUwlgoratlon- c£ the

relstlonahiJ) while Z1a mettely described Rlklstnn an a 76

- 1t~tab1l1dn3" factor in tho te31on. Even IIldlan e.nalyGta

at tbo lnatlt uta fot" Defenoo Stw1leQ and Analyses. New

Delhi, ooUave that the pro,oeta<l "re!lnsnment of Pak1stEUl

spread over give ye.ars. 1s too slo\!I to matte Rlklstan n

• I ["Pi. a •• , It 11 ••

14 15

16

!MJtm, m!pm~. 17 June 1991.

P.B. Sinha 'Uenei'al Zla's Visit to U.s.;\.!t. ~(09A&a..MBliql.a, vol. G, no. 10. Jan~'lry 1993" ~'

.. 9 ~cembct' 1982.

71 cntta paw.-

It is dUflc\.ll.t to see bow the relationship hal

benefited the USA 10 fa tangible manner. although therG

may be concrete dlvidends in future. On the other hand,

the gain to Gencnl Zia bas been very bia. He has show

a. capacity tor battd bargalll1n3 Which Ayub Khan. otter

hnv1ne put all bis eilS 1n the u.s. basket, laoke" in the

19~s. W!l11e retatnlng bls Soviet optlon. Z1a has

ot4tivnted hie public lmage as the leade. of a frontline

state to keop the u.s. a&:a1n1stratlon, tbe Congress and

tbe JDQd1a in good btJAoua:-.

That Pakistan bas been wary of too tisbt an

embraco with the AmericatlS is one thlng. But her ability

to ,1.lthstand Am:nr5.con pressure in the ions run L~ ~t.

anotber. Wltb tbe 011 &1ut and the decline 1n the

renlttanoe og fore16n elCChanae. Pald.atan woUld have to raise

her O~81 development resotmOes. ibis, plus th0 resUltant

1natab111ty in the Gulf after ttle decllne In oil pr10ea

woUld not only invite u.s. pressure on Paklstan to provide

maDl)OwGr to the Central Command but would also make an

economicall,. vulnerable Pak1stan 8uscetytl·ble to U.S.

pressure •

... •• , •• 1. " .. IU • .,.... '.

77

Rlldstan' s abll1ty to e1lPlolt the Afghan

criola bas al80 boaun to .show UIlltatlonth To stan with .. Sovl~ intervention 1n AfgfW\lstan )laS detGl'm1ne4

y 78 by events in Ii'M and not Vl At~tant A t~e bas

repOrtedly tOken plaoe .between the At8Mn 80vemcent

forces ond lnslU'aenta 1n tho ~BhGO~ valley. On the

bas1a of Iranian ovents. the ~Gr1oanl arQ hC)Pina th41J;.

tlWl ttOU1d move oloser to th0 USA afteF teo.me1n1. Nor

ore the Soviets puah1n4 towards tb& GUl.f or saUdl Aftlbla.

l~q h.ss dlstanoed itself from tbe Soviets and the crUdeb

Party of Inn MS bee.1'l bannod. Once the SO'V1et f~ of

Merican intervention in iran ebbs, they (lr'e likely to

toto a Maxed v1C\1 of the situation. In the nbsance of

a strona Comm~$t nlovOtnent in Paktst@ there 18 utta.o chanoo tha't a Sovlet-sponsored iovGn1lnent in AUtietan wo\4d 8~ceed. Hence, tho SoVl-ots ba~e llttle reoso.n to push

towafds Pakistan. Lastly. Accer1Qal\ lnterest 1n Pak1statl 1$

only An~. 1be ADteric;ans are les8 \!,'Orr1ed abo'" Sovl"

1nt1uenoo in S%lk1stan than Qbo~ the Scv1et J)Gnetrat1on ot

the Gulf and ,tho Arabian Sea.

tbe tac~ ~1"$ that tfle relationship betvleen e

superpowe¥, and a small· country l1ke Pald.stan ean never 'be

symmetrical. That ~lll.d c»tplatn \'1hy the~o 1$ a bL\s1.c

... *.... I It ; L. If' .

,-

amb,t&u:tty about Rlk1stanl statements and aot1ons. Afte~

the Afahan ot'lsls. Zla himself charaoterlsect Paklstan 6S

a "tl'()ntlina statQff and beld that he wuld bave no

"'reservatlons fI on U.S. bases once tttho communlty of. 19

Interests were rea.ttimed.- Nor d1d ~lc1stan protest it.

lncl~lon in both the U.s. Central COmmand and a map martd.Dg

the Ql'Qas undw the jur1sd1ction of thl! HDF. Pak1etan· 8

refusal to accept a clause on nonal1gnment 1n the proposed

friendship treaty with India makeD har int&ntlons suspect.

Besides. HOWUN U. Scbafler. a u.s. State Department . ~

o£fic1cll .• has rGVGAled thnt there are .§!o£Et~ .cl!!~ 1ft the

new ~eement wbtob can be spelt o~ only 1n a 01080d door

sesa!on of the U.s. conaress.

A careful appra1aal. of all aspects of the now

secur1ty relat1on6h1p between tbe t~ countries ausgesta

that \,b11e the twldementala Sl'e the same. oertain Iltpaggll

ara ditZerent £~ thoSG 0: the eati1er relat1o~*

Pak1Gtan continuGS to be a .1un1or alll8lJCG partner In much

the Gcme manner as ehe had been earlier. the compUlsions

Zor em:er1n& into the relationship remain lSl'gely the same 1:or both the s1Clos. ConseqUentlY f the d£eets Qf the &111ano.

on i"dld&tan t s ne1&bbouro hav0 bee.n sSmUsJ' to tbat thoy bad

.... I •• - a.

19 siMa.. n. 6'. ",.698-699.

80 1'1!.I.rJ.!WS. 28 cteb~y 1983. Emphasis ad4e4.

been earlier. Tbe Soviets have J'9pGQtledly ~med

P&ktstan against aid1ng the Ataban By.1Wa$11111 Md

pursued the lntt~r into Pald.stw tert1tory in hot

pursuit. tho Indians have perceived tho alliance as a

repud1e.t1on of the long.standina Ind1an w~8b to inOUlate

South Asia fran superpower conf11cta. India arauea that

Pakistan tg ams pl'Ocl.U'eroent has brought abollt a aWa.tw cha~o in tbe regloml situation, t.tllcb is identioal to

Nehn1' s earlier stend.

Ne-vertheleas. the nO\1 ~lat1onsblp baG also eot certain differing po1nts of anpbas1s.. Rlklstan has beocMRe

a v1"ual neJ.abbour of the u .. G.S.R. and a "frontline state, ft

which was not the Gase when mo JOined the Baghdad ~c1i,

That 1s \'by tho Amflrieans bave Biven Pakistan certain

seourity guarantees ~1nst XncU.a, in Q depat'tul"e ~ the.

previous rclatlonsblp.. Slno·Q technolo&y baa Blade bases less

relCNant than before., the U.s. 1s probably not insistent 011

pea.anent. bases.. Tbls would eA"Plaln Paktstnnto auCOGsa 1n pursu1ng a pollcy of amb1valenoe itt J~Qrd to baBes and her

nona11&nad status.

Jgm,~&~ ~llQI

Tbe new relationship hao had import.tlJlt cons8Quenoe. for Pakistan's domestic politic.. Ibth sides ~f}G ori th.

81 ne~ fo~ "G atr<!).ng ln4tpendClnt Paklstan. (f ~h. U.S. tbde~

_nil IE. t '1' •

81 PlIO, 23 August 1991.

Sc;!cretary of note tor Seo~lty Ase1etance. W!111aal

SchQet<1e~t deQlaX'e4 in 198, that aid tes essential f~

the "intemal Btab111ty of Paldotan. ft adding that tbe

U.S. must "honour" her ald comm1tmentlh Slmllarly, dur1ng

a Visit to Pa)Clstan at the he1aht of the MRD aa1tat1otl in 199,. u.s .. 'DefencG Secretat'V Casper We1nbGr'Ger madO it

82 clear that itantl.g0vemllU~tlt unrest 1n Pak1stan41 shoUld

not 1ntQrfere wlth u.n.-Pakistan ties. Clearly, bie 111stt

was to $ymbollSe the U.9. support; for 7.10 tnO had 31'\fGn

etatab1Uty- to Pak1etan. In tblG oontext .• tne u.s~ pursued

UU.lch tb0 same ,polieles \'Iliob She had adopted 1n tbe 19~8.

The domestic tallc.ut of the relGtlonshlp has been

wtde1l' critioised in both the countries. A Congressional

doct.Went declaNti that al4 to Pakistan \'Jl)u).d lead "to the

denial of sooial ond econom:l0 rt&~t8 o£ the people ~

Pakistan. fI \>3hen Zla vls1'ed the U.s. 1n 1992. Senato:'

Matbias of the SGnate Fore1s.n Relations Committee so~t an

aasuronoe that Pald.stan would Clove toward a thQ ~xlmun

reco&n1t1on of hQrultl rlGhts as it moves on to Q democratlc 8]

syStEm •. ~ Mter persistent presGur~ 10 th e Senate, Sec~tQl'1

01 state HaAs was fox-ced to ~ress concern about hUtntiln

rights in R\kietan.

,,_.JI •• W

82 1ht~lmtt§._oL!g4\i'f 1 OctobQ~ 1903.

e, 1ll\.~ 9 Deoember 1982.

In Pakistan. only tbe Rtklstan Democratic ~rty.a

RaM Zafarullah khan sUpported the military link by­

tl0t1n& that it had bear aaatetIDSnded by the ~i§I..

broneh of biG party. 'lhe other f)Ollt1~1 part1e~ bave

been b1tterly el'1tloal of the alllanoe. To start with.

they have -blamo4 the U is. tor dellbemtely tbrottl1n8

d.emo~aoy in Pnklstan. Zia ts opponents 8ppcflla4 to the

U.S. 'on t4 November 1981 to l1nk the Ell"mS deal ~t\tb the 85

restoration of democfttcy 1n Paklstiath The MRD openly

e~rem~ed the tear" that ~be deal wo'l1d only help the

ttmUltsry d1ctato~1ptt and;med that fttuture sovemments WGUl-dn·ft honour colmlltments" under it. Tile new treaty f

s1&ned #behlnd the backs of the p~pl~. ft ,'faS meant to 81

bolster tbG unconstitutional "'stme of OQnarel Zia. The

Patd~!ln C()mr31ttee fer Democracy and Justice expressed the

opin1on that the alllance would be used agalnst Patdstflnts

"own people" and 1ncrease ·Zla 'a 1ntrans1goftce tll neeot1at1n&-

...,.......1 Ttl *. 11.. _

84 l,he .... f.fYI1i1t.r., December 199,.

e5 B$II lhutto condemned the u.s. for n.ot "s~port1ng Patd.stan'a return to de!locrooyft and the PNP 8 SbUb Mohaam1ad Khan blame:d:J the u.s. for ~curb1ng the demoorat1o and hwn-:l.n rtabts n of the Pakistan! people. See Tb~ T'Wehifh~dJ.fl. 20 January 19B} and 2S September 198;; AS a·· en suggested. the \i.S. waa obvioualy sUpporting 21a because it was easier to "YJA.~l>U1at. a fmr 6aneralth ~ See lhe 1f"'1 At In¢!.1tV ,18 July 198'.

86 The r>PP's OhulGm Mustafa Jato! cateaorlcallY stated that n1$ party woUld1'lot bonour ftany agreement or eny dealt seoret or open. mode W1tb. the U. S. • •• s. s~ >

~. ~1dntan Senes), vol. 11, part 21. 28 ~ranuary I'mtJ. lh 268. ~

81 BtmJa& n ..... 1 December 1981 .• >,

wlth Daluch leaders, tbereby forolq; anotberseparatlst

mOV<Dertt. tt GhUlam M\lStata lOlar, tho fo-nner Qovemor and

Chief fUnlstar of Punjab. was bittel'll" oritical of tbe

0(Jouble atandar48 tl of the wast. and ot the fact that ~110 . so rnwh 1s 8ald about ~1and. tar \"~l'se dfNel(1)llents and

e'Vents 1n Pakistan UDder matelal1aw reeo1ve a mere pasa1n4 eo oomment. tt

The second polnt of crit1Gism was that Z13 had

made Patd.stan on Jnst~nt of Amortcan gla~l stNtOSY 4

The mp' a ~11~ GhtlUS Bakeb B12~ wamed Zis against maklnS

PaldGtan an American t');>a~m. n The IVIRD was crtt1cal of Us

for convol't1n& Pakistan into a "trontUne state exposed to 89

gavo chnl\6S .. n Ma'1ft~ MchaCBad !(b,nn., the Preslder!t of tbe

.9!l~tC'!!m.a!:::~A;st;li. blamed 1.1a for eaefitlcln6 nPaktston

at the alter ~ the Pcntaaon by olfering military bases to

Amen.ca ~or' its rapid daployment foreo." In specUlc tams, ~

Zia t«l8 aCQusa4 :>f grant1n6 sl~ br'lS9S to the u.S. S1m118~lY.

Ghulam f'Yustd'a Khalr. 5 ~ormer GOVCmf.)t' and Chlat tUn1&t~

of Amjab 1n the 19108. 'Brned 'that· Mlstan ought never to 91-

be "the eat's paw for any pt1ce. R

• 'at.

aa

89

90 91

• L

t!lP-a€!,Q!,ln&,. 22 -Janu.el'Y 1992. GbUlaan Hussaln~ the eo~ary..uenGral. called this a ftdouble-faced pol1cy.n .

~!1Qrlu'l"'. 14 febNal"Y 1903. ~ e Pe'u.'UaJ'Y 198,.

SimUarlr. Besem Nuarat Bb&atto was axtt'enoly critical of the Amerlctlft support tor martial la" 1n ~lstan in roturn for Zlat 8 strateg~cco.ope"at1()n.. ~c ror (~k1stan Series). vol. lOt part 19. 27 Jan~~982 .•. p. 2J1~

-fhOBO allegatIons made by t=Ok1stan t S opposttlon

leaders have Q strong basis in reality. Apart ~

Pakistan' a subosr41nat1on to U.8. 810bal strategy f there

is no doubt that the military aid has a domestic purJ)0ge.

To beaJ,n with, it has strengthened tho ann;~wor in

sooiety and has kept the opponents ot the reglme at bay.

Zis must obviously kaap the sold1ex-s happy. Tb~ best way

to do tbis 1s to e1ve now weapons to the armed forc~s and

lncl-easa tboir rol.e bl the admin1stration. U.S. aid tits

very neatly .into Zia 'a scheme ot things. Tho strong under.

ourrent o£ hostility towards the U .5. does not -lTY hila

so lona as the anued f'orces are in &004 cheer.

There are ~rloUG reasons for the large dC!'ployment

ot the army 11'1 P\mJab end Sind. SOInG argue that kaepina It

in the AtShan tn>ntler away from family life t\Ould lead to

disaffection. This EU'Sument lel not neoessarily true

because even in Pwjab and ~1nd Patd.sten deplGYS her force.

on the iTont1or and not 1n paaeet1me stat10ns it i'be arQUIlent

that the army ~ needed lor 011111 o.dm1niu'trat!on. must bo

deployed in densely-popUlated e.rtiaG like the l\m.jab is also

not completely valid. Only a cQX'ta1n numbel' 01 senior

c fflcars al.'"Q J"souU'ed tor admlr.1atr:it1on sinoe local

adminlntmtoN take Otlre of tbe ~lI11or poslt1ons. nae hal

~eason t01." th.e maasS.va deployment of the anny 1n EUnJab and

S1l'ld is tll,at th~se l.u~a the maln popUlation \:entres ltlere

" "-,

0, .!~

92 all olvn Btrif. baa orJ.alMtt4. It mtly be recalled

that Ayub \\*tl~ ovclth~wn alter be put the amy baok in the barracks. ZJ.a haB taken ~are net to repeat the

mistake, and bas ilven both attmln1str'~t1ve posit1ons and

ent~t'eneurlal fJub$1~es to thQ amy.

Beside •• thfl' arms aid 1s al80 desiSned to (!Uoll

Wlrest ~;ithln the~. One v1e\-11s th:lt the U*S., probablY

at Ziat$ betl$st, heel ~Q~1nud f'rQnl modernlsins Paldstan's

armour ,to pl"ave.nt a *Do, wertul ar&lr)ured division hooded by 93 '

aD embltious seneral t1 f~m towUna Zta. 213 has also

put ~Qsl$ on a modem air force and an antl.n~

he11eopte~ ~orce., both of \.lcb could thtfat't the detli8na

of an as!mOU~ comr.umClQr' to salzG power. On the otber haneS,

Patd.atan has devoted mucb att ent10n to the modem1sat 10n

of h,er Qir fo~et missile a:nltOUl'Y. nxt111~'"Y. f:r1&ates

and stA~rlne&t,

~adg" Milital'Y links between the U,S. and Balt-Sladelh

have ,not been very \dde.-~naJ"'l&. No~ 1s it obV1oUB that

the U .. S., has p~ppe4 "" the ¢lvll-lllUttary ~UNaUCftcy

.. l'V "'.'.J:= l • 'I ., a ' ••

til . .,._ ..nita.., ~14. M tbt lana1a4 ...... di4

inherit tho t~dlttoll' 0:£ Pa!C1atan. and telt that 1t could l'W.e tba ccuntz-y acre llItQot1-vf4V than the pol1tt.

claM. fha U.s. was elso favourably 41s:poae4 towalt4s _

anay ,for "Batt.G& \Glob _ft essentially the Game •• tbo.-to. ___ art. 'tfhe 001:, 4ltfel'ence •• tMt 81oco thG

atntegLo otakes of 'the U.S·. were not fJ) "tlb Sitl 8a~a4'_j

the oW'tat;y ~s .hot \nd.1t \4J as s1ste-atatlofll.ly as that

o~ Paktstan.

There 1a etf'On&er ev 1 d91l.c 0 to p~ the 1nvol~nt

.~j! tbe ClA in ibnalfl4esb ~up 0: 1915 ttum in eitber of the t_ faktt1tan.t cO\lp&. GGVt1JmmGnts leava vet1l little dl~ot

nC)or<1 of th$,lr COftJit inVOlv.$bl~tlt ttl 'the do:ne~t;1o. poUUos .

01 otbet'Str DG1Jldes. the U.:s. J)~$OJX:e 1n BanAlaClesh ma

elready at~n8. As -..cb. at was Mt esser¢1al to~"se

totoe 111 saO~l' U.S •. Ob~eot.tv~$. A U.s. ~q,\aes~ ~

U3Uttl1y llcced'&d to fo.~ lear og M~Uat'Oft. Alt ~ fotce

W#lB eS$$~lAi. tJG in 191~. it ~o ~~loyed throuab

aeo=pl1O&a~ of ~d1 there waN .,.afl1.

!b28im.qa 1/ba.re ~e 8t~ ·1t:idlcat1'Ons th9t the U .. S .. tl'l$i

to pnvent tile blxth ot Banaladegh tft 1971. Dtlr.tn3 t})~ Ubetatlol\ tttrugsla

tM hoPErS the tbl.ted States p1$oe4 Ul it-~ :contaot2 ~tth tile llaaal.ades'b eb5idow 80vemment So Cilleuttft tn Aug"etf; $egt~l" and Octobe.,, __ ~oranot taa ptomlsil'ie_Uesln,e. though~ ~ .. t.i\at ttme." l'hey had no- t\uth~rttl'~ no po1ttteetl

strenatb of their own and were atrald that 'they would be disowned by ~ib and otbera later.' 94

u.s. Secretary of State K1s.1nger had reportedly

d1sapp~G(} ot M~'bt Who was Ra heac1strona politician who 95

waa thwartlna b1a (K1sa1nael"s) plana for tho world.-

Further.

Amerioa helped the Pak1atanl Amy in its genooidal operations... The name of Hush Height \liaS ltnked with ~1ajor-General Reo Uaman Ali·s. He1&ht left lbngladesb abruptly after ~J..~\9.t.a DaCQa <taU), pUblished a pholfo-cuc a DSAe 4rOm Fa~an All's (leek calendar wlth Hel&bt"'$ name written on It_ Arnold. Ze1tlin of the lbltatl Preas said, ttfhe photo ,as aocompan1ed by a pl~lse bloeraphy of Rel6bt lSnk1ng blm wltb the Central Intell1&enco Agency tCIA).n 96

Accor41na to snoUu. source.

In October 1m .. a seotion of the Al1ru.o1 Leaguo p'lt out ~eelera to the Paklstan OnlY t sugeestlns a ~sa1ble agreament based on tho release of MU:11b (then a pr1soner in west Pakistan). autonomy for Bangal \11!tb.\Q Pakistan, and medla~lon by tho lblted States. 'rbl. proposal reflected e fear on tbe part oE the Awaml l.oQ&'-le that a oont1n.d.ni liberation strUggle In East Bengal m!8bt Ander them redUndant" . pusblrlg the country lrrevers-1bly to tbe lett .. 97

Khondakar Mushtaq hhmsd, one of tbe flv" m11l1stera

of the l'rovls1oMl &ovamment of ~adash dur1.ng the

l1b0ratlotl stN&B!e. me uT>b>roaehad by the U.S. to prevent

La" •• A". ".3 ....

94 1..1.. Khatib. J!hg .K&Ud M~? (New Delhi. 1981). p. 11.

9' Ibid:... p'. 95. 96 l!!:t!1, •• p. 98,.

91 Ati. n. 17. p, 9'.

thO' COunt~. s !ndopandence. w.rtlo U.S.A. had opened

socret negotiatlons with .... Nushtaq ••• not wltb

Ta.1\lddUl Abm~, the Pr.fJne MSnlster ~t the p rt)Vls1onal

government. ft Joseph Farland, the Amerlcan P.m'bassado .. 10

Rltd,stao., SU8&ested to ~neral Yabya Khan on 4 SOptenbel'

),971 that tbe

Paklsttlnis use J:Amer1~'good offices to OI"l'WlB9 secM contact between the ~rt1Stan Govemtnent ana 'the Bengall exllEHh i Tho name he sugseated to Yabya wae Noehtaaua.

What Farland, a forme!' F.B.I. Qeent, ofgor~ was ••• good o~f!CCtst in 8Ul)ven1n& the B!lnala~ob liberation IGOvanent tbtoUSb 1\-toshtaqUO.

A so.n1or ot.tlc1.al o~ the U.eJ. state Department acblttGd •• thQ~ there wore 1nd£Vl­dual Bengal1S 1n poslt1ons that wore aQcG»t­able to ~est Paklstan and were a souftSe ol hope to US (Americans). 99

Futtb er. anotber American s(lccmpl1ce,

~bub~ Alam ,Cha'sh'1i;o ViaS an ideal intel'­m~d1arv between 'the ~r1can ac1mS.n1atratlon, '~1cb ~cd to ftbofit tbe Uberat10n ot B3ng1adesh and flbshta~e. who was eagel' to. malts 3 d;;t with tho ~k1Stan military r~e bah1nd the backs ot his colleagues. 100

Muahtaq was to strongly 4eny that he bael eGtabll8hact

seeM lin'k$ witb the Americana.. Ko

waG to f!tly latGl' t~t he had only tr1ed to finti out ~ Anw1"l\oan <U.plomats *at WSMtngton 'was tb1~ vJ.&..a..vls ~adesh~ Not OYGn a plausible e~1@at1on ~en the American tilt

.,.. r ...... _ h en _,JS ..... II ._

lawrenee L1.1~chUltZ. ~e~tl9l&malld ~ ~ondon .• 1 . • pp •. ' 1 ..

99 Khatib,. n. 94, p. 61 If

100 !li4,. p. 26.

La

towardS Paktstan lGS so pronounced that Kenneth Keat1n8.t American Ambassador .in De1h1, . and Herbert SpivaoK. American ConsUl-General J.n D:lcoa. found it elllbarasa!ni. And r~abtaque·8 explanation was made even mora r1dlculo1:as by Henry K1ss1tl8or, who claimed that at 'the t1ma of the Indian attaok u.s. diplomats bad almost persU':lded Yahya Khan an4 the Calc~·ta..base4 Ban&l$deah leadersbi.p to . enter .into Maot1at1ons.· .101 Given the htstory of U.S. 1lltrigue. it 1s not

aurprisJ.ng that the Americans had a hand !n tho 1975 coup. Indlan intelliGence

souroes believe that the ClA had estabUShed links with t~1b and had planned the cOllP even before Bangladesh \Ilas !onnod. Xho man lib) esteblished contact ms the CIA Station Chlet lb111p Cherry in llicca some time in June 1m. J\ fG~1 months before the killing of N~lb, Cherry bac! arrived 1n New Delhl, before ne btarr1edly left £or Dacca in August 1974. lb~adeah had aterted blam1n8 India tor all ber pr()blGn)~h.. Influenoed by the Americans. f~lb had toed~e ~1\mer1can line for some t!lbe. Shortly after 10 oft1c1el visit to New Delhi on May 1 • e changed bis stand once a.ga1n. Th1s. •• possibly lad to the sponsortna of the plot that led to M"",lb's death,. 102

..... "·flt '., ..... '~

101

102

In fact. the

persODS plannlng to overthrow tbe MU31b Govemment approaohed officials in tHe U.S. Embassy 111 1974 and 9 ser.tes of meet1n8a took plaoe between the plottGl'S and Amer$.oan offioials. Tbe purpose of these disoussions ,,/as to determine wik"lt woUld be the attltu(Je of the U.S. Government it Q polltioal change t<1Ell'e to be brought about in Bal1l31adesh throUGh a $l..9W2 ,AtftlCfll. 103 Nor \1OJre the Americans aVeJ-SQ to a chanae 10

govemment. They l'I)l!de overtures to TB3uddln Ahmec1. r~t.&.11bt8

oustod '!Dance tUJltster. In 1915- aat he

told soma Mends of bis ••• ratld7 sent woN 01 it to Sansaoandhu andCaut10ned bSm that a conspiracy was be1ns hatched aaalnst bim. 194

'lbe 197' CO\C) was warmly weloomecS in Pakistan

since the ooup2lakers were ldeolo&!oal1Y much oloser to

Pakistan than Ml.ljlb had been. But eVen a Pak1stani. Wahal)

SldtUql, tho ecl1tor of Al-:F!-\talb told a Bangladeshi

jOUX'i':laltBt thutU

*I'he recent chanse 111 .81llglade1Jb; ft he said. "ls the cUl.m1Mtlon of the CIA plan wh1ch was 1111tlally evolved tor implementation 1n 1969. 105

_ ...... It 1 It ._

103

104

10'

This is the glst o~ teat the plotters weft to tell l.awrence Llfscbultz. a western jOurDlUst. See Khatib, n. 94. p. 52.

}P,".. p. 131.

lblsl- t p. 21.

~AOotbQr so~e ~8 With S1dd1~' . -not only did the tillte4 Stlirtee have pftor

. knot'lledae of the coUp \'bleb klUeES ~lb. but the AaezicaD £mbassy parsoMttl haa 'held d1souGs1ona tdth lntU.v1duals 1nvolved in tho plot to ollertbrow f4UJib .ore tbCin alx months prior to his daatb. 206

Such d1'~losurefJ t'nCO\1lqa the belief that the

coup»akerts bad many s~portet:$ tn tbe Ame~.tcan embasay.

Abdul (,talfal' Cboudhut'y f a BafJ&1a4eshl 3ourna11st. has

e)tJ)reased the bellef that S?nte time before the 00\4'. ~

hMa30r General Z1a had. advocated the imposltion of JIll1itary

rule. Div14 Rostet'. the American Ql11baaS9do~. was there . 107

and be s!!9RAme.4-- 't',." Of course. none of these points

of view are accolD~ed by ev1dene~ ~m official doc'lDent ••

• "., - '1'" I ...

Sucb secret and covert operations can Seldom be exP<)se4

becauso those carrying tbem out take exceptional care to

destroy all evidence. aut the win of evellts 18. by

itself. enoU&h to imply a u.s. n>le.

Insofar as the later coups 8J'e concerned, recent

Gvldenoa suaGeats that tbe coup ~loh overthrew Rahman 1n

1991 ~s not mastemlndecl by Manzoox- as w1dely bGl1evec:l.

Three months bfl~ore the event,. t1anzoor b~4 told on

acouaintance that El'sbadto tnat was alow1Y closing about

him·. • This haa beEm 1ntorpreted by observem to mean that

Manzoor' 9 ase9ss1Mtion was the htmdlwcx1c of the ~"(JDe

.d.&ht-td.ng faction of the anly led by General 8.M~ Erohad

lIIhc wanted to pU=,&0 the army leadersb1p of the lest freedom

t1Shter. ~J.lhouah~ little wldence bes been pmdu:e4. the

assllsstnatlon Qf Rahman and Mall200r as well as the eventual

aSS\,:tilpt1on of ))OWer by i::rsbad bQS been l.i:lked ~lith the

activities of a British m1l1tary ~ru~ mlss1onWh1cb.

in 1976, oorrted lonmrd an earlier security aid plbgrattee

1rllt1ated by 'tbe U.S. AcCOrl'dlng to this tbeory, the anldual

shUt to e~~e r1ibt-.wJ.ni policies ever since 197'.

cU1m£nat1n& ln Ershadts coup, had un ~erican and late~, a lOB

Brlt1eh hand. ft • ....... _ ...... x • .... .., ....

lOB

Tn~ U.S ... ~desb links have been rathart

different gran the A:nGriOOD l1nlw Wit..." PakLstan. We do

not .• , tor emlmple •. SSG any Banaladesh :;ova to seek mass!,.,.

U .. S. mil1tary aid to deter India. The partty syn(irC)me

does not obsess the B.~lade$b military elite. even wh110

the amy has aot mllOh bl86ol" t60tb Wlder ENba4. Nor do ".

see a ons to onu relatiOnship betwoan foreign m1l~tary ald

and an £no~ease 1n the capaolty of the ibnSladeeb armed forces to intervene. Whore Uanaladea.\ is s1m11Gr to PaJd.Btaft

1s in th.e evidence Qf A!llel'1ean t!~JlOrt to~ the overthrow o.t cl,,1l1an re&1mea.

, 11 small Gtato.s neaten for external military

support to ncutl'aUso tbe stftlteslc 8\4)e1'lonty of ito

ne1ebbo~ 1s uotb1ne new 10 J.ntematlQnal relations. But

everytb~ has a prlce. J1nnab and L1aQUat" Sp\lmed by the

U.s •• fOWld ftlVOLll" orQ.y after &ettina Pakistan directly

lnvolv'ed in the Cold ~·ar. Tbla ~"o1'lly ant,agonised both

India 31lcl the U.S.S.R., but may wm hele reduced Paklstan'o

m111t.~ry capability aa.glnst I.r.dla. .Besides. the U.S. X'Gtused

to sq,port Pakistan caga1=.~t lr..d1a. <wen while P!.tld.stan.

har-bo~ed un~eal1at1e not1ons of mAUtary aUJ)eriorttv ovo~

h er ttG.tghbo~.r.: "

The toothless natur~ of the Pok1stan ... \1.S.1l11A4ncct

was ~vale4 :In 196' and 1m. bttt ~klotan had D!) optloft

tban to eont1Jlu$ w1th the ex1tJtll16 ~tangemQtlt. lIultto.;

like bis J)redecessol'S, was very sct'lptl.cal about the

c.apaC1ty of tho conoerva"tJ.ve Islom1o states to aid Patd8t~

dut'J..n& ~.r. The proposed "Islamic Dank- of strategiO

military eq,l11pmont; and the CtIslamic states" Detmoe treat,

never matel'laUse4. a.utto sbrew41y oultivated the an

Amerioans tor L~nv1gorat1on ot the old ~lat1otl8b1p but

felle4 bacaUS8 be \ISS Wlwtll.1ng to compn>tnlse oft Vital

-1$'''03.

Xbe only ga1n Pald.trtan has made 1n the n~w aGour1ty

relatlolJtm.lp it) tbe U.s. aoknollledgementthat PaIUGtan·

faces a tlu~aat fran India. This is a tribute mQre to

Paklstani d1plomaoY' than to' Amerlca4 aagaolty. The At3ban ori81S bQa made Pakiatan a ftflMntUne w state, and brought

about a otlat\se 1n the u.s. pel'CeptJ..on of IMla~ t~w(W_t­

it 1s ext.fietnely unUkelY that tile ~S~ ~uld aotlvely

support PaIUatan 1n n future contl1ct ,,11th Ind1a even st

she e~tract8 El mueh b1gg~ pound of nestl than the Paklstwa

olaiaD to have g1ven her. The Paktstanls know th13 and an

articulate public op1.nion is aoutelY a'1aN of past Ut 8.

acte of eOll1mlos1on and omission.. That &~'Plalns t~e distanoe the PaklsttUi.ts bave ct\retUlly- trioed to malntaln.

Mol'e 1mportant than all the CQneaquenoe.s $soussed

above. mUlta~y arranaements wi tb the U.s. have buftlene4

Pakistan ~J1th Q strateg1c depen.dOllCe tll1th attmdant donleatlo

cOMeqUenCes. The U.s. nGV'er Q.onsUlt.ed Paldetan on tsetla1tlv.

iS8Ue$ Qonce~n1n3 the multilate.ral al11anoe~. Pbktstani

decle1on-cnakina also became sub3eot to U.S. assent

and pressure. In this cont~. a U.S. role 1ft the

"cot4W- of 1954, 1958 altt11917 CMlrlOt be entirely ruled

out. 'rho constNCtion of U.S. bases in Pakistan .turthet­

eroded Aaklatan t s sovere1anty ..

Equally noteworthy 10 the tact that m1litary aiel

ohanged the bal1U1ce ot clvtl-m!11tnry ~lat1ons in favour

of the armed forces. The Amer1¢ans established direot links

with the military. In Q olvl1-mWtary showdown, the anted

1orce8 were invariably preferred. The amy grew Wo a

strong organlsat1on bavinG a vested 1ntereat in the

perpetuation 01 ita power. Both the esmad foreos and the

external power de\telopM a symblotlc relatlonsh1p wb1oh.

under the e1.rctlDstances. was hardly eqUal. EMuah eVidence

of a deliberate U,S .. attCDpt to ho1.Gter tbe Paldstam. armed

forces bas already been Cited. It 1& not surprising.

theft~()re. that denocrat10 dlssent 1n Paldstan has (lu.r~ntlY

taken a strong ant1-U.S. twlst.

Insofar as BangladBsh Is conoeme4. the u .. s. role

1n tha 1m coup has been shown throuah ci¥"Oumstantlal

evldeneo wh1ch 18 more per's\claslve than the proof 1n respect

ot Pakistan. However,. the~ bas been no to~l and

ln9tltutlo!le,11ze4 m11itary al1ianoe bat\'J'sen tha U.s~ and

1bnaladosh .. despite reports about the lease of tho ManJi"'" base to tbe Americans. To that extent. the w.s. role 10

Banslad03h has been different .from its involvement in Patd.stan.

The weak fOl\l1atlon of SOOi1ll1 tC)rcea 1n Pakistan

and amsladoab as ~11 as the "ralat1vo autonomy· of tbe

olvU-mf.l1tary bu~a~raoy were a %'3d1dUe of oo20nloU_.

In l\lk1stan at lead-. this ftrelatl-vo autonomy- 1neVltoblY

developed into heacon), as a resUlt of the noocolonlal 109

link wlth the u.s. ?bat 18 my the external 4lmenslon

of mll1tary rule 1n the Thlrd \~o J1d 1s t10 crucial. Alena

wS.tb w$atem a14 came the impact of wostam ideas on

publio pollcy. ~he c1vU..m111tary bt.U\lmuoracy. a 1lbearel'

of \qe3tem mtlcnaUty and ted'molosy. n becamo ttan aaent

0: modam1el'ltion.- Its role was oontraotecS with that of

the inCftllletent and "demagogle" politicians Who \1er'-e \,IIllt

to rUle.. !hutto, ~ made a bitter indictment o£ tfCGUD-

aeno1l)'ft end its 11nb t!l1tb eltternally .. 1ndt1Ced "be,aMlony. ft

realised the &ftvlty of this nexus tn.tt it was too late.

The Ultimate losew ~~e ·tbe people ct Pak.latan and

Banaladc;!sh. whose asp-trnt!ons ware stifled tor:' the mo$1; pare •

... ' w. __ tr. .1 I .1 't. I MIl

109

I\SSumtna power may not bave been very dltfloult

tc~ the ttMlotionar1es of the amed fOl'Ce8. glvErn the

problems wbicb the civilians faoed 10 Pak.f.stcm tI1l4

Danalade.b. But the exeroise of power intoxicates those \lIho hold 1t and ita perpet.atlon bQcomea 1r!lporatlye. How

t.h~ khak1 .. clncS rulers o~ Pakistan and Bane'l~t1oSh fort1tlec1

their rule 1s the sub~ect of cMpter f1v'h