China Participation in Ati Piracy in HOA

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Chinas Participation in Anti-Piracy

Operations off the Horn of Africa:Drivers and Implications

Conference Report

Dr. Alison A. Kaufman

MISC D0020834.A1/Final

July 2009


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Introduction

In December 2008, the navy of thePeoples Republic of China (PeoplesLiberation Army Navy, or PLAN)

deployed a task force, made up of twoguided missile destroyers and a supplyship, to participate in international anti-piracy operations off the coast ofSomalia, in the Gulf of Aden/Horn ofAfrica (HoA) region. This deploymentmarked the first time in modern historythat China's navy has engaged in anoperational mission outside of its claimedterritorial waters. The PLANsparticipation in international anti-piracy

operations has been viewed by many inthe United States and elsewhere as anindication of Chinas apparentwillingness to take on a larger militaryrole on the global stage.

On March 20, 2009, CNA China Studieshosted a half-day conference to discussChinas anti-piracy activities. Bringing

together U.S. officials, analysts, andactive-duty military personnel, theconference examined the reasons thatpiracy has become a problem in the Gulfof Aden/HoA region; the drivers forChinas unprecedented navalparticipation in international anti-piracyefforts; the implications that thisparticipation has for Chinas navy; andthe potential implications that it has forthe United States.

This report first outlines four majorthemes discussed throughout theconference. It then turns to a moredetailed discussion of each of theconferences three panels.

Figure 1: The Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa Region1

1 http://www.reliefweb.int/mapc/afr_ne/reg/hornofafrica.html


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Themes

Piracy in the Horn of Africa region is agrowing problem, but its scale shouldnot be overstated.

Speakers cautioned that, while piracy is aserious problem in the region with 120confirmed attacks and 43 ships taken in2008 it still affects fewer than one-halfof one percent of total transits throughthe area. Several panelists also noted thatit is difficult to measure the true impact ofpiracy on the global shipping industry,and that the economic effects may berelatively minimal. However, when we

also consider the psychological strain onship crews and the political implicationsof local governments allowing piracy toflourish (discussed below), the problemlooms far larger.

Curbing piracy is, ultimately, a politicaldilemma as much as it is a military one.

Participants stressed that, while nationalmilitaries have an important role to playin preventing future pirate attacks andstopping those already underway, in thelong term the problem can only besolved with an infusion of strong politicalwill. Several speakers blamed thepersistence of pirate activity on thecombined factors of Somalias near-totaldearth of domestic governance, theinability or unwillingness of Somali

power holders to bring known pirates tojustice, and a lack of internationalconsensus on how to deal withperpetrators.

Figure 2: Pirate Attacks in 20082

.

2http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_fabrik&view=visualization&controller=visualization.googlemap&Itemid=89


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Contributing to anti-piracy operationscan bring recognition and prestige toparticipating nations.

Several participants noted that a desire to

enhance international prestige may beone driver for many countriesparticipation in anti-piracy operations.Piracy affects the trade and securityinterests of many nations, and thusparticipation in HoA anti-piracyoperations has become one way for a

country to signal both its willingness andits ability to cooperate in issues ofinternational concern. Currently at least adozen national navies have deployed tothe region, in addition to the several

multinational coalitions operating there.In a sense, panelists suggested, there is abandwagon effect: the greater thenumber of nations that send ships to theregion, the more additional nations willalso feel compelled to participate in anti-piracy operations.

3 All quoted comments are from the transcript of Chinas Ministry of National Defense news conference, 23 December2008; http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1076/52984/8565326.html.

How has China been participating in international anti-piracy efforts?

At present, more than a dozen nations have sent ships to patrol the Gulf of Aden/Horn ofAfrica region. A number of these are participating in Combined Task Forces 150 and 151(CTF-150 and -151), under the multi-national Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). The EUand NATO have also provided their own combined maritime task groups to the regionthese are not part of the CMF, but they do coordinate with it. A number of other nations,including Russia, China, India, and Malaysia, have sent naval forces operating undernational tasking to the region to protect their vessels and crews from pirates. On average,one speaker said, there are 14 naval vessels patrolling the Gulf of Aden at any given time,

in a combination of coalition and non-coalition forces.

China has not joined any coalition, and its stated primary goal in deploying PLAN vesselsis safeguarding and providing security for Chinese vessels and personnel sailing throughthe region. Although China has not joined a coalition, officials from Chinas Ministry ofNational Defense (MND) have said that China is willing to strengthen intelligence andinformation exchanges and, when necessary, take part in humanitarian relief operationswith all countries, including the United States.3 MND officials have also made clear thatthe decision to deploy naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa region wasadopted on the basis of a UN resolution, and that China advocates strengthening theleadership and coordination function of the United Nations in addressing piracy.


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Chinas participation in internationalanti-piracy operations represents asignificant shift both in the scope of itsnational security interests and in itsapparent willingness to take on a larger

military role on the global stage.

Speakers discussed several inferencesthat could be drawn from Chinasunprecedented participation in anti-piracy operations. First, they noted,Chinas willingness to send warships faroutside its territorial waters signals a shiftin its definition of its national securityinterests. Taken in conjunction with otherofficial Chinese military and government

statements, panelists surmised, Chinasanti-piracy operations may be seen aspart of a longer-term movement towardtasking the PLA and the PLAN withexpanded missions aimed at protecting amore diverse set of national interests thatare not defined by geography includingprotecting economic interests, preventingterrorism, delivering humanitarian aid,and conducting other Military OperationsOther Than War (MOOTW).

Second, some participants suggested,Chinas unprecedented cooperation with(though not formal participation in) theCMF anti-piracy task forces displays anew-found willingness to cooperate with

other militaries and governments onissues of mutual concern. By showingitself eager to be seen as a responsiblestakeholder in resolving global issues,China may be opening the door for other

cooperative efforts in the future.

Chinas naval cooperation in anti-piracyoperations has, for the most part, beenwelcomed by the United States military.

Panelists from a wide range of U.S.institutions expressed enthusiasm for thePLANs participation in anti-piracyoperations. Chinas willingness tomaintain open communications and

share information with the United States(and, more generally, with the CMF anti-piracy task force) has allowed forunprecedented daily communicationbetween the tactical and operationallevels of both militaries, in contrast to theoccasional and high-level diplomaticplatforms on which military-to-militaryrelations are usually conducted. Speakersacknowledged that there were some risksassociated with closer contact, and someexpressed reservations about whetherChinas navy is gaining more from thiscontact than is the U.S. Navy. But, ingeneral, the benefits of this closer contactwere seen to outweigh the potentialcosts.


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Panel One: Setting the Stage An Overview of Piracy off the Horn of Africa

The presentations of the first panelprovided context for Chinas participationin anti-piracy operations in the Horn of

Africa region. They included discussionsof both why piracy has escalated in theregion in recent years, and how China isaffected by this escalation. Thepresentations addressed the followingquestions:

Why have pirates been relativelysuccessful in this region?

Panelists identified a number of factors

that may contribute to piracy. Onespeaker, comparing the HoA region toanother well-known pirate haven, theStrait of Malacca, suggested that there areseven primary factors that foster piracy.He noted that these factors exist todiffering degrees in the two regions,which may help to explain why efforts tocurb piracy in the Strait of Malacca have,thus far, been more successful thanefforts off the Horn of Africa. Mostimportantly, the speaker said, whereas

other regions, suchas the mangroveswamps of theNiger Delta, mayoffer pirates safehavens in terms ofgeography, theHoA region offersthem political

sanctuary in anumber of ways.These include the

weakness or outright failure of Somaliasstate apparatus, the insufficient judicialcapacity of neighboring states to bringpirates to justice, and the ineffectivenessof international pressure on Somali

power-holders. By contrast, the Strait ofMalacca is surrounded by multiple stateswith robust sovereignty, some of which

have expressed a strong interest incurbing piracy, and on which effectiveinternational pressure could be levied.

These issues underscore the fact that, asseveral panelists pointed out, piracy is, atroot, a political problem that is, itreflects the failure of land-based politicalregimes to control crime and lawlessnesson their peripheries and to shut downlong-standing criminal networks.Participants noted, for instance, that theSomali pirates are probably aided byactors in Yemen and elsewhere in the

region. Panelists argued that the ability tocurb piracy in the long term is largelydependent on the political will andcapacity of nearby states to establishcoherent anti-piracy legislation and tobring perpetrators to justice. As onespeaker put it, the solution is ashore inSomalia, not at sea.

If I had tochoose oneword to describethe differencebetween piracyoff the Horn ofAfrica andelsewhere it

would be sanctuary.

Seven Factors Fostering Piracy

o Conflict and disorder in thegovernments and societies ofnearby nations

o Favorable geography inneighboring waters

o A maritime tradition

o Financial reward

o Legal opportunity (i.e., is thereeffective legislation in place to helpcurb piracy?)

o Permissive political environment

o Inadequate security for shipspassing through the region


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Ultimately, the speakers noted, legalmeasures will be one of the mostimportant factors in curtailing piracy. TheUnited Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS) codified anti-piracy

law in 1982, and the UN SecurityCouncil adopted four resolutions (UNResolutions 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851)that called upon states with sufficientcapacity to take active part in anti-piracyoperations off the coast of Somalia inparticular by deploying naval vessels andmilitary aircraft.

Several panelists suggested that theability of concerned nations to curb

pirate attacks and arrest their perpetratorsis hampered by several legal factors,including:

the inadequacy or weakness ofdomestic legislation in neighboringcountries

the unwillingness of many of thesenations to adjudicate piracy cases

the lack of implementation of existing

international laws that deal withpiracy.

What international efforts are beingundertaken to stop piracy?

If piracy is largely a political and legalproblem, does this mean that there is norole for national navies in curbing piracy?No. Speakers agreed that particularly inthe absence of political consensus among

neighboring nations naval power may

be the only tool currently available tocounter pirate attacks. Navies cannot endthe political problems that allow piracyto flourish, but they can help in threeways:

By significantly increasing the costs ofpiracy to its perpetrators, throughactions such asboarding suspectedpirate ships, inter-vening in attacksalready underway, andproviding surveillanceof and communicationwith ships that have

been captured. By increasing the defensive capacities

of commercial and humanitarian aidships through, for instance, providingwarnings of nearby pirate activity anddeveloping group transit plans.

By cooperating with other nationalnavies through coordination,deconfliction of national anti-piracymissions, and legal cooperation. As

one example of effective internationalcooperation, a panelist cited theInternationally Recognized TransitCorridor (IRTC). Established by theCoalition Maritime Forces in 2008,the IRTC established a new transitcorridor through the Gulf of Aden thatfunnels merchant and civilian trafficinto a smaller area, thus enabling alimited number of warships to protecta greater number of merchant vessels.

To stoppiracy wewould needto increasethe risksthat piratesface.


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Figure 3: Revised Transit Corridor, Effective 1 Feb 2009

(Promulgated in coordination with the EU and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organisation [UKMTO]) 4

In addition, industry itself has takensignificant defensive actions againstpiracy to make its ships less vulnerable.These include increasing evasivemaneuvers, communicating transit plansto local law enforcement professionals,

and developing pre-planned responses toattacks. One panelist noted that anumber of international industries havecooperated to publish a region-specificset of industry best practices for deterringpirate attacks.

How are Chinas interests affected bypiracy in the region?

Finally, the panel discussed the ways thatregional piracy affects China inparticular. One participant suggested thatwhile Chinas participation in anti-piracyactions clearly reflects a desire to protecther economic interests in the region, italso signals a set of concerns about

Chinas national image if it does notparticipate. The speaker noted thatChinas perceived inability to protect itsvessels may be viewed as a blow tonational pride, as would be the relianceon foreign ships to protect its own. (In

one case prior to PLAN deployment tothe HOA region, a PRC ship was forcedto rely on assistance from the Malaysiannavy to drive off a pirate attack.)Participating in anti-piracy missions,conversely, displays both the ability ofthe PLAN to carry out a mission far fromhome, and the willingness of Chinasgovernment to active[ly] fulfill itsinternational obligations to help controlpiracy in the region, as the PLAN Deputy

Chief of Staff said in 2008.5 This themewas echoed in the next panel as well.

4 Source: Combined Maritime Forces

5Chinas Ministry of National Defense news

conference, 23 December 2008; http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1076/52984/8565326.html


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Chinas economic interests in the Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa region

Trade with Africa: China imports key resources, such as oil, gas, metals, and minerals,from the African continent much of which passes through the Gulf of Aden/HOAregion.

Trade with the EU: The EU is Chinas largest trading partner; China, the EUs secondlargest. Much of this trade passes through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the IndianOcean all in the HOA region.

Energy imports: China currently imports half its oil, of which approximately a third or16% of its total energy needs comes from Africa. As Chinas hunger for imported oilrises, the HOA is likely to remain a key transit route, making piracy in the region anever- more-pressing threat.

Fisheries: Chinas fishing fleet has interests in the rich waters off the Horn of Africa, andat least one of its fishing vessels has been attacked by pirates.


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Panel Two: Implications for China

The speakers on Panel Two highlightedthe drivers for and operationalimplications of Chinas unprecedented

participation in anti-piracy operations.They raised the following points:

Chinas participation in these operationsis truly something new, and thereforesignificant.

Speakers noted that this is the PLANsfirst operational deployment of combatvessels outside Chinas littoral waters.The deployment presents both logistical

and diplomatic challenges: logistically,this is the first time that the PLAN has hadforces operating for an extended periodof time at a great distance from home;diplomatically, this is the first time that aPLAN task group has cooperated withinternational naval forces on anoperational mission. The PLAN taskgroup is also partly reliant on foreignsources for logistics support.

Chinas participation signals anexpansion of Chinas national securityinterests, a point which is concordantwith other recent statements fromChinas government and military.

The panelists noted that the use of PLANwarships in the Gulf of Aden/Horn ofAfrica region serves at least threepurposes:

First, it signals Chinas desire to be seenas a willing partner in internationalcooperative efforts. In other words, thePLAN is being used as a diplomaticvehicle, to demonstrate Chinas intentionto act as a responsible stakeholder inthe global arena. Chinas stated

commitment in other venues to helpsafeguard world peace and promotecommon development through

participation in international securityactivities is qualified by its declarationthat these activities must be UN-led,multilateral operations such asinternational peacekeeping, or thecurrent anti-piracy operations.6 ThusChina may be indicating that itsexpanded military operations should beviewed as cooperative rather thancompetitive or, as one panelist put it,that Chinas use of the PLAN as a

diplomatic vehicle need not pose a zero-sum situation for the United States orother countries.

Second, it proclaims Chinas intentionsand ability to militarily defend itsexpanding, globalizing national interests.Both panelists noted that since the early2000s, various official Chinesepublications and speeches havesuggested that Chinas national interestsare expanding geographically. From thepromulgation of Chinas Go Out policyat the turn of the 21st century, whichcalled for Chinese firms to invest, sell,and acquire natural resources abroad, toan increased attention to MilitaryOperations Other Than War (MOOTW)in Chinas 2008 Defense White Paper(published in January 2009), China hasproclaimed that its national security

6The General Political Department of the PLA, LessonFive: Giving Play to the Importance of SafeguardingWorld Peace and Promoting Common Development(Di Wu Jiang: Weihu Shijie Heping yu CujinGongtong Fazhan Fahui Zhongyao Zuoyong),National Defense Education website of Yichun City,Jiangxi, (June 2006), http://www.ycgfjy.com/Article_show.asp?ArticleID=2284.


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interests and its national interests morebroadly are increasingly defined welloutside of Chinas immediateneighborhood.

One panelist suggested that Chinas anti-piracy operations demonstrate the PLAsintention of carrying out the missionswith which it was tasked by President HuJintao in 2004. These missions, known asthe New Historic Missions, comprisefour short, authoritative statements thatdefine the future tasks of the Chinesemilitary, and, in this speakers view,reflect changes in Chinas assessment ofits security situation. Particularly notable,

said this panelist, is the content of thethird and fourth missions safeguardingChinas national interests andupholding world peace and promotingmutual development. The New HistoricMissions specifically define Chinasnational interests as going beyond thesecurity of our territorial land, seas, andairspace, into realms including

maritime, space, and electromagneticspectrum security. Implied in theseexpanded security spheres is the pointthat Chinas military may be required togo further afield than ever before to

protect national interests. The missiondevoted to world peace and developmentis notable in that it suggests that the PLAhas a role to play in meeting these goals in other words, that military power andparticipation constitute an importantinstrument for taking on a more activeand visible role on the world stage.

Echoing one of the participants in the firstpanel, this speaker noted that national

pride may well also be driving PLANanti-piracy operations. While manyChinese believe that China is already animportant and increasingly central international player, the Chinese navy isarguably less capable than other naviesin the Asia-Pacific region. The desire toshow that Chinas military is catchingup with the nations other growingcapabilities may help to explain whyChina would deploy its vessels on thischallenging operational mission.

Finally, Chinas participation in anti-piracy operations could indicate a shift inits long-term security priorities. Onespeaker suggested that a growing focuson MOOTW which include anti-piracyoperations is indicative of a China thatis starting to look beyond Taiwan. Thiswould be consistent with other public

statements, such as the PRC 2008Defense White Paper, which downplayedcross-Strait concerns in favor of newer,non-traditional security threats.

One panelist suggested a possible driverfor this shift might be increasedconfidence in the possibility of a non-

The Historic Missions of Our Military in

the New Period of the New Century

1. Help to guarantee the Partys rulingposition.

2. Provide a strong securityguarantee during this crucialperiod of Chinas nationaldevelopment.

3. Safeguard national interests,including not only the security

of our territorial land, seas, andairspace but [also] ourmaritime, space, andelectromagnetic spectrum security.

4. Uphold world peace and promotemutual development, partlythrough military activities.


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military solution on Taiwan. In such acase, the PLA might seek other missionsas justification for its modernization andexpansion. The perceived need toparticipate in long-term international

missions far from home could provideone such justification.

One possible implication of this shift combined with the PLAs improvedcapabilities overall could be more rapidand enthusiastic participation in futuremultilateral, global missions. Thus, forinstance, China might be more likely toparticipate in humanitarian reliefoperations in the future than it was

following the 2004 tsunami.

Participation will, in the long run, aid thePLANs modernization process.

Finally, one panelist noted that thePLANs operational and deterrentcapabilities will certainly benefit from itsdeployment to the HOA region.

The panelist pointed out that the taskforce has already shown itself to bequite capable: the two destroyersChina has sent to the HOA region areequipped with sophisticatedweaponry, and the replenishmentship is able to provide the destroyerswith fuel, ammunition, food andwater, and spare parts. (Chinas taskforce will, nonetheless, remain relianton Chinas shore-based resources foradditional fuel, spare parts, and

personnel transfer.) Reports of the taskforces operations indicate that it isperforming in a well-planned,competent manner.

The speaker also suggested thatparticipation in these operations willalmost certainly result in the PLANs

increased expertise and experience inoperations, logistics, command andcontrol, and interagency cooperation.

Most significantly, this deploymentwill serve to increase the PLANsconfidence in its capabilities.

This operation will contribute in amajor way to the transformation ofthe PLA Navy from a coastal defenseforce to one capable of operatingeffectively at long ranges from homebase.


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Panel Three: Implications for the United States

The final panel brought together policyexperts from the Departments of Stateand Defense, to discuss how the United

States has reacted to Chinasunprecedented participation in theseactivities, and what opportunities andrisks this participation brings to theUnited States.

Overall, the panelists reaction to Chinasparticipation in anti-piracy operationswas overwhelmingly positive. Indeed,one panelist said that deciding to supportChinas participation in the Gulf of

Aden/HoA region was possibly theeasiest decision weve ever made inU.S.China military-to-military inter-actions. The speakers noted severalencouraging implications of Chinas anti-piracy operations:

The PLANs participation in anti-piracymissions signals Chinas willingness tocooperate on global issues of mutualinterest. This is particularly important,

panelists noted, because the U.S. willincreasingly need Chinas help on anumber of global and regional issues both military and non-military rangingfrom global economic and environmentalchallenges, to regional hotspots such asPakistan and Afghanistan. On manydiplomatic issues, one speaker pointedout, U.S.China interactions have, untilnow, largely taken place in the context ofthe UN Security Council, and would be

aided by more continuous interaction ina broader arena. Creating habits ofcooperation, as one speaker put it, canonly make those other tasks easier.Another noted that such operationsprovide an opportunity for the U.S. tocontinue to challenge China toparticipate as a responsible stakeholder

on global issues, and to provide positivefeedback when it does so.

Missions such as these provide ongoingcontact between the United States andChina to supplement formal military-to-military relations. Speakers noted thatthe anti-piracy operations have allowedmembers of both militaries to interact inways that were never before possible. Asone pointed out, this is the first occasionwhen warships from the two nations havecoordinated non-exercise operations.Naval cooperation off the Horn of Africa

has allowed for an unprecedented degreeof contact, particularly in the operationaland tactical arenas. Indeed, as onepanelist pointed out, interaction at sea iseasier in some ways, because it does nottake place in any one nations territory;members of the different crews can visitone anothers ships and interact moreinformally.

Moreover, such cooperative operations

allow the two militaries to continue tointeract even when formal military-to-military relations are shaky and thus tomaintain a degree of communicationeven during difficult periods. This isparticularly notable now, after October2008, when formal bilateral mil-milrelations were suspended in response tothe U.S. statement of intended arms salesto Taiwan.

Finally, these ongoing interactions allowthe U.S. Navy to familiarize the PLAleadership with U.S. views on globalissues, to demonstrate professionalismand to give Chinese personnel first-handexposure to the U.S. military. As onespeaker noted, the future leaders of thePLAN are likely to have operational


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experience and henceare likely to be interestedin and influenced byoperational interactionswith the U.S. and other

nations.

At the same time,panelists acknowledgedthat some might findChinas participation

worrisome, due both to the potential forthe PLAN to improve its operationalcapabilities, and to potential risks fromcloser contact between the U.S. andChinese militaries. Panelists stressed that

such risks need to be mitigated even asoverall cooperation is encouraged.

Finally, participants noted that Chinasanti-piracy missions raise several largerpoints worth serious consideration:

The PLANs expanded portfolio raisesquestions about how the U.S. Navyshould best interact with China tosupport U.S. national interests.Panelists

provided several suggestions on how thebilateral relationship both military anddiplomatic should be managed asChinas national interests, power, andinfluence grow. One noted that the U.S.-China relationship should be consideredin the context of other U.S. relationshipsin the Asian region, saying that thestrength of U.S. regional alliancesremains an important element in the U.S.ability to work productively with China.

A second pointed out that the currentpositive interactions provide a goodopportunity to encourage Chinasparticipation in other multinationalmaritime activities, and in building betterlegal frameworks for naval cooperation.A third noted that the PLANsdeployment reminds us that Chinese

military capabilities and intentions areexpanding whether or not the U.S. likes it hence, what we need are procedures,rules of the game. This is an opportunityfor the U.S. to start thinking about these.

Incidents in recent months remind usthat China is taking on multiple imagesand roles on the world stage. Just a fewmonths after the PLAN deployed its firstwarships to the Gulf of Aden in the nameof international cooperation, otherChinese vessels harassed USSImpeccablein international waters in theSouth China Sea. While some might viewthese actions as inconsistent, one speaker

countered that in fact they represent acontinuum of Chinese military activities.The speaker suggested that it isunproductive to think of China as eitherathreat or a partner rather, China mayplay both roles in the U.S.s future, andthus U.S. planning should take the entirespectrum of Chinese military activitiesinto account.

We should keep in mind that China may

still overreach or overplay its hand.Finally, panelists noted that the increasedcapabilities that the PLAN has displayedin its anti-piracy operations do not meanthat Chinas navy is where it wants to be.We can expect to see more efforts tomodernize, as well as setbacks along theway. For this reason, noted one speaker,it is important for the U.S. to maintain astrong military, economic, and politicalpresence in the region. At the same time,

said another, the U.S. must understandthat conveying messages clearly remainsa challenging task: Communication is anissue not of [linguistic] translation but ofcultural translation.

This sort of[operational]cooperationis our chance

to possiblyinfluence thenext gener-ation of PLAleaders.


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4825 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22311-1850 703-824-2106 http://www.cna.org/international/china/

Chinas Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations off the Horn of Africa:

Drivers and Implications

20 March 2009

Agenda

1245-1300 Registration

1300-1310 Opening Remarks

1310-1410 Panel One: Setting the StageAn Overview of Piracy off the Horn of Africa

This panel will examine the current piracy situation, describe anti-piracy efforts to date, and

discuss Chinas interests in the region.

Speakers:

Dr. Martin Murphy, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Commander Andrew Garlington, Maritime Security Branch of the Strategy and PolicyDivision, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans and Strategy

Julia Rosenfield, China Analyst, CNA

1410-1420 Break

1420-1510 Panel Two: Implications for China

This panel will address the political-military and operational dimensions of Chinas involvement

in anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa.

Speakers:

Daniel Hartnett, China Analyst, CNA Dr. Bernard Cole, Professor of International History, National War College

1510-1520 Break

1520-1620 Panel Three: Implications for the United States

The final panel will provide an overview of U.S. government reactions to Chinas participation

in these anti-piracy operations.

Speakers:

David B. Shear, Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, U.S. Department ofState

Lieutenant Colonel Sande Schlesinger, Senior Country Director for China, Office of theUnder Secretary of Defense for Policy, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

Gerard Roncolato, Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy Division, Office of the Chief ofNaval Operations

Lieutenant Colonel Eric Barto, China Branch Chief, Strategic Plans and Policy, JointStaff

1620-1630 Closing Remarks


18/19

Cover photo:

Sailors salute during a ceremony held before a Chinese naval fleet, including two destroyers and

a supply ship from the South China Sea Fleet, set off from Sanya, Hainan province. The fleet

would have about 800 crew, including 70 special operations troops, and would join multi-

national patrols of the Gulf of Aden and waters off the coast of Somalia, the official Xinhua

news agency said. Picture taken December 26, 2008.

Reuters/China Daily Information Corp. (CDIC)


19/19

4825 Mark Center Drive Alexandria VA 22311-1850 703-824-2000 www cna org

MISC D0020834.A1/Final

Documents

China Participation in Ati Piracy in HOA