Chernilo Daniel - Methodological Nationalism. Theory and History

7/29/2019 Chernilo Daniel - Methodological Nationalism. Theory and History

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Methodological Nationalism: Theory and History

Daniel Chernilo*

Annual Conference of the International Association of Critical RealismKings College, London, July 2008

Abstract

This article seeks to contribute to furthering our understanding of what methodologicalnationalism actually is and offer some insights that point towards its possible overcoming. Thecritical side of its argument unravels the paradoxical constitution of the current debate onmethodological nationalism; namely, the fact that methodological nationalism is simultaneouslyregarded as wholly negative and all-pervasive. I shall substantiate this by revisiting some of themost successful attempts at the conceptualisation of the nation-state that have sought totranscend methodological nationalism in five disciplines: sociology, nationalism studies,anthropology, social psychology and international relations. The positive side of the articlesargument introduces a distinction between a theoretical and an historical form ofmethodological nationalism with the help of which it tries to address some of the problemsmost commonly found in the literature. Theoretically, methodological nationalism is associatedwith an explanatory reductionism as the rise and main features of the nation-state are used toexplicate the rise and main features of modernity itself. Historically, it introduces the historicalproblem of its prevalence, that is, whether methodological nationalism a key if not the keyfeature of the history of the social sciences at large.

Keywords

Anthropology, International Relations, Methodological Nationalism, Nationalism Studies,Social Psychology, Social Theory, Sociology.

Last revision: 20 June 2008.

Word count: 10,750

* Associate Professor of Sociology the University Alberto Hurtado in Santiago - Chile. Email:[email protected].
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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2The question of methodological nationalism has gained currency in contemporary socialsciences over the past couple of decades. Although it was first identified as a problem in theearly 1970s (Martins 1974), it was only with rise - and later decline of globalization theorythat it became a salient issue in relation to studying the nation-states position in modernity(Beck 2000, Chernilo 2006). The critical aim of this piece is to argue that even though we havemoved a long way in clarifying what we mean by and what is wrong with methodologicalnationalism, the debate has taken a paradoxical shape that has prevented its furtherdelimitation and, more importantly, its transcendence. The positive aim of the article is theintroduction of a distinction between a theoretical and a historical version of the argument onmethodological nationalism that may help in the solution of some of the substantive problemsbeing faced when trying to conceptualise the nation-state.

But let me first of all state as clearly as possibly what I mean by methodological nationalism. Atits simplest, methodological nationalism is found when the nation-state is treated as the natural andnecessary representation of the modern society. A fuller definition would run as follows: the equationbetween the idea of society as social theorys key conceptual reference and the process of historical formation of thenation-state in modernity. The idea of society becomes the all-encompassing presupposition

around which all modern social trends are being explicated; the nation-state and the modernsociety become conceptually undistinguishable.

In terms of its structure, the article begins by explicating the paradoxical constitution of thedebate; namely, the fact that methodological nationalism is simultaneously regarded as whollyuntenable and all pervasive. It further illustrates the consequences of this paradoxicalconstitution by looking at some of the problems faced by some of the most sophisticatedattempts at conceptualising the nation-state in sociology, nationalism studies, anthropology,social psychology and international relations. Both their strengths and weaknesses are revisitedin order to identify what are the most pressing issues for the social sciences when they seek toovercome methodological nationalism. The following sections expand, in turn, on the

theoretical and the historical dimensions of the debate. On the theoretical side, it is held thatthe avoidance of methodological nationalism requires of a strongly universalistic conception ofmodernity in which the nation-state is explicated as a result of modernitys deep-seatedstructural trends. Methodological nationalism is associated here with an explanatoryreductionism; when the rise and main features of the nation-state are used to explicate the riseand main features of modernity itself. On the historical side, it is argued that, against theconventional view that the canon of the social sciences tended to reify and naturalise thenation-state, it provides us with valuable resources to exercise a more reflective attitudetowards it. The reassessment of methodological nationalism lies here in the problem of itsprevalence, that is, whether methodological nationalism a key if not the key feature of the historyof the social sciences at large.

Methodological nationalism: The paradoxical constitution of the debate

Methodological nationalism is no doubt real; it can be found within the social sciences as muchas within the real world itself. A first question we need to confront is a way out of themeaningless vicious circle in which the charge of methodological nationalism is allegedly foundeverywhere, used rather indiscriminately and being inadvertently reintroduced. Indeed, a mostsalient feature of the literature that has explicitly dealt with understanding the rise and mainfeatures of the nation-state in modernity is that no one positions oneself as in favour of


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3methodological nationalism. The polemic is just not split between those for whommethodological nationalism however we define it opens up new avenues for ourknowledge of the nation-state and those who argue that it hinders our ability for dealing withit. Even if one takes into account the fact that there is a dispute over its causes, consequencesand possible remedies, the fact remains that there is almost a consensual rejection of it. It canof course be argued that this is not surprising because, insofar as methodological nationalism isseen as a form of reification, it must surely be rejected. But it is nonetheless curious to realisethat no one seems prepared to challenge the proposition that methodological nationalism isinfact a reductionist way of thinking.1

But the paradoxical constitution of the debate comprises another dimension still. This is thefeature that the label methodological nationalism is being thrown back and forth among thediscussants, rather wildly, as a mark of shame. We are in the presence of a certain intellectualoutlook that is universally rejected but which is, allegedly at least, equally fairly well extendedacross the contemporary social sciences. Methodological nationalism is generally recognised asa sin but we are left with no way out of it because we all become unintended sinners the verysecond we try to grasp the nation-states fundamental features and the problematic nature of

its position in modernity: the very attempt at studying the nation-statewith conventional social scientificmeansbecame coeval with its effective reification and naturalisation. We all believe ourselves to be smartenough to recognise the difficulties it poses, analytical enough to distinguish when we see itand sceptical enough to be able to transcend it. We all claim being aware of the problem butour arguments are all found equally problematic the very moment we try to put our hands onthe nation-state.2 The paradoxof methodological nationalism consists thus in that no one admitsto be committed to it and yet its presence is allegedly found almost in every corner of the twentieth-century socialscientific landscape.

The works I should like briefly to review in this section are chosen because, from theirdifferent angles, they have all made an important contribution to our understanding the nation-

state. They make apparent possible solutions to the problem of methodological nationalism asthey rather explicitly seek to avoid the kinds of reification, naturalisation and uniformity thatare the true leitmotif of the different critiques of methodological nationalism over the lastdecade. But some of the problems they nonetheless confront are equally instructive so I wouldhave something to say on them as well. My own contribution to the discussion lies inadvancing a distinction between a theoretical and a historical version of the argument ofmethodological nationalism which may help breaking up the paradoxical constitution of thedebate.

1 We may compare this, for instance, with the debate on methodological individualism - upon which,incidentally, the first wave of discussion on methodological nationalism was built. Methodologicalindividualism has of course been constantly criticised as a reductionist way of thinking but it has neverbeen short of support.2 We all find methodological nationalism in somebody elses arguments only for analogous criticisms tobe applied back onto our own work and there is no hyperbole here. As I criticized Ulrich Beck forreintroducing, in spite of his best intentions, methodological nationalism back into his ownconceptualization of the nation-state he came after my criticisms by pointing out that it was my ownmethodological nationalism that prevented me from understanding the metaphorical sense in which hehad intended its use (Chernilo 2006, Beck 2007: 292).


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4An early expression of this movement of trying to conceptualise the nation-state without, inthe same move, naturalising its history and reifying its success is found in the work of AnthonyGiddens. He discussed, for over a decade, the importance of the nation-state for anysociological conceptualisation of modernity and was indeed one of the first writers to addressquite explicitly the question of the rise and main features of the modern nation-state. In 1973,that is, before the notion of methodological nationalism was actually coined, he argued that[t]he primary unit of sociological analysis, the sociologists society in relation to theindustrialised world at least - has always been, and must continue to be, the administrativelybounded nation-state (Giddens 1973: 265). Later in 1981, he argued that the modern nation-state and modern capitalism were co-original and had co-evolved: capitalist states emerged asnation-states: the association between capitalism and the nation-state was not the accident ofhistory that is has appeared to be to many Marxist and non-Marxist historians alike. He thenadded that despite its European origins, the nation-state system has become a world-wide one() the emergence of the nation state was integrally bound up with the expansion ofcapitalism (Giddens 1981: 12). The key for Giddens is the nation-states capacity for drawingtogether all the required resources that turn it into a kind of power-container shaping thedevelopment of the capitalist societies He reaches the climax of his studies into the role and

position of the nation-state in modernity as he argues that the nation-state is central towhatever conceptualisation of modernity. The success of the nation-state as a modern socio-political arrangement has above all to do with its success in having become the organisingcentre of modernity itself: modern societies are nation-states, existing within a nation-statesystem () societies have often been understood by sociologists, implicitly or otherwise, asa clearly bounded system with an obvious and easily identifiable set of distinguishing traits(Giddens 1985: 1 & 17). Taken together, these propositions stand in an ambivalent relationshipto methodological nationalism because they tend to make the characterisation of modernity tocohere around the nation-state: the success of modern institutions in transcending its localorigins and reaching out globally is explicated by the success of the nation-state itself in makinga coherent whole out of all these institutional arrangements. But as he arrives at these results

he turns things around quite dramatically and makes the success of the nation-state as amodern socio-political to depend upon what he distinguishes as the four key structuraldimensions of modernity: bureaucratisation, industrialisation, capitalism andmilitarization/surveillance (Giddens 1985). In fact, already in his early work he had qualifiedhis commitment to the nation-states apparent centrality in modernity by arguing that the ideaof society, understood as the national society, has never been the isolated, the internallydeveloping system which has normally been implied in social theory (1973: 265). In anutshell: the historical statement that the nation-state becomes central in modernity, howevertrue, is independent from the explicatory proposition that modernity itself can be explicated asthe sum or result of different national trajectories. Whereas the former is true for Giddens thelatter is not because the causal relation moves the other way round: it is the development ofmodernity what accounts for the rise and success of the nation-state system and its worldwideexpansion.

If we now turn our attention to the field of nationalism studies, we can refer to the work ofAnthony D. Smith. A student of Ernst Gellner, Smiths views (1973) on nations andnationalism build upon his own previous theoretically oriented reconstruction of theconceptions of development and evolution in mainstream sociology. He diagnosed seriousdifficulties in such sociological conceptions of developments in terms of their endogenousand internalist bias so he comes to the conclusion that sociologys thoroughly modernist


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5approach has in fact tended to neglect the importance of such a key aspect of social life asnationalism and national identities. The key to the point he made was that classical sociologyhad simply been unable to grasp the problems of nationhood, nation-building and the nation-state (Smith 1979, 1983).3 The conviction he has held ever since that the rise of modernnation-states has to be traced back to the peoples own pre-modern ethnic origins remainsintact (Smith 1991). Quite recently he summarised his own argument as follows: thefashionable Western insistence on multiculturalism and the polyethnic nation have not at allundermined the salience of the nation-state in the international scene. More dramatically,[n]either, within those national states, has it dissolved the centrality of dominant or core ethnies,whose culture, myths, mores and memories continue to define the national state (Smith 2006:179). This kind of outlook has surely been subject to criticism. For once, Walker Connor alongside other modernist writers has argued that nations as such cannot be identified beforethe rise of mass movements in the late nineteenth century. In so doing, he rejects not onlySmiths proposition that nations in their prior ethnieform are pre-modern. But he is equallygoing against the ontological consequence of Smiths ethno-symbolic approach. Nations are nolonger the definitive Trgerof human history they become when, in one way or another, theyare traced back to their ancient origins. Although Connor firmly rejects the strong kind of

methodological reductionism that is attached to any such transhistorical conceptions of humanidentity, he seems nonetheless to reintroduce it from the modernist backdoor, as it were.Nations have stopped being equivalent with the longdureonly to become the unrivalled formof social identity in modernity so that the history of nations becomes in practice coeval withthat of modernity itself. As soon as one integrates into one definition the two standardsmodern conceptions of nation political citizenry and ethnic identity then Connor (2004:38) is in the position to conclude: the political history of the world since the Napoleonic Warshas largely been a tale of tension between the two identities, each possessing its ownirrefragable and exclusive claim to political legitimacy. Connors and Smiths are surelymutually opposite standpoints when it comes to timing the emergence of the nation. But onwhat it is for us the critical proposition of pre-empting the salience of nations and nation-states

in modernity, they look much more alike than otherwise may seem.

In the fields of anthropology and migration studies, Andreas Wimmer and Nina G. Schiller(2002) have urged that methodological nationalism be definitively overcome. They are,moreover, among the few to have explicitly reflected and commented upon different versionsof methodological nationalism in the social sciences. They quite rightly define it as theassumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modernworld (Wimmer and Schiller 2002: 302). And then they go on to distinguish between threedifferent strands of methodological nationalism: ignorance, naturalization and territoriallimitation. The three variants are more or less prominent in different fields of enquiry andmutually reinforce each other, forming a coherent epistemic structure, a self-reinforcing way oflooking at and describing the social world. The three variants are more or less prominent indifferent fields of enquiry. Ignorance is dominant the modus of methodological nationalism ingrand theory; naturalization of normal empirical science; territorial limitation of the study ofnationalism and state building (Wimmer and Schiller 2002: 308). They come up with thesethree versions as a result of their own substantive empirical work so it is anything butsurprising that they echo the standard complaint that so-called grand theory has simply ignored

3 A claim that in stronger and weaker versions has often been made (Beck 2000, Thompson and Fevre2001).


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6the nation-state. Their case against the methodological nationalism to be found in normalempirical social is however stronger. Schillers attention has been devoted to the relationshipbetween migration and the nation-state and she duly complains on the mutually reinforcingsins of depicting recent migration trends as the rise of novel forms of social relations and ofneglecting the central role of migratory trends throughout the history of nation-state (Basch,Schiller and Blanc 1994). Both these shortcomings create the wholly false dichotomy betweenthe traditional and fully territorialised nation-state and the recent flurry of studies on flows,fluidities and mobilities (Levitt and Schiller 2004). Wimmers (2002: 52) focus has for his partbeen on the politics of ethnic cleansing as the exclusionary side of national democracy. Theway in which he conceives of the nation-state is subtlety close to methodological nationalismas he firmly associates it with modernitys key features: modernity itself is cast in nationalistand ethnicised forms. The crucial element that pushes his anayleses beyond methodologicalnationalism is however his focus on how the nation-state incarnates the project of modernitywith its lights(national democracy) as well as its shadows(ethnic cleansing).

In a similar vein, Michael Billigs social psychological study focuses on the different ways inwhich the ideology of modern nationalim is uncritically reproduced at the level of common

sense. What he finely refers to as the banal nationalism of most Western democracies is thatkind of nationalism whose metonymic image () is not a flag which is constantly waved withfervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building (Billig: 1995: 8). Hecaptures what I should like to call the opacity of the nation-state in modernity when hesuggests that nationalism is simultaneously obvious and obscure and that nationalism is theideology by which the world of nations has come to seem the natural world (Billig 1995: 36).And he equally understands that in order to grasp this opacity we need to go beyond theempirical recognition of a plurality of nation-states. We must rather look at the nation-state asa single form of modern socio-political arrangement: [w]ith historical hindsight, it might seeminevitable that the nation-state system emerged, but it is hard to see an inevitability about theparticular nations themselves (Billig 1995: 28). There are also some other formulations which,

although they begin to look more problematic in relation to methodological nationalism, onemay still be prepared to give the benefit of the doubt: [h]istorical forces may have combinedto produce the nation-state as modernitys logical form of governance. Yet, a willful anarchyseems to have accompanied the way the logical principle has been established in practice(Billig 1995: 24). He seeks to denounce the fallacy he witnesses in much of western socialscience between our patriotism and their nationalism (Billig 1995: 55). This separation is aresult of the ideological prejudices upon which these disciplines would have been establishedand it comes a long way to reinforce the naturalization of the nation-state that is so prevalentin these same disciplines. But in breaking away from such a spurious difference his owntheorizing begins to feel the heat of some of the real difficulties posed by the study of thenation-state. He challenges the canon of sociology to core by arguing that nowhere is the socialsciences overall contamination with nationalistic presuppositions more apparent than in thewidespread use of the idea of society: the society which lies at the of sociologys own self-definition is created in the image of the nation-state () the emphasis on society and theimplicit modeling of society on nation, has both reified and concealed nationhood (Billig1995: 53-4). Again in this case, Billigs arguments look the more accomplished the more theystick to the results of his own empirical studies; for instance, on the use of the national we inEnglish tabloids. Somewhat ironically, however, he ends up mirroring the object of hiscritique. He reintroduces the dichotomy he seeks to overcome but now in the form of his


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7own self-critical attitude towards methodological nationalism and their blindness andnaturalization that is, in mainstream social sciences of the nation-state.

My final case refers to the discipline of international relations and the role that the so-calleddomestic analogy plays within it. This centres on whether the notion of an internationalsociety can be conceptualised, and establish the sources of its own legitimacy, by analogicallyinferring what its central features must be from those of the internal organisation of nationalsocieties. On the one hand, following Barry Buzan (2004) the underlying logic for the actualoperation of the analogy can vary: individuals (as well as nation-states) may decide to enter intolegal relations among themselves out of fear (the Hobbesian version of the analogy), self-interest (the Lockean version) or indeed moral duty (the Kantian version). On the other hand,however, the final assessment of the validity of the domestic analogy depends upon whethersimilar operations effectively occur at both intra-national and extra-national levels (Bottici2004, Bull 1977, Suganami 1989). This critical side of discussion is aptly summarised byHidemi Suganami (1989: 19): the domestic analogy can be said to form part of theassumptions of any contemporary writer on international affairs who attributes the instabilityof the international system primarily to its decentralized structure. In other words, the issue

lies not only in the explicit use and endorsement of the analogy but also in whether it is beingimplicitly introduced against any individual authors best intentions. There is an assessment stillto be made as to whether the discipline of international relations as such can find from withinits own canon and scholarly tradition the intellectual resources to think about theinternational without the use of domestic presuppositions. Indeed, Suganamis own survey ofthe use of the domestic analogy shows that explicit support for it has always been strongeramong those who have a practical interest in the establishment and consolidation of anpeaceful interstate system than between international relation theorists themselves the lattertend to be quite vocal in their rejection of the analogy (Rosenberg 2006, Shaw 2000). A second,more positive proposition is aptly captured by Barry Buzan (2004: 25-6) when he asks for thetranscending of conventional boundaries of both sociology and political theory. He argues

that it is within the context of a conversation between the two disciplines that we may find theright resources to abandon the traditional concept of international society and move the ideaof society out of the state, and away from human beings as members. International society isnot based on the crude idea of a domestic analogy which simply scales the society within statesup to the global level. In relation to the debate on methodological nationalism, the problem ofthe domestic analogy poses critical questions on the autonomy of the discipline of internationalrelations, whether the resources for such a conceptualisation are to be found within or beyondoutside international relations itself. Yet it still leaves unresolved the question of the nation-states history and main features in modernity.

This reconstruction is anything but exhaustive and its focus is not surveying all the problemsbeing faced when the nation-state is being studied. Rather, I have tried to prove my case thatdifficulties are bound to emerge because the nation-state has proved elusive to all socialscientific traditions. Indeed, all these writers would duly reject that the charge ofmethodological nationalism is raised against their works. To do so would not only be unfair totheir own explicit intentions but, more importantly, it would also go against the most relevantsubstantive contributions they make. I have nonetheless been also pointing out to some trickyissues, unresolved tensions and unintended consequences coming out of their writings. Theproblems they face are not too different from the ones with which I have also struggled(Chernilo 2007a).


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8A first conclusion we may need to draw to begin unravelling this paradoxical constitution ofthe debate has been singled out by Peter Beilharz (2008) as he questions whether the debatecentres at all on methodological questions or rather it is about theoretical or indeed ontologicalissues. We face a real dilemma here. On the one hand, we may be well advice to start callingthings the way they actually are and start calling the controversy theoretical or evenontological nationalism. On the other hand, however, the gains we may obtain by so doingmay cancel themselves out by the opening up of a new and rather artificial controversy overthe label itself. My own option, for the time being at least, is to stick with the term that has sofar served us reasonably well at least because it has brought to the foreground the debate onthe social sciences nationalistic presuppositions and implications that were questions that hadremained in the background for too long. Having said this, we do need to acknowledge moreclearly that more than strictly methodological questions are at stake here and be able point outwhat these planes actually are.

The specificallymethodologicaldimension is apparent in the question Schiller and Wimmer raisein relation to how methodological nationalism makes certain historical trends and forms of

identity just invisible. This is indeed consistent with Ulrich Becks proposal of methodologicalcosmopolitanism that as long as statistical keep being uncritically collected at the national level,and keep being organised for cross-national comparisons, we will keep lacking the kind ofresources we require to think outside the national box (Beck and Sznaider 2006). Theimportance of this cannot be emphasised enough. A number of aspects of modern social life old trends as well emerging ones cannot be registered, or get underrepresented, on the basisof national statistics: from the centuries-old experiences of transnational families whosememories and current lives have been split among several nationalities and states to the rapidtransformation of sporting allegiances in which neighbourhood, town, region and severalcountries become intermingled in the fate of one team; from the persistent cosmopolitannetworks of protection that intellectuals and revolutionaries have provided for themselves in

times of crises to the changing funding-strategies of scientific institutions which owe muchmore to their local and global partners than to their national location. The problems andchallenges in the measurement of social trends are possibly the only strictly methodologicalaspects of the discussion we carry on under the name of methodological nationalism. Thequestion of its transcendence would take here the form of gathering empirical information insuch a way that it is possible to reflect upon trends and processes that have been traditionallyneglected when national categories pre-empt data collection. But however important these maybe assessed, we have already demonstrated that they are not the only dimensions in which weare interested when we speak of methodological nationalism in a broader sense.

I would now like to suggest a way forward from this impasse via the distinction between atheoretical or explanatory way of addressing the issue of methodological nationalism and anhistorical or empirical one. The theoretical or explanatory version of the argument ofmethodological nationalism arises when it is assumed that the deep-seated conceptual structureof the social sciences would have led them to think exclusivelyfrom within the national box.Although this form of methodological nationalism has an historical cause, as it emerges out ofthe actual co-evolution of the nation-state and the social sciences for the best part of thenineteenth century, its key mode of operation is actually conceptual. Modernitys deep-seattrends and structural features are seen as a result of national trajectories, the conceptualisationof modernity explicitly or otherwise - would be wholly reliant on the nation-state to have any


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9real explanatory purchase. There would be a sort of natural teleology in social theory in whichthe consummation of the project of modernity would mirror the notion of a neatly-dividedworld of internally homogenous and externally fully-sovereign nation-states. Methodologicalnationalism lies here at the epistemological level; it is found in the way social scientificconcepts, allegedly at least, were and continue to be construed and actually work.

The empirical or historical version of the argument of methodological nationalism also startsfrom the premise of the co-evolution of the nation-state and the social sciences but it leads toa different end-product. It stresses the idea that states and nations have been the major actor inmodernity over the past two centuries or so and that modernitys most salient historicalempirical trend has been no other than their unification along territorially, normatively andculturally. Methodological nationalism is here seen as a factual trend: the social sciences havestudied and may need to remain studying modernity in national terms as long as modernityitself remains nationally structured. It is the historical canon of the social sciences themselvesthat would lend support to the idea that the nation-state and modernity are coeval. The veryfoundation of social theory is assessed here as being built upon a presupposition that has goneunnoticed yet it is all encompassing. All the social sciences major concepts such as class,

culture, society and the state would have taken the nation-state as their ultimate locus implicitly or otherwise.

There is no question that both versions can complement each other rather neatly but they arealso different in terms of their presuppositions, operative logics and final outcomes. These twokinds of methodological nationalism neither automatically require nor necessarily presupposeone another they do operate independently. I believe that the distinction between these twoforms may help explicate some of the difficulties have just reviewed. The substantive lessonsthat can no doubt be learnt from them seem to oscillate between overcoming one kind ofmethodological nationalism and struggling with the other. In what follows I shall expand onthe theoretical and the historical argument respectively.

Theory: The problem of explicating the nation-state

This theoretical version of methodological nationalism can adopt a soft formulation in theview that the nation-state is modernitys key organising centre and the locus around which thewhole modern project almost naturally coheres. But even if there is a clear risk ofnaturalisation of the nation-state when such a position is adopted, an even more problematicmove towards reification can still be found. A bolder version of this explanatory kind ofmethodological nationalism arises when the rise and main features of the nation-state are usedto explicate the rise and main features of modernity itself. This is the belief that the nation-state can, on its own, be used to account for modernitys main features. This is particularlyproblematic because rather than looking at the nation-state as the formidable institutionaloutcomeof modernitys deeper and longer-term trends that it actually is, the nation-state is takeninstead as the fundamental causeof these trends; the ultimate explication of modernity dependsupon the nation-state. The nation-state becomes the key independent variable with the help ofwhich whatever aspect of modernity can be eventually delineated. Giddens, Billig and Wimmerand may be found falling on the softer version but they all can duly plea no guilty in relationto the latter as their arguments all move frommodernitys central features to the nation-state.The nation-state is the central container of modern social relations in these works but itsemergence and main features are accounted for from the outside of the nation-state, as it were.


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10Whereas Giddens refers to such structural processes as bureaucratisation, industrialisation,capitalism and militarization/surveillance, Wimmer explicates that dynamics of ethnicexclusion are at the bottom of nation-building and state-formation processes.

Indeed, the question of methodological nationalism arose to counteract some internalisttendencies that were arguably prevalent in 1970s sociology, so in the controversy the strictlymethodological plane has always been subordinated to the more substantive question of therole of the nation-state in explicating modernitys key developmental tendencies (Smith above).The critical emphasis lies here in the explanatory value of the nation-state in the understandingof whatever aspect of modern social life: from Sonderwegsthat account for the peculiarities ofnational customs and tastes to the way in which the national curricula and health provision areorganised; from millennial phenotypes to differentiated attitudes towards the use of cars andrules that govern pets and childrens access to restaurants. The triviality of the examples onlyreinforces the seriousness of the point. Culturalist and indeed nationalistic strategies that takefor granted the worlds division into nations and then explicate the dramatic expansion of thenation-state throughout the world as the kind of natural telos of 190 or so Volksgeistssimplydont do the job. We require of a stronger rather than a weaker conceptualisations of

modernity in terms of a single evolutionary accomplishment of the human species so that wecan then begin to depict and delineate its internal differentiation according to a number ofdifferent lines - regional, religious, socio-economic and indeed national. Rather than leading toa state of complete incommensurability among worldviews, I suggest that we are now in aninteresting position to reassessmodernitys truly original universalistic aspirations because weneed to come to terms, simultaneously, with its global expansion and the decline of itsEurocentric matrix: the task is that of comprehending those general trends and events thatmark the truly worldwide condition of current modernitywithout, in the same move, continueadvancing unsound generalizations from the West to the rest. This is in my view the most crucialcontribution of the historical sociology that speaks of modernity as a single formation that isdifferentiated into multiple trajectories (Moore 1967, Mouzelis 1999, Therborn 1995).4

This brings to the fore the ontological implications of the debate: whether the nation can beregarded as a rather natural and necessary form of human community throughout history orwhether nation-state has become such a natural and necessary form of socio-politicalarrangement only in modernity. We have witnessed the importance of this issue in relation tothe constitutive debate of nationalism studies between modernist and primordialist or ethno-symbolists. These are surely mutually opposite standpoints when it comes to timing theemergence of the nation but on what it is for us the more crucial presupposition of pre-empting the salience of nations and the centrality of nation-states, both in terms of everydayworldviews and causal properties, they do not seem too far apart. Indeed, those who areimmersed in this discussion tend argue that the dispute can be settled on the basis of empiricalresearch. I would like to hold, on the contrary, that couched in ontological terms thediscussion is possibly unsolvable as it is above all about the ultimate presuppositions of thedifferent conceptual frameworks.

4 In terms of the historical performance of this approach I can refer to the literature with which I amost familiar: Jorge Larrans (2000) and Aldo Mascareos (2008) works on Latin American modernityas one formation within modernitys worldwide context.


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11In fact, an expression of the presuppositional character of the ontological discussion is foundin the normative issue of the extent to which the nation-state was, is and will continue to beultimate source of modern political legitimacy. My argument here is that the modern idea ofthe nation has never been the unchallenged locus of political legitimacy in modernity nor wasthe only standpoint that strove for the realisation of modernitys normative foundation. Thenation actually arose alongside two other, equally important, conceptions of modern socio-political relations: one as class and the other cosmopolitanism. Class, nation andcosmopolitanism did not first emerge as a challenge to each other but as a way ofcomplementing one another. The very idea of the modern nation could only fully unfoldbecause of the support it borrowed from the transformations in socioeconomic relations interms of class and from the universalistic normative appeal of cosmopolitanism. On the onehand, national politics emerged simultaneously and complementarily to class politics (Mann1993, Hobsbawm 1994, Fine and Chernilo 2003). Thus, for instance, by the outbreak of theFirst World War, Marxist writers and revolutionaries were asking themselves whether thecurrent imperialist phase of capitalism meant a reconfiguration of the relationships betweenworking class internationalism and the expansionist tendencies of Western nation-state and inthat sense they faced that relationship certainly as a problembut not as a fixed contradiction.

And equally importantly, that cosmopolitanisms claim to universalism is in no automaticopposition to the nation or the nation-state (Delanty 2006, Durkheim 1992, Fine 2007,Chernilo 2007a, 2007b, 2008, Habermas 2001). They all three coevolved historically inmodernity and if they began looking as increasingly incompatible towards the end of thenineteenth century that is something to be explained rather than taken as a self-evident truth.

The assessment of whether the early League of Nations and then the United Nations havelived up to the promises and standards upon which they were first instituted is surely debatable(Suganami 1989): states were rapid in learning how to best defend themselves military becausegood legal arguments do not win wars in the battlefields. And peoples learnt equally quicklythat a highly creative reinterpretation of the historical record alongside national lines was a

rather useful tool to deal with abrupt crises, use other groups as scapegoats, claim and reclaimterritory and eventually bolster internal unity. But the normative way out of methodologicalnationalism is based upon the fact the twentieth-century interstate architecture isunconceivable without the right granting people to become nations and then nation-states. Wecan briefly refer to how, roughly during the same period, even such chauvinistic writers asFriedrich Meinecke were able to recognise that cosmopolitanism and the nation-state hadcoevolved in modernity. Meineckes thesis was surely that this allegiance was bound and aboutto dissolve but he had no problem not only in acknowledging but also in defending the thesisthat it had been a necessary one. The belated emergence of the Germannational state owed agreat deal to the original claim to universalism between the nation and humanity underlying theFrench Revolution: the true, the best German national feeling includes the cosmopolitan idealof a humanity beyond nationality () it is un-German to be merely German(Meinecke1970: 21). Beyond their co-originality he is also setting up the starting point of an historicaltrend would move from humanity to the nation and then, with the unification of the Reich inthe 1870s, the state (Meinecke 1970: 48). We can see Meinecke falling for the softer kind ofmethodological nationalism I introduced at the beginning of this section. And even though hetried to explicate the nation-states alleged success in shaping up modern social life in terms ofhow it outmuscled in this case cosmopolitanism, the fact remains that cosmopolitanismremains a critical part of the equation so that the nation-state can only be explicated from the


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12outside in, as it were. Nation, class and cosmopolitanism all required one another and no onehas ever been able to monopolise modern political loyalties.

Indeed, a more sophisticated version of this is found Norbert Elias (1996: 133) as he arguesthat class, nation and cosmopolitanism belong together in the historical transition tomodernity. He explicates that the transition from a cosmopolitan to a national outlook in classterms: On balance this we-feeling of the pre-revolutionary upper classes of Europe, whichsurpassed the frontiers of states, was probably stronger than any we-feeling any feeling ofidentity which men of these upper classes had with the lower classes of their own country.Their attachment to their own state did not yet have the character of an attachment to thenation. With few exceptions national sentiments were alien to noblemen of Europe prior tothe French Revolution and in some countries for a long time after it () It was only in class-societies, not in inter-state societies, that the identity feelings of the ruling elites, and in thecourse of time those of wider strata, too, acquired the specific stamp of national feelings(1996: 143-4). At stake is in fact what he refers to as the duality of the nation-states normativecodes (): a moral code descended from that of rising sections of the tiers tat, egalitarian incharacter, and whose highest value is man the human individual as such; and a nationalist

code descended from the Machiavellian code of princes and ruling aristocracies, inegalitarian incharacter, and whose highest value is a collectivity a state, the country, the nation to whichan individual belongs (Elias 1996: 154-5).

Normatively, therefore, the nation was valuated in so far as it seemed to be an adequate placefor the effective realisation of modernitys inclusionary tendencies as well as democratic hopes.The nation was well regarded because it appeared to be an adequate vehicle for this kind ofuniversalistic project. Democracy and individual freedoms were not preferred because theywere primarily national but rather the opposite; the importance of the nation was dependantupon its universalistic outlook. The fact these expectations proved short-lived and madeapparent the nations ugly faces has of course to be taken most seriously (Mann 2005, Wimmer

2002). On the one hand, the international system of states that has been slowly emerging overthe past four or five centuries can be neither explicated by nor reduced to the fantastic notionof the formal equality of all nation-states on the basis of an equivocal respect for the right toself determination. The Realpolitik of the Cold War makes such a proposition a moot point. Onthe other hand, however, this same international system has become increasingly dependantupon the normative support of a cosmopolitan reading of the universal validity of the right toself-determination of nations. When the US decides to go solo, mock international institutionsand reject multilateralism their military might may or may not succeed but they are not only inflagrant breach of international law. Most crucially, they have fundamentally lost the normativehigh ground (Habermas 2006).

The key to transcending methodological nationalism lies here in construing explanations of thenation-states success in modernity without simultaneously having to explicate modernity itselfas a result, or on the basis, of the nation-state. We similarly have to reject the notion of thepurely endogenous development of national cultures and traditions. We are in need of somethings that are indeed new; namely original and more flexible ways of collecting data. But weequally require a deeper and soberer consideration of different approaches deep-seatedexplanatory, normative and even ontological implication. The question is how to be able tolook at the past from a different angle as much as the discovery of new facts themselves,conceptual refinement and reflexive judgment rather than fear for being haunted by zombie


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13categories and swift declarations of obsolescence. But in order to achieve these we still have toturn to the historical side of the problem of understanding methodological nationalism.

History: The question of prevalence

A key historical dimension of the debate on methodological nationalism refers to theassessment of itsprevalencethroughout the conventional canon of the social sciences from thelate eighteenth century. In contradistinction to the paradox to which we referred above, herewe do find two neatly divided camps. On the one side, by far the most widely held propositionmaintains that methodological nationalism is a key, if not the key, feature of the history ofsocial theory. This position is found in the works of Billig, Smith, Bull, Rosenberg, Schiller andWimmer. From different angles and standpoints they all agree on the fact argue that theconventional canon of the social sciences is not of much help when it comes to dealing withthe nation-state. On the other side, the argument is being made that if and when these best-known figures of social theory are read together they begin to offer a conceptualisation of thenation-state that is in fact able to curb explanatory methodological nationalism. 5 This morefavourable assessment argues that despite all its inaccuracies, shortcomings and wrong

assumptions, the core of the project of social theory refers to the critique of particularisticworldviews such as Eurocentrism and narrow analytical frameworks such as methodologicalnationalism. We have been rediscovering the way in which previous sociology and socialtheory were able to deal with and think about the global and cosmopolitanism in ways thatseemed nearly impossible only a decade or so ago.

It is then my intuition that colleagues tend, rather quickly, to be glossing over the differencebetween the loose, unreflective and even untenable images of the nation of the past and thesolid and stable self-presentation of nation-states themselves during the twentieth century. Thisis apparent, moreover, as the cases being raised against the canon of so-called grand theory arein fact mutually incompatible. They are simultaneously charged for their ignorance of the

nation-state (Wimmer, Schiller) and for taking it for granted (Smith, Giddens, Billig). In otherwords, classical and contemporary social theory is found equallyat fault for having made toomuch andtoo little out of the nation-states history and main features. In opposition to this, Ibelieve we can try and reconstruct these traditions by letting the difficulties that have beenexperienced to emerge and the tentative resolutions that have been advanced to unfold. Wehave to stop imposing backwardly a sense of the centrality and necessity of the nation-statethat past writers simply did not have. A revision of our understanding of the foundational period of thesocial sciences is a precondition to be able to transcend and overcome methodological nationalism. I am notarguing here that allwe need to do to move beyond methodological nationalism is to spendsome time reading good old books. Neither is my argument that any individual or group ofwriters got it completely right in relation to understanding the nation-state. The point I ammaking is rather that we need to put into brackets what we think we know about theirunderstanding of the nation-state and give new outlooks and propositions at least the chance

5 If in relation to the debate on globalisation Luke Martell (2007) has convincingly pointed out to therise of a third wave that is turning some the previous shortcomings and exaggerations into thepossibility of advancing more sober and sound accounts of it, we may well be at the doorsteps of asimilar move in relation to improving our understanding of methodological nationalism and, moreimportantly, how to do without it (Inglis and Robertson 2008, Turner 1990, 2006, Outhwaite 2006,Fine 2003a, 2007, Chernilo 2007a).


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14to emerge. The methodological insight we require is again aptly captured by Norbert Elias(1996: 123): The increasing tendency to conceptualize processes as if they were unchangingobjects represents a more widespread pattern of conceptual development running converselyto that of society at large, the development and dynamics of which have noticeable quickenedfrom the eighteenth to the twentieth century. t is in this context that the following claim canbe put forward: equivocal as they arguably are, when we look at them as long-term intellectualtradition, the references to the nation and the nation-state during the foundational period ofmodernity do not point in the direction to methodological nationalism (Chernilo 2007a).

For once, Karl Lwith demonstrates that references to the nation have been long part of thephilosophical and theological lexicon of western thinking. Surely, some kind of unity can befound among them; possibly around the notion of a group of people which shares one ormore features that makes their depiction as a group plausible. But this recognition is at a verylong way indeed from any statement about their transhistorical immutability, culturalhomogeneity, causal powers and intellectual salience. For instance, already in the earlyeighteenth century Giambatista Vicos The New Sciencewas established on the principle of civiltheology that was able to describe the ideal eternal history traversed in time by the history

of every nation (Lwith 1964: 124). Vicos use of the idea of the nation in the early eighteenthcentury was that of human populations whose historical differences were a result of Godsplans. This use of the nation is already very different from Voltaires systematic references to itin hisEssays on the Manners and Mind of Nationsof 1756, which was close to an empirical registerof cultural civilisations whose rationale was the secular idea of humanitys universal progress(Lwith 1964: 105). And this again no doubt different from Kants (1999) use of the term inhis cosmopolitan writings as a Federation of Nations the association of political communitiesthat would voluntarily enter into peaceful and cooperative relations with one another with aview of establishing a condition of perpetual peace.

The point I am trying to make is that the fact that the word nation has been consistently used

throughout modernity does not mean that different social actors, political elites and indeedscholars have meant one and the same thing in using it. During the Enlightenment the nationwas able to fulfil the role of conceiving of the way in which modern socio-political life couldand should be purposefully reconstituted. Whether this vision adopted a more radical take onthe challenges posed by the dissolving sources of authorities of the old regime or it preferredthe more moderate restriction of the monarchs absolute power alongside republicaninstitutions, the fact remain that a certain way of naming the political constituency had becomerecognised. These early conceptions, however, cannot be uncritically related to the romanticconceptions of the late nineteenth century that emphasised less the nations political role andmore its cultural specificity and mission. And again both the Enlightenment and romanticreferences to the nation are different from its post-colonial use during the decolonisationwaves of the post Second World War period. It is the nations semantic appeal that stilldemands fuller explanations but this cannot be accomplished by glossing over the differencesto be found among disparate references to the nation: it is precisely generality of the referencesto it vis--visthe flexibility it allows for what needs to be explicated. Let me illustrate this withtwo additional examples.

Sankar Muthu has urged that the critiqueof imperialism and colonialism was a key motif in suchkey Enlightenment thinkers as Rousseau, Kant and Herder. He complements standardreconstructions of the Enlightenment and demonstrates that standing up againstEmpires was


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15as constitutive a trend of the movement as any other of its most salient features. Muthus(2003: 9) argument is that the more particularity and diversity was being emphasised the moreeffectively inclusive and indeed universalistic these theories became: as the particularity andpartial incommensurability of human lives came to the fore in a number of late eighteenth-century political writings, the moral universalism that occupied a formal, but ultimately hollow,position in earlier political theories became more genuinely universal. A dramatic nationalisticreduction was then effected after the Enlightenment and this may come a long way to explainthe transparency of methodological nationalism that is witnessed in the assessments ofcontemporary social sciences: anti-imperialist sentiments largely fell by the wayside as theeighteenth century came to a close () By the mid nineteenth-century anti-imperialist thinkingwas virtually absent from Western European intellectual debates (Muthu 2003: 5). RobertFines reassessment of the relationship between Kant and Hegel with regard tocosmopolitanism can be read along similar lines. In his convincing reading of Hegel, he is nolonger as a champion of nationalism. Such a narrow interpretation would be based on the wayHegel questions Kants association of nationalism with immaturity and blind passion byexploring the rational foundations of patriotism (Fine 2003b: 616). Far from it, hedemonstrates that instead of rejecting Kants cosmopolitanism tout court, Hegel was in fact

concerned with cosmopolitanism being turned into an ideal notion beyond actual legalrelations and devoid of any real socio-historical content; Hegel makes cosmopolitanism realand opens the space for action on the basis of a more complex understanding of social reality(Fine 2003b: 610). The same Hegel who seemingly reified the state and would give attributedgod-like qualities to it was however a philosopher concerned with individual freedoms,universal rights as well asnational self-determination. Both Muthu and Fine are not only tryingto recover their heroes from unfair criticisms, they are also shedding new light on past authorswhose works we allegedly know all too well. More dramatically, they are opening our historicalimagination of past times a time that supposedly was increasingly dominated by the nation-state as the ultimate standard of political modernity by opening up the conventionalformulations of the social sciences own canon.

The ignorance of the nation-state that is attributed to social theory may be addressed back tocurrent commentators own lack of in-depth analysis of the works being criticised. Moresubstantively, my point here is threefold. First, that the task of immersing oneself into thecanon of social theory is no second class intellectual endeavour. It does not replace first-handempirical research nor can it be understood as the uncritical celebration or repetition of adisciplinary common sense. But it is a job that requires as much time, care and the critical andopen mind that is intrinsic to all scholarly projects. Second, that we remain sceptical whendistinctions between them (in the past) and us (in the present) get too neat. We are better offwhen we integrate our own contributions as a part of, rather than standing in opposition to,the intellectual or disciplinary traditions to which we belong. This may not bode well in termsof catching public attention but it does help reinforcing epistemological cogency andexplanatory purchase. Third, that a more subtle understanding of social theorys account onthe nation-state may still be the one of best antidote we still have against the reintroduction ofmethodological nationalism from the back door. As we have argued, different variants ofmethodological nationalism operate independently so being on firm ground in relation to onedoes not secure our position with regard to others. We need as many checks and balances aswe can get and past social theory is a valuable asset here.


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16Needles to say, the relevance of these historically oriented reflections does not lie primarily inrelation to setting the record straight. Rather, they centre on what they may tell us about whatmethodological nationalism actually is and the ways in which we are reasonably able to chooseamong competing alternatives to it. We are still in need of a more sensible understanding ofthe development of the nation-state vis--visthe evolution of the different conceptions of it inmodernity. We have to find a way to delineate the nation-states enduring features thateffectively make it a single socio-political arrangement in modernity but that must be a strategythat, simultaneously, is able to express the changing faces of the nation-state as an everydaynotion and a social-scientific concept.

Conclusions

Methodological nationalism is real. It is found in social theory as much as in empirical research,in the states self-presentation and in everyday life discourses. It will not disappear once andfor all so we have to keep it under control as much as we possibly can. One conclusion Ishould like to draw is that, no matter how much care we put into the task of avoidingmethodological nationalism, we must not get too cosy with arguments that claim to have

actually achieved so. When it comes to assessing the results accomplished by classical andcontemporary social scientists, we have to realise that certainties and successes are notexclusively on one side as neither are mistakes and shortcoming only on the other. Weremain wary of any purposefully deceiving or indeed self-deceiving proposition that states tohave definitively overcome methodological nationalism whether it affirms its success on thebasis of political voluntarism (be reassured: we now live in a cosmopolitan age / be reassured:we still have nation-states to protect us from neoliberalism and neoimperialism); theoreticalvantage points (sociologys key concepts and methods are either coeval with or inimical to thenation-state) or indeed positivistic faith (we can now demonstrate that the nation-state hasbecome less relevant in shaping peoples lives / we can use similar empirical evidence toeffectively demonstrate the opposite claim). We shall neither be defeated, intellectually as much

as normatively, by the nation-states opacity nor claim victory over the difficulties it once andagain poses to us.

The distinction between versions of methodological nationalism hereby offered may helpcorrect some of the imbalances being found. The more we refine our knowledge of thefoundational period of the social sciences the less plausible nationalistic explications ofmodernity become. The more social theorys universalistic outlook comes to the fore the lessits normative and empirical Eurocentrism remains exercising its influence hidden from criticalscrutiny. But an equally important lesson from the works being reviewed here is that when itcomes to capturing the nation-states opacity there are no safe places once and for all. We areseeking a way for breaking up the deadlock between the reification of the nation-state and theinability of making any claim whatsoever on it. This proves difficult not only because of theshortcomings of our conceptual tools but because the nation-state has proved successful inchanging and re-inventing itself. We are after strategies that allow us to make sense of thenations past and main features without simultaneously attributing full coherence to thoseimages and turning them into the organising centre of modern political life. And the solutionswe are most likely to find will prove unstable and are bound to create difficulties of their own.The critique of methodological nationalism we are in need of requires the disposition to besceptical without becoming cynical, the ability to let the ambiguity stand without slipping into


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17relativism, the commitment to understanding without flying on the face of conflictingevidence.

The transcendence of methodological nationalism requires more rather than less theory. But itis a use of theory which, apart from the analytical mind, points towards a reflective mode; it iscloser to an intellectual attitude than to the certainty of a definitive set of procedures orprotocols. The move beyond methodological nationalism we are after must be prepared to goback regularly and re-assesses its own previous presuppositions and statements in order to seewhether methodological nationalism is being reintroduced from any door normative,ontological, conceptual that has not been appropriately locked up. It must be committed tograsping the substantive features of the nation-state as a modern form of socio-politicalarrangement but prepared to resist the temptation of making it the key explanatory variable ofmodernity. And it must remain suspicious of rapid assurances on the nation-states successesand failures, its fantastic potentialities and horrible demons so that it does not fall prey of thenation-states own uncritical celebration nor of its critics damnation.

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Chernilo Daniel - Methodological Nationalism. Theory and History