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China’s New Leadership: Paradoxes, Characteristics and Implications

Cheng Li, Ph.D.Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for ScholarsProfessor of Government, Hamilton College

In his seven-decade-long academic career,the great British historian, Joseph Needham,tried to explain what Sinologists later called“the Needham Paradox.” It was a paradox that,while traditional China had many talented peo-ple and was advanced in science, the countrydeclined during the middle part of the last mil-lennium. According to Needham, a primaryreason for the decline of China was that thecountry “lost its edge” by suppressing techni-cians and merchants “whose power posed athreat to the Emperor.”

The conditions in China that Needhamdescribed have changed profoundly since themid-1990s. This is particularly evident in therecently held 16th National Congress of theChinese Communist Party (CCP). The ninemembers of the new Politburo StandingCommittee, the highest decision-making bodyin the country, are all engineers by training.Furthermore, the Party Congress has codifiedin the CCP constitution what is already true inpractice—enthusiastically recruiting mer-chants, known as “entrepreneurs” by theChinese, or “capitalists” to western reporters.

Do the new leadership and the new constitu-tion that was amended in the 16th PartyCongress mean the end of the “NeedhamParadox?” Will Chinese economic and politicaldevelopment, as a result of this historicalchange, be particularly dynamic in the future?To a certain extent, China has alreadyreemerged as an economic powerhouse in

today’s world. On the political front, this PartyCongress marked a shift of power to the so-called “fourth generation” of Chinese leaders(the first three generations were represented byMao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin,respectively). The fourth generation of leadersled by Hu Jintao has not only held almost all topministerial and provincial leadership posts, buthas also occupied over 80 percent of the seats onthe 16th Central Committee. It was the first timein the history of the People’s Republic of China(PRC) that a power transition took place in anorderly, peaceful and institutionalized way.

It is too early, however, to determine the truesignificance of China’s ongoing transformationand the 16th Party Congress. China’s twists andturns in the past century, as well as the roller-coaster ride of Sino-U.S. relations during thepast few years, have taught us to be cautious.Even today, China remains a paradox in manyimportant ways.

The Paradox of China and its PoliticalSuccession

Present-day China is indeed a dialectic ofhope and fear—a paradox of promises and pit-falls. While that has always been true to somedegree, the broad scale of contrasting scenariosis remarkable. On the positive side, there hasbeen a triumphant mood in the country overthe past two years. Beijing’s successful bid tohost the 2008 Olympics, Shanghai’s equally

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successful bid to host the 2010 World Expo, theChinese soccer team’s qualifying for its first-ever World Cup Games (although it did notscore), and China’s accession to the WTO haveall brought pride, optimism and a sense of ful-fillment to the Chinese people. Never since theOpium Wars has the Chinese nation spokenmore loudly and clearly about its courage, com-mitment and confidence in integrating with theoutside world than today.

On the negative side, enormous economicdisparity has become, in my view, the mostdaunting problem the country now faces.During the past two decades, China haschanged from one of the most equitable coun-tries in the world in terms of income distribu-tion to one of the least equitable. In addition,rampant official corruption; an unprecedent-ed, high unemployment rate; growing rural dis-content, especially in the wake of China’s entryinto the WTO; environmental degradation; andfrequently occurring industrial incidents (theso-called tofu projects that are as breakable asbean curd, as Premier Zhu Rongji has charac-terized them); all seem to suggest that theChinese regime is sitting atop a volcano of masssocial disturbance.

China’s political succession and leadershipchange have also been filled with paradoxes.Jockeying for power among various factions hasbeen fervent and protracted, but the powerstruggle has not led to a systemic crisis as wastrue during the reigns of Mao and Deng. Whilenepotism and favoritism in elite recruitmenthave become prevalent, educational credentialsand technical expertise have, at the same time,become prerequisites. Regional representationhas gained importance in the selection ofCentral Committee members, but leaders whocome from coastal regions dominate the newPolitburo, especially its Standing Committee.Regulations such as term limits and an agerequirement for retirement have been imple-mented at various levels of the Chinese leader-ship, but these regulations and norms do notappear to restrain the power of Jiang Zemin,the 76-year-old “new paramount” leader. While

the military’s influence on political successionhas declined during the past decade, theCentral Military Commission (CMC) is still verypowerful. Although Hu Jintao did succeedJiang as general secretary of the Party, Jiang’sdecision to retain his chairmanship of the CMCand to appoint many of his cronies to the newPolitburo Standing Committee apparentlymade this transition of power incomplete.

Not surprisingly, these contradictory scenesin China and these paradoxical phenomena inChinese elite politics have created much confu-sion and uncertainty. Unfortunately, there aremore myths and speculations than thoughtfulanalysis and well-grounded assessment amongChina scholars. Most China watchers have beenobsessed with the issue of Jiang Zemin’s retire-ment. While the issue of Jiang’s role after the16th Party Congress is important, many stu-dents of Chinese politics have failed to under-stand the institutional restraints that individualleaders, including Jiang himself, have to con-front. Some speculate about the power struggleamong rising political stars without payingmuch attention to the political forces andregional interests that these new leaders repre-sent. Others assume that the future will emulatethe recent past with Jiang playing the samebehind-the-scenes role that Deng did, and thatthe fourth generation leaders will continue thepolicies of their predecessors.

Jiang’s political manipulation and his seem-ing “political triumphs” in the Party Congressmight, in fact, have revealed his own weakness-es and insecurities. It is revealing that the dele-gates gave Hu Jintao the highest number ofvotes (only one of the 2,132 delegates did notvote for him), while by contrast, Jiang’s bodyguard, You Xigui, received the lowest vote inthe election of alternates; his former personalsecretary Huang Liman received the third low-est vote; and his confidant, Minister ofEducation Chen Zhili, failed to obtain a seat onthe Politburo. Though Hu Jintao is surroundedby Jiang’s protégés on the Standing Committee,these protégés are also vulnerable because ofthe political favoritism through which they

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obtained their seats. Some may soon climb onHu’s bandwagon.

It is also too simplistic to assume that the newleaders will merely follow Jiang’s policies. Ofcourse, China will not take a dramatic turn asthe new leaders assume power. In fact, mem-bers of the fourth generation have already par-ticipated in the policy-making process andmany have served as chief advisers to JiangZemin and Zhu Rongji. Yet, the history of thePRC indicates that each generation of leadershas its own mandate and its own policy priori-ties. New leaders often strive to fix the problemsof their predecessors. This raises some impor-tant questions: How will the fourth generationleaders regard Jiang’s legacy—the accomplish-ments achieved and the problems that havearisen in both domestic and foreign policy?How capable as a team will the fourth genera-tion leaders be in overcoming the pitfalls of theJiang era and in carrying out their own man-date? What, then, is the mandate of the fourthgeneration? The answers to these questions liein an analysis of the characteristics of the fourthgeneration of leaders.

Characteristics of the Fourth Generationof Leaders

Each generation has distinctive characteris-tics fostered by the socio-political environmentduring its formative years. Consequently, gener-ational cohorts often share collective behavioralattributes. In the PRC, the concept of genera-tions—or more precisely, political elite genera-tions—has also been based on the distinctivepast experiences of elites. The first three elitegenerations in the PRC have been identified as:the “Long March generation,” the “Anti-Japanese War generation,” and the “SocialistTransformation generation.”

China’s fourth generation of leaders is com-prised of those who had their formative yearsduring the Cultural Revolution (CR). Now theyare in their late 40s and 50s. Most of them wereat various levels in their education (elementaryschool, high school or college) or had just grad-

uated from college in 1966 when the CR began.While there is a 15-year span between the oldestand youngest, all members of this generationacquired their first political experiences duringthe course of the CR. The Cultural Revolution,arguably the most extraordinary event in con-temporary China, and the dramatic changesthat occurred thereafter, had an ever-lastingimpact on the collective characteristics of thisgeneration. As a result, the fourth generation ofleaders is probably the least ideological, mostcapable, most diverse, and most concerned withcoalition building of all elite generations in thehistory of the CCP. These generalizations con-stitute four main characteristics of the fourthgeneration leaders.

First, the new leaders are less dogmatic andmore open-minded than their predecessorswere. This is because most of them were Mao’s“Red Guards,” the most active participants inthe CR. They grew up in a political environ-ment characterized by idealism, moralism, andradicalism. They were taught to sacrifice them-selves for socialism and revolution. But as timepassed, their faith was eroded, their devotionwas betrayed, their dream was shattered, theireducation was lost, and their careers were inter-rupted. They had firsthand knowledge of thehuman catastrophes caused by the Communistideology. Compared to their predecessors,fourth generation leaders are far more interest-ed in discussing issues than defending “isms.”Similar to the leadership of post-CommunistRussia, China’s new generation of leaders maylack a shared commitment to the existing polit-ical system.

Second, the new leaders are more capablethan their predecessors were. This is largelybecause of the hardships they endured at ayoung age. A majority of the fourth generationleaders, though almost all attended college,had work experience as farmers and workers.For example, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (whowill likely succeed Zhu Rongji as premier nextMarch), both spent over a decade in Gansu,one of the poorest provinces in the country.Many ministers and governors in the fourth

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generation were “sent-down youths” whoworked as farmers in the early 1970s. Enormousphysical hardship and an ever-changing politi-cal environment nurtured within them valuabletraits such as adaptability, endurance, grassrootsconsciousness and political sophistication.

The new leaders have a deep understandingof the “real China,” and its severe problems. Asa result, they are probably more innovative indealing with these problems. For example,Zeng Qinghong, a new member of thePolitburo Standing Committee, is often identi-fied as Jiang Zemin’s “brain.” As Jiang’s chiefstrategist, Zeng helped orchestrate manyimportant political moves and policy initiatives.

A large number of prominent leaders of thefourth generation have served as provincialchiefs. The first and foremost responsibility of aprovincial chief is usually to foster economicdevelopment in the province in which he or sheserves. At the 16th Party Congress, provincialleaders obtained the largest representation onboth the Politburo and the Central Committee.All four provincial Party secretaries who servedon the 15th Politburo were promoted to serveon the 16th Politburo Standing Committee.Within the new 24-member Politburo, twenty(83.3 percent) have served as top provincialleaders, and ten (41.7 percent) held provincialleadership posts when they were selected. Atpresent, eight Politburo members (33.3 per-cent) remain as provincial Party secretaries.The provinces that these leaders have governedare large socioeconomic entities. It is often saidthat a province is to China what a country is toEurope. China’s provincial chiefs, like top lead-ers in European nations, have constantly beenconcerned about regional economic develop-ment and have coped with daunting challengessuch as unemployment, political stability andsocial welfare needs in their jurisdictions. ForChina’s future national leaders, provincialadministration provides an ideal trainingground.

Third, the new leaders are more diverse thantheir predecessors were in terms of political sol-idarity. Although fourth generation leaders

share similar memories of the CulturalRevolution, they often have a wide spectrum ofpolitical affiliations and class backgrounds.Some were on opposite sides during theCultural Revolution. This is evident by the threedifferent periods during which they joined theCCP, since the criteria for political recruitmentduring these periods were profoundly different.This is in sharp contrast to the previous genera-tions of leaders, who usually shared strongbonding experiences such as the Long Marchand the Anti-Japanese War.

Another important indication of the diversityof the new leaders is reflected in the differencein their educational and occupational back-grounds. Although technocrats have dominat-ed the top leadership, there are more econo-mists, financial experts and lawyers on the 16thCentral Committee than any previous one. Forexample, Xi Jinping (Party secretary ofZhejiang), Li Keqiang (governor of Henan),Cao Jianming (vice president of SupremeCourt), Zhan Xuan (president of HigherPeople’s Court), Yin Yicui (deputy Party secre-tary of Shanghai), and Yuan Chunqing (deputyParty secretary of Shaanxi) all received lawdegrees. They were all born in the 1950s, andall serve on the 16th Central Committee.Engineers, economists, financial experts andlawyers are all professional experts, but varia-tions in their expertise will likely lead to differ-ences in their political perspectives and policychoices.

The diversification of leaders in terms of pro-fessional backgrounds is partially related to thedissimilar sources of elite recruitment. Thereare now more diversified channels throughwhich new leaders can advance their politicalcareers. Political networks such as the“Shanghai gang,” the “princelings” (taizidang),“the Qinghua clique,” the “fellow provincials”(tongxiang), the “Chinese Communist YouthLeague officials” (tuanpai), and the “personalsecretary clusters” (mishuqun) have served asimportant sources of elite recruitment amongthe fourth generation leaders. In addition,some new political groups, for example,

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“entrepreneurs from stock-holding firms andjoint ventures” (hezi qiyejia) and “the returneesfrom study overseas” (haiguipai), have alsoemerged as distinct elite groups within the cen-tral leadership. The growing diversification ofpolitical networks may contribute to the disper-sion of power and highlight the need for shar-ing power.

The most important intra-generational ten-sion within the new leadership may be geo-graphical. In fact, conflicts of interest betweenregion-based factions during this time of politi-cal succession are more transparent than everbefore. This is exemplified by the contrastsbetween Hu Jintao and Zeng Qinghong, thetwo most powerful figures in the post-Jiang era.Hu and Zeng represent two different socio-political groups and geographical regions.These differences are reflected in their distinctpersonal careers and political associations.

Hu Jintao comes from a non-official familybackground. His political association was large-ly with the Chinese Communist Youth League.Hu has spent most of his adult life in some ofthe poorest provinces in China’s inland region,including 14 years in Gansu, three years inGuizhou, and four years in Tibet. It might notbe merely a coincidence that in the monthsprior to the 16th Party Congress, Hu frequentlyvisited inland provinces such as Yunnan,Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Qinghai, and Sichuan.

In contrast, Zeng is a princeling with strongfamily ties. He is known for his political associa-tion with the “Shanghai gang.” Zeng has thusfar spent almost his entire career in coastalregions such as Beijing, Shanghai, andGuangdong. This explains why, in recent years,he has attempted to form a political coalitionprimarily among those who live in the coastalregion. Many provincial leaders in coastalprovinces are princelings, for example,Governor of Liaoing, Bo Xilai; Party Secretaryof Zhejiang, Xi Jinping; Party Secretary ofHebei, Bai Keming; and Party Secretary ofHainan, Wang Qishan. Zeng has also deliber-ately associated himself with returnees of studyoverseas, a main source of the future fifth gen-

eration of leaders. A large number of returnees,who do not necessarily come from Shanghai,have chosen to settle in Shanghai and otherparts of coastal China.

The tension and difference between Hu andZeng, or what we may call “inland Hu” versus“coastal Zeng,” are obvious, but they may notlead to a vicious power struggle. This is becausethey share a need for cooperation. Hu has amajority of votes in the 16th CentralCommittee, but his inland officials have lessexperience or expertise in foreign trade,finance, technological development and large-scale urban construction than their counter-parts in coastal regions. As for Zeng, he has amajority of the votes in the Politburo and hasbeen able to control economic and humanresources. But if he does not demonstrate will-ingness to share power and resources, thepotential backlash against him, the ShanghaiGang and the rich coastal region will be over-whelming.

The dynamic interaction between Hu andZeng is related to the fourth main characteris-tics of the new leaders: they are more aware ofthe need for coalition-building than their pre-decessors were. This is mainly due to the shift ofthe criteria for elite recruitment from revolu-tionary credentials to administrative skills. Thisexplains why the top leaders of the fourth gen-eration are all capable administrators and polit-ical tacticians. Wen Jiabao, for example, workedas a chief-of-staff for three bosses (Hu Yaobang,Zhao Ziyang, and Jiang Zemin), two of whomwere purged. He not only survived but also fur-ther advanced his career. Wen’s caliber as asuperb administrator explains his legendarysurvival and success.

All these characteristics of new leaders willshape their policies, both domestic and inter-national. The fact that both Hu Jintao and WenJiabao were able to advance their careers fromwithin China’s poorest region indicates they willbe more sensitive to the needs and concerns ofinland provinces. The Jiang era has beenknown for the growing economic disparity.Jiang has allocated too much economic

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resource to Shanghai and other coastal citieswhile many inland cities have lagged farbehind. Consequently, the issue of economicgrowth and social justice has reemerged. It isnot difficult to imagine that the “Hu adminis-tration” will make a greater effort to reallocateresources from the coast to the inland in orderto reduce regional economic disparity. Theestablishment of a social safety net, the stimula-tion of demand in the domestic market, andthe development of an infrastructure in China’sinland region will be important agenda itemsfor the fourth generation of leaders. The antic-ipated effort of the new leaders to achieve a bal-ance between economic development andsocial justice is rational and timely.

The mandate of the fourth generation is like-ly to accelerate political reforms. This is notbecause the new leaders are motivated bydemocratic ideals or ideas, but because theyrealize that their mission is to prevent the CCP’ssudden fall from power, which has occurred inmany Communist or Leninist one-party regimesduring the past decade. To a certain extent,China has experienced some important politi-cal developments during the Jiang era, forexample, the emergence of NGOs, the rapiddevelopment of the legal profession, the grow-ing concern about human rights, the commer-cialization of media, the diversification ofsources of information, and local elections.

All of the developments mentioned above—plus Jiang’s “three represents,” which broadenthe CCP’s power base by recruiting entrepre-neurs—have paved the way for further politicaltransformation of the country. It is too early toassess how far and how fast the new leadership’spolitical reform will progress. To a certainextent, China’s political reform depends on apolitical environment, both domestic and inter-national, that is conducive to bold politicalexperimentation. Based on political discourse,initiatives, and signals articulated by new lead-ers and members of their think tanks, we mayanticipate political reforms in the following fiveareas:

1. The so-called “intra-Party democracy” (dan-gnei minzhu), including elections in all levelsof leadership, will be more effectively insti-tutionalized. It will gradually make factionalpolitics more transparent and legitimate.

2. A division among the functions of decision-making, policy implementation, and super-vision will be better defined. Major policydecisions will be subjected to approval by amore collective leadership.

3. Provincial governments will have more sayin the decision-making process in both theParty Congress and the National People’sCongress.

4. A consolidation of the legal system will takeplace, since some new leaders have beentrained in law and the social sciences.

5. The new leaders will pursue structuralchange to better define the relationshipamong the State, the Party and the military.They may establish a national security coun-cil, a new state institution that will be abovethe Party and the military. The fact thatnone of the top leaders in the fourth gen-eration has military background will leadthem to consolidate civilian command overthe military.

These five aspects of political reform may notbe seen as important in the eyes of some Chinawatchers because none of these changes willlead to a multiparty system of democracy.Indeed, China does not seem ready for a multi-party political system. It is unlikely that anyorganized opposition will emerge to competewith the CCP in the near future. Yet, the legiti-macy and transparency of factional politicswithin the CCP may turn out to be an impor-tant step toward a far-reaching transformationof China’s political system.

New Chinese leaders’ inclination to pursuepolitical reforms is not only driven by domesticpressure, but also by foreign policy concerns.The fourth generation of leaders will not changeChina’s foreign policy in terms of substance, butwill make a great effort to change China’s image

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in international affairs. Taiwan leader, ChenShui-bian, often argues that a democratic Taiwanwill not have any common ground with anauthoritarian China. The new generation ofleaders in China may well play the card of politi-cal reform on the mainland in order to lure thehearts and minds of the Taiwanese. Any majorpolitical move toward a more liberal and democ-ratic China will have a strong impact on cross-strait relations.

A factor that will contribute to the imagechange of China’s foreign policy is the growingnumber of western-trained leaders in China’sforeign policy circle. Many vice minister-levelpositions are held by western-trained leaders.They will be more visible in the years to come.Since these Chinese leaders attended the sameschools as their counterparts in Taiwan and theUnited States, it will be difficult for them to crit-icize each other in ideological terms. It will beinteresting to see the impact of this change onpublic opinion toward China.

Top leaders in the fourth generation have lit-tle experience in foreign affairs. In fact, none ofthe nine members of the Politburo StandingCommittee has a previous career in foreign ser-vices or foreign policy. Their primary agendawill be domestic economic growth, politicalinstitution building and social stability. Yet, thisdoes not mean that they are ill-informed aboutthe outside world. Many of them previouslyserved as top leaders in China’s coastal citiesand provinces such as Beijing, Shanghai,Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang—some ofthe most cosmopolitan areas in the world. Theyhave been deeply concerned with foreign poli-cy issues, especially China’s economic integra-tion with the global economy in an ever-chang-ing environment.

These new Chinese leaders are cynical aboutthe moral superiority of the West, resentful ofWestern arrogance, and doubtful about thecomplete adoption of a Western political systemin China. Yet, they will not refuse to learn fromthe West, including Western political ideas andgovernmental structures. They are interested inhaving a dialogue with the West. Even during

crises such as the tragic incidents in Belgradeand the EP-3 incident, they understood theneed for cooperation rather than confronta-tion. What has emerged from the recent inci-dents should not be apprehension over howquickly and unpredictably Sino-U.S. relationsmay change, but rather how rationally andcapably the top leaders, on both sides, are ableto respond to crises.

Implications for the United StatesInterests

What are the implications of new Chineseleaders and the political trends in China for theUnited States? One can argue that these politi-cal developments in China, especially the ongo-ing peaceful transition of power to the fourthgeneration, converge with the interests of theUnited States. The United States does not wantto see the reemergence of a paramount author-itarian Chinese leader or the rise of a strongChinese military regime. Chinese history showsthat a radical and xenophobic foreign policyoften required a charismatic (and paranoid)leader. None of top leaders of the fourth gen-eration seems to have such characteristics.

China’s new leaders are, of course, not amonolithic group. There have been and will con-tinue to be important variations among them.But, it is important that we do not identify theseleaders using stereotypes such as conservativesand liberals, hardliners and softliners, pro-Westand anti-West, pro-globalization and anti-global-ization. The tension of these Chinese leaders hasmore to do with their conflicting interests, deter-mined by their generational differences, fac-tions, regions, and social strata, than their differ-ences in ideologies. These leaders generally havevalid concerns. The United States’ leadersshould attempt to meet with, and continue dia-logue with, various groups in the Chinese lead-ership. The United States leaders should explainmore fully U.S. interests, values and principals. Itwould be ineffective, with possible unintendedconsequences, if the United States should sup-port one group and oppose another.

Because of the collective characteristics ofthe fourth generation leaders, they will likelyrun the country for ten years or beyond. Thefifth generation of leaders, which will includemore Western-trained returnees, may take along time to move to a more centrist position inChinese politics. Therefore, it will be a mistakefor the United States to place hope solely onthe fifth generation, and thus lose the greatopportunity to work with the fourth generationin various arenas that are important to bothcountries.

The fourth generation leaders are capablepeople, but it remains to be seen whether theyare capable enough to handle the dauntingchallenges that China faces today. One canargue that some cleavages within the fourthgeneration of leaders, especially the lack ofconsensus on major social and economic poli-cies, are so fundamental that compromise willbecome very difficult, if not impossible. On theinternational front, while the September 11thterrorist attacks reduced tensions in U.S.-Chinarelations, China has been surrounded by anextremely unstable and increasingly unpre-dictable external environment. Besides, theissue of Taiwan and other problems in U.S.-China relations, though no longer imminent,still exist. Therefore, the United States shouldalso be prepared for a scenario that may beunpleasant for both China and the rest of theworld, including the United States.

New technocratic leaders in China are notdemocrats, but they do not have an ideology

fundamentally hostile to American values. TheChinese leadership will become increasinglydiversified. More lawyers, entrepreneurs, publicintellectuals, and social advocates will permeatethe upper tiers of power and participate in thepolitical process and discourse. China's road toa more open and liberal state will not besmooth. But its ongoing effort to achieve politi-cal institutionalization and a more collectiveleadership will most likely proceed in that direc-tion. The United States should welcome thisdevelopment, because global peace and pros-perity in the 21st century requires a stable,cooperative, and responsible China.

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