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THE DIASPORA AS AN ECONOMIC ASSET
How China and India use their diaspora to support their
economic development
Candidate number: 72190
Word count: 9998
Submission: 1st September 2009
Dissertation submitted for the obtention of the degree
MSc China in Comparative Perspective
London School of Economics and Political Science
2
Abstract
In the wake of their economic reforms, both China and India have actively engaged their
diaspora to support their economic development. This paper aims at analysing and comparing
China and India’s strategies of using their diaspora for economic purposes. At the end of the
Cultural Revolution, China has created an institutional and legal apparatus to court its citizens
overseas. However, in order to utilize more efficiently its diaspora, it has widened the scope of its
policies at the beginning of the 1990’s by including all ethnic Chinese abroad, by engaging
overseas students and by trying to directly influence overseas communities. To use its diaspora,
India has also set up dedicated institutions and created incentives for overseas Indians to invest in
India. It has moreover resorted to a rhetoric strategy to appeal to the wealthiest overseas Indians
and bind them emotionally to the motherland.
The similarities in China and India diaspora policies can be explained by the peculiar
constraints a state faces when engaging a diasporic population. As the diaspora escape the direct
control of its state of origin, it is rational for the state to pursue policies that aim at rendering the
diaspora governable mainly by producing a self-disciplined diaspora that can act in accordance
with its interests. This accounts for China and India common policies because they both aim at
creating what Gamlen (2006) has called a “transnational governmentality”: through institutions,
privileges and discursive strategies, both states are seeking to render the diasporic population
governable and favourable to their interests.
However, divergences in their efforts are also conspicuous. Whereas China’s diaspora
policies are consistent and broad, encompassing all ethnic Chinese abroad, India’s scope of
diaspora engagement is much narrower in its target and in its means. For instance, India has
constructed a diasporic population centred on wealthy post-independence migrants and has not
sought, unlike China, to directly influence Indian overseas communities
We contend that China and India respective conception of nationalism are central to shed a
light on these divergences. The Chinese ethnic nationalism is conducive to the use by China of its
diaspora because it regards the link to the homeland as depending not on territory but on common
blood. On the other hand, the traditional Nehruvian conception, by its original distrust on
capitalism and by its linking of Indianess to the Indian territory, has hampered the use of the
Indian diaspora. The rise of the Hindu Right is the opportunity to test the assertion that
3
nationalism is central in explaining diaspora policies. Compared to the Nehruvian nationalism,
the Hindu ethnic conception of nationalism has been able to foster the engagement with the
Indian diaspora by first switching Indian identity from the territory to the ethnicity and secondly
by adapting its discourse to overseas Indians’ aspirations. In India, the diaspora is not only
addressed differently according to the conception of nationalism but is even turned into a field of
competition between these nationalist conceptions, thus further highlighting the relationship
between nationalism and diaspora engagement.
4
Table of Contents
Abstract ...........................................................................................................................................2
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................5
CHAPTER I: CHINA AND INDIA ’S STRATEGY TO ENGAGE THEIR DIASPORA ...................................7
China’s strategy to use its diaspora................................................................................................... 7
Creating an institutional apparatus targeting the diaspora................................................................. 7
Creating and extending the official diaspora .................................................................................... 8
Courting ethnic Chinese overseas to extract benefits ........................................................................ 9
Tackling the brain drain: from returning to the nation to serving the nation from abroad ................ 10
Creating the appropriate diaspora abroad ....................................................................................... 17
India’s strategy to use its diaspora.................................................................................................. 19
A new institutional and legal framework to court the diaspora ....................................................... 20
Construction of an official diaspora ............................................................................................... 20
The absence of efforts to engage overseas students and influence overseas communities................ 22
Quantitative comparison of India and China’s success in attracting diasporic financial resources ... 22
Convergences and divergences of China and India’s diaspora policies ......................................... 24
The common nature of the engagement: a trans-national governmentality...................................... 24
Variation in China and India engagement of their diaspora ............................................................ 26
CHAPTER II: NATIONALISM AS AN EXPLANATION OF CHINA AND INDIA ’S DIASPORA POLICIES 27
China: an ethnic nationalism conducive to the engagement of the diaspora ................................. 27
The importance of ethnicity ........................................................................................................... 27
A nationalism conducive to the diaspora engagement..................................................................... 28
India: different nationalisms for different diaspora engagements................................................. 30
The Nehruvian nationalist conception: a hindrance to the diaspora engagement ?........................... 30
The Hindu nationalism: an alternative nationalism committed to courting the diaspora ..................33
The diaspora as a site of competition between nationalisms ........................................................... 36
Conclusion: ...................................................................................................................................37
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................39
5
Introduction
After a period of economic autarky, China and India have embraced a modernization project
that relies on economic liberalization and connection to the global economy. To support this
endeavour, both countries have sought to engage their diaspora, as it indeed constitutes an
extraordinary pool of financial and human capital. For instance, the Chinese diaspora (excluding
Taiwan) represents less than 4% of the PRC’s population but has an income of $700 billions,
which equals to two thirds of the Chinese GDP. Indian expatriates have an estimated income of
$160 billions, which is equivalent to 35% of the Indian GNP, whereas they only represent 2% of
the Indian population (Devan et Tewari 2001, 55). In Western countries, both diasporas tend to
be more educated and wealthier than average (Zhu 2006, 3). If there exists a literature dealing
separately with China and India’s strategy of using their diaspora, there is not however a
comprehensive comparison between this two cases.
This paper aims at addressing this very aspect by comparing the strategy of the Chinese and
Indian state in engaging their diaspora to support their economic development. This implies that
the analysis will be conducted from the states’ standpoint, i.e. will be mainly interested by the
official discourses and policies and not by the diaspora point of view or the non-official
initiatives. The period from the beginning of the Chinese and Indian economic reforms onwards,
i.e. respectively from 1978 and 1991, will be considered, as it is when China and India began to
resolutely court their diaspora.
China and India share similarities that render the comparison relevant: China and India have
both engaged in a vigorous strategy to utilize their diaspora. In addition, they are the two
countries with the largest diaspora, with respectively 50 and 20 millions (Devan et Tewari 2001,
55). Both diasporas can be found on the five continents. We will use the terms diaspora and
overseas Chinese/Indians in a generic manner to refer to all the individuals of Chinese and Indian
origin or descent abroad. In the case of China, the term will include Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The first chapter will compare India and China’s strategy to deal with their diaspora. After
examining their policies, we will offer a theoretical framework to this analysis to highlight their
convergence and divergence.
6
The second chapter is interested in explaining the differences in China and India’s ways to
use their diaspora. We will suggest that the nature of their nationalism is central in explaining
their dissimilarities. Of course, nationalism might not be the only explanatory factors of China
and India’s diaspora policies, but we deliberately made the choice of focussing only on this
aspect, as we believe that it plays a significant role in their respective strategy. An ethnic
conception of nationalism in China has allowed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to adopt
all-inclusive and consistent policies toward overseas Chinese. On the contrary, the Nehruvian
nationalism based on the Indian territory and culture is less conducive to an engagement of the
diaspora. Such relationship between nationalism and diaspora engagement seems confirmed by
the rise in India of the Hindu Right that, relying on an ethnic nationalism, is actively involved in
courting Indians overseas.
7
CHAPTER I: CHINA AND INDIA ’S STRATEGY TO ENGAGE THEIR
DIASPORA
This section aims at analysing and comparing how China and India have engaged their
diaspora since 1978 and 1991 respectively in order to support their economic development.
China’s strategy to use its diaspora
Whereas during the Cultural Revolution the overseas Chinese were depicted as “bourgeois
capitalists” (Pina-Guerassimof et Guerassimof 2007, 255) and their relatives in China persecuted
(Thunø 2001, 911), they became a central preoccupation for the PRC as it realised the diaspora’s
potential in supporting its modernization project. Therefore, China has first created an
institutional and legal apparatus to court its citizens abroad. However, in order to utilize more
efficiently its diaspora, it has widened the scope of its policies by including all ethnic Chinese
abroad, by engaging overseas students and by trying to directly influence overseas communities.
Creating an institutional apparatus targeting the diaspora
As early as 1977, the CCP organized an “all nation overseas Chinese conference” that called
for the strengthening of the links with the overseas Chinese (which officially refers only to PRC’s
citizens abroad until the 1990’s as discussed below). One year later, the Overseas Chinese Affairs
Office (OCAO), dependent of the State Council, was instituted, what demonstrates that overseas
Chinese were now a national matter (Barabantseva 2005, 9). Except Tibet, every province and
municipality has set up their own OCAO. In 1978, the All China’s Federation of Returned
8
Overseas Chinese (ACFROC) was restored after its suspension during the Cultural Revolution.
Its official role is to provide a link between the mainland and the overseas Chinese, in other
words to channel financial and human capital for the sake of the PRC (ibid, 10-11). It has more
than 2,000 organs at the province, city and autonomous district level and 8,000 affiliated
organizations at the village and county level (Thunø 2001, 916).
Alongside with these organizations that directly deal with the overseas Chinese, the PRC has
equipped itself with institutions in charge of supplying expertise on the diaspora. For instance,
the Chinese People’s Congress has an Overseas Chinese Commission whose mission is to
conduct research and provide recommendations for guiding policy-making concerning overseas
Chinese. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference aims at studying and consulting
about the conception of overseas Chinese policies. Altogether, these institutions have contributed
to the issue of more than 11 000 laws and regulations concerning overseas Chinese.
(Barabantseva 2005, 11)
Creating and extending the official diaspora
The scope of the diaspora policy of the PRC has remarkably evolved since 1978 to adapt to
the necessity of its modernization project.
At the beginning of the economic reforms, the policies toward the diaspora were theoretically
directed only to the PRC’s citizens abroad. To court them, China sought to reincorporate them
into the national community.
This strategy has first been supported by a rhetoric tactic celebrating the patriotism of the
overseas Chinese and their indefectible link with the mainland. For instance, the editorial of the
People’s Daily of 4th January 1978 is emblematic when it proclaimed that Chinese citizens abroad
are “part of the Chinese people” and have to be involved in the “Four Modernizations” (Thunø
2001, 912). The rupture with the Cultural Revolution discourse that depicted them as traitors is
remarkable. Simultaneously, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engaged in a strategy of “re-
attachment with Chinese overseas by means of relatives” (ibid., 915) by courting the relatives
through political rehabilitation and endowment of special privileges. In 1982, the constitution
recognized Chinese overseas and returnees as a special group. The Protection Law of 1990
guarantees the protection of overseas Chinese’ family and economic interests and encouraged
9
them to come back through granting them special legal and economic privileges (Thunø 2001,
917-20). As stated by an official of Fujian quoted by Thunø, protecting the overseas Chinese was
“a question of protecting the overseas Chinese feeling of nationality (ming’an) and the concept of
fatherland” (ibid., 917).
A major shift occurred in the 1990’s: the policies toward the diaspora have gradually
embraced not only the PRC’s citizens abroad but rather all the ethnic Chinese regardless of their
nationality (ibid., 921). The official conception of the diaspora consequently underwent a
profound change as it would from now on encompass all people of Chinese origin living abroad
regardless of their citizenship. The diaspora the government could now tap in was therefore
considerably extended. How such change can be explained?
First of all, the past reluctance of the PRC to deal with ethnic Chinese bearing a foreign
nationality stemmed from the fear of alienating their host states, especially the states in Southeast
Asia. They indeed often depicted ethnic Chinese as a fifth column of the Chinese communism.
As China was committed to anti-colonialism and championed the third-world cause, it accepted
the demands of the newly independent Southeast Asian states of forbidding dual citizenship for
the overseas Chinese (Fitzgerald 1972, 102-115). However, the rise of China, its abandonment of
Maoism and its commitment to “peaceful rise” has allowed the PRC to be more self-confident in
dealing with all ethnic Chinese abroad.
Secondly, courting ethnic Chinese became a necessity for the PRC in order to respond to the
significant Taiwanese efforts in this area (Barabantseva 2005, 25).
Finally, the support of PRC’s citizens overseas took mainly the form of remittances and
donations, which were increasingly inadequate for China’s economic development. Constructing
an official diaspora that would embrace all ethnic Chinese would allow the PRC to attract the
FDI, entrepreneurial skills and networks of the wealthy ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere.
Courting ethnic Chinese overseas to extract benefits
The most conspicuous way the diaspora was induced to invest in China was first through the
creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). If the creation of SEZs is not strictly speaking
directed toward the overseas Chinese, the fact that they encompass many qiaoxiang (i.e. areas of
10
important emigration) clearly indicates that they are a call for overseas Chinese’s financial
resources. This is confirmed by a law of 1983 that accords overseas ethnic Chinese special
privileges if they decide to invest in SEZs. (Barabantseva 2005, 12-3). More generally, the
network of agencies in charge of dealing with overseas Chinese became increasingly committed
to deal with all the ethnic Chinese abroad.
Besides these administrative initiatives, the PRC officials have engaged in a discursive
strategy to promote a strong attachment to the homeland among ethnic Chinese worldwide. The
overseas Chinese are first depicted as a full-fledged part of the Chinese family and as indefectibly
linked to the Chinese soil, regardless of their current location of residence or the date of their
emigration. Kuah notices that the term zuguo, which can be translated by ancestral land or
motherland, is regularly used by officials when talking with overseas Chinese about the PRC
(Kuah-Pierce 2006, 250-1).
To support such rhetoric, the authorities have sough to foster emotional links to the
motherland. For instance, they have instituted root-seeking programs and language summer
schools for overseas Chinese (Cheng, Kinglun et Cheng 2005, 8-9). They even do not hesitate to
allow the revival of religious practices or the rebuilding of lineage ancestral houses provided that
they strengthen links with overseas Chinese (Kuah-Pierce 2006). In addition, overseas Chinese’s
success and generosity are systematically celebrated. For instance, donors and investors are
praised through certificates, plaques or public spaces named after them. On a trip to PRC, they
will be welcomed with pomp by officials (Kuah-Pierce 2006, 250).
It thus appears that the government seeks to obligate the overseas Chinese to be involved in
the welfare of the motherland by “giving them face” and binding them emotionally to China. The
state is consequently able to extract financial resources form overseas Chinese for entrepreneurial
work or philanthropy activities. Such strategy is not new as shown by the study of Madeline Hsu
about migrant’s donation in Taishan County from 1893 to 1993 (Hsu 2000). But it is dramatically
revived in the context of opening and reforms.
Tackling the brain drain: from returning to the nation to serving the nation from abroad
Besides money, human capital is the other main resource that can be extracted from a
diaspora. To tap into such asset, China has increasingly relied on its overseas students whose
11
number has dramatically increased following the opening of the PRC. They form the bulk of a
category called the new migrants (xin yimin), i.e. the people who have emigrated after 1978.
Their value for the PRC is not their wealth but rather their human capital they developed abroad.
Moreover, as they often hold a PRC passport and emigrated recently after having grown up in
China, they can be easily encouraged to support the motherland.
In the 1980’s, China’s stance toward overseas students was rather guarded, as they were
often involved in protests at home (Zweig 2006, 67). However, the continuation of the reforms
after Deng’s southern trip induced China to allow student mobility while encouraging returns.
This stance is epitomized by the “twelve-character approach” of 1993 that urges to “support
study overseas, promote return home, maintain freedom of movement” (zhichi liuxue, guli
huiguo, laiqu ziyou) (Barabantseva 2005, 16). Such strategy has been incontestably fruitful.
Zweig et al. show for instance that it has allowed China to transfer the bulk of cost of the training
of its international students and scholars on the western countries. Now, foreign organizations
mainly pay for the training of Chinese overseas students. In 2004, the Chinese government and
the danwei accounted for only 38% of the funding of overseas scholars and students whereas
foreign agencies (universities, World Bank etc.) participated to 57.8% of the funding (Zweig,
Chen et Rosen 2004, 745) Therefore, from the PRC point of view, the situation is less a brain
drain than an outsourced training.
Besides sending students training abroad, PRC’s objective was also to encourage returns to
avoid brain drain. This was translated by the slogan “improving services for returned students”.
For instance, in 1992, the Ministry of Personnel created job introduction centres and adopted
preferential policies regarding jobs and housing for returnees (Zweig 2006, 68). Today, an
important set of institutions aims at supporting overseas students and returnees:
12
Source: Zweig 2006, 71
Since beginning of the 2000’s, the objective of PRC’s policy towards students has been
extended: return is always sought but China has resolved to engage the students staying abroad.
The PRC acknowledges that Chinese students or ex-students residing overseas are crucial to
transfer new technologies and skills to China. Therefore, China’s current strategy is less fighting
brain drain than encouraging emigrants to contribute to the strengthening of the homeland from
abroad. The slogan of “returning to serve the country” - hui guo fuwu – has been replaced by
“serving the country” - wei guo fuwu (Nyìri 2001, 637). As other countries facing an important
brain drain, China is thus embracing what Meyer et al. have called the “Diaspora option” (1997,
quoted in Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 2), i.e. the transformation of the loss of the brain drain into
an asset to support the development of the motherland.
13
This strategy can be deemed as quite successful. Even while staying abroad, the new
migrants do participate in serving the country efficiently. First, it appears that Chinese scholars
abroad significantly support China by teaching, organising networks and joint research, as
demonstrated by Zweig, Fung and Han’s study concerning the interactions of overseas Chinese
academics in the US and Canada with China:
Source: Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 23
And indeed, the slogan “serving the country” seems to be heard and adopted, judging by their
declared motivations for cooperating with China:
14
Source: Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 26
PRC’s government and universities are constantly supporting such exchanges by organizing
numerous cooperation programs (Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 15-6).
Secondly, students who stay overseas after their studies can engage in business with the
mainland in different manners. In working in multinational corporations, they often play the role
of mediator between the company and the Chinese market, thus inducing firms to operate in
China. For instance, about half of the managers of foreign companies in Beijing are returnees
from abroad (Nyìri 2001, 636). New migrants can also invest in China but, contrary to the
traditional migrants who invest in low-tech labour intensive industries, they are likely to set-up
high-tech industries by transferring new technologies they know from abroad. In her study of the
Chinese diaspora in the Silicon Valley, Annalee Saxenian (2002) finds that they are importantly
involved in exchanging information and technology with the Mainland:
15
Source: Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 20
If we analyse the quality of the technology effectively transferred in mainland, it appears that
returnees are more likely to import more-advanced technologies in China than Chinese that did
not migrated abroad as shown by Zweig, Chen and Rosen’s study of technologies imported by
researchers in development zones:
16
Source: Zweig, Chen et Rosen 2004, 751
It consequently appears that China has quite successfully managed to utilize its new
migrants. Of course, the emigration of students can be assimilated to a brain drain, since it is
often the best students who go abroad. However, although the majority of overseas students
chose to remain overseas, an increasing reverse brain drain is observable (Yang et Tan 2006, 2).
Moreover, China has fruitfully embraced the “diaspora option” by obtaining from its diaspora to
“serve the country” from abroad. It seems to be the most efficient tactic given the constraints
China is facing. As stated by an official discussing the role of overseas Chinese from Osaka that
established three manufacturing companies in Changsu City, Jiangsu province:
if we had brought these people back, it is not certain we could have used them,
because currently we cannot pay them the same salaries and benefits they get in
Japan. If we could use them [that is, pay their salaries], we still could not develop
[yang] them, because the equipment they need is too expensive for us to buy now.
But if we let them stay overseas, and invite them back to serve the country, we
can use them. This is a terrific choice and model (Chen et al. 2003, 73 in Zweig,
Fung et Han 2008, 18).
Therefore, China’s use of its overseas students can be deemed as successful since it seems
that “the economic returns of their contribution to China greatly surpasses the state’s level of
investment over the past twenty years in sending them overseas to study” (Chen and Liu 2003,
172, quoted in Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 15).
17
Creating the appropriate diaspora abroad
We have described how China has adopted policies at home in order to utilize the diaspora.
But quite remarkably, China also attempts to directly fashion abroad its diaspora to make it
sympathetic to PRC’s objectives but also capable of defending China’s interests overseas.
Such strategy relies on two pillars: influencing overseas Chinese organizations and creating a
homogeneous diasporic identity. To begin with, the PRC is now involved in the supervision of
Chinese overseas associations. Interestingly, these associations turn out to be very standardized
worldwide. Nyìri notices that their activities and discourses tend to be uniform. They are
decorated with the same banners and mementos provided by PRC’s organizations. Even if such
associations claim to be tonxianghui (native-place organizations) as the traditional overseas
organizations, their leaders are from diverse provinces (Nyìri 2001, 645). Mandarin, instead of
regional dialect, is used in these associations (ibid.), thus fostering their standardization.
As well as supervising overseas associations, the PRC uses them as a bridge to reach and use
the local overseas communities. For instance, Nyìri reports that the PRC embassy in Bucarest
was consulted by the Fujianenes tonxianghui regarding the demonstration to protest against the
bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade in 1999 (ibid.). It indeed appears that complex and
numerous links exist between China’s governmental bodies and overseas Chinese organizations:
18
Source: Nyìri 2001, 647
China also aims at fostering a uniform overseas Chinese identity. As a result, it first seeks to
promote interactions between different migrants’ communities through the organization of
business fairs around the world or the pairing of different overseas associations (Biao 2003, 28).
China also creates dedicated organizations such as the China Overseas Friendship Association
whose goal is officially to “promote the unity of the sons and daughters of China and for the
unification of the motherland” (Thunø 2001, 923). Such initiatives are especially important to fill
the gap that might exist between the old overseas communities and the new migrants.
19
Moreover, an important propaganda apparatus such as TV channels, websites and
newspapers are involved in influencing overseas Chinese. These media are used to create a
correct and uniform overseas identity. Their discourse is standardized worldwide: the opinions
displayed are aligned on the People’s daily, the wealth and dynamism of overseas Chinese and
their support to the motherland are acclaimed (Nyìri 2001, 640). Concerning the newspapers,
Nìyri remarks that not only the message but also the layout is the same worldwide. References to
the country where they are edited are very rare, what allows to put at a distance the host society.
Conversely, what is happening in other overseas Chinese communities is widely explored. The
media indeed “portray the experiences of Chinese in their countries of residence in a humorous
way, or report on atrocities committed against Chinese” (Nyìri 2001, 640). By doing so, they
create a dichotomy Chinese/foreigners and thus “‘re-other’ the foreign” (ibid.).
By emphasizing a common Chineseness and putting at a distance the host society, the media
consequently participate to form a homogeneous overseas Chinese identity globally that is in line
with PRC’s aspirations. To draw on Benedict Anderson work (Anderson 2006), they shape an
imagined overseas Chinese community and foster a long-distance nationalism, i.e. “a nationalism
that no longer depends as it once did on territorial location in a home country” (Anderson 2001,
42). The usefulness for PRC is obvious in the economic realm: it allows the PRC to attract
investments and to encourage the migrants to support the motherland from abroad.
India’s strategy to use its diaspora
Before the reforms in 1991, India did not seek to exploit the potential of its diaspora. The
Nehruvian autarkic model of development coupled with a focus on the nation-building of the
young Indian state diverted the attention from the diaspora (Lall 2001). However, progressively
in the 1980’s and especially after 1991, India began to engage its diaspora in order to support its
development. India’s strategy is quite similar to China’s. It has set up an institutional apparatus to
cope with overseas Indians, created incentives for them to invest and conducted a rhetoric
strategy to bind them emotionally to India.
20
A new institutional and legal framework to court the diaspora
Officially, the India diaspora encompasses the NRIs and the PIOs. The NRIs, or Non
Resident Indians, are Indian citizens who are residing abroad. The PIOs or Persons of Indian
Origin, are individuals with no Indian passport but of Indian origin or descent (HLC 2001, viii).
India’s first means to engage the diaspora was to introduce legal and tax incentives to attract
NRIs’ financial resources in the wake of the economic liberalization (Lall 2001, 178-190;
Walton-Roberts 2004, 58). In 1999 a PIO’s card is created. It is a long-term visa (20 years) that
allows PIOs to have property or access to the education system in India.
The victory of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1998 gave an impetus to
the diaspora policy. Besides the PIO card, the government created in 2000 a High Level
Committee (HLC) on the Indian Diaspora charged by the Ministry of External Affairs to issue a
report on the role NRIs and PIOs can play in India’s development. Its recommendations led to the
possibility of a dual-citizenship to some PIOs in 2003.
In addition to these national measures, different states in India are also committed to engage
their emigrants. For instance, the states of Punjab, Kerala and Gujarat have created numerous
institutions to deal with overseas Indians, such as an NRI professional assembly democratically
elected in Punjab, a Ministry for NRI Division in Gujarat or the Non Resident Keralites Affairs
Department in Kerala (HLC 2001, 540-4).
If such initiatives are remarkable, they are nonetheless hindered by the legacy of pre-1991
autarkic model of development (e.g. Roy et Banerjee 2007). For instance, in small and medium
enterprises (SME), FDI are limited to 24%. This is likely to discourage diasporic FDI in India as
we observe that in China, diasporic FDI are predominantly small (US$ 2-3 million) and directed
to export oriented SME (ibid. 18).
Besides these policies to court the NRIs and PIOs, India has resorted to a rhetoric tactic to
construct a diaspora committed to the development of the motherland.
Construction of an official diaspora
India has engaged in a discursive strategy to court its diaspora. As in China, this is done first
by stressing the indefectible link to the motherland. For instance, Walton-Roberts underlined that
21
government and banking officials constantly “utilizes deeply cultural discourses of belonging to
wrest investment from [the] Diaspora.” (2004, 59). The overseas Indians are moreover
remembered their link to the motherland through root-seeking programs as In China. For the
youngest, the Know India Program aims, by welcoming young overseas Indian in India, “to
create awareness about the phenomenal transformation taking place in India […] and to prepare a
blueprint for creating a sustained mechanism for engaging the Diaspora youth with India”
(Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 69).
As in the Chinese case, another tool to engage the diaspora is to celebrate its success and
contribution to India. This is translated by a membership to the state-constructed Indian diaspora
largely underpinned by professional success. “Success is equated to becoming a globally
recognisable Indian ‘hero’” (Dickinson et Bailey 2007, 765). This can be easily understood as the
wealthiest overseas Indians have the best potential to invest money and transfer skills in India. A
special day to celebrate the outstanding expatriates - the Pravasi Bharatya Divas (Overseas
Indians Day)– has been decided by the government. It has gathered eminent NRIs personality
such as the Nobel price winners Amartya Sen or V.S. Naipaul. Moreover, a special decoration,
the Pravasi Bharatya Samman Awards, has been created to distinguish the most successful
emigrants. As in China, the Indian local governments also celebrate their emigrants through
conferring them taur or izzat (honour) when they pay their native region a visit (ibid., 62).
This strategy of celebrating successful overseas Indians is supported by the legal arrangement
concerning dual citizenship. Following a recommendation the HLC report, it was decided that a
dual citizenship would be possible to some PIOs in the 2003 Dual Citizenship (Amendment) Bill.
The beneficiaries of this dual citizenship can invest in industry and agriculture, acquire property,
send their children in Indian schools and universities but they don’t have the right to vote or run
for political office. Interestingly, only PIOs from Europe, North America and Australasia could
apply for it. This means that only the wealthiest and most educated communities, part of the post-
independence migration, are concerned (Dickinson et Bailey 2007, 764). As a consequence,
phrase such as “apartheid of dollars” flourished in the media to characterize this political choice
(Leclerc 2004, 11).
22
The absence of efforts to engage overseas students and influence overseas communities
If there are important convergences in the Indian and Chinese strategies to court their
diaspora, two main differences between their approaches can be identified. The first lies in the
absence of official mechanisms in India to influence the overseas communities like China does as
described by Nyìri. Similarly, whereas China has adopted specific measures concerning its new
migrants, India does not seem to engage in a precise policy targeting overseas students and recent
educated emigrants. The generic policy toward the diaspora discussed above is the only policy
framework to engage them.
Quantitative comparison of India and China’s success in attracting diasporic financial
resources
We want now to assess India performance in attracting financial resources from its diaspora
in comparison to China by relying on quantitative data. Such data cannot be taken as the definite
proof of the success of one state’s diaspora policies. Other factors such as the timing of the
reforms as well as the structure, repartition and business culture of each diaspora has to be taken
into account to properly explain these figures (Lall 2001, 199-203). This is beyond the scope of
the present paper. Nonetheless, these data are useful as states policies undoubtedly play a central
role in the attraction of diasporic resources.
FDI:
It appears that India has been less successful than China in attracting diasporic FDI. Zhu
estimates that 60-70 % of the FDI in China come from the diaspora (2006, 7), close to Roy et
Banerjee’s estimation of 50-60% (2007, 4). On the other hand, diasporic FDI in India amount for
4.18% of the total FDI between 1991 and 2003 (Roy et Banerjee 2007, 4). In a chronological
perspective, China’s success in attracting diasporic FDI compare to India is confirmed:
23
Total FDI (TOFDI) compared to overseas Chinese FDI (NRC). Source: Guha et Ray 2000, 21.
Unfortunately, no more recent data could be found.
Total FDI compare to NRIs’FDI in India. Source: (ibid., 32)
Remittances:
India is far ahead of China concerning remittances: between 1991 and 2001, China received
around $1billion annually whereas India $7.7 billion (Kapur 2004, 6). However, this is not really
24
the demonstration of India’s success in dealing with the diaspora. Indeed, remittances are less
efficient than FDI in supporting development because only a fraction of remittances is actually
invested (ibid., 10-14). Moreover, the difference between China and India in attracting
remittances can be explained by a relative substitution of remittances for FDI in the Chinese case,
as a result of different policy incentives (ibid., 6). This is confirmed by the fact that Indian
overseas financial contributions take mainly the form of remittances (Walton-Roberts 2004, 57):
source: Walton-Roberts, 2004, 57.
Convergences and divergences of China and India’s diaspora policies
The common nature of the engagement: a trans-national governmentality
As a conclusion of this first chapter, we wants to offer a theoretical framework to China and
India’s diaspora policies in order to better understand their common political choices and
highlight their differences. Drawing on Gamlen work (2006), we argue that their strategy can be
best characterized as “transnational governmentality”, i.e. a strategy “by which a [transnational]
25
population is rendered governable, through the construction, machination, and normalization of a
set of governmental apparatuses and knowledges (Foucault 1978: 102-103)” (Gamlen 2006, 5).
First of all, in accordance with Foucault’s definition of governmentality, it appears that China
and India’s governments do not aim at exerting power on emigrants as a person but on the
diaspora as a whole. The diaspora is taken as a population (in the Foucaldian sense) and
constitutes the very target of China and India’s power. We have shown that this state-constructed
diasporic population has undergone changes. In China it has been constantly extended to now
encompass all ethnic Chinese abroad. In India, this diasporic population is more restrictively
tailored as it is centred on the successful post-independence emigrants. But in any case, “the
discourse of belonging to a diaspora is crucial in attempts to produce this governable mentality,
or governmentality” (Gamlen 2006, 7-8).
Secondly, it is clear that to cope with their diasporic population, both China and India’s
strategy relies increasingly on a set of specific institutions and knowledge. We have shown that
such apparatus of institutions goes from the central government down to the local authorities in
China or in India. Institutions are not only governmental organizations but can also include
economic agencies to promote FDI or universities for instance.
Lastly, China and India’s mode of engagement of their diaspora implies a technology of the
self. Both countries, by developing a correct diasporic identity that implies a long-distance
nationalism and the support to the motherland, aims at creating self-regulated emigrants that
would act in accordance to India and China objectives by investing in the motherland for
instance. This is especially visible in China through its policy of shaping a correct Chinese
diasporic identity by influencing tongxianghui and overseas Chinese media.
Such common political initiatives between China and India can be explained by the peculiar
constraints a state faces when engaging a diasporic population. A diasporic population indeed
largely escapes the direct control of its state of origin since it lives in a foreign territory on which
its homeland does not have the monopoly of violence (Gamlen 2006, 12). Consequently,
emigrants cannot be easily reached by their state of origin and might even have developed strong
emotional ties with their host country. Moreover, engaging directly the diaspora bear the risk for
their state of origin of alienating their host country. To cope with such issues, it is rational for
states to pursue policies that aim at rendering the diaspora governable mainly by producing a self-
disciplined diaspora that can act in accordance with their interests. This accounts for China and
26
India convergence in their strategy to engage their diaspora. Celebrating emigrants, binding them
emotionally to the “homeland”, attracting their resources through special privileges and
investment friendly environments appears to be very efficient strategies to create a diaspora self-
regulated in the sense that it is spontaneously inclined to support India and China’s economic
development.
Variation in China and India engagement of their diaspora
On the other hand, we have shown that important differences exist between China and India’s
way of engaging their emigrants. It appears that China has followed a much more consistent
policies to tap into its diaspora.
First, China has extended the scope of its diaspora policies from the PRC’s citizens abroad in
the 1980’s to all ethnic Chinese today. To do so, the PRC has promoted an all-inclusive diasporic
identity to be applied to its diaspora, regardless of migrants’ wealth or date of migration. In
contrast, India has constructed a diasporic population centred on wealthy post-independence
migrants as shown by the modalities of the dual citizenship law for instance.
Secondly, China has liberalized its economy in a way that has promoted overseas Chinese
investments whereas India still have some restrictive policies, especially toward the SME, that
hamper investments.
Thirdly, China is actively committed to directly influencing overseas community abroad by
being involved into their organizations’ activities and by trying to foster a unifrom overseas
Chinese identity. In addition, it has actively embraced a policy to engage its students abroad.
Such strategies could not be identified in the Indian case.
The next chapter aims at explaining this divergence between China and India’s diaspora
policies. We argue that differences in the nature of nationalism in China and India can provide a
good explanation to this divergence.
27
CHAPTER II: NATIONALISM AS AN EXPLANATION OF CHINA AND
INDIA ’S DIASPORA POLICIES
The first chapter has analysed and compared the strategy of the Chinese and Indian states to
use their diaspora for economic purposes. If these policies are converging, important differences
exist nonetheless. We argue that the difference between China and India’s conception of
nationalism is a crucial factor to explain the variation in their diaspora policies.
China: an ethnic nationalism conducive to the engagement of the diaspora
If China has been able to engage so consistently its diaspora, it is notably because the
features of its nationalism are conducive to such approach.
The importance of ethnicity
China’s nationalism is based on ethnic grounds. Several reasons explain this nationalist
conception. First, the construction of a racial nationalism in China draws on the traditional
Confucian emphasis on lineage: it has allowed the Han to be depicted as the descendants of the
mythical Yellow Emperor (Harrison 2002, 105; Dikötter 1997, 14), i.e. as a well defined race
unified by blood. Secondly, China has embraced a racial discourse as a result of the influence of
Western social Darwinist theories at the beginning of the 20th century that is still vibrant today. It
continues to profoundly shape the Chinese identity. For instance, Dikötter underlines how these
racial conceptions are still vivid among prominent scientists, cultural circles and students (1997).
28
It consequently follows that the Chinese nationalism is underpinned by a racial conception:
the Chinese nation is the Han nation. Already, Sun Yatsen rejoiced because to him China
embodied the perfect nation as it shares the five criteria constitutive of a nation: language,
custom, livelihood, religion and race (Duara 1995, 32). More recently, to legitimize the Han-
based conception of the nation, attempts were made to trace minorities’ origin back to the Han
race. For instance, the eminent professor Zhao Tongmao underlined that
the Han are the main branch of all the different population groups in China and
that all “minority” groups ultimately belong to the ‘yellow race’: the political
boundaries of the People’s Republic of China, in other words, are claimed to be
founded on clear biological markers of genetic distance (Dikötter 1997, 30).
In this nationalist framework, the minorities are not overlooked. But they are subject to a
paternalistic supervision. For the sake of the unity of the Chinese state, their autonomy is strictly
limited to the symbolic, cultural and even commercial fields (He 2005) and the alternative
nationalism they might defend is certainly not the nationalist conception of the Chinese state.
A nationalism conducive to the diaspora engagement
It is now possible to understand some characteristics of the Chinese strategy toward its
diaspora. We argue that if the PRC’s diaspora policy is so dynamic and all-inclusive, it is notably
because the Chinese ethnic nationalism is likely to consider overseas Chinese as part of the
Chinese nation, even the most ancient or the less successful overseas communities. If every Han
is to be seen as sharing the same blood and ancestors, then, from the state point of view, overseas
Chinese are still linked to the Chinese nation whatever their geographical or even emotional
distance to China are.
It could be argued that such argument is flawed since China has demonstrated hostility
toward its diaspora during the Cultural Revolution for instance. However, this stance is the
exception and not the rule. The continuous engagement of the Chinese overseas from the end of
the 19th century onwards rather tends to support a relationship between the Chinese conception of
nationalism and diaspora engagement. At the very beginning of the 20th century, the Qing
Dynasty was already committed to engage overseas Chinese for supporting China modernization
(Wang 2000, 65-8). This was much more striking under the Kuomintang: for instance the
29
government created an Overseas Chinese Affairs Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The nationalists even sent teachers abroad to teach the Chinese culture and language to overseas
communities (Wang 2000, 70-1). The relationship between the Chinese nationalism and diaspora
engagement of the late Qing dynasty and of the nationalist government is definitely proved by the
Nationality Law of 1929 that endorses the principle of jus sanguinis from the law of 1909. This
law is even still in operation in Taiwan (Fitzgerald 1972, 7). Except during the Cultural
Revolution, the CCP has also constantly engaged the overseas Chinese even if its policies were
constrained by the desire to accommodate the Southeast Asian states that saw the overseas
Chinese as a fifth column (Fitzgerald 1972). It consequently appears that from the end of the 19th
century onwards, China has been willing to link the overseas Chinese to the motherland despite a
few exceptions.
Bearing in mind the Chinese ethnic conception of nationalism, it is now possible to better
appreciate China’s diaspora policies since 1978. First we understand why China has quickly
extended the scope of its diaspora policies from the PRC citizens to all ethnic Chinese living
broad regardless of migrants’ wealth or date of migration. It could be objected that business
success is important in the PRC’s diaspora discourse and thus would exclude the less successful
overseas Chinese. However, this discourse it is not as central as it is in India for instance. All the
overseas Chinese communities, including the poorest, received the attention of the PRC, even if
they are for instance in Peru, Ecuador or Chile (Cheng, Kinglun et Cheng 2005, 10).
Secondly, the nature of the Chinese nationalism helps us to understand the centrality of the
discourse on common roots and values in PRC strategy to engage its diaspora. It sheds a light on
the confidence with which China is influencing overseas communities and fostering a
homogeneous diasporic identity as described by Pàl Nyìri. Race is used to speak to the overseas
communities, as exemplified by the slogan of an overseas Chinese magazine in Budapest:
“Saluting the Descendants of the Dragon, saluting the Chinese race” (Nyìri 2001, 641). In
addition, the fact that to engage the diaspora China has not
officially produced discourse of ‘Fujianeseness’ or ‘Cantoneseness’ of the kind
that has traditionally been produced among overseas Chinese, especially in South-
East Asia (Nyìri 2001, 16)
30
proves the importance of the PRC’s conception of nationalism in underpinning its diaspora
policies. If the attachment to one’s native place is often recalled to engage migrants, nevertheless,
“provincial identities are derived from a single national discourse” (ibid., 16).
In a word, the racial nationalism in China casts a light on the consistence and the all-inclusive
character of the Chinese diaspora policies. We even could imagine that such relationship between
nationalism and diaspora is not meant to be one-way as Franck Dikötter observes that
the desire to consolidate and expand a biologised notion of Chinese identity in
mainland China and elsewhere may further be reinforced by the resurgence of
overseas networks (Dikötter 1997, 32).
India: different nationalisms for different diaspora engagements
As in China, the features of nationalism in India can explain India’s strategy to engage its
diaspora. India official nationalist discourse is not as definite as in China. In fact two main
nationalisms are competing in today’s India as explained by Meghnad Desai (2000). The
nationalism promoted by Nehru still constitutes the core of Indian official nationalism but the
Hindu right nationalism is increasingly challenging it. And both produce different ways of coping
with the Indian diaspora.
The Nehruvian nationalist conception: a hindrance to the diaspora engagement ?
According to the Nehruvian vision, India is a secular nation that treats its citizen regardless
of their language, religion, and custom. Notably, minorities’ rights are protected by a state that
has no official religion and might even grant minorities special rights. If the Nehruvian
nationalism is not religious or ethnic, it is on the other hand cultural and geographic (Adeney et
Lall 2005, 263). For Nehru, India’s identity is the result of numerous historical contributions such
as Buddhist, Hindu or Muslim influences (Duara 1995, 77). As written by Nehru, “[t]hose who
professed a religion of non-Indian origin or, coming to India, settled down there, became
31
distinctively Indian in the course of a few generations.” (Nehru, 1946, 41, in Adeney et Lall
2005, 263). For this reason Nehru considered that
the high points of Indian history were the reigns of Asoka, the Guptas, Akbar, and
the great Mughals, all of whom attempted to develop a political framework to
unite the cultural diversity of the subcontinent (Duara 1995, 77).
Therefore, India’s identity is “unity among diversity” (ibid.). Rather than the blood, it is the
allegiance to a secular nation and to the post-colonial nation-building project that is constitutive
of the Nehruvian nationalism. The fact that a person not of Indian origin can obtain the India
citizenship, such as the current Chairperson of the Congress Sonia Gandhi, confirms the
territorial and non-ethnic dimension of the Nehruvian nationalism. This is a strong contrast with
the Chinese conception whereby “one does not become Chinese like one becomes Swiss or
Dutch” (Dikötter 1997, 32), or Indian could we add.
This conception allows us to appreciate some features of India’s strategy to engage its
diaspora. First of all, we can understand the relative failure of India to attract diasporic FDI
compare to China. Historically, because of the territorial character of Nehruvian nationalism and
its focus on state building, India has largely overlooked its diaspora until the end of the 1980’s.
M. C. Lall indeed argues that India regarded its emigrants as people that had abandoned India for
selfish reasons, notably for economic gain. “By abandoning their mother country they have in
fact lost their Indianess.” (Lall 2001, 207). Consequently, Nehru’s policies spurred them to
integrate in their host country society. The difference is obvious with China were the ethnic
nationalism has allowed the engagement of the Diaspora from the end of the 19th century
onwards.
The situation has undoubtedly changed today as India is resolutely embracing economic
liberalism, but some obstacles to the engagement of overseas Indians still exist because of the
effects of the Nehruvian nationalism. For instance, M. Walton-Roberts underlines that, at the
popular level, NRI are not always celebrated today and have been called Non Reliable Indians
(2004, 60).
In addition, the Nehruvian legacy participates to explain the extraordinary low Indian
diasporic investments, especially compared to China. The traditional Nehruvian reluctance
toward FDI has induced an economic environment that is not conducive to diasporic FDI. The
importance of bureaucracy and the lack of economic liberalization are regularly highlighted as a
32
reason for the weak NRI investments (e.g. Roy et Banerjee 2007). Besides the quantitative
difference, this might also explain the qualitative difference between China and India diaspora’s
financial contribution. The less investment friendly environment in India might be a reason why
overseas Indians’ contributions are made predominantly through remittances and not through FDI
like in China, as shown above.
Secondly, the Nehruvian focus on territory and state building as constitutive of Indianess can
elucidate why India, unlike China, has not engaged in a strategy to directly influence the Indian
overseas communities. In the Chinese case, the emphasis on a common blood, the efforts to
create a long-distance nationalism and the attempts to put at a distance the host society are central
to China’s strategy to gain influence over overseas communities. All these three means are not
available to an Indian state committed to a Nehruvian nationalism that historically hold Indianess
as territorially based and encouraged the assimilation of overseas Indian in their host society.
Thirdly, the Nehruvian nationalism sheds a light on why the state-constructed diaspora
mainly focus on recent emigrants who settled in western countries, as shown by the scope of the
dual-citizenship law. This cannot be explained only by the importance of their wealth. For
instance, though wealthy and numerous the Indians from South Africa are excluded of the dual-
citizenship law of 2003. This is better elucidated by the fact that the officially constructed
diaspora is determined not only by its Indian origins but also by a strong cultural dimension, in
accordance with the Nehruvian conception of nationalism. For instance, the HLC report defined
the diaspora as “Indians who migrated to different parts of the world and have generally
maintained their Indian identity” (HLC 2001, viii, our emphasis). Therefore, the PIOs of South
Africa are excluded from the dual-nationality law because, as stated in the HLC Report, “a
century and a half of existence in an alien land, and four or five generations of acculturation in a
white dominant society has diluted their Indianness” (HLC 2001, 84 in Dickinson et Bailey 2007,
767).
The Nehruvian vision of nationalism is thus central to understand the lesser consistency of
Indian diaspora policies compared to China. Naturally, the Nehruvian nationalism is not an
inescapable framework, especially as India is increasingly committed to liberalism and that the
Hindu nationalism is developing. However, its effects are relevant to understand the India’s
strategy to engage the diaspora.
33
The Hindu nationalism: an alternative nationalism committed to courting the diaspora
If we assume that nationalism is an important factor in explaining China and India strategy to
engage their diaspora, a change in their nationalist conception should consequently alter these
strategies. The rise of Hindu nationalism in India offers an occasion to test such assertion.
Seeking to challenge the Nehruvian conception of the Indian nation, the Hindu nationalism
has developed quickly since the 1980’s, leading to the victory of the BJP in 1998. According to
this view, the Indian nation is based on the Hindu religion. Hindus are a nation, a civilisation but
also a race since they are the common descendants of the ancient Vedic fathers (Bhatt et Mukta
2000, 413-4). In this conception of the nation, minorities have to show deference to the Hindu
majority (ibid, 418). It thus appears that whereas Nehruvian nationalism is territorial and cultural,
Hindu nationalism recognizes the ethnicity as a central criterion of nationality. The Hindu
nationalism is thus a more conducive ideology to engage the diaspora as it has the merit, compare
to the Nehruvian conception, to detach Indianess from the Indian territory. And indeed, although
the Hindu nationalism claims to resist globalization and westernization as they are a threat to
“Hindutva” (Hinduness), it is in fact using the globalization to pursue its goals (van der Veer
2004, 9). For instance the VHP (or World Council of Hindus, i.e. the umbrella structure of the
Hindu Right organizations abroad) is “a movement that is very active globally and one of the
prime agents of the globalization of Hinduism” (ibid.). Indeed, one of the VHP’s goals is
officially to reach all the Hindus in the world. (van der Veer 1994, 130).
As a consequence, we observe that the rise of the Hindu Right has meant a further
engagement of the Indian diaspora. The BJP has long presented itself as the champion of the
NRIs and PIOs’ causes. It is therefore not surprising that the major progress of India in engaging
with its diaspora happened under the rule of the BJP from 1999 to 2004 and not under the
Congress Party. It is the BJP that first proposed a PIOs card that would grant PIOs numerous
benefits. It is under the BJP rule that the Indian Government commanded the HLC report,
appointed a NRI ambassador in Washington and introduced the Overseas Indian Day. The
highlight is the adoption of the 2003 Dual Nationality Law that is a clear rupture with the
Nehruvian nationalism. Naturally, such measures were interpreted as a gift to the NRIs for their
generous support to the BJP (Leclerc 2004, 2).
34
The commitment of the BJP to court the diaspora thus supports the hypothesis that
nationalism is an important explanatory factor of the diaspora engagement strategies: a change in
the ruling party’s nationalist conception has lead to changes in the diaspora policies.
Apart from the policy-making area, the Hindu Right’s conception of nationalism has allowed
it to engage the diaspora in the area of religion, education or philanthropy to attract financial
resources and promote its ideas. As such, these efforts are not part of the Indian state policies and
thus seem to go beyond our topic. However, Hindu Right’s engagement of the diaspora is worth
analysing because it illustrates the link that exists between nationalism and diaspora engagement.
Moreover, this Hindu nationalist conception cannot be ignored in India, as it is the main
nationalist discourse along with the Nehruvian nationalism and might even become dominant.
In its effort to use the diaspora, the Hindu Right puts forward it nationalist conception first to
promote a uniform diasporic identity among overseas Hindus. To do so, it employs a strategy that
echoes the Chinese case: it fosters an all-inclusive Hindu identity and uses an important network
of institutions to extract some benefits from the Hindu diaspora.
The force of the Hindu Right to use the diaspora has been its capacity to propose an inclusive
conception of its nationalism that fits well the overseas Hindus’ expectations. First, it presents
Hinduism not only as a religion but also as a culture and a spiritual philosophy to respond to
migrants’ apprehension to loose their identity. Hinduism becomes sanitized and all-inclusive,
overlooking the divisive matters such as the castes issues for instance. Mathew and Prashad
(2000) have shown how the Hindu Right in the US advocates this kind of Hinduism as a response
to the anxiety of the Hindus of loosing their identity because of the American way of life.
Moreover, this strategy is efficient as religion is the best way to assert one’s identity in a
multicultural society like the US:
Given this space [provided to religion in the US], the leaders of the Indian-
American community, many of whom are technical-professionals with no training
in theology, make the passage to the religious as the necessary cultural content of
Indian-American life, as opposed to ‘American’ life. With the growth of the
Hindu Right in India during the 1980s, many Indian Americans opportunistically
made alliances with that nationalist project and detached themselves from the
Nehruvian nationalism of the Congress (ibid., 524).
35
In addition, Hindu nationalism is tailored to fit the NRIs’ wealthy and modern life. It is
compatible with capitalism and business success. Chris Fuller and John Harris (2005) have
shown how a Hindu gurus have adopted a religious monist discourse to address to the trans-
national Indian businessmen. Two successful businessmen declare that they find the guru’s
teaching appealing as they find it “scientific” (ibid., 220). In the kind of Hinduism promoted,
business success is freed of guilt and even legitimate. It is even the sign that Hinduism is
compatible with modernity, or better, is the way to modernity (ibid., 221).
These kinds of discourses are complemented by the support of the Hindu Right to economic
liberalization. It has made Hindu nationalism appealing to the wealthy NRIs. Meanwhile, it
induces them to abandon the Nehruvian ideals as
many of the technical-professional migrants blamed the soft socialism of the
Congress for India’s problems and urged the new Brahmins of Indian politics to
galvanize the population towards a ‘Hindu free market’ (Pandya 1998). The
business-friendly project of Hindutva drew the support of many of the merchants
and technical-professional migrants who found this added incentive to their
‘cultural’ connections to the Hindu project (Mathew et Prashad 2000, 224).
To promote this conception of nationalism and extract benefits from the diaspora, the Hindu
Right can in addition rely on an important apparatus to reach the overseas Hindu communities.
For instance, the VHP has branches in all the major countries hosting an overseas Hindu
community (Mukta 2000, 444). Its primary objective is “ to forge a sense of Hinduness world-
wide” (ibid., 446). To reach this goal, the VHP is using varied means such as the vernacular press
(ibid., 447) student organizations on campus, internet (Mathew et Prashad 2000, 526), and
organizes summer camp for the youngest (ibid., 521). The pervasiveness of the Hindu Right in
the Hindu overseas communities must not be underestimated. For instance, in the UK, the vast
majority of Hindu organizations have identified themselves with the VHP and the few who did
not have not however publicly opposed the VHP political agenda (Bhatt 2000, 560).
To what extent is the Hindu Right successful overseas? At the ideology level, we have shown
the Hindu Right’s ideology is quite popular thanks to a discourse that fits overseas Hindus needs.
At the financial level, it is difficult to answer precisely as no comprehensive statistics exist on the
funds raised by Hindu Right organizations. But, as philanthropic organizations are predominantly
organized along religious membership (at least in the US) (Sidel 2004, 224) and that the Hindu
36
Right organizations are likely to constitute the bulk of the Hindu religious organizations, we can
assume that Hindu Right organizations channel a lot of money. Such reasoning could be made for
the Sikh or Muslim overseas organizations as well.
The diaspora as a site of competition between nationalisms
If nationalism impacts on diaspora engagement, diaspora engagement is also a tool in the
competition of nationalisms in India. The construction and engagement by the Hindu Right with
the Indian diaspora must be understood as a part of its broader political agenda to impose its
conception of nationalism.
Engaging the diaspora is first a way for the Hindu right to attract financial support. Certainly,
a large part of overseas Indian contributions is devoted to poverty relief, education or
infrastructure investments. But they are also used to support the Hindutva movement in India. For
instance, the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in 1992 was the occasion of campaigns against
the financing of extremist Hindu movements, including diaspora donations (Leclerc 2004, 12).
Mathew and Prashad assert that a large proportion of the money given to charities by the Hindu
community in the US is in fact used by Hindu Right organizations without the knowledge of the
donors (2000, 520).
In addition, the diaspora is a fertile ground to disseminate the Hindu nationalism and fight the
Nehruvian conception of the Indian nation. In the US, the VHP resorts to an impressive apparatus
that allows it to spread and defend the correct Hindu identity: it encompasses media such as the
newspaper Hinduism Today, religious organizations like the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh that
aims at monitoring religious activities and organizing events, or the American Hindu Anti-
Defamation Coalition to fight any prejudicial discourses against Hindu (Mathew et Prashad 2000,
527). This is not unique to the US: for instance the Hindu Right apparatus is equally imposing in
the UK (see Bhatt et Mukta 2000) where it has been quite successful. For instance, the VHP
sends delegates to the local organization that supervises religious education in state school. It has
even published the book Explaining Hindu Dharma: A Guide for Teachers in 1996 (ibid., 444).
Finally, the Hindu Rights is of course committed to be involved to the official initiative to
engaging the diaspora. E. Leclerc reports that the RSS (the main Hindu Right mobilization
organization) is probably infiltrating the Overseas Indian Day manifestations (2004, 12).
37
Conclusion
It appears that both China and India have actively engaged their diaspora to support their
economic development. We have shown that in many ways, they have used quite similar
strategies to create what Gamlen (2006) has called a “transnational governmentality”. By binding
the migrants emotionally to the homeland, granting them privileges and making them the target
of a dedicated apparatus of institutions, China and India are seeking to render this transnational
population governable and favourable to their interests. However, divergences in their efforts are
also conspicuous. Whereas China’s diaspora policies are consistent and broad, India’s scope of
diaspora engagement is much narrower in its target and in its means. We contend that their
conceptions of nationalism are central to shed a light on these divergences. The ethnicity-based
Chinese nationalism is conducive to the use by China of its diaspora because it regards the link to
the homeland as depending not on territory but on common blood. On the other hand, the
traditional Nehruvian conception, by its original distrust on capitalism and its linking of Indianess
to the Indian territory, has hampered the use of the Indian diaspora. The rising Hindu ethnic
conception of nationalism has been able to foster the engagement with the Indian diaspora by first
switching Indian identity from the territory to ethnicity and secondly by adapting its discourse to
overseas Indians’ aspirations. As these two nationalism are in competition in India, we have
showed that the diaspora is not only addressed differently by them but is even turned into a field
of battle between them, thus further highlighting the relationship between nationalism and
diaspora engagement.
Ultimately, we believe that this comparative analysis is not only relevant to the Chinese and
Indian case but offers a much more universal insight in the relationship between the state and
globalization. It indeed challenges the common acceptation that globalization undermines the
state power and agency. The analysis of China and India’s use of their diaspora to support their
economic development exemplifies how states, even the less wealthy, can utilize globalization
and especially migrations to strengthen themselves (Shain 1995 quoted in Nyìri 2001, 648).
States have not to be necessarily viewed as passive when confronted to increasing flows of
people but also as able to make use of these flows to reassert their power. Of course, such logic
38
can also work against or rework the states’ discourse. In this respect, the undermining of the
Nehruvian nationalism by the Hindu Right’s engagement with the Indian diaspora is a good
example. But the existence of concepts once bounded to the territory such as citizenship (Beck
2000, 23 quoted in Dickinson et Bailey 2007, 759) or nationalism (Anderson 2001, 42) that can
now be detached from the territory to become “distance nationalism” (ibid.), dual citizenship or
even of “flexible citizenship” (Ong 1999) allows the state to reassert itself as an inescapable
framework. Similarly we believe that the Chinese and Indian case also demonstrate that
nationalism is not meant to be a relic of the golden age of the Westphalian sovereignty but is
rather a central variable in the states’ way to tackle globalization. Ultimately, the comparison of
China and India have illustrated that nationalism may influence greatly the state response to
globalization and, in the meantime, be influenced by it.
39
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