China Cp - Scdi 2013

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/china-cp-scdi-2013 1/56

CHINA CP

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


1NC

Text: The People’s Republic of China should substantially increase its economic

engagement towards ______________________________.

The CP competes and solves the case – China offers a unique model of

economic engagement.Hsiang ‘9 (Antonio C. Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan

China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of Emerging

Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 issue 1 November 2009)

Because “many Latin American countries no longer look to Washington leadership,” the so- called

Washington Consensus “has lost traction”.28 As a global rising power, China offers an alternative model

for Latin America’s development. Even though China has been hurt by the 2008 financial crisis, “its economic and

financial powers have been strengthened relative to those of the West. China’s global influence

will thus increase, and Beijing will be able to undertake political and economic initiatives to increase it further.” 29 In fact,

“Washington seemed to adopt a Chinese-style solution to its escalating financial problems: greater state intervention to restrict the

movement of capital.”30 Thus, Beijing’s emergence as a global economic power is seen throughout

Latin America as offering an alternative from the Washington Consensus model for economic

development. The “Beijing Consensus” is the brainchild of Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former senior editor and foreign editor of

Time magazine and later a partner at Kissinger Associates, the consulting firm of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus has three features. The first is a commitment to innovation and

constant experimentation in reforms. The second, a rejection of per capita GDP as the only measure of progress, as

sustainability and equality also count. And the third, a commitment to self- determination. Less developed countries

should therefore ensure their own financial integrity and keep great powers in check. 31 The Beijing Consensus has

evolved to describe a plethora of alternative plans for economic development in the

underdeveloped world. Ramo argues that China and India, who “most pointedly” ignored the World Bank and the IMF-

championed Washington Consensus, “now have records that speak for themselves.” 32 Consequently, the so-called the“Beijing Consensus” has been attracting attention in Latin America because of “China’s distinctive

development model, . . . [which] posits far more state intervention in the economy and a greater

concern with political stability and strong government to guide the development process.” 33

The CP solves better because there are comparative benefits to China.Dr. Hsiang ‘9 (Antonio C. is an Associate Professor Chihlee Institute of Technology, Taiwan.

“China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of Emerging

Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 Issue 1 November 2009)

It is no accident that in March 2007, during the Inter-American Development Bank’s annual¶ meeting in Guatemala, the Bank’sPresident Luis Alberto Moreno signed an agreement of ¶ understanding with Zhou Xiaochuan, the head of the People’s Bank of

China, to formalize¶ talks over Beijing’s request to become a member. In November 2008, China became the¶ third Asian nation to

join the bank, after South Korea and Japan. Even former U.S.¶ Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson asserts, “China obviously is a big

player, a global¶ economic player, and that’s obviously a good thing for Latin America¶ World Bank economists

report that the rise of China and India is bestowing substantive net benefits on Latin America

through higher commodity prices, cheaper industrial inputs, and growing capital inflows. Moreover, if Latin American governments adopt appropriate¶ investment and trade strategies, including negotiating bilateral free-

trade agreements, Latin American exporters should be able to successfully penetrate the burgeoning

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Asian commercial markets and better integrate themselves into Asian-linked global production

networks. No wonder economists from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and¶ Development (OECD), generally

concur with their World Bank counterparts that “as seen¶ through the Latin American lens, China is closer to heaven

than hell.”37¶ Facing China’s new role in the Western Hemisphere, For most of Latin America, with the main exceptions of

Mexico and Central America,¶ China has been an engine for export growth, allowing exporters to

diversify away from traditional markets in the north. Beyond the fact that the region’s exports to China are¶

concentrated on commodity products, the issue remains that China’s economic and political¶ rise should be a wake-up call for more

reforms in the region.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


2NC Solvency – Generic

CP solves the case and avoids the turns – Latin America prefers China and their

model of development ensures better stability.

Mallén, 6/28 (Patricia covers Latin America for the International Business Times. Patricia holdstwo BAs from Universidad Complutense de Madrid and an MA in International Reporting from

CUNY Graduate School of Journalism. “Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does

That Mean For The US?” June 28 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-

relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981#)

Though a recent trip to the region by Vice President Joe Biden seems to run counter to the Pacific Alliance snub, China’s President Xi

Jinping has also visited recently, and likewise met with Latin American leaders, illustrating how the two global powers are

going after the same prize. Biden traveled to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil in May, with the last leg of his trip

coinciding with the beginning of Xi’s in Trinidad, before jumping to Costa Rica and Mexico. Both leaders met with several Latin

American presidents and discussed trade and cooperation. The outcomes of their trips were very different, however. Xi’s trip

was the first visit from a Chinese official to the region in almost a decade. Trinidad and Tobago’s main

newspaper, Newsday, called the visit a “historic occasion” and a “visit from China to a good friend.” Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said she was committed to boosting relations with China and accepted an invitation to Beijing for November of this year. In

Costa Rica, Xi signed a $400 million loan to build a cross-country road and reaffirmed relations with its main ally in the region. Costa

Rica is the only country in Latin America that sides with China in the mainland-Taiwanese dispute and does not recognize the island

as a nation. Even more significant was Xi’s visit to Mexico . President Enrique Peña Nieto welcomed his Chinese

counterpart, whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wants closer trade relations

with China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export and import - - an important development considering that Mexico is,

for now, America's biggest trade partner in the world. Biden’s visit was not as successful. His meeting in Trinidad

and Tobago was called “brutal and tense” by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist Andrés Oppenheimer deemed

the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry cal led Latin America “Washington’s backyard” in a much-berated slip last April.

While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rio and Bogotá, no agreements were signed during his trip. Perhaps the biggest development

in China’s investment in the area is the recent decision by the Nicaraguan congress to allow a Chinese company to build a canal

through the country. Although still in the proposal stages, the project would bring profound change to the geopolitics of the region --

and even the world. If built, the canal could significantly affect commerce through the Panama Canal, which, though it is now part of

Panama's domain, was built by the U.S. and remains a symbol of the nation's historical dominance in the region. Thatdominance is in decline. After decades of uncontested U.S. influence in the region, some Latin

American leaders have started making decidedly anti-American policies. The most notable was the late

Venezuelan Comandante Hugo Chávez, who was very vocal about his disdain for the U.S., but he is far from the only one. Bolivia's

President Evo Morales, for instance, kicked out USAID after Kerry's verbal slip, and has gone so far as to ban Coca-Cola from the

country. But now it's Ecuador bumping heads with its northern neighbor, mostly in regard to Ecuador granting entry to NSA-secrets

leaker Edward Snowden. President Rafael Correa openly said that they would welcome the whistle-blower because he was a "free

man," no matter what the U.S. said. Disagreements between the governments have led to the cancellation of a special trade

agreement, which Ecuador has called "an instrument of blackmail." Beyond the lack of understanding with its former main trade

partner, why is Latin America so smitten with China? Kevin Gallagher, a professor of international

relations at Boston University, says China speaks to the region’s newfound confidence. “China is

offering attractive deals to Latin American economies while the United States continues to

lecture and dictate,” Gallagher wrote for The Globalist. “For too long, the United States has relied on a rather

imperial mechanism, just telling Latin America what it needs,” he added. “Compare that to China’s approach: Itoffers Latin America what it wants.” Gallagher argued that the U.S.’ biggest offer to Latin America is the Trans-Pacific

Partnership, which offers access to the U.S. market on three conditions: deregulate financial markets, adopt intellectual property

provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms, and allow U.S. firms to sue governments for violating any of its conditions. China, on

the other hand, has been providing more financing to Latin America than the World Bank, the Inter-American

Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank combined since 2003, with no previous conditions and very few strings

attached. “Latin America is very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and the

World Bank,” Gallagher said. “China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditionalities.” Gallagher said the U.S. should awake

from its past slumber and stop taking Latin America for granted. Shlomo Ben-Ami, vice president of the Toledo International

http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981





8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Center for Peace and former Israeli foreign minister, takes a different stance. He argues that China's advancement in

the region does not automatically equate with American loss of preeminence. U.S. exports to Latin

America continue to rise (by 94 percent over the past six years), as do imports (87 percent in the same period), and America

continues to be the biggest foreign investor in the area.

Chinese trade agreements would solve each of the topic countriesHearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H., research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney. He has conducted

research in Cuba (three years) and China (ten months), and is currently undertaking a study of Chinese engagement with Latin

America. Author of multiple books on Cuba, China, and Latin America. Pacific Rim Report No. 52, January 2009 “China’s Relations

with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts” http://usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)

Some scholars believe that a coordinated multilateral approach to China will improve outcomes

for Latin American countries. As Enrique Dussel Peters and Jorge Katz (2006) have argued, a region-based

bilateral dialogue with China could integrate the booming resource industry into a broader,

more sustainable development plan. The foundations for such a process already exist in

common markets such as MERCOSUR, in which China holds consultant status. Its members (Argentina, Brazil,

Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela) have demonstrated a commitment to defending the integrity of MERCOSUR, and although

Paraguay’s continuing support for Taiwan has been an obstacle, Chinese investments in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela

have created favorable conditions for a MERCOSUR-China FTA. The prospect for greater bilateral cooperation

is strengthened by the fact that all three of these countries have used support from China to increase their bargaining power with

the United States and to oppose the U.S.-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas. Indeed, Venezuela’s 2005 accession to

MERCOSUR may further this objective as Hugo Chávez builds linkages with the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA)

network (Antigua, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and Venezuela) and its associated ‘People’s Trade

Agreement’ (TCP). Mexico is well positioned to engage Central and South American countries to

stimulate dialogue about the capacity of multilateral collaboration to promote regional interests

vis-à-vis China. Membership in NAFTA should not stand in Mexico’s path toward simultaneously

developing alternative economic partnerships. As Chile has shown through the concurrent development of FTAs

with Canada, China, Mexico, Korea, the United States, MERCOSUR, and the European Union, multiple agreements can consolidate

overseas business networks and secure broader access to foreign markets. The emergence of China represents more than a

temporary problem for Mexico; rather, it raises the historically enduring challenge of developing balanced

and sustainable international economic relations. The threats associated with this challenge include, but extendbeyond, specific cases of ineffective enforcement of customs regulations, unscrupulous profiteering from tariff loopholes, and even

the encompassing problem of competition for a place in the consumer markets of the Americas. Indeed, the threats extend to the

global scale in the form of economically and environmentally unsustainable development strategies based on natural resource

exports. To overcome the most impending of these threats Mexico could tighten domestic policing of illicit commerce and build

knowledge of the emerging Chinese market in order to identify niche areas and develop appropriate strategies for filling them.

Tortillas and cement are a good start, but there are significant opportunities to expand existing sales of specialized electronics and

auto parts, synthetic fibers, steel and plastic products, beer, and a range of other items. Opportunities also exist to develop

production chains based on assembly of Chinese manufactured components in Mexico, and subsequent export throughout the

NAFTA zone, though this would require careful legal preparation. Expanded production of automobiles, heavy industrial equipment,

and computing equipment would benefit from Mexico’s geographic proximity to the United States, sophisticated logistical

infrastructure, high levels of human capital in technological development, and access to U.S. and Canadian markets. Refined

educational exchange programs that more strongly encourage face-to-face dialogue with Chinese counterparts and industry

professionals would deepen opportunities for collaboration. Indeed, Venezuelan scholarship programs in China (mainly in the oil and

space satellite industries) demonstrate that the prospects for long-term professional partnerships are enhanced when students are

exposed to—and tested on—a broad base of technical, linguistic, and cultural experience. Mexican educational initiatives in China

such as those of the Tecnológico de Monterrey have shown that strategic industrial targeting and flexibility in program design haveproduced positive outcomes. At the most encompassing level, the emergence of China raises questions about the long-term viability

of development models based on bilateral free trade, particularly in natural resources. Multilateral blocs such as ASEAN, the EU, and

MERCOSUR, have shown a historical capacity to represent the interests of member countries through improved harmonization of

trade policies. These organizations have historically structured themselves to leverage benefits from trade with the United States,

providing them with a solid basis for adaptation to the emergence of China. The 21st century may turn out to be the century of

regional trade accords, and a vigorous exploration of new partnerships will only benefit Mexico. Regional integration has

also become more important for Cuba, which together with Venezuela and Bolivia, has

advanced the People’s Trade Agreement (TCP) under the auspices of ALBA. It is worth noting that ALBA’s

preference for exchange and bartering of resources (material and human) through state-administrated programs rather than free

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


market commerce is an approach accommodated by China’s economic policy. Indeed, even as it pursues integration into the

capitalist world market as a WTO member, China often pays for Latin American natural resources with trade credits, construction

equipment, infrastructure upgrading, and technical training rather than hard currency (Robles 2005). China has not openly

endorsed ALBA, but its willingness to develop commercial relations within the framework of

state-to-state cooperation is an important dimension of its engagement with Latin America. For

Cuba this has meant the consolidation of ‘South-South cooperation’ through collaboration in education, food security, biomedicine

(particularly cancer and blood pressure research), solar energy, light industry, and tourism. Intensifying engagement with China has

also produced challenges for Cuba, where prior experience with the United States and the Soviet Union has generated acute political

sensitivity about excessive foreign influence. Elsewhere I have discussed the key political and economic factors shaping

contemporary Sino-Cuban relations (Hearn forthcoming); rather than repeat this discussion, the next section draws primarily on

ethnographic data gathered in Beijing and Havana to discuss how the Cuban state has incorporated China into its administrative

priorities.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Comparative Solvency – Generic

Latin American countries want China over US.Hakim ‘6 (Peter Hakim is the President of the Inter-American Dialogue. “Is Washington Losing

Latin America?” Foreign Affairs, Volume 85 Issue 1, January/February 2006, A_Yu)

China's interest in Latin America is significant and expanding. The region has become a vital

source of raw materials and foodstuffs for China. In the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown

more than sixfold, or by nearly 60 percent a year. Beijing also faces a major political challenge in the region: of the 26 co untries that recognize Taiwan,

12 are in Latin America or the Caribbean. China is intent on reducing that number through aggressive diplomacy and increased trade, aid, and

investment. Bush administration officials have watched China's growing commercial and political e ngagement in the region closely. Chinese

President Hu Jintao traveled to Latin America twice in the past two years, spending a total of 16 days there. He received a warm

welcome in the five Latin American countries he visited, the concessions the host governments offered him (such as

the quick granting of "market economy status" to China), and the enormous expectations his presence created of major Chinese investments in roads,

ports, and other infrastructure. Hu's ¶ trips have been reciprocated by a long series of visits to China by Latin American heads of state, economic

officials, and corporate leaders. Many people in Latin America look to China as an economic and political

alternative to U.S. hegemony. Although officials in some of these countries are concerned that China, with its lower

manufacturing costs, will cut into their sales, profits, and investment, others (mainly South America's ¶ food- and mineral-producing nations) largely

see China as a major potential partner for new trade and investment. Brazilian ¶ leaders, including President

Lula, have said ¶ they want to establish a strategic relationship with Beijing that might involve ¶ trade in high-tech products, mutual support ¶ in

international organizations, and scientific ¶ and cultural collaboration. Interestingly, the ¶ recent advances of China (and I ndia as ¶ well) have

prompted some Latin Americans ¶ to examine their own economic and political ¶ development, producing a new wave of self criticism about the

region's stumbling ¶ performance in recent years and intense ¶ discussion about what can be learned from ¶ the success of some Asian countries. ¶ It

is too early to predict what China's longer term influence on Latin America will be. ¶ Chinese trade with Latin America, for ¶ instance, may be

expanding rapidly, but it ¶ still amounts to less than ten percent of U.S. ¶ trade with the region. Some of the Latin ¶ American countries that were the

most ¶ eager to forge strong links with China are ¶ now having second thoughts. At the time of ¶ Hu's November 2004 visit, Argentina and ¶ Brazil

forecast huge increases in Chinese ¶ investment in both countries. Less than a ¶ year later, the two governments ¶ acknowledged that China's actions

had ¶ fallen short of their expectations and said ¶ they were now eager to stem escalating ¶ C hinese imports. Brazil's foreign minister, ¶ Celso Amorim,

complained that their ¶ "expectations were greater. ... Investment is ¶ coming slowly." In fact, it has barely come at ¶ all.

China offers an alternative to the status quo of the US

Cheong ‘8 (Ching Cheong, a senior journalist for The Straits Times in Singapore “Rising of

Beijing Consensus?” China Daily page 9 October 28, 2008)-KarlaRamo asserts that the Beijing Consensus represents opposition to the status quo represented by US

hegemony. This perhaps explains why China is gaining ground worldwide at the expense of the US, as

no one seems comfortable with a world with just one superpower.¶ A Chinese scholar, drawing lessons from the financial crisis,

has added beef to Ramo's concept. According to Professor Huang Weidong of the China University of Science and Technology,

the current crisis was caused by the US' huge current account deficit, financed as it was by

booming Asian and oil-rich countries.¶ With both US households and government in the red, the US has

become the world's largest debtor economy. China, Japan and other holders of US treasury bills footed the bill for its

imprudence.¶ According to Huang, China can keep itself intact by drawing seven lessons from the crisis.

The more salient ones include upholding self-reliance as the foundation of economic growth; de-

emphasizing trade and capital account surpluses; re-focusing on the real side of the economy

such as the production of basic necessities; increasing income and employment; and fueling

growth via technological advancement and domestic consumption.¶ Huang is not alone in theseprescriptions. Akira Kojima, a senior fellow at the Japan Center for Economic Research, too has urged Japan "to slow or reduce

exports to the US and to expand its domestic demand".¶ If China manages to emerge from the current financial

crisis relatively unscathed, the Beijing Consensus might well find favor among developing

countries as an alternative approach to economic growth.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency – Cuba

China’s involvement helps develop Cuba’s economy and reduces necessity of

the US embargo

Nash ’13 (Paul Nash, 24 May 2013, “How the Chinese are Helping to Transform Cuba, Again,”http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/brics/1465-how-the-chinese-are-helping-to-

transform-cuba-again)

China is Cuba’s second largest trading partner after Venezuela, and Cuba is China’s largest

trading partner in the Caribbean, with bilateral trade now standing at around $2 billion. Beijing

wants to help Cuba push through market-oriented economic reforms, knowing from its own

experience over the past three decades that private sector entrepreneurial activity can

stimulate foreign investment, build national capital and promote domestic consumption. To

this end, China has granted Cuba numerous long-term low or interest-free loans to support

development and maintain financial and social stability through the reform process. It has also

undertaken significant technology transfers and entered into joint ventures in farming, light

industry, and tourism. Cuba has started the reform process focussed on its biggest export

industries. It has, for example, begun restructuring its ailing sugar industry by abolishing the

sugar ministry and creating Azcuba, a state holding company consisting of 13 provincial sugar

companies that operate 56 sugar mills and 850 sugarcane farms. Azcuba signed foreign

investment agreements with companies from Brazil and Britain in 2012 to modernize harvesting

equipment and build biomass energy plants. Cuba exports about 400,000 tonnes of sugar

annually to China, more than half the amount it produces for domestic consumption.

China’s interest in Cuba is, of course, inseparable from the Caribbean’s natural resources and

those of Latin America more broadly. The Sino-Cuban economic fraternity, from Beijing’s

viewpoint, is largely pragmatic rather than idealistic. Beijing has demonstrated that it will

conduct business with left-leaning governments like Venezuela and Ecuador as readily as with

right-leaning governments like Chile and Colombia. The Sino-Cuban partnership may represent alost opportunity for the United States in promoting liberal democracy in the Western

Hemisphere. But it may also represent a path to normalized relations if China can help Cuba’s

economy reform such that it, like Vietnam’s, no longer justifies the continuation of a decades-

old U.S. trade embargo on the basis that Cuba’s economy is “dominated or controlled by

international communism.”

China is key in developing Cuban energy development

Davis ‘12 (Bob Davis and Wayne Ma, 5 July 2012, “Cuba Seeks Closer Ties With Beijing,”

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303684004577508432963724246.html)

Chinese technocrats and academics are working on a dozen projects to help remake the Cuban

economy, including infrastructure, transportation and energy, said Xu Shicheng, a Cuba expert

at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. While Cuba has made progress, "most importantly,

there is a need to update the people's mentality," he said. "Many people in Cuba think that

updating the private sector means adopting capitalism. It will take Cuba a long time to

accomplish what China did." Mr. Castro's visit comes as China tries to be a major player in Latin

American affairs. Already, China is a major destination for commodities from Brazil and

http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/brics/1465-how-the-chinese-are-helping-to-transform-cuba-again


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303684004577508432963724246.html

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303684004577508432963724246.html



8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Argentina, and is boosting investment in the region, especially in energy projects. Beijing also

has long been involved in a tug of war with Taiwan over diplomatic recognition by Central

American and Caribbean countries, which play off Taipei against Beijing. Cuba is a nation of just

11 million people but it has long been a foreign-affairs flash point because of the charismatic

leadership of former President Fidel Castro and its struggles against the U.S. There are about 1.5

million Cuban-Americans, many of whom live in Florida and other politically important states.

Havana has relied on exports of oil from its closest ally, Venezuela, headed by President Hugo

Chávez, who also had pledged in 2007 to help Cuba build or expand its refining capacity. But

Venezuela didn't follow through, and after the global financial crisis, China stepped in. State-

controlled China National Petroleum Corp. signed a $4.5 billion deal last year to upgrade

Cuba's Cienfuegos refinery.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency – Cuba (Oil)

China is committed to developing Cuba’s oil industry Franks, ‘11 (Jeff Franks, 8 June 2011, “China To Play Major Role in Cuban Oil Development,”

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/cuba-china-oil-idUSN0814065020110608

HAVANA, June 8 (Reuters) - China looks ready to play a major role in the development of

Cuban oil, including the island's soon-to-be explored fields in the Gulf of Mexico, after the

signing of energy-related accords during a visit this week by Vice President Xi Jinping.

The text of the agreements has not been disclosed, but they appear aimed at making China a

significant oil partner with its fellow communist-run country, which is likely to raise eyebrows in

the nearby United States. State-owned China National Petroleum Corp said on Wednesday the

accords committed the company to make "full use" of its oil expertise to help Cuba raise its oil

output and "to expand cooperation with (state-owned) Cubapetroleo in exploring and

developing new onshore and offshore oil blocks in Cuba." Whether the agreement means CNPC

has leased Gulf of Mexico blocks for exploration was not immediately clear. But Jorge Pinon, a

visiting fellow at Florida International University and expert on Cuban oil, said the Cubans have

previously said they were discussing the leasing of five of their 59 offshore blocks to the

Chinese. "All the pieces of the puzzle are finally falling into place," he told Reuters.

Those pieces include two other accords that commit the two countries to negotiate contracts

for a major expansion of a Cuban oil refinery in the city of Cienfuegos, and the construction of

a liquefied natural gas project, including a regasification plant, at the refinery. Sources have said

the projects would cost $6 billion, most of which would be provided by China and backed by oil

from Venezuela. Socialist ally Venezuela and China are, respectively, Cuba's number one and

two top trading partners.



8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency – Venezuela Oil

China is key to Venezuela oil sales and development through loansKatakey and Guo, 13

Rakteem Katakey and Aibing Guo, 6 March 2013, “Chavez’s Death Could Dim China’s VenezuelanEnergy Prospects,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-06/chavez-s-death-could-dim-

china-s-venezuelan-energy-prospects.html

State-run China Development Bank Corp. has agreed to lend Venezuela $46.5 billion since

2008, representing half of the loans the country received in the period, according to a Jan. 13

report from Massachusetts-based Tufts University. About 95 percent of the debt is backed by

sales contracts for crude, the report shows. Chavez, who transformed Venezuelan politics by

channeling record oil revenue to the poor, died at 58 after a struggle with cancer, raising the risk

of unrest and political infighting. Yao Zhongmin, head of China Development Bank’s supervisory

board, said in Beijing today the Venezuelan loans carried risks, for which the bank has a

contingency plan. He didn’t give any details. Shipments to China by Petroleos de Venezuela SA,

the state producer known as PDVSA, are up nearly tenfold since 2006 to an average 518,000

barrels a day and will surpass 1 million barrels a day before the end of 2015, Venezuela’s Oil

Minister Rafael Ramirez said Sept. 25. The country sells China about 19 percent of its output,

based on Ramirez’s statement.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency – Mexico

China will not harm the Mexican market

Reuters ’12 (David Garcias, a journalist for Reuters news source “Mexico hails "new

relationship" with China over trade” Reutershttp://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/21/idUKL2E8FKGO120120421 April 21, 2012)-Karla

PUERTO VALLARTA, Mexico, April 20 (Reuters) - Mexico said on Friday it had reached an accord with China aimed at

promoting fairer bilateral commerce and announced joint business deals and investment worth

some $560 million. Mexico's Economy Ministry said the agreement with Beijing would stop "unfair

Chinese practices" in shoemaking, one of the main industries in Mexico to complain that China is flooding it with cheap

imports. The two signed business deals worth $300 million and agreed on new investments worth

$260 million, the ministry said. It did not provide further details. "This new relationship looks to answer the

imbalance that affects Mexico and establish a basis for more balanced and sustainable trade

in the long term," the ministry said. China is Mexico's third-biggest export market outside North America, and the two nations

compete to sell manufactured goods to U.S. consumers. Chinese investment has traditionally been very modest in Mexico but it has

picked up this year. The balance of trade between the two developing economies is heavily tilted in favor of the Asian giant, which

now provides Mexico with roughly 15 percent of its imports. Less than 2 percent of Mexico's exports go to China, with nearly 80percent of them heading to the United States. However, Mexico has been moving away from its dependence on

the United States in the last few years. "It's a fact that the most dynamic region on the planet is Asia. That's the

reality," said Francisco de Rosenzweig, Mexico's undersecretary for foreign trade. "Latin American and global

businesses with new investments are looking to make the most of the comparative advantages

in China." De Rosenzweig added that a planned Mexican trade mission to China was likely this summer. Mexico's announcement

coincided with the close of a trade meeting of the Group of 20 economic powers in the Mexican Pacific resort of Puerto Vallarta,

where ministers agreed to support open markets and oppose protectionist measures

Better Chinese-Mexican relations leads to enormous benefits

Kuribrena ’13 (Jose Antonio Meade Kuribrena, Mexico’s secretary of foreign affairs “Mexico

and China: a Promising Future” http://english.caixin.com/2013-05-20/100530091.html 5/20/13)-Karla

Mexico respects and admires China's universal inputs. Since the establishment of diplomatic

relations in 1972, both nations have forged strong bonds of friendship, solidarity and

cooperation with enormous potential benefits for both countries. This was recognized by Pena

Nieto and President Xi Jinping during their meeting in April as part of the Boao Forum for Asia.

They agreed then to raise the relationship to new levels of dialogue and cooperation that

correspond to their enormous potential and the role Mexico and China play in the international

arena. We share hopes in the international realm and challenges that I am sure we can solve if

we bind our ties and exchange experiences. Progressively but surely, Mexico will have greater

presence in this area of rapid growth, global development and innovation that the Asia-Pacific

region has become. Mexico and China have the opportunity to consolidate their existing ties in

deepening exchanges, and making them more and more productive and mutually favorable.Political dialogue, trade, investment, education, science, technology, tourism and culture are

priorities in a broad and expanding bilateral agenda. The relationship between Mexico and

China has a promising future. We are countries in motion and in constant process of

transformation. With the relaunching of our ties, we will work to benefit from our coincidences

and our complementarities. I am convinced that in this new stage, the people of both Mexico

and China will benefit from a bilateral relationship sustained on a greater strategic and long-

term vision.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/21/idUKL2E8FKGO120120421%20April%2021

http://english.caixin.com/2013-05-20/100530091.html




http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/21/idUKL2E8FKGO120120421%20April%2021

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Increased Mexico-China relations has a potential to benefit both nations-

Mutual cooperation is keyMaurice and Xizhi 6/03 (Liang Xizhi and Peter Saldana Maurice, reporters for English news “

Interview: Mexican senator calls for stronger ties with China” English News,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-06/03/c_132427267.htm , 6/03/13)-Karla

MEXICO CITY, June 3 (Xinhua) -- Mexico should strengthen cooperation with China, one of the world'smost dynamic economies, Senator Teofilo Torres Corzo said ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping's upcoming visit to the

country. Expecting China to have bigger role on the international stage and greater presence in international politics in the years to

come, Corzo said the country "should be an opportunity for Mexico, and Mexicans are beginning to understand that we can benefit

better from the second largest economy in the world." Also, China should be regarded as a factor for bolstering

Mexico's national competitiveness, as both countries have the potential and opportunity to develop greater economic

cooperation, he said. China and Mexico have maintained close dialogue at the highest level in recent years, and they need to expand

such cooperation to the fields of science, technology, culture and education, said the senator, who chairs the Mexican Senate's

foreign affairs committee for the Asia-Pacific. He called for the two sides to find new possibilities, improve mutual understanding,

and expand cooperation and mutual understanding. Mexico, Corzo said, should continue to work with China to promote

international ecological cooperation, the development of alternative energy sources, conservation and rational use of water, and the

construction of a new international financial system. With "very promising" prospects, the Mexico-China relationship

has the potential to benefit both nations as well as their respective regions, he added.@ The senator

also said Mexico and China should strengthen cooperation in infrastructure construction, aviation and maritime transport, tourism,

energy, mining and other fields. Corzo believed that Xi's upcoming visit will effectively promote the development of the bilateral

relations. "The mutually beneficial China-Mexico relationship will become closer with joint efforts

of the two governments," he said.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-06/03/c_132427267.htm



8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency - $

China has the money to pay for the plan – they give billions.Gallagher ‘13 (Kevin Gallagher is an Associate Professor of International Relations. (BA,

Northeastern University; MA, PhD, Tufts University. ww.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-06/13/content_16613062.htm. US Blind to Latin America). – HyeongMoney

So what is the Chinese approach? During his visit to Latin America and the Caribbean, President Xi offered

more than $5.3 billion in financing, with few conditions attached, to its newfound Latin American friends. These offers will need to

be confirmed, but according to media reports, during Xi's trip the Chinese signed deals for $3 billion in commitments

to Caribbean countries for infrastructure and energy; $1.3 billion in loans and lines of credit to Costa R ica - a $900-

million loan from China Development Bank for upgrading a petroleum refinery and a $400-

million line of credit from Export-Import Bank of China for road infrastructure; and a $1-billion

line of credit from Export-Import Bank of China to Mexico for its state-owned oil company

PEMEX. Making available this financing comes on top of the already $86 billion in financing provided by China to Latin American gove rnments since

2003. Granted, that the amount - large as it sounds - seems just like another number in today's world. To put it into proper perspective, consider this:

Since 2003, China's policy banks have provided more finance to Latin American countries than

their counterparts at the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the US Export-Import Bank.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency – Drugs

China influence key to counter-narcoticsShapiro, ‘5 (Charles S., U.S. Department of State, “Chinese Engagement in Latin America Should

Enhance U.S.,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western Hemisphere, September 21,2005, http://archives.uruguay.usembassy.gov/usaweb/paginas/527-00EN.shtml)

We expect that China's increasing engagement in the region will lead to increased cooperation

between China, the United States, and other Latin American and Caribbean governments on matters

affecting regional stability, especially terrorism, transnational crime, and counternarcotics. We view positively

China's participation in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti in a way that contributes to the mission. China's Role in Narcotics

Control Given this subcommittee's interest in narcotics, let me elaborate on China's role in narcotics control in the

region. China has a large and developed chemical industry, and, like the U.S., it is one of the

world's largest producers of precursor chemicals, which have legitimate uses but are also used

in the production of cocaine and synthetic drugs. In particular, China is the world's leading exporter of bulk

ephedrine (used in cold medicines and weight-loss tablets) and a source country for much of the ephedrine and pseudoephedrine

imported into Mexico. China notifies the DEA of shipments of precursor chemicals to the U.S. and Mexico so that tracking may be

done to prevent diversion of these chemicals for illicit purposes. Nevertheless, some precursor chemicals are diverted from legal use

to manufacture methamphetamine destined for the United States. To regulate its chemical industry, China is a party to the 1988

U.N. Drug Convention and has regulations for record keeping and import/export controls on all chemicals included in the

Convention. Several provinces have more stringent controls than called for in the Convention. In the State Department's

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report we have noted, however, that China needs to improve its infrastructure to

adequately monitor its large chemical production capacity and international trade in chemicals. U.S. and Chinese

cooperation in chemical control and counternarcotics is good and has been steadily improving .

This was highlighted by a joint operation involving the DEA and several PRC law enforcement agencies in October 2004, leading to

the world's largest seizure of the synthetic drug Mandrax (18 metric tons), and the seizure of 10 tons of pseudoephedine tablets (a

key precursor for methamphetamine) in Los Angles in September 2004. While China is a transit country for heroin produced in

Southeast Asia to international markets, the DEA's Heroin Signature Program indicates less than one percent of heroin seized in the

U.S. comes from Southeast Asia.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency – Renewables

China can successfully engage over Renewable EnergyBrandt ’12 (Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), “Chinese Engagement in Latin America and

the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy” December 2012 American University)One area of potential growth and trilateral cooperation is in renewable energy investment.

Historically speaking, the United States has led the way in renewable energy investment, but

over the past several years, China has made remarkable advances with a surge of new

investment in and emphasis on renewable energy technology. Investments in renewable

energy reached new heights in 2011, topping $257 billion, up from only $39.4 billion in 2004

(552 percent increase in eight years). 29 China has surpassed the US in the volume of

renewable energy investment, is second behind the EU, and is looking to expand its markets

for renewable energy. China and other Asian countries have set ambitious targets for

renewable energy as part of their primary energy portfolios. Government grants, subsidies and

other tax incentives have prompted a wave of Chinese manufacturing in wind turbines, solar

photovoltaic panels and other renewable products. For example, Chinese solar panel

production has actually outpaced demand globally and the Chinese are aggressively trying to

develop Latin America’s market for solar panels. Latin America provides an attractive market

for Asia in the renewable sector and there is great potential to foster increased cooperation in

the energy security of both regions as they strive to become less dependent on expensive and

dwindling hydrocarbons. Alternative energy provides a green platform to promote closer

economic ties, ultimately helping to mitigate the all - inclusive threat of climate change.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency – Infrastructure

China successfully engages and invests in infrastructure – they solve the case.Brandt ’12 (Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), “Chinese Engagement in Latin America and

the Caribbean:Implications for US Foreign Policy” December 2012 American Un iversity (Page 11)

One of the major issues concerning Latin America and its US trade partners is the outdated

infrastructure and its effects on import and export activities throughout the region. In 2011,

Latin America had one of the lowest proportions of paved roads (as a percentage of total road

network) across all regions at 22.2 percent, second only to Sub - Saharan Africa at 18.8

percent. 30 Overall, there has been a very low rate of infrastructure investment by Latin

American governments with the average ranging between 1 percent and 2 percent of their GDP.

31 Other challenges include bureaucratic obstacles and flawed project implementation that

inhibits Latin America’s infrastructure competitiveness. 32 Latin America’s poor infrastructure

in regards to its roads, railways, and ports, hinders its export transfer and cost efficiency. In

fact, transport costs pose higher barriers to Latin America’s products entering US markets than

tariffs. 33 Thus, China has taken a more active role to finance infrastructure projects within theregion The Inter - American Development Bank (IDB) and the Export - Import Bank of China

(China Ex - I m B ank) have agreed to establish an infrastructure investment mechanism to

finance public and p rivate sector projects in the IDB borrowing member countries. 34 In

addition, China has proposed a $5 billion cooperation fund for infrastructure investment 11

and a $10 billion credit line to support the construction and infrastructure companies in the

region. 35 Such infrastructure investments present a beneficial outcome for Latin America,

China, and the United States. For Latin America, infrastructure investment will benefit other

aspects of their economies such as competitiveness, productivity, and trade. On China’s side,

this allows for a better export and import environment, but also opportunities to further expand

the use of the RMB currency in diverse markets. China’s infrastructure investment in Latin

America poses no current concern to the United States. Chinese infrastructure investmentinvariably benefits the United States as it creates a more modern export and import

environment for future trade.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency – Agriculture

China can successfully engage over agriculture.

Arabia ’12 (“China Urges Closer Ties with Latin America, Proposes $10 Billion Loan” Arabia 2000 June 27 2012)

Chinese financial institutions will allocate 5 billion dollars to initiate a China-Latin Americacooperation fund for joint investment in cooperation projects in manufacturing, high and new

technology and sustainable development, and the Chinese side will also initiate a 10-billion-

dollar special loan to support infrastructure cooperation between the two sides, he said.

Moreover, China is ready to discuss and sign currency swap agreements with more ECLAC countries, said the Chinese leader. China

proposes to launch a forum for Chinese and Latin American agriculture ministers, a China-

Latin America mechanism of emergency food reserves of half a million tons, and an

agricultural cooperation and development special fund, he said.

Meanwhile,China is willing to set up research and development centers for agriculture technology,

demonstration industrial parks for farm product processing and development zones for agriculture investment in Latin America, Wen added.

He also asked for the exchange of agricultural experts and technicians and urged people-to-people

and cultural exchanges to strengthen China-Latin American friendship. ECLAC, a regional economic

committee under the UN Economic and Social Council, was established in 1948. It is aimed at promoting regional economic and social

development and boosting economic cooperation between its 44 member countries. Wen arrived in Chile on Monday for an official visit.

Later on Tuesday, he left Santiago, concluding his South America tour, which had also taken him to Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina.

China agriculture engagement is a win-win.

Arabia, 6/9 (“Chinese Vice Premier Calls for Agricultural Cooperation with Latin America” Arabia 2000 June 9 2013)

Vice Premier Wang Yang on Sunday called for closer agricultural cooperation between China and

Latin America and the Caribbean.

In a speech at the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Agricultural Ministers' Forum in Beijing Wang said, “We should boost

mutually beneficial cooperation in agriculture and other areas in pursuit of win-win

development.”, Xinhua reported More than 300 representatives from both sides attended the forum. China and Latin America and the Caribbean are complementary to each

other in agriculture, and to tap the immense potential for cooperation serves the interests and welfare of the

people in all the countries concerned, Wang said. He proposed that governments involved

should work more actively as coordinators to establish stable, pragmatic and effective

mechanisms for agricultural cooperation. Also, enterprises should boost technological

exchanges and expand trade of produce, said the vice premier. China and Latin America and the

Caribbean can strengthen communication to safeguard their common interests on major agriculture-

related issues, and make joint efforts to push ahead with the formulation of an international produce trading system featuring fairness,

justness and stability, he added.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


NET-BENEFITS

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Doesn’t Link to Politics

Because it doesn’t have the USFG act…

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solves the China DA

Because it increases Chinese soft power in Latin America…

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Internal Taiwan NB

a. China engagement key to diplomatically isolating Taiwan.Ellis ’11 (R. Evans is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for

Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. “Chinese Soft Power in LatinAmerica: A Case Study,” JFQ, Issue 60, 1st Quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-

soft-power-latin-america.html)

Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important

issue of political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that

diplomatically recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although

the People's Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do not recognize the PRC,

China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such

investments and market access difficult for those countries that do not recognize it, while

simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the opport-unities that diplomatically

recognizing the PRC could bring. When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May

2007, for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of $300 million ingovernment bonds, various highway, public works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the country's petroleum

refinery, as well as PRC aid in facilitating access to Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such

Chinese generosity was directed toward the other countries in the region that still recognized

Taiwan in order to demonstrate the types of benefits that could be made available if they too

were to change their diplomatic posture.13

b. Peaceful unification of Taiwan depends on China’s economic leverage and

growing diplomatic recognition – the alternative is military intervention and

nuclear war.Lee ‘ 13 (Dennis, Harvard International Review, “A Narrowing Strait” Global Security Notebook,

January 28, 2013, http://hir.harvard.edu/a-narrowing-strait)

Since the 1970s, the cross-straits relationship has swung drastically in China’s favor. Not only has the Chinese economy boomed

since the opening of its markets, but the United States has started to abandon Taiwan militarily as well.

Now inferior in both economic and military strength, Taiwan can only hope for continued de-facto

independence. At present, the hopes for remaining separate are dwindling. With China gaining

prominence in Asia and the global stage, Taiwan may not have a choice in the matter. Cultural differences

present the greatest challenge to the Chinese assimilation of Taiwan. The distinctiveness of Taiwanese culture has already become

quite evident since the Kuomintang escaped to the island decades ago. During his presidency, Chen Shui-bian argued frequently that

the Taiwanese culture had evolved to be ethnically different and that, in consequence, Taiwan deserves independence. While this

argument is unlikely to hold in China at the present, as time passes, it will inevitably become reality. However, the current Chinese

strategy almost completely ignores this barrier. China is preparing Taiwanese society for assimilation. Economically, the Chinese are

promoting an increase in Taiwanese investment and trade. By offering a profitable economic future, the People’s Republic of China

(PRC) is luring Taiwanese businessmen and entrepreneurs to the mainland. This has led to integration of some Taiwanese into

Chinese society. Not only does this change the Chinese perception of Taiwan, but it also affects the Taiwanese perception of China.

Opening the two societies to each other makes reunification easier and the Chinese hope to

eventually reach a point where unification is smooth for both sides. Economic leverage on

politics is also powerful. The strength of Chinese influence and intervention in Taiwanese

politics increases substantially from this economic integration. While it is possible for the reverse to happen,

where Taiwanese influence is exerted on the Chinese political apparatus, the fact that China has a fairly closed, one-party

government makes this rather unlikely. On the contrary, the Taiwanese government is much more prone to

lobbying, and, as a result, can be subject to more leverage from mainland China. This completely

http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html



http://hir.harvard.edu/a-narrowing-strait





8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


lopsided trade relationship can, and likely will, be used to China’s f avor. Yet despite the potential political

and economic connections, the social differences between China and Taiwan may simply be too drastic to reconcile. Taiwan’s

democratic way of government is something that the Taiwanese people hold on to rather dearly. It is high unlikely, if not impossible,

for the Taiwanese to give that up, even in the event of an all-out military conflict. The Chinese solution to this problem may be one

that is not a new concept in the country and would call for a “one state, two systems” approach. Currently in the PRC, both Hong

Kong and Macau are Special Administrative Regions with local rule, differing judicial systems, and influential local governments.

Inner Mongolia goes further as an autonomous region of China granted a greater degree of self-rule. This “two systems” doctrine

has fallen out of favor in Taiwan recently due to opposition of its current implementation in China, but also represents a potentialpath to unification. All this begs the question of what would occur if Taiwan were to refuse China’s

call for unification. Many Taiwanese believe that their rejection of reunification, by a possible declaration of

independence, would trigger Chinese military aggression across the Taiwan Strait. The military hostility

between both countries is not new. Throughout the conflict, Taiwan has relied on its own military, as well as that of the United

States, as a deterrent to Chinese aggression. On the other hand, China has used its military might to ward off any declarations of

independence on the part of Taiwan. This impasse has changed as of late since the current pact between the United States and

Taiwan does not commit the United States to defend Taiwan. One would assume that in the event of military

aggression, the United States would hesitate to entering a military conflict with a fellow

nuclear power. Recent technological investments in the Chinese military only heighten the

stakes of the conflict and make Taiwanese-Mainland reunification a certainty in China, with the

only uncertainty being the question of whether military conflict will prove necessary to the

realization of this goal. If China continues to push for unification, unification will most likely

occur. Taiwanese resistance is weak without foreign assistance and Taiwan is overpowered

economically and militarily. Foreign intervention is fickle and varies with each US administration, public support, and other

international factors, thus making both US intervention and Taiwanese independence highly unlikely.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


-- Taiwan Ext

China influence stops Taiwan recognition.Erikson & Chen, ‘7 (Daniel is a Senior Associate of US Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue.

Janice is a degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “China, Taiwan, andthe Battle for Latin America,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31:2, Summer 2007, pg. 71)

When longtime Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega triumphed in Nicaragua's presidential election in November 2006, the shockwaves

from his historic victory extended to China and Taiwan. Leaders in the two rival East Asian capitals knew that, in 1985, a much

younger Ortega had swept into the presidency and unceremoniously broke relations with Taipei in favor of an a lliance with the

People's Republic of China (PRC). Though Nicaragua's formal diplomatic ties to China ended abruptly when Ortega was voted out of

office in 1990, his return to power now represents a fresh opportunity for Beijing to usurp one of Taiwan's precious remaining allies.

The re-establishment of a Chinese embassy in Managua could potentially serve as a valuable

beachhead for China to facilitate diplomatic inroads into Central American countries that are

friendly to Taiwan, thereby making Beijing's dream of enforcing global recognition of the "One

China" policy one step closer to reality. While increasing economic and political ties between China

and Latin America have attracted significant attention from U.S. policymakers in the past few years, the extent

to which Beijing's foreign policy is shaped by its desire to isolate Taiwan internationally is oftenoverlooked. Yet, this crucial dimension of Chinese foreign policy is indispensable to a full understanding of China's rising influence in

the global system, and its possible repercussions for U.S. national interests. Today, in some of the most remote corners of the

world, a fierce contest for diplomatic recognition and political influence is being fought between

Taiwan and the PRC. In particular, Latin America has emerged as the crucial battleground where a dozen

struggling nations, mainly in Central America and the Caribbean, have become ensnared in the cross-strait dispute. The

strategically significant "swing states" among them face growing pressures to abandon their

longstanding relationships with Taiwan in favor of cementing diplomatic ties with China .

Meanwhile, officials in Washington have yet to fully consider the possible implications for U.S. policy of this intensifying

competition in their own backyard.

Economic engagement improves economic stability and resolves the Taiwan

conflict.Forman & Moreira, ‘9 (Johanna & Susana are Senior Associates of the Americas Program at

CSIS. “Taiwan-China Balancing Act in Latin America,” Mar 10, 2009,

http://csis.org/publication/taiwan-china-balancing-act-latin-america)

The Taiwan-China struggle in Latin America and the Caribbean will be solved either by an

improvement in cross-strait relations or by the economy. As China’s economy and trade flows

expand and Taiwan’s decline, the gravitational pull of the mainland has grown stronger.

Taiwan’s Latin American allies, it seems, are driven by economic imperatives in their dealings with Beijing

and Taipei. For small and poor countries, the struggle between China and Taiwan provides an important

source of much needed resources, especially when infrastructure projects have fallen out of favor among Western

donors. It has become a particularly attractive proposition because diplomatic relations with one partner do not preclude efforts to

attract investment and boost economic trade with the other.22 For larger economies, however, China’s growing

importance as a source of imports and as a (potential) buyer of products, especially coffee, sugar, and

soybeans, makes the normalization of relations with the PRC increasingly irresistible.

http://csis.org/publication/taiwan-china-balancing-act-latin-america



8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


-- Taiwan Impact

Taiwan war would escalate causing extinctionHunkovic ‘9 [Lee. Prof Military Studies @ American Military University. “The Chinese-

Taiwanese Conflict – Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the UnitedStates of America” www.lampmethod.com, 2009]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear

conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by

such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they

were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global

economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able

to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and

begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India,

which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain

the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few

countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and

United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries

will not be considered in this study.

http://www.lampmethod.com/



8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


ANSWERS TO:

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


A2: Solvency Deficits

China engagement helps Latin American growth- Aff concerns are myths

Hsaing ‘9(Antonio C. Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan

China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of EmergingKnowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 issue 1 November 2009)-Karla

The fact is that “China and India’s growth has not been a zero-sum game for LAC [Latin American and

Caribbean], but the potential benefits are not being fully realized. It is crucial that LAC countries

take advantage of the growing presence of China and India in world markets by adopting offensive

strategies that facilitate both the participation of LAC firms in global production networks and their commercial presence in t he two Asian

economies’markets.” 39 Since formally becoming a member of the Inter-American Development Bank in

2009, China has already contributed $350 million to sustain regional development. Comparisons of

export structure are based on the assumption that similar export structures will suggest the highest potential for competition.40 An OECD study

found: “In general terms …. there is no trade competition between China and Latin America. . . .

[Moreover] this trade competition is even decreasing rather than increasing over the recent period of time. Not

surprisingly, countries that export mainly commodities face lower competition . . . Paraguay, Venezuela, Bolivia and Panama are those exhibiting

the lowest figures among 34 selected economies, i.e. those are the countries that suffer less from Chinese trade competition. Brazil could be

considered as an intermediate case between Mexico and Venezuela.” 41 ¶ Facing China’s new role in the Western Hemisphere, Latin Americangovernment[s] need to boost general competitiveness by lowering country-cost factors and emphasizing policies that promote innovation that favor

the companies of tomorrow. Investment in infrastructure that maximizes export comparative advantages and facilitates deeper and faster regional

trade and business integration should be a priority, together with funding and support of education and research institutions assimilating the needs

and demands of the markets. 42 ¶ For most of Latin America, with the main exceptions of Mexico and Central America, China has

been an engine for export growth, allowing exporters to diversify away from traditional

markets in the north. Beyond the fact that the region’s exports to China are concentrated on commodity products, the issue remains that

China’s economic and political rise should be a wake -up call for more reforms in the region.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


A2: Solvency Turns

China engagement good for Latin American economies –

a. Trade flow and constructive development aid.Hsiang ‘9 (Antonio C. Hsiang, Associate Professor at Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan

China Rising in Latin America: More Opportunities than Challenges” Journal of Emerging

Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Volume 1 issue 1 November 2009)-Karla Latin America is now a key region for Chinese foreign policy. However, China has maintained a low profile and

avoided antagonizing the United States in the region. It is exaggerated to accuse Beijing of

challenging Washington’s “Monroe Doctrine” for three main reasons. First, both sides find the trade relationship to

be largely beneficial. Thus, the relation between China and Latin America is characterized far more by

expanding trade flows and business connections than by establishing traditional military or

political ties. Such an approach would further allow China to side-step Washington’s Monroe Doctrine by pro-actively diffusing

any allegations of a Chinese challenge to Washington’s traditional sphere of influence. China supports its trade-oriented

goals by behaving as a “responsible stake-holder” in Latin America. Compare with Russia’s “security and

military-technical cooperation” with Latin American countries, China’s engagements, from sending peace-keeping force to Haiti to donating aid to Cuba, have been far more constructive. China’s

purchase of regional commodities has also been the main factor for Latin America’s economic

growth in the last decade. In sum, “the expansion of China … seems to be pulling and crowding in growth in the Latin

American region.”53 ¶ Second, China stands to gain tremendous international prestige by offering an attractive alternative model for

Latin American economic development. Beijing’s emergence means that the Washington Consensus is possibly on the wane. As

China formally became a member of Inter-American Development Bank in 2009, Beijing now can contribute more to

Latin America’s development and thus aid global recovery. ¶ Third, Latin American is now the proving

ground for a “diplomatic truce” between China and Taiwan. Responding to President Ma Ying- jeou’s diplomacy of “modus vivendi,”

Beijing allowed Lien Chan, Taiwan’s former vice-President, to attend the APEC 2008 in Peru. So long as the “one China” principle

remains the political basis for Beijing’s relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries. China is content to share some of the

spotlight with Taiwan, while reaping the multitudinous benefits of improved relationships. The benefits extend beyond

China and Taiwan, as the more stable the political relation between Beijing and Taipei, the more

economic opportunity will be afforded Latin America and the United States.

b. Makes Latin American countries believe in themselves.

Feinberg ’07 (Richard is a professor of international political economy at the Graduate School of International Relations and

Pacific Studies at University of California San Diego. “Latin America and the Caribbean's Response to the Growth of China and India:

Overview of Research Findings and Policy Implications/Angel or Devil? China's Trade Impact on Latin American Emerging Markets”

Foreign Affairs Volume 86 Issue 1 January/February 2007)- Elizabeth

Economists from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) generally concur with their World Bank

counterparts: as seen through the Latin American lens, China is closer to heaven than hell. Even if

China’s export surge and export surplus are "short-term" problems, in the long term Chinese imports will catch up,

easing pressure on other developing economies. Nevertheless, the OECD study warns, Chinese manufacturing

wages are a mere quarter of the Latin American average, and the Chinese labor market is endlessly abundant. To compete, LatinAmerica (especially Mexico and Central America) should take advantage of its geographic proximity to the world's largest import

market, for the relative costs of trade can be more important than relative tariff rates. For example, an important complement to

the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) would be the construction of the long-awaited Panama-Puebla highway.

Happily, capital-rich China and Japan may themselves supply financing for such large infrastructure projects. Another upside

to the rise of East Asia is the positive "cognitive effect": Latin Americans recognize the success of

"pragmatic," export-driven economies.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


c. China will be an import market for LA products.

Dr. Arruda ‘6 (Carlos Arruda, a professor of innovation and competitiveness at Fundação Dom

Cabral in Brazil, member of the board of trustees of Unicon “Can Latin American Countries Win

in the World Trade Stakes?” The Latin American Competitiveness Review 2006, 2006) -Karla According to an Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) study published in 2005, China has become an important

import and export market for Latin America over the past 20 years. Latin American countries have addressed thegrowing import challenge to their domestic production with a number of defensive measures designed to keep China’s products out.

However, today, these policies are aligned with efforts to forge closer economic ties with China so as to benefit from ever-growing

Chinese demand. Although Latin American exports to China still consist largely of raw materials and

commodities—the Brazilian mining company Cia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) exported 36 million

tons of iron ore to China in 2005, and Chinese demand for CVRD iron ore is predicted to rise to

50 million tons by 2007, representing 35 percent of global demand for iron ore—China may

gradually start absorbing other types of products, from agro-industrial to other manufactured

goods. At the multilateral level, the IADB study highlights that direct competition between China and Latin America, in particular

Mexico, has intensified due to their increasingly similar export baskets, especially in various manufacturing industries. In view of

China’s expansion of its international production and export base, however, the challenge to Latin American manufacturers may

increasingly be felt across the board. In particular, the global textile and apparel sector is expected to undergo changes that are

likely to enhance China’s standing relative to Mexican and Central American exporters. Beyond low-skill intensive manufactures,

China’s leap to production and export of higher value-added manufactured goods means that Latin American countries aiming toexport the same goods will face a higher competitive threshold of entry into the global marketplace.

Chinese competition in Latin America is not harmful

Blazquez, et. Al ’06 (Jorge Blázquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodríguez and Javier Santiso, “Angel Or

Devil? China’s Trade Impact On Latin American Emerging Markets” OECD Development Center,

June 2006)-KarlaThe results are quite interesting. Figures are relatively low for all Latin American economies except Mexico. In general terms, the

results suggest that there is no trade competition between China and Latin America . As shown in Appendix I,

this trade competition is even decreasing rather than increasing over the recent period of time .

Not surprisingly, countries that export mainly commodities face lower competition. This is an expected result since China is a net

importer of raw materials. Paraguay, Venezuela Bolivia and Panama are those that exhibit the lowest figures among 34selected economies, i.e. those are the countries that suffer less from Chinese trade competition. Brazil could be considered as an

intermediate case between Mexico and Venezuela. When we compare Latin America to other emerging countries, and particularly

those located in Asia, we observe that Chinese competition is not a problem in general terms. Thus, we might

conclude that there are few, if any, short-term trade costs for Latin America, if any, from the trade

point of view. In fact, most Latin American countries are witnessing a tremendous increase in

their exports to China. Over the past years, China has, for example, become Brazil's fastest-growing export market,

purchasing 80 per cent more from Brazil in 2003 than in 2002. Bilateral trade has more than quadrupled over the past four years.

Five commodities — soybeans, iron ore, steel, soy oil and wood — accounted for 75 per cent of Brazil's exports to China last year.

China bought 6.2 per cent of Brazil's $73 billion of exports in 2003, up from a level of 1.4 per cent in 1999. Some big Brazilian

companies such as Aracruz, Latin America's largest wood pulp maker, had more than doubled its sales to China in the past two years

to 12 per cent of the company's exports16. Another issue for Brazil is in dynamic terms. China will continue to expand its exports

over the next decades, gaining market share in third markets in new products. From this perspective, as underlined by Brazilian

economists (Paiva de Abreu, 2005), some Brazilian sectors such as iron and steel products might be affected by Chinese competition

in the medium term. In a more long-term perspective, the automobile industry may also become an issue.

Mutually beneficial and results in more aid & development for Latin America.Mingde, ‘12 (Zhang is a professor of diplomatic policy at the Shanghai Institutes for

International Studies in China. “A senior Shanghai scholar says China poses no threat to the

region,” Americas Quarterly, January 11, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Mingde)

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


In some quarters, we hear concerns about the so-called “China threat” and “China looting” (that unfair

trade practices will undermine local economies). Nothing could be further from the truth: the China –Latin

America relationship is normal and founded on mutual respect and interest. China’s growth of investment

and trade in Latin America is organized entirely around the principles of cooperation, mutual benefit and common development.

Some people also claim that the development of China –Latin America relations, especially

economic and trade relations, threatens the interests of other powers in Latin America. I believe

the contrary. Our economic and trade relations do not pose any potential threat to the interestsof the United States and European countries in Latin America; they will instead help to alleviate

the pressure on the U.S. and European countries to provide aid to Latin America .

China EE good for LA economies.O'Neil ’12 (Shannon K., Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, “October 26, 2012,

http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/)

On the good side, trade with China has helped spur Latin America’s economic growth. Increased ties

with China have played a big part of the strong (by Latin American standards) GDP growth of last decade.

Especially for Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, connections to the world’s economic engine wereimportant in wake of the world financial crisis. Comparing Brazil’s and Mexico’s growth rates in 2010 tells that

story—and the positive role that China can and does play. China’s trade has also benefited Latin America’s

consumers. The big story of the last two decades is the rise of a middle class in many Latin American countries. Achieving a

middle class lifestyle relies in part on higher incomes, but also on greater purchasing power. Access to more goods of better qua lity

and at lower prices, has changed the lives of many. China’s sales of clothing, electronics, and even cars have

benefited those in the middle and lower middle ranks .

http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/


8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


A2: Cyber Attack Turn

No cyberterror threat – it’s all hype.

Rid, 13 (Reader War Studies at King’s College, 3-13-’13, Thomas, “The Great Cyberscare” Foreign Policy,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare)

The Pentagon, no doubt, is the master of razzmatazz. Leon Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an

impending "cyber Pearl Harbor." Just before he left the Pentagon, the Defense Science Board delivered a remarkable report, Resilient Military Systems

and the Advanced Cyber Threat. The paper seemed obsessed with making yet more drastic historical comparisons: "The cyber threat is serious," the task force wrote, "with

potential consequences similar to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." The manifestations of an all-out nuclear war would be different from cyberattack, the Pentagon scientists

helpfully acknowledged. But then they added, gravely, that "in the end, the existential impact on the United States is the same." A reminder is in order: The world

has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack. Such

statements are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. Some sections of the Pentagon

document offer such eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an

MA dissertation in a self-respecting political science department. But in the current debate it seemed to make sense. After

all a bit of fear helps to claim -- or keep -- scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for

its top two priorities alone, protecting nuclear weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors. Then there are

private computer security companies. Such firms, naturally, are keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And hype is the means to that

end. Mandiant's much-noted report linking a coordinated and coherent campaign of espionage attacks dubbed Advanced Persistent Threat 1, or "APT1," to a unit of the Chinese

military is a case in point: The firm offered far more details on attributing attacks to the Chinese than the intelligence community has ever done, and the company should becommended for making the report public. But instead of using cocky and over-confident language, Mandiant's analysts should have used Words of Estimative Probability, as

professional intelligence analysts would have done. An example is the report's conclusion, which describes APT1's work: "Although they control systems in dozens of countries,

their attacks originate from four large networks in Shanghai -- two of which are allocated directly to the Pudong New Area," the report found. Unit 61398 of the People's

Liberation Army is also in Pudong. Therefore, Mandiant's computer security specialists concluded, the two were identical: "Given the mission, resourcing, and location of PLA

Unit 61398, we conclude that PLA Unit 61398 is APT1." But the report conspicuous ly does not mention that P udong is not a small neighborhood ("right outside of Unit 61398's

gates") but in fact a vast city landscape twice the size of Chicago. Mandiant's report was useful and many attacks indeed originate in China. But the company

should have been more careful in its overall assessment of the available evidence, as the computer security

expert Jeffrey Carr and others have pointed out. The firm made it too easy for Beijing to dismiss the report. My class in cybersecurity at King's College London started poking

holes into the report after 15 minutes of red-teaming it -- the New York Times didn't. Which leads to the next point:The media want to sell copy

through threat inflation. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline writers at the Times intoned in late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar,"

shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper actually published two supportive articles on it and

pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption." The Post should have reminded its readers

that the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage -- Stuxnet -- was actually

executed by the United States government. The Times, likewise, should have asked tough questions and pointed to some of the evidential problems in the

Mandiant report; instead, it published what appeared like an elegant press release for the firm. On issues of cybersecurity, the nation's fiercestwatchdogs too often look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories from private firms as

well as anonymous sources in the security establishment . Finally, the intelligence community tags

along with the hype because the NSA and CIA are still traumatized by missing 9/11 . Missing a "cyber 9/11"

would be truly catastrophic for America's spies, so erring on the side of caution seems the rational choice. Yes, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper's recent testimony

was more nuanced than reported and toned down the threat of a very serious cyberattack. But at the same time America's top spies are not as forthcoming with more detailed

information as they could be. We know that the intelligence community, especially in the United States, has far better information,

better sources, better expertise, and better analysts than private companies like Symantec, McAfee, and Kaspersky Lab. But for a number of reasons

they keep their findings and their analysis classified. This means that the quality of the public debate

suffers, as experts as well as journalists have no choice but to rely on industry reports of

sometimes questionable quality or anonymous informants whose veracity is hard to assess.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare



8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


A2: Perms

Still links to the net-benefits

Can’t do both – Economic presence is zero-sumMalik ‘6 (Mohan, PhD in International Relations, "China's Growing Involvement in Latin

America," June 12, uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/[email protected])-mikee

With the United States preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, Beijing has obviously been busy carving out a large sphere of

influence for itself in Asia, Africa and Latin America. With the presence of China being felt everywhere, from the backwaters of the

Amazon to mines in the Andes, U.S. dominance in its own backyard is no longer unquestioned or

unrivaled. Opinion is divided on whether China's economic engagement is guided only by commercial interests or is a ruse to

divert attention from Beijing's geostrategic goals in the region. Some contend that the Chinese presence in Latin

America marks the end of the Monroe Doctrine, while others are more skeptical . Over the long

term, Chinese intentions in Latin America may not be as benign as some China-watchers

suggest. Nor can China's expansion be equated with Japan's or Spain's interest in Latin America because of

the highly competitive nature of the U.S.-China relationship. Beijing calculates that one of theconsequences of the burgeoning Sino-Latin American trade and resource dependency will be a

widening of the gap between U.S. and Latin American interests. As U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense

Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Pardo-Maurer points out: "China has its own set of political, economic and military

interests, requiring us to carefully distinguish between legitimate commercial initiatives and the possibility of political or diplomatic

efforts to weaken the democratic alliances we have forged." While Beijing's forays do not indicate a seismic

change in the balance of power within Latin America, the very presence of China does make

U.S. diplomacy difficult. Increasingly, "the China option" affords Latin American countries

greater room for maneuver and an additional source of leverage vis-à-vis Washington. While the

Chinese may not want to be drawn into Venezuela, Brazil or Cuba's problems with the United States, that does not mean that these

countries will not play "the China card" in their relations with the United States. Likewise, the revival of the old ideological debate

over which political system -- Chinese authoritarianism or Western democracy -- delivers more people from poverty, and whether

wealth or elections are a greater measure of freedom does not bode well for Washington's efforts to promote transparency and

democracy. Beijing's strategic interests and unconditional investments prop up many authoritarianregimes, thereby undercutting Washington's ability to persuade them to change their behavior.

Just as the United States can no longer take the Latin American countries' allegiances for

granted, its access to the region's resources is also far from assured . Washington is increasingly concerned

over Beijing's efforts to "lock up" oil and mineral supplies with new ventures in Latin America, Africa, Central Asia and Russia, and

the Middle East. Hong Kong-based Takungpao News recently quoted General Xiong Guangkai, the former PLA deputy chief of staff,

as saying that "in the long term, the strategic race for the world's energy may result in regional tension and even trigger a military

clash." In particular, Beijing's newly cultivated energy alliances with populist left-wing leaders in Latin America have caused alarm in

Washington and prompted the dispatch in May 2006 of Thomas A. Shannon, Jr., assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere

affairs, to hold first-ever talks with his Chinese counterpart on China's role in a region that some analysts fear could become a site

for great power rivalry.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


A2: Hege/Miltiary Turns

China’s involvement is economic, not hegemonic.

León-Manríquez ’12 (José Luis León-Manríquez is Professor of International and East Asian

Studies at the Metropolitan Autonomous University in Mexico City. “Should we worry aboutChina’s engagement in Latin America?” 08/06/2012,

http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/PartnerPosts/tabid/671/PostID/3100/lan

guage/en-US/Default.aspx )

But I argue rather, at least for the time being, that China doesn’t have fully fledged hegemonic intentions in

Latin America. Unlike the USSR during the Cold War, the Chinese strategy for the LAC region is much more

economic than either ideological or geopolitical. By stating this, I am not buying the Chinese mantra of a “peaceful

rise”. As far as I can see, no great power behaves as Saint Francis of Assisi. I therefore subscribe to the neorealist idea that power

politics is explained by states’ capabilities and interests. The subjective intentions of political

leaders are usually constrained by systemic arrangements in the international arena.

China’s rise is peaceful but economic downturn triggers the worst impacts – Wehave comparative evidence.Japan Times ’12 (“The real ‘China threat’” Mar 8, 2012,

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/03/08/editorials/the-real-china-

threat/#.UcZZdiMoze4)

Considerable attention has been devoted to the threat seemingly posed by the growth of

China’s power and influence. It seems like every week the country is marking some new “first” in its military

modernization program, all of which are said to be underwritten by a desire to become the pre-eminent power in Asia. In fact, if

China threatens international stability, it is more likely an economic rather than a military

challenge. And the problem is not China’s strength that should be the focus of policymakers, but

its weaknesses. The unraveling of the Chinese economy would deal a body blow to the globaleconomy and ripple through the region and the world. The China story in modern memory has been its

outstanding growth. The country has registered 10 percent growth on average for three decades, overtaking Japan to become the

world’s second largest economy and the world’s largest exporter of goods. Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of

poverty and its middle class is now equal to or exceeds in size the entire population of most countries. Its dynamism powered the

global economy. Despite the downturn triggered in 2008, China’s economic resilience, while the rest of the world flirted with a new

depression, imbued the country with a status and image that exceeds its actual wealth. In recent months, however, economists

are troubled by the prospect of a “hard landing” as the Chinese economy slows. The country’s

manufacturing sector has shrunk for four consecutive months, as global demand slows. With a glut of housing — it is estimated that

there are 10 million to 65 million unoccupied units nationwide — the average prices for homes have fallen in 100 cities for f ive

consecutive months. Meanwhile, consumer goods prices are creeping up, with inflation hitting 4.5 percent in January; food prices,

which make up a third of the consumer index, ballooned 10.5 percent in January. Real estate problems are especially worrisome.

The real estate sector is said to account for about 20 percent of the Chinese economy. It is the primary asset of many households; a

widespread drop in value could stir unrest. But the spillover effects are most troubling. Local governments rely on land sales to raise

revenues; in 2011, land sale revenues dropped 13 percent year on year. Banks have considerable exposure to the real estate market.Banks were also the primary vehicle for the massive stimulus program that Beijing implemented after the 2007-08 financial crisis to

stave off a downturn. There is little faith that those funds were invested well and there are concerns about a banking crisis when

those loans come due. Most economists anticipate a gradual slowing of the Chinese economy, a drop from double-digit growth to a

more reasonable level. After expanding 9.2 percent in 2011, the World Bank estimated in November that China will register growth

in excess of 8 percent in 2012, although some fear that 8 percent could be a ceiling. It is a core belief in China that 8

percent growth is the minimum necessary to absorb new labor market entrants and workers

displaced by privatization. Anything less risks social unrest and potential political instability. It isnot at all clear how the Beijing government — or the people — will handle a downturn like that which has gripped the advanced

economies during the last few years. Will it unleash nationalism? Will China look overseas for scapegoats to distract the

http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/PartnerPosts/tabid/671/PostID/3100/language/en-US/Default.aspx



http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/03/08/editorials/the-real-china-threat/#.UcZZdiMoze4






8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


public? And how will a downturn impact those economies, like Japan’s, that have grown on the back of

China’s own expansion? Most observers believe that the stakes as too high — especially during a time of political transition

— for the economic situation in China to get out of hand. In other words, the Chinese government will do whatever is necessary to

keep the economy expanding and maintain popular support.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


A2: Democracy Turn

Latin American democracy is resilientFingar ‘1 (Thomas Fingar, Statement by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and

Research Before the Senate Select Committee, February 7, 2001.http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/terrorism/t_0031.htm )

That said, Latin American democracies have proved resilient in the face of economic crises, and

all ideological alternatives to democratic government remain discredited. Fragile democratic

institutions in countries such as Ecuador and Paraguay remain under great pressure to respond

to legitimate mass needs, but few consider military rule a feasible alternative. Latin American

militaries know that overt intervention risks international opprobrium and sanctions. They will,

therefore, favor solutions that maintain at least a semblance of constitutional legitimacy. To

date, popular support has sustained President Chavez's political revolution in Venezuela, but the

swift, dramatic fall of former Peruvian President Fujimori indicates that there are limits to the

appeal of populist authoritarians. The OAS-managed hemispheric reaction to suspect elections

in Peru in mid-2000 underscored the strength of the prevailing pro-democracy consensus. In

none of the other major countries of Latin America-- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and

Mexico-- is democracy threatened in the short or medium term. Indeed, the election of Vicente

Fox to the Mexican presidency, ending peacefully the long reign of the Institutional

Revolutionary Party, is a major step forward for democracy in Mexico and throughout the

hemisphere.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/terrorism/t_0031.htm



8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


A2: International Fiat Bad

International fiat is good – 1. Role playing – international perspectives make us better decision-makers that

consider the world-wide consequences of our actions2. Neg flex – allows us to test the aff fully and encourages critical thinking

3. World-wide education – raises awareness of global literature and reduces cultural

relativism – if our counterplan isn’t well-researched you should go for solvency deficits

4. Reject the argument not the team

5. Counterinterpretation – the judge is an analyst who must choose the best solution

for the problem of the resolution – a few net benefits –

A) Cost-benefit analysis – choosing actor is a component of policymaking that is critical

to overall implementation

B) U.S. and federal key warrants force them to do the same justification as they might

with the states CP which is key to education

C) A variety of international organizations have to choose between multiple

international actors

6. Counterinterpretation – we can only fiat international actors that specific literature

exists to warrant funding of infrastructure projects in the United States – no literature

on how Bhutan should do the aff

7. They don’t meet their own interpretation – action by the federal government isn’t

monolithic

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


AFF ANSWERS TO CHINA CPYou can obviously use a lot of the aff answers to the DA. For example, “not zero sum”

is a great perm argument. Also, any of the impact turns are disads to the CP.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency Answers

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Says ‘No’

Latin America says ‘No’ to China – no cultural connection.Hilton ’13 (Isabel Hilton, writer and broadcaster and editor for chinadialogue “China in Latin

America: Hegemonic Challenge?” NOREF Expert Analysis February 2013)-Karla

The environmental and ethical practices of Chinese companies have drawn unfavourable

comment. The first major Chinese mining company in the hemisphere was Shougang Group, which began operations in Peru in

1992 with the purchase of the state-owned Hierro Peru for 14 t imes an independent valuation. Shougang has contributed heavily to

the poor reputation of Chinese companies, over fines for environmental damage for the contamination of water supplies,

low wages and dangerous working conditions. It has been the object of frequent strikes and protests. Other companies have

experienced problems with community relations. After buying the Canadian company Corriente in 2010,

Tongling and China Railway Construction Corporation proposed an open-pit mine in the province of Zamora Chinchipe in Ecuador.

National protests followed an agreement with the government, including a march on the capital by the country’s most powerful

Indigenous movement, Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE). Chinese companies lack

experience of compliance with much higher environmental or community relations standards

than prevail at home. Some are adapting, hiring local managers, public relations (PR) and law firms, but they are likely

to struggle for some time with the cultural gaps and the lack of understanding of local concerns

and political considerations. One example of an attempt to meet those concerns is the Chinese mining company Chinalco’s

relocation of 5,000 residents of the town of Morococha, 150 kilometres east of the Peruvian capital, Lima, to remove them from an

area likely to be contaminated by the new $2.2 million Toro- mocho opencast copper mine. Advised by local managers and PR

consultants, Chinalco is investing $50 million in an entirely new town nearby, a project it describes as “the biggest privately-funded

social project in Peru’s history” (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ people.cfm?authorID=580). Two-thirds of the

residents have moved, although the project has also been dogged by complaints about inadequate housing and compensation.

Although some dispute the claim that Chinese conduct is worse than U.S. or local equivalents, China suffers from

widespread negative perceptions and the identification of Chinese companies with the Chinese

state. Local labour groups, some government officials and many indigenous and social groups in the region make little distinction

between private Chinese companies and state-owned enterprises. Local opinion surveys reveal that most companies,

whether large or small, state owned or private, suffer from anti- Chinese sentiment and the

perception that they put profit above environmental and social concerns. In several African countries,Chinese security guards have been deployed to defend companies’ interests and have even, on occasion, killed Africans. Both the

Peruvian president, Ollanta Humala, and the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, political allies of

China, have felt obliged to insist to their electorates that Chinese troops would never be allowed

to set foot in their countries.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Solvency Turns

China involvement causes Dutch Disease (unstable commodity dependence)Brandt ’12 (Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), “Chinese Engagement in Latin America and

the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy” December 2012 American University Page 9 )Since 2000, LAC exports of commodities have constituted 70 percent of export growth. The China - LAC relationship is predominated

by natural resource extraction. This has led to near - term ‘boon’ for Latin American countries; foreign currency reserves have

increased, governments have been far more financially secure and there has been a rise in investment and development. However,

the long - term projection of this commodity trading is risky. Latin American countries are

dependent on sustained commodity prices to uphold an economy that has yet to develop into a

more modern, dynamic level. If commodity prices fall, countries could fall back into chronic

debt. Furthermore, many Latin American countries have not used the influx of capital from

China to invest in manufacturing, research and development and other value - added stages of

production to elevate the quality of economic output. If these Latin American countries are

lulled into ‘Dutch disease’, they run the risk of not advancing socio - economically and putting

continued strain on the primary commodity sector to perform year in and year out. This socio -

economic concern is of the US national interest as future trade, research and development is

contingent on

Chinese presence in Latin America net worse – trades off with local economiesFeinberg ‘11 Richard Feinberg Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c Studies

University of California, San Diego. 2011. Latin American Research Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 by the

Latin American Studies Association. “C H I N A , L AT I N A M E R I C A , A N D T H E U N I T E D S

TAT E S : C O N G RU E N T I N T E R E S T S OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE?” http://lasa-

2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf At the same time, the volume is not oblivious to the threats that China’s economy poses to certain countries and

sectors in Latin America. The impact is varied, clashing most directly with producers of

manufactured goods. Chinese exports directly compete with Mexican textiles, electronics, and telecommunications equipment in third

markets, notably in the United States. The removal of quotas for textiles and apparel (a change the volume does not fully

capture) has hit maquilas in Central America and the Caribbean hard, as efficient Chinese firms

employing cheap labor seize a greater share of global markets. A particularly interesting and innova- tive chapter by

Robert C. Feenstra and Hiau Looi Kee argues that every 1 percent increase in the variety of Chinese exports

reduces that of Mexi- can exports by 0.5 percent (table 8.3, 258). China’s expansion constrains the

dynamic gains that might otherwise be available to Mexico as a result of U.S. tariff liberalization under the North

American Free Trade Agree- ment. This adverse impact is of particular concern because the growth of export varieties benefits

aggregate productivity in the exporting country. However, the dominant constraint on Latin American manufacturing ex-

ports comes not from Chinese competition but from domestic shortcom- ings. Examining Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, Gordon H. Hanson and

Raymond Robertson point to local constraints on manufacturing growth, such as relatively high energy prices, poor telecommunications infrastructure,

and slow growth in the supply of skilled labor. In response to those problems, the editors of China’s and India’s Chal- lenge to Latin America propose a

series of policies. Latin American workers who lose their jobs to Chinese imports should be retrained, and countries should focus on innovation and

expanded capabilities in science and technology—admittedly, improvements easier said than done. In this regard, cooperation with China might be agood option, as the joint Brazilian-Chinese program in satellite development exemplifies. But Latin Americans should eschew protectionism; rather,

firms should seek integration into global production networks, including those that involve Chinese (and Indian) firms. Some countries can concentrate

on sectors in which geographical proximity gives them an edge, such as tourism and health-care services. In his contribution to China’s Expansion into

the Western Hemisphere: Im- plications for Latin America and the United States, Robert Devlin accepts that China is more opportunity than threat;

nevertheless, he is agitated by the threat and daring in the policies that he proposes. The prowess of the Asian giant is a loud

wake-up call for the region, Devlin warns, and a motivation for Latin America to make better and more systematic use of its inherent

advantages. A former manager at the Inter-American Development Bank, Devlin does not want Latin America to return to heavy-handed statism of the

sort that generated gross inefficiencies in the earlier era of import sub- stitution; but he does see an important lesson in the success of East Asia and

China: after the market-oriented reforms of the Washington Consen- sus, the state should be brought back into development strategy.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Chinese economic engagement dampens long-term South American growthGallagher ‘11. Kevin Gallagher, associate professor of international relations at Boston

University. “China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory by Adrian H. Hearn and José

Luis León-Manríquez.” 2011. Americas Quaterly. http://americasquarterly.org/node/3042

Much of the recent scholarship has concluded that China’s growing economic ties, while fairly beneficial to South American countries,

have been costly—politically and economically—to Mexico and Central America. South America has

natural resources that it sells to the Chinese, but many Central American countries have suffered retaliation from

China because of their recognition of Taiwan. And Mexico’s fewer natural resources not only offer

little opportunity for exporting to China but make it more difficult to compete globally with

Chinese firms. Meanwhile, U.S. observers are increasingly alarmed that South Americans may be creating political

alliances with the Chinese. Not all alliances are of concern, but loans-for-oil deals with Venezuela and satellite cooperation between

Brazil and China have raised eyebrows in some Washington circles. While there is some truth to that overal l view, this book goes deeper and wider.

Economic essays do a nice job of separating some of the benefits and costs of the China –Latin America relationship. For example, as Javier Santiso of

ESADE Business School and Rolando Avendano of the OECD Development Centre point out, China offers a new source of trade and finance for many

countries, and, as the U.S. economy continues to slump, this diversified portfolio is a good thing for many Latin Americans. However, there are costs as

well. Chinese imports are putting pressure on Latin American firms by out-competing them in

both world and home markets, and Chinese investment in natural resources can exact a heavy

environmental and social toll. The combined effect can push up the value of a country’s currency and threaten

long-term economic growth. In Brazil, for example, China has triggered a debate over de-industrialization and the future ofeconomic growth. In the essay “China’s Challenge to Latin American Development” Enrique Dussel Peters of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de

México shows how Chinese economic activity is accentuating inequalities and creating new sets of winners and losers

across the hemisphere. Dussel shows that despite the increasing exports of primary commodities to China from

the region (winners), the region as a whole experiences a significant trade deficit due to the import

of light manufactured goods (losers).

China engagement causes “Dutch disease” for Latin America – dooms growth.O'Neil ’12 (Shannon K., Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, “October 26, 2012,

http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/)

The downsides also exist. These same imports that make consumers happy hit the economy atlarge. They directly compete with Latin American producers, both in home markets as well as abroad in the

United States and the European Union. Anecdotal evidence points to factories closing, and aggregate trade data shows Latin

American producers losing world market share to China. Still, estimates suggest this head to head competition occurs in roughly 12

percent of exports from Latin America’s biggest economies—significant, but not everywhere.The indirect effects of

China’s rise have also caused problems—especially through the “Dutch disease.” This occurs

when the success of commodity exports raises the currency, making it harder for manufacturing

companies to compete internationally. Many argue that this has occurred in Brazil (and helps account for the decline

in manufacturing production as a percent of exports) it may also be happening in Venezuela, Argentina, and Peru. The bigger

worry for Latin American countries is that they are losing their hard fought gains. Over the last

few decades many both successfully opened their economies and diversified their production.

Looking at the breakdown of exports, one can see a manufacturing surge in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia since the 1980s. But

China’s pressure on its trading partners threatens to undo these gains. Whether or not Latin America can

continue to climb the economic value-added chain matters for the long term. Commodity dependency leaves

countries more vulnerable to global commodity price swings, and makes it harder to plan and

implement long-term policies as a result. It also limits the job opportunities for the growing

number of educated, urban, and ambitious people—the new middle class.



8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Perms

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


No Trade-Off

Engagement is not zero-sum – the US & China have different interests.Cerna ’11 (Michael, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State

University, Kennesaw, April 15, 2011. “China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implicationsfor U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region.” http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-

presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/)

While China’s commodity-based trade structure is currently lucrative, it does not encourage

diversification of Latin America’s exports into more value-added goods, manufactured products, and modern services.

Economic relations are dependent on often unstable commodity market demands. U.S. investment in the region is far

more diversified and spans a range of value-added activities, including manufacturing, finance, telecom, retail

and other services. Going back to a comparison with the United States, while China accounts for 6.7% of the region’s total exports,

the United States continues to be the largest buyer, with a 40% share. Latin America’s exports to the U.S. are more diversified and

remain fairly balanced so it is better suited to survive a possible commodity cut-off in Latin America. Roughly 24% of the region’s

exports are raw materials, another 12% consists of resource-based goods and 60% is manufactured products. Karen Poniachik of

Latin Trade also sees enormous risks for the region: “The steep overvaluation of the region’s currencies—due in part to the flood of

investment flows and export proceeds—is eroding the competitiveness of its higher-value added goods and services. This could inturn fuel its already high level of overdependence on commodities.” Future Implications With both the U.S. and China

making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow;

which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an

alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more

diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct

competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China

is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political

consequences – primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine,

Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic

alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.

No trade-off, the US & China offer different form of engagement.

Shapiro ‘5 (Charles S., U.S. Department of State, “Chinese Engagement in Latin America ShouldEnhance U.S.,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western Hemisphere, September 21,

2005, http://archives.uruguay.usembassy.gov/usaweb/paginas/527-00EN.shtml)

However, even though China has expanded commercial ties with Latin America and is an important new

investor in the region, U.S. trade and investment in the Americas continues to dwarf that of China. U.S.

trade with the region exceeded $445 billion in 2004, 10 times China's level, Shapiro said. He noted that Latin America's exports to

the United States are up 10 percent and imports from the U.S. are up 15 percent in the first half of 2005 compared to 2004 levels.

And whereas Chinese investment in the region is approximately $8.3 billion, U.S. investment in Latin America is more than $300

billion, the State Department official said. Apart from the significant difference in scale, Shapiro explained, the

United States' economic engagement in Latin America fundamentally differs from that of China.

Chinese exports, particularly in the areas of textiles and apparel, provide stiff competition for some Latin

American and Caribbean producers but the United States provides high-tech and knowledge-basedgoods and services, he said.

http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/





8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Cuba Specific Perm

China and United States seeks to cooperate with each other in Latin America

and Cuba—not a zero sum game.

Hearn ‘9 (Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is a researcher at the School of Social and Political Sciences at theUniversity of Sydney, he has conducted research in both Cuba and China for a couple of years.

“Cuba and China: Lessons for the United States” Commissioned report for the Cuban Research

Institute, June 2009, A_Yu)

For the United States, the value added by the above process lies in its promotion of trilateral cooperation. Both China and

the United States favor more open markets in Cuba , and considering the attempts of Chinese enterprises to

build Cuba’s export capacities and develop its transport, manufacturing, and resource sectors, the United States is a logical

source of management services and marketing expertise. Building on existing U.S. activities in agriculture, medicine, and

telecommunications, expansion into these sectors would bring both economic benefits for U.S. firms and opportunities for

harmonizing approaches to governance and information sharing. Indeed, the Obama administration’s relatively

conciliatory stance toward Cuba could lay the foundation of a much-needed “mutually reinforcing

diplomacy” with China in the region (Wilder 2009:4). A defining challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century

will be the development of mutually beneficial partnerships with China. With sensible diplomacy,

Chinese projects inLatin America could become a source of deeper cooperation, for as Daniel Erikson concisely put it to the

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “trade is not a zero sum game” (2008:3). Hu Jintao’s proposal at the 2009

G-20 to jointly develop financial monitoring mechanisms reflects China’s desire for cooperative

relations with the United States. With legal authorization, Cuba could become a platform for

advancing responsibly governed trilateral projects that demonstrate awareness of regional

diversity and a commitment to international cooperation. Accommodating diversity is critical to effective

diplomacy, for although Confucius may have stated, “have no friends not equal to yourself”, in his pragmatic wisdom he also

taught his followers to be “firm in the right way, and not merely firm.”

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


No Net-Benefit

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


No Taiwan War

No war – economies too intertwinedBhakal ‘12 (Maitreya- Freelance Writer at ABSAS Solutions Pvt. Ltd. “Five reasons why China

will not invade Taiwan, and an analysis of Cross-strait Relation.”http://indiaschinablog.blogspot.com/2011/08/analysing-cross-strait-relations-and-5.html)

China has always placed economics at the forefront of most other matters. Despite the often-

tumultuous state of Sino-Indian relations (and an unresolved border dispute), trade has touched $63 billion. China is India’s second

largest trading partner. In the Senkaku island dispute with Japan, Deng Xiaoping, as soon as he came into power in 1978, proposed

that China and Japan jointly explore the oil and gas deposits near the disputed islands without touching on the issue of sovereignty.

China has also sought joint exploration in the resource-rich Spratlys, a solution which is the right step forward and is in fact more

urgent than sovereignty, which the Philippines and Vietnam and have so far been reluctant to do. China doesn’t mind

waiting and biding its time until sovereignty issues get resolved. As Deng Xiaoping famously

remarked regarding the Senkaku dispute, “It does not matter if this question is shelved for some

time, say, 10 years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will

certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all”. Unlike his predecessor Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao has used

a softer approach towards Taiwan, promoting stronger economic and cultural ties, high-level

official visits and direct flights in order to reduce tensions. This pragmatic approach is on display even in the

Taiwan dispute. China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, and Taiwan is China’s seventh largest. Two-

thirds of all Taiwanese companies have made investments in China in recent years. In 2010, China

(including Hong Kong) accounted for over 29.0% of Taiwan’s total trade and 41.8% of Taiwan’s exports. The ECFA was heavily tilted

in Taiwan’s favor. It cut tariffs on 539 Taiwanese exports to China and 267 Chinese products entering Taiwan. Under the agreement,

approximately 16.1 % of exports to China and 10.5 % of imports to China will be tariff free by 2013. Taiwanese firms have invested

$200 billion in the mainland, and trade between the two sides has exceeded $150 billion. Taiwanese trade with China. Source:

Reuters Both China and Taiwan have a lot to lose by fighting with each other. Another factor to

consider is the incalculable loss that an invasion will have on the Chinese economy, not to

mention scaring away potential investors.

http://indiaschinablog.blogspot.com/2011/08/analysing-cross-strait-relations-and-5.html



8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


CP Causes Taiwan War

Chinese in Latin America emboldens Beijing – causes war with TaiwanFergusson ‘12

(Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International BusinessTimes, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at

University College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of

Glasgow, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-

ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)

Taiwan – domestic, or foreign policy?¶ China’s goals in the region amount to more than the capture of

natural resources. Although the People’s Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to

be a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of China’s main foreign policy goals is to

isolate Taipei internationally. The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international

recognition among all the states in the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where

12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside. ¶ The historical

background¶ Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to

the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the UnitedStates intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the

battlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy.¶ When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of

China (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the

PRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported

its position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration

wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the

’China seat’ to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of

President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and

gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic

recognition from Taipei to Beijing.¶ The economics of international recognition¶ In the Americas, the PRC had international

recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained more

diplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the

states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that “from the late

1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwan’s direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean,”

[51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the

formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that for Latin

American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it ever

has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is that

Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing

economies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition.¶ However, while the decision is not political

for Latin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC

damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designation

of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008.¶ Countries Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC

(Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda,

Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St

Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,

Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay¶ On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for theROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the ‘Taiwan issue’

unilaterally. Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has

taken to ‘outbidding’ Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the

defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that “the region’s leaders

have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each

other.” *53+ Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on

infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007.¶ However, even Taiwan‘s economy can be put

under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese

cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC – take for

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


example, the Dominican case.¶ In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to

public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic

relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54]¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms,

the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America.¶ Political strategies of the PRC¶ In political terms too; the PRC is in an

advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China “provides

incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan,” *55+ the reality is that the use of

force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain

official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive

to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domínguez

suggests that the PRC “has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan),” *56+ the

legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example “in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in

Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan.” *57+ This incident showed that China is prepared

to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, China’s

experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in

addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship

based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 “the CCP had established relations

with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America,” *58+ further isolating

the ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶ Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin

America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the

Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican)would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations

between China and the West. As China’s economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis

both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where

it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on

Taiwan, perhaps by force.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Disads/Turns to CP

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Cyber Attack Turn

Chinese presence enables cyber-terror attacks.Ellis ’13 (R. Evan Ellis is associate professor for Hemispheric Defense Studies, “China's New

Backyard: Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag?” JUNE 6, 2013,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america)

The challenge to Washington from China's presence in the region also extends beyond

economics and policy objectives. The U.S. Defense Department's critical posture regarding

Chinese cyberattacks is a reminder that hostilities between the United States and China, though

highly improbable and undesirable, are not unthinkable. In such a conflict, China-operated ports, airports,

telecommunications infrastructure, and other parts of the Chinese commercial presence in Latin

America would represent potential assets in a global asymmetric warfare campaign against the

United States.

Cyber-attack would destroys the US economyVatis, 2000 (Michael, FBI, Congressional Testimony to the Subcommittee on Crime in the House

and the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Federal News Service, 2/29, l/n)

And this is not just a criminal problem; it is also a national security problem. This is because our nation's critical

infrastructures -- and by that I mean those services that are vital to our economy and to our national

security, such as electrical power, telecommunications, transportation and government operations -- are now all

dependent on computer technology for their very operations. And that dependence makes

them vulnerable to an attack which, if successful, could deny service on a very broad scale. The

same basic types of cyber attacks that therefore have become attractive to criminals are also

attractive to foreign intelligence services, who seek new ways to obtain sensitive government or proprietary

information, and also to terrorists and hostile foreign nations, who are bent on attacking U.S.

interests.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


Democracy Turn

China influence decks democracy in the region.Farnsworth ’12 (Eric Farnsworth is vice-president of the Council of the Americas in Washington

DC and from 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House special envoy for theAmericas. “Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas

Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth )

Is China a Threat to the Normative Advances in the Hemisphere? Since the end of the Cold War, however, the region has

struggled to develop a regime of democratic behavior that is intended to prevail in the

hemispheric community of nations. Democracy, including freedom of the press, is to be respected; labor and the

environment protected; corruption and illegal activities inspected and prosecuted. It is difficult to implement such

standards unless leverage exists to develop a broad consensus that promotes certain behaviors, and at least one nation or

regional organization is willing and able to enforce the regime effectively. For example, U.S. efforts to promote labor and

environmental reforms through trade agreements are undermined when other nations have the

ability to sign similar agreements with China that do not include similar provisions. Programs of multilateral lending agencies

like the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank that promote financial reforms and good governance

become less relevant if borrowing nations can receive funds from China or elsewhere, including

Venezuela, without conditions. To put it starkly, the oft-maligned IMF has no influence with nations such as Argentina that do not

currently require IMF funding or access to global capital markets.5 In fact, China’s huge purchases of hemispheric

commodities and the provision of credits on favorable terms have greatly assisted Latin American commodities

exporters in the ongoing global economic crisis. In some cases this has allowed leaders the flexibility to

postpone indefinitely the necessary economic and political reforms that would otherwise be

consistent with open market, healthy democratic governance. Ironically, this has allowed some

democratically elected leaders to undermine democratic institutions , including freedom of the press, and

return to the days of corporatist, rent-seeking economies. This model failed spectacularly during the twentieth century, but

it is now enabled, if not promoted, by Chinese economic engagement. At the microeconomic level, firms

with government connections have profited handsomely from these arrangements, but such an economic model tends not to foster

innovation, dynamism or sustainable, broad-based economic growth over time. It just makes the politically connected

more wealthy—exaggerating what has traditionally been one of the fundamental problems of

Latin America’s economic development. Additionally, the behavior of Chinese firms has not always followed the

Western model, which includes corporate social responsibility activities, payment of taxes, job creation in the local economy,

environmental mitigation, anti-corruption policies, and the like. This will be an increasingly important issue because China is

laying the groundwork for a long-term relationship. Its toolkit goes beyond commercial engagement. It includes

student exchanges and the export of Chinese language studies through the Confucius Institutes, which have spread like kudzu across

Latin America since the first institute was opened in South Korea in 2004.

Loss of democracy leads to extinctionDiamond ’95 Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995,

Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htmOTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the

former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies

through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have

utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears

increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are

associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for

legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of

http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth




8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do

not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their

leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much

less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build

weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable,

open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are

more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to

protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations

and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own

borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation

on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

8/13/2019 China Cp - Scdi 2013


International Fiat Bad

Encourages abdicating responsibility to other countries- responsibility is a

necessary precondition to making ethical judgments

Promotes bad advocacy skills- no actor faces deciding which nation should do a

policy

Unfair research burden - we have to research every country to find answers

False judicial dichotomy – no actor faces deciding between whether one nation

or another should do a policy, means the discussion isn’t politically relevant

C/I- the NEG gets to have the same actor as the AFF (USFG)

Documents

China Cp - Scdi 2013