China’s Search for ‘National Rejuvenation’

China’s Search for ‘National Rejuvenation’Domestic and Foreign Policies under Xi Jinping

Edited by Jabin T. Jacob · Hoang The Anh

China’s Search for ‘National Rejuvenation’

Jabin T. Jacob • Hoang The AnhEditors

China’s Search for ‘National

Rejuvenation’Domestic and Foreign Policies under Xi Jinping

ISBN 978-981-15-2795-1 ISBN 978-981-15-2796-8 (eBook)https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2796-8

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21- 01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

EditorsJabin T. JacobDepartment of International Relations and Governance StudiesShiv Nadar UniversityUttar Pradesh, India

National Maritime FoundationNew Delhi, India

Hoang The AnhInstitute of Chinese StudiesVietnam Academy of Social SciencesHanoi, Vietnam

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2796-8

Dedicated to Prof. Do Tien Sam (1953–2019)

vii

Jabin T. Jacob would like to thank his former colleagues at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, where this project was first conceived and thanks especially, Rajesh Ghosh for his editorial and research assistance.

Hoang The Anh would like to thank his colleagues in the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences for their support and help in editing of the Vietnamese papers.

Acknowledgements

ix

Part I Introduction 1

1 ‘National Rejuvenation’ as Panacea for China’s Domestic and External Challenges 3Jabin T. Jacob and Hoang The Anh

Part II Domestic Developments 21

2 Reform of Party and State Structures in China 23Nguyen Xuan Cuong

3 Changes in China’s Economic Development Model After the 19th CPC National Congress 37Nguyen Quang Thuan and Tran Hong Viet

4 Xi Jinping’s Political and Economic Initiatives and the ‘Success Trap’ 49Manoranjan Mohanty

5 Political Considerations in the Chinese Leadership’s Economic Assessments 63Jabin T. Jacob

contents

x CoNTENTS

6 China’s Military Reforms in the Wake of Recent CPC National Congresses 77Bui Thi Thu Hien

Part III Neighbourhood Policies 95

7 Key Markers and Trends in Chinese Foreign Policy in South Asia 97Prashant Kumar Singh

8 The BRI and the East Sea Disputes in China’s Ties with Southeast Asia 115Hoang The Anh

9 Strategic Competition Between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific 131Cu Chi Loi

10 Competition and Caution in Chinese Foreign Policy Towards Northeast Asia 143Nguyen Quang Thuan and Hoang The Anh

Part IV CPC Propaganda Abroad 155

11 The CPC’s International Department and China’s Party- Based Diplomacy 157Ngeow Chow-Bing

12 China’s “Great Overseas Propaganda” Under the Belt and Road Initiative 169Roger C. Liu

xi CoNTENTS

Part V Economic Development and Foreign Policy 185

13 China’s Quest for Global Leadership Through Scientific and Technological Innovation 187Nguyen Binh Giang

14 Rural Vitalisation and Foreign Policy 199Prachi Aggarwal

15 China’s State-Owned Enterprises as Agents of Party and State Power 215Aravind Yelery

Index 231

xiii

Prachi Aggarwal Sanchi University of Buddhist Indic Studies, Sanchi, Madhya Pradesh, India

Bui Thi Thu Hien Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam

Cu Chi Loi Institute of American Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam

Hoang The Anh Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam

Jabin T. Jacob Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Uttar Pradesh, IndiaNational Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, India

Roger C. Liu FLAME University, Pune, Maharashtra, India

Manoranjan Mohanty Council for Social Development, New Delhi, IndiaInstitute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi, India

Ngeow Chow-Bing Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Nguyen Binh Giang Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam

contributors

xiv CoNTRIBUToRS

Nguyen Quang Thuan Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam

Nguyen Xuan Cuong Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam

Prashant Kumar Singh Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India

Tran Hong Viet Graduate Academy of Social Sciences, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam

Aravind Yelery Peking University HSBC Business School, Shenzhen, China

xv

Table 6.1 Timelines and contents of national defense and military reforms after the 18th National Congress of the CPC 82

Table 14.1 Chinese provinces making foreign agriculture investments 208Table 14.2 Amount of outward direct investment by China, 2003–2016 210

list of tAbles

PART I

Introduction

3© The Author(s) 2020J. T. Jacob, Hoang The Anh (eds.), China’s Search for ‘National Rejuvenation’, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2796-8_1

CHAPTER 1

‘National Rejuvenation’ as Panacea for China’s Domestic and External

Challenges

Jabin T. Jacob and Hoang The Anh

The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October 2017 is by all accounts a landmark event in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and of the ruling CPC. The Congress saw the solidification of CPC General Secretary and PRC President Xi Jinping’s personal political authority within the Party as well as set the direction for a series of domestic reforms that have long-term conse-quences both internally and externally. The Congress is a culmination of the recentralization of power under Xi in the sense that it gave an offi-cial stamp to the process by enshrining ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ in the Party constitution. At the same time, it is as much a beginning—hence,

J. T. Jacob (*) Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Uttar Pradesh, India

National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, Indiae-mail: [email protected]

Hoang The Anh Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-981-15-2796-8_1&domain=pdf

mailto:[email protected]

4

also the reference in Xi’s Report to the Congress to a “new era” in Chinese history—in the sense that the CPC will need fresh measures to both continue and stabilize this process of recentralization of power.

Recentralization has been marketed by the CPC as being necessary for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xi 2017) but “national rejuvenation” is not possible without China tackling both domestic and foreign challenges. In Xi’s words, this requires the CPC to:

… conscientiously safeguard the solidarity and unity of the Party, maintain the Party’s deep bond with the people, and strengthen the great unity of the Chinese people of all ethnic groups and the great unity of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation at home and abroad. We must unite all the forces that can be united and work as one to progress toward the brilliant future of national rejuvenation. (Xi 2017)

In this statement to the 19th Party Congress, Xi also highlights what he sees as the challenges—maintaining Party unity, the relationship of the Party with the masses, social and ethnic rifts within the population and the need to tap the resources and reach of ethnic Chinese beyond China’s borders. Thus, the reasons and directions for this ‘national rejuvenation’ are derived from internal debilities and contradictions just as the means and ability to sustain the rejuvenation are derived from strengths and com-petencies built up by the CPC over the course of decades both within the country and outside. What needs to be underlined is the intimate connec-tion between Chinese domestic policies and its external policies and out-reach. To underestimate the influence and importance of domestic politics and considerations for the CPC in the formulation of the country’s for-eign and security policies as well as the impact of external events on China’s internal political dynamics would be a mistake. This volume attempts to explain each of these aspects if not comprehensively at least substantially across several themes and geographies.

The challenges outlined by Xi and the CPC are not new for China and nor is the search for national rejuvenation in the country a new phenom-enon. At least in the modern era, it traces its roots to the ‘self- strengthening movement’ during the Qing dynasty in the middle of the nineteenth cen-tury. As the CPC neared victory in the civil war on mainland China in 1949, Mao Zedong declared that the Chinese people had “stood up” and that they had “friends all over the world” (Mao 1949), but, of course,

J. T. JACOB AND HOANG THE ANH

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there was much that remained to be done in order for China to find what it considered its legitimate place in the world.

The reference to “national rejuvenation” in this work refers to this con-tinuing effort by the Chinese Party-state with a focus on the renewed attempts by Xi to carry this process forward. As he puts it, the ‘new era’

… will be an era for the Chinese people of all ethnic groups to work together and work hard to create a better life for themselves and ultimately achieve common prosperity for everyone. It will be an era for all of us, the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, to strive with one heart to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. (Xi 2017)

Thus, the CPC is once again talking about the need for the Chinese people to make sacrifices at the national and individual levels to ensure that China converts its domestic strengths to global standing and leverage. And these sacrifices will be necessary because of the economic difficulties that China faces on both the domestic and external fronts.

Continuing EConomiC ChallEngEs

The global economic situation today is one in which countries appear to be turning inwards and protectionist. This is the result of the global econ-omy slowing and the experiences of a series of economic shocks over the past decade starting with the global financial crisis of 2008 and including such country- or region-specific events such as the anti-corruption cam-paign in China and demonetization in India. Together with social stresses created by issues such as the flow of migrants/refugees to Europe, for instance, this has resulted in a series of conservative, right-leaning govern-ments taking power or threatening established political consensus on free trade and democratic rights in even many developed economies. A prime case in point is the United States (US) where Donald Trump was elected president with the slogan “Make America Great Again” and under which the US is threatening to wall itself off against immigrants.

China has tried to take advantage of the moment by launching the BRI and by attempting to fill the vacuum being created by American/Western withdrawal from the provision of various global public goods.

Nevertheless, not only does the US remain a formidable economic, military and political power in the world today but China’s attempts to

1 ‘NATIONAL REJUVENATION’ AS PANACEA FOR CHINA’S DOMESTIC…

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claim the mantle of No. 1 are limited against the backdrop of its own con-siderable economic challenges, even if Xi (2017) claims that China is “closer, more confident, and more capable than ever before of making the goal of national rejuvenation a reality”.

Some of these challenges are old and persistent. Inequality is a major challenge at multiple levels. There is the inequality between the different regions of China—the coastal east, the interior provinces, the western provinces and the northeastern industrial rustbelt—as well as within prov-inces themselves. Then there is the inequality that exists between urban and rural areas, as well as the huge gaps in income between individuals. While extreme poverty is expected to be eliminated by 2020 (Xinhua 2019), in time for the centennial of the founding of the CPC in 2021, the problem in China is now of relative poverty—of the sense of deprivation that those without too many means feel while observing the lives of the rich, the prosperous and the connected in China. Regional inequalities even play into admissions to China’s top universities (Fu 2018).

Meanwhile, despite the Third Plenum Decision of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2013 which talked about giving a “decisive role in resource allocation” to market forces (Xinhua 2013), Xi has subsequently focused on strengthening state-owned enterprises (SOEs) instead and both promoting them as “national champions” and calling on them to become leaders internationally (Cai 2017). Currently, SOEs hold the greatest amount of unproductive assets and debt and yet get most of the credit from state-controlled banks (Wang and Leng 2018). What is more, Xi has also strengthened the Party’s presence in Chinese private enter-prises (Chen 2019; see also The Conversation 2019) as well as foreign ones located in China (Martina 2017) calling into question the distinction between private and public in the Chinese economy.

All of this has implications for the efficiency of the Chinese economy, including the viability of the BRI—note that most Chinese companies involved in BRI projects abroad are SOEs and if they carry forward the same lack of environmental standards or business practices from China, then there are reasons for host countries to beware of Chinese invest-ments. Add to these, there are problems within of Chinese officials exhib-iting a ‘go slow’ attitude to work, for instance, which has required ever more exhortations from Xi to the CPC to reduce what is euphemistically referred to as “bureaucratism” (Xi 2017).

On the positive side of the ledger is the Chinese leadership’s farsighted focus on gaining leadership in both basic and frontier-edge technologies


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from telecom hardware to mobile payment applications to social media and artificial intelligence-based big data applications. This is a new ‘Great Leap Forward’ in Chinese economic history and likely to be far more suc-cessful than the first iteration in the late 1950s–early 1960s.

At the same time, the coercive economic measures and plain stealing that China has practised in this technological race has invited strong reac-tions with the US finally reacting to this mercantilist Chinese approach in the form of the trade war and restrictions on technology transfers to China.

If the CPC under Xi appears to have some handle on the problems of political unity and reform of governance structures and mechanisms within the country and the Party, resolving the domestic economic situation is a harder task given China’s close integration with the world economy. It could be argued that while transforming the pattern of economic develop-ment has been a strategic focus in China’s economic reform process since the 18th CPC National Congress, success has eluded the Party primarily for political reasons of control and incentives available to local leaderships. It is at least partly to address these challenges that the anti-corruption campaign, Xi’s recentralization of power and the renewed emphasis on strengthening of state-owned enterprises as ‘national champions’ have taken place.

Several chapters in this volume underline the centrality of the Chinese economy to domestic developments as well as the importance of the econ-omy to China’s larger global ambitions. The Chinese economy is today a major player globally and any impact whether negative or positive on its economy—brought out by political processes and considerations at home and abroad—will have corresponding impact on the global economy.

thE ‘China modEl’The grand CPC strategic vision melding the domestic political agenda of unity and maintaining Party supremacy with the goal internationally of increasing Chinese economic might and political influence is exemplified by Xi’s statement at the 19th Party Congress where he defined “socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era”, as that which “offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their devel-opment while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wis-dom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind” (Xi 2017).


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What this also underlines, however, is that where once the CPC thought it could learn from the outside world and control the consequences at the same time or at least that the consequences would not fundamentally threaten its own existence, today the measures undertaken by Xi suggest that such confidence no longer exists. From the heavy-handed anti- corruption campaign to the ever increasing number of directives and instructions underlining limits to debates in universities to the constant drumbeat of state-driven propaganda and adulation of Xi to the extreme surveillance measures used against its own citizens, the Party looks less like it is in charge and more like it is fire-fighting.

In fact, under Xi, the CPC has sharpened its battle against Western norms and ideas and is taking this practically to the level of an existential issue. To this end, the CPC is combining its Marxist-Leninist heritage with supposed Chinese traditional values that favour hierarchy and order in society and abroad to try and prevail against Western liberal ideals and the international order dominated by the West. Hitherto, this conflict with the West was evident usually only when reading between the lines of Chinese statements and actions. At the 19th National Congress of the CPC, even if a supposedly domestic affair, Xi appears to have more for-mally and explicitly acknowledged this challenge to the West by, among other things, “offer[ing] Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solv-ing the problems facing mankind” (Xi 2017).

Xi appears to believe the centennial goals of building “a moderately prosperous society in all respects” and “a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” by 2021 and 2049 respectively (Xinhua 2017) can be realized through eco-nomic measures, anti-corruption struggles and ‘harmony’ among the peo-ple—obedience, in other words, to the diktats of the Party. The dominant narrative of the political centrality of the CPC to China’s future is accom-panied by a reduction of space for dissent and pushing of strong and insen-sitive efforts at homogenization and assimilation of minority ethnic groups.

The 2021 goal is of ensuring “that China’s development improves the lives of all its people, particularly those who are below or near the coun-try’s poverty line” (Xinhua 2017). But even China’s ethnic minorities are today reasonably economically well off after four decades of reforms. If there is still poverty in China, it is not entirely due to economic reasons but because of the way economic development is promoted in an unequal manner, and in the case of the minorities, also because it is promoted without sensitivity to their identity or cultural concerns.


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Similarly, the CPC also appears to believe that economic development and the use of technology will ensure the 2049 target of a ‘culturally advanced and harmonious country’. While ‘harmonious’ here is also understood in terms of poverty alleviation, curbing pollution and ensuring ‘sustained and healthy economic and social development’ (Xinhua 2017), it is not clear why a strongly centralized form of government or cultural homogenization are essential to achieving these goals.

China’s economic growth is increasingly held up by the CPC and by state organs of the PRC as a model for the rest of the world to emulate but China’s economic growth has come at great cost in terms of the environ-ment, civil liberties and human lives. Xi’s promotion abroad of a Chinese model of economic development and growth should therefore be read as an attempt to justify to his people that the costs incurred were worth it. Without the ambition of trying to become a superpower and the global presence and military might that comes with it, the CPC’s missteps would be shown up to its own people.

China is unique in that it tries to portray its global expansion and espe-cially its increasing political influence as something that is non-threatening to the rest of the world. It has sold this as a case of China contributing to regional and global peace and stability. A case in point is its presence in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, which however, also conve-niently allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy opportunities to gain experience of a different ocean from the one that China physically borders. It also allows the Chinese to engage in military diplomacy and exercises with a host of Indian Ocean littoral nations subtly challenging the position of dominant regional powers such as India. This narrative of the ‘global goods’ or ‘public goods’ is of a piece with China’s increasing par-ticipation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, for example, where it is the largest contributor among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. However, while other nations seldom, if ever publicly, declare this Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean as worrying or threatening, the Chinese regularly accuse other nations exercising freedom of navigation in the East Sea (South China Sea)1 as being inimical to Chinese interests.

What is more, China has increased militarization of the features it occu-pies by putting missiles on them. In mid-2014, there was a major intrusion

1 While this chapter and others use the expression “East Sea”, the more commonly used name internationally is the “South China Sea”. The “East Sea” is the preferred usage in Vietnam.


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into the Vietnamese exclusive economic zone by the Chinese oil platform Haiyang Shiyou 981, which led to significant tensions in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. Beijing has been at it again since July 2019 with the Chinese Geological Survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8 repeatedly violating Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the south of the East Sea (Vu 2019). These Chinese actions raise the question of whether China really seeks to develop peacefully as Xi stated in his Report at the CPC’s 19th National Congress.

At the same time, the strong economic rationale for China’s expanded political and military presence worldwide cannot be denied. China has economic interests including the flow of its energy and other raw materials supplies and trade across the globe that justify its security concerns and the need to build up political and military capabilities to guard against poten-tial threats from unstable polities as well as perceived threats such as the US or India.

It is also a fact that that China’s extensive—and illegitimate—claims on various features in the East Sea are the result of the narrative of the ‘cen-tury of humiliation’ so heavily promoted by the CPC at home. While in the past, China did not have the capability to enforce these claims, it never actually ever let up on them. It also engaged in substantial diplomacy with the countries of Southeast Asia and with Japan lulling these countries into a false sense of security that somehow China had set aside or was not inter-ested in enforcing these claims. But the ‘century of humiliation’ narrative also has consequences in that the CPC itself cannot now not seek recom-pense for the ‘humiliation’ or reclaim what is ‘rightfully’ China’s when it actually has the capabilities to attempt to do so. Thus, it is that the Chinese have—as part of the process of ‘national rejuvenation’—illegally occupied and reclaimed and built up several features with the help of its commercial and naval might and appear to have no intention of ever exiting these areas no matter how many freedom of navigation operations the US or other foreign navies might engage in.

It is important to note, however, that China does not seek to maintain its claims by force alone. It also works assiduously to shape narratives and histories in its neighbourhood and around the world subtly or otherwise in its own favour. For instance, the great Ming dynasty admiral, Zheng He’s voyages to the Indian Ocean are now recast as peaceful missions of friendship aimed at bolstering trade and cultural ties than viewed as the expeditionary voyages displaying Chinese power that they were in reality. Indeed, for the CPC, all history is political. Historical narratives are con-


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stantly modified and reshaped to achieve political ends of enforcing or reinforcing Chinese claims on distant territories, of promoting the story of China as a great civilization that influenced other kingdoms and peoples and therefore, that China’s rise today is a normal and welcome development.

Institutional actors such as the PLA and China’s state-owned and pri-vate enterprises too have a role in promoting the ‘Chinese dream’. In fact, they also have strong sectoral interests and motivations in creating and promoting the narrative of the ‘Chinese dream’ for this would also increase their own profile and importance in the Chinese political system and among the Chinese people. For the PLA, for instance, appearing a mod-ern, powerful military force with the latest weapons as well as one that is both engaged in supporting public goods and an efficient war-fighting force is, therefore, an important consideration. China’s rulers see the PLA’s growth and expansion as well as actual permanent physical presence abroad in the form of bases in such locations as Djibouti in the Horn of Africa as an important part of China’s progress to becoming a global superpower.

Meanwhile, the close relationship between Chinese enterprises—whether public or private—and the Chinese Party-state needs particular attention, as Chinese state capital and influence are increasingly crossing borders. It is Chinese law that all Chinese enterprises are beholden to the Party-state (see Tanner 2017), and this means that laws of the counties that host them are not as important to these entities as Chinese law itself. In other words, if Chinese enterprises have substantial or controlling stakes in tech and financial companies in other countries or manage for-eign port terminals, then if host companies or countries are not careful or are ignorant of China’s domestic political system and its priorities, then everything from personal data to physical security of assets in those coun-tries can become subject to Chinese state control or surveillance. It is for this reason that this volume has placed such an emphasis on studying not just the reforms in China’s governance structures but also its economic reforms and their international implications. Such events as the interna-tional contretemps around the global rollout of 5G technology by Chinese private telecom major Huawei is also why this volume has delved deep into issues like China’s scientific and technological innovation that is widely understood as having security implications around the world but also into the state of Chinese agriculture and its external ambitions in this sector which do not receive equal attention.


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struCturE of thE Book

This volume attempts to look at the policies and goals outlined by the CPC in the quest for Chinese national rejuvenation from a distinctly Asian perspective with scholars from across India and Southeast Asia examining a range of issues from China’s governance structures and economic devel-opment to its military and its foreign policies towards neighbours and the wider world. It seeks to assess policies in these areas for their impact and influence at home as well as on China’s external policies. At the same time, the book also looks at specific themes like technology, agricultural devel-opment, reform of state-owned enterprises and the use of Party bodies to engage in foreign propaganda work among other things to offer examples of the merging of Chinese domestic political and foreign policy interests. In the process, this work offers its readers a better idea of China’s place in the world as the Chinese themselves see it and the implications over time for China, its neighbourhood and the rest of the world.

The first major section of the book discusses prominent domestic devel-opments in China over the last several years since the 19th Party Congress while contextualizing them against aims and achievements of the 18th Party Congress. In Chap. 2, Nguyen Xuan Cuong addresses questions of governance reforms in China noting that these have tended to fuse Party and State structures ever more closely. ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ on ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era’ adopted by the 19th Congress has now been written into the Party constitution, while the 13th National People’s Congress also passed an amendment to Constitution of the Chinese state to this effect. These amendments to the Party and state con-stitutions indicate the trends and approaches of the reform of Party and state agencies, and the chapter explicates these in some detail with a focus on the anti-corruption campaign.

Nguyen Quang Thuan and Tran Hong Viet in Chap. 3 focus on the changes in China’s economic development patterns after the 19th National Congress and the rationale offered for these by the Party. The planned transition of the Chinese economy from a phase of rapid growth to a stage of what is called high-quality development is a pivotal stage for transform-ing China’s growth model, improving China economic structure and fostering new drivers of growth. The chapter looks at the measures and practices China has undertaken in the current period including for inte-grating the Chinese economy into the world economy. The key change they see is the increased involvement of the Party-state in China’s current


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economic development policies both because of the need to fulfil the cen-tennial goals and because China’s major foreign economic initiatives and strategies require enormous resources and tools for implementation.

Manoranjan Mohanty, in Chap. 4, underlines what he calls the ‘success trap’ afflicting China’s and Xi Jinping’s political and economic initiatives. China’s economic successes have been accompanied by enormous social, political and environmental problems, as well as increasing income inequal-ity, regional disparity and corruption. These are systemic problems arising from the economic reforms that started in 1978; but to their credit, China’s leaders have recognized many of these issues over the past decades and initiated some measures to address them. Despite their efforts, prob-lems persist—increasing social and regional inequality, environmental deg-radation, social alienation, declining freedoms and persistent corruption, among others because China’s current reform path is ultimately incompat-ible with the type of actions needed to tackle these problems.

In Chap. 5, Jabin T. Jacob examines the many political considerations at the centre of the CPC’s economic reforms agenda. The world at large has tended to focus on China’s economic prowess, its large domestic mar-ket and of late, its rising international economic heft as expressed in such outreach economic projects as the BRI. But for the CPC itself, the central focus has always been to use its economic strength to ensure domestic stability and the continuation in power of the Party. This chapter, there-fore, looks at the Chinese leadership’s views of the Chinese economy as gleaned from prominent reports and speeches and what these say of their views, including apprehensions, about the state of affairs of the Chinese economy and the implications for the position and legitimacy of the CPC.

The Chinese military is a key guarantor of the power of the CPC given that the PLA is the Party’s army rather than that of the PRC. In Chap. 6, Bui Thi Thu Hien looks at Chinese military reforms since the 18th CPC National Congress and the additional measures proclaimed at the 19th Congress. She finds that China’s current round of military reforms is dramatic in nature with ambitions of turning the Chinese military into one of the strongest forces in the world, capable of multi-terrain combat and of becoming the world’s most powerful naval force in order to control distant waters. The chapter looks at the national and international contexts before China as it carries out a series of policies and measures to strongly promote military reform and also assesses the relationship between the CPC and the PLA in the process. The attempt


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