CHINA’S CONFUCIAN MAKEOVER The discourse of harmony in state-sponsored Confucianism and China’s “peaceful rise” as national image management

Rachael Gary University of Puget Sound ‘12

Department of Politics and Government PG495: Independent Study

Advisor: Professor Karl J. Fields Pacific Rim 2011-2012

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INTRODUCTION

On 12 January 2011, a 31-foot bronze statue of Confucius, China’s most famous

philosopher, was unveiled in Tiananmen Square. 1 Prominently displayed in front of the Chinese

National Museum in Beijing, the statue faced both Mao Zedong’s mausoleum in the center of the

square and his iconic portrait on the opposite side, proudly overlooking China’s political heart.

The installation of the statue is a sign that Confucius has at long last been officially rehabilitated.

His prime seat in China’s most sacred political space is the highest endorsement the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) could give the ancient sage—an ironic honor, considering the

abhorrence he inspired in China’s not-so-distant Maoist past. During the Cultural Revolution,

Confucius was seized upon as the champion of the counterrevolutionary belief system,

associated with the oppression and social inequality of imperial China. Attacks on Confucius

were therefore understood as attacks on the old regime, and the Anti-Lin Biao and Anti-

Confucius Campaign of the mid 1970s are remembered as some of the most violent years of the

Cultural Revolution.2 The juxtaposition of Mao and Confucius, side-by-side in Tiananmen

Square, the grandfatherly-looking Confucius staring into the eyes of his former persecutor, is

thus a jarring one, almost paradoxical. However, in recent years, the CCP has increasingly

chosen to present just such an image to the world.

Over the past ten years, Confucianism has enjoyed a revival as the state ideology of

China: Confucius’ unveiling in Tiananmen Square is merely the latest and greatest in a series of

moves by the Communist party-state to incorporate the sage into the pantheon of Communist

saints. Eager to fill the ideological vacuum left by Marxism’s fall from grace, the CCP has

championed Confucianism as both a new national code of conduct, emphasizing tenets such as

1 Chang, 2011 2 Sommer, 2008, p.3

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social responsibility and harmony, and as a symbol of national identity. The signs of this revival

of are everywhere, from books,3 to films,4 to new construction projects.5 Within China, the

resultant rage for “national studies” has even led to the revival of private schools called shi shu,

where children memorize classical texts under the tutelage of teachers dressed in Han dynasty

robes and bow to statues of Confucius.6 In large part, the Confucian revival speaks to the failure

of Communism to provide an adequate ideological foundation for China’s continued growth.

“The rise of a big country requires a cultural foundation, and Chinese culture upholds the spirit

of harmony,” said Wu Weishan, the sculptor of the Tiananmen statue. “The essential thoughts of

Confucius are love, kindness, wisdom and generosity. And peace and prosperity are what the

people are striving for.”7 In the absence of an attractive example from more recent Communist

history, the CCP has therefore turned to the distant past for a vision of Chinese culture that can

inspire audiences both domestically and abroad—and has rediscovered Confucius.

However, it is important to note that not every cadre within the CCP is in favor of

Confucius’ comeback. The philosopher’s occupancy of Tiananmen Square was short-lived. The

statue was moved during the evening of April 20, 2011, with no prior announcement, from its

prominent position in Tiananmen Square to a sculpture garden within the National Museum.8

The statue’s removal was met with outrage from Confucius’ descendents, delight from Maoists,

and confusion from Western observers. When reached for comment, officials stated that its

3 Yu Dan, a professor of media studies at Beijing Normal University, at last count has sold over 4.2 million legal copies—and an estimated 6 million pirated versions—of her reflections on “The Analects,” which has remained a best seller since its publication in 2007 (Melvin, 2007). 4 The CCP authorized the creation of a biopic commemorating the life of Confucius, ironically in celebration of the Party’s 60th birthday. Released in January of 2010 in the midst of tremendous hype, the state-backed biopic “Confucius” featured leading man Chow Yun-Fat in the title role, though the film bombed both in the box office and amongst critics (Bell, 2010). 5 The newly constructed Party school in Shanghai is apparently modeled on a Confucian scholar’s desk (Bell, 2010). 6 Melvin, 2007 7 Chang, 2011 8 Jacobs, 2011

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position overlooking Tiananmen Square had always been considered to be temporary, until it

could be moved to the sculpture garden. However, considering the official ceremony the statue

received at its unveiling, this explanation seems unlikely.9 Instead, the sudden removal of the

statue suggests a behind-the-scenes political decision. Older cadres from within the conservative

faction likely saw the statue’s orientation across from Mao as a quiet challenge to Marxist

orthodoxy, and therefore to the Party itself.

Given the clear ambivalence within the Party and divided feelings amongst Communist

leadership about the scope of the Confucian revival, why does it continue to press on? There are

as many compelling reasons to suppress the revival of Confucianism as to promote it: as Cheng

Li, an analyst at the Brookings Institute, says, Confucianism “is such a big basket you can select

whatever you want.”10 While the Party can invoke Confucian harmony and filial piety in hopes

of greater social order and respect for authority, political dissidents can just as easily point to its

progressive humanism in their demands for responsible government and ethical leadership. And

so, while some commentators explain the revival of Confucianism as a purely anti-democratic

move by the CCP—yet another attempt to encourage deference to Party rule—this explanation

seems too simplistic in light of the potential risks posed by the very same doctrine.

It is certainly true that the CCP has revived Confucius, at least in part, for a Chinese

audience. In the face of widespread public cynicism regarding traditional Communist ideology,

particularly since Tiananmen, the Party has been searching for an alternative philosophical

tradition for the past two decades. Confucianism can appeal to the public without contradicting

the Party’s continuing use of official Marxist theories on politics and social development. It also

9 Dotson, 2011, p. 13 10 Yee, 2011

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promotes social stability domestically, urging the public to remain calm and loyal despite rising

income inequality, environmental pollution, and official corruption.

However, what this explanation ignores is that there is an international dimension to the

resurgence of equal importance. In many ways, the revival of Confucius appears to be largely for

foreign consumption, a way to reassure nervous international observers of China’s good

intentions as it continues to grow. While Mao Zedong remains a controversial figure in the West,

reviled for the famine, poverty, and political oppression that marked Maoist China, Confucius is

seen as grandfatherly, wise, and above all, respectable. The CCP hopes that by presenting a

Confucian China to the world, they can harness that respectability to improve their national

image and smooth over negative perceptions of China abroad. Indeed, in this light the installation

of Confucius in Tiananmen Square takes on added significance. Tiananmen has been the subject

of international scrutiny since the events of 1989; the placement of Confucius in a place

irrevocably tied with violence in the Western consciousness can therefore be interpreted as an

attempt to superimpose a new, peaceful gloss on the square’s bloody history.

It seems at least one element of the state-led revival of Confucianism is thus an attempt to

put a positive spin on China’s rise in the eyes of foreign observers. The rise of the Chinese

popular nationalist movement since the 1990s, aggressive, confrontational, and sometimes anti-

Western, has negatively influenced popular opinion abroad and contributed to Western fears that

China’s rise—already an unsettling concept for many—poses a threat to global stability and

peace. The development of the Confucian-influenced discourse of “peaceful rise” or “peaceful

development” is thus part of a broad, international propaganda campaign to describe China’s rise

in a non-threatening terms. Although the CCP has certainly been motivated by domestic

concerns in the revival of Confucianism, the key factor in Confucius new role as the avuncular

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symbol of Chinese culture is the Western conviction of a “China threat”: the invocation of

Confucian themes in the discourse of “harmony” or “peaceful rise” is therefore an attempt to

rebrand China abroad as a responsible and harmonious world power.

I begin this paper with an overview of the origin of the popular Confucian revival as well

as various scholarly perspectives on the motivation for the state-led movement. Next, I will

discuss the negative perceptions of China in the West as well as the rationale for the China threat

theory, particularly how both are influenced by Chinese nationalism. I will then describe the

patriotic education campaign of the 1990s and its role in rise of popular nationalism, arguing that

the ability of Chinese nationalists to exert pressure on the party-state has had severe negative

consequences for China’s national image. Finally, I will discuss China’s Confucian image

adjustment through the development of the CCP approved discourses of the “harmonious

society” and “peaceful rise,” pointing to conspicuous examples of the new “Confucian China” as

packaged for audiences abroad. I will close with an evaluation of the potential consequences of

the revival.

STATE-LED CONFUCIANISM

First I should be clear on what I mean by “Confucian revival.” In this paper, the

Confucian revival refers to the resurgence in the popularity of Confucian ideals within the last

decade amongst the official narratives of the CCP—or, at least, the promotion of a very selective

interpretation of the Confucian tradition by the Party. While this paper addresses the state’s role

in the Confucian revival, there is a popular movement that exists parallel to the state-led variety,

and it is important to distinguish between the two. The popular movement developed from the

bottom-up out of the socio-economic conditions of reform and opening, gaining momentum in

the 1990s among Chinese intellectuals disillusioned with the West. As this disillusionment grew,

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intellectuals began to rediscover the values of traditional Chinese culture and develop a new

ideology that drew selectively from this legacy.11 Chinese intellectuals have thus been

experimenting with Confucianism for at least two decades. In comparison, the state-led revival

seems somewhat belated. Engineered by Party elites from the top-down, state-led Confucianism

did not take off until 2005, when President Hu Jintao first invoked Confucius in a speech,

declaring “Confucius said, Harmony is something to be cherished.” Rather than led by

intellectuals, the state-led revival reflects the Party’s concerns—that is, harmony and peace—and

is mostly propagandic. This resurgence is therefore nothing new. Confucianism has experienced

a popular revival for decades. The question is why does this newest, state-led wave come so late?

To answer this, we can turn to the literature. Scholars have studied the official

rehabilitation of Confucius with interest and have offered a variety of explanations for the

revivalists’ goals. Some scholars see the revival as a conservative reaction against

Westernization. Theodore de Bary argues that those disposed to the revival see Confucianism as

a bulwark against unwanted change. Revivalists seek to preserve the status quo, and

Confucianism is invoked as a symbol of traditional values, which are equated with stability and

continuity in the face of modernity and change.12 Likewise, Suisheng Zhao argues that

Confucianism is invoked as insulation from the “spiritual pollution” of the West, pointing to the

de-romanticization of the West among Chinese intellectuals in the 1990s for the revival’s

origin.13

Other scholars see the revival as a response to social unrest. Particularly, they look to the

increasing popularity of the Confucian concept of datong, or the Grand Harmony, as a evidence

of the lack of harmony in Chinese society. Shiping Hua points to the problems created by 11 Zhao, 1997, p. 737 12 De Bary, 1984, p. 8 13 Zhao, 1997, p. 730

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unbridled materialism, the widening gap between rich and poor, and widespread political

corruption. He argues that the Confucian ideal of the Grand Harmony, with its emphasis on the

collective good, fills the spiritual void in a society from which social responsibility has

disappeared and each person pursues their happiness at the expense of others.14 Confucius is thus

invoked to promote order and stability amongst an increasingly dissatisfied populace.

Alternatively, a third group of scholars see the revival as a response to calls for political

liberalization. They argue that, in the face of mounting pressure from the West and the increasing

number of domestic agitators, Confucian benevolence and meritocracy are being presented as

alternatives to Western liberal democracy. In the same way that capitalism and communism

coexist in the economic sphere, modern day Confucians like Daniel Bell envision democracy and

Confucianism together in the political sphere.15 However, Neil A. Eaglehart argues that the

selective application of cultural relativism, such as arguments for unique “Asian Values” or

“Confucian Ethics,” are the result of political reasons rather than a reflection of traditional

mores.16 By appealing to Confucius and traditional Chinese values of “harmony” and “stability,”

the CCP hopes to put a democratic veneer on its activities and lend academic respectability to

their vision of “democracy with Chinese characteristics.”17

While these interpretations are very different, a common thread runs through these

arguments, and that is that the Confucian revival is mainly a reactionary response with primarily

a domestic audience in mind. These arguments don’t seriously consider how the international

environment might have played a role in Confucius’ rehabilitation, which is ironic considering

14 Hua, 2005, p. 67 15 Bell, 1999, p. 465 16 Eaglehart, 2000, p. 554 17 It is important to note that “democracy with Chinese characteristics” is not really democracy at all: the Party has repeatedly stated that Western Democracy isn’t suitable for China. A Confucian alternative is thus proposed as a compromise, whereby a benevolent—though authoritarian—leader rules on behalf of the people in order to achieve the benefits of democracy while bypassing inefficient and “culturally inappropriate” democratic processes.

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that the revival has grown with China’s increased openness to the international community.

Some of the most significant moments in the revival have had a conspicuously international

orientation: the choice to present a Confucian China to the world during the Beijing Olympics,

the installation of a statue of Confucius in Tiananmen Square, the foundation of Confucian

Institutes abroad to spread Chinese language and culture, and the creation of The Confucius

Peace Prize as a Party approved alternative to the Nobel Peace Prize. The outwardly focused

nature of the Confucian revival seems to suggest that there is an international thrust to this

campaign of at least equal, if not greater, importance. The CCP thus actively invokes Confucian

themes as it projects its power abroad, hoping the rhetoric of harmony and peace will calm

Western fears of China.

“THE CHINA THREAT”

“Sweetie, are you having nightmares about the Chinese again?” —Cartman’s mother to her son, in an October 2008 episode of South Park that begins with Cartman frightened by a dream of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics.

While it may seem ridiculous, a funny gag for a late night television show, Cartman’s

attitude reflects the attitude of a large number of Americans. The majority of people in Western

countries view China’s rise with a mixture of suspicion and fear. A 2011 BBC World Service

poll reveals that the number of people who view China’s increasingly powerful economy with

unease has grown substantially since 2005, especially amongst China’s key trading partners.

Likewise, when asked how they would feel if “China becomes more powerful militarily than it is

today,” 59% of those surveyed Western countries responded negatively, with only 24%

expressing positive feelings.18 A recent Pew global attitudes survey reports similar findings:

18 BBC World Service, 2011

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“In 32 of 46 countries surveyed, China's increasing military muscle is viewed with alarm. These worries are most prevalent in two countries with a long and sometimes bitter historic connection to China: South Korea, where fully 89% view Chinese military might as a bad thing and Japan where 80% share that view.”19

The same survey reports that overall attitudes have soured as well, with the largest declines

among China’s major neighbors (Japan, South Korea, and India) and Western Europe (Britain,

France, Germany, and Spain). Yet another survey from the Pew Research Center reports that

20% of Americans now identify China when asked to name the country representing the greatest

threat to the US, compared to 12% answering Iran, 10% answering Afghanistan, and less than

10% answering Iraq.20

American pundits fuel popular fears of a rising China. This is perhaps best represented by

Bill Gertz, Washington Times columnist and leader of the conservative “Blue Team,” a group of

journalists, analysts, and politicians loosely unified by their mutual belief that China represents a

threat to US national security. 21 Gertz and his colleagues attack “panda huggers” as capitulators

who distract from the reality of the Chinese threat, disguising the evil dragon as a cute panda at

the expense of American preparedness.22 Gertz’s paranoia in his 2000 book, The China Threat:

How the People’s Republic Targets America, both reflect widespread American suspicions about

Chinese intentions and serves to deepen them. Fellow dragon-slayer William Triplett, coauthor

of Year of the Rat and Red Dragon Rising and a former member of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, argues that China is determined to challenge the United States for supremacy and

19 Kohut, 2007 20 Pew Research Center, 2011 21 Coined by William Triplett, former counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the name refers to the color of US forces (blue) in war games, as opposed to the red that represents American opponents (Gertz, 2000, p. 46). 22 Gries, p. 2

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urges Americans to fight for democracy and freedom from China’s “dictatorial regime.”23

The Western media often echoes these dark sentiments. Foreign correspondents stationed

in Beijing, habitually harassed by government officials, often focus on the negative side of life in

China: corruption, censorship, and confinement.24 While there is truth to this portrayal—perhaps

especially for journalists, who face more difficulties and dangers in China than almost any other

profession—it is just one side to the truth in one of the most diverse and complicated countries in

the world. Alone, it is an oversimplification that leads to a very negative depiction of China in

the West. Below is a cartoon by Morten Morland from The Times that depicts China as a dragon,

wreathed in fire, terrorizing the rest of the world.25

23 Gries, p. 3 24 Journalist Johnathan Watts wrote in an article for the Foreign Correspondents Club of China, “China, I suspect, sometimes gets more negative coverage than it deserves because its old system of restricting the activities of foreign correspondents pushes them into taking sides. To do a sensitive story in the provinces, journalists used to have to choose between going officially and getting an overly rosy view of what was happening, or sneaking in without permission and hearing only the views of disgruntled peasants…Forced to choose, most journalists often gave the benefit of the doubt to the little guy up against the system” (Watts, 2008). 25 Morland, 2009

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The United States, represented by Uncle Sam, is tangled in the dragon’s coils and waving an

IOU fan in surrender, representing the American government’s dependence on China as its

banker. The British bulldog is kept at bay with a single claw and former Indian Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh is easily shoved out of the picture; meanwhile, the Dalai Lama is kept prisoner

in the dragon’s claws. The Copenhagen climate deal is shown torn in half by the dragon’s scales,

while golden pendants hang around the dragon’s neck, symbolizing both China’s wealth and its

exploitation of Africa. Most importantly, though easy to miss in the bottom right corner, the

dragon holds the world tightly within its sharp talons. Overall, the picture painted is a grim one,

in which a colossal China crowds out potential competition, squeezes the last drops of usefulness

from a failing former power, and cruelly silences dissent. This style of depiction of China is

fairly typical—the Chinese state as an ill-tempered dragon, presiding over a land of oppression,

preparing to further spread its sinister coils over the rest of the world—and reflects the most

ominous of Western fears concerning the rise of China.

What is it about China that makes its continued growth so frightening to Western

observers? On one level, the international community always fears the rise of a new nation to

prominence because of the way this upsets the status quo. Traditional analyses predict that the

rise of a great power by nature signifies a threat to international security: as one power rises,

another is displaced, resulting in tension, distrust, and conflict as the newcomer uses its newly

gained power to force its national interests.26 Further, as an authoritarian state, China faces an

extra level of scrutiny and suspicion from liberal democratic countries. However, the fear that

surrounds “the China Threat” seems to be more than just than a fear of a changing international

order. India is growing at a similarly impressive rate, and yet its rise is viewed as a more benign

26 Ikenberry, 2008

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event—at least the “rise of India” does not inspire the same media frenzy,27 perhaps because of

India’s status as a fellow democracy. Likewise, although the democracies of the world might

wish for the PRC to liberalize, there is little threat that Chinese politics might spread to the West,

even at the most pessimistic analysis. This extra measure of China fear mongering can thus be

explained by the rise of Chinese popular nationalism. Views of China as a threat to global

security stem from Western perceptions of China as an irrational actor, the result of the highly

emotional, highly aggrieved popular nationalist movement and increased saber rattling from the

Chinese state itself.

As the policies of reform and opening began to take hold during the 1980s, the

ideological vacuum created by the failure of communism forced the CCP to turn elsewhere for

legitimacy. Re-establishing itself as the paramount patriotic force and the protector of national

pride, Party officials actively promoted nationalist themes in the 1990s in order to encourage

loyalty to the CCP. On one had, this nationalism has helped Beijing’s national image within

China by reinforcing its legitimacy, quieting potential dissidence, and diverting public attention

from domestic problems to foreign enemies. On the other hand, the rise of contemporary Chinese

nationalism has complicated China’s relations with both its neighbors in the region and the West.

The “victim” mentality of Chinese popular nationalists in regard to Western powers has led to

hypersensitivity in issues of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, resulting in indignant

demands for respect from other nations and a return to China’s former greatness. The growth of

popular nationalism and its influence over Chinese foreign policy has played a significant role in

27 An 30 April 2012 Google search of “rise of China” returns 8,940,000 results, compared to 569,000 results for “rise of India.” The top results for each search are very revealing of the general tone of the coverage that each nation’s growth inspires: the top result for China is a New York Times page entitled “China Threat” or a “Peaceful Rise of China,” while the top result for India is a Foreign Affairs page that in its first sentence describes India as a “roaring capitalist success story.” Overall, the Western media seems to be more suspicious of China’s growth than of India’s.

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shaping the Western fears and in the articulation of the China Threat. As the grumbling of

disgruntled youth is given weight by the acknowledgement and attention of the CCP, which is

bound to honor nationalist sentiment in order to protect its legitimacy, China’s image as a mature

and responsible world power is necessarily damaged. In this light, the Confucian revival can be

considered an attempt to demonstrate China’s commitment to maintaining harmonious relations

with its neighbors to the world, despite the agitation of nationalists.

Patriotic education and the rise of popular nationalism In the wake of reform and opening, the CCP found itself confronted by a profound

spiritual crisis,28 largely the result of the social dislocation that accompanied reform and opening:

as economic reforms became progressively market-oriented, the official ideology began to lose

its credibility. The departure from the Marxist political discourse and the growing awareness of

economic inequality, led many Chinese to become increasingly disillusioned in the late 1970s

and early 1980s. With rapid decay of communist ideology and the growing possibility of a

regime crisis, the Party leadership began to search for an alternate source of legitimacy for its

governance in China, and eventually settled on nationalism as a possible solution. While

communism had become stale in the face of growing materialism and ideological

disillusionment, nationalism remained deeply engrained in the Chinese political consciousness

throughout reform and opening. The former greatness of imperial China and its humiliation at

the hand of Western imperialists is such an important national myth to the modern Chinese state

that it has become cliché.29 Most Chinese, even the most vehement anti-traditionalists,30

28 Known as the “three belief crisis” (sanxin weiji), it was comprised of a crisis of faith in socialism (xinxin weiji), crisis of belief in Marxism (xinyang weiji), and crisis of trust in the Party (xinren weiji) (S. Zhao, 1998, p.248). 29 China’s “century of humiliation” (bainian guochi) refers to the period of subjugation China suffered under foreign imperialists, both Western and Japanese. Its genesis is typically dated to the First Opium War between Great Britain and the Qing Dynasty in the mid-nineteenth century, during which Great Britain smuggled opium illegally into the

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desperately yearned for the re-emergence of China as a world power. By redefining reform and

opening as a nationalistic campaign for Chinese greatness, the CCP could more easily justify its

departure from socialist goals like equality. Nationalism was thus looked to provide the spiritual

content to fill the void left by the decline of Communism.

Beginning in the 1990s, the Chinese state thus systematically encouraged patriotism and

nationalist sentiment in its student population with a campaign of “patriotic education”

(aiguozhuyi jiaoyu). The purpose of the campaign was to educate youths in Chinese tradition and

history, national conditions, and the nationalist legacy of the CCP in order to inculcate nationalist

resentment against foreign pressures, past and present, simultaneously emphasizing the Party’s

role as the ultimate protector of Chinese national interests. By emphasizing China’s repeated

victimization at the hands of the imperialists, the Party sought to encourage a more critical view

of the West, hoping to neutralize the political threat posed by increased globalization. The

portrayal of a Western siege of China and the formation of an” anti-China club,” headed by

politicians in Washington, would also serve to divert protest away from the Party and towards

external sources. As result, sovereignty and territorial integrity have become major themes in

Chinese nationalism, with special attention paid to the historical incursions of foreigners and

their interference in China’s domestic affairs. In the context of this new narrative, international

condemnation of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown could be portrayed to the public as a Western

attack on the Chinese political system, China’s failed bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games an

anti-China plot constructed by the West, the campaign for international human rights as lies

country in hopes that the resulting addiction would forcibly pry open the formerly exclusive Chinese market, and ends with the expulsion of the Japanese by Communist forces in 1945. 30 Anti-traditionalism is a school of Chinese intellectual thought that sees traditional Chinese culture as the major source of Chinese backwardness and therefore the reason for China’s repeated failures to modernize. The anti-traditionalists reject traditional Confucian culture, values, and norms and seek for their eradication in favor of Western technical knowledge, whose adoption will make China strong (S. Zhao, 2000, pp. 7-9).

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meant to disgrace China internationally, the promotion of intellectual property rights an attempt

to halt Chinese economic development.31 While patriotic education was not necessarily intended

to create animosity towards the West, it was intended to raise suspicion of Western “universal

values,” such as democracy and free speech, and the supposed benefit of such principles for

China. By portraying foreign powers as self-interested and even antagonistic towards China, the

CCP is able to assert its own interpretation of international conflicts and cry foul whenever the

West’s doesn’t match.

While invocation of nationalism may have saved the CCP from regime crisis, this has

come at a cost. The move towards a deeper engagement with history begun by patriotic

education has led to a heightened awareness of the trauma of China’s past. The result has been an

exacerbation of popular feelings of external siege and persecution from the Western world.

These passionate feelings of anger serve as the “psychic fuel”32 behind the more virulent forms

of popular nationalism. By creating a dichotomy between China and the West, emphasizing the

humiliations of history and the modern “siege” China faces from the Western world, the CCP has

created an environment supportive of radical nationalist expression.

This radicalization has had serious consequences for China’s relations with foreign

powers. The young nationalists of the fourth generation, known as fenqing or “angry youth,”33

care very much about relations with Taiwan, Tibet, Japan, and the United States and their

belligerent attitude towards these issues makes diplomatic negotiations difficult for the Party.

Since the Party has based its legitimacy on its nationalist inheritance and its role as the protector

of the national interest, it must be responsive to nationalist feeling within the country. This

complicates foreign relations, sometimes forcing the CCP to take a more aggressive stance on 31 S. Zhao, 1998, p. 297 32 Gries, 2004, p. 11 33 Osnos, 2008

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issues than it may otherwise like—or at least to take precautions against appearing overly

conciliatory. Compromise with foreign powers thus comes at the risk of the Party appearing

unpatriotic, a perception that undermines the nationalist legitimacy it has worked so long to

develop.

However, China’s aggressive stance towards the West has not gone unobserved, and the

high profile belligerence of Chinese nationalists has been a major contributing factor to popular

fears of the “China Threat.” This is not just a fear of wild-eyed youth, however. There is real fear

in the West of the implications of the rise of popular nationalism in China. Too often,

commentators mistake the sentiments of Chinese nationalists as merely “party propaganda,”

ignoring the role that people and their passions play in the further development of this

movement. While it is true that the CCP party-state has played a large role in creating a hyper

nationalistic environment in China today, its involvement in its creation does not make the

aggrieved feelings of nationalists any less real. At best, nationalism is a method of control and

the Chinese state doesn’t share the anger of its people; we are still left with a movement out of

control, one that the Party must appease with real action to maintain its legitimacy. As Peter

Hays Gries cautions, “Western policy makers should…recognize that because the Party’s

legitimacy now depends upon accommodating popular nationalist demands, the Foreign Ministry

must take popular opinion into account as it negotiates foreign policy.”34 So long as the Chinese

people demand a say in nationalist politics, it must be acknowledged that the fate of the nation is

no longer the Party’s exclusive province.

The consequence of this tenuous balance is something more serious than the rumblings of

discontented youth, and causes Western observers to look with added suspicion to Chinese

movements abroad. For example, the shadow cast by Chinese nationalism gives darker 34 Gries, 2004, p. 20

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reverberation to concerns in the West over the Chinese military buildup. China’s defense budget

will double by 2015, making it more than the rest of the Asia Pacific region’s combined.

Beijing’s military spending will reach $238.2 billion in 2015, compared with $232.5 billion for

rest of the region. That would also be almost four times the expected defense budget of Japan,

the next biggest in the region, in 2015.35 Likewise, in this light, China’s continued disputes in the

South China Sea take on added significance.36 The wave of rising Chinese nationalism has

prompted Beijing’s recent attempts to recover territory it claims was taken when the country was

weak. China maintains its “undisputable sovereignty” over as much as 80% of the South China

Sea, including territory claimed by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.37 In

fact, Chinese leaders have stated that the South China Sea is an area of “core national interest,”

on par with Tibet and Taiwan. The implications of this statement are enough to give pause to

concerned observers: China has reserved the right to use force to establish national unity in the

vehemently contested region. With the PRC loudly rattling the sword at its borders, the rising

cries of the angry youth represent a larger threat: the CCP must respond to nationalist demands in

order to maintain its legitimacy, and such examples are evidence of its ability—and suggest its

apparent willingness—to follow through.

At worst, however, Party leaders share in the humiliation of Chinese nationalists—and

their desire for vengeance. China does appear to be testing its power, flexing its growing

muscles. While it might be comforting to view states as rational actors, it is important to

remember that politicians and policy makers are people too, vulnerable to the same passions.

Factionalism within the CCP makes it particularly difficult to divine the Party’s motives: is the

35 China’s Military Spending to Double by 2015, 2012 36 Clashes with Japan over the ownership of the Diaoyu, or Senkaku, islands have escalated in recent years, with the most recent dispute over the collision of a Chinese fishing boat and a Japanese vessel on 8 September 2010, ending in a ban on the export of rare earth minerals and a material increase in tension between the two nations. 37 Richardson, 2010

Gary 19

Party performing for a domestic audience, exhibiting, in its aggressive stance, its national

strength? Or does nationalist posturing reveal something more sinister at work? This paper does

not pretend to have an answer to this question, and in some ways it does not matter, since the

CCP’s nationalist obligations seem both as able and equally likely to lead to conflict as any

purposeful maneuver. Either way, the aggrieved tone of Chinese nationalism and the rising

influence of popular nationalists have contributed to the fear of a China threat and a negative

national image abroad.

The consequences of popular nationalism on national image Each day, some thirty-five hundred Chinese citizens are going online for the first time.38

With a rapidly growing number of domestic Internet users, the web has become an increasingly

popular gathering place for Chinese nationalists. Chinese cybernationalism has focused on

foreign policy issues such as China’s relationship with Taiwan, the future of Tibet, and Sino-

Japanese relations—a perennial hot topic. Cybernationalists have also found themselves

particularly moved by perceived slights to China by Western powers, such as NBC’s coverage of

the 1996 Olympics, the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the

collision of a Chinese F-8 fighter with an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft over the South

China Sea in 2001. These exchanges between Chinese “netizens” and the rest of the world have

had a powerful impact on China’s international image. Barred from free expression and political

participation in real life, Chinese nationalists often compensate online with added vehemence.

Shielded by the anonymity of the Internet, cybernationalists express their opinions with a violent

passion that both offends and worries Western observers. Extreme forms of online nationalism

directly sabotage Beijing’s desired national image as a peaceful and responsible rising power.

38 Osnos, 2008

Gary 20

For example, in April 2008, Grace Wang, a Chinese freshman at Duke University, found

herself the target of online persecution. Branded as a “race traitor” after trying to separate a

group of pro-Tibet from pro-China protestors on campus, her picture and personal information

appeared online in a forum for Chinese students. 39 Wang became the subject of heated, personal

attacks and received emails threatening her with death should she return to China. “Call the

human flesh search engines!”40 one user threatened, calling for physical, as opposed to virtual,

action.41 Internet users dug up her address in China and vandalized her home, forcing Wang’s

mother into hiding. The unnecessary violence of this response contributes to perceptions of

China as defensive, hypersensitive, and childishly vindictive. New York Times columnist

Nicholas D. Kristof captured the American reaction to Wang’s story well, sighing that this is the

kind of incident that makes Western observers so uneasy about rising Chinese nationalism:

“[This] kind of Internet bullying seems more common in China — there have been many such cases — than in most other countries, and it has shades of the Cultural Revolution in it: The mob of crazed students clinging blindly to an ideology, denouncing a cosmopolitan intellectual as a “stinking No. 9″ and demanding that he or she repent to the crowd. This kind of nationalism is blinding, just as Maoism was in 1967, and it’s not good for China or for the world. And those fiery nationalists are doing far more damage to China’s image around the world than a million Grace Wangs could ever have done.”42

Such stunts compromise Beijing’s attempts to portray a confident and self-assured rising power

to the international community. Likewise, this image of hypersensitivity also causes Western

audiences to question China’s ability to provided international leadership: if China is unwilling

to open itself to dialogue, how will it manage the responsibilities of a global power?

Chinese nationalists assemble offline as well, sometimes resulting in violent protests. In

39 Osnos, 2008 40 While this term implies physical action, it does not necessarily mean the commenter is calling for physical violence. Rather, it may simply refer to identifying individuals offline and exposing them to public humiliation. 41 Dewan, 2008 42 Kristof, 2008

Gary 21

1999, after NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese people, tens

of thousands of protestors—mainly students and youth—took to the streets in what later became

known as the “May 8th” protests, throwing bricks, rocks, garbage, and Molotov cocktails. The

rioters kept US Ambassador Jim Sasser and his staff trapped in the American embassy for days,

shouting slogans like “Blood for blood!” and burning American flags.43 Students organized

boycotts of American goods, targeting American-owned businesses like McDonalds by calling

for the government to “Kick American hamburgers out of China!”44 The Party at first implicitly

encouraged protestors, constructing web pages devoted to protesting the Belgrade bombing and

publishing confrontational articles, like this op-ed from The People’s Daily:

“This is 1999, not 1989…China is a China that has stood up; it is a China that defeated the Japanese fascists; it is a China that had a trial of strength and won victory over the United States on the Korean battleground. These Chinese people are not to be bullied, and China’s sovereignty and dignity are not to be violated. The hot blood of people of ideas and integrity who opposed imperialism for over 150 years flows in the veins of the Chinese people. U.S.-led NATO had better remember this.”45

The US media was shocked by the Chinese reaction. Unable to understand its strength, they

quickly directed the blame at the Chinese government, who they accused of inflaming the

passions of protestors. A review of editorials from 11 May by Peter Hays Gries reveals that most

major US newspapers believed government propaganda was to blame for the mistaken view

within China that the bombing was intentional, and that the Chinese people were not genuinely

angry. The San Francisco Chronicle maintained that Beijing had “failed to tell its citizens that

the US attack was an accident and that President Clinton has apologized to Beijing.” The

Washington Post echoed this sentiment, announcing “the Big Lie is alive and well in Beijing”

43 Gries, 2004, pp. 14-15 44 Ibid, p. 14 45 Han, 1999 (as cited in Gries, 2004, p. 11)

Gary 22

while the Boston Globe accused the Party of orchestrating displays of “state-approved anger.”46

While Gries denies these interpretations, the violence of the anti-American nationalist backlash

was seized upon by the majority of Western commentators as proof of the Communist menace,

evidence of an emerging China threat.

Violent displays of nationalism, both online and off, affect both China’s domestic stability

and international image. From the perspective of already suspicious observers in the West, the

quickness with which nationalists turn criticism into slight, their conviction that Western powers

deliberately deny China “face,” and their propensity for overreaction all serve to discredit

China’s claim to a “peaceful rise.” Minxin Pei argues that the aggrieved tone of Chinese

nationalism damages China’s image as a responsible stakeholder, arguing “a very nationalistic

public makes foreigners very wary of China and harms China’s image.”47

While some observers accuse Beijing of consciously harnessing popular nationalism as a

way to counter elements of Western political values, still more worrying is the idea that the

movement is organic, genuine, and beyond the control of the CCP. While a certain percentage of

angry youth is reasonable—perhaps even beneficial for a country still battling with injustice—

the thought that the management of China could be handed over to them is horrifying.48 Susan

Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs under President Bill Clinton, has

explored this potentiality, arguing that the combination of China's growing military and growing

popular nationalism present concrete dangers: “It creates the risk, not a high probability, but a

risk, that one day China's leaders could feel that to look strong in the eyes of their public they

have to make a threat to Japan or to Taiwan and that they will feel that they cannot back down

from that threat without jeopardizing their own domestic support or even their own survival in 46 Gries, 2001, p. 25 47 Bajoria, 2008 48 Zhao, 2008

Gary 23

power.”49 This uncomfortable balance of power thus informs Western perceptions of China as an

unpredictable and potentially irrational actor, a perception that complicates the party-state’s

foreign policy dealings.

A state’s reputation can have real consequences in terms of its relations with other states:

a state that projects a tough and aggressive image may be interpreted by other international

actors as potentially threatening or as less willing to cooperate. These interpretations can have

serious consequences for that state’s foreign policy goals. A judgment of a state’s character,

national image is used to predict future behavior.50 Robert Keohane argues “the most important

aspect of an actor’s reputation in world politics is the belief of others that it will keep its future

commitments even when a particular situation, myopically viewed, makes it appear

disadvantageous to do so.”51 Developing and maintaining a positive national image becomes an

important task for all states in order to work effectively with other international actors and

achieve its foreign policy goals.

National image is also an important dimension of national power. Harvard political

scientist Joseph Nye argues that the subtler power that comes from attraction, otherwise known

as soft power, is a more cost effective way to lead:

“A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries admire its values, emulate its example, aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them.”52

A state’s soft power, Nye contends, rests on three major resources: its culture, its political values,

and its foreign polices.53 As a result, a state with an attractive culture, appealing political values,

49 Grammaticas, 2009 50 Ding, 2011, p. 295 51 Keohane, 1984, p. 116 52 Nye, 2004 53 Nye, 2002, pp. 8–12

Gary 24

and persuasive foreign policy can more effectively achieve its international goals: if a country

can present an attractive culture or ideology to the international community, more people will

willingly follow; if people are willing to follow, the country can shape international norms and

values in ways that benefit its own interests with less suspicious or resistance.54 Therefore,

national image matters. By cultivating a positive or attractive national image, states have access

to a wider range of options in wielding their national power. In contrast, a state with a negative

national image will constantly find itself constrained, struggling against the low expectations of

the international community and contained by suspicion.

The conviction of the dragon slayers of the West in the existence of a “China Threat” is

therefore partially the result of a negative national image, and by extension poor national image

management. This negative national image affects China’s relationship with other international

powers, and thus its ability to conduct effective foreign policy. As China continues to develop, it

has a greater capacity to pursue its national interests. However, if every flexing muscle is met

with cries of alarm from the international community, its power is necessarily constrained. The

problems for China’s national image posed by the aggression of many Chinese nationalists have

thus created the need for an international campaign to revitalize the Chinese “brand.” In response

to Western accusations of a “China threat,” China’s Former Director of State Council

Information Office, Zhu Muzhi, has said,

“Some (foreign countries) have prejudices or have wrongly believed rumors, therefore what they think about China is not the true image of China. We will try every means to present a comprehensive and real picture of China to the outside world so that you can see the true image of China.”55

Indeed, in recent years Western governments have called on China to do just that:

reassure the international community of its intentions. “Just as we and our allies must 54 Ding, 2011, p. 295 55 Wang, H. 2003

Gary 25

make clear that we are prepared to welcome China's arrival as a prosperous and

successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and

growing global role will not come at the expense of the security and well-being of

others,” said James Steinberg, former US Deputy Secretary of State.56 Therefore, in order

to calm nervous observers in the West, Beijing’s top priority has been to maintain peace

at home while continuing to take a greater role in international affairs. By rebranding

China as a Confucian China, the CCP hopes to superimpose the image of harmony and

peace over its aggrieved nationalist movement and recast the People’s Republic as a

smiling panda in place of a snarling dragon.

THE CONFUCIAN REVIVAL The Harmonious Society and peaceful rise

The new, state-led revival of Confucianism was initiated by President Hu Jintao who

began to emphasize the importance of harmony in response to increasing social tension. He first

invoked the ancient sage in a February 2005 speech to the National Congress, declaring,

“Confucius said, Harmony is something to be cherished.”57 Since then, the concept of harmony,

or hexie, has become central to the Party’s social discourse, as the mantra for both domestic and

foreign policy. The idea of harmony is the key feature in China’s brand management, and is used

to paint a picture of a peaceful China. Official propaganda looks beyond the tumultuous present,

past the violent chaos of the Communist period, and back to a harmonious golden age in China’s

imperial past where sage kings ruled with wisdom and benevolence.

56 Grammaticas, 2009 57 Schell, 2008, p. 24

Gary 26

The state-led revival of Confucianism is tied closely to the Party’s official narrative of a

“Harmonious Society” (Hexie Shehui).58 Although first introduced in 2005, not long after Hu’s

first public flirtation with Confucianism, the Harmonious Society did not become official Party

canon, enshrined in the CCP’s charter, until the 17th National Congress in October 2007. The

unifying concept of the Hu administration, Hu describes the Harmonious Society as one that

“puts people first.”59 A shift from China’s primary focus on development to a more balanced,

“Confucian-style” approach, it seeks to maintain economic growth while addressing social issues

such as increasing income inequality, environmental degradation, and domestic political

corruption.60 This propaganda theme emphasizes the Party’s benevolent concern for all Chinese

citizens, their efforts to balance growth more evenly, and the implied price for this new socially

responsible growth—loyalty to the CCP.61

Hu has also extended the Harmonious Society beyond domestic policy and into the

international sphere with its foreign policy alter ego, China’s “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi). A

response to the “China threat theory,” the conviction in the West that China’s rise represents a

threat to the international order, the term peaceful rise refers to China’s commitment to pursue

“harmonious” and “peaceful” relations with its neighbors as it continues to develop. Peaceful rise

was first introduced by Zheng Bijian, former vice president of the Central Party School and

current Chairman of the China Reform Forum, at the Boao Forum in November of 2003. In his

speech, Zheng described peaceful rise as China’s new strategic path: to continue to build 58 The Harmonious Society is a reference to the Confucian ideal of datong, or the Grand Harmony, a state that existed long before Confucius’ own time. It is important to note that, for the Chinese, datong is not an abstract concept but a phenomenon that may be realized on earth in a human community. The achievement of datong has therefore been an important goal for Chinese intellectuals and rulers throughout history, and dominates even modern beliefs about the ideal society. Even Mao had his own vision for a socialist datong, one of utopian harmony, and spoke of the need to “eliminate class and realize datong.” Any discussion of Confucian harmony thus strongly echoes the call for datong and the realization of the perfect society (Hua, 2005, p. 62). 59 Hu, 2007 60 Gries and Holt, 2009, p. 75 61 Dotson, 2011, p. 6

Gary 27

socialism with Chinese characteristics, while participating in rather than detaching from

economic globalization.62 However, almost as soon as the term “peaceful rise” was introduced,

some senior leaders and analysts expressed their concern about the use of the world of “rise.”

Concerned that the talk about “rise” might further fuel Western fear of the “China threat,” it was

decided to transition to a less loaded word. Thus, when President Hu Jintao delivered a speech in

April 2004, again at the Boao Forum, he avoided any mention of “peaceful rise,” instead

stressing China’s “peaceful development.”63 Since then, “peaceful development” has become the

official slogan, though scholars and Western commentators have continued to use both “peaceful

rise” and “peaceful development” almost interchangeably.

Despite the amount of ink the Chinese propaganda machine has dedicated to its promotion,

it is difficult to further define exactly what “peaceful rise” entails beyond a few broad

generalizations. Rather than a concrete policy program, it appears mostly to be a reassurance to

the international community of China’s intentions. In this way, the discourse of “peaceful rise”

seems to be mostly this—a discussion. The idea of peaceful rise is thus intended to send a

message to China’s international observers: that China is moving into a new stage of

development, that it is finally stepping out into the world, and that it is doing so in a confident—

but non-aggressive—manner.

What is it about Confucius that makes him so particularly suited to send this message? For

one, the breadth of Confucian teachings makes the ancient sage a particularly convenient

figurehead; remembered mostly for a large collection of disconnected proverbs, it is easy to pick

and choose from a wide variety of teachings for practically any occasion—and equally

important, easy for the Party to leave out what they would rather ignore. Confucianism is a

62 Zheng, 2003 63 Liu, 2008, p. 545

Gary 28

flexible philosophy, at least in its state-led incarnations, and has a long history of

reinterpretation. Likewise, Confucianism was the ruling political ideology of China for centuries,

long before Mao and the arrival of Marxism. Its legacy as the bulwark of Chinese imperialism

means that the CCP can base their modern day appeal solidly in Chinese culture. Unlike

Marxism, there is a cultural foundation for Confucianism in China, which give its ideas more

staying power and added credibility, for both domestic and foreign audiences. Within China,

Confucianism can provide the CCP with a kind of cultural legitimacy—an element missing from

previous appeals to socialism and nationalism, both foreign imports—as well as the moral

authority that the Party has lacked since the iron rice bowl was broken.64 Abroad, Confucianism

serves to prioritize China’s ancient past over more controversial Communist history, glossing

over painful memories from the Mao period with a colorful imperial palette. Confucius has thus

come to replace Mao as China’s national mascot, the uncontested symbol of the greatness of

Chinese civilization. In this way, the CCP hopes the Confucian revival will focus international

attention on China’s cultural contributions to the world and emphasize its philosophy over its

politics.

At a more basic level, though arguably the most important, the CCP hopes the revival of

Confucius will break the association of brash irrationality produced by the angry complaints of

popular nationalists. The personification of wisdom, judgment, and restraint, Confucius acts as

the perfect foil to the angry youth and his revival can be understood as performance of China’s

good qualities for an international audience. Through the invocation of Confucius in a series of

conspicuous international events, institutions, and awards, the CCP thus seeks to present a vision

64 The system of state-guaranteed lifetime employment and access to basic social services that existed during the Mao period. Symbolically, the breaking of the iron rice bowl was a serious act; the promise of cradle-to-grave employment had been made by Mao himself and had served as one of the fundamental appeals of the communists since the early revolutionary period (China’s communist revolution, 1999).

Gary 29

of a mature and responsible China to the world: one who can be trusted with the responsibly of a

great power and to rise without making waves.

Confucius rehabilitated Confucius in the 2008 Opening Ceremonies

Although the CCP has appealed to Confucian narratives increasingly since the early

2000s, the Western mass media didn’t take serious notice of its propagandic repurposing until

2008, when the new CCP spokesman was reintroduced to the West in style during the Beijing

Olympic Games. The Harmonious Society was featured prominently in the official themes

surrounding the Games, starting with the running of the Olympic Torch, christened the “Journey

of Harmony.”65 Confucian themes were even more prominently featured in the opening

ceremonies. Directed by Chinese filmmaker Zhang Yimou, the opening ceremonies emphasized

the contributions of Chinese civilization throughout history, deemphasizing China’s communist

history in favor of its cultural legacy. The ceremonies began with 2,008 drummers, beating

electrically lit Fou drums and chanting a welcome from the Analects: “Friends have come from

afar, how happy we are.”66 The second act of the artistic performance of the ceremonies, entitled

“Beautiful Olympics,” echoed this message with a choir of 810 performers dressed as the 3000

Disciples of Confucius, carrying bamboo scrolls inscribed with text from the Analects and

chanting Confucian aphorisms: “Isn't it great to have friends coming from afar?” and “All men

are brothers within the four seas.” They were followed by a fantastic display of rolling blocks

representing the moveable type printing press, one of China’s great inventions, rising and falling

65 This name became ironic as pro-Tibet and pro-PRC protestors clashed at one relay location after another. Often violent protests in London, Paris, and Seoul became the object of international scrutiny, as well as the Chinese government’s furious reaction to both the protests and the tenor of their coverage. Demonstrations in Athens, London, Paris and San Francisco dominated media coverage of the relay, overshadowing the harmonious message of the Olympics and causing in a pubic-relations nightmare for officials in Beijing. 66 Chinese culture shines at dazzling Olympics opening ceremony, 2008

Gary 30

to music. The narration noted the resemblances to wind rolling across a field of grass, a reference

to Confucius’ famous proverb on the virtue of rulers.67 The blocks then rearranged themselves to

produce three variations of the character 和 (he), which means both “peace” and “harmony.”68

Even Yimou’s nod to modern China prioritized the Party’s harmonious narrative, featuring a

dove of peace constructed from the bodies of a thousand illuminated dancers.69

The Beijing Olympics are often spoken of as China’s “coming out party,” and in many

ways they were. For China, the chance to host the Olympics represented both higher status in and

greater respect from the international community, and so the Games were seized as an

opportunity to present the face of the “new” China to the rest of the world—the fact that it chose

a Confucian face is highly significant. The opening ceremonies deemphasized China’s

Communist history in favor of the achievements of Chinese civilization. This selective

interpretation of Chinese tradition, particularly the Confucian themes of harmony, brotherhood,

and peace, was meant to put a kinder, gentler face on the PRC at a time where it faces enormous

criticism from the international community on everything from human rights to trade policy.

Ironically, the extravagant spectacle and militant precision of the opening ceremonies themselves

were enough to incite fear among China Threat theorists—“Honey, are you having nightmares

about the Chinese again?” However, the emphasis the opening ceremonies placed on China’s

cultural contributions the world, its commitment to peace, and Confucian harmony represented a

drastic departure from the blood and revolution of the Mao days.70

67 “The virtuous leader can pass across his subjects with the ease of the wind” (Confucius, Book 12, Chapter 19 of The Analects). 68 Dotson, 2011, p. 9 69 Beijing welcomes world to 2008 Olympic Games, 2008 70 This change in narratives was especially timely given the Western ambivalence surrounding the 2008 Olympic Games. International outrage following the crackdowns in Tibetan prompted calls to boycott the Opening Ceremonies. Western journalists, like Fareed Zakaria, cautioned spectators not to “feed China’s nationalism” at the

Gary 31

Confucius in the Classroom

Abroad, the rapid spread of “Confucius Institutes,” state-sponsored Chinese-language and

culture centers, is by far the most visible foreign symbol of the Confucian revival. By the end of

2010, there were a total of 322 “Confucius Institutes”71 and 369 “Confucius Classrooms”72 in 96

different countries. In the United States, there are currently 73 Confucius Institutes and 51

Confucius Classrooms, the most of any country.73 In 2009, over 260,000 registered students

attended these institutes (a twofold increase from the previous year), and over 17,000 Chinese

teachers and volunteers have reportedly been sent to Confucius Institutes between 2005 and early

2011.74

The Confucius Institutes have become a key instrument of Chinese soft power abroad.

China itself admits this: Li Changchun, China’s propaganda chief, has described the institutes as

“an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup.”75 The CCP thus provides funding for

Chinese studies abroad hoping to popularize them, making Chinese language and culture more

attractive to the next generation of global decision makers. At the same time, by doing so under

the banner of Confucius, it hopes to project a benign image of China within the international

community to soften the impact of its rise.

However, the implications of these Confucius Institutes have raised eyebrows in higher

education circles. The influx of Chinese government funding into classrooms abroad has come at

Olympics with public humiliation while others, like David Shambaugh, warned the world to brace itself for xenophobic outbursts (Zakaria, 2008; Shambaugh, 2008). Contrasted against all this, however, was the huge outpouring of sympathy from the international community following the Sichuan earthquake. The introduction of a peaceful, Confucian face amidst this drama thus had an especially strong impact amidst Western confusion. Those observers who expected to see China’s belligerent nationalism on display were greeted by dignified restraint—or as restrained as is possible on a 44 billion-dollar budget—as a Confucian China graciously welcomed its fellow states as brothers. 71 Affiliated with universities 72 Affiliated with primary schools 73 About Confucius Institute/Classroom, 2010 74 Dotson, 2011, p. 16 75 Redden, 2012

Gary 32

a crucial moment, allowing for a significant expansion of language and cultural programming

despite budget cuts caused by the global recession. In spite of this, the presence of these

institutes, particularly on university campuses, has raised concerns about academic freedom.76

The Confucian Institutes are partnered with Chinese universities overseen by Hanban, a

subsidiary of the Chinese Ministry of Education. Hanban provides yearly funding to host

universities, pays the salaries and travel costs of Chinese teachers, and provides teaching

materials.77 Critics complain that this relationship causes universities to self-censor themselves

on sensitive issues, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Falun Gong, curtailing freedom of speech and

constraining faculty research.78 If true, the “peacefulness” of these institutes may be

questionable; it would certainly constitute a barb within China’s soft power projection. Still, the

use of Confucius’ name to brand this effort is telling and reflects again the desire of the CCP to

put a friendly face on its maneuverings abroad. The association of Confucius with harmony is

thus intended to take the edge off any discomfiture felt by the Institutes’ foreign hosts, and the

philosopher’s peaceful reputation is used as a guarantor of good Chinese intensions in the face of

Western suspicion.

The Confucius Peace Prize

One of the Party’s most memorable—though perhaps the least successful—attempts to

put a Confucian gloss on their public image is the “Confucius Peace Prize.” The controversial

2010 Nobel nomination of Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo was met with anger and alarm by the

CCP leadership. An outraged state press accused the Nobel committee of pandering to the

Western, anti-China agenda, stating there is “reason to question whether the Nobel Peace Prize

76 Redden, 2012 77 Redden, 2012 78 Redden, 2012

Gary 33

has been degraded to a political tool that serves an anti-China purpose. Instead of peace and

unity in China, the Nobel committee would like to see the country split by an ideological rift, or

better yet, collapse like the Soviet Union.”79

In response to the nomination, China launched an “anti-Liu” public relations campaign,

which included the creation of a competing award, the “Confucius Peace Prize.”80 While the

identity of the ostensibly private nominating organization was never made clear, invitations to

the award ceremony were sent by the Ministry of Culture, which falls under of the CCP Central

Propaganda Department.81 The chairman of the organization explained that the goal of the prize

was to reflect the Eastern vision of world peace, one influenced by Confucius.82 The first

recipient was former Vice President of Taiwan and KMT Party Chairman Lien Chan, for his

work “[building] a bridge of peace between the mainland and Taiwan.”83 Lien, however, did not

attend the ceremony—the award was instead accepted on his behalf by an extremely

uncomfortable looking 6-year-old girl—and when reached for comment, Lien denied every

hearing of the Confucius Peace Prize.84

In many ways, the Confucius Peace Prize did exactly the opposite of what was intended.

Although clearly intended as a challenge to the Nobel Peace Prize, neither the international

media nor the prize’s recipient took the Confucian alternative seriously. The dramatics

surrounding its unveiling reinforced the image of China as childish, prompting ridicule and

contempt from observers in the West. However, it does demonstrate the extent to which the Party

relies on Confucianism when in need of an appealing image to project abroad. The brandishing

79 2010 Nobel Peace Prize a Disgrace, 2010 80 Tran, 2012 81 Dotson, 2011, p. 17 82 Jiang, 2010 83 Tran, 2010 84 Foster, 2010

Gary 34

of Confucius name and image has become the kneejerk response to trouble with China’s national

image, regardless of how inappropriate the association or how outrageous the cause.

CONCLUSION

While parts of the Confucian revival have certainly been performed for the benefit of a

domestic audience, the most significant moments of the revival have all had an international

orientation, projecting Confucian themes of harmony and peace abroad—the 2008 Olympic

Games, the growth of Confucius Institutes, and the Confucian Peace Prize. Likewise, Confucius

is invoked in each of these episodes to put a harmonious gloss on China’s growing power that

will assuage fears abroad connected with China’s rise. By projecting a more benign image of

China into the international community, embodied by the grandfatherly Confucius and the

harmonious world order he is associated with, the CCP hopes to combat negative perceptions of

China, largely created by the aggression of Chinese nationalists and the wild card they represent

within Chinese foreign policy. The CCP depends on the nationalist legitimacy created during the

1990s in order to maintain its hold on power; as such, it cannot stifle the agitation of China’s

angry nationalists without risking Party leaders appearing unpatriotic themselves. Likewise, the

Party must occasionally meet nationalists’ demands, even if these demands offend neighbors and

upset the West. Basing its claim to continued party-rule as the guarantor of the nationalist goals

of greatness and glory for China, the CCP dares not to give over this role to actors in civil society

for fear of becoming irrelevant. Since the Party cannot curtail the expression of nationalists

themselves, it attempts to manage the impact of these expressions instead. The large-scale

rebranding of the People’s Republic in Confucian terms is the CCP’s answer to the China threat

theory propagated in the West: its used as proof that the new Confucian China is a mature,

cooperative, stable, and responsible world power.

Gary 35

The question remains, however: is the revival all rhetoric, or is there some substance

behind it? Do we see a more harmonious, peaceful China rising to prominence, or is the positive

image associated with Confucius being used to mask malicious intentions? It is difficult to say,

partly because Communist Party cadres may not yet know themselves. The tenuous balance that

exists between China’s aggrieved nationalists and the party-state that is forced to represent their

interests makes it almost impossible to divine whether the motives for the Confucian revival are

“genuine,” if there is such a thing. Chinese leaders may sincerely desire a peaceful rise for

China, but so long as its legitimacy remains grounded in nationalism, the CCP must continue to

deliver victories in the name of Chinese national greatness or risk being perceived as weak by

China’s rabid popular nationalists.

Regardless of whether we understand China as a peaceful power, the Confucian revival is

decidedly lacking in Confucian values. Revivalists use the historical Confucius as a symbol of

traditional culture, and as an ambassador of the new, peaceful China, while either grossly

oversimplifying or completely ignoring his teachings. The “Confucian” element of Chinese

foreign policy is thus essentially contentless; the Confucian revival is an attempt to put a

Confucian “gloss” on China’s image abroad and calm the fears of Western observers over

China’s rise.

However, this selective interpretation of particular themes, such as harmony, while

ignoring others, like the Confucian concept of the ethical and transparent rulership, is a

contradiction that has been noted. Party ideologues should take care to remember Mencius, one

of the most famous neo-Confucian philosophers: a ruler retains the authority to rule only so long

as he retains the mandate from heaven, which depends on his virtue. A king without generosity,

self-sacrifice, humility, receptiveness to instruction, or responsiveness to the needs of his

Gary 36

subjects is not a king at all. When asked about the regicide of the King of Zhou, Mencius

responded, “Someone who does violence to the good we call a villain; someone who does

violence to the right we call a criminal. A person who is both a villain and a criminal we call a

scoundrel. I have heard that the scoundrel Zhou was killed, but have not heard that a lord was

killed.”85 Mencius makes it clear: those who lose the moral authority of rulership have lost the

right to rule. By invoking Confucius in the political sphere once again, the CCP dredges up old

expectations of the ethical imperatives of benevolent rule. It is difficult to break the association

between Confucianism and the mandate of heaven, and by using Confucius as the new stand-in

for contemporary Chinese culture, the party-state draws attention to and invites an evaluation of

their performance—and opens the door to possible regime challenge should the perception rise

that the mandate of heaven has been lost.

Finally, we might question the wisdom of this latest attempt at cultural engineering. Party

leaders continues to believe they can create and guide mass movements to solve problems,

manipulating readily recognizable cultural mores for political ends, but if we look to the past this

is not proven. These attempts usually have unforeseen consequences—like the nationalism

engineered in the 1990s in response to the political fatigue following the excesses of revolution

and the failure of socialism. Now, in the 2000s, we see the Party trying again, responding to the

failures of a mass movement with yet another mass movement. Why should the CCP’s attempts

be any more successful this time around? Such state-engineered movements have proven both to

be disingenuous, thus unable to pass ideological muster, and very difficult to control. In the same

way that the state-led nationalism has veered out of control in recent years, causing the Party

arguably more problems that it solved—including much of the negative press that is currently

85 Ebrey, 1993, p. 22

Gary 37

forcing China to rebrand—so too could state-led Confucianism. Only time will tell what pitfalls

lie hidden for the new Confucian China, but Party leaders should look to the past for caution and

know that they revive Confucius, and the accompanying baggage, at their own risk.

Gary 38

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