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PART TWO
CHAPTER III
FROM UNQUALIFIED TO QUALIFIED SUPPORT
THE KASHMIR DISPUTE
Of all the disputes that have bedevilled Pakistan's relations
with India since the partition in 1947, the most enduring and
outstanding has been that related to the future of the princely state
of Jammu and Kashmir. 1 Stemming from the Indian claim that the
Instrument of Accession signed by the Hindu Maharaja in October 1947
had rendered Kashmir 'an integral part of the Union of India', and
the Pakistani contention that the future of the state --- a muslim
majority area and, hence, assumed to be potentially a Pakistani
province could only be determined through a UN-supervised
plebiscite, the dispute had plunged India and Pakistan into a
'limited war' in Kashmir within a year of their independence.
Seven teen years later, following a series of unsuccessful efforts
both inside and outside the United Nations for its peaceful
settlement, this dispute had also resulted in a major war between
these two states in September 1965.
After the war, however, through Soviet mediation, both India and
Pakistan agreed 'not to have recourse to force and settle their
disputes through peaceful means' •2 This agreement embodied in the
Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966, effectively meant that
Islamabad had accepted the fact that it could not succeed in unifying
and integrating the princely state with Pakistan, and, therefore, had
1 S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.16-36; for detailed discussion of the history of this dispute see, for example, Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1953); Alaistar Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947 to 1966, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966); and G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations With India, 1947-1966, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968).
2 Dev Sharma, Tashkent: The Fight For Peace, (Allahabad: Indian Universities Press, 1966), pp.63-65.
75
indirectly ag1:eed t.o a status quo where India occupied three-fift-hs
of Kcwhmir with a populat.ion of four million people, and }•aldstan
controlled the rest of the state with a total population of one
million as 'Azad Kashmir'. Nevertheless, the Ayub regime and the
three successive governments in Pakistan continued to stress that the
Kashmir issue was still alive and that its resolution was a
pre-requisite for a durable peace in the subcontinent.
This continued emphasis on the Kashmir issue haF been explained
by t.he Pakistan Government in terms of principles. Giving up t.he
demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir,' it is argued, would be tantamount
t.o accepting that, due to i·ts sheer size and capabilities, Inttia
should be allowed t:o settle disputes on its ovm terms. 'J'hi s, it is
furthe1: arqued, vmuld set. a precedent: which could be followed l>;,
' India in any otJwr d.i sputes that may arise bet·..;een Nt~w Delhi an(t
':l
Islam a bad in fut;ur e.··'
cor,siderinq that throughout its history I Pakistan's leaders have
perceived their Indian counterparts as at worst bent upon undc.,ing
Pakistan and at best relegating it to a satellite status, this
explanat.ion cannot be totally ignored. However, the fact remains that
other factors account for the continued refeJ:ences to U1e Kashrni.r
dispute as well. First:ly, for inst_ance, t.he is:>uP- is kept alive: <1uc
t:o the pressure from the military which, by arquinr3 tlMt. unt.i1 the
dis.put.e is settJ ed the presence of t.ile Indian lnmy in tlw ' ed
Kas~nir' ~lscs a security threat to Pakistan, has been aLJe to demand
Secondly, the demand i en-
a plebiscite has: often been raisqd t:o retain Uk~ support of t::,'
'"{
Intervi e·w tJ an oi ficial from Pak:i stan Fore:\ en ot lCe, L1t:',,
19 8.C: '
76
Pathans, and especially of the Punjabis, who have all along
Pakistan's history closely identified themselves with the 'cause' of
the Kashmiri people. Thirdly, it has also provided the Government,
when required, with a rallying point and a means to divert its
people's attention away from the country's economic and political
problems.
Regardless of the reasons behind the continued emphasis on the
Kashmir issue, however, it cannot be discounted that the issue has
been kept alive by all the Pakistani regimes, and that it has always
been a yardstick with which these regimes have judged the degree of
other states' friendship with Pakistan. This chapter deals with the
Chinese policy towards this most enduring issue in Pakistan's
history. It begins with a description of Chinese support for Pakistan
on the Kashmir issue during the period from 1969 to the end of the
Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. Then, it proceeds to trace Beijing's
policy on this issue during the Bhutto and Zia regimes respectively.
China and the Kashmir Issue: 1969-1971
The beginning of 1969 witnessed the Pakistan Government
asserting, as in the past, that the Tashkent Declaration signed three
years be.fore had established beyond any doubt the fact that the
Kashmir issue was the basic cause of the tension in the subcontinent
and that therefore, it needed to be resolved as early as possible. It
was on the basis of this assertion that Islamabad rejected New
Delhi's offer for a 'no-war' pact made on 1st January 1969, as it
only provided for talks and not negotiation on the Kashmir issue. 4
Meanwhile it also began diplomatic moves urging the four permanent
members of the Security Council to pass a resolution on the Kashmir
4~, 16 January 1969.
77
issue, even if only a simple appeal to the countries involved to
enter into direct negotiations to settle it. 5 Upon the failure of
this move, three months later, following the Indian Government's
decision to confer propriety rights on non-muslims over the
muslim-evacuee land in Kashmir, and make the voicing of the demand
for self-determination an offence liable to heavy punishment, 6
the
Pakistan Government submitted a protest note to the Security Council
identifying the Indian moves as constituting 'serious violations of
the international agreements embodied in the UNCIP and the Security
Council resolutions'. The Indian Government, the note stressed, was
under an obligation to invite the citizens of the state who had left
the Indian occupied area to return to their homes and also to
7 guarantee all human and political rights to the people of the state.
The Indian Government, on the other hand, continued to claim
that the integration of Kashmir in the Union of India was
irrevocable, its sovereignty non-negotiable and that New Delhi was
not obligated under the Tashkent Declaration to settle the issue.
Hence, it argued, by raising objections to the Indian moves in
Kashmir and referring the issue to the United Nations, Pakistan was
committing 'brazen-faced interference' in India's internal affairs.8
The Chinese response to this controversy, as had been the case
since 1964, was to support Islamabad's position on the Kashmir issue.
on 23 March 1969, for instance, at a Pakistan National Day reception
held in Beijing, Chinese Vice-Premier Hsieh Fu-Chih assured his
Pakistani hosts that 'the Chinese people remain unshakable in
their stand of giving resolute support to the Kashmiri people's just
5Times of India, 5 February 1969. 6Pakistan Times, 15 March 1969.
7 k' Pa 1.stan Times, 13 April 1969. 8 . f T1.mes o India, 28 May 1969.
78
struggle for the right to self-determination' •9
Six weeks later, on 5
May 1969, Chou En-lai once again stated that 'the Chinese Government
and people will, as always, •.• firmly support the Kashmiri people's
struggle for the right of self-determination' , 10
and reiterated his
support during Air Marshal Nur Khan's visit in July. Responding to
the Air Marshal's appreciation of 'China's unqualified support to the
people of Jammu and Kashmir in their just struggle for the
inalienable right of self-determination'. 11 Chou En-lai expressed
his Government's resolve to 'always' firmly support the Kashmiri
people in their struggle for self-determination. 12
These and other
similar categorical declarations were supplemented with a frequent
coverage and endorsement by the Chinese media. 13 On 16 June 1969,
for instance, Hsinhua reported a Dacca weekly, Holiday, as stating
that 'for the last few weeks as if to browbeat the new government in
Pakistan, the Indians have time and time again parroted their
assertions of "sovereignty" over 0 14
occupied Kashm1r' • The same day,
the Chinese news agency also reported the Indian Foreign Minister,
Dinesh Singh's statement of 27 May 1969 that India would not 'give
away Kashmir', and Pakistani official's reaction that Kashmir belongs
9Hsinhua, 23 March 1969, in Hsinhua Daily News Release, (Hereafter
cited as HDNR), 24 March 1969, p.12 (emphasis added). 10chou En-lai's Congratulatry message to General Yahya Khan on
assuming the Presidency, 5 May 1969, in R.K. Jain (ed.), China South Asian Relations: 1947-1980, Vol.II, (New Delhi:
Radiant Publishers, 1981), pp.118-119 (emphasis added). 11 'Air Marshal Nur Khan's Speech at Farewell Banquet in Beijing',
NCNA, 16 July 1969, in SCMP, No.4460, 23 July 1969, p.18.
-:r2'Chou En-lai's Spe~at Farewell Banquet given by Air Marshal Nur Khan', NCNA, 16 July 1969, in Ibid, p.20 (emphasis added).
13It is essential to point out that, barring the occasions when the
Kashmir Issue is in the limelight, Chinese media's endorsement of Pakistan's position is generally restricted to reporting what Pakistanis say about the issue without any comment s.
14 •Pakistan Papers Refute 'Pravda' Slanders', Hsinhua, 16 June 1969, in HDNR, 18 June 1969, p.7.
79
to the people who alone have the right to decide their future
affiliation'. It also reported the Pakistani official's comments that
Dinesh Singh's statement indicated a hardening of India's attitude
and revealed its real intentions towards Pakistan and demonstrated
its unwillingness to eliminate the basic cause of difference o Then
it proceeded to discuss a Pakistan Times editorial on the need to
resolve the Kashmir issue, and identified it as 'exposing the Indian
authorities' recent capricious attitude towards Pakistan •oo1
o15 Ten
days later, on 26 June, citing the Pakistan Times as the source of
its information, Hsinhua reported the accusation by Abdul Hamid,
President of the Azad Government of Jammu and Kashmir, that the
Indian leaders were exhibiting a ' growing obduracy' on the Kashmir
. 16 h' f 1 ~ssue. T ~s was o lowed, on 14 July ~969 by another news item from
Hsinhua reporting a statement by a 'public figure in Rawalpindi' that
the 'Indian expansionists' occupation of Kashmir was the worst
conspiracy against the freedom loving people of Kashmir and
Pakistan', and that the Indian expansionists wanted to subjugate
Pakistan because it was supporting the Kashmir people's struggle for
17 freedom.
The Chinese policy of support for Pakistan over the Kashmir
issue continued for most of 1970 as well. During his visit to
Pakistan on 11 March 1970, for instance, Kuo Mo-jo, Vice-Chairman of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, declared
that 'The Chinese Government and people will, as always, • o. firmly
15'Pakistan Charges India With Avoiding Settlement of Basic Issues
between two countries', Hsinhua, 16 June 1969, in HDNR, 17 June 1969, ppo12-13o
16 'President of Azad Government of Jammu and Kashmir Denounces
Certain Powers for Backing Indian Expansionist Designs', Hsinhua, 26 June 1969, in HDNRO, 28 June 1969, p.15.
17 'Kashmir Martyrs Day Observed in Pakistan' , Hsinhua, 14 July
1969, in HDNR, 15 July 1969, p.11o
80
support the Kashmiri people in their just struggle for the right of
self-determination', 18 and repeated this stand at a Pakistan National
19 Day reception in Beijing twelve days later. This was foilowed, on
4 April, by Fang Yi' s reiteration of support on the Kashmir issue,
with the added assurance that 'this stand of [the Chinese Government
and people] . 20 is ever consistent and unswerv~ng' Similar assurances
were given by the Commander of the Chinese Air Force, WU Faxian as
well during Air Marshal Abdul Rahim Khan's visit to Beijing in May -
June 1970. 21
Along with these assurances the Chinese media continued to
provide a frequent coverage echoing or reporting the Pakistani
position. On 14 July 1970, for instance, in a report from Rawalpindi,
Hsinhua gave details of the 'Kashmir Martyrs Day' held in Pakistan
and Azad Kashmir, highlighting the participants' emphasis on 'the
need to liberate Kashmir from the Indian oppression', and their
denunciation of 'the Indian rulers ••• for a colonial policy towards
the Kashmir people • • d hm' I 22 1 ~n occup~e Kas ~r • On y six days later,
citing western news agencies, Hsinhua reported the demonstrations and
rallies held in Indian-Kashmir during Indira Gandhi's visit,
emphasising that they reflected the desire of the Kashmiri people to
determine their own future. The demonstrators it reported, 'refuted
Indira Gandhi's alle~tion at a public meeting on 15 July that
Kashmir had acceded to India 23 years ago and had become an integral
18NCNA __ , 19
NCNA __ , 11 March 1970, in SCMP, No.4618, 18 March 1970, p.116.
23 March 1970, in SCMP, No.4627, 1 April 1970, p.133. 20see Fang Yi, Chinese Minister for Economic Relations' banquet
speech, NCNA, 4 April 1970, in SCMP, No.4635, 14 April 1970, p.78. 21see WU Faxian's Banquet Sp~ in Honour of Pakistan Air Marshal
Abdul Rahim Khan, NCNA, 31 May 1970, in SCMP, No.4673, 10 June 1970, pp.63-64.
22 'Pakistan Kashmir People Rally to mark Kashmir Martyrs Day', Hsinhua, 14 July 1970, in HDNR, 16 July 1970, p.3.
81
part of India' , 'pointed out that the people of Kashmir must be
allowed to exercise their right to self-determination so as to decide
to whom Kashmir belongs', and concluded that 'the Kashmir people will
not rest until they are given the right to decide their future
23 themselves'.
Towards the end of 1970, however, Beijing began exhibiting signs
of reducing the level of its political support for Islamabad.
Firstly, throughout the period September - December 1970, the Chinese
media neither reported the developments in 'Azad' or 'Occupied'
Kashmir, nor echoed the Pakistan Government's demand for a
settlement. Secondly, in contrast to Air Marshal Abdul Rahim Khan's
visit, when Beijing repeatedly assured him of its support over
K hm . 24 d . h . . b dm' 1 . as ~r 1 ur~ng t e v~s~t y A ~ra Muzaffar Hasan, Commander-~n-
Chief of Pakistan's Navy, in September 1970 1 the Chinese Government
25 stated its position only once. Thirdly 1 although during President
Yahya' s visit in November 1970, the Chinese Government and media
frequently stressed their 'firm support [for the] Kashmiri people in
their just struggle for the right to self-determination' , unlike
during Kuo Mo-jo's visit to Islamabad in March 1970 they did not go
on to declare that Beijing 'will, as always', provide its 'firm
23 'Youths in Indian Occupied Kashmir Demonstrate Against Reactionary Rule' 1 Hsinhua, 24 July 1970, in HDNR 1 21 July 1970, pp.10-11 (emphasis added).
2%ee 1 for example, 'Pakistan Air Force Commander-in-Chief Abdul Rahim Khan Gives Farewell Banquet in Beijing' 1 NCNA, 3 June 19701 in SCMP, No.4675, 12 June 1970, p.130; see also f.n.22.
--r5See 'Chinese PLA Naval Commander Hsiao Ching-kuang to Warmly Welcome Pakistan Naval Commander-in-Chief Muzaffar Hasan', NCNA, 18 September 1970, in SCMP, September 1970, p.3~ ----
Gives Banquet Vice Admiral
No.4746, 28
82
26 support' to the Kashmiri people. Moreover in the Joint Cormnunique
issued at the end of the visit the Chinese Government merely 'note[d]
with interest the recent offer made by the President of Pakistan on
the withdrawal of troops with the view of enabling the people of
Jarmnu and Kashmir to freely exercise their right of self-
determination, and consider[ed] it worthy of support of the people of
various countries]' without declaring specific Chinese support for
it. This omission was significant as the Pakistan Government, in
marked contrast, had categorically stated in the joint communique its
support for Beijing's admission to the United Nations --- an issue
which had been as important for China as had the Kashmir question to
k. 27
Pa 1stan.
This 'new' Chinese policy of reduced support continued during
1971. In February 1971, for example, a part of the Karakorum Highway
was handed over to Pakistan by the Chinese Government. India had
frequently criticised the construction of this highway on the grounds
that it passes through an area which legally belongs to India, i.e.
Azad Kashmir.28
The Chinese Minister of Communications, Yang Jie, who
attended the inaugural ceremony, made no reference to Beijing's stand
that the Kashmir issue still needed to be settled. 29 Neither did Chou
26 See, for example, 'Jen-min Jih-pao Editorial: Warmly Welcome
Distinguished Pakistan Guest', NCNA, 10 November 1970, in SCMP, No.4782, 19 November 1970, pp.14g::-:j"40; 'Vice chairman Tung Pi-Wu's Speech at Banquet in Honour of Pakistan President Yahya Khan', NCNA, 11 November 1970, in SCMP, No.4783, 20 November 1970, p.191;~d 'Pakistan Minister of Finance Gives Banquet in Honour of Friendship Delegation of the People's Republic of China • , NCNA, 11 March 1970, in SCMP, No.4618, 18 March 1970, p.117 (emphasis added).
2-7-- . For complete text of the cormnun1que see NCNA, 14 November 1970,
in SCMP, No.4785, 24 November 1970, pp.67-69 (emphasis added). 2-8-
See, for example, India's protest note of 25 June 1969 to China,Keesing's ContemEorary Archives: 1969-1970, 1-8 November 1969, p.23652.
29NCNA, 18 February 1971, in SCMP, No.4847, 1 March 1971, pp.40-44.
83
En-lai, in his congratulatory message on Pakistan's National Day on
22 March 1971, mention Chinese support for Pakistan over Kashmir. 30
Only on 21 and 29 May 1971 was Beijing's support for Islamabad in the
dispute reiterated by the Vice Foreign Minister, Han Nianlong, and
Vice Chairman of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Regional
Revolutionary Committee, Long Shuj in respectively; but on neither
occasion was anything said about intent to continue this support in
the future.31
Thereafter the Chinese Government maintained a studied
silence on the Kashmir issue until the end of the year.
In December 1971, war broke out between India and Pakistan,
including in Kashmir and Punjab. Within a few days the Indian Army
had occupied a much larger area than its adversary across the
ceasefire line in Kashmir. 32
Soon afterwards, the spectre of an
Indian effort to dismember and render defenceless West Pakistan as
well was raised, when the United States began expressing fears that
the Indian Government contemplated redeploying all its forces on the
western front after operations in East Pakistan ended, so as to
liberate the Pakistani part of Kashmir and wipe out the Pakistani
Army and Air Force. 33 The genuineness of these fears cannot
definitely be determined, as the US Administration itself was divided
about the feasibility of such an Indian adventure. 3 4 Nevertheless,
30NCNA, 22 March 1971, in SCMP, No.4870, 1 April 1971, p.205.
31 'Chinese Foreign Ministry Gives Banquet Celebrating 2Oth
Anniversary of Establishment of China-Pakistan Diplomatic Relations', NCNA, 21 May 1971, in SCMP, No.4909, 2 June 1971, p.109; and NCNA,
29 May 1971, in SCMP, No.4914, 9 June 1971, p.147. --
3~obert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India-Pakistan-Bangla Desh, (London: Chatto and Windus for International Institute for Strateg~c
Studies, 1975), pp.116-121. 33
Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p.901.
34 See, for example, Christopher Van Hollen, 'The Tilt Policy
Revisited: Nixon, Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia', Asian Survey, Vol.XX, No.4, April 1980, pp.350-352.
84
the very fact that the spectre ~ raised by a world power made the
Pakistan Government extremely nervous, when it was already facing the
1 . b '1' f k. ' . 35 c ear cut poss~ ~ ~ty o East Pa 1stan s secess1on.
The Chinese Government initially responded to the situation by
supporting U3 moves aimed at reducing the possibility of an all out
Indian attack on West Pakistan. On 10 December 1971, Huang Hua held
a secret meeting with Henry Kissinger who informed him of the US
Government's plan, worked out with General Yahya, to propose in the
United Nations an immediate ceasefire to be followed by negotiations
for troop withdrawals and the satisfaction of Bengali aspirations·
Considering that by then the Indian Army had already occupied a large
area of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangla Desh had become a
distinct near-future possibility, the US proposal was aimed primarily
at putting an end to Indian military operations in the west. Two days
later, in an urgent meeting (called, in a marked departure from past
practice,by the Chinese Government itself), Huang Hua conveyed to~Haig
Beijing's acceptance of the US proposal. He also refrained from
criticising, and therefore implicitly endorsed, American moves aimed
at urging the Soviets to dissuade the Indian Government from an all
out attack on West Pakistan --- moves which proved successful as the
Soviet Union actually began pressing New Delhi to accept the
territorial status quo in the west, including Kashmir.36
However, on 16 December 1971 --- the day when the Pakistani Army
surrendered in the East and New Delhi offered to cease hostilities in
the West, in a move similar to that made during the Indo-Pakistan war
of 1965, the Chinese Government intervened directly with a note to
India alleging that Indian armed personnel had crossed the Sikkim
35Interview with a ranking Pakistan Army Officer, May 1984. 36Kissinger, op.cit, pp.905-913.
85
border on 10 37
December. The same day, in a report on 'Indian
expansionism', the NCNA gave a detailed account of the origin and
developments of the Kashmir dispute and accused New Delhi of taking
'a truculent and unreasonable attitude with regard to Kashmir, a
region in dispute between India and Pakistan, trying to take
possession of this region ~ force' • This policy, along with other
acts of the 'Indian Government's interference in, bullying and
aggression against Pakistan', the report concluded, was the root
cause of the turmoil in the South Asian subcontinent.38
These moves,
while important in that they had put on record the Chinese opposition
to any Indian moves for unifying Kashmir by force, were essentially
insignificant.. By offering a cease fire in the West, India had
implicitly at least made it clear that it did not intend to try to
seize all of Azad Kashmir by force, so all China was doing was giving
apparent support to Pakistan which it knew would not be required.
The Bhutto regime - The Kashmir Issue and China
The lessons of the Indo-Pakistan war (1971) confirmed the
futility not only of Indian but also of Pakistani attempts to change
the situation in Kashmir by force. Hence the new government in the
'new' Pakistan, under Bhutto's leadership, decided to close the
Kashmir issue permanently. The Indian Government, which all through
the history of the dispute had demonstrated a preference for sealing
the issue, shared this interest. However, there was one condition. As
the war had resulted in India's emergence as the dominant regional
power and because it was holding 90,000 Pakistanis in captivity and
37NCNA __ , 16 December 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3867, 17 December 1971, p.C/12.
38NCNA __ , 16 December 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3868, 18 December 1971, pp.C/9-11 (emphasis added).
86
occupying almost 5,000 square miles of Pakistani territory, New Delhi
wanted to settle the issue on its own terms. This was reflectedJas
will be discussed in detail in Chapter V, in the statements of a
number of Indian leaders suggesting a 'straightening' of the border
in Kashmir in the immediate aftermath of the war. It became even
more obvious after the conclus~on of the Simla Accord in July 1972,
when the Indian Government unilaterally linked the withdrawal of its
forces from Pakistan's territory with an agreement on the delineation
and demarcation of the line of control in Kashmir. At this stage, as
will also be discussed in detail in Chapter V, the Chinese Government
supported Pakistan by providing it with a leverage against New
Delhi's attempts to settle the Kashmir question on its own terms.
Beijing declared categorically that as long as the Indian Government
refused to comply with the UN resolutions passed during the 1971 war,
the Chinese Government would bar Bangla Desh' s entry to the United
Nations. It was primarily this leverage which made India change its
position and proceed with the delineation and demarcation of the line
of control in Kashmir followed by the withdrawal of forces before the
year 1972 came to an end.
The beginning of 1973, therefore, witnessed a situation in which
India occupied three-fifths of Kashmir and Pakistan controlled the
rest of it with a line of control demarcated through a mutual
agreement between the two states. Since the clause related to
Kashmir in the Simla Accord had stipulated that the line of control
'shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised
position of either 'd I 39 Sl. e , there were speculations
39For text of Simla Accord, See, Pakistan Times 2 July 1972.
that,
87
40 notwithstanding either Pakistani or Indian claims to the contrary,
this line of control was to be treated by both sides as an
international border. These speculations seemed valid when both
India and Pakistan embarked upon a process of integrating their
respective parts of Kashmir.
In India, the process had already been initiated in 1972 when
Mrs Gandhi lifted the ban on Sheikh Abdullah • s entry to Kashmir, and
deputed G. Parthasarathy and the External Minister, S war an Singh to
enter into negotiations with him and his lieutenant Mirza Afgal Beg
for a complete and final accession of Kashmir to the Union of
I d . 41 n ~a. As a friendly gesture the Indian National Congress also
decided not to contest elections in the Kashmir Valley in September
1972, thereby letting the United Front, formed by the banned
Plebiscite Front and the Awami Action Committee, emerge as the
strongest group in the Kashmir Legislative Assembly~ • 42 In 1973,
however, New Delhi increased its efforts for achieving Kashmir's
total accession and, therefore, as another friendly gesture lifted
the two year old ban on the Plebiscite Front in January 1973.43
On the other side of the border, Bhutto also initiated a slow
process of integrating Azad Kashmir into Pakistan. The first
indication to this effect was received in August 1972 when the
Pakistan Government took steps to end the feudal tribal rule and
bring Gilgit and Baltistan, parts of the disputed area of Kashmir on
its side of the ceasefire line, under the administration of the
4 °For Pakistan's claim that the Simla accord does not alter the status of the Kashmir issue, see Bhutto's statement, Pakistan Times, 4 July 1972; and for Indian claims that Kashmir issue has been settled, see P.N. Haksar's statement, Times of India, 20 July 1972.
41 Times of India, 11 August 1972; and The Times, 6 March 1973 42K . I ees~ng s Contemporary Archives: 1971-1972, p.25547 43K . I c t 97 26 4 ees~ng s on emporary Archives: 1 3, p. 2 3.
88
44 Central Government. Much clearer indications, however, were given
in November 1973 when Bhutto visited Azad Kashmir and suggested that
it should be administratively integrated with Pakistan. 45
Simultaneously, his Government began attempts to promulgate an
'interim Constitution' for Azad Kashmir which among others, included
a provision for a 14 member Council with Pakistan's Prime Minister as
46 its head and the Azad Kashmir Prime Minister as its Vice-President.
In spite of these moves, the Pakistan Government did not admit
to its people that the Kashmir issue had been effectively sealed.
This was primarily for domestic political reasons; during the
National Assembly hearings to ratify the Simla Accord, a number of
opposition leaders had expressed fears that the clause related to
Kashmir would essentially amount to burial of the issue4 7 but had
been assured, especially by Bhutto, that the Accord did not prejudice
Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue and that the Government
would continue to champion the cause of the Kashmiris. 48 Once
delineation of the line of control was completed, the Pakistani
Government could not afford to withdraw these assurances, as to do so
would have provided the opposition, already at loggerheads with the
Central Government in Baluchistan and the NWFP, with a chance to
mobilize the masses in Punjab as well.
Therefore, Islamabad continued to raise the Kashmir issue. On 5
March 1973, for example, as reports began appearing in the Indian
44The Times, 23 August 1972.
45see Bhutto' s Speech in a public meeting at Muzaffarabad, Azad
Kashmir, Pakistan Times, 6 November 1973. 46
see Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Pakistan Law Minister's Statement, Pakistan Times, 11 June 1974.
47see Pakistan Times, 15 July 1972.
48For full text of Bhutto' s speech, see Pakistan Times, 15 July 1972.
89
press that talks were being held between Indira Gandhi's emissaries
and 'some Kashmiri politicians' on the future of Kashmir, Bhutto
issued a statement reiterating Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite,
and stressing that 'no action or arrangement which attempts to
determine the future shape and affiliation of the state, or any part
thereof, without any impartial ascertainment of popular will, would
constitute a disposition of the I 49 state • • • •
The frequency of such references was initially not very high,50
increasing only after the Delhi Agreement was concluded in August
1973 and the Indian Government agreed to repatriate the 90,000
Pakistani POWs. Only 20 days after the agreement, speaking in the UN
General Assembly, Bhutto referred to the 'unresolved dispute over the
state of Jammu and Kashmir', and stressed that 'the important issue
of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir, to which
the United Nations and both India and Pakistan are committed, will
have to be faced and honourably resolved for the good of [the
subcontinent] •. 51 Six weeks later, on 5 November 1973, during his
tour of Azad Kashmir, Bhutto once again raised the issue and declared
his government's willingness to enter into talks with India on the
future of Kashmir. 52
Beijing responded to this situation by adopting a posture
parallel to that of Islamabad.
49 'Statement issued by the President of Pakistal'), Mr. z .A. Bhutto,
regarding Pakistan • s Stand on the Kashmiri' s right to selfdetermination', Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XXVI, No.2, Second Quarter 1973, pp.118-119.
50This policy stemmed ensuring that it got the complications.
~hl\1.
from,.. Pakistan prisoners of
Government's interest in war back without any more
51 'The Prtme Minister of Pakistan's Address to the 28th Session of the UN General Assembly', Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XXVI, No.4, Fourth Quarter 1973, pp.160-161.
52Pakistan Times, 6 November 1973; see also Dawn, 10 November 1973.
90
Throughout the period preceding the Delhi Agreement (August
1973), the Chinese Government refrained from issuing any categorical
t t f f k . hm' . 53 . s a ements o support or Pa 1.stan on the Kas 1.r 1.ssue, nor d1.d
the Chinese media provide frequent coverage of Pakistani and/or Azad
Kashmir leaders' references to the need to resolve the issue. Between
January and August 1973, for instance, the NCNA transmitted only two
news items on the Kashmir question. The first merely reported a
Pakistani statement of gratitude for consistent Chinese support on
issues including Kashmir, 54 the second reported in detail Bhutto' s
statement of 5 March 1973 on the reported talks between Mrs. Ghandi's
emissaries and Sheikh Abdullah. 55
After India had agreed to repatriate the Pakistan POWs, however,
Beijing once again began exhibiting a willingness to identify itself
with Islamabad's stand on the dispute. On 17 January 1974, after a
year-long interval, Zhang Caiqian at last reiterated the Chinese
support for the demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. 56 Four months
later, during Bhutto' s visit to Beijing, Chinese Vice-Premier Deng
Xiaoping declared at a banquet on 12 May that 'come what may, the
Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support
the people of Kashmir in their struggle for the right to
self-determination' •57 Although the Indian Charge d'Affaires
thereupon walked out, the Chinese Government repeated its
53ouring Pakistan Chief-of-Army Staff General Tikka Khan and Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto's visit to Beijing in January and February 1973 respectively, for instance, no mention was made of Chinese support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.
54statement by the General Secretary of the Pakistan China Friendship Association, Ayub Mirza, NCNA, 3 March 1973, in FBIS:CHI, 6 March 1973, p.A/9.
SSNCNA, 6 March 1973, in FBIS:CHI, 7 March 1973, pp.A/4-5.
SGNCNA 17 1974 ' 197 /1 ____ , January , 1.n FBIS:CHI, 16 January 4, p.A • 57~, 12 May 1974, in FBIS:CHI, 13 May 1974, p.A/7.
91
determination to support the people of Jammu and Kashmir in the joint
communique issued at the end of the visit.58 This position was
defended on historical grounds by a NCNA report on 18 May, 1974 in a
commentary entitled 'Who Is "Fishing in Troubled Waters?" • • It
to referred~ a Tass statement about Deng Xiaoping' s remarks, made on 14
May 197 4, describing them as 'a deliberate effort to stir up a wave
of provocative clamoring in order to fish in troubled waters'. NCNA
argued that the Soviet position on the Kashmir dispute, accepting the
state as an integral part of India, reflected Moscow's desire to
'take advantage of and expand the Indo-Pakistan dispute to further
realise ••• [its] wild social-imperialist ambitions in ••• [the South
Asian] region' • 59 In contrast, NCNA argued, the Chinese Government
had consistently maintained that the Kashmir dispute, deliberately
left over by British imperialism in order to create antagonism
between India and Pakistan, should be solved through peaceful
negotiations between the two states and in accordance with the desire
of the people of Kashmir 1 • • This stand' , the report said, 'is not
only supported by the Pakistani Government and people, but at the
same time is identical to the earlier stand of the Indian Government
on this question', and pointed out 'that in 1953 the prime ministers
of the two countries reached an agreement and expressed that the
Kashmir dispute "should be settled according to the desires of the
people of Kashmir". Before this, the Indian Prime Minister Nehru had
guaranteed more than once to give the people of Kashmir the right to
self determination •. Further justifying Beijing's continued support
for Pakistan the NCNA report pointed out that this stand was in
58 For full text of the Communique, see NCNA, 14 May 1974, in FBIS :CHI I 15 May 1974, pp.A/1-3.
59'Who is 'Fishing in Troubled Waters'?', ~, 18 May 1974, in FBIS :CHI, 21 May 1974, pp.A/8-9.
92
confonnity with United Nations' resolutions on the Kashmir dispute,
which India had also accepted in the past as a basis for solution of
h d . t 60 t e J.spu e.
The Chinese support continued during the second half of 1974,
when the Bhutto regime once again brought the Kashmir issue into the
limelight. In a series of statements issued during this period, the
Pakistan Government accused India of synchronising its talks with
Sheikh Abdullah with mobilisation of its troops in Sialkot and
Kashmir. 61 Th 11 . d . d b lh. 6 2 . 1 . d h ese a egatJ.ons, enJ.e y New De l., J.mp J.e t at
once the Indian Government succeeded in signing an accord with Sheikh
Abdullah, it would also attempt to integrate Azad Kashmir per force.
At this stage the Bhutto regime was facing the Qadiani issue and
intensified warfare in Baluchistan, and probably raised the spectre
63 of an Indian threat to divert attention from the domestic problems.
The Chinese Government, however, ignored this probability and,
as in the past, identified itself with Pakistan's position. On 11
July 1974, for instance, the NCNA reported that Bhutto had
'disclosed' in an interview with a correspondent of the New York
Times that very recently there had been some 'ominous' movements and
deployment of Indian forces near Sialkot and Kashmir and elsewhere
which pointed to a 'grand design • of playing on Pakistan's nerves,
intimidating it and making some unpleasant announcement relating to
60 Ibid, p.A/8. 61--
See, for example, Bhutto' s Speech at Mangora, Pakistan Times, 13 July 1974; and
Foreign Minister, Aziz Ahmed's press conference on 20 July 1974, Pakistan Times, 21 July 1974.
62s ee, for example, Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's Statement in the Rajya Sabha on 1 August 1974, Times of India, 2 August 1974.
63This view was widely held by the opposition groups inP~Kistan who accused Bhutto of impairing the chances of Indo-Pakistan~~~isation by continuously referring to the Kashmir issue.
93
the occupied Kashmir. 64
This was followed by another NCNA report
which quoted Bhutto as stressing that neither India nor Pakistan
should remain under the impression that the Kashmir issue had been
solved. 65 These and other similar reports66
were supplemented with
occasional Chinese criticism of India's stand on Kashmir. On 29
October 1974, for example, while discussing 'India's aggression and
expansion in the south Asian region', an~ commenator pointed out
that scheming to forcibly annex Indian-occupied Kashmir, the
Indian Government ignores that the case has still to be settled with
Pakistan and is acting in defiance of the Kashmir people's right to
d • t' 1 67 self- eterm1na 1on •
The year 1975 began with the news that the negotiations between
Sheikh Abdullah and the Indian Government, which had dragged on since
. ' t 68 Th' 1972, were being concluded and that an accord was 1mm1nen • 1s
news was confirmed on 24 February when Mrs Go'!1dh i announced in the
Parliament that Sheikh Abdullah had agreed in principle to Kashmir's
complete accession to the Union of India, and to dissolve the
Plebiscite Front and replace it with
69 Conference.
the original National
As soon as the agreement was announced Bhutto, who had
previously mentioned on several occasions that any unilateral
decision by India would not be acceptable to the world at large and
64NCNA, 11 July 1974, in FBIS-:CHI, 12 July 1974, p.A/21. 65~, 26 September 1974, in SWB:FE, No.4715, 28 September 1974,
p.A3~ 66
See, for example, 'Bhutto on Talks with India', NCNA, 3 December 1974, in FBIS:CHI, 4 December 1974, p.A/8.
67NCNA, 29 October 1974, in SWB:FE, No.4742, 30 October 1974, pp.A3/4-5.
68International Herald Tribune, 20 January 1975. 69see Text of Statement by Mrs. Gandhi in Parliament on 24 February
1974, in Times of India, 25 February 1975.
94
specifically to the people of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan,70
reacted sharply by calling on all Kashmiris and Pakistanis to observe
a complete strike on 28 February 1975. 71 Bhutto's interest in
diverting attention from Pakistan's economic problems partially
accounted for this sharp reaction. A major factor, however, was his
interest in stemming any charges of actually 'selling Kashmir out'
during the negotiation of the Simla agreement.
Regardless of the motivations behind Bhutto's reaction, however,
the Chinese Government once again sided with Pakistan. On 25
February 1975, NCNA transmitted a detailed report of Bhutto's
statement and his call for a general strike. The call was made, it
pointed out sarcastically, 'immediately after hearing the
announcement" by Indira Ghandi of an "agreement" on the status of
Kashmir reached between her and Sheikh Abdullah, former Prime
Minister of the Indian-occupied Kashmir' •72
The Same day it
transmitted 'International reference material on the Kashmir
problem', which blamed India for not resolving the Kashmir dispute.
After tracing its origin and discussing the 1953 agreement between
India and Pakistan, it stated:
70
Since 1953 Pakistan has all along advocated conducting a plebisicite while India time and again has broken its promises, claiming that "Kashmir is a component part of the Indian Union". It even declared that plebiscite was no longer practical. It is why the Kashmir problem has remained unsolved for a long time. 73
China also identified itself with Bhutto' s position that the
See, for example, Bhutto' s Statement in Campbellpur, Dawn, 28 January 1975.
71 Pakistan Times, 25 February 1975. 72NCNA, 25 February 1975, in FBIS:CHI, 26 February 1975, pp.A/2-3. 73 'International Reference Material: The Kashmir Problem', ~'
25 February 1975, in FBIS:CHI, 27 February 1975, p.A/16.
95
clause on the Kashmir dispute in the Simla Accord did not mean that
Pakistan had given up its demand for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir
and that, therefore, India was under an obligation to settle the
dispute bilaterally and unilaterally. It was mentioned in the
reference material that 'in July 1972, India and Pakistan had
concluded the Simla agreeement, which stipulated that the two parties
should respect the ceasefire line without doing harm to each other's
stand which is known to all'. 'However', it said, 'the Indian
government has stepped up its activities to change Kashmir's status
and this time has finally [and] unilaterally declared that the India
. d f hm' . 74 occup~e area o Kas ~r ~s a component part of the Indian Union'.
For the next few weeks, the NCNA increased markedly its coverage
of the Kashmir dispute. 7 5 Occasional references were also made to
the international reaction to India's accession of Kashmir. 76 This
was accompanied by an article in Jen-min Jih-pao on 3 March 1975
entitled 'The People of Kashmir Will Not Tolerate Deprivation of
Their Right to Self-Determination' • Though not officially
representing the Chinese Government's stand on the Kashmir dispute,
this article condemned the Indian action. It stated:
On 24 February, the Indian Government unilaterally declared the Indian-occupied area of Kashmir to be a constituent part of the Indian Union. This act by the Indian Government is resolutely opposed by the people of Kashmir and Pakistan. The Chinese people firmly support the just struggle of the Kashmiri people for their right to self determination, and firmly support the just stand of the Pakistani Government
74 Ibid, pp.A/16-17. 75
see, for example, 'P~Itistani Envoy's Press Conference', NCNA, 28 February 1975, in FBIS :CHI, 4 March 1975, p.A/10; 'People in~hmir Strike' , NCNA, 1 March 1975, in FBIS: CHI, 4 March 1975, p .A/11; and 'Pakistani Press Scores India', NCNA, 2 March 1975, in FBISPCHI, 4 March 1975, p.a/12. ----
76see, for example, 'Iranian Foreign Ministry Statement' I NCNA, 1 March 1975, in FBIS:CHI, 4 March 1975, p.a/11; and 'Nepalese~rnal Denounces India', NCNA, 8 March 1975, in FBIS:CHI, 11 March 1975, p.A/6. --
96
and people on the Kashmir question. 77
This article also pointed out that the Indian decision to
integrate Kashmir would affect the process of normalization in South
Asia. '··· The Indian Government', it said, 'had continuously stepped
up its activities to change the status of Kashmir. [I]t ••• has
annexed the Indian occupied sector of Kashmir, blatantly making the
unilateral declaration to formally make the Indian-occupied area of
Kashmir a constituent part of the Indian Union'. 'This act', it
maintained, 'not only violates the UN resolution and tramples on the
Kashmiri peoples' right to self-determination, but is detrimental to
peace and stability in the South Asian region' • 78
The question as to how the Indian decision would affect the
peace and stability of the region, however, was not answered in this
article but in another NCNA broadcast on 7 March 1975 which quoted an
editorial published in the weekly Jad-o-Jehad (Struggle) from the
Indian part of Kashmir, as stating:
• • • To think that the agreement will go to lessen tension in this region, bring about stability or lead to solving the problems facing the masses is sheer wishful thinking and an exercise in self-deception... Far from lessening, the tension between India and Pakistan (which had been accepted as a party to the Kashmir dispute by Sheikh Abdullah and India) will further increase, and those sections of the people in the Kashmir valley who are dissatisfied with the agreement will give a new form and dimension to their struggle .•• r~nsion and struggle, ••• [therefore] are bound to intensify.
On 11 March 1975, the NCNA transmitted another report on
'India's Sophistry Over Kashmir Issue' which questioned the Indian
claim that the developments in Kashmir were India's internal affair.
77Text transmitted by Radio Peking, 3 March 1975, in FBIS :CHI, 4
March 1975, p.A/13. 78Ibid, pp.A/13-14. 79
'Jammu Journal Hits Indian Policy', NCNA, 7 March 1975, in FBIS:CHI, 11 March 1975, p.A/5.
97
The Indian Government, it argued, had agreed to resolve the question
of the accession of Kashmir region - 'a big international dispute' -
through a plebiscite, both in the United Nations and in the
Indo-Pakistan joint communique of 1953. 'However, going back on its
own words', it continued, 'the Indian Government arbitrarily defined
Kashmir as one of its states in its constitution. Now, it again
described the accession of Kashmir as an "internal affair" which
could be decided unilaterally by India'. 'If it is an internal affair
of India' , it asked, 'why has the Indian Government said on several
occasions that it would respect the will of the local people? And why
has it agreed to hold a plebiscite to solve the question of the
accession of Kashmir'. The report also supported Pakistan's 'stern
condemnation' of the accord by saying 'Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto
put it well when he said that according to the UN resolutions
accepted by India and Pakistan, the Indian Government cannot change
the status of dispute on the Kashmir issue•. 80
This Chinese support for Islamabad continued for the rest of
1975. Initially, the Chinese media frequently reported the Pakistani
and Azad Kashmiri leaders' opposition to the accord and reiteration
of the need to resolve the issue through a free and impartial
1 b . 't 81 p e J.SCJ. e. Simultaneously, the Chinese leaders exhibited a
willingness to reiterate Beijing's pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir. In
April 1975, for example, Vice-Premier Li Xiannian stated that • [The
Chinese Government] will continue to render resolute support ••• to
80~, 11 March 1975, in FBIS:CHI, 13 March 1975, pp.A/12-13. 81
see, for example, 'Pakistan Minister Ahmed comments on Kashmir', NCNA, 1 April 1975, in FBIS:CHI, 4 April 1975, p.A/14~ and 'Azad Jammu-Kashmir President on People's Struggle', NCNA, 6 June 1975, in FBIS:CHI, 18 June 1975, p.A/10.
98
the struggle of the people of Kashmir' •82
However, in the second half
of the year, as the Pakistan government began playing down the issue,
the Chinese references to, and support for Pakistan's stand on, the
Kashmir issue also became less frequent.
The beginning of 1976 witnessed a change in China's attitude on
Kashmir, Beijing again seeming less willing to consistently declare
its support for Pakistan. In February 1976, for example, Zheng
S ansheng, Deputy Commander of the PLA units in Xinjiang) visited
Pakistan but failed to reiterate Beijing's support for Islamabad 1 s
stand. Similarly, on 16 May 1976, while commenting on the
Indo-Pakistan agreement to restore diplomatic relations, a Jin-min
Jih-pao newsletter only hinted at Bhutto 1 s and Agha Shahi 1 s
statements that the future of Kashmir still remained to be settled.83
'The result of the India-Pakistan talks', it stated, 'does not mean
that from now on all will be smooth sailing in South Asia. There are
still unresolved disputes between the two countries' • 84
Its silence
on Kashmir was especially noteworthy, because it referred
specifically to the Farrakha Barrage, a dispute between India and
Bangla Desh, not Pakistan, as one of 1 the problems in the entire
, I 85 reg1.on •
82see Li Xiannian 1 s speech at the banquet given in his honour by Bhutto, ~' 21 April 1975, in SCMP, No.5845, 25 April 1975, p.41.
83soon after the 11 May 1976 agreement between India and Pakistan, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi had declared that of all the issues listed under the Simla Agreement, only Kashmir remained to be resolved. Two days later, Bhutto had stated on 13 May 1976, that Kashmir was a basic issue on which there could never be a compromise, for the destinies of Pakistan and Kashmir were unbreakably tied to each other. A Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman on 16 March 1976 had also identified the Kashmir dispute as one of the three outstanding issues that needed to be resolved by India and Pakistan. ~' 12, 14 and 17 May 1976.
84 •New Developments in Pakistan India Relations', text transmitted by Radio Peking, 16 May 1976, in FBIS:CHI, 19 May 1976, p.A/12.
85 Ibid~
99
That these omissions were not inadvertent became obvious only a
few days later. From 21 to 26 May 1976, Bhutto visited North Korea
where he consistently raised the Kashmir issue and referred to the
'international conspiracy' which dismembered Pakistan in 1971.86
While reporting this visit, the NCNA not only ignored his critical
references to India but omitted all his references to Kashmir.87
Bhutto went from North Korea to visit China from 26 to 3 0 May
1976. On the day of his arrival, Jen-min Jih-pao published an
editorial which stressed the recent improvements in the diplomatic
relations in the subcontinent, attacked imperialism and hegemonism,
and lauded Pakistan's economic progress during 1972-1976, but made
only a passing referene to the Kashmir dispute and, more noticeably,
omitted the word 'just' in reiterating Chinese support for Kashmiri
self-determination. 88
On the same day, at the welcoming banquet, the
new Chinese Premier, Hua Guofeng, blamed South Asian discords on an
(unspecified) evil-intentioned outside power, and welcomed Pakistan's
normalisation of relations with India and Bangla Desh. The more
noticeable feature of his speech, however, was that in reiterating
China' s support for Pakistan in 'the struggle to safeguard
independence, defend state sovereignty and oppose outside
. f ' h d . f hm. d. 89 1 ~nter erence , e rna e no ment~on o the Kas ~r ~spute. On y
after Bhutto had mentioned the dispute in his speech at the return
banquet on 29 May 1976, maintaining that 'normalisation does not mean
86see, for example, Bhutto' s speech at a banquet given in his honour by Marshal Kim Il Sung, in Pyongyang, on 21 May 1976, and the Joint communique issued. at the end of Bhutto' s visit to North Korea, PakistanH$?rizon, Vol.XXIX, No.2, Second Quarter 1976, pp.187-193.
87 See 'Pyongyang 25 May Mass Rally', Banquet', 25 May 1976, in FBIS:CHI, 26
88Jen-min Jih-pao, 26 May 1976,
pp.A/9-10.
NCNA, 25 May 1976, May 1976, pp.A/6-7.
in FBIS:CHI, 26
89~, 27 May 1976, in FBIS:CHI, 27 May 1976, pp.A/6-7.
and '25 May
May 1976,
100
that one side must abandon its traditional support to the right of
self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, [and]
90 resile from the basic principle of its foreign policy' did Chinese
Premier reiterate China's support for the people of Jammu and Kashmir
'in their just struggle for self-determination•. 91
In the joint communique issued at the end of the visit, the
Chinese Government, once again, attempted to distance itself somewhat
from the Pakistan Government's position on Kashmir. For the first
time in 12 years, Beijing did not join Pakistan from the beginning in
expressing its support for Kashmiri people • s right of self-
determination. Instead, modelled after the Shanghai Communique
issued at the end of Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 --- a
head of a state, Beijing was not friendly with --- the Sino-Pakistan
Joint Communique allocated the Pakistan Government paragraphs eight
and nine to express its opinion on the process of normalisation in
South Asia, and record its views on why a settlement in Jammu and
Kashmir was essential for full normalisation in the subcontinent. In
paragraph ten, the Chinese side appreciated the developments in South
Asia, and it was only in paragraph eleven that it joined Pakistan in
expressing 'firm support for the struggle of the people of Jammu and
Kashmir for attaining their right to self-determination'. The word
I' t 1 ' 'tt d 92 JUS was once aga~n om~ e •
Beijing's reluctance to consistently identify itself with
Islamabad's position on Kashmir continued till Bhutto's overthrow in
July 1977. Although the Pakistan government, motivated by the need to
prevent the opposition capitalising on the issue in an election year,
90NCNA, 30 May 1976, in FBIS:CHI, 1 June 1976, p.A/17. 91--
NCNA, 30 May 1976, in Jl:JicL , p. A./2.v 92
For text, see NCNA, 30 May 1976, in FBIS: CHI, pp.A/23-24.
June 1976,
101
continuously raised the Kashmir issue, Beijing refrained from even
acknowledging the existence of the dispute. On 5 October 1976, for
example, in his speech in the UN General Assembly, the Chinese
Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua expressed his Government's support
for the people of Zimbabwe 1 Namibia, Azania, Palestine, Cyprus and
Timor but made no mention of Kashmir. 93 This omission becomes
especially noticeable in view of the fact that at the same General
Assembly session, the leader of the Pakistani delegation, Aziz Ahmed,
had called for resolution of the dispute and had identified it as the
only step remaining to be taken under the Simla Agreement for
normalising relations between India and Pakistan. 94 On 28 January
1977 also 1 an article entitled 'Premier Chou Creatively Carried out
Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line in Foreign Affairs' was published
in the Beijing Review1 it recounted the contributions made by Chou
En-lai in formulating China's foreign policy, but significantly
omitted any reference to the Kashmir dispute. 95
The Zia Regime - The Kashmir Issue and China
On 5 July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Bhutto and assumed
power on the pretext of holding an impartial election within ninety
days. Towards the end of the year, however, after postponing the
promised elections indefinitely, the Zia regime also began raising
the Kashmir issue in an attempt to divert public attention away from
the constitutional crisis.
93 'The Chinese Government Will Continue to Carry OUt Resolutely
Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line and Policies in Foreign Affairs: Speech by the Chairman of Chinese Delegation Chiao Kuan-hua at the UN General Assembly Session', Peking Review, Vol. 19, No.47, 15 October 1976, pp.12-15.
94united Nations General Assembly Official Records, Vol.I, 31st
Session, 8th Plenary Meeting, 28 September 1976, (New York: United Nations, 1977), p.98.
95•Premier Chou Creatively Carried OUt Chairman Mao's Revolutionary
Line in Foreign Affairs', Peking Review, Vol.20, No.5, 28 January 19771 p.6-15,
102
The Chinese Government responded, as in the final eighteen
months of Bhutto' s reign, by demonstrating a reluctance to
consistently identify itself with Islamabad's stand. In fact this
reluctance was slightly more pronounced than before. On 14 December
1977, Zia went to China on an informal visit. During this visit, as
had been the case earlier with Bhutto, Jen-min Jih-pao published a
welcoming editorial which praised Pakistan for its positive role in
international affairs and contributions to the cause of Third World
unity and reiterated Beijing's resolute support for the 'Pakistan
people in their just struggle to safeguard national independence and
state sovereignty' • However, it failed to make even the cursory
reference to Beijing's views on Kashmir that had been made during
Bhutto's visit. 96 Only when Zia raised the issue 1 maintaining that its
resolution would pave the way for a durable peace in the
subcontinent,97
did Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping express" China's
support, and did so in phraseology milder than that used by Beijing
previously. Instead of using the traditional expression of support
for • the struggle of the people of Kashmir for self-determination' ,
Deng restricted himself to expressing the Chinese Government and
people's unswerving support to the Pakistani people in their
efforts for the exercise of self-determination by the people of Jammu
and Kashmir' without, once again, identifying the struggle as "just"
one, and without expressing support for the Pakistan Government's
efforts. 98
96 •A Welcome to the Distinguished Pakistan Guests', ~' 13 December 1977, in FBIS:CHI, 14 December 1977, pp.A/8-9.
97see text of Zia' s speech at the banquet given in his honour, NCNA, 16 December 1977, in FBIS7CHI, 19 December 1977, p.A/17.
----g[See text of Deng Xiaopu•ng's speech at the return banquet given by General Zia, NCNA, 18 December 1977, in FBIS:CHI, 19 ~cember 1977, p.A/21 (emphasis added).
103
For the next two years, the Chinese media drastically reduced
their coverage of Pakistani statements on the dispute. The number of
high-power delegates expressing Chinese support for Pakistan on
Kashmir also decreased. OUt of six high-level Chinese delegations to
Pakistan during the 1978-79 period, only two visiting Chinese
Vice-Premiers, Geng Biao and Li Xiannian, reiterated their
Government • s support for Pakistan on the dispute, and even this was
couched in very qualified terms. Firstly, as was the case during
Zia' s visit (December 1977) the Chinese Vice-Premier, Geng Biao,
restricted himself to supporting • [Pakistan's] efforts for the
99 self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir'. The next
visiting Chinese Vice-Premier, Li Xiannian, even further modified the
expression and repeated his Government's firm support for the
'Pakistan Government • s efforts for the realisation of the right of
self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir' •100
Secondly,
during Geng Biao' s visit, in marked contrast to the Pakistani news
media, the Chinese highlighted their leader's reference to Beijing's
support for all the South Asian states and only afterwards mentioned
China's support for Pakistan on the Kashmir . 101 J.Ssue, thereby
conveying to India, and Pakistan, that Beijing's first priority was
improvement of relations with all South Asian states rather than
siding with Pakistan on a basically dormant issue. Thirdly, in
reporting speeches which contained references to China's support for
Pakistan, the Chinese media omitted sentences which gave an
99 See text of Deng Xiaoping's speech at the return banquet given by
General Zia, NCNA, 18 December 1977, in FBIS :CHI, 19 June 1978, P• A/12 (emphasis added).
100see the text of Li Xiannian's speech at the banquet given in his honour, NCNA, 22 January 1979, in FBIS:CHI, 23 January 1979, p.A/17 (emphasis added).
101see footnote 67.
104
impression that the support was unqualified. During his visit to
Pakistan in January 1979, for example, Li Xiannian reiterated his
Government's support for Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute and then
said, 'We have done so in the past and will continue to do so in the
future. The vagaries of the international climate notwithstanding,
principled stand will always remain unchanged'.
speech, NCNA omitted these sentences. 102
In reporting his
More importantly, unofficially the Chinese Government began
suggesting to Pakistan that it should 'forget' about the Kashmir
issue and attempt to improve relations with India. 103
It would, therefore, be fair to suggest that, during the 1978-79
period the Chinese reluctance to support Pakistan on the Kashmir
dispute became even more pronounced, in fact almost bordering on
neutrality on an issue over which Beijing had thrown in its lot with
Islamabad in 1964.
Conclusion
The preceding account has attempted to demonstrate that Chinese
support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue has vacillated between
complete identification with Pakistan's position on the issue, and a
definite reluctance to echo Pakistan's position on the issue. From
1969 till late 1970, for instance, Beijing supported Pakistan on the
issue --- a support which waned towards the end of 1970 and remained
so for a major part of 1971. Towards the end of 1971, however, as the
Indo-Pakistan war broke out, Beijing reverted to a policy of total
identification with Pakistan's position. The period from 1972 to 1975
witnessed a continuation of this policy. Thereafter, however,
Beijing's support dwindled and came to border on neutrality.
102For Chinese version of the speech see footnote 108; for Pakistani version, see Pakistan Times, 22 January 1979.
103Interview with a ranking Pakistani military officer, May 1984.
CHAPTER IV
FROM QUALIFIED TO UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT
EAST PAKISTAN CRISIS (1971)
On 16 December 1971, following Lieutenant-General Niazi's
agreement to surrender unconditionally all Pakistan land, naval,
paramilitary and civil armed forces in East Pakistan to the nearest
regular troops under Indian Command, Indian forces entered Dacca·
This heralded not only the end of the nine-months old East. Pakistan
crisis, which had begun with the military crackdown on 25 March 1971,
bu·t also the end of Pakistan as it had existed since its independence
in August 1947. Throughout this period the Pakistan Government
continued to claim that the Chinese Government was providing
' unflinching and forthright support to Pakistan's solidarity,
integrity and sovereignty' • 1
The question arises as to what extent this claim was justified
or, to put it differently, what was the nature of Beijing's political
support for Islamabad during the East Pakistan crisis. This chapter
attempts to answer this question; to this end it describes briefly
the events leading upto the military's decision to act on 25 March
1971 against the Bengalis, the unfolding of the crisis, Indian
at.tempts to exploit the situation to dismember its erstwhile enemy,
Pakistan's reactions to these attempts and the Chinese response to
these developments.
The Road to the Crisis
The genesis of the East Pakistan crisis is often traced back to
the geographical, social and political differences existing between
1 See, for example, Dawn, 22 May 1971.
106
2 the two wings of Pakistan at the time of independence. However, the
fact that most Third World states lack completely complementary
political and social units seems to suggest that, notwithstanding
these dissimilarities, 'United Pakistan' could have continued to
exist had its leaders attempted to integrate the communities of both
the wings or, at least, acknowledge the claims of various groups to
share power and resources, and to enjoy cultural autonomy.
Unfortunately, the bureaucratic-military elite that ruled Pakistan
since its inception, and consisted predominantly of Punj abis, and
Urdu speaking migrants from Indian provinces 1 pursued policies that
denied the constituent units their due share of power and resources 1
and attempted to negate their cultural identities. 3 These policies
exacerbated the already existing differences between East and West
Pakistan to an extent that, by the mid-1960s, the Awami League, which
drew its support from the rising East Pakistani enterpreneurial
class, students, government officials, and various professional
groups, openly began demanding a drastic restructuring of Pakistan's
4 political system.
t!Jhile the Ayoob regime reacted negatively to these demands for
regional autonomy, General Yahya Khan, who ascended to power in March
2 See, for example, Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis:
India-Pakistan-Bangla Desh, (London: Chato and Windus for International Institute For Strategic Studies), pp.9-20; and Mohammed Ayoob, 'Background and Developments', in Mohammed Ayoob, et al. (eds), Bangla Desh, A Struggle for Nationhood, (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971), pp.1-44 :-
3For a detailed analysis of these policies, see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Inte9ration 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); see also, Khaid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direct~on of Chan<le, (USA-: Praeger Publishers, 1980); and Hamza Alavi, 'The Crisis of Nationalities and the State of Pakistan' , Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. I, No.3, 1971, pp.42-66.
4Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its
Aftermath, (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International Limited, 19i3'01, PP• 18-2 4.
107
1969, exhibited a more sympathetic attitude. on 28 November 1969, he
announced that elections for both a Constituent Assembly and
Provincial Assemblies would be held in December 1970 on the basis of
universal suffrage with a common vote in both wings. Five months
later, on 30 March 1970, he promulgated the Legal Framework Order
(LFO) which identified 'maximum autonomy' for the provinces as one of
the 'fundamental principles for the future Constitution of
5 Pakistan' •
t'ne The Awami League agreed to contest..., election under the LFO. The
results of the election, held on 7 December 1970, proved astonishing
as the Awami League won 167 out of 313 seats and emerged as the
majority party in the Constituent 6 Assembly. Within four years of
raising the issue, therefore, the Awami League seemed closer to
implementing its goals. However, it never eventuated. Soon after the
election, Bhutto, whose Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had won 81
seats on a programme of a 'strong central government, a powerful army
and anti-Indianism' , began demanding that the Awami League should
negotiate with the PPP on the nature of the draft constitution prior
to the inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly. The 'hawks' in
the Yahya regime, who were hostile to the League's stated intention
for a drastically reduced defence budget, began endorsing Bhutto' s
7 demand. 'l'he inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly,
therefore, was delayed. Finally, on 13 February 1971, Yahya announced
that it would be summoned on 3 March 1971.8 However, only two days
5 Herbert Feldman, The End and the Beginning: Pakistan, 1969-1971,
(Londo~ OXford University Press, 1975), pp.62-75. 6 Safdar Mahmood, The Deliberate Debacle, (Lahore: Ashraf Press,
1976),p.84. 7Jackson
Sen Gupta, (Calcutta:
op .cit, pp. 24-2 8; Feldman, op.cit, pp. 98-1 09; History of Freedom Movement in Banladesh:
Maya Prakash, 1974), pp.225-238. 8Pakistan Timee, 14 February 1971.
and Jyoti 1943-1973,
108
before the Assembly was to meet, on March the military regime
postponed the inaugural session indefinitely on the grounds that. the
differences between Muj ib and Bhutto on the question of the draft
constitution remained unresolved. 9
This announcement, made without any prior consultation with
Sheikh Mujib, was received with fierce resentment in East Pakistan.
Mass rallies were held urging secession, and on 2 March 1971, the
flag of Bangla Desh - (meaning the land of Bengalis) was hoisted by
the students' League in Dacca. Simultaneously, Sheikh Mujib called
for a general strike in the province on 3 March 1971, launched a
non-violent non-cooperation movement against the Government, and
announced that a mass rally would be held in Dacca on 7 March at
which he would make a final decision on the future course of action'.
This announcement was followed, on 4 March 1971, by the Awami
League's decision to run a parallel government in East Pakistan. 10
Faced with this situation, on 3 March, Yahya invited Mujib to
attend a conference of leaders of all parliamentary groups. On
rejection of this 1 on 6 March, he announced that the Assembly would
be called into session on 2 5 March 1971, but the next day Muj ib
refused to attend the session unless the Government conceded to
withdraw Martial law, return the Army to barracks, conduct an inquiry
into the loss of life caused by the Army's actions since March
1971 1 and immediately transfer power. On 15 March, therefore, Yahya
arrived in Dacca and began talks with Mujib, urging him to avoid
confrontation with the mil i1:ary regime. 11
9M . orn1ng News, 3 March 1971; and Bangla Desh Documents, Vol.I, (Madras: B.N.K. Press, n.d.), pp.188-189.
10Times of India, 4 March 1971; and Maniruzzaman, op.cit, pp.
78-81. 11
Dawn, 4, 7, 8 and 10 March 1971; Bangla Desh Documents, Vol.I, pp.216-227.
109
Meanwhile, however, the 'hawks' accelerated the pace of troop
reinforcement and arms supply from west to East Pakistan, to
challenge Mujib if he persisted in his 'uncompromising attitude'· On
23 March the Awami League presented to Yahya a draft constitution for
Pakistan which aimed at denying the central government any real
control over even defence and foreign affairs. Probably apprehensive
that Yahya might concede to accept the draft, the 'hawks'
. 12 1ntervened.
The Crisis - India, Pakistan and China's Initial Reaction
On 25 March 1971, General Yahya suddenly left for West Pakistan
and General Tikka began the notorious military crackdown; West
Pakistan army units moved against the Bengali police, attacked
Bengali army officers and soldiers, took over the students' halls in
Dacca Universty, seized the offices of the opposition newspaper,
raided the houses of the Awami League supporters, and killed a number
of civilians. The next morning, Sheikh Muj ib was arrested, and a
series of Mar·tial Law orders were promulgated banning all political
activity. This operation, undertaken with the explicit aim of
suppressing the Bengalis within 72 hours, backfired. While the Awami
League leaders went underground, the officers and soldiers of the
East Bengal Regiment (EBR), East Pakistan Rifles (Ern), and police
force instantly rebelled against the West Pakistan Army. They were
joined by the Bengali civil servants, and the enraged Bengali
population who either heard of, or became direct. or indirect victims
of, the Army's atrocities. Simultaneously, a number of Bengalis fled
12For details,
Pakistan, (Londo~
see G. w. Choudhury, The Last Days of United c. Hurst and Company, 1974), pp.154-158, 164-17cr:--
110
across the border into India. 13
These developments were exploited by Pakistan's main antagonist,
India. Soon after the military crackdown on 25 March, the Indian
C~vernment held a special meeting of its Political Affairs Committee
to discuss the propriety of Indian military intervention in support
of the Bangla Desh rebels. The idea was opposed by the three Chiefs
of Indian Services on the grounds that the Indian forces were
unprepared at that ~nt for a military intervention which could
lead to an all out war. It was, therefore, shelved temporarily and
the Indian Government opted for a strategy of covertly assisting the
rebels, while overtly limiting itself to expressions of sympathy for
the Bengalis, and urging the international community to take urgent
steps to prevent the Pakistan Government from ruthlessly suppressing
its own people. Thus, the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) was
instructed to lend all possible assistance to the Mukti Bahini, the
EBR and EPR, without risking a direct confrontation with the Pakistan
Army. Meanwhile most of the Awami League leaders, who had gone
underground during the military crackdown, and then had fled to
India, were received cordially by the Indian Government, which
d . . h h h . 1 f f . t . '1 14 1scussed w1t t em t e1r p ans o orm1ng a governmen -1n-ex1 e.
Simultaneously, New Delhi began issuing statements expressing
its sympathy for the freedom fighters. On 26 March 1971, Indian
Foreign Minister,Swaran Singh expressed 'great concern' over the
developments in East Pakistan. 15 The next day, speaking in the Lok
Sabha, Indira Gandhi described the crackdown as 'not merely the
suppression of a movement, but meeting an unarmed people with
13Jackson, op.cit, pp.33-35;
Feldman, op.cit, pp.138-44. Maniruzzaman,
14M . . an1ruzzaman, op. c 1.t., pp. 10 7-111. 15
BanglaDesh Documents, Vol.I, p.671.
op.cit, pp.81-98;
111
tanks' , and stated that a 'wonderful opportunity for the
strengthening of Pakistan has been lost in a manner which is tragic
[and] agonizing and about which we cannot find strong enough
words to 16
speak' • This was followed, on 31 March 1971 , by the
unanimous adoption of a resolution by both Houses of the Indian
Parliament which demanded immediate cessation of 'the use of force
and the massacre of defenseless people', and called upon 'all peoples
and Governments of the world to take urgent and constructive steps to
prevail upon the Government of Pakistan to put an end immediately to
the systematic decimation of people' which amounted to genocide. The
resolution also assured 'the 75 million people of East Bengal
that their struggle and sacrifices ~would] receive the
wholehearted sympathy and support of the people of India'. 17
Though these expressions of sympathy were carefully worded to
suggest that India' s support for Bengalis was limited to 'their
st.ruggle for a democratic way of life' - within the framework of
Pakistan -, and though the Indian Government was cautious enough to
highlight that, in spite of the tremendous popular pressure it did
not intend according recognition to the Bangla Desh Government, which
had proclaimed independence on 10 April, New Delhi's policies evoked
srong criticism from Islamabad.
The Indian Government, Pakistan complained, was blatantly
interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs by • circulating malicious
and baseless reports' about, and issuing statements and resolutions
on, the situation in East Pakistan. It was also helping
'miscreants' , Pakistan alleged, by sending armed infiltrators into
16For text, see Indira Gandhi, India and Bangla Desh: Selected
Speeches and Statements, March to December 1971, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), pp.9-10. -
17Bangla Desh Documents, Vol.I, p.672.
112
the border areas of East Pakistan. Simultaneously, Pakistan charged,
the Indian Government was encouraging its press and people to urge an
active and direct participation in Pakistan' s internal affairs. 18
This policy, which was disconcerting as it jmplied a threat of use of
force at some stage in the future, Pakistan argued, was a part of the
'Indian grand design' of establishing its hegemony in the region.
After bringing Pakistan under its sphere of influence, it alleged,
the Indian Government was to embark on a process of affecting the
sovereignty of the neighbouring states such as Burma, Ceylon,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Afghanistan and Iran. The international
community, therefore, Islamabad consistently stressed, was under an
obligation to condemn the Indian policy towards East Pakistan as it
was setting a precedent for intervention in neighbouring states'
l ff . 19 interna a .a1rs.
The Chinese Government's response to this call was initially
very slow to come through. Various Chinese diplomats, when asked to
comment on the post-military situation in East Pakistan, stated that
it was an internal affair of Pakistan and that China did not
interfere in other countries' internal affairs ,2° Meanwhile the
Chinese Government and news media maintained a studied silence on the
issue. This silence was broken only on 3 April 1971 --- eight days
after the Pakistan Army crackdown when the NCNA broadcast a
report on the situation in East Pakistan. 21 This report, however,
did not meet the requirements identified by Pakistan, i.e.
18see texts of Pakistan's protest notes to India, Pakistan Times,
27 and 31 March 1971, and 2 April 1971. 19
See, for example, a report transmitted by Radio Pakistan, 1 April 1971, in Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East, (Hereafter cited as SWB: FE, No.3651, 3 April 1971, p.B/5.
20Hindu, 31 March 1971.
21--For text of the report see NCNA, 3 April 1971, in SWB: FE,
No.3653, 6 April 1971, pp.B/1-3.
113
condemnation of India's interference in Pakistan's internal affairs.
Instead, it exhibited China's reluctance t.o side with Pakistan
against India on the East Pakistan issue. Firstly, it reported that
the Pakistan Government had lodged strong protests with the Indian
Government successively on 2 7 March, 30 March and 2 April against
'its blatant interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan' but
was careful to indicate that the Chinese Government did not
necessarily agree with the allegation by identifying Rawalpindi as
the source of the information. secondly, it reported briefly General
Yahya' s broadcast to the nation on 26 March 1971 of his decision to
ban the Awami League but was once again careful to suggest that
Beijing did not necessarily agree with Islamabad's description of the
Awami League as representing anti-Pakistan and secessionist elements,
by putting these words within quotation marks. Thirdly, and quite
interestingly, by referring to various western news agencies, the
NCNA allocated almost one-third of the total report ·to the Indian
reaction to the military crackdown in East Pakistan, but refrained
frcm commenting on the propriety or impropriety of the response,
thereby reflecting Beijing's reluctance to commit itself to a
clear-cut policy on the East Pakistan issue.
This non--committal attitude underwent a slight change four days
later. On 7 April 1971, while lodging a protest against a
df'Jnonstration in front of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on 29
March, the Chinese Government identified India as
int.erfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan' • 22
'flagrantly
This change
could be ascribed to not so subtle hints in the Pakistani news media
suqgesting that Islamabad expected Beijing to support Pakistan. On 5
April 1971, for instance, Pakistan Times, which reflects Government
22NCNA, 7 April 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3655, 8 April 1971, p.A3/4.
114
views and policies, had expressed confidence that China would stand
by Pakistan 'through thick and thin' •23 However, since the Chinese
protest note had highlighted that 'basing itself on the five
principles of peaceful coexistence' Beijing had never interfered in
the internal affairs of other countries, 24 it is more likely that the
slight change was caused by the Pakistan Government's decision on 6
April 1971 to make public Yahya' s reply to Podgorny' s letter of 2nd
April 1971 urging Islamabad to take most immediate measures to end
the repression in East Pakistan. In the reply Yahya had stressed
that 'for any power to support ..• t India's] moves or to condone them
would be a negatiol! of the UN Charter as well as Bandung
• • l I 25 Pr~nc~p es , and, therefore, had also indirectly indicated to
Beijing that failure to condemn Indian interference would mean that
China did not necessarily adhere to the principles of peaceful
coexistence it had referred to only fifteen days ago.
Notwithstanding the slight move away from a non-committal
attitude, the Chinese Government was careful to emphasise that there
were limits to which it was prepared to support Pakistan against
India in the East Pakistan crisis. The contents of the protest note
of 7 April, for instance, reflected Chinese reluctance to repeat
Pakistan's allegations that India was spreading malicious and
baseless reports about the situat:ion in East Pakistan. The note
stated:' ••• [O)n 29 March 1971, several hundred Indians frantically
shouted slogans slandering China as aiding the Pakistan
Government in its "war on the freedom-loving people of East Bengal".
2 3P k. t . 5 . ( . a ~s an T~mes, Apr~l 1971 emphas1s added). 2 ~CN~, 7 April 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3655, 8 April 171, pp.A3/4. 25
For text of Soviet President Podgorny' s lette.r of 2 April 1971, and Yahy&'s reply of 5 April 1971, see R.K. Jain (ed.), Soviet South Asian Relations, 1947-78, Vol.1, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), pp.105- 108.
115
Yet the Indian policemen 26
made no effort to stop them' , thereby
suggesting that Beijing was objecting to being slandered and not to
Pakistan being branded an aggressor in East Bengal.
Similarly, the next day, in an introductory note before
transmitting Yahya and Podgorny' s letters of 2 and 6 Apr i1, the ~
refrained from mentioning India by name and merely drew attention to
Yahya' s statement that Pakistan was determined not to allow any
• f • • I • 1 ff • 2 7 country to lnter ere ln Paklstan s lnterna a alrs.
This policy of an ex1:_remely qualified support for Pakistan did
not change until 11 April 1971 when a 'Commentator's article' in the
Jen-min ,Jih-pao, entitled 'What are the Indian Expansionists Trying
to do?' , categorically accused India of having 'done its utmost to
interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan in disregard of the
repeated stern protest of the Pakistan Government' • 28 The article
then proceeded to repeat Islamabad's contention that New Delhi's
response to the situation reflected India's expansionist policies.
'The relevant measures taken by Pqkistan' s Yahya Khan in connection
with the present situation in Pakistan', it stated, 'are the internal
affairs of Pakistan, in which no country should or has the right to
interfere; but the Indian reactionaries come out in a great hurry to
interfere openly in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Certain
prcminent figures in the Indian Government raised a hue and cry
for .•. interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The Indian
Parliament and the Indian National Congress flagrantly discussed the
internal affairs of Pakistan and adopted resolutions interfering in
26NCNA, 7 April 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3655, 8 April 1971, p.A3/4.
27-c- 8 ·1 1971 · N NA, Apr l , ln SWB: FE, No.3656, 13 April 1971, p.A2/1. 28-,-- . .
Jen-mln Jlh-pao Commentator's article: What are Indian Expansionists Trying To Do?', NCNA, 11 April 1971, in SCMP, No.4882, 22 Apr i1 1971, pp.109-110.
116
these affairs •••• Meanwhile, the Indian reactionaries have set their
entire propaganda machine in motion to fan up anti-Pakistan
chauvinist sentiments' • 'All these frenzied acts' , it maintained,'
have laid bare the expansionist features of the Indian
reactionaries' • The article also repeated Pakistan's claim that the
Indian Government had massed troops along the East Pakistan border,
and had instigated armed personnel in civilian clothes to infiltrate
into Pakistan territory for disruption and harassment. It also
questioned India's claim that the geographical proximity made it
difficult for India to view the developments in East Pakistan as
'simply an internal matter for Pakistan' ·1. 'Such an argument', it
maintained, 'is extremely preposterous. Every country occupies a
definite place in geography and has neighbours. If this 'theory' of
t:he Indian expansionists can be established then coun·tr ies with
expansionist and aggressive ambitions can interfere in the .internal
affairs of their neighbouring countries at random on geographical
excuses' • 'Under these circumstances' , asked the commentator, 'what
normal relations can there be between com1tries?'
The Commentator's article was followed, the next day, by Chou
En-lai' s letter to Yahya which pointed out that Beijing had noted
that 'of late the Indian Government has been carrying out gross
interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan by exploiting the
internal problems of Pakistan' , and then stated that should India
'dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinse Government
and people will, as always, finnly support the Pakistan Government
and people in their just struggle to safeguard the state's
. t d . 1 . d d 29 sovere1.gn y an nat1.ona ln epen ence' •
29 For text of the letter see R. K. Jain ( ed.) , China South Asian
Relations 1947-1980, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1981), p.211.
117
It was, therefore, seventeen days after the military crackdown,
that the Chinese Government voiced its support for Pakistan against
India on the East Pakistan crisis. The support, however, contrary to
the claims made by the Pakistani news media, was far from being
unqualified. The Jen-min Jih-pao article, for instance, which was
hailed by the Pakistan news media for having exposed 'the obvious
insincerity of India against Pakistan' ,30
had demonstrated that
Beijing was willing to repeat Islamabad's allegations against New
Delhi if they dealt specifically with India, but that it was not
willing to echo Pakistan's contention that the Awami League, in
collusion with India, was bent upon disintegrating Pakistan and,
therefore, justify the Army action in East Pakistan. The article had
also conveyed that, though willing to question the logic of India's
claim that the geographical proximity rendered it difficult for I~dia
to ignore the developments in East Pakistan, Beijing was not prepared
to argue against India's claim that the West Pakistan Army was
massacring its Bengali population. In addition, it had also clearly
set out the limits of Chinese commitment to Pakistan by stating that
'the Chinese Government and people will resolutely support
[Pakistan in its] just struggle for safeguarding national
independence and state sovereignty, and against foreign aggression
and interference' but by omitting any reference to Beijing's support
for Pakistan's territorial integrity --- the real issue at stake in
the Bangla Desh crisis. The omission was significant as only two
paragraphs earlier the author had asked rhetoricallY= 'As known to
all, if the independence, sovereignty, unification and territorial
integrity of a country are encroached upon, then what is left of the
30M . 14 '1 197 orn1ng News , Apr 1 1 •
118
3 1 interests of the people?' Similarly, Chou En-lai' s letter, which
was praised by the Pakistani news media for expressing China' s
unequivocal support for Pakistan, significantly lacked any reference
to Pakistan's territorial integrity. In fact, the letter was worded
to suggest that Beijing did not approve of Pakistan's handling of the
crisis. ' It :i.s important' it stated,' to differentiate the broad
masses of the people from a handful of per sons who want to sabotage
the unity of Pakistan' • 32 More importantly, this letter, which was
reportedly wr i·tten in response to 'President Yahya' s appeal to
Beijing for support as a counterbalance to Moscow's support for
d , I 33 In ~a , was not at all reported by the NCNA, thus indicating
Beijing's intention to downgrade its significance.
For the next seven months, there was no change in the Chinese
policy of providing a qualified political support to Pakistan.
By mid-April 1971, for instance, as the Pakistan Army had
succeeded in quelling the rebellion, at least temporarily, and had
established a semblence of normalcy in the eastern wing, a mass
exodus of Bengalis, both Hindus and Muslims, had begun from East
Pakistan into the Indian states of Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, and
West 34
Bengal. Faced with this massive infl u:x: of refugees
estimated by Indian sources as approximately 60,000 35
per day
various Indian leaders began emphasising that India 1 which was
31 • Jen-rnin Jih-pa~ Commentator' s Article: What Are Indian Expansionists Trying To Do?', ~£-cit, p.110.
32R.K. .rain, China South Asian Relations:
(emphasis added) • ----·------·
33G.W. Choudhury, .!ndia, Pakistan, Banglades~Jand
(London: The Free Press, 1975), p.211. 34
BanglaDesh Documents, Vol.I, p.460. 35 . f . T~mes o. Ind~a, 24 April and 5 May 1971.
1947-1980 1 p. 211
the Major Powers,
119
already finding it difficult to raise Rs.500 million for raising
additional jobs and lowering the level of unemployment, could not
afford to shelter the refugees at a daily cost of one million rupees.
The international community, therefore, they maintained, was under an
obligation to not only assist in providing relief to the refugees but
also urge Yahya' s regime halt the genocide and 'ensure that
conditions were established soon in East Bengal for the refugees
to return to their country as soon as possible' • 36 Meanwhile, the
Indian Government continued to exhibit a sympathetic attitude towards
the Awami League. Not only was the establishment of the Bangla Desh
Government-in-exile on 17 April 1971, with Tajuddin as its Prime
Minister, and its requests to the international community for
recognition given extensive coverage by the Indian news media ,but
Indian leaders also issued a number of statements suggesting that New
Delhi was considering the issue of according recognition to it. 37
The Pakistan Government retaliated against this policy by
maintaining that the Indian Government was exaggerating reports and
figures about the refugee influx. Whatever refugees were there in
West Bengal, it argued, were mainly destitutes and other rootless
persons who had been collecting there since independence, including
those who might have migrated from East Pakistan years ago and were
yet to be settled. New Delhi, however, it was claimed, was raising
the refugee issue because it wanted to 'hoodwink the world' about the
presence of armed infiltrators in East Pakistan militarily and, more
importantly, receive massive doses of foreign aid on the pretext of
36 See, for instance, Stat.ernent by Mr. Khadil kar, Indian Minister
for Rehabilitation, Radio New Delhi, 6 May 1971, in SWB:FJE, No.3678, 8 May 1971, p.B/6; and Kuldip Nayar, 'The Unending Stream of Refugees From Bangladesh', Statesman, 12 May 1971, p.9.
37see, for example, Indira Gandhi's reply to discussion in Lok
Sabha, 26 May 1971, in Gandhi, op.cit, p.22.
120
providing relief to the refugees in order to bolster its own
38 economy. As for the Bangla Desh Government-in-exile, Islamabad
argued, it was an imaginary Goverrunent set up by New Delhi on the
Indian soil and not in Chuadanga 1 East Pakistan, as was popularly
claimed by the Indian news media. These acts, coupled with the
massive mobilization of Indian forces along the East Pakistan-India
border, the Pakistan Government claimed, reflected India's intentions
of dismembering Pakistan and, therefore, required the attention of
the world community. 39
The Chinese Government, as already pointed out, did not respond
to these developments by siding indiscriminately with Pakistan
against India. Instead, it exhibited a certain degree of restraint
in identifying itself with Islamabad's position. During the
mid-April to mid-May period, for instance, the number of news items
transmitted by Radio Peking and NCNA on various aspects of Pakistan
totalled only nine, of which six concentrated on the developments in
the eastern wing. Of these six items, four were merely reports of
the situation in East Pakistan, and therefore 1 like the first NCNA
report on the subject on 3 April 1971, duly cited the sources of
their information and contained absolutely no comments on the news
reported. 40 The remaining two i terns, both transmitted by Radio
Peking, were commentaries on East Pakistan's situation which, instead
38 See, for example, Radio Pakistan, 2 May 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3674,
4 May 1971, p.B/6; and Commentary on Indian "exaggeration" of refugee problem, Radio Pakistan, 10 May 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3681, 12 May 19 71 , p. B/3.
39 See, for example, Statement by Pakistan Official Spokesman,
Pakistan Times, 30 April 1971; and Malcolm w. Browne, 'War With India Possible, Pakistan General Asserts' , New York Times, 6 May 1971.
40NCNA 1 18 April 1971 1 in SWB: FE, No.3662, 20 April 1971, p.B/1;
NCNA, 30 April 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3672, 1 May 1971, pp.B/6-7; NCNA, 2 May 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3675, 5 May 1971, p.B/3; NCNA, 8 May 1971, in SWB: FJ.!:., No.3680, (1 May 1971, p.B/2.
121
of focusing only on the Indian actions, dealt with the Soviet,
o I o 1 ff o 41 American and Indian interference in Pak1.stan s 1.nterna a a1.rs.
'Facts show', it was argued, that 't.he two super powers, working in
close coordination with the Indian reactionaries, have carried out
crude interference in Pakistan's internal affairs' a contention
which, by blaming Moscow and Wasington as well, tended to reduce the
intensity of criticism directed solely against India. Even the
contents of the reports and the commentaries reflected, as before,
the Chinese Government's reluctance to repeat Pakistan's allegations
against India in toto. Beijing, for instance, was prepared to repeat
that 'the ugly expansionist features of the Indian reactionaries'
were revealed by its policy of 'feverishly encroaching upon
Pakistan's territorial integrity', blatantly discussing 'certain
measures [adopted by Yahya Khan] concerning the present situation in
Pakistan, massing troops near the border of East Pakistan,
dispatching armed personnel in civilian clothes and troops into
Pakistan territory to carry out armed threats' , and violating
Pakistan's airspace. It was also prepared to report Pakistani
analysis that the statements by various Indian leaders and analysts
to the effect that India could not sit idle, and its policy of
'supporting the handful of people to create turmoil' in East Pakistan
indicated New Delhi's intentions of committing aggression and
dismembering Pakistan. The Chinese news media were also willing to
echo Islamabad's claim that, contrary to the reports of the Indian
media, public opinion in East Pakistan was opposed to, and condemned,
India's interference in Pakistan's internal affairs.
However, Beijing was not willing to even report, as before,
------------4 1R d . k 0 7 0 1 0 . a 1.o Pe 1.ng, 1 Apr1. 1971, 1.n SWB: FE, No.3662, 20 April 1971,
pp.A2/1-2; and Radio Peking, 28 April 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3671, 30 April 1971, pp.B/4-5.
122
Islamabad's allegation that India had been instigating Sheikh Muj ib
-thQ.
to move away from the demand off ,''Six"Points' to the idea of a
confederation, that it had been supplying anns to the Awami League
which the latter was intending to use in an armed uprising planned
for a zero hour on 26 March 1971, and that the military action in
East Pakistan was an attempt to foil this conspiracy. Neither was it
willing to repeat, either in the reports or the commentaries, the
Pakistani claim that the Indian Government had set up the imaginary
Government of so-called Bangla Desh on its soil in order to 'boost
its morale as well as that of its collaborators' • 42 The Chinese
Government also demonstrated its unwillingness to repeat Pakistan's
contention that the Indian Government was raising the refugee issue
and exaggerating their number in order to receive assistance for its
own economic' development. Furthermore, while reporting India's
violation of Pakistan's territorial integrity and insisting that 'no
foreign country has the right to interfere with the just stand and
actions of the Pakistani Government and people to safeguard their
territorial integrity, national unification, sovereignty and
43 independence' , the Chinese Government continued to display a
reluctance to voice its support for Pakistan's territorial integrity.
Similarly, from mid-May onwards, as it consolidated its control
in East Pakistan, the Yahya regime began to take a number of steps
directed at reversing the growth of the refugee outflow into India.
'rhe UN General Secretary, u Thant, for instance, was informed of
Islamabad's willingness to accept his proposal of April 1971 for UN
42 See, and Awami 1971 •
for example, Official Pakistan 6 May Statement on India's League's role in The East Pakistan Crisis, Dawn, 7 May
43Radio Peking, 28 April 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3671, 30 April 1971,
p.B/5.
123
1 . k . k' 44 assistance in p anning and organising rel1ef wor 1n East Pa 1stan.
simultaneously, a series of conciliatory public declarations were
made urging the 'law abiding' citizens of East Pakistan to return to
their homes and reception camps were set up along the East
Pakistan-India border. 45 This was followed on 10th of June, by
General Tikka' s declaration of an amnesty for 'all citizens of the
province' , including political leaders and workers, and members of
the armed forces and other law-enforcing 46
agencies. More
importantly, the authorities in Islamabad began to stress that they
did not intend denying the Awami League members a share in political
power. on 24 May 1971, while announcing his intentions of shortly
revealing a revised plan for a return to the orderly progress towards
a transfer of power to 'the representatives of people' , General Yahya
emphasized that 'with the exception of the ones who had committed
serious crimes' all the National Assembly members elected on the
Awami League would also be transferred power. 47
These conciliatory moves, were spurned by the Awami League. On
2 June 19 71' Tajuddin, Prime Minister of the Bangla Desh
Government-in-exile stated in an intervieW": ' ••• LAJs far as we are
concerned, there is no rocm for ccmprcmise within the framework of
Pakistan. Bangla Desh is sovereign and independent, and we shall
defend its separate and free entity at any 48
cost' • The Indian
Government, which by then had begun assisting the exiled government
in raising and equipping a guerrilla army and regular troops to fight
44 Jackson ~cit, p.50. 45
See, for example, President Yahya' s public declaration of amnesty, Pakistan Times, 22 May 1971.
46oawn, 11 June 1971. 47-k. .
Pa 1stan T1mes, 25 May 1971. 48
'rajuddin Ahmed's Interview with All India Radio on 2 June 1971, Bangla Desh Documents, Vol.I, p.325.
124
the Pakistan Army supported this position,49
and itself also reacted
negatively to Islamabad's moves. The influx of 2 million refugees,
deliberately expelled by the Pakistan Army, it argued, had caused
economic, social and political problems for India, and especially for
its states bordering East Pakistan. Consequently, what was
previously Pakistan's internal problem had become an internal problem
for India as well. It was, therefore, entitled to ask Pakistan to
create conditions for the early return of the refugees under credible
guarantees for their future safety and well being' • 'l'his could not
be achieved, it was maintai~e<,-\. by the military regime's policy of
suggesting a solution to its eastern wing's problems. Neither could
it be achieved by arriving at a settlement with India, nor with the
breakaway groups of the Awami League. 'lhe only solution, which would
be feasible as well as acceptable to New Delhi, it was stressed, lay
in Islamabad's acquiescence in working out a political settlement
with the representatives of Bangla Desh outside the framework of
k. 50
Pa ~stan.
To this Islamabad retaliated by arguing that New Delhi had no
right to sit in judgement over the developments in East Pakistan and
dictate a certain course of action in regard to matters that were
exclusively Pakistan's own affair •51 In any case, it was claimed,
the movement for 'Bangla Desh' was dead as its 'pioneers' were ridden
with factional disputes and lacked any conviction. As for the
49Jackson op.cit, p.56. 50
See, for example, Indira Gandhi's reply to discussion in Rajya Sabha on 15 June 1971, and her interview with Italian TV team the same day. Gandhi, op.cit, pp.24-30; and Indian Foreign Minister's address to the National Press Club, Washington, on 17 June 1971, Bangla Desh Docum~nts, Vol.I, pp.686 - 688.
51 See 'Note of the Government of Pakistan to the Government of
India', Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XXIV, No.2, Second Quartec 1971, PP· 137-139.
125
refugees, Islamabad maintained, they were being forcibly retained and
moved to far flung areas because the Indian government wanted to keep
the 'so-called refugee issue' alive in order to find a pretext for
d . k' t 52 estroyHg Pa 1s an.
Beijing's policy in this new round of arguments was the same as
before, i.e. one of providing a qualitative support to Pakistan. In
fact, the Chinese Government exhibited slightly ~ restraint in
voicing its support for Pakistan. From mid-May until the end of June
1971, for instance, Radio Peking and NCNA relayed nine news items
related to Pakistan. Of these, not a single item dealt with the
developments in, and Indian policy towards, East Pakistan, or
Islamabad's allegations against New Delhi.
Neither did the Chinese Government declare its support for
Pakistan's t.erritorial integrity. 01 21 May 1971, for example, at a
reception to mark the establishment of diplanatic relations between
Pakistan and China, the Pakistani ambassador stated: 'Today when our
very existence as a nation has been threatened by hostile outside
interference in our internal affairs, the People's Republic of China
has come out with unflinching and forthright support to our national
l • d • t • t • d • I 53 so 1 ar1 y, 1n egr1ty 1 an sovere1gnty • However 1 the Chinese Vice
Foreign Minister, Han Nianlong, made no reference to the Indian
threat to Pakistan's existence and, in his speech 1 merely repeated
China's canrni tment to support Pakistan in its 'just struggle to
safeguard state sovereignty and national independence and oppose
foreign aggression and interference' , without mentioning the word
52 See 1 for example, ' "Discovery"
Radio Pakistan, 3 1 May 19 71 , in p.AJ/12.
of "Bangla Desh SWB:FE 1 No.3697,
government"' , 1 June 1971,
53NCNA 1 21 May 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3691, 24 May 1971 1 pp.A3/1-2
(emphasis added) •
126
I • 't I 54 1.ntegr1. y •
The restraint in Beijing's support was once again reflected
during the months of July and August 1971. Upon receiving 'reliable
reports from a friendly great power' 55 in July that the Indians had
begun to prepare for a military confrontation, Islamabad accelerated
the pace of internationalising the East Pakistan issue hoping that it
might dissuade India from fighting a war which Pakistan was bound to
lose. At the meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
on 5 July 1971, therefore, it endorsed the idea that the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should send its 'representatives'
or 'observers' to the East Pakistan border to create favourable
conditions for 56 the return of the refugees. This idea, which was
contained in U Thant' s aide-memoire to both India and Pakistan on 19
July was rejected by New Delhi, on the grounds that it attempted to
equate India with Pakistan, and failed to appreciate that the
stationing of observers, rather than creating 'the necessary feeling
of confidence' among the refugees to return to their homes it would
merely create a facade of action as a cover for the continuation of
the present policies of the Yahya regime and further aggravate the
suffering of the people of Bangla Desh. 57 Nevertheless, Islamabad
once again proposed to the President of the Security Council on 11
August 1971 that a 'good offices' team of the Council should visit
the border areas of India and East Pakistan 'to defuse the tense
situation' there.Even this proposal was rejected by India which
argued, on 18 August, that if Pakistan sincerely wished to defuse the
54Ibid, p.A3/1. 55--
Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p.194. 56J k . . ac son op.cJ..t, p.67; T1.mes of India, 22 July 1971. 57 ---
Jackson, op.cit, pp.67-68.
127
situation 'it ought to settle [the issue] with the elected
representatives of Bangla Desh' and not insist on converting the
. . . . . 58 situation Ln East Bengal Lnto an Indo-PakLstan1 Lssue.
Throughout this period, in marked contrast to the United States
and Great Brita in which had welcomed the proposal for stationing UN
'observers' along the Indo-East Pakistan border, Beijing refrained
from commenting upon, or even reporting, Islamabad's suggestions and
New Delhi' s refusal to accept them. Instead, the Chinese media
concentrated on reporting I? akistan' s opposition to the idea of 'two
Chinas' , its support for Beijing's representation in the UN, and the
Bank of China's decision to handover its offices in Karachi and
Chittagong to the Government of Pakistan!
Even the accelerated pace of military build up aong the borders
in September-October 1971, and the rising spectre of another
Indo-Pakistan war failed to swerve China from its policy of qualified
support for Pakistan. During the month of October, for instance,
when the Pakistan Government consistently maintained that the Indian
moves along the East Pakistan border and the posture adopted by its
armed forces suggested a serious possibility of its aggression
against Pakistan, and called upon the international community to
impress upon India the need to desist from interfering in Pakistan's
internal affairs and to withdraw its forces from the Indo-Pakistan
59 borders, the Chinese Government scrupulously refrained from either
subscribing to, or reporting, Islamabad's position. Instead, its
media merely reported Yahya' s message of greetings to China on its
National Day receptions held in Pakistan to mark the occasion and the
58 k' . Pa Lstan TLmes, 16 August 1971; and Times of India, 25 August 1971 •
59 See, for example, 'Yahya Khan's Address to the Nation', Pakistan
Times, 13 Oct.ober 1971
128
details of a Pakistani atheletics team's visit to China.60
This guarded attitude became most noticeable in early November
1971 when General Yahya sent a high powered delegation, led by
Bhutto, to Beijing, presumably in an atte.mpt to seek assurances from
the Chinese Government that it would, as in the 1965 war, deter an
Indian attack on East Pakistan. 61 In spite of the claims made prior
to, and during the visit, by Islamabad and Pakistani news media that
an Indo-Pakistan war would not be 1 imi ted to the subcontinent, and
that China's friendship would help in preserving the independence,
integrity and unity of Pakistan, Beijing exhibited a reluctance to
identify itself too closely with Islamabad.62 Firstly, as the
delegation arrived in Beijing, it was subjected to a 'spontaneous'
demonstration against the military regime's policies in East
k . 63 Pa ~stan. Secondly, at the welcoming banquet on 7 November 1971,
the Chinese Acting Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei expressed his
Government's concern 'over the present situation in the
subcontinent' , and identified India as having 'crudely interfered in
Pakistan's internal affairs, [and having] carried out subversive
activities and military threats against Pakistan by continuing to
exploit the East Pakistan question' • He also identified Yahya' s
proposal for mutual withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan armed forces
fran the border as a 'reasonable' one and 'helpful to easing tension
60Mizanurrahman Shelly, Chinese Attitude Towards Bangla Desh,
(Dacca: Polwel Printing Press, 1981), p.21; and NCNA, 20 October 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3819, 22 October 1971, p.A3/11
61 ----Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangla Desh and the Major Powers,
p.213 62
See, for example, Commentary by Ahmed Hassan of the 'Sun' , Radio Pakistan, 5 November 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3833, 8 Novembec 1971, p.A3/3; and Daily Mail, 4 November 1971
63H. d ~n ustan Standard, 10 November 1971
129
in the subcontinent' , and suggested that it 64
should be welcomed.
However, unlike the Pakistani spokesman on Beijing talks on 6
November, he refrained from categorically stating that 'the
aggressive posture of India along Pakistan's borders threaten[ ed]
peace' , or that New Delhi had been grossly exaggerating the figures
for the refugees. 65 Neither did he express Beijing's support for
Pakistan's territorial integrity. Thirdly, the same evening, at the
banquet given by Bhutto, Chou En-lai merely observed that the
Pakistani delegation's visit was a demonstration of 'friendly
relations of cooperation' between the two states but did not touch
upon the merits of Indian and Pakistani positions on the East
P k . t . t . 66 hl . a 1s an s1 uat1on. Fourt y, the two sides d1d not issue a joint
communique at the end of the visit.
~-Change in S~vport: Qualified to Unqualified
The second half of November 1971, however, witnessed a change in
Chinese policy. In the wake of a sudden acceleration in the speed of
the drift to an Indo-Pakistan war:, the Chinese delegate in the Third
Committee of the UN General ·Assembly issued a statement on 19
November 1971 which, for the first time since March 1971 , referred
and subscribed to Islamabad's stand on the issue of Pakistani
refugees in India. 'The so-called question of refugees from East
Pakistan', he stated,' came into being and developed to its present
state due to a certain country's intervention in Pakistan's internal
64NCNA, 7 November 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3834, 9 November 1971,
A3/1~
65R d. . a 10 Pak1stan, 6 November 1971, in Ibid., p.A3/4 66
NCNA, 7 N b 197 . b' I ovem er 1, 1n I 1d., p.A3 3
PP•
130
affairs ••• • • 6 7 The Pakistan Government, he maintained, had
repeatedly proposed relaxing the tension on the subcontinent and
settling the refugee question but these proposals were rejected by
'the cocmtry concerned' , which continued 'to exploit the question of
refugees to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan, to
carry out subversive activities against her and obstruct the return
of the East Pakistan refugees to their homeland .•• • • 68 The
responsibility for not arriving at a reasonable settlement of the
question of the East Pakistani refugees, therefore, he suggested, lay
. d' k' t 69 wlth In 1a and not Pa lS an.
Five days later, on 2 4 November i.e three days after India
had launched an undeclared war in East Pakistan in a meeting with
the Pakistani ambassador, Chou En-lai 'expressed concern over the
military provocations carried out by India along the East Pakistan
70 border in the past few days' • The following day, speaking at the
inaugural ceremony of the Taxila Heavy Mechanical Complex in
Pakistan, the Chinese Minister of the First Machine Building
Industry, Li Shuiqing, identified Pakistan' s ' cause' as a ' just' one
--- an expression used for the first time by any Chinese leaders in
eight months --- and expressed his conviction that it was bound to be
. t . 71 VlC OrlOUS. Four days later, speaking at an Albanian reception in
Beijing m 29 November, Chinese Vice-Premier, Li Xiannian, blamed the
67statement by the Chinese delegate Fu Hao in The Third Committee
of The UN General Assembly on Pakistani refugee's in India, 19 November 1971, in R.K. Jain (ed.), China South Asian Relations: 1947-1980, p.217 (emphasis added).
68rbid, p.218 (emphasis added).
69 Ibid, p.218. 70
NCNA, 24 November 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3849, 26 November 1971, p. A3/13 :-
71 NCNA , p. A2/6.-
26 November 1971, in SWB: FE, No. 3851, 29 November 1 971 ,
131
Indian 'subversive activities and military provocations against East
Pakistan' , which were being supported and encouraged by social
im:Eerialism (i.e. the Soviet Union), for aggravating the tension on
the subcontinent' • ''rhe Chinese Government and people',he stated ,'are
_greatly concerned over the present India-Pakistan situatiorl • 'We
maintain' ,he proceeded, that ' it is • • • impermissible for a country,
under any pretext, to employ large number of armed troops to wilfully
cross its own border and invade and occupy another country' s
territory'. Then he identified, as had Chi Peng-fei during Bhutto's
visit early in the month, General Yahya' s suggestion for the
respective withdrawal of the armed forces from the border as a
'reasonable proposal' , 72 However, unlike Chi Peng-fei, he did not
limit himself to stating that the proposal 'should be welcomed, but
underscored that it should be given 'serious consideration. 73
Parallel to the issuing of these statements, the Chinese news
media broke their six-months old silence on the developments in East
k. 74
Pa 1.stan. On 2 4 November 1971, the NCNA transmitted its first
account of the Indian invasion in the Jessore sector and other places
in the province. 75 This was followed by extensive coverage of the
East Pakistan situation, including among others, news of Indian
moves, Pakistani people's opposition to New Delhi's actions, and
various statements by Chinese leaders supporting 76
Islamabad. Of
72 NCNA, 29 November 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3853, 1 December 1971,
p.A3~emphasis added). 73
rbid, p.A3/4 (emphasis added), see also, NCNA, 7 November 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3843, 9 November 1971, p.a3/1 (emphasis added).
74The last report on East Pakistan was transmitted by the ~ on 8
May 1971. 75
NCNA, 24 November 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3840, 26 November 1971, p. A3/15.
76 See, for instance,· Radio Peking, 25 November 1971, in SWB: FE,
No.3850, 27 November 1971, p.A3/24; and NCNA, 26 November 1971, 1.n SWB: FE, No.3851, 29 November 1971, p.( i).
132
major significance, however, were three themes discussed by the
Chinese media in this coverage, Firstly, for the first time since
the military crackdown, they subscribed to Islamabad's position that
Bangla Desh was a creation of the Indian Government. A commentary on
the 'Indian Ambition to Annex East Pakistan' , for example, stated on
2 December 1971, that the so-called "Bangla Desh" is entirely a
sinister means of the Indian Government to interfere in the internal
affairs of Pakistan to divide and subvert Pakistan' • Following the
serious turn that matters took in East Pakistan in March 1971, it
pointed out, India 'made use of some secessioninsts of Pakistan to
rig up in mid-April a so-called "Provisional Government of Bangla
Desh"'. The "independence ceremony" of "so-called Bangla Desh" ,it
maintained, was staged by the Indian Government in a remote village
very close to the Indian border, and its members were actually active
. cal tt N D lh' d th 1 ' d' 77 1n cu a, ew e l an o er p aces 1n In 1a. Secondly, in
marked contrast to the policy eight months back, it began suggesting
that the Indian actions deserved serious condemnation, While
commenting on Indira Gandhi's demand of 30 November that, as a
'gesture for peace' , Pakistan should withdraw its forces from East
Pakistan, for instance, the report cited above stated: 'The glaring
fact is tha·t the Indian Government has dispatched large numbers of
troops to invade Pakistan, but reversely accused Pakistan of
threatening India's security and even demanded the withdrawal of
Pakistan's troops fromEast Pakistan. 78 What arrant gangster logic 1.
Thirdly, it stressed that the Indian Government was being backed and
abetted by social-imperialism (i.e. the Soviet Union) which had been
77 NCNA, 2 December 1971, in SWB:FE, No.2854, 4 December 1971,
p.A3~emphasis added). 78
rbid, P• A3/7.
133
supplying weapons to India while, at the same time, putting pressure
h b . . f th . . 69 on Pakistan since t e eg~nn~ng o e cr~s~s.
Notwithstanding these themes and the Chinese leaders' expression
of concern which marked a move away from Beijing's policy of
qualified support, however , the Chinese Government did exhibit some
reluctance in completely siding with Islamabad. Both Li Shuiqing and
Li Xiannian, for example, in their statements on 25 and 29 November
1971 respectively, merely reaffirmed the Chinese Government's pledge
to support Pakistan in its ' just struggle against foreign aggression
and interference and in defence of (its] ••• sovereignity and national
independence' and refrained from mentioning, as before, the word
'territorial integrity' •80
The outbreak of the declared Indo-Pakistan war on 3 December
1971, however, removed this element of reluctance. On 4 December, the
Chinese Acting Foreign Minister, Chi Peng Fei, for the first time in
nine months, 'strongly condemn[ ed] India's subversion and
aggression,' and reaffirmed the Chinese Government and the people' s
'firm support', for Pakistan's 'territorial integrity' • 81
The next day, without mentioning the Pakistan Air Force's attack
on the Indian airfields of J.\mritsar, Pathan kot and Avantipur on 3
December which had actually extended the war to the western sector,
the NCNA, in its first report of the declared war, stated: while
stepping up its armed invasion of East Pakistan, the Indian
Government yesterday (4 December 1971) flagrantly exEanded aggression
79see, for example, East Pakistan', NCNA, December 1971, p.A3/5.
80 NCNA, 26 November
op.c~p.3/4.
Chinese Report on 'Indian Activities Against 30 November 1971, in SWBc: FE, No.3853, 1
1971 ,op.cit, p.A3/6; and ~, 29 November,
81Radio Peking, 4 Decembr 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3857, 6 December
1971, p.A3/13 (emphasis added).
134
b 1 h . k k' 82 y anne ~ng attac s on West Pa ~stan. This was followed by a
markedly stepped up coverage by the Chinese news media of the South
Asian situation. 83 In this coverage, the Chinese Government not only
consistently highlighted its resolute support for Pakistan's struggle
to protect its territorial integrity but also denounced the 'Indian
Government strongly for its flagrant aggression against Pakistan' • On
6 December 1971, for example, a commentator's article in the Jen-min
Jih-pao, titled ·~ost Preposterous Logic, Flagrant Aggression' stated
that 'the armed aggression against Pakistan was the inevitable
outcome of the expansionist policy the Indian reactionaries •• • [had
been] stubbornly pur suing' • Since March 1971, it maintained, New
Delhi had supported 'the secessionists in Pakistan by every means' ,
and had 'grossly interfered in Pakistan's internal affairs' o
Later, it had 'cooked up a so-called "Provisional Government of
Bangla Desh", which in reality was installed on Indian territory and
it also 'dispatched so-called "freedom fighters" into East Pakistan
to perpetrate armed harassment and subversion o Finally, it stated,
New Delhi was attempting to 'inject this "puppet regime" into
Pakistan through open, direct invasion by the Indian troops o o o' o
''l'he fact is clear' , it stated, the Indian Government is the naked
84 aggressor.
To commit aggression against Pakistan, the same commentator
pointed out, New Delhi had 'created various most absurd pretexts,
arrogant to the extreme' • In a 'typical expression of
82NCNA, 5 Deceltlber 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3858, 7 December 1971,
pp.C/4-5, (emphasis added) o 83
see, for instance, 'Chinese Coverage of India-Pakistan Conflict: Editorial Report', SWB: FE, Noo3859, 8 December 1971, pp.C/6-7; and I Beijing Radio Coverage' ' swa: FE, No. 3860' 9 December 1971' p. ( i) •
84 NCNA, 6 December 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3858, 7 December 1971,
pp.C/6-7 (emphasis added).
135
big-Indianism' , for example, it had maintained that 'Pakistan is
"next door" to India and the "solution of Pakistan's internal affairs
must be done according to India's formula' • Then it had the
impudence to carry out unbridled armed invasion of Pakistan on the
pretext of the "refugee question". such practices, it was pointed
out, were not without a precedent in India's history. New Delhi, it
was stated, had engineered ten years ago 'the rebellion of
serf-owners • • • in the Tibet region of China' , but upon its failure,
New Delhi had 'abducted tens of thousands of Tibetan inhabitants of
China to India and made use of this incident to carry out frantic
anti-China activities' • 'It is the customary practice of the Indian
reactionaries' , the Jen-min Jih-pao commentator stated, 1 to poison
the relations between nationalities in neighbouring countries and
create incidents to be used as pretexts for intervention, subversion
and aggression against these countries' • 85
Neither was the Indian demand for the 'withdrawal' of Pakistani
troops from its eastern wing, it was pointed out, without a parallel
in the world history. The demand resembled the methods used by
Japanese imperialism to invade and bully China in the 1930s. • In
1931' , it was explained,' the Japanese militarists flagrantly created
the Mukden incident, drove the Chinese troops south of the Great Wall
and rigged up a "Manchukuo" in North East China •••• [Four years
later], while engineering the so-called "autonomy in north China",
and rigging up a puppet administration in east Hopei, [ they] openly
demanded that Chinese troops withdraw from their own territory, Hopei
province, so as to attain their goal of further occupying North
China' • 'The gangster's logic of the Indian expansionists' ,
85_!.bid, p.C/7; See also 1 Commentator article entitled "Farce of New
Delhi" published in Jen-min Jih-pao on 8 December. 1971, NCNA, 8 December 1971, in SW~ FE, No.3860, 9 December 1971, p.C/11. ----
136
therefore, it was claimed,'is merely the ususal tactic of all
86 aggressor f! •
The Indian reactionaries were rampant to this degree, the
Chinese news media claimed, because they were being encouraged by
social-imperialism in undertaking their venture of annexing East
Pakistan. In addition to providing economic, military and political
support to New Delhi, it was stressed, the Soviet Government had also
exerted both disguised and undisguised pressure on Islamabad to force
the. it to succumb to India's demands. In reality, therefore," Soviet
Union was pursuing policies similar to those pursued by the German
and Italian fascists vis-a-vis Japanese militarists on the issue of
establishing "Manchukuo" regime in north-east China.87
This criticism of the Indian and soviet policies by the Chinese
media was accompanied by a very strong and direct Chinese support for
Pakistan at the United Nations. On 4 December 1971, during the
Security Council deliberations, unlike the United States'
representative who spoke of 'the recourse to war by the nations of
South Asia' , 88 the Chinese representative, Huang Hua categorically
stated that 'the Government of India (had] openly dispatched troops
to East Pakistan, thus giving rise to a large scale armed conflict
and thereby (had) aggravated tension in the subcontinent and in
Asia as a whole' • 89 Then he proceeded to identify the Indian
86Ibid, p.C/12; and NCNA, 6 December 1971, op.cit, p.C/8. 87Ibid, p.C/8; see also, 'Soviet Revisionists Energetically Support
and Instigate Indian Movement to Carry Out Subversive Activities and Armed Aggression Against Pakistan' , NCNA, 5 December 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3858, 7 December 1971, pp.C/5-6; and 'People's Daily Commentator Refutation of 'rass on India-Pakistan COnflict' , NCNA, 7 December 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3859, 8 December 1971, p.C/4.
88 ---'Statement by Mr George Bush' , Bangla Desh Documents, Vol. II,
(Madras: B.N.K. Press Private Ltd., n.d.), p.431 (emphasis added). 89
statement by Mr. Huang Hua, Representative of China, 4 December 1971', in Ibid, p.435 (emphasis added).
137
argument that the continued massive influx of refugees from East
Pakistan accounted for its East Pakistan policy as 'completely
untenable' • The facts reveal, he maintained, that New Delhi had 'not
the least intention to settle the question of the East Pakistani
refugees' , but that it intended to 'capitalize on the question as a
pretext for committing further subversion and aggression against
Pakistan' • Thus 1 he stated ,the Security council should 'surely
condemn the act of aggression by the Government of India and demand
that the Indian Government immediately and unconditionally withdraw
all its armed forces from Pakistan' • The next day, the Chinese
representative subnitted a draft resolution which, like the draft
resolution tabled by the United States on 4 December 1971, called
upon India and Pakistan to cease hostilities and withdraw
respectively from the international borders However, unlike the one
presented by the United States, this draft resolution devoted the
preceding three paragraphs to noting India' s large scale attack on
Pakistan ,condemning its act of creating a so-called "Bangla Desh",
and calling upon the Government of India to withdraw its armed forces
and personnel sent in Pakistan immediately and unconditionally on the
grounds that failure to do so 'would be tantamount to legalizing
India's aggression. 90 The same day, the Chinese representative
vetoed a Soviet draft resolution which 'called upon Pakistan to
cease all aspects of violence... which had [resulted] in the
deterioration of the situation' on the grounds that it reflected the
Soviet Union' s utmost attempts to • defend the Indian aggressive acts
subverting the Pakistan Government and disrupting the national unity
90 'Draft Resolution by China in the Security Council, S/10 421 1 5
December 1971', and 'Statement by Mr. Huang Hua, Representative of China, 5 December 1971' 1 in Ibid, pp.337-338, and 442-443.
138
of Pakistan' • 91 Two days later, on 7 December 1971,during the
General Assembly meeting, the Chinese representative stressed that
the United Nations should not repeat the mistakes made by the League
of Nations, and draw a clear 1 ine between the aggressor (India) and
the victim of aggression (Pakistan) •92 The resolution passed by the
General Assembly, however, only 'called upon India and Pakistan
to take forthwith all measures for an immediate ceasefire and
withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other
.... ' . 93
Thereafter, the Chinese Government and press continued to repeat
its condemnation of the Indian and Soviet policies against
k. 94
Pa ~stan. The final Chinese Government's statement issued on 16
December 1971, for instance, accused India of brazenly launching a
large-scale war of aggression, and exploiting the • refugee question'
to achieve the 'pipe dream of a greater Indian Empire' • It, then
proceeded to reaffirm Chinese firm support for Pakistan 'against
• d' • • d ub • I 95 aggress~on, ~v~s~on an s vers~on • Four hours later, however,
General Niazi surrendered to General Aurora and brought the
nine-months old crisis to an end.
Conclusion
The initial phase of the 1971 crisis saw the Chinese Government
91 'Draft Resolution by the U.S.S.R. in the Security council,
S/10418, 4 December 1971', in Ibid, pp.335-336; and 'Statement by the Chinese Representative Huang Hua in the UN Security Council, 5 December 1971 (Extracts)', in R.K. Jain, China South Asia Relations, pp.223-224.
92•statement by the Chinese Representative Chiao Kuan-hua in the UN
General Assembly', 7 December- 1971 (Extracts', in Ibid, pp.225-228. 93
Bangla Desh Documents, Vol. II, .pp. 342-3 43. 948 f . ee, or ~nstance, NCNA, 11 December 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3863, 13
December 1971, pp.C/8-9-.---
95NCNA, 16 December 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3867, 17 December 1971, pp.C/1-3.
providing extremely qualified support for Pakistan against India.
Pakistan's allegations against India were not repeated neither was
any attempt made to justify the Yahya regime's actions in the Eastern
wing of Pakistan. Significantly, there was a clear cut reluctance to
evince China's support for Pakistan's territorial integrity. It was
only, in the last stages of the crisis when an 'undeclared' war
started in East Pakistan, that Beijing in a volta-face sided with
Pakistan against India and echoed all those Pakistani allegations
against New Delhi that had, hitherto, remained unreported by the
Chinese media. This .support continued both within and outside the UN
until 16 December 1971 when the Indian forces marched into Dacca and
the dismemberment of Pakistan eventuated.
The questions arising from this chapter are as follows:
Why was China reluctant to side with Pakistan in the initial
stages of the East Pakistan crisis?
Did China approve or diapprove of- the Pakistan Government's
military crackdown in the eastern wing?
If Beijing disapproved of the Yahya regime's domestic policies,
why did it choose to side with Islamabad during the final stages of
the crisis?
Was this change a function of Chinese perceptions of the Soviet
and Indian moves in the South Asian region?
Possible answers to these questions will be discussed in Chapter
IX.
CHAPTRR V
UNQUALIFIED SUPPOR'I!:
CHINA AND THE 'NEW' PAKISTAN'S ·PROBLEMS
DECEMBER 1971 - APRIL 1974
on 16 December 1971, a few hours after Mrs. Gandhi's declaration
in the Lok Sabha that 'Dacca is now the free capital of a free
country' , 1 the Indian Government announced a unilateral ceasefire on
the western front from 2000 hours the following day and expressed the
hope that there would be 'a corresponding immediate response from the
Government of Pakistan' • 2 The next day, · Radio Pakistan reported
President Yahya' s announcement that Pakistan had accepted the Indian
proposal for a cease fire. 3 Thus the fourth Indo-Pakistan war, which
had caused a major geopolitical restructuring of the South Asian
region, formally came to an end on 17 December 1971. Three days
later, General Yahya stepped down from the posts of President and
Chief Martial Law Administrator and handed over power to Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto whose party, the PPP, had won the majority of the West
Pakistan seats in the December 1970 elections. 4
Soon after ccming to power, this new regime of the 'new'
Pakistan --- or what was left of the 'old' Pakistan faced a
myriad of problems. These included, among others, the problems of
securing Indian withdrawal from the 5000 square miles of territory
occupied on the eastern front during the recent war, and the release
of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs) captured by the Indian
Army after the surrender on the eastern front.
1New Delhi home service, 16 December 1971, in SWB:: FE, No.3867, 17 December 1971, p.C/13.
2New Delhi home service, 16 December 1971, in Ibid, pp.C/13-14.
3 d. k-. Ra lo Pa lstan, 17 December 1971, in SWB:: FE No.3868, p.C/5-6.
~adio Pakistan, 20 December 1971, in SWB:: FE, No.3870, p.C/\
141
This chapter attempts to describe the Chinese policy towards
Pakistan throughout this period, i.e. December 1971 to April 1974.
It begins with a brief description of Islamabad's attempts to secure
the withdrawal of troops and the repatriation of POWs, and then
describes and analyses the motives behind the Indian policy of
delaying the process. It, then, proceeds to describe the nature and
significance of Beijing's support for Islamabad in solving its
postwar problems.
Pakistan' s Problems
On 20 December 1971, as he took over the reins of government,
Bhutto found Pakistan facing a situation drastically different from
the one existing at the end of the Third Indo-Pakistan war ( 1965).
Unlike then, when its territorial gains had remained limited, the
Indian Army was now occupying large tracts of the 'new' Pakistan' s
territory. It was in a position to cut the main Pakistani lines of
north-south communication through Hyderabad to Karachi and was
occupying approximately 5000 square miles of Pakistan's territory,
i.e. seven times the area it had captured in the 1965 war. 5 At the
same time, it was holding in captivity about 10,000 Pakistani
civilians and 80,000 soldiers who had surrendered to the Indian
command in the eastern sector. 6 The Pakistan Army' s gains ,on the
other hand, were minimal. It was occupying only 69 square miles of
5In the 1965 war, even according to the New Delhi estimate, the
Indian Army had captured only 740 square miles of Pakistan's territory, cited by S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An
Historical analysis, (London: OXford University Press 1973), p.334; ~' 6 August 1972.
6 'Letter Dated 20 August 1972 from the representative of Pakistan
to the President of the Security Council' , UN Security Council Official Records: Supplement (Hereafter cited as SCOR:SWPP, 27th Year, July, August, September, 1972, (New Yor~ United Nations, 1973), p.91.
142
Indian territory, and approximately 50 square miles in Jammu and
Kashmir, and had captured only about 1000 Indian soldiers on the
western front. 7
Faced with this unfavourable situation, Bhutto shelved his claim
of fighting 'a thousand years of war with India' and began to issue
statements expressing Pakistan's intentions of living in peace with
its South Asian neighbour. On 30 December 1971, for instance, while
addressing a meeting of journalists, educationists and writers, he
said, 'Pakistan wants to live in friendship with all its neighbours,
more so with India ••• 1 • 8 However, he was careful to point out on
this and subsequent occasions that this friendship could be
established only if the Indian Government treated Pakistan as an
equal and not a satellite. A practical manifestation of such an
attitude, he emphasised, would be the Indian decision to immediately
release Pakistani prisoners of war and evacuate the territories
occupied during the 1971 war. 9
The Indian response to this call was not very favourable. For
the first time in the last twenty four years, the Indian Government
was finding itself in a clearly advantageous position. Instead of
giving up this position, New Delhi was determined to exploit it for
pressuring Islamabad into finding a permanent solution to the Kashmir
problem on Indian t.erms. Soon after the war ended, therefore, the
Indian Government had begun issuing statements suggesting that an
adjustment to the old ceasefire line in Kashmir would be necessary
for settling matters between the two Sout.h-Asian states. On 18
7 Dawn, 6 August 1972. 8Radio Pakistan, 30 December 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3877,
1972, pp.C1/2 (emphasis added). 9Ibid, pp.C1/3; see also Radio Pakistan, 3 January 1972,
No.3880, 5 January 1972, p.C/1; Pakistan Times, 15 January
January
in SWB: FE, 1972.
143
December 1971, for example, after declaring in the Lok Sabha that
'there 'Was] no dispute between India and Pakistan which
••• [could] not be settled through friendly negotiations' the Indian
Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram had stated: 1 It will now be our
endeavour to forge ••• a new relationship with Pakistan based • •• on
cooperation guaranteeing to us the security of our borders and our
vital road canmunications' •10 Three days later, India's External
Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, made it clear in the Security Council
that India would insist on some adjustments with regard to the
ceasefire line in Kashmir 1 to make it more stable, rational and
viable.' 11 This was followed by Mrs. Ghandi's press conference on 31
Decembec 1971, where soon after stating that various issues which had
arisen because of the recent conflict could be discussed between the
two countries, she mentioned the Kashmir issue. 'The whole idea of a
ceasefire line in Kashmir' , she said, 1 was to maintain peace and
security.' It was to be seen whether this aim has been achieved. It
may be necessary to have some adjustments' • 12 Unless and until
Islamabad agreed to this demand, and 'a concrete border settlement
reached with Pakistan' the Indian Government was careful to
emphasise, 1 there was no question of its troops withdrawing from the
present ceasefire positions along the western frontier ~. 13
Neither was it prepared, the Indian Government emphasised, to
repatriate immediately the Pakistani prisoners of war.
10Hadio New Delhi, 18 December 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3869, 20
December~-; p.C/6. 11 A . d 1 Slan Recor er, 72, 22 - 28 January 1972, p.10577. 12
Radio New Del~i, 31 December 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3877, 1 January 1972, pp.C1/1 (emph-asis added).
13 See, for example, Jagjiv,an Ram's statements in Vishakapatnam,
Bombay and Gauhati, Hadio New Delhi, 8 and 9 January 1972, in SWB: FE, No.3885, 11 January 1972, p.c/5: and Radio New Delhi, 15 January 1972, in SWB:FE, No.3891, 18 January 1972, p.A3/4.
144
The delay in their repatriation, New Delhi was careful to
suggest, was linked not with the straightening of the ceasefire line
in Kashmir but with the issue of Pakistan's recognition of Bangla
Desh. The Pakistan army on the eastern front, it was explained, had
surrendered to a joint Indo-Bangla Desh command. The Indian
Government, therefore, was not entitled to release the prisoners
without the concurrence of the authorities in Dacca. This, in turn,
it was pointed out, could not came about without Pakistan's
willingness to recognise Bangla Desh as a separate . d . 14 1. ent1.ty.
However, in spite of its attempts to suggest otherwise, certain
statements by the Indian Government reflected that it was using the
POWs as a lever to obtain a final Kashmir settlement on its own
terms. On 27 December 1971, for example, some Indian official
spokesmen, soon after declaring that the 'ceasefire line in Jammu and
Kashmir ••• may have to be straightened and rationalized' added that
the new rulers of Pakistan would 'have to sober down before there
[could) be talks about repatriation ••• ' • 15
f.,aced with this Indian policy of procrastinating over troop
withdrawal and POW repatriation as a lever to extract maximum gains
on the Kashmir issue , the new Pakistani regime found itself in a
predicament. It could not succumb to the Indian demand for
'rationalizing the ceasefire line in Kashmir, primarily for two
reasons. Firstly, negotiating from a position of weakness, it could
not predict the extent to which it would have been forced to
compromise on the Kashmir issue. secondly, even if the Indian
14 See, for example, Indira Gandhi's Interview with the
correspondent of Hungarian newspaper 'Nepszabadseg' , Times of India, 2 4 Apr il 19 72
15R d' . a J..o New Delh1., 27 December 1972, in SW~ FE, No.3875, 30 December 1971, p.C1/1.
145
Government's demands for a compromise were not maximal, the mere idea
of compromising on the Kashmir issue might have enraged the Pakistani
people 1 especially the Punjabis who were in the majority in the 'new'
Pakistan and had all through Pakistan's history identified themselves
closely with the Kashmir issue. Considering that Bhutto had received
maximum political support from the Punjabis during the December 1970
elections, their opposition to any compromise on Kashmir could have
undermined the new regime's stability.
Neither could Islamabad counter New Delhi's tactics by
recognising Bangla Desh and depriving India of the alibi that the
prisoners could not be repatriated without the concurrence of the
Bangla Desh Government. This inability to accord immediate
recognition to what had been previously part of Pakistan stemmed not
from the Pakistan Government's refusal to accept the reality of
Bangla Desh but from its appreciation of the fact that the people of
Pakistan were going through a trauma after the secession of the
eastern wing. Throughout the nine months of counter-insurgency
operations, they had been kept in the dark about the real
developments in the East and, therefore, when faced with the shock of
Pakistan's dismemberment, were reacting negatively and fiercely
opposing the idea of endorsing Bangla Desh' s independence. Under
these circumstances, instead of forcing them to instant acceptance 1
the new regime in Pakistan had opted for a psychological approach of
gradually preparing its people to accept the reality of Bangla Desh.
Initially, therefore, it had maintained that the Indian occupation of
the eastern wing had not marked the end of the 'United Pakistan'. In
his first address to the nation as the President 1 for instance 1
Bhutto had stated that East Pakistan was an inseparable and
unseverable part of Pakistan, and that he was determined to negotiate
with the leaders of the eastern wing to work out a settlement
146
ensuring that the two parts retained their links, even if it was
within a loose framework of Pakistan. 16 Two weeks later, he had
released Sheikh Muj ib, who had been kept under solitary confinement
since March 1971, on the grounds that the Sheikh was a 'patriotic
Pakistani leader' and that by releasing him the Pakistan Government
was not only respecting world opinion but also paving the way for
finding a link between the two wings. 17 Upon arrival in Dacca on 10
January 1972, however, Sheikh Muj ib had declared that there could be
no question of maintaining 1 inks with West Pakistan, and that Bangla
Desh was a reality that had cane to stay. 18 Nevertheless, the
Pakistan Government had continued to maintain that 'the last word had
not yet been spoken by the Sheikh' and that there was still sane
possibility of the continued existence of the 'United Pakistan' • 19
It could not, therefore, suddenly change its position and accord ~
jure recognition to Bangla Desh as it would have met with fierce
domestic opposition. Moreover, there was no guarantee that even if
it did succeed in depriving New Delhi of the chance to use the POWs
as a lever, the Indian Government would not continue to exploit the
issue of withdrawal of forces for securing Pakistan's approval to
frontier adjustments in Kashmir.
'l'he Pakistan Government could not afford to maintain the status
quo either. A policy of allowing the Indian Government to detain the
POWs and delay the withdrawal of troops for an indefinite period of
time was bound to create dissatisfaction among the Pakistani
population. This would have been especially true in the case of the
16 k. . Pa ~stan 'I'~mes, 21 December 1971. 17 k' . Pa ~stan 'I'1mes, 4 January 1972. 18 d. 1 Ra 10 Bang a Desh, 10 January 1972, in SWB.: FE, No.3886, 12
January 1972, p.C1/2. 19~ f 1 k' . wee, or examp e, Pa J.stan TJ.mes,
Bhutto' s speech at a news conference. 13 January 1972, and text of
Dawn, 14 January 1972.
147
province of Punjab where the majority of the Pakistani soldiers came
fran and, therefore, as previously mentioned, could have undermined
the stability of the new regime in Pakistan.
To get out of this predicament, the Bhutto regime explored three
avenues. Firstly, it began arguing that the Indian Government should
separate the question of the POWs from the rest of the issues
bedevilling relations between the South Asian states. The Pakistan
Government, it was maintained, was prepared to negotiate with its
Indian counterpart to arrive at a modus vivendi but believed that, in
order to prepare a climate conducive to negotiations, New Delhi
should desist fran using the POWs as a lever against Islamabad and
release all of them immediately. 20 In any case, it was argued,
according to Article 118 of the Geneva Conventions, the POWs could
not be the subject of negotiations and had to be repatriated as soon
as a cease fire had been arrived at. 21 This repatriation, it was
contended, could not be delayed on the pretext of the absence of
Bangla Desh' s concurrence because, firstly, the Pakistan army had
surrendered to the Indian forces and not to a joint Indo-Bangla Desh
command which was a 'legal fiction' , 22 and, secondly, the POWs were
being detained by the Indian and not the 'Bangla Desh' authorities. 23
'rhe Indian Government, ho.wever, ignored these argmnents and, during
Mrs Gandhi's first official visit: to Bangla Desh on 17 March 1972,
agreed in principle to transfer any Pakistani prisoner of war against
20Radio Karachi, 4 March 1972, p.B/3.
21R d' a 10 Karachi, 6 March 1972, pp.A3/8.
22 See, for example, Bhutto' s
the j,j,_!Jl~ of~Jndia' , and the Radio Pakistan, 16 March 1972, pp .A3/8.
in SWB: FE, No.3932, 6 March 1972,
in SWB: FE, No.3934, 8 March 1972,
interview with the correspt;Jnd"r.t.::c of · !.n9.ian __ Exp):"es~_: , as transmitted by in SWB: FE, No.3943, 18 March 1972,
23 See, for example, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary' s Press
Conference, Pakistan Times, 10 March 1972.
148
whom a prima-facie case could be found to Bangla Desh, for the
purpose of holding war crime trials. 24
Secondly, Islamabad attempted to indirectly counter India's
pretext that Dacca's opposition was the prime cause of the delay in
the repatriation of prisoners by dissuading Bangla Desh from its
resolve to put them on trial. This was done partly by threatening to
use the 400,000 Bengalis stranded in Pakistan as hostages if Dacca
proceeded with the trials. 25 At the the same time, however, with the
help of 'some friendly countries' especially Indonesia, the Pakistan
Government attempted to establish contact with the Bangla Desh
authorities. Mujib and Bhutto, it suggested, should meet on an equal
footing and settle, along with various other issues, the question of
. . . . t . l 26 putting the PakJ.stanJ. prJ.soners on war crJ.me rJ.a s. This
settlement of disputes, it maintained, would pave the way for
Pakistan's recognition of BanglaDesh. These moves, however, failed
to achieve their objective. The Bangla Desh Government refused to
hold any meeting between the leaders of the two countries without
prior de jure recognition by Pakistan of Bangla Desh' s separate
stat.ehood. It also refused to be cowed by Islamabad's threat of
using Bengalis as hostages and reiterated its resolve to hold war
crime trials of Pakistani POWs. 2 7
'I'hirdly, the Pakistan Government tried to muster international
support. for pressuring India into resolving the issues arising out of
2'\adio New Delhi, 18 March 1972, in SWB: FE, No.3944, 30 March
1972, pp.A3/6. 25 Radio New
1972, pp.A)/8. Delhi, 12 April 1972, in SWB: FE, No.3963, 14 April
26s.M. Burke, 'The Postwar Diplomacy of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971', Asian Survey, Vol. XIII, No.11, Novembec 1973, p.1038.
27 ------------A See, for example, Bhutto's statement at a press conference on 10
August 1972, in 'Documents', Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XXV, No.3, Third Quarter, 1972, p.124 1.nd 'Chronolog:-r. March- May 1972', Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XXV, No.2, Second Quarter, 1972, p.89.
149
the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. Within three weeks of coming to power,
therefore, Bhutto asked all countries, especially the major powers,
to refrain from according recognition 'to the "so-called Bangla Desh"
28 in a hurry' • This move was made on the assumption that India was
keen to win recognition for Bangla Desh and that a delay in its
recognition in support of Pakistan was likely to make India
reconsider its strategy of exploiting Pakistan's weakness for
extracting concessions on the Kashmir issue. However, this move met
with little success. A number of states recognised Bangla Desh
within a few weeks of its independence. More importantly, the two
super powers did not respond favourably to Islamabad's moves. The
Soviet Union recognised Bangla Desh on 2 4 January 1972, and two weeks
later invited Mujib to visit 29
Moscow. The United States c,1lso
accorded recognition to the new South Asian state on 4 April 1972 and
expressed its willingness to assist Dacca in the task of economic
t . 30 reconstruc ~on.
Chinese Support for Pakistan
In marked contrast, however, Beijing stood by Islamabad during
this period. Even prior to Bhut.to' s ascent to power, the Chinese
Government had demonstrated on a number of occasions its
unwillingness to acknowledge the dismemberment of Pakistan and had
identified the fall of Dacca as a 'temporary difficulty' faced by the
Pakistani people. On 17 December 1971, for example, ten hours after
t.he Pakistan Anny had surrendered, the NCNA transmitted a report on
'some facts of • • • (Indian] bullying and aggression against Pakistan'
28p k' t . a ~s an T~mes, 14 January 1972. 29
Iftekhar Chaudhury, Bangla Desh' s External Relations: The Strategy of a Small Power in a Subsystem, PhD Thesis Canberra: ANU, 1980 ) ' p. 150.
30New York Times, 5 April 1972.
150
which identified Bangla Desh as East Pakistan, its new government as
a 'rebellious organisation' 1 and the Farrakh Barrage dispute as one
existing between India and Pakistan 1 not between India and Bangla
31 Desh. The same evening, speaking at a banquet for the Sudanese
Vice-President, Chou En-lai branded India as an aggressor, and
accused it of having occupied East Pakistan, installing there a
single-handedly manufactured puppet regime of 'the so-called "Bangla
Desh'" , and attempting to legalise this aggression by imposing
surrender terms on Pakistan. 'However' , he asserted, ' the fall of
Dacca is definitely not a so-called "milestone" towards victory for
the Indian aggressors, but the starting point of their defeat' and
expressed his Government's conviction that 'no matter what
difficulties and dangers may arise' , final victory surely belonged to
the 'great Pakistani people ••. ' • 32 'rhe next day, in its first report
on the fall of Dacca, the NCNA had maintained that 'with the active
encouragement and energitic support of Soviet revisionist social
imperal ism in disregard of the strong condemnation of world opinion' ,
the 'Indian aggressors ( hadl invaded and occupied Dacca, the
capital of East Pakistan, by armed force ••• • • After occupying Dacca,
it reported, the Indian Government was expressing the intention to
'hang on in East Pakistan and impose military occupation there' •
Therefore, the NCNA quoted 'foreign news agency reports' , it had
installed' the so-called Bang.la Desh puppet regime [which]
"remain( ed] under the overall command of General Aurora" (Indian
Commander in the Eastern theatre)'. However, the report suggested in
the end, it was a temporary victory which was bound to have domestic
------------------31 NCNA 17 December 19 71 1 in SWB: FE I No. 3868, 18 December 19 71 1 I
pp. cl9=11. 32NCNA I 17 December I 971 I
pp.M/2-3. in SWB: FE, No.3869, 20 December 1971 1
151
and regional repercussions for the Indian Government. ' ••• [ T] he
Indian reactionaries', it stated, 'are pleased with their own ruses.
However, those who play with fire will burn themselves ••• [T]heir
crime of aggression will definitely arouse stronger dissatisfaction
and resistance among the people of Pakistan and the South Asian
subcontinent, including the people of Indi~ •33
Simultaneously, the Chinese Government had also exhibited
concern over the Indian intention to exploit Pakistan's weakness for
extracting concessions on the Kashmir issue. This concern was
initially reflected in an NCNA report of 17 December 1971 on 'Indian
Expansionism' which allocated almost 60 per cent of its content to a
discussion of the Kashmir issue and commented that Indira Gandhi had
inherited Nehru's mantle and was obstinately clinging to the
t . th t I K hm. . d. ' t . t 34 asser ~on a as ~r ~s In ~a s err1 ory. Two days later, the
Chinese media expressed this concern more openly. After reporting
the statement of the Indian Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram that any
Indo-Pakistan solution must 'guarantee to [India] a security of
[its] ••• borders and vital road communications' , the NCNA quoted a
western news agency's analysis where it was indicated that the Indian
forces would seek to hold the territory they had occupied in West
Pakistan, especially, the territory around Shakargarh which
commmanded the major road link to Kashmir. It also reported an
Indian official spokesman's statement that 'India's frontiers must be
settled according ·to "the new ceasefire line"' and commented, 'such
is the gangster logic of the Indian expansionists: India's boundary
lies wherever the Indian aggressor troops have invaded and
33NCNA, 18 December 1971, in SWB:: FE, No.3869, 20 December 1971, p.c/~phasis added).
3 ~CNA, 17 December 1971, in SWE: FE, No.3866, 18 December 1971, pp.C/9-11.
35 occupied' •
152
The Chinese Government persisted in its policy of not
acknowledging the emergence of Bangla Desh and encouraging the
Pakistani people to face this 'temporary difficulty' even after the
change of regime in Islamabad. Only nine hours after Bhutto was
sworn in as President, for example 1 the NCNA transmitted a
'worker-peasant-soldier battlefield special column' accusing India of
following a 'piratical logic' • In the name of ' fighting for
fundamental ideals' , it maintained, the Indian reactionaries,
colluding with Soviet revisionism, had 'trampled over' and 'usurped'
half of Pakistan's territory. However, it concluded on an optimistic
note, ' ••• The time when one could act outrageously and do as one
pleases by force is gone for ever. The frantic 'ideals' of Indira
Gandhi and the like can never be implemented. ••• Indian
reactionaries, you will never have peace. Do not feel happy too
soon' • 36 Two days later, on 22nd December 1971, while congratulating
Bhutto on his assumption of the Presidency, Chou En-lai repeated this
optimistic assurance. 'We are deeply convinced', he stated, 'that so
long as the people of Pakistan ·uphold unity and persist in struggle
[against the Indian aggressors] , they will certainly be able to
overcome temporary difficulties and final victory will certainly
belong to the great people of Pakistan ••• ' • 37 This was followed,
four days later, by Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian' s speech at a
banquet for an Iraqi delegation in which, while referring to the
35NCNA, 19 December 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3870, 21 December 1971,
pp. C/ 11.:'1 2.
36 •worker-peasant-soldier a certain Chinese PLA unit, NCNA, 21 December 1971, PP· C/7-8.
battlefield special column' by Hung Yi of "Refute Indira Ghandi' s Piratical Logic" 1
in SWB: FE, No.387s, 23 December 1971,
37 NCNA, 22 December 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3873, 28 December 1971,
p.c;16:(emphasis added)
153
plight of Biharis in Bangla Desh, he identified the emergence of the
new state as the military occupat:ion of East Pakistan by the Indian
expansionists, and the Bangla Desh authorities as the East Pakistan
rebels under the Indian command who were 'massacring and
persecuting innocent Pakistani people in all parts of East Pakistan
1 38 Thereafter,the Chinese media frequently
39 terminology while reporting events in Bangla Desh.
used this
Contemporaneously, Beijing continued to indicate its concern
over the Indian i"'tentions of exploiting Pakistan's weakness for
gaining concessions in Kashmir. It was re fleeted, for instance, in
Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian' s speech on 26 December 1971 in
which he stated that the 'Indian Government must .•• immediately and
~c;2.ndi tionallz withdraw its aggressor forces from East Pakistan and
all the othE~r places it has ~~~pied' • 40
The Chinese support for Pakistan, however, was most clearly
spelt out during Bhutto' s three days' visit to Beijing on 31 January
1972. On the day of his arrival, a·en-min Jih-pao published an
editorial which branded the assertions made by New Delhi that
' "Bangla Desh" (had] become a "reality"' as 'a typical argument
to legalise aggression' • 'The whole world', it stated, 'can see that
it is created by the Indian Government through naked aggression and
subversion and with the support of Soviet revisionism'. Then it
proceeded to endorse, without mentioning his name, the position taken
by Bhutto in his his first broadcast to the nation on 29 December
------·-------------38NCNA, 26 December 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3874, 29 tiecember 1971,
p.C/_1. __
39s f . b ee, or 1.nstance, NCNA, 27 Decem er 1971, in ibid, pp.C/2-3; I!,CNA, 28 December 1971, in SWB:FE, No.3875, 30 December 1971, p.C/10; and NCNA, 9 January 1972, in SWB: FE, No.3885, 11 January 1972, p.c/2.
40 NCNA, 26 December 1971, in ~FE, No.3874, 29 December 1971,
p.C/~mphasis added).
154
1971, that the leaders of East and West Pakistan should be given an
opportunity to work out a settlement between the two wings and that,
prior to these negotiations, India must vacate East Pakistan, ' A
Pakistani leader once said', the editorial stated, 'that the Pakistan
Government has made blunders and terrible blunders indeed in the past
in handling the question of East Pakistan. But this can only be
solved ••• by Pakistan itself. It does not mean that ••• [India can]
dispatch troops to occupy East Pakistan and impose a so-called
solution on Pakistan by force from outside' • 41
The next day, at the banquet in Bhutto's honour, after reviling
India for 'seriously disrupting peace in the South Asian
subcontinent' , Chou En-lai noted that the Indian forces to date were
'in forcible occupation of Pakistan territories' , and were
incessantly violating the ceasefire and continuing their military
provocations against Pakistan. Then 1 to convey that these pressure
tactics for changing the status of the Kashmir issue would not be
viewed with equanimity by Beijing, he reiterated China' s resolute
support for Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
endorsed Pakistan's position on ·the Kashmir issue. 42
This was followed, on 2 February 1 by the issuing of the joint
communique in which Beijing identified itself completely with
Islamabad's stand on the issues arising out of the Indo-Pakistan war
(1971). Firstly, in paragraph II of the cornmunnique, the Chinese
Premier expressed his understanding of and respect for Bhutto' s stand
that future relations between the two parts of Pakistan should be
41 ' It is Impermissible to Legal ise India's Invasion ad Occupation of East Pakistan' , Jen-min Jih-pao, 31 January 1972, transmitted by NCN?!, 31 January 1972, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: People's Republic of China, (Hereafter cited as FBIS: CHI, 31 January 1972, p.A/9.
42NCNA, 1 F b 197 ' e ruary 2, 1n FBIS: CHI, 2 February 1972, pp.A/2-3.
155
established through negotiations between the elected leaders of the
people without forcing intervent.ion or influence, and that Indian
forces must withdraw from East Pakistan to enable such negotiations
to take place without any intimidation. Secondly, in paragraph IV,
Chou En-lai joined Bhutto in calling upon India to fulfil its
obligations under the Geneva conventions and repatriate the Pakistani
prisoners of war without further delay. Thirdly, in paragraph III,
along with Pakistan, Beijing expressed its opposition to Indian
attempts to exploit Pakistan's weakness by stressing that New Delhi
must vacate Pakistani territories, and that the UN must ensure strict
observance of the ceasefire and withdrawal of forces to their
respective territories and positions along the ceasefire line in
d hm. 43 Jammu an Kas 1r.
Twenty five days later, on 27 February 1971, the Chinese
Government once again demonstrated its support for Pakistan. In a
joint communique issued after Nixon's visit to Beijing, in marked
contrast to the United Stated which 'favoured' the idea, the Chinese
Government 'firmly maintained that India and Pakistan should, in
accordance with the UN resolutions on the Indo-Pakistan question,
immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories
and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir.• 44
Thereafter, the Chinese media continued to highlight Indian
reluctance to implement the relevant UN resolutions by reporting
Pakistan's allegations of Indian torture of the POWs, attempts to use
them as a bargaining chip, and frequent violations of the ceasefire
43NCNA, 2 February 1972, in SWB: FE, No.3906, 4 February 1972,
p.A/1-3-(emphasis added). 4 ~CNA, 27 January 1972, in FBIS: CHI, 28 February 1972, p.A/11
(emphasis added).
156
line at Kashmir. 45 As long as New Delhi persisted in this pol icy,
Beijing maintained throughout these first few months in the history
of the 'new' Pakistan, like all other ' justice upholding countries'
it would resolutely oppose the Indian aggressors.
To prove this commitment was credible, the Chinese Government
consistently opposed India in various international forums. On 7
January 1972, for instance, despite arguing very strongly in favour
of increasing the number of seats for the Asian group, the Chinese
Government opposed the Indian candidature to the sessional committees
of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
Explaining this opposition, the Chinese representative, An Chih-yuan
stated: 'as is known to all India launched a barbarous
aggression against Pakistan, trampled upon and dismembered a
sovereign country. With its cri~inal acts, the Indian Government has
stripped off all the mantles of 'peace' , 'humanity' and
'non-alignment' , thus laying bare its ugly features as an
aggressor. The Indian Government has grossly violated the UN
resolution calling for ceasefire and troop withdrawal by India and
Pakistan, and refused to impl ei:nent the Security Council resolution
for ceasefire and troop withdrawal' • 'Will it not be big mockery to
the United Nations' , he asked rhetorically, 'if such a country which
has trampled upon the purposes and the principles of the UN charter
at will should be allowed to take part in the sessional committees of
the ECOSOC?' 46
This was followed, in March 1972, by Chinese opposition to the
45see, for example, ~' 10 March 1972, in SWB: FE, No.3938, 13
March 1972, pp.A3/7; NCNA, 27 March 1972, in SWB: FE, No.3952, 29 March 1972, pp.A3/4, and NCNA, 5 March 1972, in SWB: FE, No.3983, 8 May 19 72, p. ( i) •
46Hsinhua, 8 January 1972, in FBIS: CHI, 11 January 1972, pp.A/1-2.
157
proposed participation of India in the Special Committee on
Decoloniza tion and its working group. The Chinese representative,
Chong Yung-kuan, repeated the allegation that India had 'seriously
undermined peace on the South Asian subcontinent' , and had 'crudely
violated' and 'refused to implement' the relevant UN resolutions.
The Chinese delegation, therefore, he explained, considered it
inappropriate for such a country which had ignored the common desire
of all the peace-loving and justice-upholding countries and peoples,
and which had refused to imple.ment the UN resolutions 'in open
violation of the purposes and principles of the UN charter' to join
the Special Committee and its working group. 47
As another gesture of support for Islamabad, Beijing sometimes
expressed its disapproval of other states' plans or decisions to
recognise Bangla Desh. The expression took both direct and indirect
forms. In the case of Brita in, for instance, China expressed its
displeasure by transmitting reports of the strong criticisms of
Indian policy of dismembering Pakistan from various groups in
Britain, and their calls to support the unity of Pakistan. 48
Similarly with the Burmese . Government, Beijing indicated its
opposition through the 'voice of the People of Burma' --- a Radio
Station operated from South China which criticised Ne Win's
decision to recognise Bangla Desh as 'an extremely reactionary act' ,
a proof of the military gove.rnment' s support for the Indian
reactionaries, and 'an open interference in the internal affairs of
Pakistan ••• ' • 49 However, in the case of the Soviet Union, China
47NCNA, 2 March 1972, in SCMP, No.5094, 16 March 1972, p.158.
48--See, for example, NCNA, 30 Dcember 1971, in SWB: FE, No.3877,
January 1972, pp.C1/4-~and NCNA, 12 January 1972, in SW& FE, No.3888, 14 January 1972, pp.C/4-5.
49•voice of the People of Burma' 20 January 1972, in SWB: FE,
No.3898, 26 January 1972, pp.A3/1.
158
resorted to direct condemnation. In an article published seven days
after the Soviet recognition, for instance, Jen-min Jih-pao accused
Moscow of • brandishing the signboard of the so-called "support to
national self-determination" • while in essence interfering in
Pakistan's internal affairs and attempting to legalise its
aggression, and then suggested that by recognising Bangla Desh, the
Soviet Union was paving the way for East Pakistan's conversion 'into
a new Indian protectorate' . 50
This pro-Pakistan declaratorz policy was translated into actual
support for Islamabad in the second half of 1972. To fully
appreciate the significance of this support it is essential to
describe the context within which it was provided.
In early 1972, the Indian Government had expressed its
willingness to hold a summit meeting with Pakistan but had suggested
that it should be preceded by emissary level talks. 51 Islamabad had
reacted favourably but again asked the Indian Government to
repatriate the prisoners beforehand. 52 New Delhi, however, indicated
a continued intent to link release of the prisoners to the Kashmir
issue. Five days before the emissary level talks, which were held on
2 5 April 19 72, for instance 1 the leader of the Indian team, D.p.
Dhar, visited Bangla Desh and held a meeting with Sheikh Mujib.
Our ing this visit 1 he told newsmen that the agenda.' of the forthcoming
talks included 'certain issues which were absolutely bilateral
[and others) which were tripartite and concerned Bangla Desh' ,
thereby indicating that New Delhi still refused to discuss the
50' It Is Impermissible to Legalize India' s
of East Pakistan' , op.cit., pp. A/9-11. 51 P k' t . '1 a ~s an T~mes, 8 Apr~ 1972.
528 f • t I ee, or ~ns ance, Commentary on Mrs. with Bhutto', Radio Karachi, 8 April 1972, April 1972, pp.A3/5.
Invasion and Occupation
Gandhi's offer of talks in SWB: FE, No .3960, 11
159
question of prisoners without Dacca's participation. At the same
time, he also emphasised that 'the future of Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir' would be one of the main issues in the talks and saiili
Pakistan has no locus standi in Kashmir and [it] has to vacate from
there' • 53 This was followed, six days later during the
emissary-level talks, by Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh's
statement in the Lok Sabha that New Delhi wanted to 'solve the basic
and peripheral issues with Pakistan together to remove the threat of
another war' 54 indicating his government' s preference for a package
deal involving the solution of the Kashmir dispute.
The Bangla Desh Government for its part continued to reject
Islamabad's moves to hold talks before recognition and worked out a
programme, by 22 May 1972, to try Pakistani soldiers for war
crimes. 55
The situation underwent little change even when summit level
talks were held in Simla in July 1972. Mrs. Gandhi refused to
discuss the release of the POWs captured on the eastern front on the
grounds that she was committed to the Bangla Desh Government on this
point, but expressed her wi 11 ingness to exchange those captured on
the western front. 56 However, she did discuss the Kashmir issue and
the withdrawal of forces. The Simla agreement, concluded at the end
of the meeting stated that the two parties would withdraw their armed
forces to their respective sides of the international border within
30 days of the accord coming into force. In Kashmir, the two sides
agreed to respect 'the line of control resulting from the cease fire
53Radio New Delhi, 20 April 1972, and Radio Dacca, 20 April 1972, in SW& FE, No.3969, 21 April 1972, pp.A3/2.
5 ~eported by SW& FE, No.3975, 28 April 1972, p.(i). 55
Radio Dace':, 22 May 1972, in SWB: FE, No.3997, 24 May 1972, PP· A3/9.
56Times of India, 2 July 1972.
160
of 17 December 1971 ••. without prejudice to the recognised position
of either side' • 57
This agreement was cautiously welcomed by the Chinese
Government. Speaking at a banquet in honour of the southern Yemen
delegation on 9 July 1972, for example, Chou En-lai identified it as
one of the new sucesses achieved by the people of various countries
in 'their struggle against imperialism, revisionism and reaction' ,
and praised Bhutto for having 'upheld the reasonable position he had
declared prior to the talks' i.e., not permitting India to impose
humiliating terms of peace on Pakistan. 58
The course of events, immediately after the agreement, however,
demonstrated that Bhutto had not succeeded in actually dissuading New
Delhi from persisting in its delaying tactics. Firstly, the Pakistan
Government called a special session of the National Assembly only
eight days after the agreement was signed. While it got it ratified
on 14 July 1972 and conveyed the instrument of ratification to New
Delhi the next day, 59 it was not until 1 August, that the agreement
was presented by the Indian Government to the Lok Sabha. It then
took New Delhi another three· days to deliver the instrument of
ratification to Islamabad. 60 Secondly, as it conveyed the instrument
of ratificat.ion to Islamabad on 4 August, New Delhi also issued a
statement making it clear 'that action for the withdrawal would have
to be simultaneous with the delineation of the line of control in
57 For text of the Simla Agreement see Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 25,
No.3, 3rd Quarter 1972, pp.117-118. 58
For Chinese reaction, see NCNA, 5 July 1972, in SW& FE, No.403?, 7 July 1972, pp.A3/14; NCNA, 9 July 1972, in SW&FE, No.403?, 11 July 1972, pp.A3/6; and for Bhutto' s statement before leaving for Simla talks, see Pakistan Times, 28 June 1972.
59P k' t . 15 1 a lS an Tlmes, Ju y 1972, and 16 July 1972. 60 T· f d' 2 ~~-~~~~, August 1972, and 5 August 1972.
161
Jammu and Kashmir.' 61 This position not only ran counter to the
accord arrived at Simla which had identified no such link and had
specified 30 days after the ratification as the duration within which
the withdrawals were to take place, but also suggested that if the
delineation of the line of control did not take place in accordance
with India's wishes the evacuation of Pakistani territories might be
delayed. Thirdly, thirteen days after the agreement was concluded,
Mrs Gandhi sent her Principal Secretary, P. N. Haksar to Dacca where,
after holding talks with the Bangla Desh Foreign Minister, he
repeated the Indian Government's position that the POWs would not be
repatriated without the consent of the Dacca authorities. 62
Under these circumstances, Bhutto through the then Pakistan
ambassador to China, Agha Shahi, requested the Chinese Government to
assist Pakistan in fully resolving its problems arising out of the
1971 war. The assistance, it was suggested, could take the form of a
Chinese veto over Bangla Desh' s admission to the United Nations which
was filed on 8 August 1972 as it would then enable Islamabad to have
some bargaining power while dealing with India and Bangla Desh. The
Chinese Government, according to a Pakistani diplomat, assured the
Pakistan Government that' it could consider China's right to veto as
its own' • 63 That the Chinese Government meant it was proven a few
days later.
At the outset of the UN Security Council meeting held on 10
August 1972 to discuss the question of Bangla Desh' s admission ,the
Chinese representative, Huang Hua, unsuccessfully opposed the
61All India Radio, 4 August 1972, in SWB: FE, No.4060, 7 August
19 72 , pp • A3 /2 • 62
Between the two governments he stated, a complete identity of views exist, see Radio New Delhi, 19 July 1972, in SWB: FE, No.4046, 21 July 1972, pp.A3/13.
63 I t ' . h b . n erv1ew w1t an ex-am assador of Pak1stan to China.
162
inclusion of the item in the agenda. 'As is known to all' , he said,
' "Bangla Desh" is still collaborating with India in continuing to
obstruct the United Nations [General . Assembly and Security Counc ill
resolutions [of December 1971] concerning the withdrawal of troops
and the release of the prisoners of war. India has not only failed
to effect a true withdrawal of its troops but is colluding with
"Bangla Desh" in unreasonably detaining more than 90,000 Pakistani
prisoners of war and civilians over a long period and refusing to
release them. "Bangla Desh" is even holding out threats of a trial
of the prisoners of war.' 'All this', he maintained, 'has directly
violated the two United Nations resolutions and the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and is totally lincompatible with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations' • In these
circumstances, he stated, the Chinese delegation did not consider
II B 1 D h'' t b 1 . f . d 11 . . th . t d N . 6 4 ang a es o e qua ~ ~e at a to JO~n e Un~ e at~ons.
Soon after the discussion began on the agenda, the Chinese
representative opposed the Indian, Soviet and Yugoslavian de..mand for
the immediate admission of Bangla Desh to the United Nations. 65
Elucidating his Government's reasons for opposing Dacca's entry, he
argued that India had failed to comply with a General Assembly
resolution of 7 December 1971 calling for an immediate ceasefire and
withdrawal, and a Security Council resolution of 21 December calling
upon them to take all measures necessary to preserve human life and
to apply in full the Geneva contention provisions for protection of
the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilians, and immediate
release and repatriation of the prisoners of war. 'The Indian
64united Nations Security Council Official Records (Hereafter cited
as s.c.o.R.), 27th Year, 1658th meeting, 10 August 1972, 5/PV. 1658, (New York: United Nations, 1975), pp.1-2.
65 rb id, pp. 4-7.
163
Government', he said, 'failed to withdraw all its troops to its own
territory in accordance with the resolutions concerning troop
withdrawal and has been detaining over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of
war and civilians' • The Indian Government, he argued, was resorting
to 'such an unreasonable course of action' because it wanted 'to
maintain the tension on the South Asian subcontinent and use the
prisoners to arrive at a 'final settlement' of the Jammu and Kashmir
dispute. By threatening to try the Pakistani prisoners, he
maintained Bangla Desh was in fact 'colluding with India in
blackmailing Pakistan and obstructing the implementation of the
relevant UN resolutions. Under these circumstances, he implied,
admitting Bangla Desh to the United Nations would be tantamount to
declaring the UN resolutions of December 1971 invalid, and 'aiding
and abetting evil doings' • The Chinese Government insisted that
Bangla Desh'sapplication should be considered 'only when the relevant
resolutions have been truely implemented and only after a reasonable
settlement of the issues between India and Pakistan and between
66 Pakistan and "Bangla Desh" has been achieved ••• •.
However, since neither China nor any other state offered a
formal alternative proposal, the President of the Security Council
referred Bangla Desh' s application to the Committee on the Admission
of New Members. 6 7 At its first and second meetings held on 11 and 21
August 1972 the Chinese representative reiterated the stand taken in
the Security Council. He also opposed and then abstained from
participation in the vote taken to determine the attitude of members
towards the application of Bangla Desh on the grounds that it could
not fully represent the views of various delegations who favoured
66 Ibid, pp.7-8. 67 Ibid, p.10.
164
adjourning the consideration of the issue. 68
Meanwhile, the Chinese Government tabled a draft resolution
which suggested that the Security Council should defer the
consideration of Bangla Desh's application until the pertinent
resolutions of the, United Nations were fully implemented. 69
Explaining this draft resolution on 2 5 August 1972, the Chinese
representative asserted that since the relevant resolutions adopted
by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council the year before
had not been implemented it was difficult to judge if Bangla Desh was
'merely uttering empty promises' or whether it was 'truly willing' to
carry out the responsibilities contained in Article 4 para 1 of the
UN Charter. only after these resolutions had been fullly complied
with, he suggested, could the Security Council confidently admit
BanglaDesh to the organisation. 70
The Chinese draft resolution, however, was vetoed on 2 5 August
1972 by the Soviet Union which along with Great Britain, India and
Yugoslavia, cosponsored another draft resolution calling for Bangla
Desh's immediate admission. 71 Under these circumstances, the Chinese
representative, who had already declared his Government's
determination 'to not compromise on principles of the UN charter' ,
vetoed the four power draft resolution72 --- the first veto cast by
China since its admission to the organisation in the previous year.
Justifying the veto, the Jen-min Jih-pao stated on 2 8 August
1972 that it was cast in faithful fulfilment of China's sacred duty
68 Ibid, p.94. 69
•oocument S/10768, Ibid, p.92. 70s.c.o.R., 27th Year~59th meeting, 24 August 1972, pp.1-2. 71
Document S/10771, Septanber 1972, p.93; August 1972, p.7.
72~, pp.10, 15.
S.C.O.R.: Supp, 27th Year, July, August, and s.c.o.R., 27th Year, 1660th meting, 25
165
. 73 to uphold justice and oppose . heqemony, aggression and e:x:pans1on.
The same day, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua visited
Islamabad \'.'here he repeated his Government' s call for the
implementation of the UN resolutions of December 1971. China, he
said, hoped that the countries of the South Asian subcontinent would
seek among themselves fair and reasonable solutions for their mutual
problems on the basis of the five principles of peaceful
coexistence. 7 4 Pakistan, he maintained, had been making efforts to
this end. President Bhutto, for instance, had made 'positive
contributions' towards arriving at an agreement on the withdrawal of
troops. He had also expressed his willingness to meet Sheikh Muj ib
without preconditions to discuss all questions between them. What
was lacking, he suggested, was reciprocity by India and Bangla Desh.
New Delhi, he stressed, must imple~ent 'conscientiously' the agrement
on the withdrawal of forces. Sheikh Muj ib should also welcome and
respond to Bhutto' s 'reasonable proposal' for unconditional talks.
Failure to do so and attempts to put off a reasonable settlement of
the South Asian problems, he pointed out, would prolong the time
before which Beijing would concede to Dacca's entry into the United
N t. 75
a .lOllS •
That Beijing refused to be diverted from this po 1 icy was
underscored at the General Assembly's 27th session (September 1972)
when the Yugoslav Government, with Soviet backing, again attempted to
secure the admission of Bangla Desh. Fran the outset, the Chinese
Government opposed this move. on 21 September 1972, for instance,
73Jen-min Jih-J2aO editorial as transmitted by ~' 28 August 1972, in SWB: FE, No.4078, 29 August 1972, pp.A1/3-5.
74 k' t . 29 9 ( . dd d) Pa 1s an T1mes, August 1 72 emphas1s a e • 75
see Chiao. Kuan-hua' s speech at the dinner given by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Iftikhar Ali, on 29 August 1972, NCNA, 30 August 1972, in SW& FE, No.4080, 31 August 1972, pp.A3/1-2. ----
166
when the idea was presented to the General Committee of the General
Assembly, the Chinese representative voted against it. 76 Two days
later, when the issue came up during adoption of the agenda the
Chinese Government again opposed the idea. This was followed by
Chiao Kuan-hua' s speech at the plenary session on 3 October. The
argument presented during all these meetings was essentially the same
as before. The Chinese Government maintained that it was not
fundamentally opposed to the admission of Bangla Desh, but it held
that consideration of the question should be postponed until the UN
resolutions were fully complied with as this alone could lead to the
relaxation of tension in the South Asian region aand prepare
conditions for a permanent peace. 77
Faced with this consistent Chinese opposition to, and the Soviet
pressure for, Bangla Desh' s immediate admission, the General Assembly
adopted together, without a debate or vote, the Yugoslav resolution
and another draft resolution sponsored by Argentina, which expressed
the desire that the parties concerned should make all possible
efforts to reach a fair settlement of issues that were still
pending, and called for the return of the POWs. 78 Since these two
resolutions were identified by the President of the General Assembly
as interdependent and as suggesting that Dacca's entry into the
United Nations should be considered within the framework of an
overall solution of the political, legal and humanitarian problems,
76 NCNA, 23 September 1972, in SWB: FE, No.4101, 25 September 1972,
pp. A1/1,:-2. 77
Ibid, pp. A 1/2; Official Records of the General Assembly Plenary Meetings (Hereafter cited as G.A.o.R.PM), Vol. I, 27th Session, 2037th meeting, 23 September 1972 (New York: United Nations 19·76), p.5; and G.A.O.R.PM, Vol.II, 27th Session, 2051st meeting, 3 October 1972, p. 15.
78united Nations Official Records of the General Annexes, (Hereafter cited as GAOR: Annexes), 27th Session, 93' pp.l.l...
Assembly: Agendaitem
167
their simultaneous adoption was tantamount to vindicating Beijing's
stand and, therefore, was welcomed by the Chinese representative.
The Chinese delegation, he stated, hoped that now the parties
concerned would truly and speedily implement the relevant UN
resolutions so that "Bangla Desh" could be admitted to the
. t' l . t' 79 lnterna lona organlsa lon.
Significance of Chinese Support
The question arises as to how this consistent Chinese oposition
to BanglaDesh's admission into the UN actually assisted Pakistan in
securing the evacuation of its territories and release of its
soldiers.
Throughout the Security Council and General Assembly proceedings
on the issue, by consistently identifying India as 'the main culprit'
and Bangla Desh as a state which was merely colluding with it, and
always mentioning the need for a reasonable settlement of disputes
between India and Pakistan before referring to the Pakistan-Bangla
Desh disputes, 80 the Chinese Government had clearly indicated that if
the Indian Government did not resolve the problems arising out of the
December war in a manner acceptable to Pakistan, Dacca would not be
able to enter the United Nations. In other words, it provided
Pakistan with a leverage in dealing with India. The longer New Delhi
delayed the evacuation of Pakistani territories and repatriation of
the POWs, the longer would Pakistan delay Bangla Desh' s admission by
indirectly using China's right of veto. Since, as previously
mentioned, the Indian Government had been keen on getting Bangla Desh
79GAOR: PM, vol.II, 27th Session, 2093rd meeting, 29 November 1972,
p.26 80
See, for instance, s.c.o.R., 27th Year, 1658th meeting, 10 August 1972, pp.2, 8; and GACR: PM, Vol.II, 27th Sesion, 2051st meeting, 3 October 1972, p.15.
168
a state created with active Indian assistance into the
organisation, this leverage clearly softened its attitude vis-a-vis
Pakistan.
This was most obvious in the case of the withdrawal of forces
fran occupied territories. On 5 September 1972, for example, in
marked contrast to the past, the Indian Government issued a statement
which was significant for its conciliatory tone. The problems
involved in the delineation of the line of control in Jammu and
Kashmir, it maintained, were taking longer than had been anticipated
but both sides were 'trying to overcome the difficulties [causing the
delay] as speedily as possible. The delay in the canpletion of the
delineation, it further stated, was 'bound to have some effect on the
withdrawal of forces' but assured that 'every effort would be made to
keep the delay to a minimum possible' • 81 Later, although the Indian
Government continued to link the delineation of the line of control
with the withdrawal of forces, 82 in line with the prerequisites laid
down by China, it was cautious to emphasise repeatedly that it wanted
to conduct negotiations with Pakistan on the basis of equality and
not from a position of strength. In October 1972, for example, a
dispute arose over the possession of a 1. 5 square miles area of
Thakur Chak which was occupied by Pakistan but was wanted by India.
Initially, the Indian commanders suggested that the two sides should
commence the withdrawal of forces and postpone the settlement over
the disputed area for a later time. Pakistan rejected the offer.
This would have delayed the delineation and hence the withdrawal.
However, the Indian Government took the initiative in hastening the
81 Radio New Delhi, 5 September 1972, September 1972, pp.A3/3.
in SWB: FE, No.4086, 7
82see, for example, Swaran Singh' s statement, in the UN General
Assembly, 'I'imes of India, 4 October 1972.
169
process by agreeing to give up its claims on two villages - Dhund and
Gaikot - in return for Pakistan's agreement to withdraw its forces
from the Thakur Chak area. 83 The agreement on the delineation of the
line of control, therefore, was reached by 13 December 1972 and
within 13 days after that the evacuation of territories was
completed.
As for the POW issue, the Chinese Government had cl:"early stated
that if Bangla Desh continued to provide India with a justification
to detain the soldiers by persisting in its threat to put them on
trial and attempted to use them for extracting ~ jure recognition
from Pakistan, it would not be able to join the United Nations. This
threat softened Dacca's position which, even if prepared to wait for
Islamabad's recognition, had consistently, since its inception,
expressed an interest in immediately joining the UN. This softening
of attitude was reflected initially in the reluctance of Bangla Desh
Foreign Minister, Samad, to mention a set date for the trials, even
though in May 1972 Dacca had announced that such a plan had been
completely worked out.84 Later, in November 1972, in marked contrast
to previous statements, Sheikh. Muj ib also talked about 'forgiving'
the Pakistanis. 85 However, since the Dacca authorities had
consistently maintained that they would put on trial about 1500
Pakistani soldiers for war crimes, they could not afford to suddenly
change their position on the issue, as it entailed the risk of
triggering domestic opposition. Therefore, as late as 3 March 1973,
Sheikh Muj ib was still declaring that Pakistani war cr imimals would
83Radio New Delhi, 12 December 1972, in SWB: FE, No.4170, 14 December 1972, pp.A3/6.
8 ~adio New Delhi, 26 October 1972, in SWB: FE, No.4130, 28 October 1972, pp.A3/6.
85R d' a 10 Dacca, 19 November 19 72, in SWB: FE, No. 4150, 21 November 1971, pp.A3/3.
170
be tried in Bangla Desh before an eminent judge and in accordance
with international convention. 86
Neither could the Indian Government suddenly agree to repatriate
the prisoners. This would have confirmed the Pakistani and Chinese
allegation that the ' joint Indo-Bangla Desh Cbmmand' was merely a
'legal fiction' used by New Delhi to justify its detention of
one-fifth of Pakistan's army for the purpose of extracting
concessions on the Kashmir issue. Therefore, throughout the second
half of 1972, while drastically reducing the frequency of news media
coverage on the issue, the Indian Government continued to maintain
that the POWs could not be repatriated without Pakistan's recognition
of and negotiations with the BanglaDesh authorities on the issue. 87
However, beginning in early 1973, New Delhi visibly changed its
policy on t.he issue. In order to create conditions for the
repatriation of the prisoners, Mrs Gandhi's Political. Secretary, P. N.
Haksar visited Dacca in March 1973, and this was followed by a visit
by Bangla Desh Foreign Minister, Dr. Kamal Hussain, to New Delhi on
13 April 1973. 88 At the end of this exchange of visits, India and
Bangla Desh issued a joint declaration on 17 April expressing their
readiness 'to seek a solution to all humanitarian problems through
simultaneous repatriation of the Pakistani prisoners of war and
civil ian internees, except those required by (Dacca] for trial on
criminal charges, repatriation of the Bengalis forcibly detained in
Pakistan and repatriation of the Pakistanis in Bangla Desh, that is,
all non-Bengalis who owe allegiance and have opted for repatriation
8 ~adio Dacca, 3 March 1973, PP• A3/11 •
in SWB: FE, No.4237, 6 March 1972,
87 See, for example, Radio New Delhi, 7 December 1972, in SWB: FE, No.4166, 9 December 1972, pp.A3/5.
88Times of India, 7 April 1973, and Radio New Delhi, 13 April 1973,
in SWB: FE, No.4273, 16 April 1973, pp.A3/5.
171
to Pakistan' •89 The proposal was rejected by Pakistan, which
questioned Bangla Desh1 s right to try 195 Pakistani soldiers.90
At this stage, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei
visited Islamabad on 18 June 1973. During this visit he identified
the current situation in South Asia as 'still disquieting' and
expressed concern over the 1 continued unreasonable detention' of over
90,000 Pakistani prisoners and civilians. Then he supported
Islamabad's stand on the Joint Indo-Bangla Desh Declaration by
stating that Pakistan's demand for the unconditional release of all
the detained personnel was "entirely just". 91
However, it seems that, during his visit, the Chinese Foreign
Minister also urged Pakistan to reciprocate the Indian initiative for
unfreezing the situation in South Asia. Although no clear indication
to this effect can be found in Chi Peng-fei' s statements during the
visit, the subsequent policy initiatives taken by Islamabad and
Beijing's reaction to them seem to support this contention.
Firstly, only eight days after the visit, the Pakistan National
Assembly passed a unanimous resolution empowering the government to
recognise Bangla Desh at a: time deemed appropriate without
compromising Pakistan's interest. 92 Three days later, Beijing
expressed its approval of the decision by transmitting a detailed
report of the unremitting efforts made by Pakistan at solving the
postwar problems and identifying the resolution as 1 another important
89Times of India, 18 April 1972. 90 Burke, ~p.ci.t, p.1040. 91
NCNA, 19 June 1973, in SWB: FE, No.4326, 21 June 1973, p.A3/1 (emphasis added) •
92Pakistan Times, 28 June 1973; and 'Resolution on "Bangla Desh"
passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan, Pakistan Horizon, Vol.xxvi, No.3, 3rd Quarter 1973, pp.113-114.
172
step' in that direction. 93
Secondly, only four days after Chi Peng-fei' s visit, Pakistan
responded favourably to the Indian offer of 11 June 1973 suggesting,
in a marked contrast to the past, that bilateral official level talks
be held to discuss various 'humanitarian issues' arising out of the
Dec ember war , including the question of the prisoners. 9 4 The talks
were, therefore, held on 2 4 July 1973 in Rawalpindi followed by
another round in New Delhi from 17 to 2 8 August resulting in the
conclusion of the Delhi Agreement under which the Indian Government,
with BanglaDesh's consent, agreed to return the POWs and pledged not
to undertake any action against the 195 alleged war criminals before
95 a tripartite meeting of India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh. Only two
days later, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Aziz Ahmed, visited Beijing
where he was told by Chi Peng-fei that the Chinese Government
approved of the 'positive results' yielded by the series of
constructive measures taken by the Pakistan Government in the recent
Indo-Pakistani talks. 96
However, while urging Islamabad to reciprocate New Delhi's
initiative for breaking the stillemate on the POWs issue, it seems
that Chi Peng-fei had assured Bhutto that the Chinese Government
would continue to bar Dacca's entry into the UN unless it abandoned
the idea of holding war crime trials against 195 Pakistani soldiers.
This was indicated firstly by Bhutto when he stated during Chi
93 NCNA ___ , 12 July 1973, in SW& FE, No.4346, 14 July 1973, p.A3/2. 94~, 26 June 1973. 95 •For the
Indo-Pakistan concluded in Quarter 1973,
96NCNA, 30 p.A3~
Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the talks at Rawalpindi and the text of the agreement
New Delhi, See, Pakistan Horizon, Vol.xxvi, No.3, 3rd pp. 114-117.
August 1973, in SW& FE, No.4388, 3 September 1973,
173
Peng-fei' s visit --- a statement reported by the NCNA --- that he
felt elated that China would continue resolutely, determinedly and
unswervingly to support Pakistan's position in the months to come. 97
Concrete proof, however, was given during the 28th session of the
General Assembly. Ignoring the conciliatory remarks made by Dacca
with an implicit request to pave the way for its entry into the UN, 98
the Chinese representative Chiao Kuan-hua maintained on 2 October
1973 at the plenary session of the General Assembly that it was not
until 28 August 1973, i.e. eight months since the Assembly had
adopted its interdependent resolutions, that an agreement had been
reached on the POW issue. Although to be welcomed, he stated, 'the
agreement reached is on paper, and there will have to be a process
before it can be turned into reality. The complications may yet
• I ar~se . The Chinese Government, therefore, he asserted, felt that
the question of admitting Bangla Desh into the UN could be considered
' only after the thorough implementation of the UN resolutions, and
definitely not before' , the position Ohina had adhered to since the
UN debates of August 1972. 99
Thereafter, the Chinese Government did not issue any statement
on the question of the POWs. This was probably due to the fact that
a deadlock existed between Pakistan and Bangla Desh over the issue of
trial of 195 alleged war criminals, and China could do nothing more
than wait for some incident to break this deadlock. This happened
when during the Islamic Summit held in Lahore in February 1974,
through the mediation of Muslim states Pakistan recognised Bangla
97NCNA, 98 __ _
See, September
99NCNA, pp.C/6-7.
19 June 19 7 3 , in SW B: FE , No • 43 2 6 , 2 1 June 19 7 3 1 p • A3 I 1 •
for example, excerpts from a commentary 1 Radio Dacca, 2 1973, in SW&FE, No.4390, 5 September 1973, p.A3/1.
3 October 1973, in SWB: FE, No.4416 1 5 October 1973,
Desh, and Sheikh Mujib agreed to attend the Summit. 100 During his
visit, he indicated his Government's willingness to drop the demand
for trial of the soldiers by expressing the hope that the issue would
be resolved 'satisfactorily' in a tripartite meeting. 101 The meeting
was held in April 1974 and Dacca dropped its insistence on trying the
195 POWs. Two months later, the Security Council once again
discussed Bangla Desh 1 s application and Beijing quietly agreed to
admitting Dacca to the international organisation. 102
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that in the immediate
aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan war(1971), the 'new' Pakistan was
beset with a number of problems. These included the securing of the
withdrawal of Indian forces from Pakistani terri tory and the release
of 90,000 POWs without either compromising on the Kashmir issue or
immediately according recognition to the breakaway province of
Pakistan. At this juncture, when most of the states ignored
Pakistan's pleas for postponing Bangia Desh's recognition until such
time that Pakistan solved its post-war problems,for reasons that will
be analysed in Chapter X, the Chinese Government supported Pakistan.
~y vetoing Bangia Desh's admission to the United Nations unless India
implemented the UN resolutions passed during the 1971 war, Beijing
provided Pakistan wi.th a leverage against New Delhi. This enabled
the Bhutto regime to solve its post-war problems without settling the
Kashmir issue on India's terms.
100sabiha Hassan, 'Foreign polJcy
~·----1 Vol.XXXVI, No.3, 3rd Quarter,
101Q':';h'r~, 25 February 1974. 1 iew, 21 June 1974, p.4.
of Bangia Desh-I', 1983, pp.72-73.
tan
CHAPTER VI
CAUTION AMIDS 'l' CONTINUITY:
CHINA, THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST
AND A
PROPOSED NUCLEAR F'REE SOUTH ASIA.
On 18 May 1974, India became the sixth nuclear power when it
staged its first nuclear test, involving the detonation of a
plutonium device in the 10-15 kiloton range at a depth of over 100
metres in the Rajasthan desert. 1 Announcing the explosion, the Indian
Atomic Energy Commission maintained that it formed a part of the
programme undertaken by the Indian Government to keep itself abreast
of developments in nuclear technology 'particularly with reference to
its uses in the field of mining and earthmoving operations'. India,
it highlighted, had no intention of producing nuclear weapons as it
was strongly opposed to military use of nuclear explosions. 2
Despite this assurance, the international reaction to the test
was generally unfavourable. 'rhe Pakistan Government's response,
however, was the strongest. Commenting within a few hours of the
announcement, a Pakistani official stated that the news 'is a
development which cannot but be viewed with the degree of concern
matching its magnitude by ·the whole world, and more especially by
India's immediate neighbours•. 3 The next day Pakistan's Prime
Minister Bhut.to identified the 'new development' as entailing the
risk of 'nuclear blackmail' •4 Four days later, on 23 May 1974, the
Pakisi:an Government raised the issue with the UN secretary General
-----··-·-----·-·----·-
1 . '
2Ke~~ln~~-~~1t~~ra~~Arc~~~~~~ 1974, 24- 30 June 1974, p.26586.
Times of India, 19 May 1974. 3Pak::~~~~~, 19 May 1974. 4Pakistan Ti~~~, 20 May 1974.
176
and expressed its 'deep concern at the military implications of
India's atomic explosion'. 5 This was followed, on June 1974, by
Pakistan's decision to postpone its talks with India on the
restoration of communication links and travel facilities, which were
due to be held in Islamabad on 10 June. 6
This chapter attempts to assess briefly the reasons for this
negative response, and then describes the strategy adopted by, and
Beijing's political support for, Islamabad in the immediate aftermath
of the Indian nuclear explosion. Then, it proceeds to discuss
China's response to Pakistan's proposal for a Nuclear-Free Zone (NFZ)
in South Asia put forth within and outside the United Nations during
the period from 1974 to 1979.
Indian Nuclear Explosion
Pakistan's Fears and Search for Guarantees:
The historic animosity which had conditioned each major South
Asian State to view the other's gain as its loss and vice-versa would
at any stage of history have provoked Pakistan to respond negatively
to India's nuclear test. However, the reasons why the Pakistan
Government reacted as fiercely as it did in May 1974 could best be
understood with reference to the developments after the Indo-Pakistan
war of 1971.
The Fourth Indo-Pakistani war, which drastically restructured
the geopolitical situation on South Asia, had not only resulted in
the emergence of an independent state of Bangla Desh but bad also
further tilted the regional military balance of power in favour of
India. The ratio of .tanks in Pakistan's inventory to those in the
" JPaki~tan Times, 24 May 1974. 6 Dawn, 2 June 1974.
177
Indian Army, for instance, had deteriorated from 1: 1. 8 in July 1971
to 1:2. 1 in July 1972. Similarly, the ratio of total Pakistani combat
aircraft and naval vessels to those of India had changed from 1: 2. 2
and 1:2.3 in 1971 to 1:3.2 and 1:4.2 respectively in 1972. 7
To reduce this level of disparity, the Bhutto regime, soon after
coming to power, had embarked upon a process of acquiring weapons.
Although this weapon acquisition programme did not result in
Pakistan's emergence as the regional military power, it did decrease
slightly its military inferiority vis-a-vis India. By the end of
197 3, therefore, the ratio of Pakistani tanks and aircraft to those
of India had improved to 1: 1. 8 and 1:3.0 respectively, and that of
Pakist.ani to Indian naval vessels to 8 1: 2. 9. Consequently at the
turn of 1974 the Pakistan Government had begun identifying the
Indo-Pakistani military disparit.y as being 'within manageable
dimensions' • 9 It was at this stage of growing confidence after the
demoralising experience of 1971 that the Indian Government staged its
first underground nuclear test and once again heightened Pakistan's
sense of insecurity.
Despite the Indian contention that the test had been carried out
for peaceful purposes and its disavowal of intention to produce
nuclE~ar weapons, the Pakistan Government viewed India as having taken
the first step towards acquiring a nuclear arsenal. 1 As there [was)
no difference between a peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear explosion,
Pakistan's military analysts maintained, it was 'a hard and
unpalatable fact that India [had) become a nuclear power'. With
reactors working at Trombay, Rana Pratap Sagar and 'rarapur, they
7 See Table 1. 8 Ibid. 9 Lt. Col. Aslam, 'India's Nuclear Explosion and Pakistan'. A talk
delivered on 10 July 1974, The Owl, no date, p.37.
178
TABLE 1: THE RATIO OF THE INDIAN AND PAKISTANI MILITARY POWER: 1971-1973
-----Type of July 1971a July 1972b December 1973c
Equipment Paki- India Ratio Paki- India Ratio Pakistan India Ratio stan stan
Tanks 775 1, 450 1: 1. 8 660 1,490 1: 2. 3 1, 11 0 1960 Aircraft 285 625 1:2.2 200 650 1:3.2 265 787 Naval vessels 22 52 1:2.3 14 59 1:4.2 22 63
a: Militar~ Balance: 1971-72, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971 ), pp.40,50.
b: Military Bala~~~ 1972-73, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972~p.49,53.
c: These values have been computed on an assumption that only 50% of the total additions or phasing-out that took place during the July 1973-July 1974 period had been completed by the end of 1973. Military Balance: ~73-74, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), pp.51,55-56 ; and Military Balance: 1974-75, (London: International Institute for' Strategic Studies, 1974), pp.54, 58-59.
1: 1. 8 1: 3. 0 1:2.9
179
argued, India's estimated annual production of plutonium was about
200-220 kgs, which could be used for producing 35 low yield 'crude'
a tom bombs • 1 0 Limited range delivery means, such as conventional
aircraft which needed only slight modification were already available
to India. Therefore, they argued, if it so chose, India could gain in
. l l 'k b'l't 11 a year or so tact~ca nuc ear str~ e capa ~ ~ y. Over the next
three to four years, they predicted, this capability was to further
increase with the coming into operation of three more nuclear
a. reactors and rapid development of,.. programme for producing medium
. 'l 12 range mlSSl es.
These prospects were considered ominous by Pakistan primarily on
two accounts. Firs·tl:z, they were viewed as having implications for
any future conflict between India and Pakistan. In any future war,
it was feared, encouraged by sections who did 'not consider the
actual use of atomic weapons in armed conflicts as illegal and
immoral' ,the Indian Government might be tempted to resort to tactical
nuclear weapons after a conventional attack in order to conserve
th . d f. . h th d. l 13 elr manpower an ~n~s e war spee ~ y. Secondly, the Pakistan
Government feared that even if India did not actually use the nuclear
weapons, it would be able to exploit its sheer capability to do so
for forcing Pakistan into compromising on various regional issues and
10 Ibl'd,, 34 d . d 1 I • P• ; an WJ.ng Cornman er Inamu Haq, Ind~an Nuclear Explosion and Its Implications', Pakistan Times, 6 September 1974. It is, however, important to point out that the 'Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission' (PAEC) estimated that India was capable of producing only 6 bombs per year. See, for example, Dr Munir Ahmed Khan, Chairman, PAEC, 'Challenge and Response', Pakistan Times, 14 August 1974.
11 Asl am , op . cit . , p. 3 4 • 12 . Haq, op.c~t. 13 Ibid.
14 relegating it to the status of a satellite state.
180
•ro counter this perceived threat., the Pakistan Government under
Bhutt.o who had always advocated acquisition of nuclear capability
and, there fore, soon after coming to power had put the Pakistan
Atomic Commission under his direct supervision, intensified its
efforts to respond to the Indian threat in kind. However, with only
one 125MW heavy water reactor, supplied by Canada and safeguarded
through the International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA) , operating in
the country, coupled with lack of skilled manpower especially in
engineering, relatively less developed steel, chemical and
electronics industries, financial constraints and no known Uranium or
Thorium deposits, it was obvious that Pakistan was eight to ten years
away from acquiring the capability to carry out its first nuclear
1 . 15
exp OSlOn.
As an interim measure, therefore, the Pakistan Government opted
for a political strategy of seeking credible security assurances from
the United Nations and the five nuclear powers against a threat of
attack. Speaking at a news conference held the day after the Indian
test, Bhutto stated that 'the· threat by a nuclear weapon power
14 } ' f fl d ' l I f 19 1'llS .ear was re ecte ln B1ut.to s press con erence on May 197 4 when he asserted that despite India's entry into the nuclear club Pakistan would not compromise on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan Times, 20 May 174. Later it was reflected in a number of articles and editorials published in the government-controlled media which pointed out that India would exploit its nuclear power to force Pakistan into compromising on regional issues. See, for example, A.T. Chandhuri, 'India Goes Nuclear', !'akistan times, 19 May 1974; and Editorial: Nuclear Threat', Pakistan Times, 13 June 1974
15John Maddox, 'Prospects For Nuclear Proliferation', AdelJ2hi
Pa11er~, No. 113, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 197:)), pp. 19-20; 'Nuclear Proliferation' , Strategic Survey: .197_:!, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), P· :35; and 'Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weans' , CIA Report, E>eptember 1974, cited by Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic bombs: The Nuclear 1'hreat to Israel and the Middle Eat, (New York: Times Books, 1981 ), p.161.
181
against a non-nuclear weapon country affects not only the victims but
also the entire international community, particularly the great
powers' • There was, therefore, no reason why Pakistan should n:ot
'secure political counter-measures against a potential nuclear threat
from India' and not be left alone in facing the challenge. As the
nuclear proliferation posed a threat to the whole world, he
elaborated, the United Nations had a clear and pressing duty to
address itself more vigorously to the question of credible security
assurances against a nuclear threat or blackmail to all non-nuclear
weapon states. The existing assurances by the security council, he
maintained, lacked credibility. Neither could the US- Soviet
statement of intent to act jointly to prevent a nuclear war inspire
sufficient confidence among the victims of would be aggressors. 'What
is needed', he explained, 'is a joint undertaking in the nature of an
obligation by all the permanent members of the Security Council to
act collectively or individually on behalf of the threatened state •
• ••• ['l') he nuclear umbrella of all the five big powers or filling that
of at least one of them', he added, 'is the irreplaceable minimum of
protection that is required to give states like Pakistan a real
assurance of security against nuclear threat or blackmail. 16 The next
day, i.e. 20 May 1974, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Aziz Ahmed,
repeated in Washington that India's successful underground detonation
represented a new threat to Pakistan's security and that it would,
therefore, seek protective guarantees from major powers against an
I d . 17 n l.an nuclear threat. Thereafter, within the next few days the
Pakistan Government raised the issue of the Indian nuclear explosion
16For full text, see 'Documents',
Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XXVII, No.2, Second Quarter 1974, pp.131-34. 17
New York Tim~~, 21 May 1974.
182
and the need for a 'nuclear umbrella' at the CENTO meeting and with
UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. 18 Simultaneously, the Pakistani
news media, in an extensive coverage, began asserting that the very
fact that the test was carried out at a stage when millions of Indian
people continued to suffer from poverty, starvation and unemployment
indicated that New Delhi had acquired the capability to threaten and
blackmail its neighbours, especially Pakistan. Under such
circumstances therefore, it stressed, the Pakistan Government was
19 justified in demanding a nuclear umbrella.
However, while highlightinq the significance of nuclear
guarantees, the Pakistan Government and media were careful to
indicate continuously that they expected to elicit Chinese, more than
any other state's, assurances in t:his respect. On 19 May 1974, for
instance, while declaring that his Government was sending envoys to
various states to secure a political assurance against India's use of
nuclear threat, Bhutto mentioned China before referring to other
20 nuclear powers. The same day, a leading article in the government
controlled newspaper Pakistan Times emphasised that the Indian test
~Jsed an equal threat to China as New Delhi was initially allowed to
develop its nuclear power as a counter poise to China, thereby
indicating that the new development required a joint Sino-Pakistani
21 response. Two days later, using a different frame of reference,
18Pakistan Times, 22 May 1974 and 24 May 1974.
19 For example, A.'r. Chaudhuri, 'India Goes Nuclear', Pakistan
Times, 19 may 1974; 'Editorial: India's Blast', Pakistan Times, 21 May 1974; Radio Karachi, 21 May 1974, in SWB:FE, No.4607, 23 May 1974, p. C/1
20He said: 'We are formally approaching the Secretary General of
the Un.i ted Na t.ions and I am also sending the Foreign Secretary to China, France and Bri·tain to explain our position'. 'Documents', Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XXVII, No.2, Second Quarter 1974, p.133.
21 A. T. Chandhuri, 'India Goes Nuclear' , Pakistan Times, 19 May
1974.
183
Radio Karachi drew a parallel between the Chinese and Pakistani
positions. 'China', a commentator said, 'once faced the threat of two
superpowers, just as Pakistan today is confronting Indian nuclear
blackmail', and then proceeded to stress that the world should take
measures against d . 22 In 1a. This was followed a few days later by
another article in the Pakistan 'l'imes which categorically stated that
'China is the one country from which Pakistan could expect helpful
understanding'. 'It can be hoped', it said, 'that Pakistan does not
23 stand alone'.
Chinese Response
The Chinese Government, however, despite these direct and
indirect calls for political support adopted a very cautious
attitude. On 19 May 1974, for example, it was thirty hours after the
official Indian announcement before NCNA transmitted for the first
time, a report of India's nuclear test. Although coming only eight
hours after Pakistani official's criticism, it was brief and factual,
refraining from criticising, or even commenting on, New Delhi's
nuclear explosion. 24
'l'he omission was significant as less than three
hours later, in reporting a Soviet underground nuclear explosion, the
NCNA not only criticised the Soviet Union but also accused it of
redoubling 'the efforts to sharpen the hatchet [of nuclear war]' • 25
The next day, the Chinese media reported Bhutto's press
conference of ·19 May 1974, in which he expressed a resolve that
Pakistan would not succumb to India's hegemony or dominance over the
subcontinent. Similar to the pattern adopted during the early phase
22 Radio Karachi, 21 May 1974, in SWB:FE, No.4607, 23 May 1974,
P· C/1. 23
Abdul Majid, 'India's Nuclear Threat', Pakistan Times, 13 June 1974.
24NCNA __ , 19 May 1974, in FBIS:CHI, 20 May 1974, p.A/1. 25
NCNA, 19 May 1974, in FBIS:CHI, 21 May 1;2.4, pp.A/4-5.
184
of the East Pakistan Crisis, this report frequently used quotation
marks and avoided commenting on the contents of the press conference,
thereby indicating that Beijing was not prepared publicly to agree or
disagree with the Pakistani contentions that Indian entry into the
nuclear club was a 1 forceful development 1 , and a prelude to Indian
1 nuclear blackmail 1 and 'domination over the sub-continent' . Even
more significant, however, was the fact that while reproducing
Bhutto's statement, the NCNA completely omitted any reference to his
call for nuclear guarantees from all the permanent members of the
Security Council, collectively or individually, against an Indian
nuclear threat. Neither did it report Bhutto's arinouncement that the
Pakistan Government was sending its Foreign Secretary to China,
France and Britain to explain its position] on the Indian nuclear
l . 26 exp oslon.
The same pattern was adopted by the NCNA three days later as
well when it reported, on 23 May 1974, the Pakistani Foreign
Minister, Aziz Ahmed 1 s speech at the CENTO meeting stressing his
Government's resolve not to submit to India's nuclear blackmail and
regional hegemony. Not only did the report make frequent use of
quotation marks, neither endorsing nor opposing Pakistan's criticism
of Indian nuclear tests, but it also failed to report Aziz Ahmed's
declaration that the great powers, who had a stake in peace and
stability in the subcontinent, had a responsibility to reestablish
confidence --- shaken by the Indian nuclear test --- among India's
neighbours. Moreover, while reporting the communique issued at the
end of the meeting, the Chinese news agency also ignored the
paragraph related to the Indian nuclear test, and referred only to
the CEN'rO ministers' reaffirmation of the importance they attached to
---·---·------26NCNA, 20 May 1974, in FBIS :CHI, 21 May 1974, p.A/5.
185
27 the preservation of the territorial integrity of the member states.
That Beijing was cautious not to criticise India's acquisition
of nuclear capability and openly side with Pakistan against India was
once again demonstrated on 31 May 1974 when the NCNA transmitted a
commentary on India's economic problems. The country, it claimed, was
beset with economic difficulties, manifested in the serious food
shortage leading almost 5 50,000,000 people to the brink of
starvation, a 26% annual inflation rate and rapidly increasing
unemployment. 'But tmder such a difficult economic situation', it
noted, 'the Indian Government has steadily increased its military
spending in recent years. Its budget for the fiscal year 1974-75
provides a record 19,150 million rupees or 5,040 million rupees more
than that of fiscal year 1971-72 (the year of the Indo-Pakistani
war)'. 'With a view to making up the financial deficit, maintaining
huge military spending and repaying foreign debts', it continued,
'the Indian Government has been borrowing from abroad year after
year' and has reached a stage where its projected foreign aid
requirements for the current fiscal year exceed the estimated
payments on debts and interests. 28 Although this projection of
India's situation was akin to that described by the Pakistani media
since the 18 May 1974 nuclear test, the commentary refrained from
highlighting this similarity. Neither did it go to the extent of
stating that the nation whose leaders had 'trotted the globe with a
begging bowl asking for roubles and dollars ••• to feed the hungry
27NCN~, 23 1974 ' May , .ln FBIS:CHI, 30 May 1974, p.A/19; 'Statement of the Minister of State foroefence and Foreign Affairs of Pakistan at the Plenary Session of the CENTO meeting in Washington', Pakistan ~orizon, Vol.XXVII, No.2, Second Quarter 1974, pp.134-35; and 'Press Communique issued at the conclusion of the CENTO Council of Ministers' Twenty-first Session in Washington', Ibid., pp.136-37.
28NCNA, 31 May 1974, in SWB:~~' No.4616, 4 June 1974, p.A3/1.
186
mouths' had 'squandered away' twelve billion rupees 'to detonate a
nuclear device and blackmail small powers•. 29 Instead, it stated very
nonchalantly that UPI on 24 May had 'quoted US commerce Department
Officials as saying that India, which became a nuclear power a week
ago, is encountering its "worst economic year" since independence
from British rule in 1947' • 30
The Chinese Government did not swerve from this cautious
attitude even in the first week of June 1974\o.fhen Pakistan Foreign
Secretary, Agha Shahi, visited Beijing. Throughout this visit, which
lasted from 6 to 10 June, the Pakistani media continuously pointed
out that it was made because of the Indian nuclear test. 31
Simultaneously, they continued to suggest, as before, that China
should be forthcoming in its political support for Pakistan against
the Indian nuclear threat. On 7 June 1974, for instance, a major
article in the Pakistan Times, while reiterating the need for
political assurances in the wake of India's nuclear test, maintained
that the Security Council guarantees as well as the 'Three Powers
Declaration' were not sufficient, thereby implying that the onus was
now on China and France to help 're-establish confidence' among the
South Asian states. 32 Three days later, another article in the
Pa~istan Times suggested that, taking place within a week of Bhutto's
visit to Beijing, the Indian test was a rebuke to Beijing's desire
for normalisation of relations with all the South Asian states
(expressed in the Sino-Pakis·tan joint communique) and, therefore,
29 For example, 'Editorial: India's Blast', Pakistan Times, 21 May 1974; and commentary by a 'political observer', Radio Karachi, 23 May 1974, in SWB:FE, No.4609, 25 May 1974, p.A3/1.
30 NCNA, 31 May 1971, in SWB:~~' No.4616, 4 June 1974, p.A3/1.
31For example, Radio Karachi, 6 June 1974, in SWB:F~, No.4620, 8
June 1974, p.A3/9; and Dawn, 7 June 1974. 32
Mohsin Ali, 'India's Massive Nuclear Projects', Pakistan Times, 7 June 1974.
187
warranted a joint Sino-Pakistan 33
response. Beijing, however,
completely ignored these suggestions and throughout the visit
refrained, unlike its Pakistani counterpart, from even hinting that
the visit was made in accordance with Bhutto's announcement following
the Indian detonation. In fact, on 11 June, i.e. the day after Agha
Shahi's departure, NCNA transmitted a report on Bhutto's reply to
Indira Gandhi refuting her justification for the nuclear test which,
as before, duly cited the Associated Press of Pakistan (AAP) as the
source of the information, and frequently used quotation marks
without any comments, thus indicating Beijing's reluctance to openly
support Islamabad against New Delhi on the nuclear issue34
Towards the end of June 1974, however, the Chinese Government
moved slightly away from its cautious attitude. On 27 June, NCNA
repJrted a Pakistan Foreign Office SpJkesman' s statement of China's
support for Pakistan. It quoted him on the outcome of Agha Shahi's
recent visit to Beijing as stating that:
... "China has expressed her firm opposition to the attempt of any country to pursue expansionism by means of nuclear threat or nuclear blackmail. China has also reiterated her consistent . position that nuclear weapons should be completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed and, as a first step, countries r~ssessing nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, pledging in particular not to use them against non-nuclear weapon countries and nuclear weapon free
" 35 zones .••.
This report was significant as it contained, for the first time
in two weeks, a Chinese admission, even if an indirect one, that Agha
Shahi' s visit was related to the Indian nuclear explosion. However,
it still fell short of Islamabad's expectations because it
33 '.Politicus', 'New Dangers in Asia', Pakistan Times, 10 June 1974. 34
NCNA, 11 June 1974, in FBIS: CHI, 12 June 1974' pp.A/5-6. 35
;CNA, 27 June 1974, in FBIS :CHI, 28 June 1974, p.A/16.
188
demonstrated, firstly, that Chinese support for Pakistan had been
couched in extremely general terms and, secondly, that Beijing had
not specifically committed itself to supporting Pakistan against
India, which in any case did not claim to be possessing nuclear
weapons. The report further highlighted the second aspect by
completely omitting any reference to the claim made by the Pakistan
official that 'China's full and resolute support to Pakistan
approximates to a Chinese nuclear umbrella over Pakistan' •36
That China was not willing to go beyond this limit in supporting
Pakistan against the Indian acquisition of nuclear capability was
underscored the next day,i.e. 28 June 1974, when the Jen-min Jih-pao
published a 'commentator' article on the resolution adopted by the
fifth Islamic Foreign Ministers' conference, calling on all countries
possessing nuclear weapons not to use them against non-nuclear weapon
countries. 37 After criticising the super powers' policy of nuclear
armament, this article stated: '[H] arbouring the ambition to become a
sub-super power, a certain country, though not a super power, is
engaged in arms expansion and war preparations and even resorts to
nuclear blackmail and threat to realise its expansionist designs' •
'The Pakistan Government and its people', it continued, 'have always
opposed any aggression and threat from outside, After the recent
Indian nuclear blast, Prime Minister z.A. Bhutto declared in Pakistan
National Assembly: "It is out of the question" for Pakistan "to
submit to the nuclear blackmail of India"' • 'The solemn stand of the
Pakistan Government expressing the Pakistan people's unswerving
determination to defend state sovereignty and independence in
36For Pakistani official's statement, see Pakistan Times, 27 June 1974.
37'A Just Demand', Jen-min Jih-pao, 28 June 1974, in SWB:FE,
No.4638, 29 June 1974, p.C/1.
189
defiance of brute force', it maintained, 'has won sympathy and
support from many countries'. Even on this, the first occasion when
Beijing had provided implicit support for Pakistan's 'solemn stand' ,
the anonymous commentator soon proceeded to water down the critic ism
against the 'certain country'. In the next paragraph it identified
the resolution passed by the conference as 'an effective exposure of
the super powers which are pursuing the policy of nuclear blackmail
and the country which entertains expansionist ambitions' thus
exempting India from the charge of nuclear blackmail. Moreover, while
outlining China's reaction to the resolution, it once again limited
itself to general statements without categorically supporting
Pakistan against India. 'The Chinese Government and its people' , it
stated, 'firmly support the just struggle of Pakistan and other
countries for national independence and state sovereignty, and
against aggression and intervention from outside, including against
nuclear blackmail and threat'. 'We hold', it concluded, 'that no
policy of nuclear blackmail and threat of any country can cow the
people of various countries. Countries which try to carry out
expansion and aggression by resorting to nuclear blackmail policy,
will only be lifting a rock to squash their own feet and will suffer
disgraceful defeat' . 38
Thereafter, the Chinese media occasionally mentioned India's
ent:ry into the nuclear club but the frequency of these references,
and the intensity of crit.icism, remained extremely low compared to
38rb'd __ 1._• I pp.C/1-2.
190
that levelled by the Pakistani media. 39
In marked contrast to this
cautious attitude, however, the Chinese Government exhibited a
willingness to support openly Pakistan's call to establish a nuclear
free zone in South Asia.
Nuclear-Free Zone in South Asia
The idea of declaring South Asia a Nuclear Free Zone had been
mooted by Pakistan as early as September 1972, when its
representative to the IAEA called for a treaty between the South
Asian countries similar to the Tlatelolco treaty for the
denuclearization of Latin America. 40 This was followed by Bhutto's
declaration at the inaugural ceremony of the Karachi Nuclear Power
Plant (KANUPP) that, to ensure that atomic energy did not become 'a
symbol of fear for its people, Pakistan would welcome, if the entire
subcontinent, by the agreement of the countries could be declared a
41 nuclear free zone and the introduction of nuclear weapons banned'.
It was only after the Indian nuclear test, however, that Islamabad
began propagating the proposal with any seriousness.
On 20 August 1974 the Foreign Secretary, Agha Shahi, asked the
UN Secretary General in a letter that an item entitled 'Declaration
and Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in South Asia' be inscribed
39on 2 September 1974, for inst.ance, while criticising India's annexation of Sikkim, a Jen-min Jih-pao article said: 'Regarding itself as a sub-super Power, India dreams of lording it over South Asia .... Recently, it blasted off a nuclear device to make nuclear blackmail and nuclear menace in the South Asian Region'. '"Commentator": Denounce India Strongly for its despicable act, annexation of Sikkim', Jen-min Jih-pao, 2 September 1974, in SWB:FE, No.4694, 4 September 1974, p.A3/2; and on 29 October 1974, a commentary stated: 'Last May The Indian Government exploded a nuclear device in Rajasthan on the border of Pakistan... The reactions in South Asian region were that this was nuclear blackmail and nuclear t.hreat'. NCNA, 29 October 1974, in SWB:FE, No.4742, 30 October 1974, p.A3/5. --
40D ~I 4 October 1972.
41 nawn, 29 November 1972.
on the agenda of the General Assembly's twenty-ninth
191
' 42 sess1.on.
Explaining the proposal in his policy speech in the General Assembly
on 27 September 1974, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Aziz Ahmed,
maintained that the explosion of a nuclear device by India was 'a
development of great import', Regardless of Indian claims that it was
intended entirely for peaceful purposes, he emphasised, the fact
remained that technologically there was no difference between nuclear
explosions for peaceful and military purposes. Furthermore, he
warned, the explosion might have removed the restraint on nuclear
proliferation and therefore could be emulated by others. One of the
collateral measures to check this development and achieve the goal of
general and complete disarmament, he said, could be to declare the
South Asian region a nuclear-free zone. Elaborating the concept, he
stated that various South Asian states, e.g. Sri Lanka, India and
Pakistan had proclaimed their opposition to the introduction of
nuclear weapons into the region, or their acquisition. Therefore,
Pakistan felt that 'this common desire of the states of South Asia
now need [ ed] to be translated into a formal arrangement' • Such an
arrangement, he spelt out, might include 'an unequivocal commitment
by the regional states not to acquire or manufacture nuclear
weapons', ·and 'a regime for independent observation and verification
of explosions conducted for peaceful purposes as a safeguard against
diversion of peaceful nuclear programmes to military ends• 43
The proposal was supported by the Chinese Government five days
later, on 2 October 1974. Unlike the US delegate, who only
underscored the need for the world to realise the peaceful benefits
42oawn, 21 August 1974. 4 3
Off i cia 1 Records of General_. ~-:-A_s--"s_em_b_l~y'-'--: ___ P_l_e=n.:.a.:.r~y'--_.:.M:.;e::..:e::.t::.l.=· :.;n:.;:g:.::.s , (hereafter cited as GAOR:PM), 29th Session, 2247th meeting, 27 September 1974, document A/PV. 2247, pp.41-42.
192
of nuclear technology without contributing to nuclear proliferation,
and t.he Soviet delegate who did not even mention the Indian nuclear
test, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chiao Kuan-hua, stated in the
General Assembly that the effects of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971
had 'barely subsided', when 'India exploded a nuclear device
allegedly for peaceful purposes'. 'rhis, along with a number of other
developments, he continued, had caused turbulence in the south Asian
region which ran counter to the desire for peace of people of all the
countries in the region and, therefore, called for vigilance. The
proposal put forward by Pakistan for the es·tablishment of a
nuclear-free zone in South Asia is entirely reasonable. China gives
it her firm support'. The Chinese Government, he added,
'consistently holds that the nuclear countries should undertake not
to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
countries or nuclear-free zones. We are ready to make such an
undertaking in regard to the proposed nuclear-free zones in South
Asia and Middle East. We hope that all the other nuclear countries
will do the same•. 44
The Chinese Government expressed its support for Pakistan's
proposal in the General Assembly's First Committee as well. To fully
appreciate the value of this support, it is essential to recount the
developments that took place in the First Committee to which was
assigned the responsibility of discussing the issue.
1'he Pakistan Government had formally presented its proposal
before the Committee on 28 October 1974 when its representat.ive,
Iqbal Akhund, had outlined the 'cardinal features of the arrangement
envisaged' for the proposed nuclear-free zone in South Asia. These
44GAOR:PM, 29th Session, 2252nd meeting, 2 October 1974, document
A/PV.2252, pp.51-53.(emphasis added)
193
features, he said, included, firstly, an understanding by states of
the region to refrain from producing or acquiring nuclear weapons;
secondly, an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states not to
introduce nuclear weapons into the area and not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against members of the zone; and thirdly, a
system of safeguards and verification to ensure the faithful
45 implementation of their commitments by the parties. He also
outlined four salient steps that needed to be followed. These were:
firstlz, the General Assembly should £reclaim South Asia as a
nuclear-weapon free zone; secondly, consultations be held as soon as
possible among the countries of the region and, at an appropriate
stage, with the nuclear-weapon states to give practical shape to this
declaration; thirdly, the Secretary General be authorised to invite
countries of the region to begin consultations; and ~thl,'l, the
Assembly should lay down appropriate guidelines in order to
facilitate the process of negotiation and give it a sense of
d . . 46 1.rect1.on.
The Indian Government opposed this proposal. ' ••• [T] he first
prerequisite to the creation of such a zone', its representative,
K. P. Misra, argued on 11 November 1974, 'is an agreement among the
countries concerned 1 •
1 As regards Pakistan's proposal' , he said 1 no
consultation among the states in the region took place before the
item was inscribed on our agenda. Therefore, it would be premature,
indeed it would be prejudging future consultations, to declare South
Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone or even to endorse the concept'.
Furthermore, he explained, the Indian stand had been that the
45official records of General Assembly: Proceedin<,JS of the F~
Committee, (hereafter cited as GAOR:1st Com.), 29th Session, 2002nd meeting, 28 October 1974, document A/C.1/PV.2002, p.47.
46 Ib1' d., 43 47 PP· - •
194
differing conditions from the one part of the world to another need
to be taken in·to account in assessing the feasibility of creating a
zone. 1 Africa and Latin America 1 , he elaborated 1 are separate and
distinct continental zones, geographically and politically. In that
sense South Asia cannot be considered a zone. The presence in Asia of
countries belonging to military alliances and the existence of
nuclear-weapon powers would have a vital bearing on the viability of
a nuclear-weapon free zone 147
Faced with this opposition, the Pakistani delegation, which had
already revised its draft due to international opposition by
downgrading the demand for proclaiming a NFZ in South Asia to merely
endorsing the concept, attempted to discuss the draft with its Indian
counterpart so as to find some common ground on the issue. On 12
November, therefore, the Foreign Secretaries of the two states held
talks which ended in failure. 48 Thus, on 14 November 1974, Pakistan
tabled its draft resolution with the following principal clauses:
[The General Assembly]
1. endorses, in principle, the concept of a nuclear-weapon free zone in South Asia.
2. invites the states of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear weapon state5 as may be interested to initiate, without delay, necessary consultations with a view to establishing a nuclearweapon-free zone and urges them, in the interim, to refrain from any action contrary to the achievement of these objectives.
3. requests the Secretary General to convene a meeting to render such assistance as may be required for the purpose and to report on the subject to the General
47GAOR:1st Com., 29th Session, 2016th meeting, 11 November 1974,
Document No.A/C.1/PV.2016, pp.26-27. 48 Dawn, 13 November 1974.
195
Assembly at [the next] session. 49
On the same day India also tabled a draft resolution with only
one operative paragraph, stating that the General Assembly 'considers
that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon free
zone in the appropriate region of Asia should come from the states of
the region concerned, taking into account its special features and
geographical extent' • 50 Both these draft resolutions were adopted
initially by the First Committee and then the General Assembly as
parts A and B of one resolution 3265: XXIx. 51
Throughout these discussions, the United States adopted a stand
which, though sympathetic towards the Pakistani proposal, came much
closer to the Indian stand. Its representative, Stuart Symington, for
instance, welcomed Islamabad's interest in denuclearizing South Asia
but identified certain criteria for establishing such a zone which,
inter alia, required that the initiative should come from the states
in the region, and that the zone should preferably include all states
in the area whose participation was deemed important. 52
The Soviet
Union went a step further and endorsed the Indian proposal, while
criticising that of Pakistan as having omitted some important
53 elements. In contrast, the Chinese Government sided with Pakistan.
In the Committee's general debate on 4 November 1974, its
49 • 1 . d b Dec arat~on an esta lishment of a Nuclear Free zone in South Asia: Report of the First committee, GAOR:1st Com., 29th Session, 6 December 1974, Document No.A/9911/, pp.4-5.
50 Ibid., pp.3-4. 51
Ibid., pp. 3-5; and 'Resolution 3265 (XXIX): Declaration and Establishment of a Nuclear Free Zone in South Asia', Resolut~ Adopted by th_e General Assembly, 29th Session, Agenda Item 107, 7 ,January 1975, document A/Res/3265 (XXIX), pp.1-3.
52GAOR: 1st Com., 29th Session, 1998th meeting, 21 October 1974,
Document A/C.A/PV.1998, p.36. 53
GAOR: 1st Com)., 29th Session, 2024th meeting, 20 November 1974, document A/C.1/PV.2024, pp.47-48.
196
representative, Mr An, stated that the proposals put forward by
various states for establishing nuclear-free zones 'are entirely just
which the Chinese Government fully supports'. Then he
specifically mentioned Islamabad's stand and said: 'we welcome the
proposal made by Pakistan and we are prepared to undertake due
obligations' •54 Two weeks later, just before the Pakistani and Indian
draft resolutions were put to the vote, the Chinese representative
gave another detailed statement. 'The Chinese Government and people',
he said, 'deeply sympathise with the numerous small and medium sized
countries in their positive efforts to safeguard the peace and
security of their regions, to oppose nuclear blackmail and threat,
and to establish nuclear-free zones In our view, the Pakistan
proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia
is just and reasonable•. 55 A few minutes later, when the vote was
taken, the Chinese delegation abstained on the Indian draft
resolution but became the only nuclear power to vote in favour of
that put forward by Pakistan. To underscore that Beijing was
prepared to stand by Pakistan, the very next day, on 21 November,
NCNA transmitted the news that the First committee had adopted
Pakistan's draft resolution, without even mentioning that the Indian
resolution had also been adopted, 56 in fact with a slightly more
votes than those secured by Pakistan. 57
The year 1975 witnessed the continuation of this support. During
54GAOR: 1st Com., 29th Session, 2007th meeting, 4 November 1974,
document A/C.1/PV.2007, p.62. 55
GAOR:1st Com., 29th Session, 2024th meeting, 20th November 1974, document A/c.1/PV.2024, pp.53-55.
56NCNA, 21 November 1974, in SWB:FE, No.4764, 25 November 1974, p.A3~
57The Indian draft resolution was adopted with a vote of 90 to none
with 32 abstentions, whereas Pakistan's draft secured 84 votes in favour, 2 against with 36 abstentions.
197
his visit to Pakistan in April 1975, for instance, Chinese
Vice-Premier Li Xiannian stated that his Government will 'continue to
render resolute support to the proposal of the Pakistan
Government for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia •• ' 58 Six months
later, when the issue was once again discussed by the General
Assembly's First Committee, the Chinese representative reiterated his
Government's support for Pakistan's efforts. 59 Later, on 4 December
1975, when the Indian and Pakistani draft resolutions, almost
identical to those submitted the previous year, were adopted
simultaneously without a vote, the Chinese representative declared
that had they been put to the vote, his Government would have voted
in favour of the Pakistani draft and abstained on that of India. 60
In 1976, however, Beijing began exhibiting signs of reluctance
to continuously side with Islamabad on the proposal to denuclearise
South Asia. During Bhutto's visit to Beijing in May 1976, for
instance, the Chinese Premier Hua Gofeng initially declared his
Government's 'firm support' for Pakistan's proposal but only three
days later, at the banquet given by the Pakistani Prime Minister,
failed to reiterate the ·61 stand. This failure was all the more
noticeable as only a few minutes earlier Bhutto had expressed his
government's appreciation for China's 'firm support', maintained that
its positive attitude towards the deep concern of non-nuclear states
over the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons had evoked wide
approbation, and had expressed the hope that other nuclear ates would
58NCNA, 21 April 1974, in SCM~, No.5845, 5 April 1974, p.41.
59GAOR:1st Com., 30th Session, 2084th meeting, 11 November 1975,
document A/c.1/PV.2084, pp.23-25. 60
GAOR:1st Com., 30th Session, 2105th meeting, 4 December 1975, document A/C.1/PV.2105, p.61.
61 NCNA, 26 May 1976, in SCMP, No.6109, 7 June 1976, p.33; NCNA, 29 May 1976, in~, No.6111,-g!June 1976, pp.177-178.
198
emulate the Chinese example. 62 Even in the joint communique issued at
the end of the visit, China did not join Pakistan in stressing the
need to denuclearise the South Asian region. Instead, following the
pattern of the Shanghai communique of 1972, Pakistan was allocated
one paragraph to express, once again, its gratitude for Beijing's
firm support on the issue. This failure was also significant as only
in the preceding paragraph, China had joined Pakistan in firmly
supporting the 'just proposition' of Sri Lanka for making the Indian
ocean a zone of peace. 63
That these omissions were not accidental was confirmed when the
issue was once again discussed by the General Assembly's First
Committee in October-November 1976. During these discussions, unlike
in the past, the Chinese representative did not specifically mention
Pakistan's proposal for a NFZ in South Asia but issued a general
statement of support for the proposals put forth by various states
'for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Latin America,
Africa, South Asia, the Middle East etc'. Moreover, he identified
the superpower policies of aggression, expansion and war as the
'principal obstacle to the true realisation of nuclear-free zones'
a position opposite to that of Pakistan, which blamed India for
the failure to establish such a zone in South Asia. 64
This reluctance was reflected in the Chinese Government's
behaviour in 1977 as well. On one occasion during his visit to
Beijing in December 1977, for example, General Zia expressed the
Pakistan Government's appreciation to the Chinese Government for 'its
62 NCNA, 29 May 1976, in Ibid., p.174. 63
For full text see NCNA, 30 May 1976, in SCMP, No.6112, 10 June 1976, pp.228-31.
64GAOR:1st Com., 31st Session, 25th meeting, 8 November 1976,
document A/C.1/PV.25, p.46.
199
support to the initiatives to realise the objectives of establishing
a nuclear-weapon free zone in South Asia'. The Chinese vice-Premier,
Deng Xiaoping, in contrast, ignored the issue and restricted himself
to general expressions of support for Pakistan. 65
The 1978-1979 period also witnessed the continuation of this
policy. There were occasional references to China's support for
Pakistan' proposal. During his visit to Nepal in February 1978, for
example, Deng Xiaoping expressed his Government's 'firm support for
the proposal of the Pakistan Government for the establishment of a
nuclear-free zone in South Asia•. 66 The same month, while presenting
his report at the Fifth National People's congress, Hua Gofeng
reiterated his Government' s 67 support for the proposal. Even Geng
Biao supported the concept during his visit to Islamabad in June
1979. However, at the United Nations where the issue was
consistently raised by Islamabad, while continuing to vote in favour
of Pakistan's, draft resolutions for the NFZ in South Asia, the
Chinese Government persisted in its policy of not being 'vocal' about
this support. 68 Both in 1978 and 1979, therefore, unlike the United
States and the United Kingdom, which after voting in favour of
Pakistan's draft resolution, explained the reasons for doing so, the
Chinese representative opted to remain silent.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated two points:
Firstly, despite the fact that the Indian nuclear explosion was
65 NCNA, 16 December 1977, PP• A/15-17.
in FBIS : CH!_, 19 December
66NCNA, 5 March 1978, in SWB:FE, No.5758, 8 March 1978, p.C/28.
67 NCNA, 16 June 1978, in FBIS:CHI, 19 June 1978, p.A/12.
1977,
68GAOR:1st Com., 33rd Session, 55th meeting, 29 November 1978,
document A/C.1/PV.55, pp.24; and GACR:1st Com., 34th Session, 38th meeting, 21 November 1978, document A/C.1/PV38, p.37.
200
perceived by Pakistan as increasing its security risk, Beijing han
exhibited a clear reluctance to respond to Pakistan's call for a
'nuclear umbrella'.
Secondly, in the immediate aftermath of the Indian nuclear test,
China was willing to categorically support Pakistan's proposal for
establishing a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. However, after 1976,
this support gradually tapered off. While consistently voting in
favour of Pakistan's proposal at the United Nations, Beijing began
exhibiting a clear reluctance to publicise or even defend this
support.
This chapter raises the following questions:
Why did the Chinese Government exhibit a reluctance to respond
to Pakistan's call for a 'nuclear umbrella'?
, Why did Beijing strongly support Islamabad's proposal for a
nuclear-free zone in South Asia during the 1974-76 period?
Why did the Chinese support for ~akistan's proposal for a
nuclear-free zone in South Asia taper off after 1976?
Were these developments a part of an overall change in China's
South Asian strategy?
Answers to these questions will be discussed in Chapter X.
CHAPTER VII
PAKISTAN AND THE SAUR REVOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN ( 1978)
CHINESE RESPONSES
On 27 April 1978, following a successful military coup in Kabul,
the rule of the last member of the Nadir family, President Daoud, was
terminated and the pro-Soviet Jamiyat-e-Democratiqi-yi-Khalq-
i.-Afghanistan, commonly known as the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan ( PDPA) , took over the reins of Government. Three days
later, the Republic of Afghanistan was renamed the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan ( DRA) and Nur Mohammad Taraki, the General
Secretary of the PDPA, was elected Chairman of the Revolutionary
Council and President and Prime Minister of the country. 1 outlining
his government's policies on 6 May 1978, Taraki stated that 'new
Afghanistan, its party, Revolutionary Council and Government, (would]
· • • pursue a policy befitting the people and for the development of
democracy, economic progress and friendly links with all countries,
strictly and consistently remaining in a position of non-alignment' •
'No one' , he stressed, 'can be our "model" in accordance with which
we shall develop. As a non-aligned country, Afghanistan neither
wishes for nor intends to concl udo any military arrangements, either
bilateral or multilateral. our foreign policy is non-alignment.• 2
Despite this and subsequent similar statements by him and his
colleagues, however, the news of the change of government in Kabul
was received with a certain degree of apprehension and nervousness by
the Pakistan Government, which did not recognize the new regime in
Kabul until 5 May 1978. 3 The questions arise as to why the Zia
1Radio Kabul, 30 April 1978, in SW& FE, No.5802, 2 May 1978, p.B/3;
Morning News, Karachi, 1 May 1978. 2
Kabul Times, 13 May 1978. 3Pakistan Times, 6 May 1978.
202
regime, which itself had come to power by overthrowing Bhutto in July
1977, reacted negatively to the coup in one of its neighbouring
states, and how, if at all, Peking reacted to this situation. This
chapter attempts to answer these questions and therefore, is divided
into two parts. The first part analyses the Pakistan Government's
threat perceptions in the wake of the Saur revolution in Afghanistan.
The second part describes the extent to which Peking subscribed to
these threat perceptions and the manner in which it supported
Pakistan during the twenty months of rule by the Khalq governments.
The Saur Revolution and Pakistan's Threat Perceptions
To fully understand the Pakistan Government's threat perceptions
after the emergence of the left-oriented regime in Kabul, it is
necessary to look at the hist.ory of, and Afghan policy towards,
Pakistan's two provinces adjoining Afghanistan, North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan.
During the British Raj, the nationalist movement in the NWFP
a province with muslims secure in their 94 per cent majority, and far
from Delhi followed a pattern markedly different from that in
areas that were later to constitute the Dominion of Pakistan. Not
having faced the problems encountered by muslims residing in the rest
of United India, especially in Hindu- dominated provinces, the
dominant political party in the province, Khudai ~idmar~aran (Red
Shirts), led by Khan Abdul Ghaffer Khan was not averse to
collaborating with the Indian National Congress to oust the British
Government. 4 In fact, it established a political alliance with the
Congress against the Muslim League's efforts to partition India.
However, as the creation of Pakistan became an immediate prospect and
4 Beverley M.Male, Pakistan's Relations With the Middle East, Ph.D
Thesis, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1969}, p.307.
203
the British Government began discussing the need to hold a plebiscite
in the NWFP, Khan Abdul Ghaffer Khan, with the support of his party,
demanded that a third choice of a 'a free Pathan State of all
Pakhtoons' be given, in addition ·to that of tmion with either India
or Pakistan. 5 Upon the British rejection of this demand, Khan
Ghaffar Khan called upon his supporters to boycott the referendum of
6 July 1947. Almost 49 percent of the electorate refrained from
voting, but an overwhelming majority of those who did vote favoured
the idea of joining Pakistan. 6 The Khudai Khidmargaran, therefore,
changed their position, maintained all they wanted was 'full freedom
for the Pathans to manage their internal affairs as a unit within
Pakistan State' , and declared themselves willing to delegate the
responsibility for the NWFP's defence, foreign affairs and
canmunications to the central government of Pakistan. 7 Thereafter,
depending upon the Punj abi national ruling elite's willingness or
unwillingness to give a certain degree of provincial autonomy to the
federating units, the National Awami Party (NAP) --- the successor to
the Khudai Khidmargaran8 led by Ghaffer Khan's son Wali Khan ---
vacillated between support for the idea of Pushtunistan within
Pakistan and a separate state for the Pathans. Though the frequency
of references to an independent Pushtunistan decreased towards the
end of the 1960s as the Pathans were integrated more within the
national economic mainstream, occasional references in the post-1971
5 D.G. Tendulker, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, (Bombay: Gandhi Peace
Foundation, Popular Prakashan, 1967), pp.439-41. 6
Of the 292,118 voters, 289,244 opted for Pakistan, whereas only 2,874 expressed their desire that the NWFP should be a part of India. V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p.389.
7G. Allana, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, (Lahore: Ferozesons Limited, 1967)' p.464.
8The Khudai Khidmatgaran was banned by the Pakistan Government in
September 1948.
204
period suggested that the NAP was unwilling to give up completely its
' t ' th ' 9 prerogat1ve o ra1se e 1ssue.
The situation in Baluchistan, the largest and internally most
varied, South-western province of Pakistan, was somewhat similar to 1
but more serious than, that prevailing in the NWFP. our ing the
mid-eighteenth century 1 almost a hundred years before the British
arrived in the area, Mir Nasir Khan, a tribal chief had succeeded in
establishing a loose confederacy spread between the Indus in the east
and the Persian province of Kerman in the west. Upon their arrival,
however, the British Government broke the confederacy up and
concluded agreements with the Persian and Afghan Governments as a
result of which one-third of the 'original Baluchistan' was ceded to
Persia and a thinly populated strip in the north was assigned to
Afghanistan. The remaining Baluchistan was divided into two parts:
one was administered directly by the British Government whereas the
other, a principality called Kalat, was ruled by Khans who traced
their lineage back to Mir Nasir Khan. On the basis of this lineage,
while collaborating with the British Government, they periodically
demanded that the whole Baluch .territory be, someday, united under
their rule. The British Government took no notice of this demand. 10
In August 1947, when the British left India, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan
Baloch, the then Khan of Kalat, declared his principality a sovereign
state. The Pakistan Government initially accepted the Khanate's
sovereign status but very soon began to demand its accession to the
9 Feroze Ahmed, 'Pushtunistan and the Pushtun National Question', in
Feroze Ahmed (ed.), Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtun Question, (Lahore People's Publishing House, 1975), pp.BS-89.
10Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlights on Baloches
and Balochistan, (Karach~ Royal Book company, 1974), pp.238-249; and Selig Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan' , Foreign Policy, No. 32, Fall 1978, pp.142-143.
new muslim state and mobilised 11
forces against Kalat.
205
Faced with
this military pressure, the Khan proposed confederate status,
granting the Dominion of Pakistan the right to control the Khanate's
foreign affairs, defence and currency. The Pakistan Government
pr em ptl y rejected the proposal, and militarily annexed the
principality in 1948. This sparked an insurgency led by Prince Abdul
Karim Khan, the Khan of Kalat' s younger brother, which was quelled
quickly but was followed by another rebellion in 1958, led by the
Khan of Kalat himself, provoked by the Pakistan Government's decision
to merge its four western Pakistani provinces into 'one unit' • This
rebellion was also crushed by the Pakistan Government but for the
next eleven years Baluchistan remained a trouble spot with the
National Awami Party assisting the guerillas. 12
Towards the end of the 1960s, the situation in Baluchistan began
to improve from the Baluches' point of view. Yahya Khan's decision
in 1969 to disestablish the 'one unit' , grant Baluchistan the status
of a separate province, and to hold elections on the basis of
universal suffrage in December 1970, gave rise to hopes among the
Bal uches that for the first tiine they would be granted provincial
13 autonomy. These hopes came .to fruition when, after caning to
power, Bhutto permitted the winning National Awami Party and the
Jamiat-ul-Ulmae Islam (JUI) to form a coalition provincial government
in Baluchistan. This parliamentary period) however, proved to be
short lived. Soon after his success at Simla in projecting an image
of a ' united Pakistan' , Bhutto reverted to his preference for a
11Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baloch, Baluch Kaum-wa-Khawanin-i-Baluch,
(Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1972), p.147. 12
Inayatullah Baloch, 'Afghanistan-Pushtunistan- Baluchistan', Aussen Politik, Vol.31, No.3, pp.294-296.
13 Ibid., p.296.
206
strong central government and gradually began alienating the
political elite of Baluchistan as well as the NWFP. The climax came
in early 197 3 when, taking advantage of the seizure of Soviet arms
from the Iraqi embassy and the rebellion in Lasbela, Bhutto dismissed
the Baluchistan government, sparking off an insurgency in Baluchistan
which lasted for almost four years, i.e. from 1973 to 1977 and was
led by the Marxist-oriented Baluchistan People's Liberation Front
(BPLF) and the Baluch Students' Organization (BSO). 14
These various political groups in Baluchistan and the NWFP, who
actually fought for or merely threatened succession, were supported
by the Afghanistan Government from 1947. This support primarily
stemmed fran Afghanistan's own stand on the Pushtunistan issue. The
1893 agreement for the Durand Line, which demarcated the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Kabul maintained, had been signed under
duress and therefore the area west of the Indus down to the Arabian
Sea belonged to Afghanistan and not Pakistan. 15 On the basis of this
stand, the level and scope of Afghan support for the Baluch and
Pathan leaders of Pakistan varied from time to time depending upon
the personal commitment of the Afghan rulers, the need to divert the
publics attention from domestic problems, and the situation in
Pakistan. During 1952-1955, for example, when the Pakistan
Government amalgamated the various parts of the western wing into one
administrative unit under the name of West Pakistan, the Afghan
14Inayatullah Baloch, op .cit., pp. 296-300; and Harrison, op.cit., pp.143-149.
15For a detailed exposition of Afghanistan's stand on the
Pakhtunistan issue 1 see 1 Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, (London: Afghan Embassy, n.d), pp. 73-74, 132; Rahman Pazhwak, Pushtunistan: A New State in Central Asia, (London: no publishers, 1960), pp.7-8; and S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: an H:!.:_storical Analysis, (London: OXford University Press, 1973), pp.72-77.
207
Government, under the premiership of Mohammad Daoud, provided staunch
support to the Bal uches and Pa thans of Pakistan. The people of
Pushtunistan, Kabul reiterated frequently, should be allowed to
secede and form a separate state which might remain independent or
join Afghanistan. 16 After 1963, when Daoud resigned as Prime
Minister and King zahir Shah began to pursue a more moderate policy,
Afghanistan's support subsided, and was restricted to a demand that
the two provinces be allowed to participate in the main political
system.
In 1973, however, the situation once again underwent a change.
Sardar Daoud's rise to power as the head of the Republic of
Afghanistan coincided with Bhut·to' s dismissal of the NAP-JUI 1 s
government in Baluchistan and the subjecting of Khan Abdul Wali Khan
and other Pathan leaders to severe harassment. Daoud who had always
been a fiery Pushtun nationalist, therefore revived the Pushtunistan
issue and also began providing sanctuaries and other assistance to
Bal uch insurgents and sane of the Pathan leaders who had fled to
Afghanistan. 17
This support continued until late 1975 when the Shah
of Iran succeeded in prevailing· upon Daoud to moderate his stand on
the Pushtunistan issue. The Afghan Government, thereupon sealed its
16For example, the Afghan Foreign Minister, Sardr Nairn Khan stated
in a press conference in Karachi on November 1954 that the people of Pushtunistan should be given an opportunity to express themselves on their 'status and way of living'. Dawn, 8 November 1954; see also, Daoud Khan, the Afghan Minister's --;t;tement that Afghanistan has certain responsibilities with regard to (their) Pakhtoon brothers ••• • • Pakistan Times, 2 September 1954; the resolution passed by the Afghan Grand National Assembly, LOi Jir<ta, in the middle of November declaring that Afghanistan did not recognise the 'Pakhtunist.an' territories as a part of Pakistan, Asian Recorder: 19 55, p. 521 ; Sanga t Singh, _£aki stan 1 s Foreign Policy: An Appr ai sa~ (Londo~ Asia Publishing House, 1970), pp.28-29; and Leon B. Poullada, 'Afghanistan and the United States; The Crucial Years' , The Middle East Journal, Vol.35, No.2, Spring 1981, pp.188-189.
17Wh. 1.te Paper on Baluchistan, (Rawalpindi; Government of Pakistan,
1911..f),pp.42-44; see also, Harr1.son, o:rz.cit., p.152.
208
borders to Baluchistan, which were being used by pro-secessionist
Pakistani Baluch elements, and then opened a dialogue with Islamabad
1 h ht . t . 18 to reso ve t e Pus unls an lssue.
In June August 1976, Bhutto and Daoud exchanged visits.
During these visits according to unofficial sources, Daoud agreed to
accept the Durand Line, and to withdraw his support for the
Pushtunistan issue provided Bhutto freed all the Bal uch and Pathan
leaders 19 The conclusion of the actual agreement, however, was
delayed initially due to the domestic turbulence after the March 1977
elections and then by the change of government in Pakistan in July
1977.
The new regime in Pakistan led by General Zia-ul-Haq, while
attempting to establish contact with the Afghan Government, initially
concentrated on defusing the situation in Baluchistan by reaching a
truce with the Baluch leaders and declaring a general amnesty for all
the Baluch insurgents in November 1977. Early the following year, it
also freed all the Baluch and Pathan leaders who had been held in
captivity by the Bhutto regime since February 1975. Following these
decisions, Daoud visited Islamabad on 5 March 1978 and, according to
unofficial sources, agreed to repatriate, forcibly if required, all
refugee Baluch and Pathan political 20 leaders. For the next four
weeks, Daoud implemented the agreement and repatriated a few
Pakistani political exiles, including Wali Khan's brother-in-law,
Captain Azam Khan. 21 The process, however, stalled with the change
of government in Kabul on 2 7 April 1978.
18samina Ahmed, The Soviet Factor in Pakistan's Relations (1978- ) , M.A. Thesis, (Canberra: Department of International Relatlons, Australian National University, 1982), pp.38-42.
19 Ibid.' pp.42-43. 20~ence Lifschultz, 1 Accounting for the past in Pakistan' , Far
Eastern Economic Review, 23 June 1978, p.32. 21 Ibid.
209
The Saur revolution brought to power the PDPA which had not only
opposed the Zia-Daoud accord but had also used it to rouse the masses
against Daoud in the ten days preceding the coup. Soon after
assuming control, this regime expressed its intention of ceasing to
repatriate political leaders from Afghanistan. 22 Simultaneously, it
also revived ·the Pushtunistan issue. On 4 May 1978, for example,
Radio Kabul claimed that letters from northern Pushtunistan
expressing joy on the victory of the Saur revolution had concluded
with slogans like 'long live the brotherhood of Afghanistan and
Pushtunistan' •23 Two days later, in his first press conference,
Taraki categorically referred to the Pushtunistan issue as a
'political problem' requiring a 'peaceful and friendly solution' with
'our Pakistani brothers' • 2 4 Once again on 9 May 1975, while
presenting a 30 points manifesto on his government's policies, he
identified 'the realization of the right . to self-determination for
the Pushtun and Baluchi people through peaceful negotiations and
talks between the ffiA and Pakistan' as one of the Kabul's main
f . l' b. t. 25 ore1gn po 1cy o Jec 1ves. Probably to suggest that the new regime
was really committed to this objective, Taraki also held a meeting
with Khan Ghaffer Khan, and Ajmal Khattah, General-Secretary of
Pakistan's outlawed NAP party who had been residing in Afghanistan
since 1974. 26
That the Daoud regime, soon after coming into power in 1973 had
22rbid, p.32, and~' 10 May 1978.
23R d. a 10 Kabul, 4 May 1978, in SWB: FE, No.5807, 8 May 1978, pp.B/3-4.
24Kabul Times, 13 May 1978. 25
Radio Kabul, 9 May 1978, in SWB: FE, No.5811, 12 May 1978, p.B/2; and Morning News, 10 May 1978.
26salamat Ali, 'The View From Islamabad' , Far Eastern Economic
Review, 26 May 1978, p.28.
210
first raised but then dropped the Pushtunistan issue should have
convinced the Pakistan Government that, given time, the new regime
might do the same. However, certain factors made Islamabad 12erceive
the Taraki regime' s references to the Pushtunistan issue as being
more ominous than those of the previous one. First and foremost was
the character of the new regime in Kabul. The PDPA was essentially a
canmunist party. It had been initially established, in 1965, during
the period of democracy-yi-naw or 'new democracy' of the Afghan
monarch zahir Shah, with a Marxist-Leninist programme, but, due to
tactical and personality differences, had soon split into two
factions, the 'Khalq' and the 'Parcham' • The Khalq, led by lower and
lower-middle class nationalist Ghilzai Pakhtoons, such as Taraki and
Mafizullah Amin, had attempted to develop its roots among the
rural-based educated Pushtun speakers. The Par cham, led by
Dari-speaking, pro-Soviet, Kabul intellectuals like Babrak Karmal, on
the other hand, had solely concentrated its activities in the
military and, therefore, in July 1973, had played an instrumental
role in bringing the pro-Soviet Daoud to power.
Within two years of his a.scent to power, however, the Parcham
found Daoud consolidating his rule to the exclusion of his leftist
allies. In 1977 he declared a one-party system under his leadership
and sought to forge close ties with and receive financial assistance
fran the Shah of Iran and the Arab world. Meanwhile, he undertook a
gradual but steady process of purging his administration of
canmunists. Faced with this threat, and encouraged by the Soviet
Union, the Parcham and Khalq reestablished the PDPA and drew up plans
on the basis of which, in the wake of the party leader Mir Khyber' s
death and the arrest of the major PDPA leaders, the military
overthrew and killed Daoud. 27
2 7K. Wa:fadar, 'Afghanistan in 1980: The Struggle Continues' , Asian
Survey, Vol.xxi, No.2, February 1981, pp.173-174.
211
Secondly, the Soviet Union had reacted very favourably to the
change of government in Kabul. It was the first state to recognize
Taraki' s government on 30 April 1978 --- even before other embassies
could establish telephone contacts with the new regime. 28 Three days
later, Brezhnev and Kosygin sent congratulatory telegrams to Taraki
on his election as head of the Afghan Government and expressed 'firm
confidence' that 'relations of lasting friendship and fruitful
29 all-round cooperation' would develop and strengthen. The next day,
on 4 May, a commentary by Radio Moscow referred to the coup as 1 the
important changes in the history of Afghanistan' s national liberation
movement' and noted 'with satisfaction that the prediction of the
Great Lenin, who said that the Soviet Union would always remain the
first friend of the Government of Afghanistan has come true in our
t, I 30 :une • Simultaneously, the Soviet news media had markedly
increased the coverage of the world's reaction to, and the policies
of, the new government in Kabu1. 31 Although, this coverage refrained
from either commenting upon, or even reporting Taraki and his
colleagues refer~nces to the Pushtunistan issue, the Pakistan
Government feared that Moscow would support Kabul's policy vis-a-vis
the Baluches and Pathan of Pakistan, as it had done explicitly during
the 1955-63 period and then implicitly since 1963. 32 Moreover, there
280. h ~na Lee, 'Kabul's Coup makers Keep Their Neighbours Guessing' , Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 May 1978, p.8.
29Tass, 4 May 1978, in The Summary of World Broadcasts: Soviet·
Union, (hereafter cited as SWB: SU), No. 580 5, 5 May 198, p. A3/1.
~ommentary by Igor Savchenka, Radio Moscow, 4 May 1978, in SWB: SU No.5806, 6 May 198, p.A3/1.
31 See, for example, Tass, 1 May 1978, in SWB: FE, No. 580 2, 2 May
1978, p.B/4; Radio MosCDW;" 4 May 1978, in SWB: SU, No.5806, 6 May 1978, p.A3/2, ~' 8 May 1978, in SWB: FE, No.5808, 9 May 1978, p.B/1; and Radio Moscow, 8 May 1978, in SWB: SU, No.5808, 9 May 1978, p. A3/2.
32sangat: Singh, Pakistan's Foreign Policy:
Asia Publishing House, 1970), pp.135-36. An Appraisal , (London:
212
had also been reports that, in the 1950s and early 1960s, Moscow had
prepared plans to despatch agents to Pakistan from the Afghan
territory it had also discussed the possibility of sending Soviet
troops into Afghanistan at the appropriate time for joint operations
against Pakistan. 33 That the Kremlin was prepared to pursue such a
policy during the reign of a monarch and then of a republican related
to the royal family, the Pakistan Government feared, was an
indication that the Soviet Union was much more likely to support the
new regime, a communist one which included the pro-Soviet Parchamis,
over the Pushtunistan issue. 34
The threat of Soviet-backed Afghan attempts to destabilise
Pakistan was perceived to be more serious in Baluchistan than in
NWFP, due to the simultaneous presence of a number of factors. The
first factor was the newly emerging congruity in the Soviet and
Afghan concepts of Pushtunistan. 'rhroughout the period preceding the
Saur revolution, Afghan Governments had consistently defined
Pushtunistan as comprising both the NWFP and Baluchistan. An Afghan
career diplomat, Rahman Pazhwak, in the late 1950s, for instance, had
identified the Chagai area, Bolan and the Baluch States of Kalat,
Makran, Las Bela, and Kharan as part of the 'Pushtunistan' of
35 'today'. The Soviet Union, however, while siding with Kabul on the
issue, had always restricted its support to the creation of
Pushtunistan comprised of the Pushtun-speaking people of Pakistan
only. It did not accept the wider Afghan claims over Baluchistan
which was always identified as a distinct geographical area, and the
Baluches were identified as a separate nationality with their own
33 Olev Pankovsky, The Pankovsky Papers, (London: Collins Clear-Type
Press, 1966), pp.90-91.
34! t . . h . n erv~ew w~t an offic~al of Pakistan Foreign Office. 35
Pazhwa:k, op.cit., pp.8-1 0.
213
right to self d . . 36 eterm1nat1on. This dissimilarity between the
position of the two governments disappeared with the PDPA's ascent to
power. For the first time now, the Afghan Government also
acknowledged the right to self-determination of both the Baluches and
the Pushtunsas separate nationalities. On 5 May 1978, for instance,
Radio Kabul transmitted a message from two unknown people, described
as Baluch leaders, expressing their hopes that the Afghan revolution
would lend strength to the Baluch people's struggle for
self-determination. 37 This was followed, as previously mentioned, on
9 May 1978 by Taraki' s policy statement referring to the 'right of
self-determination for the Pushtun and Baluchi people 1 38 That
this congruity with the Soviet position was not an aberration but
part of a consistent policy was reflected in the subsequent frequent
references by Afghan leaders distinguishing clearly between the two
nationalities.
Secondly, in spite of General Zia' s attempts, the situation in
Baluchistan had not been fully defused. Anti-government feelings were
still rife and the BPLF, led by Khair Baksh Marri, was insisting that
the army pull back to pre-1972 positions. It was also expressing its
distrust of Zia's amnesty declaration. 39 In fact, Khair Baksh Marri,
while privately warning bluntly of the danger of Baluch separatism,
was publicly also hinting that the Baluches may be 'forced to adopt
an attitude different from the prevalent norms of politics•. 40
Thirdly, Pakistan was being ruled by General Zia a
36 Inayatullah Baloch, op.cit., pp.286-87. 37
Radio Kabul, 5 May 1978 in SWB:FE, No.5807, 8 May 1978, p.B/4. 38
Radio Kabul, 9 May 1978, in SWB:F~, No.5811, 12 May 1978, p.B/2. 39
Lawrence Lipschultz, 'Accounting for the Past in Pakistan' , Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 June 1978, p.32.
40 . . HarrJ.son, op.cJ.t., p.\46.
214
representative of the army which, as an institution, had
traditionally been suspicious of the Soviet Union and had
consistently adhered to the theory that Moscow wanted to gain access
to the warm water ports of the Indian Ocean through Baluchistan. The
change in the· Afghan policy on the issue of the Baluches' right to
self-determination and the existing exploitable dissatisfaction in
Baluchistan were automatically perceived by Islamabad as signalling
that the Soviet Union was going to use its links with the new
communist regime in Kabul to destabilise the situation in
1 h. 41 Ba uc 1stan.
Even if the Soviet Union did not do so, the Pakistan Government
feared it would exploit its ability to do so to pressure Pakistan
into changing its foreign policy. This threat perception could be
explained in terms of the nature of the regime in Pakistan, a
pro-American, right wing, military government which, having
overthrown the relatively liberal Bhutto government, was drawing
political support from the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) which
included, among others, extreme right-wing Muslim fundamentalist
Parties like the Jamaat-i-Islaini. 42 This regime, therefore, was
bound to view the emergence of a canmunist regime in its
neighbourhood as ominous. However, this perception was reinforced by
Moscow's refusal to even attempt to convince Pakistan that it did not
intend using its links with Kabul to change Islamabad's foreign
policy orientation. Instead in a marked departure from the past,
when he had appeared anxious to befriend Pakistan, the Soviet
ambassador to Islamabad, Sarwar Azimov, criticised Pakistan's foreign
policy in an interview with a Lahore magazine, Afrasia. 'Pakistan'
41 I t ' ' h ' n erv1.ew Wl.t a rank1ng Pakistan Army Officer. 42
Ahmed, op.cit., pp.53-54.
215
he said, 1 is a friend of our enemies. [H) er foreign policy is
directed against us and she is an aligned country unlike India, and
Afghanistan who are non-aligned and our friends I . . . . Then he
demanded that Pakistan withdraw from CENTO and hinted that failure to
do so might jeopardize diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 43
Corning within two weeks of the coup in Kabul, this interview (later
denied by the Soviet Union) convinced Islamabad that its threat
perception was justified.
Chinese SUEE?rt for Pakistan
Questions arise as to what extent Peking subscribed to
Islamabad's threat perceptions and what was the nature of political
support, if any, for Pakistan during the April 1978 - December 1979
period.
The Chinese Government initially adopted a cautious attitude.
It was unwilling to identify itself directly and exElicitly with
Islamabad's view that the danger to Baluchistan and the NWFP, as well
as the possibility of Soviet pressure on Pakistan, had increased with
the emergence of a communist government in Afghanistan. On 9 May
1978, for instance, the pro-Peking newspaper from Hong Kong .Wel}_ Wei
Po published a 'special article' column on the coup in Afghanistan
which referred, in general terms, to Pakistan's threat perceptions.
After pointing out that the several coups d'etat in Afghanistan in
the 20th century were closely related to the social system, the
economy and the conventions of the imperialists, it stated:
'However, the shadow of the Soviet Union still covers Afghanistan and
makes Pakistan and Iran worry that they may be affected by the chaos
43Pakistan Times, 11 May 1978; 'A New Soviet Offensive', Asiaweek,
26 May 1978, p.16; and A.G. Noorani, 'Soviet Ambitions in South Asia', International Securitl, Vol.4, No.3, Winter 1979/80, p.54.
216
created by the Soviet Union. •44 Although this article indirectly
reflected the views held by Peking, no such references were made
directly by the news media in mainland China itself. Instead, the
Chinese media restricted themselves to only implicitly subscribing to
Islamabad's threat perceptions. On 12 May 1978, for example, a short
commentary entitled 'A noteworthy trend' the Ren-min Ribao referred
to Sarwar Azimov' s interview with Afrasia. 'According to reports in
Pakistan newspapers', it stated, 'the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan,
in a rare talk with a reporter, smeared Pakistan as a biased country,
a friend of the Soviet Union's enemies and an enemy of the Soviet
Union's friends, and also stated that only when Pakistan withdrew
from CENTO would the Soviet Union find everything about Pakistan
satisfactory'. 'It is by no means accidental', it continued 'that the
Soviet Union 1 s envoys in South Asian countries are unrestrainedly
interfering in the internal affairs of other countries'. 'On the
contrary' , it echoed the views of ·the Pakistani news media, 'these
are intentional acts E,y Moscow to exert I?ressure ~ Pakistan and
other Asian countries' • However_, unlike the Pakistani media, it
refrained from categorically stating that these 'intentional acts'
were linked directly with the coup in Kabul. Instead, it restricted
itself to stating that they were 'attributable to Moscow's
anxiousness to strengthen its strategic plan in the arc extending
from Africa to South Asia through West Asia I . . . . This commentary
also exhibited Peking's reluctance to clearly spell out Pakistan 1 s
fears with respect to the situation in its two western provinces.
For instance it stated that the 'Soviet Union is an expert and a
44"Special article" column by Ku Chin-hsin, 'AfghanistaV~ Beckons to
Peking - Will Afghanistan 'Lean Toward' the Soviet Union?', Wen Wei Pu, 9 May 1978, in FBIS:CHI, 11 May 1978, p.N/1.
217
veteran at subversion and sabotage' and advised, among others, the
South Asian countries not to be afraid, and to be to some extent
prepared 'to deal with Soviet aggression, subversion, and
infiltration However, it did not explicitly subscribe to
Pakistan's fears by either identifying Baluchistan and the NWFP as
the most likely targets of Soviet subversion, or pointing out that
the possibility of Soviet infiltration had increased with the
emergence of a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. 45
Neither was the Chinese Government initially prepared to
acknowledge the existence of and declare its support for Pakistan
against the more obvious threat posed by Afghanistan which was
consistently emphasizing the Baluches' and the Pushtuns' right to
self-determination. This became more obvious during Chinese
Vice-Premier Geng Biao's visit to Pakistan in June 1978 to attend the
inaugural ceremony of the Karakorum Highway. Firstly, on 16 June
1978, in a banquet given in Geng Biao's honour, Gene.ral Zia indicated
his government' s concern over Kabul' s attitude towards Islamabad.
'It is our conviction', he said, 'that close friendship and
cooperation is in the best interest of ••• [Afghanistan and Pakistan]
and in the larger interest of regional stability and global peace' •
Then he 'expressed the hope that efforts would be made to bring to a
close an era of confrontation in South Asia The Chinese
Vice-Premier, however, despite the fact that he was reported to have
had 'cordial' and 'friendly' talks with General Zia the same morning
and that General Zia in his speech had also underscored the identity
of Sino-Pakistan views on major international issues, chose to ignore
the issue and made no reference to Afghanistan's policy towards
45 'Commentary: "A noteworthy trend"', Ren-min Ribao,
as Radio Peking, 12 May 1978, in SWB:FE, No.5817, pp.12/5-6 (emphasis added).
12 May 1978, 19 May 1978,
218
Pakistan. 46 Secondly, at the same banquet, General Zia, whose regime
had been fearful of a further disintegration of Pakistan, tried to
elicit a categorical statement of China's support for Pakistan by
expressing a 'deep sense of gratitude to the Chinese Government and
people for their help and assistance in the defence of [Pakistan's]
sovereignt:t:, independence and territorial , , I 47 J.ntegn. ty • Geng
Biao, however, on this and subsequent occasions, refrained from
giving any such categorical assurance. Instead, as in the East
Pakistan crisis, he restricted himself to expressing China's
'unswerving support [for] the Pakistan Government and people in their
just struggle to safeguard national independence and state
sovereignty' without mentioning the words 'territorial integrity• 48
Thirdly> unlike the Pakistani media which stressed that Geng Biao' s
visit was significant because it had primarily taken place 'against
the background of important changes gradually making themselves felt
in the region• 49 (the usual expression referring to the coup in
Afghanistan), the Chinese media was cautious to emphasize, throughout
and immediately after the visit, that the major significance of the
visit stemmed from the fact that it was made to attend the inaugural
ceremony of the Karakorum Highway50
The Chinese Government continued to exhibit this cautious
attitude for most of the second half of 1978. In the first week of
September, Pakistan's Adviser for Foreign Affairs, Agha Shahi,
46NCNA, 16 June 1978, in FBIS:CHI, 19 June 1978, pp.A/10-15.
47Ibid, p.A/13.
48rbid, p.A/13; and Geng Biao' s remarks at the Karakorum Highway
completion ceremony, NCNA, 18 June 1978, in FBIS:CHI, 19 June 1978, p.A/17. --
49'Fruitful Visit: Editorial', Pakistan Times, 23 June 1978. 50
See, for example, NCNA, 18 June 1978, in FBIS:CHI, 19 June 1978, pp.A/18-20; NCNA, 21 June 1978, in FBIS:CHI, 22 June 1978, p.A/13.
219
visited Peking. Although not enough information is available on the
visit, there are a few pointers which suggest that he discussed the
Khalq regime's policies with the Chinese Government. On 6 September
1978, for instance, at a banquet for Agha Shahi, the Chinese Foreign
Minister Huang Hua stated: 'Our exchange of ideas for a better
understanding of the situation is very necessary in view of a world
which is in the grip of unrest and intranquility, with the two
super-powers, especially Soviet Social-imperialism, launching new
offensive in Africa, Middle East, the Persian Gulf and South East
Asia' • 51
The next day, ~ reported his meeting with Vice-Premier
Li Xiannian and described his talks 'on the further development of·
the friendly relations between the two countries and on issues of
common interest' as 'friendly', which was the usual word for
indicating agreement. 52 In spite of this agreement, however, the
Chinese Government refrained from issuing any categorical statement
supporting Pakistan against the perceived Soviet, or the more obvious
Afghan threat. Instead, Huang Hua limited himself to expressing the
belief that 'the friendly relations between the peoples of China and
Pakistan would surely be further strengthened through regular
exchange of views•. 53
Seven weeks later, on 27 October 1978, NCNA transmitted a
'feature' article on the improvement of relations among South Asian
countries. In this article, for the first time since the April 1976
coup in Kabul, the Chinese Government acknowledged the existence of a
dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Notwithstanding the Taraki
regime's consistent reiteration, and Pakistan's questioning of the
51NCNA, 6 September 1978, in FBIS:CHI, 7 September 1978, p.A/17. 52
NCNA, 7 September 1978, in FBIS:CHI, 8 September 1978, p.A/15. 53
NCNA, 6 September 1978, in FBIS:CHI, 7 September 1978, p.A/17.
220
need to resolve the national issue of Pakhtun and Baluchi people,
however, Peking refrained from openly siding with Islamabad against
Kabul. Instead, the article appreciated and encouraged Pakistan to
establish friendly relations with its northwestern neighbour.
'Although problems of one kind or another still exist among the South
Asian countries' ,it stated) 'the nations concerned are making progress
in the direction of the gradual and systematic settling of disputes
by peaceful negotiations' • 'Last September' , it elaborated, 'when
Zia-ul-Haq was visiting Afghanistan, he said that if there were
differences between the two countries, they could be solved through
negotiations carried out in a friendly and brotherly atmosphere'.
'This trend', it expressed its appreciation, 'is in accordance with
the interests of the South Asian peoples themselves and will
undoubtably lead to the further stabilisation of the situation
throughout South Asia•. 54
At the turn of 1979, however, Peking began moving away from its
cautious policy. On 30 December 1978, ~ transmitted a commentary
entitled 'Kremlin pushes southward in 1978' which for the first time
since the coup in Kabul,explicitly subscribed to Islamabad's threat
perceptions. 'The Kremlin's southward push', it stated, 'stands out
most noticeably in its global expansionist offensive this year'. One
of the moves witnessed by the outgoing year, it pointed out, is
'opening up a corridor to the South'. 'The coup d'etat in
Afghanistan last April', it explained, 'was followed by the
conclusion of a USSR-Afghanistan treaty of "friendship, good
neighbourliness and cooperation", including a military clause'. 'The
contiguous Iran and Pakistan', it asserted, 'are obviously the next
54NCNA, 27 October 1978, in FBIS: CHI, 31 October 1978,
A/16-18. PP•
221
This was followed on 19 January, by an article in
the Beijing Review entitled 'Social-Imperialist Strategy in Asia',
which, while outlining Moscow's 'deeply disturbing acts of aggression
and expansionist intrigues in Asia last year', for the first time in
the preceding eight months, categorically identified Baluchistan as a
target of Soviet subversion. The Soviet Union, it stated, 'tried to
consolidate its footholds in South and West Asia so as to encircle
Pakistan and Iran. It provided the weapons for Baluchistan
insurrectionists, tried to further dismember Pakistan and force it to
obey its dictates•. 56
While identifying itself with Islamabad's perceptions, however,
the Chinese Government initially exhibited an unwillingness to
categorically declare its full support for Pakistan against the
Soviet backed Afghanistan. On 20 January 1979, for instance, Chinese
Vice-Premier Li Xiannian visited Pakistan. During this visit,
according to the NCNA itself, he exchanged views with General Zia '
on the present international situation, particularly the situation in
the South Asian subcontinent' . 57 As before, since Pakistan was
worried about the situation on its northwestern frontier, it is not
illogical to assume that General Zia would have raised the subject of
his regime's problems with Kabul. Nevertheless, the Chinese
Vice-Premier refrained from declaring his Government's full support
for Islamabad. Instead, during 1:he banquet given in his honour on
the 21st of January, he restricted himself to stating that 'the
government and people of China will, as before, resolutely support
55'The Social Imperialist Strategy in Asia' 1 Renmin Ribao, 30
December 1978, in SWB:FE, No.6008, 5 January 1979, pp.A2/1-2. 56
•social-Imperialist Strategy in Asia', Beijing Review, Vol.22, No.3, p.14.
57NCNA, 21 January 199, in FBIS:CHI, 22 January 1979, p.A/27.
222
the just struggle of the Pakistan Government and people in defending
national independence and state sovereignty and opposing external
aggression and intervention ••• ', once again omitting any reference
to China's support for Pakistan's 'territorial integrity•. 58
A similar attitude, was adopted by the Chinese Government during
the Pakistani Secretary of Defence, Lieutenant General Gilani's visit
to Peking in February 1979. On one occasion, for instance, General
Gilani indicated the kind of support his government expected to
receive from China: ( W] e know' , he said, 'that the Chinese
people will never seek hegemony and their power will be a source of
strength to the smaller countries in guarding their national
independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity'. Then he
asserted that, although they wanted to live in peace with all, 'the
people of Pakistan [were] determined to safeguard their
. d d d t . t . 1 . t . t ' 59 ln epen ence an errl orla ln egrl y • The Chinese deputy Chief
of General Staff, Zhang Caiqian, however, ignored the reference to
territorial integrity and merely assured that ' whatever happens
in the world, [China) will never change [its] stand of
supporting the just struggle of the Pakistani people to safeguard
their national independence and state sovereignty' • This omission was
significant as the assurance was preceded by Zhang Caiqian's
statement that 'at the present moment when the hegemonists, big and
small, are posing an increasingly grave threat in our region, the
Chinese people and their liberation army are very much concerned for
Pakistan our friendly neighbour•. 60
It was not until the end of March 1979 that Peking fully came
out in support of Islamabad.
58'Pakistan's Hoq, Li Xiannian 21 January Banquet speeches', NCNA,
22 January 1979, in FBIS:CHI, 23 January 1979, pp.A/15-17. 59
NCNA, 11 February 1979, in FBIS:CHI, 12 February 1979, p.A/12. 60
Ibid,.
223
Since the April coup in Kabul 1 a number of Afghans 1 whose
interests were directly threatened by the change of government 1 had
been migrating to Pakistan and Iran. The frequency with which Afghan
refugees began pouring into Pakistan and Iran 1 however, markedly
increased towards the end of 1978 due to a number of socio-economic
reforms introduced by Taraki's right hand man, Hafizullah Amin, such
as the abolition of the bride price and 'purdah' 1 cancellation of
agricultural debts, land redistribution and formation of rural
cooperatives on the communist pattern, as well as the regime's
efforts ·to replace the authority of the local elite with its own
party bureaucracy, wide spread arrests, massacres and execu·tions of
opponents. These Afghan refugees, who poured in at an average rate
of 13,000 per month after November 197861
and included the
traditional elite, religious class and the fundamentalist and
nationalist groups from the rural areas organised themselves into a
number of guerilla groups and, in early March 197 9, when the snow
melted, began insurgency operations in Afghanistan. 62 The first
target was Nooristan but soon the insurgency was to spread in a
number of eastern and south-eastern provinces.
Faced with this situation, the Afghan Government, which had
initially denied the presence of any rebellion, began to accuse the
Pakistan Government of collaborating with 'some imperialist countries
and left' extremist aggressors in imparting special training to a
'group of traitors•. 63 The Soviet media adopted an even more hostile
61 Beverley Male 1 'A Tiger by 'rhe Tail: Pakistan and the Afghan
Refugees', Refugees: Four_~~litical Case-Studies, Canberra Studies in World Affairs, No.3, (Canberra Australian National University, 1981 ), P• 38.
62T h' . 'Th f h · a lr Amln, ·. e A g an Reslstance: Past, Present, and Future' ,
Asian Survey, Vol.XXIV, No.4, April 1984, pp.380-84. 63
Radio Kabul, 23 March 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6077, 27 March 1979, p. C/1.
224
tone than the DRA towards Pakistan. on 19 March, a Pravda article by
I.Alexandrov entitled 'Reactionary Intrigues against Democratic
Afghanistan' accused Pakistan of supporting the Afghan rebels. One of
the most active groupings operating under slogans hostile to the
April revolution, it stated, was the • Muslim Brotherhood' which had
its main bases in Pakistan. These groupings, it accused were waging a
'vicious propaganda campaign' against Democratic Afghanistan and its
revolutionary government 'from the territory of Pakistan and a number
of other states' • 'Radio stations set up in Pakistani territory', it
elaborated, 1 are disparaging the measures carried out in the country
[Afghanista~ , slandering the bodies of power and sowing all kinds of
rumours intended to shake the confidence of the masses in the
revolution. They send in leaflets calling for a 1 holy war'
against the legitimate Government and its bodies'. 'Everything
indicates', it claimed, 'that the activities of the rebels and
counter-revolutionaries are being unfolded not without the knowledge
of the official Pakistani authorities', and accused 'these
authorities' of failing to cut short these activities entailing 'a
gross violation of the principles of good neighbourliness'. The
article also accused that Chinese instructors were training the
'sabotage and terrorist gangs sent into Afghanistan from Pakistan'
and that 'the Karakorum Highway was being used for transporting
weapons, equipment and propaganda materials intended for organizing
subversive activities in the DRA' • 64 This was followed by two more
articles in Izvestia and Pravda on the 20th and 21st of March
respectively with similar accusations and a warning that 'the
inciting statements in support of the "Afghan Muslims" coming from
64I. Aleksandrov, 'Reactionary Intrigues against Democratic
Afghanistan', Pravda, 19 March 1979, in SWB:SU, No.6071, 20 March 1979, pp.A3/1-2-(emphasis added).
225
Iran and Pakistan ••• indeed are not in the interests of the peoples
of Pakistan and Iran themselves•.65
The Pakistan Government, despite the fact that these charges
were true, denied them on 2 0 March 197 9. The allegations were
described by a Pakistani official as 'totally baseless' and as 'false
and mischievous charges' that had been made in complete disregard of
facts. The Pakistan Government, he maintained, was not allowing the
Afghan refugees to carry on hostile propaganda against the DRA. On
the contrary, he claimed, Afghan refugees had been granted asylum in
Pakistan on purely humanitarian grounds and on the condition that
they would not use Pakistan's territory for any activity that might
jeopardise its attempts at forging close ties with a neighbouring
state, Afghanistan. 66
The Chinese news media, from the outset, supported this
position. On 23 March 1979 NCNA transmitted news of Zia's denial of
Pakistan's complicity in the Afghan rebellion. 6 7 The next day, a
Renmin Ribao article described the recent articles published in
Pravda as 'slandering the Pakistan Government for interfering in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan' and as spreading the 'preposterous
rumour' that China and Pakistan were collaborating in training and
arming Afghan guerillas. These allegations, it pointed out, had been
refuted by the Pakistani media as well as the government which had
described 'all these malicious slanders fabricated by Pravda' as
having been 'made in complete disregard to facts' and 'totally
baseless'. Giving further details of the refutation, the article
stated:
65Radio Moscow, 20 March 1979, in SWB:SU, No.6072, 21 March 1979,
p.A3/2; and Tass, 21 March 1979, in _SWB:SU, No.6073, 22 March 1979, pp.A3/4-5. --
66Pakistan Times, 21 March 1979. 67
NCNA, 23 March 1979, in FBIS:CHI, 27 March 1979, p.F/2.
On 19 March Pakistan's President Ziaul Haq told reporters at Peshawar that about 35,000 Afghan refugees had entered Pakistan, 25,000 of whom were staying in the north-western border provinces. 'It is purely on humanitarian· grounds' that the Pakistan Government offered to take care of their everyday needs so that they could go on living. They had not done anything to harm relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. President Ziaul Haq also said: we are making the greatest efforts to maintain a highly peaceful relationship with Afghanistan, and I believe we can succeed".
226
'This [refutation]', the article stated emphatically 'is ~rue to
68 facts'. Then it proceeded to provide an explanation, one totally
parallel to Islamabad's position, of why it considered Pakistan's
denial as being based on fact. Since the Afghan coup the previous
year, it maintained, the Pakistan Government had been attempting to
establish friendly and cooperative relations with the Taraki regime,
and the Pakistani President, Ziaul Haq, had visited Kabul in
September 1978 for that purpose. It had also offered entrepot
facilities to Afghanistan and had made a friendly gesture of
providing Kabul with wheat, sugar and 3 0, 000 tons of rice 'despite
domestic economic difficulties'. As for the refugees, it quoted a
Pakistan Times editorial, they had been given asylum in Pakistan on
humanitarian grounds, and then pointed out that their influx could
not be stemmed due to the rough and difficult terrain along the
common borders, and intermarriage between the people living in these
border areas, which prevented Pakistan from closing the border.
However, it stressed, Islamabad was not responsible for the 'recent
clashes between Muslim guerillas and government troops in
Afghanistan' as it was neither its policy nor was it in its interest
to interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs. The article was
finally concluded with an analysis of motives behind Pravda's
68Li Yunfei, 'What is Renmin Ribao, 24 March ~p.A2/2 (emphasis added).
Pravda's motive in fabricating rumours?' , 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6083, 3 April 1979,
227
fabrication of rumours and accusations 'when the facts were so
obvious'. Soviet social-imperialism, it argued, was facing growing
opposition from the people of South and West Asia because its
'frantic expansion and infiltration' into that region had created
great unrest and brought serious disasters to the people. 'To defend
its conquest and make new expansionist moves', it continued, 'the
Soviet Union is adopting all kinds of despicable tricks to shift the
blame on to others and divert the peoples' attention from the real
situation. The 'Pravda articles thus hide a malicious intent' •69
The Chinese media's total identification with Islamabad's
position was accompanied by the Chinese Government's categorical
declaration of full support for Pakistan. On 26 March 1979, speaking
at a banquet in Islamabad, the Chinese Air Force Commander-in-Chief,
Zhang Tingfa used a phrase stronger than had been used by various
Chinese leaders in the previous eleven months to express Peking's
support for Islamabad. 'The Chinese people and the Chinese People's
Liberation Army', he said, ' will, as in the past, firmly support
the Pakistani people in their struggle for safeguarding national
independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity•. 70
This Chinese policy of fully and explicitly supporting Pakistan
continued for the next five months. In early April 1979, for
instance, the Soviet accusations against Pakistan assumed a stronger
tone. A Radio Moscow commentary maintained that in spite of all
assurances by the Government of Pakistan, 'armed groups of bandits'
were continuing to cross from its territory into Afghanistan. The
facts showed, it argued, that the Pakistani special services in
69Ibid, 70
NCNA, ad de~
pp.A2/2-3 (emphasis added).
28 March 1979, in FBIS:CHI, 28 March 199, p.F/2 (emphasis
228
collaboration with the CIA, were 'using the cunning ploy' of sending
'armed gangs' of the reactionary 'Muslim Brotherhood' into
Afghanistan 'not at just one place but several, so as to give the
impression of rising everywhere against the Afghan Government' . It
also questioned Islamabad's assurances that it wanted to establish
good-neighbourly relations with Kabul and pointed out that the
problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan was 'not a matter of
innocent refugees, but of armed units which enjoy at least the
connivance of the Pakistani authorities'. 'Is it not obvious', it
warned, 'that such a policy is fraught with serious complication for
Pakistan itself? Can one reason that Afghanistan will stand idly by
in regard to actions which could not be tolerated by any
71 self-respecting state?' • Two days later, on 5 April 1979, Tass
accused Pakistan of channelling the Chinese trained 'gangs of
' d 'd I h h ' ' ' f h ' 72 terror1sts an ra1 ers t roug 1ts terr1tory 1nto A g an1stan.
To counter h d h . 'l . 73 h t ese an ot er s1m1 ar accusat1ons, t e NCNA
transmitted a commentary on 9 April 1979 which presented an analysis
of Soviet motives behind raising 'a hue and cry against "interference
in the internal affairs of Pakistan"'• 'Afghanistan', it asserted,
'has long been a strategic target of the Soviet ruling clique, which
have all along attempted to put this country under their wing and to
use it as a land route southwards to the Indian ocean' • 'After the
so-called "April revolution" hailed by Moscow', therefore, it argued,
Soviet military advisers and specialists of all kinds were rushed
into Afghanistan. Consequently, all key sectors of state power
-----------71
Radio Moscow, 3 April 1979, in SWB:SU, No.6085, 5 April 1979, p.A3/1 (emphasis added).
72Tass, 5 April 1979, in
73-See, for
SWB:FE, No.6088, 9 April 1979, p.C/1.
1979, p.C/1; 1979, p.C/2.
example, Tass, 2 April 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6085, 5 April and Tass, 4 April 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6086, 6 April
229
organs, including the ministries for economy, transport and
communications and mines, were being controlled by the Soviet Union.
However, the Soviet influence, it quoted the West German paper Di~-
W~Jj;:, , was 'more far-reaching in the army' where the majority of
higher officers were all Soviet. Moscow, the commentary asserted,
wanted to further consolidate its control of and intervene in
Afghanistan. To cover this 'hideous performance of an intervener',
it explained, the Soviet Union was 'laying a smokescreen' and
'concoct[ing] rumours' alleging that China and Pakistan, along with
other states, were 'carrying out a "joint action programme" against
Afghanistan•. 74
This argument was further developed in the next three weeks in
various reports and commentaries in NCNA, Radio Peking and the Renmin
'b 75 R1. ao. Quoting the western news agencies, the Chinese media
pointed out that since it took over the government, the PDP of
Afghanistan had never effectively controlled the whole country.
However, it had made matters worse by closely aligning itself with
the Soviet Union. Within a month of the coup, it was maintained, the
Soviet Union had concluded with Afghanistan some 40 agreements under
various names and had increased the numbers of its advisers,
including those in the military, to 1,000-2,000. The two states had
also concluded a 'treaty of friendship, good neighbourliness and
cooperation' in December 1978. These treaties and agreements, and
74'Moscow is spreading smokescreen', NCNA, 9 April 1979, in SWB:FE,
No.6089, 10 April 1979, pp.C/1-2. 75~rhis paragraph is based on information from current affairs
review: 'What has happened in Afghanistan' , Radio Peking, 16 April 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6096, 20 April 1979, p.C/1; commentary: 'Moscow is spreading a smokescreen', in Ibid, pp.C/1-2; NCNA, 22 April 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6100, 25 April 1979, in SWB:FE, No. 6102, 27 April 1979, pp.C/3-4; and 'Behind the Soviet Aid to Afghanistan', NCNA, 28 April 1979, in SWB:FE, No. 6105, 30 April 1979, p.C/1. ----
230
the existence of large numbers of Soviet advisers, which were all
'aimed at controlling and intervening in the Afghan political
situation and plundering the country's wealth', it was argued, had
sown the seeds of resistance among the Afghan people. The current
unrest, therefore, was 'a great eruption of such "seeds"'. The
Soviet Union, it was pointed out, had even taken advantage of this
situation and had 'intensified its infiltration and expansion into
the west Asian region'. It had been airlifting weapons to Afghanistan
on a crash basis and sending large numbers of military advisers
there. It had also sent a military delegation led by A. Yepishev,
Soviet Deputy Minister of Defence, to Kabul 'to boost the morale of
Afghanistan's high-ranking officers'. All these steps, it was
argued, proved that Moscow was intent upon converting Afghanistan
into its 'sixteenth republic'. However, to justify its actions and
find another pretext for intervention, it was maintained, the Soviet
Union had been vilifying China, the USA, Britain, West Germany,
Pakistan, Iran, Egypt and other countries for interfering in
Afghanistan's internal affairs.
Similarly, in May and June 1979, the Chinese Government
continued to side with Pakistan against the Soviet and Afghan
Governments. On 9 May 1979, for instance, the Taraki regime issued a
'resolute protest' to the Government of Pakistan in connection with
the growing frequency of armed attacks on areas of the DRA from
Pakistan territory and accused 'a large number of Pakistani soldiers,
armed with light and heavy weapons' of participating in these
76 attacks. Two weeks later, on 2 3 May 1979, a Pravda article by
Yuriy Glukhov charged that attempts were being made to launch
large-scale military actions against the young Afghan republic. 'Wide
76Kabul Times, 11 May 1979.
232
situation [could] ••• not leave the Soviet Union indifferent ' 78
The Pakistan Government, however, once again denied these
allegations and reiterated its position of providing asylum to the
refugees on humanitarian grounds and of consistently adhering to the
goal of establishing friendly relations with Afghanistan. 79
The Chinese media, as before, supported this position. The news
of the Pakistan Government's refutation was reported promptly and
consistently. 80 Moreover, on 26 May 1979, a Renmin Ribao commentary
identified the allegations made by yravda against Pakistan three days
earlier as 'sheer fabrication'. The recent turmoil in Afghanistan, it
argued, was caused by the 'intensified Soviet penetration and
expansion' in that country. But Pravda blamed all this on Pakistan
and made unreasonable charges against it. 'The Soviet paper,
however', the commentary continued, 'failed to provide any tangible
proof of a direct Pakistani connection with the turmoil in
Afghanistan. Finally it had to defend its charge by saying weakly
that "it is hard to guess whether the Pakistani authorities were
unaware of the activities of the Afghan reactionaries or were unable
to restrain them"' • The Pravda statement, it analysed, had
unwittingly revealed that Moscow's charge against Pakistan was based
on guess work! 'The timely refutation of the Soviet charge by the
spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry', therefore 'is fully
• • f • bl I 81 EStl 1~.
78Aleksy Perrov, 'Provocations Continue', Pravda, 1 June 1979, in
SWB:SU, No.6131, 2 June 1979, p.A3/1. 79P k' . 16 a 1stan T1mes, May 1979, 17 May 1979 and 24 May 1979. 80
See, for example, NCNA, 18 May 1979, FBIS:CHI, 18 May 1979; NCNA, 25 May 1979, in FBIS:CHI, 25 May 1979, p.F/2; and NCNA, 27 May 1979, p.F/2;
81'Ill omen', Renmin Ribao, 26 May 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6129, 31 May
1979, p.C/1 (emphasis added).
231
scale interventionist plans direct.ed against Afghanistan' , it wrote,
'are actually being drawn up ••• Several thousand Afghan rebels,
equipped with Chinese and US arms and trained in the ways of guerilla
warfare, are now concentrated on the territory of Pakistan. They are
destined to be sent into Afghanistan to provoke armed conflict
between Afghanistan and Pakistan'. Then pointing out that 'friendly
relations between the two neighbouring countries meet the national
interests of both Afghanistan and Pakistan', it concluded:
In spite of warnings and public denials by Pakistan, its territory, as shown by numerous facts, continues to be used as a place d' armes for subversive action against the neighbouring state. Pakistan is being drawn into a risky game which may have disastrous consequences. 77
This was followed on 1st June by another Pravda article which accused
Pakistan of 'direct complicity' in the unseemly subversive activities
of 'groups of bandits and diversionists' from Pakistani territory
against the DRA. The bandits and terrorists captured, it stated,
testified that the anti-Afghanistan groups were being trained with
the participation of Pakistani and Chinese instructors and, that they
were being supplied with weapons_ and ammunition as well as large sums
of money in Pakistan, 'Consequent.ly', it stated, 'the facts of the
recent days give a lie to the assurances of the Pakistani
administration that it would not allow its territory to be used for
anti-Afghanistan activities. Interference from Pakistan in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan is taking place it is now a
reality' . The article, once again, concluded with a warning that
'violation of Afghanistan's sovereignty, incursions of armed gangs
into its territory from Pakistan and the attempts to create a crisis
77Text of agency report of Pravda article by Yuriy Glikhov, Tass,
23 May 1979, in SWB:SU, No.6124-, -24 May 1979, pp.A3/1-2 (emphasis added).
233
Three weeks later, on 15 June 1979, against a background of
continuous Soviet and Afghan charges of Pakistan's complicity in the
Afghan rebellion, Radio Peking transmitted a detailed report which
indirectly supported Islamabad. Echoing Pakistan's stand that the
policies pursued by the Afghan regime itself, rather than the alleged
outside interference, accounted for the turmoil in Afghanistan, the
report stated that 'in the final analysis' there were three major
causes for the breaking out and spreading of anti-government armed
activity in 15 of the country's 29 provinces and municipalities.
Firstly, it explained, 'Since coming into power in April 1978, the
present Afghan Government had carried out three major cleaning-up
campaigns, suppressing large numbers of people, not only military and
government officials and religious and tribal personages who had
opposed the present regime, but also ordinary staff members and
workers. Secondly, numerous economic difficulties, poor agricultural
harvests and insufficient industrial funds had rendered the lives of
the people very hard, creating an exodus of 300,000 refugees to Iran,
Pakistan and some Arab countries. Third, the present government's
'extraordinary relationship' with the Soviet Union had aroused
discontent among the people of all strata resulting in intensified
anti-government activity. The Afghan government's attempts to
suppress this activity with Soviet backing, it explained, had aroused
discontent among military personnel who had been mutinying and
defecting to the anti-government armed forces. 'With the many
up-to-date weapons they have carried away with them' , the report
maintained, 'the Muslim armed forces have been able to improve their
equipment and greatly increase their fighting capacity', thereby
implying that Pakistan was not, as charged by the Soviet and Afghan
Governments, a place d'armes. 82
82Radio Peking, 15 June 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6145, 19 June 1979,
pp.C1/1.
234
The strongest refutation and criticism of Soviet and/or Afghan
charges against Pakistan, however, was made by NCNA on 26 June 1979.
Commenting on the statement made by the Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Organisation of the Soviet Union on 21st June 1979, which'
call [ ed] on the international democratic public and on all people to
resolutely demand an end to the open military interference [in the
DRA] by the Pakistan authorities,' it stated: 'This is the first time
that an official Soviet organ has come out with an attack against
Pakistan. This is something which warrants public attention' • The
Soviet Union, it explained, had begun its propaganda campaign against
Pakistan last March, but at that time the tone of the attack was
comparatively mild, and the targets of attack, apart from Pakistan
included same other countries. Since April, however, the Soviet Union
had increasingly directed its attacks solely against Pakistan, and
charges and intimidations had escalated. This escalation in Moscow's
attacks on Pakistan, it maintained, had always been paralleled with
the Soviet intensified control of and intervention in Afghanistan,
the latest attack by the AAPSO, therefore, it pointed out, was
significant not because it was valid but because it indicated
Moscow's anxiety over the situation in Afghanistan and its attempt to
once again find a pretext for increased intervention in that
83 country.
The Chinese media's support for Pakistan against the Soviet and
Afghan charges continued during July and August 1979 as well. For
instance, on 8 August, i.e. only three days after the fierce fighting
between Afghan guerillas and armed forces (which was followed by
83NCNA, 26 June 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6152, 27 June 1979, pp.C/2-3;
see also, Xue Yuan 'The Soviet Union will suffer the consequences of its interference in Afghanistan', Renmin Ribao, 29 June 1979, p.6, in FBIS~~~~' 10 July 1979, pp.C/1-2.
235
Soviet and Afghan allegations and Pakistani denials of any
complicity); 84
Renmin Ribao published an article which repeated the
arguments that the resistance movement in Afghanistan was triggered
by the Soviet interference in the country, and that Moscow was
further tightening its control over all Afghanistan by taking
advantage of the turmoil. However, it stated, to cover its actions
up, Tass had 'attributed the fighting which broke out in Kabul to the
provocations carried out by "imperialist forces in conjunction with
85 foreign reactionaries and their former pawns"'.
This was followed by another commentary, transmitted by NCNA on
20 August 1979, which stated that the Soviet Union, which was the
root cause of the turbulent situation in Afghanistan, had always
tried 'to cover up the truth by throwing the blame on the
Afghanistan's neighbours as well as other countries'. To prove that
this contention was correct, it quoted an editorial in the Hindustan
Times on 8 August 1979 which had argued that the scale of fighting
inside Afghanistan could no longer be explained away as the work of
counter-revolutionaries and their abettors. To further reinforce its
argument, it also quoted a commentary in the July 1979 issue of Round
Table which had pointed out that 'no one had yet produced a scrap of
evidence to connect any foreign power directly with the uprising in
H t th b 11 . . th Af h . ' 86 era or e re e 1on 1n e g an prov1nces • In September
1979, the situation changed. As a result of a palace coup, Hafizullah
Amin, the main organiser of the April 1978, ousted and killed Taraki
84see, for example, Text of communique of The Government of the
DRA, Radio Kabul, 5 August 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6187, 7 August 1979, p.C/1; Radio Moscow, 9 August 1979, in SWB:FE, No.6191, 11 August 1979, p.c/4; and Pakistan Times, 7 August 1979.
85 . Xue Yuan, the instability of the Political Situation in
Afghanistan', Renmin Ribao, 8 August 1979, p.5, in FBIS:CHI, 22 August 1979, p.F/2.
86NCNA, 20 August 1979, in SWB:FE, No.7202, 22 August 1979, p.C/3.
236
and came to power. Soon after assuming control, Arnin attempted to
improve relations with Pakistan in a bid to bring the Pakistan-based
insurgency to an end. He not only declared his resolve to settle the
'outstanding issues' between Kabul and Islamabad through friendly
negotiations, but also renewed the invitations earlier made by
Taraki, for visits by Pakistani Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, and
General Zia. Although Islamabad did not respond to these overtures
as enthusiastically as Kabul would have preferred, General Zia did
announce on 2 7 September 1979 that his government was prepared to
87 exchange views at the foreign ministers' level.
As the diplomatic negotiations to set a date for Agha Shahi' s
visit began, despite the fact that the Soviet Union continued to
occasionally accuse Pakistan of collaborating with the other states
to undo the revolution, the Chinese Government ceased to issue any
statements refuting these allegations. At the same time, once again
Peking began to shy away from categorically expressing its support
for Pakistan. On 8 October 1979, for instance, at the banquet for the
visiting Pakistani Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Anwar Shamim, the
Chinese Commander of the Air Force, Zhang Tingfa used a much weaker
phrase to express Peking's support for Pakistan than he himself had
used earlier in March 1979. 'We always hold', he said, 'that Pakistan
which adheres to a policy of independence and sovereignty and stands
on the subcontinent of South Asia will play an important role in
maintaining stability and peace in this region', and then wished
Pakistan prosperity, stability and constant growth. 88 Similarly,
only twelve days later, during his visit to Islamabad, Zhang Caiqian,
Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA restricted himself to only
87p k' a 1stan Times, 28 September 1979. 88
NCNA, 8 October 1979, in FBIS: CHI, 17 October 1979, p.F/1.
237
stating that 'stable and prosperous Pakistan is of great significance
to the defence of peace in this region and in the world' •89
This change proved shortlived. On 27 December 1979, the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan, ousted and killed Amin and installed
Babrak Karmal as the head of the state. Soon afterwards, the Chinese
Government reverted to its policy of refuting Soviet and Afghan
allegations, a trend which to date has continued.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the emergence of
a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan was viewed apprehensively by the
Pakistan Government. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government was
unwilling to categorically identify itself or support Pakistan
a~ainst a perceived Soviet threat and obvious Afghan attempt to
exploit the secessionist tendencies in Baluchistan and NWFP. It was
only, at the turn of 1979, when Afghanistan signed a Treaty of
Friendship with the Soviet Union that Beijing gradually moved to
. support; Pakistan against Kabul and/or Moscow. This support primarily
took the form of refuting Soviet and Afghanistan allegations of
Pakistan 1 s complicity in training and arming Afghan guerillas. The
duration of Hafizullah Amin ascent to power, however, once again
witnessed Beijing's reluctance to categorically side with Islamabad.
This chapter raises major questions about China's policy towards
South Jl.sia d·uring the 1978-79 period. These questions, which will
be answered in Chapter X, are as follows:
What was Beijing's perception of the Taraki regime in 1978?
vvhy did this perception change at the turn of 1979?
Why d.i d China avoid siding with Pakistan during Amin 's rule?
'J'o v1hat extent does China's fear of Soviet encircJ ement explain
the Chinese responses to the Afghan Coup of 1978?
89~SNA, 22 October 1979, in FBIS: 25 October 1979, p.F/2.
CHAPTER VIII
CHINESE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN : 1969-79
The most frequently mentioned and least discussed aspect of
China's relations with Pakistan relates to its economic and military
assistance It is, for instance, frequently emphasised that, with
military and economic aid worth US$378 million provided during the
1965-79 period, Pakistan ranks as the largest recipient of Chinese
assistance among the non-communist Asian states. 1 However, with one
exception, little or no attempt has been made to focus attention on
this dimension of Sino-Pakistani relations. 2 The main reason for
this neglect is probably the barriers faced by the researchers in
accumulating relevant data. The two states are signatories to an
agreement which prohibits them from divulging any information on
their economic and military interactions. 3 It is, therefore, often
difficult to obtain exact information from either of them on the
Chinese component in even the most widely publicised projects
undertaken by the Pakistan Government with Beijing's aid. The news
media of the two countries do not provide a clear picture either;
while the Chinese press generally refrains from reporting any news of
aid to Islamabad, the Pakistani press repeatedly reports the same
news, thereby conveying an impression that the quantum of Chinese
economic aid is much larger than is the reality. 4
1 John Franklin Copper, China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80, Occasional
Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, School of Law, University of Maryland, No.5, 1981, p.15.
2 Yaacov Vertzberger, 'The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistan
Relations: Trade and Aid, 1963-82', Asian Survey, vol. XXII, No. 5, May 1983, PP• 637-652
3rnterview with an official
Government of Pakistan. of Economic Affairs Division,
4An example of the confusion created by such reporting is the
information provided by Wolfgang Bartke who identified Beijing as providing US $82.0 million during 1967-68 instead of the correct amount of only US$40.6 million. Wolfgang Bartke, China's Economic Aid, (London: c. Hurst & Company, 1975), pp.10-11.
240
The barriers become even higher when one ventures into the
sphere of military assistance. Unlike in the case of western
suppliers, the Chinese Government does not announce the conclusion of
any agreement on military aid. Consequently, while it is possible to
ascertain to some degree the number and type of weapons transferred,
it is immensely difficult to obtain information on the time of
conclusion and the exact terms of the agreements under which these
arms are supplied. Neither is it easy to estimate the value of these
arms transfers with any degree of precision. The US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which has access to information
unobtainable by independent research organisations, for instance,
provides information on the cumulative value of Chinese arms
5 transferred to Pakistan during the last five or ten years. Though
significant, as these values include the smallest items and equipment
for defence industries, they are not necessarily useful for a
researcher who might wish to focus on a specific period of time. The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), on the
other hand, makes available its unpublished worksheets which provide
an annual breakdown of the value of Chinese arms supplied to Pakistan
but due to its tendency to count every announced sale as a transfer
it comes up with figures that, to the despair of the analysts, are
substantially higher than those of ACDA. 6
Notwithstanding these barriers, however, it is possible to trace
a pattern, even if a bit sketchy, of the Chinese economic and
5 See, for example, ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1969-1978, (Washington: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, December 1980), pp. 159-162; and ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1972-1982, (Washington: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 1984), pp.95-98.
6 Lawrence Freedman, 'The Arms Trade: A Review', International Affairs, (London), Vol.55, No.3, p.433.
241
military assistance to Pakistan, and this chapter precisely attempts
to achieve this goal with reference to the period from 1969 to 1979.
It is divided into two parts; the first part focuses on the economic
aid, whereas the second deals with the military dimensions of the
Sino-Pakistan relations.
Chinese Economic Aid to Pakistan
Due to the widespread poverty in the country, the Pakistan
Government has always found it difficult to mobilise adequate
resources from the domestic economy to meet its requirements of
capital goods, industrial raw materials and other essential
equipment. To bridge the gap between total foreign exchange earnings
and the total import bill, therefore, it has relied on foreign
economic assistance since independence. During the 1950s, the bulk
of this assistance, which took the form of grants and loans and
increased from US$371 million during the 1950-55 period to US$990
million in the First Five Year Plan (1955-60), was provided by the
United States and various Western countries and agencies (later
organised as the 'Pakistan Consortium') under bilateral agreements.7
It was only in July 1964 that the Soviet Union became the first
Communist state to provide a loan worth US$25. 9 million with an
interest-rate of 2. 5% and repayable in 12 years for exploration of
mineral resources, including oil. 8
The Chinese aid relationship with Pakistan, however, was
established in 1964 when Beijing offered an interest-free loan of
7rrving Brecher and S.A. Abbas, Foreign Aid and Industrial
Development in Pakistan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp.22-24; and Pakistan Economic Survey: 1970-71, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1971"), p.124.
8Pakistan Economic Survey: 1973-74, (Islamabad: Government of
Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1974), p.97.
242
US$60 million, to be repaid in Pakistani currency and goods over a
period of twenty years beginning in 1976. 9 Half of the loan was to
be utilised for importing various commodities from China including
steel billets, coal, aluminium conductors, galvanised sheets,
structural steel and electrical installations. 10 The remaining half
was earmarked for various industrial projects. During the talks held
in June 1966 to discuss the nature of these projects, the Chinese
Government agreed to allocate a major share of this project aid to
providing technical assistance and equipment for a Heavy Mechanical
Complex in Taxila designed to produce complete plants for sugar mills
and cement factories, low-pressure boilers, overhead travelling
cranes, earth-moving implements such as road rollers, scrapers and
bulldozers, and railway equipment. Construction of this complex was
to begin in 1967 and be completed by 1972 with full production
capability to be acquired in 1978. 11
This first Chinese loan was followed by another, worth US $6. 9
million, in January 1967. Extended solely for the purpose of
importing 100,000 tons of wheat and 50,000 tons of rice from China,
this loan was also interest-free and was repayable in 20 years
12 following a grace period of ten years.
At the turn of 1969, the Chinese Government extended another
interest-free credit worth US$40.6 million. Repayment, as with the
previous two loans, was to commence after a grace of 10 years and was to
extend over two decades. 13 According to the terms of the agreement,
9 John Franklin Copper, -?e\<ing' s Foreign Polic;r,
p. 61. 10
Dawn, 28 December 1967.
China's {London:
Foreign Aid: An Instrument of D.C., Heath and Company, 1976) ,
11 Dawn, 19 August 1966, 7 February 1967, and 18 January 1969.
12Pakistan Economic Survey: 1970-71, p.86.
13 Ibid~
243
one-third of this credit was allocated for purchase of Chinese
commodities including cement, coal and 14
steel. The remaining
two-thirds was earmarked for specific development projects such as a
sugar mill, a chemical fertiliser plant in East Pakistan, and a
refractory plant for manufacturing magnesite bricks. Most
importantly, this loan was to provide the foreign exchange component
for a proposed Heavy Foundry and Forge project at Taxila which was
designed to supplement the Heavy Mechanical complex and, at full
capacity, was to produce steel castings, steel ingots, iron castings,
press forging, forged billets and copper and aluminium castings worth
15 Rs 395.7 million annually. During the fiscal year 1970-71, the
Chinese Government announced two additional loans for Pakistan. The
first one was interest-free and worth US$2.9 million.16
The second
loan, which was offered during General Yahya' s visit to Beijing in
November 1970, was the largest donation of aid yet to Pakistan and
one of the largest the Chinese Government had made to any Third World
state; a US$217.391 million interest-free loan, repayable over twenty
years with a 10 year grace period. 17 Negotiations on the utilisation
of these loans began in 1971 and by mid-October 1971 the Chinese
Government agreed to assist Pakistan in setting up small fertiliser
factories run on gas in different parts of the eastern wing and
inserting 5,000 tube wells in the northern districts of the province.
It also agreed to send its experts to East Pakistan in November 1971,
14oawn, 27 December 1968. 15
Pakistan Times, 10 April 1970; and Pakistan Economic Surv~ 1974-75, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1975), p.56.
16This loan was also repayable over a period of 20 years with a 10
year's grace period. Pakistan Economic Survey: 1971-72, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1972), p.87.
17 The only other Chinese loan that exceeded this amount was offered
to Tanzania and was worth US$270 million. Bartke, op.cit., p.11.
244
to determine the feasibility of ten developmental projects for which
Islamabad had sought Beijing's assistance. 18
Due to the outbreak of
the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971, and the secession of East
Pakistan, however, these projects were never undertaken.
During Bhutto' s visit to Beijing in January 1972, the Chinese
Government converted four project-cum-commodity loans amounting to
US$110.4 million into grants and deferred the repayment of the
19 US$217.391 million loan of 1970 for twenty years. Thereafter, the
Chinese Government did not provide any grant assistance, but it did
advance three additional loans. The first, in 1975-76, was worth
US$4.293 million, and repayment was to commence immediately at 4.5%
interest. The second loan, worth US$5.718 million, was provided in
1977-78 at an interest rate of 4.5% to 5.0% per annum, and an
amortization period of 6. 5 years. This was followed in 1978-79 by
another loan worth US$3. 618 million, repayable over a period of six
years at an interest rate of 4.5% per annum (Table 1).
Cumulatively, these loans were utilised primarily for a number
of industrial projects undertaken by the Government of Pakistan.
Although an exhaustive list of these projects is not possible to
obtain, the most frequently reported by the Pakistan news media
include:
1. Larkana sugar mill, which was completed in March 1975. This mill has an annual crushing capacity of 400,000 tons and it provides employment for 3,000 people1 20
18The list included, among others, aid for a new Dacca-Chittagong
railway line, railway signalling, the Rupsa bridge, and a power supply system for the irrigation projects of the East Pakistan Agricultural Development Bank. Ibid, pp.156-157.
19,s. k' . --~no-Pa ~stan Jo~nt Communique: 2 February 1972', NCNA, 2
February 1972 in SCMP, No. 5075, February 1972, pp.44-461 and Pakistan Economic S~y: 1973-74, p.89.
20P k. . 15 19 a ~stan T~mes, March 75.
:245
TABLE 1: CHINESE LOANS CONTRACTED BY PAKISTAN: 1969-1979 (US$ MILLION)
Year Amount
1968-69 40.6 1970-71 2.9 1970-71 217.391 1975-76 4.293
1977-78 5.718 1978-79 3.618
Sources:
Interest Rate %
0 0 0
4.5
4.5-5.0 4.5
Amortisation Period
30 years 30 years 30 years
7 years
6. 5 years 6 years
Remarks
tConverted into grants tin February 1972. tAmortization period twas increased to 40 tin February 1972
yrs
(1) Pakistan Economic Survey: 1970-71, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1971), p.86.
(2) Pakistan Economic Survey: 1971-7~, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1972), p.87.
(3) Pakistan Economic Survey: 1979-80, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1980), pp.154-158.
2. Exploration of copper, chromitl Baluchistan, Kalabagh and Kashmir; 2
and iron ore in
3. Two mini-steel mills; one in Nok Kundi, Baluchistan, based on local iron ore deposits, and another one at Kashmore -a place where the border of three provinces, i.e. Sind, Baluchistan and Punjab meet, also based on local iron ore deposits; 22
4. Two fertiliser plants in the NWFP; one near Peshawar with an annual production capacity of 70,000 tons of urea, and another one in Haripur, Hazara, of 95,000 tons; 23
5. One glass-sheet factory at Nawshera, NWFP, wh~<ah would also manufacture safety glass for motor vehicles;
6. One cement factory in Daoud Khail, NWFP;25
7. Five textile mills in Dera Ghazi Khan, Tarbela, Kotri, Mirpur (Azad Kashmir) and Punjab; 26
8. The construction of Tarbela-Wah 220 kW double-circuit transmission line to link Tarbela power station with the
. 1 'd 27 nat1.ona gr1. ;
9. The installation of a new 30,000 kW thermal power station 28 at Quetta.
246
Other Chinese aided projects, which are either planned or under
construction, include a ceramic factory in NWFP, 29
a refractory in
2 1Mehrunissa Ali, 'Pakistan, China Relations' , Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XXXVII, No.2, Second Quarter, 1974, p.55.
22P k' . 9 ( 1 a 1.stan Econom1.c Survey: 1 79-80, Is amabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1980), p.77; and Pakistan Times, 29 June 1977.
23Pakistan Times, 15 June 1973; Radio Karachi, 10 August 1974, in SWB:FE, No.W789, 21 August 1974, p.A/36; Pakistan Economic Survey: 1977-78, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1978), p.54; and Bartke, op.cit., p.155.
24Pakistan Times, 10 September 1975; and Radio Karachi, 20 May
1976, in SWB:FE, No.W880, 2 June 1976, p.A/23. 25
Pakistan Times, 10 September 1975; Radio Karachi, 28 August 1975, in SWB:FE, No.W842, 3 September 1975, p.A/31. 26~tan Times, 9 January and 8 June 1974; Radio Karachi, 26
April 1975, in SWB:FE, No.W825, 7 May 1975, p.A/32; Dawn, 6 June 1975.
27p k' . 3 a 1.stan T1.mes, 2 MayJC)1'5" 28p k' . a 1.stan T1.mes, 29R d' h' a 1.0 Karac 1.,
1975, p.A/31.
18 November 1972.
28 August 2975, in SWB:FE, No.W842, 3 September
247
30 . b d . d 31 Abbotabad, and two sugar mills, one each in PunJa an S1n .
Although canprising only 2. 81% of the total grants and loans
received by Pakistan during the period from 1969 to 1979 32 I the
Chinese economic assistance had been significant for a number of
reasons. Firstly, it had been provided when Pakistan was in dire
need of foreign aid. In 1970, for example, the Pakistan Government
had launched its Fourth Five Year Plan envisaging an annual increase
of 6.5% in the GNP, and a total expenditure of Rs 49,000 million in
the public sector and Rs 26,000 million in the private sector but its
foreign exchange reserves were so low that, unlike the estimated
foreign aid requirement of US$2 ,850 million for the Third Five Year
Plan (1965-70), it required foreign assistance worth US$4,620 million
to finance the Plan. 33 Economic assistance from the Western
countries, however, was not forthcoming. The Aid-to-Pakistan
Consortium countries had pledged or indicated a contribution of
US$578. 4 million for the first financial year of the Plan but the
actual disbursement of this assistance was delayed as the Consortium
postponed its meeting, from December 1970, to March 1971. The
Pakistan Government, therefore, asked the International Monetary Fund
34 (IMF) for a loan of US$50 million for the financial year 1970-71.
The IMF agreed in principle to meet the request but tied the loan
30Radio Karachi, 18 October 1977, in SWB:FE, No.W593, 2 November 1977, p.A/24.
31 Interview with an officia Government of Pakistan.
l of Economic Affairs Division,
32The total loans and 1969-79 period amounted Survey: 1970-71, p.86: pp. 169,. 163.
grants provided to Pakistan during the to US$9473,945 million Pakistan Economic
and Pakistan Economic Survey: 1979-89,
33Pakistan Economic Survey: 1970-71, pp.125-1267 Werner 'Socialists Go East', FEER, 2 July 1970, p.91; and Iqbal 'Pakistan's Collapsable Plans', ".;,_~·, 13 March 1971, p.73.
34Ib1'd_ d k' _ ; an Pa 1stan Economic Survey: 1970-71, p. 127.
Adam, Mirza,
248
with the demand that Pakistan should devalue its currency. Although
the Pakistan Governmen·t did not concede to the demand immediately,
the possibility of such a decision affected markedly the total value
of home remittances made by overseas Pakistanis. 35 At this stage,
without attaching any strings, the Chinese Government offered an
interest-free loan of US$217.391 million which comprised 21.62% of
the total aid pledged to Pakistan during the 1970-71 fiscal year and,
therefore, reduced the economic burden on the Pakistan Government to
36 some extent. Similarly in early 1972, when the Bangla Desh crisis
and the Indo-Pakistan war ( 1971) had resulted in almost complete
depletion of Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves, and the COnsortium
countries were not prepared to assist the government of the 'new'
Pakistan against a virtual collapse of its economy by resuming the
aid supplies suspended in mid-1971, the Chinese Government had taken
the initiative of converting four loans into grants and extending the
37 grace period for the November-1970 loan for another ten years.
Secondly, the terms of the Chinese aid were more favourable than
those granted by any other country, capitalist or communist. For
instance unlike Soviet loans with an interest rate of 2. 5% per annum
and American loans with interest rates ranging from 0. 75% to 7% per
38 annum, 95.03% of the total Chinese loans extended to Pakistan
during the 1969-79 period were interest-free and included a ten year
grace period before repayment was to commence.
Jhirdl:Y.,, a major portion of the loans and grants was utilised
for establishing projects which the western donors had been unwilling
35werner Adam, 'Pakistan: Bankrupt Heirloom', FEER, 30 January 1971, p.8.
36p k' . a 1stan Econom1c Survey: 1970-71, pp.BS-86. 37p k' a 1stan Economic Survey: 1972-73, (Islamabad: Government of
Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1973), p.107. 38p k' t . ~~n E~~~om1c Survey: 1979-80, pp.150-158.
249
to finance. A major proportion of the 1968-69 loan which was later
converted into grant, for example, was allocated for Chinese
technical assistance and equipment for a Heavy Foundry and Forge
project --- the first of its kind in the country which was
expected to save Pakistan Rs 395.7 million a year once it reached
f 11 d t . . t 39 u pro uc 1on capac1 y.
Fourthly, the terms on which the project aid was offered were
more favourable than those offered by various Western donors. The
Chinese Government, did not insist that its technicians and workers
be given salaries higher than those of their Pakistani coworkers.
Instead it stipulated in the project aid agreements that its workers
would be paid in accordance with Pakistani standards. Considering
that in projects undertaken with the assistance of western countries,
a major proportion of the loan is generally used up by paying for
disproportionately higher salaries to the consultants and workers of
the donor state, the Chinese refusal to follow suit meant that the
Chinese aid was proportionately more valuable than equivalent sums in
Western (or Soviet) aid.
Fifthly, instead of being concentrated in the relatively more
developed province of Punjab, the Chinese aided projects were
established in all four provinces and, being labour-intensive in
nature, provided employment for people in even the remote areas of
Baluchistan like Nok Kundi.
Notwithstanding these favourable attributes, the fact remains
that viewed on its own, the Chinese economic assistance to Pakistan
gradually declined during the period from 1969 to 1979. This becomes
evident, from a comparison of the total value of Chinese loans
contracted by Pakistan during the period under review. During the
39Pakista~ Ec~nomic Survey: 1974-75, p.56.
250
period between the fiscal years 1968-69 and 1970-71, Beijing had
granted Islamabad three loans which amounted to US$260.891 million.
In marked contrast, however, the total value of three Chinese loans
extended to Pakistan during the second half of the 1970s did not
exceed US$13.629 million. The terms of the loans also gradually
became less favourable; the first three loans, were interest-free,
and included a grace period of ten to twenty years before the
repayment was due to commence and three of them were converted into
grants. 'rhe loans provided during the period from 1975 to 1979,
however, not only incurred an interest rate of 4. 5% to 5. 0% per annum
b t l d ;d t . . d 40 u a so ~ not con a~n any grace per~o •
These changes in the volume and terms of Chinese economic
assistance to Pakistan were accompanied by a decline in Pakistan 1 s
share of total Chinese aid to Third World countries. In 1970, for
example, the US$ 217.391 million loan extended to Islamabad
constituted 28.2% of the total loans granted by Beijing to various
underdeveloped countries in that year. This share, however, declined
to 1.17% in 1975. Two years later, it increased to 3.14%, but in
1978-79, with the Chinese loan worth US$3. 618 million, Pakistan 1 s
share of Chinese aid commitments to the Third World, once again
registered a decline to 1.95% (Table. 2).
Concomitantly, the rate of disbursement of Chinese loans to
Pakistan also slowed down. During the period between 1972 and 1975,.
for instance, on an average, US$16.88 million were disbursed
annually. However, this rate declined by 15% in the 1976-78 period
to an annual average of US$14.34 million dollars. This is
40This is especially significant as the Soviet loans to Pakistan
during the 1975-79 period were extended at an interest rate of 2.5% to 3.0% per annum only. Pakistan Economic Survey: 1979-80, pp.156-158.
TABLE 2: PAKISTAN'S SHARE OF THE TOTAL CHINESE LOANS EXTENDED TO DEVELOPING STATES: 1969-79
Year
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
(US$ MILLION)
Total Chinese aid extended to developing countries
781 563 607 600 282 366 150 182 185
Total Chinese aid extended to Pakistan
220.3
4.293
5.718 3.618
% of the total
28.20
1. 17
3. 14 1. 95
251
National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Non-Communist Less Develo£~~ Coun~ries: 1978,
Aid Activities in (Washington, D.C.:
Central Intelligence Agency, 1979), p.11.
(2) Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China- 1980, Hearings before th~ Subcommittee -;:m- Priorities and Ec;;-omy in G;;;,ernment of the Joint Economic Committee, 96th Congress, Second Session, 30 June and 25 September 1980, (Washington, D.C.: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 78.
(3) Pakistan Economic S~:t::_~ey: 1979-80, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1980), pp.154-158.
252
significant as in the corresponding period, despite a relative
decline in total Chinese commitments, the overall rate of
disbursement of Chinese credits to the Third World states had
increased on average by 7.6% (Table. 3)
That the value of Chinese economic assistance to Pakistan
gradually declined during the period from 1969 to 1979, however,
becomes most evident with a comparison of 'grant equivalent' and
'grant ratio' of various Chinese loans extended to Pakistan during
the period under consideration. The 'grant equivalent', i.e. The
difference between the amount of a loan and the present value of the
flows generated by repayment41 can be determined by the following two
42 formulae:
G
and
G
where
T L - L:
j=l
L -P j=l
[ c. + I.
] J J
(l+q) J
I. T C .+I. + L: J J j
(l+q) j j=M+l (l+q) j ..
- G is the grant equivalent in cash terms.
- L is the face value of the loan.
41Abbas, op.cit., pp.178-179.
(1)
(2)
42rt must be pointed out that various other formulae can also be
used to determine the grant equivalent of loans, and that this formula has been used primarily because its ability has been proved in a previous study of Chinese loans to Third World State, Janos Morvath, Chinese Technology Transfer to the Third World, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp.25-32.
TABLE 3: A COMPARISON OF THE YEARLY DISBURSEMENT OF CHINESE LOANS TO PAKISTAN AND ALL THE THIRD WORLD STATES: 1972-79
Year
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
(US$ MILLION)
Disbursement to all the developing countries
260 240 255 180 315 225 215 n.a.
Disbursement to Pakistan
28.720 12.121 5.941
20.77 14.78 14. 13 14. 13 n.a.
Sources: (1) National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in
Non-Communist Less Developed Countries: 1978, (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1979), p.11.
(2) Pakistan Economic Survey: 1972-73, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1973), p.111.
(3) Pakistan Economic Survey: 1973-74, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1974), p.92.
(4) Pakistan Economic Survey: 1974~75, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1975), p.112.
(5) Pakistan Economic Survey: 1976-77, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1977), p.117.
(6) Pakistan Economic Sur~ey~ 1977-78, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's Wing, 1978), p.108.
(7) Pakistan Economic Survey: 1979-80, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser's ·Wing, 1980), p.144.
(8) Pakistan Statistical Yearbook: 197~, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, 1977), p.161.
(9) Paki?tan ~tatistical Yearbook: __ ~~77, (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, 1978), p.160.
- T is the time of maturity in years.
- q is the opportunity rate of discount as a fraction.
- Cj and Ij are, respectively, the capital repayment and the interest payment due at the end of the jth year, and
- M is the moratorium years on repayments, that is the grace period.
254
The 'grant ratio', on the other hand is the proportion of grant
43 equivalent in a loan and can be ascertained as follows:
g' G/L X 100
where
- g' is the grant ratio.
- G is the grant equivalent, and
- L is the face value of the loan.
Computed on the basis of these formulae, and the assumption that
the opportunity rate of discount is 6% , it becomes evident that the
grant equivalent and grant ratio of the Chinese loans offered to
Pakistan gradually declined during the 1969 - 79 period. The Chinese
loan worth US$ 40.6 million offered to Pakistan during the fiscal
year 1968-69 and later converted into a grant, for instance,
initially contained a grant equivalent worth of US$2 7. 566 million
with a grant ratio of 67.89%. The second loan worth US$2. 9 million
also contained a grant equivalent of US$1.97 million with a grant
ratio of 68.24%. The third loan worth US$217.391 million was offered
on even better terms; while initially its grant equivalent amounted
to US$147.771 million with a 67.97% grant ratio, after Beijing's
decision to defer its payment for 20 years, its grant equivalent was
255
increased to US$178.523 million thereby raising the grant ratio to a
record level of 82. 12%. In marked contrast, however, the Chinese
loan of US$4.293 million contracted by Pakistan in 1975-76 contained
a grant equivalent worth of US$0.723 million only with a grant ratio
of 16.84%. The US$5.718 million credit of 1977-78 contained an even
lesser amount of grant, i.e. a grant equivalent worth of US$0. 566
million only with the grant ratio declining to a mere 9.89%.
Although these two values for the US$3.618 million worth loan
extended in 1978-79 increased to US$0.523 million and 14.45%
respectively, the fact remains that the grant equivalent and grant
ratio of the Chinese loans, and hence their real value, declined
during the second half of the 1970s (Chart I & Table 4).
Chinese Military Assistance to Pakistan
Since independence in 194 7, Pakistan has perceived India as
posing a major threat to its security. The Indians, Islamabad has
believed, have never accepted the partition and, therefore, would
some day take military measures to reincorporate Pakistan into India.
Hence, from the outset, Pakistan' s defence policy has been
preoccupied with maintaining a military balance vis-a-vis India.
Because Pakistan has been industrially and economically much weaker
than its neighbour, this preoccupation has resulted in Islamabad
pursuing a policy of closely aligning itself with and acquiring
weapons from extra-regional major powers. During the 1950s and early
1960s this policy found expression in Pakistan's membership of the
Western alliance system and close defence links with the United
States which entitled it to sufficient arms deliveries to offset the
perceived Indian threat.
In 1965, however, the Chinese Government also came into the
picture. This entry was caused by the US decision to impose an arms
TABLE 4: GRANT EQUIVALENT OF CHINESE LOANS CONTRACTED BY PAKISTAN 1968/69-1979/80 (FISCAL YEARS)
-----·---·------------- ·-------Year
1968-69 1970-71 1970-71 (a) 1971-72(a) 1975-76 1977-78 1978-79
Loan (US$ million)
40.6 2.9
217.391 217.391
4.293 5.718 3.618
Grant equivalent (US$ million)
27.566 1. 97
147.771 178.523
6. 723 0.566 0.523
(a): The loan extended in November 1970.
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey: 1979-80.
and Personal calculations
256
Grant Ratio (Perc age)
100
50
0
a
b
*
257
Ct--fART 1: COMPARISON OF GRANT RATIO OF CHINESE LOANS EXTENDED TO PAKISTAN: 1968 - 1979 (FISCAL· YEARS)
a * The U$217.391m. worth loan's
grant ratio in November 1970
b * The U$217.39lm. worth loan's
grant ratio after Chinese decision to defer repayment for 20 years
1968- 1970- 1970- 1971- 1975- 1977- 1978-1969 1971 1971 1972 1976 1978 1979
F I seal Years
258
embargo on both India and Pakistan on 8 September 1965, L e. only
two days after the Third Indo-Pakistan war had broken out. This arms
embargo, which was fully lifted only in April 1967,44
affected
Pakistan more than India because, unlike the Indian Government which
had received less than US$110 million worth of American military
assistance45 the Pakistan Government was almost entirely dependent on
the Unites States for military equipment. 46 Soon after the 1965 war,
therefore, the Pakistan Government faced the task of not only
replenishing the losses incurred during the war through sources other
than the United States but, also to eliminating any future risk of
being rendered completely defenceless through total dependence on any
single arms-supplying state. However, very soon it became clear that
the NATO countries and the USSR were hesitant to sell arms to
Pakistan for fear of alienating India which had consistently opposed
any decision to supply weapons to its regional adversary. 4 7 The
Pakistan Government, therefore turned towards China which, not
inhibited by any consideration of India's reaction, agreed to provide
military aid to 1965. Under this agreement, the existence of which
44Although the embargo was partially lifted in February 1966, it
was only in April 1967 that the US Government agreed to sell weapons to Pakistan on cash basis. SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World, (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), p.495.
45Following the Sino-Indian border war, the US had promised to
provide military aid worth US$11 0 million to India but it had only partially been delivered when the Ind;t:a-Pakistan war broke out in 1965. The Times, (London), 5 March 1963~ New York Times, 13 May 1964.
46 d' Accor J.ng to the SIPRI worksheets, although the value of US military assistance to Pakistan had decreased from US $2 7, 0 13, 0 0 0 in 1962 to US$2,201,000 in 1964 the US still met 100% of Pakistan's defence needs when the war broke out in 1965. SIPRI worksheets, Unpublished data.
47Anwar Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entante Cordiale,
(London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.129.
259
was not acknowledged until 23 March 1966,48
the Chinese Government
supplied Pakistan with 4 MiG-15s (UTI), 4 IL 28 bombers, 40
MiG-19 (F-6) interceptor/fighter aircraft and approximately 80 T-59
medium tanks during the 1965-66 period. The deliveries of these
Chinese weapons, however, was disrupted by the onset of the Cultural
Revolution and for the next three years no Chinese arms were received
by Pakistan.49
At the turn of the 1970s, as it came out of the CUltural
Revolution, the Chinese Government resumed its arms supplies to
Pakistan. From early to mid 1970, for example, Pakistan received
approximately 20 T-59 tanks and 24 MiG-19s. The volume of supplies
increased during the next twelve months, when approximately 125
additional T-59 tanks and 20 PT-76 light tanks were delivered.
Massive Chinese military aid, however, began only after the Fourth
Indo-Pakistan war ( 1972); in the first six months of 1972, Pakistan
received approximately 95 T-59 tanks and 11 MiG-19s. This was
supplemented in the next two years by the deliveries of 400
additional T-59 tanks, 90 MIG-19s, 4 'Hu Chwan' fast attack hydrofoil
torpedo and 4 1 Shanghai II 1 motor gun boats. From mid-1974 to
mid-1976, Pakistan also received another consignment of 100 T-59
tanks, 8 'Shanghai II' and 2 1 Hai Nan' class large patrol craft
(Table 5).
For the next two and a half years, Pakistan did not receive any major
weapons. however, in late 1979, the two states began negotiations
for the the suppy of Chinese F-6(bis) aircraft which were concluded
48This acknowledgement came in the form of the Pakistan's National
Day flypast being led by four MiG-19s and the display of three Chinese T-59 tanks. Pakistan Times, 24 March 1966.
49SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade with the Third World,
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1974), pp.37-40.
TABLE 5: MAJOR WEAPONS TRANSFERRED BY CHINA TO PAKISTAN; 1965-79
Year Army Navy Air Force
T-59 PT-76 MiG-19
1965 to July 1968 (8 0) 40 1969 1970 (20) 24 1971 ( 125) 20 1972 app.95 app.11 1973 300
1974 100 1975 1976 100
1977 1978 1979
Convention: ( )
Sources:
Unconfirmed
4 Hu Chwan: Shanghai II 62
2 Shanghai II 28 5 Shanghai II 2 Hai nan Class large Patrol craft
(1) Military Balance: 1969-1980, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies).
(2) SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade with the Third World, (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International, 1974), pp.37-40.
(3) Jane's Fighting Ships: 1970-80.
IL-28
4
260
50 in early 1980.
261
Simultaneously with the transfer of arms, the Chinese Government
also assisted Pakistan in establishing local defence industry. Under
an agreement concluded in mid-1967 and made public in June 1968, for
instance, Beijing assisted in the setting up of an ordnance factory
at Ghazipur, East Pakistan. This factory became operational in April
197o. 51 The magnitude of Beijing's assistance in enabling Pakistan
to acquire defence production capability, however, increased markedly
after the 1971 war. Following the Fourth Indo-Pakistan war , the
Chinese Government was approached by Pakistan for assistance in
establishing an aircraft battle damage repair facility located fairly
close to the main operational sectors along the central and northern
borders of India. Beijing not only accepted the request but also
offered a more advanced capability than had been requested, including
full overhaul and rebuild capabilities. Consequently, under a
protocol signed in 1972, the Chinese Government assisted Pakistan in
setting up an F-6 rebuild factory at the Pakistan Aeronautical
Complex, Kamra. Pakistan's contribution to this factory, which was
inaugurated in November 1979, was limited to providing the site,
labour force and cement, sand and water. The Chinese Government, on
the other hand, not only provided technical assistance but also
funded and supplied all equipment, machine tools, steam generating
52 plants and electrical fittings for the rebuild factory.
Concomitantly, Beijing also assisted Pakistan in setting up a
Heavy Rebuild factory at Taxila. This factory, the negotiations for
which were started and concluded in 1972 and which was fully
50 r t · · h k' · n erv1ew w1t a ran 1ng Pak1stani Air Force officer 51
Pakistan Times, 7 April 1970. 52
John E. Fricker, 'Chinese Assisting Pakistani Industry', Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 March 1981, pp.58-59.
262
commissioned in November 197 9, is capable of undertaking complete
• • h "I. 53 rebuilds of T-59 tanks, and maJor eng1ne over au~. The coverage by
Pakistani news media seems to suggest that in addition to providing
technical assistance, the Chinese Government funded and provided
equipment for at least the engineering facilities like Investment
casting, Gas Nitriding, Shell Casting and Tool (TIP) Plants which
. 1 . p k' t 54 were prev1ous y rare 1n a 1s an.
In addition to these two defence projects, there were, as yet
unconfirmed reports of Chinese collaboration in the production of
ground-to-air missile SAM-2 in Pakistan, and assistance in the
setting up of a factory near Karachi to manufacture tanks and
anti-tank missiles. 55
This Chinese military assistance during the 1969-79 period,
although provided at a stage when the Pakistan Government was
exploring the possibilities of and receiving military equipment from
th 56 . 'f' f b f o er sources was s1gn1 1cant or a num er o reasons.
Firstly, it was provided when Pakistan needed it most. During
the 1971 war, for instance, Pakistan had lost 83 aircraft, 220 tanks,
2 submarines and 20 naval vessels. In contrast, India had lost only
83 tanks, 54 aircraft and one naval vesse1, 57 and the regional
military balance of power had therefore til ted even more in favour of
India than had ever been the case in the past. The new Government in
Pakistan, therefore, was faced with the task of not only replenishing
53The Guardian, 19 January 1980; and interview with a ranking
Pakistan Army Officer who was involved in these negotiations 54
'HRF: A Milestone in Self Reliance', Pakistan Times, 6 September 1979, p.S.
55The Times, 28 January 1974; and Daily Telegraph, 29 June 1978.
56 h l' l' . T e 1st of supp 1er s 1ncl uded Sweden, France, Italy, Iran,· UK, USSR and USA.
57strategic Survey: 1971, (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1972), p.52.
263
the losses incurred during the war, but also ensuring that the margin
of Pakistan's military inferiority was reduced to manageable
proportions. The United States, despite the Nixon Administration's
sympathetic attitude towards Pakistan, was not prepared to provide
any military equipment, because of Congressional opposition. Neither
could the Pakistan Government itself afford to purchase large
quantities of military equipment on the open market due to the heavy
economic costs of the crisis and subsequent war with India.
Therefore, soon after assuming power, Bhutto visited Beijing in
January 1972 to discuss, among other subjects, Pakistan's 'defence
needs'. 58 During this visit, although the Chinese Government
declined Pakistan's proposal for a 'defence pact' to counter-balance
the 59 Indo-Soviet treaty, it agreed to provide military assistance,
and during the next two and a half years delivered to Pakistan
approximately 495 T-59 tanks, 101 MIG-19s(F-6) and 8 naval vessels.
By mid-1974, therefore, the ratio of the total number of Pakistani
tanks to those in India was reduced from 1 : 2. 3 in 197 2 to 1: 1. 8
Similarly, the ratio of Pakistani to Indian aircraft and patrol boats
had reduced from 1:3.2, and 1:4.2 in 1972 to 1:1.7 and 1:2.9 in 1974
t . l 60 respec ~ve y.
Secondly, a major proportion of this assistance was provided as
a grant at a time when Pakistan had to pay for weapons from other
58New York Times, 3 February 2972; see also William J. Barnds, 'The
Indian Subcontinent', The World Today, Vol. 29 No. 1, January 1973, P• 31.
59The Chinese were reported to have said they ' [did] not ascribe
too much importance to legal formulae in any case'. Asia Research Bulletin, 1-28 February 1973, p.1623.
60M'l' l 197 ~ ~tary Ba ance: 2-73, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), pp.49, 53; Military Balance: 1974-75, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), pp.54, 58-59.
264
61 states, even when payment was required, China made the situation
62 easier by extending loans on extremely soft terms. Thirdly, the
military equipment was delivered at a speed unmatched by western
suppliers. For instance, unlike the French Government which took
three years to supply 28 Mirage Vs, the Chinese Government during the
same period delivered approximately 100 MIG-19s(F-6). 63 Fourthly,
the Chinese Government had been a more dependable source of military
supplies. During the Bangla Desh Crisis, for example, France and the
United States banned deliveries of equipment ordered by Pakistan in
64 1970 and early 1971, but the Chinese Government continued to supply
the 125 T-59 and 20 PT-76 tanks ordered before the crisis started.
It was only after these deliveries were completed that Beijing
expressed its unwillingness to supply additional major weapons.
65 However, it still continued to supply small arms.
Finally, unlike the Western countries and especially the United
States, the Chinese Government did not gear its military aid to
making Pakistan permanently dependent on it for spare parts. Instead
it not only pursued a policy of supplying sufficient spare parts but
also assisted Pakistan, as previously discussed, in acquiring the
capability to rebuild and overhaul these weapons indigenously. The
F-6 rebuild factory, for instance, has provided Pakistan with the
capability to refurbish 30 aircraf·t per year instead of sending them,
61chou Enlai has been reported to have said during Bhutto's visit
to Beijing in January 1972 that 'we are not ammunition merchants, whatever your defence requirements are, they will be met gratis', New York Times, 2 February 1972.
62rnterview with an official of Economic Affairs Division,
Government of Pakistan 63 '1. 1 97 _M_l __ l_t_a_r~y~_B_a __ a_n~c~e~=---1~~1_-~7=2, p.70; and Military Balance: 1974-75,
p.59.
64M'l' 1 1tary Balance: 1971-72, p.70. 65
rnterview with 1982
a ranking Pakistan Air Force officer, February,
265
as was the case in the past, to Shanghai for approximately 18
66 months.
Regardless of these favourable attributes, however, the fact
remains that, contrary to the commonly held view, Chinese military
assistance gradually declined during the 1969-79 period. This
becomes evident firstly from a comparison of the average distribution
per year of major Chinese weapons delivered to Pakistan during the
period under review. During the 1970-76 period, for example, the
Pakistan Army and Air Force received on average 127 tanks and 31
aircraft per year. The Pakistan Navy was also supplied on average 4
patrol boats per year between the period 1972 to mid-1976 (Table.
5). But from mid-1976 to December 1979, despite some reported
interest, Pakistan did not receive any major weapons from China67
Secondly, although the military aid during the 1969-76 period
was provided free of cost, according to Pakistani sources, the
Chinese Government began demanding payment for arms in 1978.68
Finally, a comparison of Pakistan's share of the total value of
Chinese arms delivered to various developing states also suggests a
decline in Beijing's military ·support for Islamabad. During the
1973-77 period, for instance, Islamabad's share of the total value of
66Fricker, 2£·Cit., p.59. 67
In May 1976, for example, during Bhutto's visit to Beijing there were reports that Pakistan was interested in procuring Chinese F-7 aircraft. These reports were lent credibility not only by the composition of Pakistani delegation which included Joint Chief of Staff, Mohammed Shariff, and Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Zulfigar, but also by the fact that also some high officials of the Pakistan Air Force were summoned from home during the negotiations, and Air Marshal Zulfiqar stayed in China after Bhutto had left. However'· the annual aircraft inventory of Pakistan's Air Force in July 1978 reveals that these requests were not accepted. FEER Military Balance: 1978-79, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), p.66., and, Salamat Ali, 'Bhutto's Winning Ways', FEER, 11 June 1976, p.33
68I t ' ' h k' ' n erv1ew w1t a ran 1ng Pak1stan Air Force Officer.
( 1 )
(2)
266
TABLE 6: COMPARISON OF THE CUMULATIVE VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS BY CHINA TO SELECTED STATES (US$ MILLION)
States
Total aid for develop-ing countries
North Vietnam
North Korea
Pakistan
Egypt
Iraq
Libya
Sources: World Military (Washington, pp.155-148.
World Military (Washington, pp.95-98.
1973-1977 1978-1982
Value
860
110
360
200
10
10
% of the total
12.79
41.86
23.25
1. 16
1. 16
Rank Value
1900
3
1 260
2 230
4 200
4 490
310
Expenditures and Arms Transfers: D.c.: u.s. Arms Control and Disarmament
Expenditures and Arms Transfers: D.c.: u.s. Arms Control and Disarmament
% of the total
13.68
12. 10
10.52
25.78
16.31
Rank
3
5
4
2
1968-19771 Agency, 1979) 1
1972- 1982, Agency, 1984) 1
267
Chinese arms transfers to the developing countries was 23.25% and it
ranked as the second major recipient of Beijing's military aid.
However, during the period between 1978-82, this share declined to
12.10% and Pakistan ranked fourth among the Third World states
receiving arms from China (Table. 6).
In brief, therefore, it can be stated that although the Chinese
Government provided valuable economic and military assistance to
Pakistan, contrary to the commonly held beliefs, the real value of
this aid declined after the mid-1970s.
Conclusion
This chapter shows the Chinese Government was forthcoming in
continuing its pre-1969 policy of supporting Pakistan both
economically and militarily. This support was not without
significance as it was provided when Pakistan needed it most and on
favourable terms. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the magnitude
of this support declined since 1976 and remained so until the end of
1979.
