CHEMICALCORPS HISTORICALSTUDIES MECHANIZED FLAMETHROWER OPERATIONS NUMBER5 INWORLDWARII HISTORICALOFFICE G"'teEyCHIEFOFTHECHEMICALCORPS Scannedby MilSpecManuals MECHANITRRO\il'..RI N IIJJlII LTCOLLlXlNAHDL.MeX!)'N!Y.CMLCR'lS. HistoricalOff ice Officeofthe Chec !cAlCorp!' 14February1951 Scanned by Mi lSpecManuals '!'l>le18the:firstdraftofJ"l1Ul8 'nlrowf!rOoerntloD8inVorldVl'!.rII..'l'bia studyi8DOtpresented8S8d.finitiYeand officlnlhl_to17.but1_renrodncedforcur-rentwithinthe tftbl18hment theof& definl \lyehistory. And relatl.9toandadequacyof ereInYited.Atthe closeofthethe findfOTa3 foruseIn auchtothe Chief,HistoricalOffice,OfficeoftheChief Officer. ii Scannedby MilSpecManuals Chapter I II TABLEOFCOIITHnup. r:l1945. 14 If' HistC\';'S!HdPac,Vol.III,AnnexIIcl,p.3. Ltr,LtColJ A.. rnesE. Fl l1 meInstr'lC'tor",ea1Tl,OPEC toCGCorps,1:Feb45,sun:Peri "'rrower Installationana.'Irai:.:" :lsonL'3yte.I n[{istCWSl-::..tiPcc,\" 01.III IICl.Ref64. - 17-Scanned Eighteenp"riscoll e-mountedfle.'!!.'!!throwers..,,,renowtoNe", Caledoniaforinstallationint he7l 0thTank:Battalion.Theahip-ment"'88&Cco!!m8.niedby!minstal lati oncrewof navaloffi c er andfOUTenUstedmen ,!lIl datraininf:teamofoneoffi cera.r..done 16 enUstedman. Fouroftheseba t talions... erea ttachAdfortheRyukyusopera-tionasfollo ... s: 706th ?lOth 711th 763d TankBattalion 11II "" "" - 77thDivi si on - 27th" 7thII _96thIt 2.Employmen t.On9June1945,aftertheoperation ,Tenth Armyreportedthatnei t herthep erilcope-mountedflamethro",ernOT thebowgun.",ithwhichtheMari nedi vi8i on8vereequi pped,hadbeen emp loyeddur ingtheoperation.ThereWArevariou sr eaaonsforthia. Itwasbeli evedthAttheavailabilityofmainarnamentflamethrowera hadeli mina tedtheneedforamallone s.The27thInfantryDivision rt'mor t edthattheauxiliarywe8!'0nswerenotusedbecaulle8CO::1Pa.n:: froothe713thProvidonal?lameThrowerTankBattalion,which"' 8S equ1'opedwithmaina r mamen tflamethrowers,.... asavailableatall 17 times .OperatoT sreported theraneeontheauxiliaryflame tankva 8too fue lcapacityt ooandthattheywere 16 BiatCWSMi dPac,Vol.II, IIcl,p.41. 17 27thInfDiv.OpnsRpt- Okinava,1Jan- 30Jun45. - 18-Scannedby Mi lSpecManuals afraidofit becauseoftheincreasedfirehazard.The7thInfantry Divieionpreparedover12,000gallonsofthickenedfuelfor 18 the71lthTankBattalionandbroughtitintothecombatarea.In theearly pha.eofthecampaignthisbat t alionlostthreeflame tanka.twoofwhichburnedafterreceivingdirecthitsfromJapaneae artillery.Theflamethrowerfuelunitinoneofthesetanka burningofthetankcrewtodeath andwoundingtwo.Thethird 19 tankstruckamineandtheflamethrowerfueltankexplo cled.New. ofaccidentssoonspreadtoothertankbattalionsandcreated afearofflamethrowers.Operatorswereafraidof thembecauseoftheincreasedfjrehazardandcO!!lplainedthatthe rangewastooshortandthefuelcapaci tytoosmall.Someofthe tankmenemptiedtheirauxiliaryflamethrowersancl.hadnointention 20 ofusingthem. The7thInfantryDivisionreportedthatJapanesemediumand heavyartillerywastheprincipa.lanti-tankobstacleonOkinawa.A. greatdealofaccuratedirectandindirecthitswerereceivedbythe tanks.Inonecompanyeverytankwasputoutofactionordestroyed bythisdevastatingfire.Radiatorswerepunctured,suspension destroyed,guntubesdamagedbeyondrepair,finaldrivehousingswere 18 7thInfDiv,OpnsRpt-RyukyusCampaign,1A:pr-21Jun45. 19 20 711thTk:En,ActionAgainstEnemyRpt,RyukyusCampaign, 1Apr-30Jun45. Ltr,OmI0TenthArmytoemI0CPEC,9Jun45,sub: Throwers.InBlstCWSMi dPac,Vol.III.Ref114. - 19-Scannedby MilSpecManuals broken,andintwocasesflf>.:nethrowe r s andburnedtheir crewstodel'J.th.Theonlydefenseagainstartill e ryattackwa sma.in-21 tenanceofmaximumdefilade.Anindica ti onofthedan&eroffire 1ntanks1sobtainedbyanalyzingthelossesofthe706thTankBattal-lionwhichsupportedthe77thInfen tryDivi si onduringtheoperation. Twent y-sixtanksinthisbattalionwergcOTIPletelydestroyed,sixby satchelcharges,fourbymines,andsixte"! nbyanti-tw.kgun'lndartil-leryfire.Ofthefifteent hatburned,t hirteenburnedafterbeing ') ? hitbyartilleryfireendtwoburneda : terstrik1n{"mines."'''''Itis !'lotknownhowmanyofthetankA,ifany,containedfilledflamethro\"ers atthetime,butit iskno ... mtha tafterthiscamnaignbot hth"battalion andthe77thDivisionwerestronglyopp osedtoauxili a ry flame 3.LessonsLearned.Itis possible thisweapondidnotget afairtrialatOkinawaoecauseoftheprejudicesbuil tupagainstit duringtheea rl ypartoft heoperation.H01Vever,it waseclip sedby t hemuchmor espectacularan deffectivemainarmamentflamet hro ....1ng tank.Afterthisc !?mpai gn,t heComma ndi ngGeneral,XXIVCorps,ex-pressedtheopiniontha ttheauxiliaryflamethrowershouldbet aken outofthetanksandthemainarmamentflamethrowerestabli shedas asi nrlepurposeweapon.Heexplainedt rili ttheaveragetankerisgun 21 7thInfDiv,OpnsRut,ByukyueCampaign,1Anr-21Jun45. 22 706thTkBn,RyukyusOpnsRpt,30Jun45. - ;::.0-Scannedby MilSpecManuals consci ousasaresultofhiseb.r l:,- t 'rRi ni n;:' ,and.that .. ouldresori 23 tvt heuseofthegunwh9nheshoul d: 0 onnmitzion .Af ter thedivis ion i sexper i enCAatOki na.... 2. .Comnandlnf;Ge'1.oral.77tt-I nfantr:,Division .a.le,ofavoredtheempl oy:n9ntofarmore dflarn 9t hr o ... :-ersasarrhl'lry"eanon .Hefelttha ttheadcHt i c!'!.oftheauxiliary typeflamethrower anextrafiret anksequippec.... tith8:::. 11thro\o'erexplodedand24 eve:".tank\ot3,Snot:::'I enetrated.Friortothee:1.dof theoperation ,Ten thArIl1;"-"r eq..J.es t edir:llnedh"testiplllcn toffv::- t yt al".ksf r omOahuandthirtyfr omtheUni ted torep laceco:nbat losses.Theque stionB.!'OS9a ttheCe:-lt,relPacificCor,:,:::a."lda st o whetherornotflemathro ..... shoul d installe:lir.a n:,"ofthese:s.nks. Thisquesti on.... asr eferredt oTenthArmy ,..... ':. icht !'>.ati tdidnot wan tanyoft betanksequipped'..;ithfl3.:lle ..:.sehe.a. be encadeoftheweapon . E.Soutr.W' estPaci fi cArea 1.Suppl y5itup. ti on.Aiterattecpttoempl oy modifiedKl..Alflamethrowers0:1.l,!arinetanksin...:Dri tainopera.-ti on(Dece:nber1943- J:'!nua ry 1 tdec t ",dabarri c:: dedb'.li1 dine;whichhl:\.nks!J1ac hin3gunneda ndc a veopeninfs 8.ndanysuspicionsRreasonthehillsides.Ont h!?northernou tskirts ofBaguioth esecondt ankfiredsixroundsof7fi-m"1 .andaquan ti ty ofmachineguna!l1lT1unitionintoh!o"byt,.,o-foot0pen-ingin6 twentyYArdsfr omthefr omwhi chsninerfirewas coming.Asthetankmo vedpasttheCAVeopening,aBp tchelcharge

Persltr.eml0ICorp stoCC"7S,?nAOT45.In- 2!"i-Scannedby MilSpecManuals wasthrownwhichcausedaexplosion,butdidnot the tank, backedupRnr.firedsix roundsof75-Mm.and aconsi.derableamountof anur.uniti onint.othec,qve.The tankmovedonbut,astheinfantry up,theywerehp.lted"yrifle firefromtheofthecave,whichheldthembactforthirty minuteswhilea.nM4AlMediumtank,mountingoneoftheflame guns,"broughtforwa.rd.Thef1err.etankmovedopnosi tethecave andmaneuveredintopositioncrosswiseoftheroad.Sixshort blastsofflame,estimatedata"boutone-halfatank(twelvegallons), werefiredintotheCHveatarangeoftwentyyards.Two immediatelyranfr0'i1theca.ve,theirclothesaflame.Onewasshot down,"buttheotherranupthe andturnedasiftojump onthetar.k.He"' A.Skilled"byth3tank'sgunfire.Thebrushand grassnearthecaveweresetonfireandnumerousexploslonsoccurred withinthecave.AftertheexplosionshadceasedtheCavewasex-aminedandtheburnedbodiesoftht ....tyJapanesewerefoundinside. TheartilleryandmachinegunfirefromthetankhPdnot"beeneffec-36 tive"becauseofaturninthe nearthemouthofthecave. On ' 30June,priortotheendoftheLuzonoperation.threeother flEVllemi asionswerefiredb:'the775thTankBattalioninsupportof the25thand37thDi vi sionsinICorn s'zoneofa-c tion.The5'lccess oft ....oofthesemissions fartoincreasetheconfidenceofthi'! 36 USAFFBEdRrt296.IVseofFlameThrowersE4-5in Luzon,27Aoril1945." - 26-Scannedby MilSpecManuals battalionandthe13thArmoredGroupintheflamethrowerwr i ch hadproveditseffectiveness,wberethetank'sotherweaponsoo.d 37 failed. 3.Comments.Combattestsindicatpd severalmodlfica-tionawerenecess,,ov44,S'.1'b:34-5FlamE>.ThrO\1ers.In 12thArmyGrrecords.470.71-Apparatus.(?)Rad.CM-IN-27889 , 29A;pr45. Hi st.Rp t.Sec,SeventhArmy,1Dec- 31Dec44.InCML,;G. - 38-Scannedby MilSpecManuals 2.InstallationandTraining.Thefirstfourflamethrowers receivedintheEuro-;JeanTheatorofOpera.tions... ereissued.tothe 70thTank.Battalion,FirstArmy,andinstalledbypersonnelofthe battalion.Thus,whenflame arrivedforthe743c.end 747thTankBattalions.FirstArmy.thereweretrainedmentoin-structthepersonnelofthosebattalionsininstallingandopera-64 tingunits. Toexpediteinstallationandtraining.thetheaterrequested theWarDepartmenttosendOTerthreequali fiedjuniorofficersto asist1nthetankunits.Thesethreeofficersarrivedon24November andwereinadditiontofirsttwoofficers.whoweregentto 65 thetheaterintodemonstrA.tetheweapon.Thesefive throwererpertswerethenmadeavailabletotheFirst,Third,Seventh, andNinthArreiesfortrainingpA.rsonnelintheinstallation operationofflamethrowers.by20Novemberallo'ltfi ts wereengeredinheavyfifhtinginstallation.andtraininewere.in general.relegatedtoperiodswhenunitswere withdrawn fromcombat. situationtendednot todelayiDstallation, buttodiscourageit.66 64 65 66 Ltr.Actgeml012thArmyGptoCli'lO'sThirdandArmies.27Oct44,Bub:E4-5FlameThrowers.Infiles ofCmlSect.NinthArmy,T-16-A.CmlCSchLibrary. FrO!!!"Chemical\larfareServiceOfficersonACtiveDuty. it InOCCmlO,PersDiv,Br. 6thArmyGp,A/A.Rpt,1l 'eb45,forofNov,p.3. - 29-Scannedby MilSpecManuals On18January1945.NinthArmyreportedthatoffifty-fiveunitsreceived.twenty-ninehadbeeninstalled;nin'eofthem fittedwithtransmissionfueltanksandtherestwithonlythe 67 twenty-fivegallonGponsontank.Aschoolhadbeenconducted from2to5January.atwhichtwenty-onemenfromthe747thTank Battalionhadbeentrained.ofthe57tl:.Chemical alsoattendedthisschoolinordertobecomeE8 inflamethrowermaintenance.withwhichtheywero.chArged. IntheSeventhArmy.noflamethrowerswerereceiveduntil thef:rstoftheye"r.anrlthetacticalsi tuationatthCl ttimepre-ventedrapidinstallation.By23?ebruary1945onlynineteenunits hedbeeninstalled.Theseweredistributedasfollows:fourtothe 12thArmoredDivision, tothe14thArmoredDivision,threeto the191etTankEattali cln,2ndthreetotr.e7SIstTanir"Battali on. Schoolshadbeenheldandopentorsandmein t enancemenhad.been 69 trained. Alloftheinstallation",orkproceededunderseverehandLcaps. Theweatherwascordandwet,and.freQuentlythetankshadtobe 67 68 69 Ltr,emI0RinthArmytoHQCO!T'ZETO(CVIS),18Jan45, sub:FlameThrovrer,:s4R2-5Rl.Infilesof CmlSect,NinthAJ"'!1Y.T-16-A,Crr ICSehLib. Sq Army,OfficeofC'fll0,7Jl'\n45,"OutlineofFlf'...me '!'brower(E4Rl-5Rl )School. IIIn Memo,2dLtAlvineR.Irvinefor0SeventhArmy. Feb 45.Bub:RptonE4-SFlameThrowers.InCrlSect,Seventh Army.470.71FlameThro ..... ers.FuelsNo.2.Feb-Sen45.ORll. - 40-Scannedby MilSpecManuals 70 wi thdrawn combatsothatflamethrowerscouldbeinsta.lled. Therewasashorta.geoftanks,and commandersvereadamant intheirrefusaltoinstallflamegunsatthecostofanyofthe 71 tank' s t. Otherdifficulties,suchasmechanicalfailuresandvari ous technicalwereencounteredwheninstallationsweremade inthefield.Detailedinstructionsinthemethodofinstalling theflamethro\"erswerecon tainedinTBCWl?,FlruneThrowers Mechanized,E4R2-5RlandE4R2-5RlandE4R?-4R3-5nl,dated16October 1944,buttheseinstructionswerenotsufficientlycomprehensive. changesh " dtobemadeinth'!!interiorarrangemento fthe itself,andthesewerenotanticipatedinthemanual.Asa result,consiCierabletimeWASrecuiredtoinstallaunit.Inone typicalinstance,installationwa.sattherateofO!l eandF!hp..lf tanksp erda;V.ThisVIP S::'(losteclt ot.hree,)E'rday,however,when a'1o ther"'elderW!" Serrmlo ;vedend,,,hen wa scon tinueda tn1 ght. Thisi!lstallationtook-oleceinthe701stTan1r kttal1on,:Hinth Army,withtheassistanceof personnelfrom .the57thChemical MaintenanceComnany.Improvisedmachineworkwasdonebythe 70 71 In tervs,HistBr,OC wi tl-tColGilbertH.'::hite,C',/S, OffAsstCfor16Jul45;withLtEdwi!lG.Poos, CWS,TechCommand,Ed8' ewoodArsenal,Hd.,12Jun45;and withCap tJa'TlesK.LittYJits,WarPlansBr,OCCI'TS, 28Aug45. Ltr,Ci{SectETOUSAtoCC1;{S,7Feb45,sub:Information RequiredbyCWS.mc'w's400/359.IneMU/G. - 41-Scannedby MilSpecManuals 72 Illth MaintenanceCompany.Thegeneralprocedurelaid downbytheprovidedforinstallationbyOrdnance,under 73 theofCWS.Withtheexceptionoftheinitialin-stallations,"'hichwere byofficersfromthf"United thedirectedprocedurewasusuallycarriedout.After installation,theflamethrowerswerecheckedandtestedby chemicalmaintenancecompAnies,thenturnedovertoordnancemain-tenancecomanies,"d thCWSpersonnelassi intheinstallation 74 whentodoeo.Therewere,however,instanceswh",re installationwascarriedoutbytankba ttal10nsthemselves,wi th-outassistanceorinstructionsThebasisofissueof .E4-5'swas nineeachpertankbattalionand,althoughthefullissuewas1n-75 stalled1nthetanksofsomebattalions,manyoftheunitswere neverinstalled.Althoughoriginallyhadbeeninsistenceon thetwenty-fivegallontransmissionfuelunits,tankcrewsobjected toitittookup8?ace.Asaresult,itusuallywasnot installed. 72 (1)Ltr,Oml0,NinthArmytoeml012thArmyGp,30Apr45, sub:.echanizedllamaThrowerActivities(E4R2-5Rl).In CMLWG.(2)Ltr,Cml0ArmytoCOml0l2trArmyGp, eJAn45,sub:EtndMaintenanceofE4-5Flam'!thrower, Inc13,22Dec44,Reporton31s1tto57thCmlMaintCo.In Om.WG. Memo,';Ie t" BUb;:4-5Mechanized'!hro":ers . - 47-An:.;!'G!l.7 I nCML',,C. Scanned by MilSpecManuals 4.TacticalDoctrine .Bythetimetha ttheE4-5 badbeenintroducedintothe Thea ter ,officia lbeenpublishedbythet-tarD!'!partmenti nTra iningCi r cul ar'Jumber35, dated8Hay1944.Ingen'!lral.thedoc trines tre ssed'fourbasi c principl es:(1)thep r i :narymiss i onof flamet hrowe r s "'1'1.8identicalwiththatoft heportabl -e ,asa..,eap onofDsycholog-ica l... erfaretoconfusea nd theenemy:( 2)mechan ized flAmethrowersweretob- usedinconfo r mitywithexisti ngdoctrine fortheemployment.oftPJlks;(3 )i twesanp.u:T1l1 p..ry 'Ourpose wes'Oon ,t o u sedon l yint Rct1calsitup..t1ons.... hereotherwean ons noteffective:and(4)a sintank theuseofthe mechani zedfl amewa sseverel yli mitedbyt errainand weatr.er. fr omt h ..fiel drev"! a lthl:ltthefl amethro"'erexhi b-itedf argrea terp syc hologicalvaluei n t haninthePacifi c. Forexamnl e.i noneac t ion,wherf!t he:!4-5 ' swer eerr:p l oyed ,t t.e flamet hr o.., era towithinQnnr oxi ma tel y120ya rdeofa Germanmachi negunnes t,butc oul dgetnoDe sp i tet ha t fact,wa sfiredand ,althoughno r ef'. c hedthet ar get, theGermanssurrendered. Int hemanualswhichsetfortht hedoc tri nefo rt actical employmen toft anks ,offensivet ankect jonweBconc eiveda. sa &sSBult orat t Ack,..,ithp roceedi nginsuccessivewaveg - 48-Scannedby MiiSpecManuals inco-operationwithengineer.infantry,reconnaissance.and 83 artilleryelements. theflamegunwesprovidedas additionalweaponintank itwassoasto beeasilyadaptedtotheprevailingdoctrinegoverningtan": ilJ'arfare.ThisobjectivewasaccomplishedbydesiGningthegun ofthe14-5sOthatitwasinterchangeablewiththe.30-caliber bowmachinegunintheM4A2mediumtank.Thefir5tpublished instructionsontheE4-5indicp.tedthattheflameth.ro1t.'ergun andthe.Zo-calibermachineguncould interchan:e:ed".. hilethe vehiclewasonamission.Thischangecouldbeaccomplishedin aboutoneminute.Alatertechnicalbulletinpaintedoutthat theflamegunwasnotintendedasapermanentpartofthetank's armament,andthatit could interchangedwiththe 30-ca11 ber gunbyt:heassi stan tdriverbefore,during,orafteramission. Employmentofarmor,therefore.waspOSSiblewithoutany intacticaldoctrine.8S Thattanksequipped.wi th flamethrowerswereusedin accordancewithpublisheddoctrineforassaultbyar Moredunits isattestedbyace.pturedGermandocumententi tled,IIViev;of 83 84 85 FM17-33,Dec44,TankBattalion,Ch.VI,Sect..II,and 1M17-36,7Jul44,SupplementNo.1,EmplOymentof wi t hInfan trz. (1)TECW2,12Feb44,FlameThrowersE5Rl-5and per.36,p.xi.TC;:15,p.1.(3)TBCW. 17,16 Oct44,FlameThrowers,Mechanized andE4R2-4R3-ill, par.4",p.54. USCWCommi tte", ,ReportofReadinessforChemical as of1July1944,'P.55.InC.L'IW. - 49-Scannedby MilSpecManuals 84 AmericanCombatHethocls,"which8tatedthat"inattackingpill-boxes.twotofourtanksfireagainstthe 200to 300meters,afterwhichtanka'Wit hflac:lethro ...:ersadvanceand 86 knockoutthepillbox."Initially,it wasexpectedthatthe 87 flamethrowertankwouldbeusedagainsttheSic,f friedline, and,inaccordancewithdoctrine,theywOllldbeusedtotlbutton up"pillboxes,aftertheengineersnadbreachedthedr agon' a teethandbeforet heinfantryhaddestroyedtheobstaclewith 88 demolitioncharges.WiththP..tplaninmind,the747thBattalion,one thefirsttoavailthemselvesofthegt1n, installedt!'l..reeE4-5' sineachcompany 'stanks,litomakethe captureofpillbOxesandan ti-tankelitcheseas ier. "89";henthe twelfthArmyGroupr eceiveditsfirstofE4- 5 's,it appearedthatthe?wouldhavellinn"U.l'l8rableflametargets,"in theinvasionofGermMYandthatmanywoul d.be"improvi sedshe lters wi thonlysmallarmsthe r einwhichcan.betelytaken."90 86 ReportNo.10,ETO,12Dec44. 87. 88 89 Ltr,DrG.BroughtontoOCCWS,16Sep44,15,In TechLi bary,AemlC,Md. 5thInfDiv,Orani zati onofAs saultS"' cti onruldUseof SupportingArms,(AGFRptHo . ETO19Oc t44, C,p.2. 7 47th11n,AlA R? t,Nov44. 90 Persltr,Crd01 2t hArm;,- G9toDCC}S,7Nov44.In Cl!LHG. - 50-Scannedby MilSpecManuals !hroughoutJnnuarytherefore,tre?41thTank tacticaltraining,withtankfl nmethrowerssupportinr. 91 infantryAsaresu ltofexperienceintheuseofflameagainstspe-cificloc .!offue landpressure .Dl r1ngthigp eriod the18thTankBattalionhadnooPT-o rt un1 tytoits :necr.-snizedflamethrowers.Ac cordi ngtop latoonandCQuman j -ers ,theGer manswould!'lg::tat2000t o3000yards ,cut 11nion.... ther esult oiobserv3ti onsofprcoviousoperati ons .It\rr{asfelt 1:=,the time8tankc oul dman"!.lV"l'clos')enouc"to sui ta'\:'le!lemetar ge t. enenyfir"!\,: oul dknockedi toutbeforei tcould 124 fir e .Th",tensi o'"...."3; 5sohigh,hnc.the oft'rl",Alli es sosl owt ho ta r :noredunitsth!l! selvescouldnotbeecrp loy-edin !"t.:, ,CT.l0Nin t il.hr:rJ;{to(TolC12t l-Gp.30ADr J.1echan i : '?dFlameThr O'I,""rActiviti es I n124 WF:EdRp t,MroUSA.T:Jo .Jnn45,p.li . - 69-Scannedby MilSpecManuals accordancewithestablisheddoctrine.Armorwo:; sUS"lp44. l.n:1ist' l i r j}' ac: ,\' 01.IV,Annex!IcJ,Hef.J,p.7. 1011.1i6 .,pp .7-10. ScannedbyMilSpecManuals- 81-andfifty,'! ereshotandfiftJ- surrendared. 11 4.Conll'nents."iJocasualtiestoper sonneloccurreelas resul tofflamethr QVleroperations.Suchas:na.llnumberofnenhaobef'n trainee:fortheoperati on,oneoperatorandonedriverf f)reachtank, thatb::1 ttle becameapr oblen.[ uringthefi ghtinearoundTapotc hau,a.schoolYlassetup500;r,qrdsbehi ndthefr ontlinest otra.in additi onalmen.Theint'O' r estancconfirlenceoft. hemenintheYleaponis indicatedbythefactt hatthecrews".;rererecru:i_tedfromvolunt eersand thereweremorevolunteersthanwereneeced.l2 OneflametankonTinianwasoutof onLplus2bya seaminewhichblewoffthetreadandinjuredthetwooccupants.Since partswerenota. vailable,thistankwascannibalizedf orsFareparts. tankwasdeadlined thetwooperati onshecauseofmalfuncti oning ofthefliirnethrower.:-!owever,severaltanksweredeadlinedtemporarily JE' causeofmechanicalbrea1.cdowns .13 Supplieswerecarriedonthebasisofathirty-dayoperati onwith anexpectedrefuelingofoneloadperday .Itwasf oundthatthetank:; refueledontheaverageoftwiceeachday.Afterabouttwelvedays, 11n-d 12I h,. --2.... , p.11. pp.11-13. 13RPt,Operati onofilr oore dFlar.Je SaipananeTinian,21Aug44. AnnexIre],Ref .1,p.4. Throwersby4thDivisi onon InMistC-r:SPac,IV, Scannedby MilSpecManuals - 82-thickenedfuelranoutand"BunkerC"fuelfromshipswasused.This fuel,mixedwithDieseloiltoproducealowflashpoint,gavearange offHtytosixtyyards.Thein5_ tialsupplyofcarbondioxideViasex,.... hausted,butaddi tionalcylindp.rswereohtainedfr omNavyshi ps .Fuel ancpressurebottleswerehauledinhalf-tracksfromtheorieinaldump torallyingandalternaterallyingpoint s .Atotalofapproximately .36,000gallonsoffuelWasexpencedint hetwooperati onsbythe4th MarineDivisionalone.14 Sincerefuelingv;asusuallydoneatnight, thepresenceoflightsinsidethetankwouldha vebeenagreathelp. Sinceljghttankswereveryvulnerabletolightartilleryandanti-tankweapons,it wasrecommendedthattheflamethr owerbemount edin mediumtanksf orfutureoperati ons.15 B.PeleliuOperation 1.tBvelopmentofNavyIFlameThrowerandPre para tionfor Employment.Inordert omeettheneeddemonstratedatTarawa(21Nov 43),theBureauofOrdnanceinitiatedthedevelopr.1entofarUGgedly constructedflamethrower,witharangeofmorethan100yards,tobe inanLeVPorsimilarassaultlandingcraft.Theintendedploymentofthisweaponwastocoverabeachhead thflameduringthe 14rbid.,pp.3-5. 15cPA,ConferenceonFlame5Sep44.InHistC\iS:.fidPac, Vol.IV,AnnexIre3,Ref.p.11. - 83-Scannedby MilSpecManuals initialassaultphAse.It wasfeltthatbyusinE;twent;of units, atintervalsoffift yyards,abeach1,000yardslonr,couldbecoverec withflametoadepthof100yards.Afterneatralizingabeach,the flamethrowerV7a stobereturr: edt otheshi p,andtheLCVfwast obeem-ployedinlandjngtroopsandequipuent.On2March1944,thefirst.ten unitswerereceivedbytheITavyrepartmentandtested.InApril,twenty unitswereshippedtotheCommander-in-Chief,U.S.PacificFleet.16 On 29April,theCor.unanrlingGeneral ,VA.'IlphibiousCorps,reportedthatl1in viewoftheexcessiveweightoftheMarkIflamethrower,itssuitability fore:nployment5.Damphibiousoperati on sisdoubt.'ul'lamithatfiveofthe unitswouldbeturnedovertot heCOr.Jr.iandint:Gener a l,CentralPacific Area,forexperimentalpurposes .17E-srliin thefiveunitswerere-ceivedbythe4Jc.ChenicalLaboratorY,A.tOahu,wherei t\;assoonl earrJea thattheycouldnotbeinstalledinmeciumtanks.18 charar-teristics ofthisfh.methrowerwere:netfuel- 200Gall ons;rateof ejection- 2. 5gallonspersecond;sustainedfirinctime- 7Lsec onos; o:oeratingpressure- 475poundspersquareinch;plectrical;:,llitions:"s-te:uairatomized[ r ossweiGhtempty- 5,200 filled-Thefuelwas:rro?elledbyairofwhichtheani t 16Ltr ,C-in-C toC-in-CUSPF,19Apr4/.. ,sub:Throwers.In f.listCWS:.!icl?ac,Vol.III,Ref.9. 17Ltr ,CGVA:nphibCorpstoC-in-CUSPF,29Apr44,sub;:.!arkIFLme ThY'O"I'Iers.InT-!istC\:S:.1idPac,Vol.III,Ref .10. Cor.u:;pntVo .2,C:nl0CPAtoTk0anoG-J[r5PAY,6L:aJ" sub: IFlameThrowers.InP.ist . CtS:.!idPac,Vol.III,Hel, Ref.11. Scannedby MilSpecManuals - B4-carried10.5cubicfeeta2,000p.s.L,necetisitatingthenseof3 reducti nnvalve.19 OnJJune194/+aFlar.leThrowerDetachment,consi ofone 0fficerancthreeenlistedmenv,iththrp.et:avyJ ark:::flamethrowers andaccessories ,joinedthe1sti.farine:Civisj.onatCuadalcanal.'l'he:,.-\'.' erea ttachedt ot he1st:'arineAmphibianTractorBattalionf orthe p-clrp8seofrilountiniSthefla!nethr owersonLVT' sf erthePeleliuopera-tion'", hich schedaledf or15September.Thej obinvolvedsecuring thefl-3rr,et hrmversinLVT' s,:noc1::i f:,ingtheconstructi onoftheunitsto fitt hevehicle ,08visineasahsfactorychar giIl gsystf'ril,a ddi r, gtothe aircompressorequipmentt oprovi del owpressurp (0-150p. s. i.)airfor usewhenneeoed,devisineafireextinguishingsystem,trainingopera-tors,()btainings pCl reparts,tools,andsupplies,andassi stinginthe operati ona lplanninG'forwlplo;;n:lentofthE':un::. ts.Theflarr.ethrower h;:1 r1beende s igneeto\ .' ithstanGthevibrationsofanamphibious tract0ro!,erat:i n:;onl ancl ,.qnGnumerouscifficu.ltieswerpencountered. shie l r:issecurer't othF:flameGuntopr otecttheLunnervihrateci l oose ;insulati on(I nthesparkpluescrackecioff;t.hedamp climatecansedrusttoformintheairbankLsic.inori ginalrepory hottleswhichinturncl() sseciandbroketheairst rainersallowing todamaget heregulatorva lves;thefuelpUr.lpwascie signedt o 19H tp1f'1' .11 Jt:'\...,. 19' f44bV'rT .p,. ;:nl, c . : }lams,r.,UH,: .ay,su:.5.iav:,); Fh:neThrower!,!a rkI.InHi stC",S Pac,Vol.III,ftef.13. ScannedbyMilSpecManuals - 85-operatebyanelectricmotor,butthemotorhadtobereplacedbya !I jeep"enf, inebecauseelctrici tywasnotavailable. Inadditiontothe;.:arineswhooperatecthetractorsandmanned themachineguns,tenotherswereassignedtothedetachment;fourto IT1Ai.ntainancs ervicetheequipment;andsixtooperatethethreeunits. Ashortaeeofnapalmpreventedpropertrainingofoperators. Shortlybeforeembarl r ses l opes .I nt"'I]"Ieflametankacannoneerdisillou nted.ancafront lineinfantr yman ,,',' ho!.InCULl.ti. Scannedby MilSpecManuals - 128-..... hoonthp. se;:3.cvan tacest otheut::lost .Ca'/ ei n nn('t ocove ra ll 8Vf"TlUeSofa ppr oach interlock_ c1Jambers a.rnpleo: t or csofl :... t l2l""am."lun i-tior. .'..lr,OCrt:r ouncinstalla t ionsv:prefoundl':! Jich,atleastf or br ieff'o:..l l (a c.:co;rnori a t eove r1, 000c.en.defet lc er:)11150 ""1 ) 1 \)ft hf.curiousstoneho.lrialCUi:(!ee pinto ttl:: "in";oftenconnc. tecibytunnels.oftheopenu:r 6uno ofa llincl uci.r. ;:bur iecaerialbO!:lbS,"-l 'Cu seet.yt he enenyt oanextentalmostunec;.ua lleci n;,bePacifi cFrlemyartil-ler:'anC;-: Mortars\.. erpprRS tr.ti nh r ecnlinhersancwereusedt oa(Lreater extentI...haneverbefol'ei nmasst'! C rorbothc l ospsupportanc'th'ce:1erl11OJ fthf','Jermanc (lnc.:eptofdefenset nr. ('pth_a(; c ot huf r.lll t unll;,, . suppor tin;;:; trongpojntsc over inCallavenue sofapl.)roach mim'c ,andsupportedbyir,fantrycounterattacksandinfiltra-hopelf:::;u l jlant'cut-offent>mypockpt s"'fhichhel doutt othelast ::lan ,no!"int.hei nrividual3uiciQf?a ttacks,witt,satchelcharcesi:lIld :;X,:{8!1-1I 1__11 Scannedby MiiSpecManuals - 129-balesofhighexplosives,UStanksandpersonnel.Thoughnu-mericallyinferiortotheAm"'Ticans,thbJapansehadalllpletroops8lld munitionswithwhic htof ight.Thus,whiletheterrainonOkinawa allowedrelativelyoorefreedomforandtracked vehiclesthanon1woJima,thecombinationofd.eepmud.congested traffic,fi=e,andmineirestrictedtheu seofflametankaen masseto1.nrlldupaIfwalloffire"which,inSO!Il9instances.mighthave 71 beeneffective. TheJapanese47-mm.anti-tankguncaused.alargenu:nberoftank casualties.Thesegunswerefoundl ocatedinpreparedpositions.such ascavesandburialvaults. tunnelsservedaspassageways formovementofgunstoa.1 ternate posi tiona.Posi tiona of guIleon8da:,- wer eoftenocc"J.piedduringt hef ora.ctionor..the followingMostofthean t i-tankfire wa sclose-range flanking'fireatranf 9soffl' om 300to800yards.OnsomeoccaiHOCS theenemyallowedoneortwoleadtankstopassthroughtheirfiel dof fireandthenopenedupontherea.r Anotherpracticeernploye4 bytheenemywas-:' 0letatankturna roundexposingthereareD!ne compart::lentbeforefiring.Ene!IlYanti-tankfirevasrapidandaccu-rate.:i::venthoug:-_ thegunswerel ocatcincaves,theterrainusuallj tankmovementsinto fieldsoffire.Thegunswere 71 Hi atCWSMidPac,Vol.IV"Ann'xIIc3,p.34. - 130-Scannedby MilSpecManuals hardtodetectbecausetheenemywi thdrewU l,elili r.- totheceV 30i!ladbeeD.fired,and"'t>'!cau6et hsj'",",'eretiredfrom poei tionswell totherearofthemouthofinclosures.TheJapaneses mokel ess> weealsoafactorcon tribut ingtothpdi fficultyofdetecting theguns.Thelargest a..c.ti-te.nkfir'::-Qceivedt"h",battalion was?&-mn:.Onorleoccas! "r,arO\Uldoft:-.i ec.:.li berpierceJ.thesiaeofa tankbeneaththeapoD8onandenteredanapalmfueltank,butdidnot 72 igni tethefuel. NarrowrOAds,shellholee,andmudcau8edmanytanktothrowtheir tracks .Thesetankawereabandonedand,atnieht.becametargetsfor 73 theenemy.... hodestroyedthemIo'itbsatc helchElrgesand.incendiaries. IntheOkinawaoner ationthearmoredflamet hroversweregenerally attachedasacompanyofeighteenflametankatoatankbattalion,which inturnre-attachedaplatoonofsixflametankatoeac htank:c0!!llallY. Thetankcompaniesthenusuallyattachedaofthreeflametanks toeachregulartanknlatoon .Normallyastandardtankcompany8upported aninfantryregiment,withits nlatoonsInsupportofinfantrybattalion Wi thinthetank-infantryteam,flamet A1lkewereemployedindifferentwaye. 72 Rq?l3thTkEn.AlARpt,ArmoredFlAmePr ovisional, Cha!>_VII,p.1. 73 !.ill.. Scannedby MiiSpecManuals - 131-Insomethey attachedtoactedasanintegralnartofthe tanknlatoon.Inotherinstencestheywereattl'l,chedtoatankplatoon endremainedinaforwardassemblyareaforusewhenasui te,bletarget wasencountered.Insuchcasestheflametank cRlledupandsun-lJortedbyothertanksuntilitaccomplisheditsmission.Underthese condi tiona,thetankplatoonle8dercon trolledtheactionofth. tthe]a rgeofenemy killedandtheenemyequipmentdestroyeciclidnotindicateth"!ttmevalue ofthemainarmam9n tflameThetrueva lueoftheweaT)onwa s provedbyitsabi li tytodrioutofhi S'PreTIA-re elnosi tions 74 Ibid.,Chap.VIII,-p.2. - 132-Scannedby MilSpecManuals intotheonenI" hereheWP-. S1d.1l9clbythe troOps . Thefollow-ingliEtgivesthemostcommonmisusesofthetanks: 1.Useofthro" er fortheirmRchinep;un fireonly,outinfrontofthei nfa.ntry';o1ithout an;'sur.rport. 2.FailureontheTlP.rtoftheinfantr:vronl1.te.nkCO!!l-m,anderstot ak"ethead.viceoftheflR.methrower commandersastoproperofth"!weapon. 3. supnortonthenartoftheinfantryend tanks. 4.Theuseofflamethro\on'>.rstoburnl a re;eareatar-gets'\o,herethere1 snoknownresistance.AI thour-h 1snecesse.ryinsomecases,itiswellforthe infantrytobearinmindthe.tthesunnlyofflame islimi tedandcarmotbeusedtoburnane.thfor theiradvAllce. 5.Failureonthepartoftheinfantrytomoveunand quic'ldyoccunythep.:rounotak t,R.,;ukyusCampaif"n. 77 17thInfRegt,OpnsRpt,R;yukyusCs,"1pllirn. - 134-Scannedby MilSpecManuals regiments,since,inmany theadvp..nceW;:1 Sslowed.down78 ablyashortageofthem.Thel84thInf/tntry7thDivision recommendedaminimumofoner>latoon(sixtanks)offlametanksassuo-79 portforeachassaultbattalion. The27thInfantryDivisionreTlort"ldthA. tthearmoredflamethrowers weretoalimitedextentforburningout andc nvesend forgeneralmopping-upoperationsandha dnerformedthesemi ssionsinan 80 excellentmanner. The96thInfantryDivisionrerortedthatduringthemop-upphase allcaveswerebeingblownandsealedandtheenemyWA. Shidingincane fields,tallgrass,andbuildings;theflemetankswereusedextensively forclearingoutthoseJapanesewhoa t temptedtousethistypeofcon-cea1men t.Itwasrecommendedthatinthefuturethecompanyofflf'.lI\e tanksbeattachedtothemediumtankbattalionsufficiently nriortoan operati ontopermi tdetailed andco-ordina tedtrainingofthesetwouni ts 81 andthesupportedinfantry.The382dInfantry,96thDivision,reported thattheflametankwasoneofthemosteffectiveweaponsusedatOkinawa, endthat"whenallweaponsfailedtothesuicidalenemyfrom 78 32dInfRegt,CombatOpnsRpt,RyukyusCamoaign,OkinawaShima. 79 80 81 184thInfRegt,OpnsRpt,RyukyusCatrrpaign .InFistCWSHidPac, Vol.IV,AnnexII c3,'P.99. 21thInfDiv,OpnsRpt,PhaseI,NanseiShoto.InHistCWSHid Pac,Vol.IV,AnnexIIc3,p.99. 96thInfDiv,ActionRpt,RyukyusCampaign. - 135-Scannedby MilSpecManuals his defensi vetheflametbroYingt anKs,whenthey c oul dreechthenoe1t1on,wouldquicklyMe.82 The763dTankRattalion,attachedtothe96thDivision, t hedemandfo rtanksalwaysexceed9dthesupply.Itvasalsore- t ha tin ca sesinfantryfAiledtooccU'o),anareawhich hadbeencleAnedoutbytanksAndflametRnks ,thusnecessitAtinga repetitionofthe8Meworkthefollowingday,e ndpivinptheM 83 onnortunitytobolsterhisnnt.i - tankdefensesint hAt!,! osltlon. TheXXI"Corosreportedthl'l tthf!ofsmallinfantryunits was,in{'t'eatmeAsure,the'ProgressofcloselyknitinflUltry-h.nkassAult teams ,infBlltry-demol1t1onassaultteams,andinfMtry-fiAmethrower assaul tteams .It ...recommendedmediumtanksb emadeavail-abletotheextentoftwothre'!-comyanybattfl.l1on8percorpsofthree div1 8tons.134 TenthArmy'sAf terActionReportsubstAnti a tedthereportsofthe unitsnsF,lvenfl.bove.ItW8.Sfeltthatthebatta.l1onnotthep r oper forflamethrowersbeCAu seflametankwerea lwp-ysattac hedtootherunits combat,thebattalion commanderandhi sstaffwithfewduti esAn drp.snonsibilities.Itwas 82 382dInfRept .OpnsRnt ,Okinawa ,1AT:lrll- 30194 5 . 63 84 76:3dTkBn,RyukyusOperationRot .InFiletPac,Vol. IV,AnnexIIc3,n.101. XXI VCorns ,ActionRn t,Ryuk::"UsCampR1en .InR1stCI.TSt-'idPA.C , Vol.IV,A"'!nexIIc3,p .102. - 1 36-Scannedby MilSpecManuals thRtaflamethrower: s nk: bear.dec.asRnor{'"anic 85 uni ttoeachtRnp:battalion.The'l'nnk:Battalion'st '-'nv.swere V4AI WqSi nferior1n'!lobilitytot he tanks ,with whichthreeofthefourAr my t ankbattal i onsi nt heoneration throwersbemoun tedintheM4A3,orAr'lode lequalinmobilityfi n dnro-tect1veRrmo'!'tothee(]uin,:!ontofunitstobesunnorted. Onthematt.,ro fretentionofthe75-mm.Funinthefl amet Rnkand ofmountingthe co-axiallywiththecannonbarrel,theTenth Armyconcurredwiththe713thArmoredThrowerBattaliononlyif thefuelcClpacitywerenotr educed,a ndprovidedthf-'ttheca'PAbHi tyof thefl a.megunwe.snothandicappedthereby.It is p ossi blethatthe Co mmandingGeneral,XXIVCorps,WRScorrectwhenhestatedthatthe averagetankerwasgunconsciousbecauseofhiseRrlytnliningandmi ght resorttotheuseofhisPUnwhenheshoul dbeonamission. TheTenthArrrryrecommendedP.3600 traversein steadof2600Alluni te ren ortedth8ttheIDA-inflexiblefuellinetothe,qunhadashort11 fe andtha truntureswerefrequent.InP..normRId8.y 'So-perRtlonoverFUgf': ed terrAin,numerousleAks infuelan dpre ssurelines,necessi ta- er7eatdeRIoffirste nds econdechelon Thenressure reE"Ul at orvalvere quirec0.gree t ofRdjust mentthrouf':houttheoper a.-85 TenthArMY,ActionRpt,Ryukyus.InHistCT:,'S"idPac,vol. IV,AnnexIIc3,LJ.102. - 137-Scannedby MilSpecManuals tion.ThesolenoidAndothervalvesontheflamethrowerOperatedelec-trically,butitwasbelievedthatmanualooerationwouldbemoresatie-86 fp-.ctory. Fuel.After testsonnapalmmixtures,r?nPinvfrom 'three'0 ercenttoninep ercent,andalsoonmixturesof}.Tavy"BunkerC" fueloil,asixnercentnepalmmixturewit hFasolinewa sfoundtobe 87 themostsa tisfactoryf ue lforall'Ou!"'()oses.Atotalof183,000ge.l- ofsix'Oercentnap almfuelwasmixedfortheTenthArmyduring December,January,andearlyFebruary.Lessthanthirty percentofthis fuel,whentestedinthetargetareas,hadaGardnerviscositycorres-pondingtothatoffournercentfreshlymixednanalm.ItsviscosityWaS 11 ttlebetterthanthatofgasoline.ItthereforebecamenecessAryto discardmostofpre-mixedfuelandtonrepBrefuelinthefield. MixingwasdonebytheArmyCWSDepot. chemicalservice troopswereavailableandquartermastertroopswereassignedtoassist inthetwofuelmixinFunits.Thesemixingunitshadbeen builtatOahuandeachacapacityofgallonspereighthours.It wesnscessr-e rytooperatethetwouni tscontinuouslytofillthedemands ofthe7l3thArmoredFlameThrowerRattalion,whichexpendednearly 88 200,000gallonsataneverincreasinr- ratedurin{,:theO'Oer8.tion.}(pnalm 86 87 Ltr,CGTent hArmytoCG POA.,27Eay4;:) ,sub:Reco:n.rnendedChanf' es ineonstructiononPOACWS-HlHechanhedFla!!leThrower s.In ..lG. 7l3th AFT,Prov,A/ARot,ChapIII. 88 LtCol'im.R.RTJtofOfficialIT'rRve1toCC".' S,28Sep45, Sec tI II,p.17.I n - .138-Scannedby MilSpecManuals wasallocatedbytheArmythroughcorpsB.nddivisions.Divisiona11o-catedfueltotheflamethrowert?nkcompanieswho,.,erea'bl etodraw direc tlyfromChe mic?.l'I,'erfa,reServicesu'ODI ypoin tsinex?.ctlythe 89 811mey.:e.yinwhichtheydrewothera'11llTUnition. Inorderto'Oreventthedet"'riorationofngpa.l!!lthic1cenedga soline. the43dChe':ltcalLa'borfi.toryCorypanyatOA.hudevelopedamethodforsta-'bilizinr- thisfuel.Thisnrocessconsistedof1.6percent finelygroundsilicagelintothesixpercentnapalmthickenedg P.so-90 line.TheMarineshade: reatdi fficul ty...,rithunsta'blethickenedgaso-lineandweret hefirsttorequestst a'bilizedfuelfrom Ql theC','lSDepota tSc ofieldBPrrecks,Oahu.-ExtensionEose.AfterthePelel1uon"rationit WrJ. Ssusgested ths.titHould'beoftremendousheIri 7'theauxili .o,rytypeflaMethrower tank sc ould'beequipp edwith200feeto fhir-h'O ressurehoseforusein flamingc avesand.'Pill 'boxesintheterr ainwheretankswereuna 'bleto apnroachwi thinfirinsdi st a nce. 92Afterthe1woJ1ml'!.opere.tionthe 2dBllttr:. li on.24thr9'portedt haton'!lImyoccasionsareelof flexi 'bleho seextensi ononalargeRonsonfla.methrowertank",ouldhave 'been!!lostvalua'ble.Thisextensionhose,,,ou ldenableinfantrymento 713thAFTBn,A/ARDt,Chan.IX. 90 SeeAnn en si:t::7for1\detailedtechn i calren ort. 91 92 LtCo l':.'illitlr:1R.l.Il'mll,RotofOfficiAl'1' r qvel,toCC1,.,'S, 28Sen45 .InCVLiG. Ltr,Cml0POAtoA(', fo r:F'ldOpns,13Jan45. - 139-Scannedby MilSpecManuals "larkinclosetofortificati onswhichcouldnotbei-ipproachedwith safet ybyanancarryingaheavyportablef la:nethrc,wer,orv:here theterrai npreventedtheuseofflanetanks.93 TheChemi c a l\'iar f areinHawaiiconductedexperiments withextensi c.nhoseand,on27February194 5,heldade:nonstrat ion f oragrou pofinterestedof fi cers,using400feetofs tandardi,t1chrubberfirehOSE,i nstandardfifty-foota ttachedto theRonsonflamethr owermountedinmediumAflamerangeof fift ytos i xtyyardswasobtained.ASaresultofthedemonstration, the'l' enthArnygott hreesetsoftheseextensionhos eforthe71Jth Ar:noredF13.r'l8natt alion,"ihichlaterprovedthej rvaluei n s everaloptankseachfor anormaltankAsaresultofoperationalexperience,this organizationwaschangedtoenablethe ofhalfsouadrons.One regiment,the141RoyalArmoredCorps,W8. S?ovaile.oleforthe}Tormandy landing. threeregiments,the141RoyalArmoredCorps,the 1stFifeandYorfarandthe7thRoyalTanks,wereformedunder abrigadeandattachedforadministrationtothe79thArmoredDivision. ThearrivalofCrococ.ilesinItalybegl3ninAu{:Ust1944,andtheorgani-zationeventuallybecamethe51stRoyalTanks,whichwasmadeunoftwo squadrons,eachwithsixteenCrocodiles.InIndiaandtheFarplans calledforoneCrocodileineachtroopofthreetanksinthefighting squadrons,i.e.,fiveflametankspersquadron.andflamethrowerswere tobeapartofthenormalorganization. Theseweaponswereini tiallyheldin ,.Armypoolstobe drawnasrequired.Thissystemprovedunsatisfactorybecauseitdid 113 ForacomprehensivetreatmentofBritishflamethrowers,see Hiat (British),III,\{arfare.InCMLWG. - 157-Scannedby MilSpecManuals notensuretheavailabilityofequinmentattheneeded,the ofmaintenancewaslowerthanwhenthAwasheldby uni ts,andtrainingdifficu lties'WereproevAlen t.Twenty-oneArmyGroup p olicyto ' ,'erdtheendofthewar forsix't/asps(V8rkIIC)tobe l!lountedinea chinfantrybattalion,lithtwenty-fiveper-114 centreserveincorpsandarmyTF_cticalDoctrine.Theessential oftActicalem-ploymentwere:(1)thoroUhreconnaisBA.nce;(?)Adeouatefiresupport; (3)if:olatetheobjective;(4)usesufficientflrune- threeormore gun s;(5)followimmediatelywi thsupportinginfan try;(6)-provide cut-offfireontheflRnka;end(7)eetthefllLllethrowersupanaaway quic'dy.Wa !"used.effec ti velyA.{"" ainstthefollowingof targets,whicharelistedbelowinorderoftheirsuitabilityfor 115 Attack mechrulizedflamethrowArs. 1.Dp.fenseintheopen- she1 terpi t s,l'I.no. trenches. Naturalcover- ditches,shrubbery,stand-inpcrops,:mrlercgesofwoods. 3.Fieldfortifications- ni11boxAs.dugouts, bunkers,and18.r gerforts. 4.Forti fi[luil di'""I f" s-intowns andvi 118.t'"e s. Co-o-peration\\1.ththeinfe..n try'Wasstres$ed.ThefollOwing-POints wereconsideredessentiAl: 114 Ibid,pp.20,77,91. 115 LectureCP..p t Ar",? ,Arsenp-.l,!'d., 19 48.In- 158-Scannedby MilSpecManuals 1.Contactbet"eeni nfnntr y tankcom-mandersshoul dbeeste. bli shed8- t all l evels.De t ailsshouldout toge ther. 2 .'!''.. n!-- t hr owersshouldbeplacedin suyportoft heinfA.ntry. 2.Intercommunica t ionof ?ndunmi stakable aree s sen t i al. 4.Co 'ltposi ti onofden endonthe natureoftheterraint heof enemydefense s .IfmAneuverabi l-ityisrestricted ,t A.n1{son erate1nsun -'l')or tofi nfAntry;inopencountrytenks theattack.Inal lcases ,guntanks insU'!,rport. 5.Usecoverinth"l8nnr o.'lch.axis ofadvancemayb.,.usedinfantryAnd t ank sinordertotakefulladvantageof cover. 6.Thei nf antr ymustfollowupi mmediately. r refe: ablyusingtroopsfrom r e-serve ,bef oretheenemyhasachanc eto rec over. For!!L'ljorassault sonorganizeddefense s,fl e net hr owers""ereem-p loyedinmas stotheiniti aladvp.ncewherei twaspOSSibleto Eett hemintoapositionwit hi noftheenemyf orwarddefenselines, ei t her orbeforezerohour .This ofsupportcoul dnormallybe carriedoutonl ywhere l i neswereasina canalorrivercr ossing .Ingener a l,flp-met anksweres t sinet organizedpositi on saftergap shadbeen'TI8sideofroad,wereto fl ninepositionsinhedgerowsenrouteto :SonRenos.An l a t oon ofi nf an trywasto8,dntncebehinde;;.chtroor>ofCrocodiles,".rithone sectionil edtofolIo ... ,i '1:r.lec.i "tel ybehind.thefb.m'?tank.'!I he obj'?ctivewr' st ob"!thorUvision8rtill"ryuriorto H:o lus20 ,','iththEa ssist a!1c'?ofsmokeon b eyondtr."!objective. Ar eh"!f.\rsA.ltoo1.rn lcewi ththoinf8.nt r ytocler:1 0nstr2tetheI'l.b ili ty oftrooT' stow8.1kthroUf' htr.efl a:neonceit""R Sor..th"!{! r ound.Al thoCl..'h thedemon strators'cootss c fferecinthenroce s s ,thl:)rehearsa lW? S CO'lsi c.eredworth... ::Ule'.!hontheinfe.ntr yentered.Le"Po!"!.Re1)oS't,ithout casual tiestothe':1s "!lvesortotheCroc odi l e s.Apoli te"than:("you, 'r:ea reOKnow"fr omt h ep latooncO:TInanderandt heCrocodilesturned about,leavingthei nfant rytoco!'.t inueonitsWP,:7 .Unfortunately, thisoporation,theCrocodiles h eldtooforwArdforsev-eraldcl ysanrl.suffered casual tiesfrom"!neroymortarsanda.ir Intheep.rlypa rtofJuly,CrocodilesI,.;ereusedtofl?JD8 woods,hedgerows,villa&, es,houses,Mc hine["un-P OSiti on s,a ncltrenches andwereoftenc R.ll"!dUDontop"!r formi mpo ssi bletasks. Thefir s tCrocodi leactionofsquadron occurredon17 Jul]1944.InthisactiontheysU:T)por tedf'th_ Bp.ttfl.lion ,S"!afor.th Righl enc1_ers,f).!1 1n r ovedtobemosteffecti vein run nests.-->" Fi Gure16 . Scannedby MilSpecManuals On14September,the1stBattalion,116thInfantry( lessCo:-::pany A),supportedbyoneplatoonofthe12lstFngineers,oneplat oonof4.2-inchchemicalmortars,three75-:nm.tankdestroyers, andthe 14lstRACTankSquadr onYfa3orcerec't orecl.'.c ethef ort.T heengineE:r pla toon,undercoverof4.2morta rs moke ,swe ptanetapedatan'{lane theminefield.CompanyC,116thI nfantry,he l dpos jtionsalong thesunkenroadt ot hp."!'lestofthefort.At1645hoursonlL.theinitial TIaslaunchedf r omatank area800meters northwe s tofthef ort.Compan;yCr eoainec.inlinearoundthef ort whi leCompanyBacc ompaniedthreeflametanksmov ini ncolumnfr omthe tankasse'11blyarea.E::n [; ineerplatoonwasinr e serve .}'ourGun tanks thecommandt.ank) ,aneithree75- mrn .tankdest r oyers (SP)u_IOfiredinsupport.Sincevisibilitywasexcellent,themortar bymaint aininGasmokes creenfroneastofthefort,f ore-stalledenel'1Yartilleryacti on.fift y-pounddell oli tj onchar8es1iere carrieob:'aboutsixinfantrymen. -r:henthpf i r stf l a r,etankreachedthesunY-enr 'Ja d ,itsucc e sGfully flamecthefortnntili t sfuelYJasexhaus t e c .TIJ en,:J u pport i nt:thR j jt attackedthef ort 1':) . t h75- m.:::.andr.1achinefire.Al-thoughthe':la""et ankwashit witha20-1nm.3hel l,:. tcontin'.lRC2- n actionunti litS1.: cr oppe c'int oac or: crete emplaceClentter:feetdecp.Thetankwasdi sabledbu tthereViereno casualties.Thesecone1 flametankstruckaminev:hichbleilo1'fthe Scannedby MilSpecManuals - 177-righttrack,killedthedriver,andinjuredtheremainingfourcrew t!le r.lber s.Thethirdfla;netank,whichby-passedthesecondafterthe engineershadclearedalane,reachedthefortatabout1800hours, butcouldnotgetintoflamingposition.A.75-011\ .guntan'r,fy,enty-firstArmyGr oL...p ,avaiLhl e , Sher'nan-Cr ocodi lefla Gethr oY' ersY;hi chhad':: eenffianufC:l. c turedbythe British,werEi s suedt or inthArmy . OpArati ons1'ri th2dArmoredD:iv\si on .SinceAJ1ericantroopsl ackp. d E'xnerienceinthet acti calemploymentoffl o.:netanks,co- operati onwith theinfantryv:asnutah,a;)- sgood ,nor,',ereoper a tions succe ssful. From20t o22Nov8:::ber1944 ,asquadronof'1stFifeCJ.rl CForfarye omanry wasattachedtothe2dAr::' loredDivisionf ort hreeattackoperati ons. Theresultsreflectthei nexperienceofcomponentelement s. Greenswf' illerAttack.':'ankForceXWC1f;t oassaultthevillagefr om theleftflankwi t htwotroopsofCrocodilesl eac.: ing,fo llowecib:,'Ci battalionofinfantry.Theartillerywastofirec oncentrati onsi'1'0!Tl:; minus5to\.1pbs10.Theattackwassucce ssful.Thearti llerJfire kepttheenemypinneddOtmast heassaultwaver;a pproachnc; .;{henthe artillerylifted ,theCr oc odilesbeganflamingt heoutskirtsofthe town,whi.leallsup:cortinr.;'wea ponswerefirir. g.'.:heinfantryclosecin themomentthef1amineceased.TheCrocodilesthenwithdrew.The successofthE'a ct t onyra sattributedt othefactthattheinfantry followedcloselybehindtheCr ocouilesandohtainedthefullbenefitof t.hes hockoft heflamethrowers.Casualtieswereveryli t,;ht. 129Ltr,CGtlinthArmytoCGTl'I'elithArmyGp,.31Oct44,sub:Special F4ui pnent(F1a;nE'ThrowingTar.ks).I n12thArmyGprecor ci s, 470.71,Apparatus. Scannedby MilSpecManuals - 180-FriealejenhovenAttack.Theplanofa tt"ck' :a sthescb1 . asabove, huttht=:ti:ninCoftheattackViasthrOt'moffhyrninefielc 5whic hprev"Onteo. closeco- nr c:i n:J.ti uf!betwe eninfantryamiarrwr.TheLr oco(; ilesH. 0VanCec afterknr. ;1n hadapparentl:,heenclearec,butr anintoun-locCltpcminefie l os\htchknoc keC:ou tthre eCroc oci lE)s.Thef ou rthCr oco-eilesuccpededinf13:' '1:ingt heH:;:; eofthF.t,OI'1Tl,butI'.'aslaterui tched. Verzenhau s enAttack .ThreeCr ocodileswer pt otheassault infantrycom.panies. acdengineerunitsweretot:uardtheflanKS, whileanarti11er:ls:nokecoric e rltr a t ionWa st obepLcedonthevi l18ge 3.l! C() nt heflan'v: sfr :)IDH!:linus15t o:ipl u sJO.ThelineofCf. :xlrture : ortheinfantry-Crocouileassaultwas300:yardss outhv:estoft heob-jective.Theinfantrywa sto,j oint heCrocoGilesor.thelineofce;;a r-t'J.reat!!minusJO.tjhentheassaultr;aslaunchec,onlyapartofthe infantryhadjoinedtheCroc odilesandt :'eprot ecti vE)s:nokescreenhad dissipater:: .TheCrococ ilesv,eres oheavilyeng ageebyaIlti-tCill ":fi re a stheyapproac hedthetm.nthatall-' ,erecestr oyed.l30 VICorptlOperdtions.On10DecEY:1 ber1944,theComruancinrSenera.1, VICorps,reql1estectheComnanc incCeneral,SeventhArmy,tomakeClvail-al;lp.t Yie lvOhurchill-Crocodiletanks,c ompleteVJithcrews,forllSP.in hr eachingtheMaginotandSiegfriedLines.Therequesta lJOETOUSA,Immed:i.ateRptt-.:o.14,16Dec44.InC:'L1;G. ScannedbyMilSpecManuals - 181-strongdesireforsuchaweapontoauementthestandardweapons.131 TheseflametankswereeventuallymadeavailabletoXIXCorps. 78thInfantryDivision.Asquacl ronfro::!thelstfifeandForfar feomanryoppratec.iwiththisdivisi oninJanuary1945dur ingthefi ght-ingintheSiegfriedLineintheHoerRiversector.1)2 3.Bri tishFlameThrowersF:nployedby Tr OODS Procurementf ro::!theRritish.Crococi iles.Therequirementf ora mechanizedfla:'1ethrowerforusebyUSforcesintheinvasionofthe ContinentViasGivenseriousconsiderationthr ouehouttheplanninephase oftheoperCition.Sincesuchweaponswerenotavailablefr om the UnitedStates,thepossibilityofprocuringandadaptingBritishf lane throvrer st otheSherman(medium)tankswasstudied.On6,March1943 , theprototypeCrocodileflamethr oi ler,mountedontheL:hurchilltank, wasdemonstratedf orthefirsttimet orepresentatiesoftheUSArmy. Aseconddemonstrationforobservers,includingrepresentativesofthe AssistantChiefof;:,taff,G-3,ETO,andG-5,'WasheldinApril1943. Asaresultofthesedemonstrations,theChiefChemicalOfficerofthe theatersuggested,on27 totheAssistantChiefofStaff,G-3, thataninvestigationbeconductedtodet er minet herequirementfor mechanicalflamethrowers.Basedonastudymadebyrepresentatives 13\tr,CGVICorpstoCGSeventhArmy,10Dec44,sub:Suppliesand Equipment.400.34.In7thArmyCmlSecRecords,470.71- FT Fuels,Jan43- Feb45,ORB. 132Eist: 'onoq:raph(3ritish)III.FlameWarfare,p.67.Inc.,U.Y;Q. - 182-Scannedby MilSpecManuals ofG-5andtheChiefChemicalOfficer,it wasrecommendedthat100Sher-mantanksbefittedwit hattachments,plusareserveoftwenty-fiveadQi tionaltrailers.On6July1943thisrecomr'1enddti onViasfor-wardedtotheActingChiefofStaff,G-3,whoconcurredwiththerecom-nencati on,andreque s tedt heaporovaloftheChiefofStaff. ,On16July 1943,thethe iit ercommanderappr ovectherecommendati onandit Viasf or-warded':,0t heChiefofServices,Headquarters,50S,ETO,fornecessary acti on.On24July1943theChiefofServicesf orwaroe cit hecorres pon-dencetotheChiefChemicalOfficerfornecessaryaction. TheUSrequirementwassubr.ri.ttedtotheBritishflarOfficeon11 August1943,requestingthat100f18rnetnrowerunitscompletewith trailers,andtwenty-fiveadditionaltrailers,befurnished.Thisre-quirementwasheldbytheFarOfficeuntilfinalapprovalofaproduc-tionmodel.7asreceived.However,actingonthisrequirement,the BritishPetroleum'NarfareDepartoentproceed edwiththeconstructionof awoodenmock-uponaShermantank.Thismodel wascompletedandin-spectecon1October1943.TheWarOfficewasadvisedon5October1943 thatthemock-upinstallation wassuitableandthatworkwastobecon-tinuedtoproduceaprototypeoftheflamethrower.Theprototypewas completedinJanuary1944a ndWasEivenitsfirstfieldtrialsonJanuary 28.Subsequenttrials..,rereheldon3February1944,aty{hichrepresenta-tivesfr omSuprerneHeadquarters,FirstUSArmyGroup(laterTwelfthArmy Group),FirstUSArmy,2dand3dArmoredllvision,XIXCCorps,Or dnance, andChemicalServicewer E- present.Theperformanceofthe - 183-Scannedby MilSpecManuals prototypeViassatisfactory,buttheconstructionwasnotofaproduction type.Meanwhile,thedesignofaproductionmode lf orthe::14tankwas onhand.Thefirstmodel,fabricatedinmildsteel,wasavailabledur-ingthelatterpartof\{arch1944.133 TheproblemofmountingCrocodilesonShermantanksinvolvedthe useofpartsthathacJnotbeenstandardizedforl!'lou:ltingontbeChurch-ill tank.Itwasplannedtopoolcom.':loniteQs,whiles pecialconponents weretobefurnishedfromtheUnit-eelStates.AnorderforsixS!1er:nc'1n-CrpcodileswasplacedinEngland.Specificationsanddrawingsforthe s['ecialparts'!'feresenttotheChief,ChemicalV:arfareService,on30 whostatedthatdeli veryoftensetscouldbemadeinthirt:'CRYS, andthattheorderof100setscouldbecompletedinsixtyda;ls.134 ArmyGroc;.ndFer cesmadenoobjectiontothisprocurementprogramal-thouf, htheArmoredForceintheUnitedstateshadrepeatedlystatedthat notrailertJ' peflamethrowerwouldbeacceptable.135 3y,Tulythede:.lonstrationsinEnglandoftheE4-5flamethrowerhad convincedSupremeHeadquartersthatthisweaponwasunsatisfactory. Hence,on15Julythe3eadquartersreaffirmeditsoriginalorderfor100 ofthe"Crocodile,"4:far InETORecords,470.71- Flame Thr ower s,ORB. 134 iliemo,CTechDivtoAC for 8Jun44,sub:FlameThrower for:.lherman(M4)Tank- Crococile.In135( 1)10:,1,CTechDivtoC'TheatersBrOCCWSthru:ACCWSforHateriel, 14Jun44.(2)10M,ACcrlSforFldOpnsto(,;TheatersBr,20Jun 44.InCMDI"G. Scannedby MilSpecManuals - 184-Crocodile-ShermanswithtVJent,y-five, additionaltrailers,andurgecthat theor derbeexpedi tf>(;,l36But,s i ncetheCrocodileswereaney;'Wea pon \','hi chdidnotshowupwellouringthef i rstmonthofEuropeanl'i ghting, theenthusiasmforitdieddoy,'!', .On13 stGeneralEisenhowerad-visedt.heqri Ush ,ll noer-Secret3ryofS:'ate,rirectorofSpecialYieapons ancVehiclEs,thatlISForcEsciesirect ocanceltheirrequirementfor th ffiO,Cm1AdviserG-JtoCCml0BTOUSA,11Aug44,sub: VehicleFlameThrower.InCMLYID. 145(1)'Persltr,CCllO, 3dArmytoeC1'1!S,4Nov44.InCmX;(}.(2)A/A Rpt,ThirdArmy,1.Aug44- 9May45,Vol.II,PartII,crt,p.5. Scannedby MilSpecManuals- 187-!'edu.cedtheburnineteoperature. AtthistimetheCanadianHeadquartersinformedSunre'!leEeacquart-ersthatther ewereappr oxir.1C1.tely700obsoleteRonsonflamethrowersin theUni tedKingdomforl';hjchnonee dexisted .Theli arI:epartmentre-questedt hatbefor ethesewt::!rescrapped ,USForce:;;inEur opebeasked v:hethertheyl'lantedtheweapons.l46 On25 'l'vlelfth'Ar:nyGroup s t .:jtedthattheE4-5f l amet hrOl':ers'HereadequCf 'tefortheirneedsand thatnorequiret:lentexistedf ort hei'i.onsons .l47 :JeanVihile,on7:":ove'.:nheratBernea u,Be1t.: iulI1,acemonstr ationof thecarrier- bor ne\ 'laSheldforofficersoftheSeventhandr inth tl.r::lies .Asaresult ,theweaponwas rejected .Thechief objections ( l)unsuitabi lityofMaehalf- trackcarrier ,which behi ghlyvulner3;blet oaut.omaticweaponsandartill eryfire; (2)hckofs parepart3supplyandthecii fficult yofresuppl yoffuel; and(3)difficultyofobtainingpersonnelt l'ainedintheoperationand maintenanceoftheequiunentintimet,om'il{eitsuseprofitahle .l1 .. S TheSeventhArmyEngineer,ho\,:ever ,r equ estedf our\'[aspst obeusedby 146 Rad,SHAEFto12thand.6t hArmyGps ,18Oct44.InTwelf thArmyGp records,470 . 71,147Rad,Twe lfthArmyGptoSHAJ.:F',25Nov1.1. ,sub::n.amEJThr o'l':ers.In !'.;,elfthArmyGprecords ,470 . 71,iipparatus . 148 ( 1)HqNinthAr,:!l,i4,Minn t esof Sp'('ial30ard, lOOOlll! ovCW.InCmlC..,chLl.b ,1- 18 .(2 )H3.. stl.pt,CmlSec , HqSeventhNov1. /1,Pio).1- 2 .InC:.!L1i!G .(3)Ninth.V!:'!.y,HI?,t, 0- 3t,oCofS,1/.;';OV44.InenlCSchLi b ,T- l b. Scannedby MiiSpecManuals _188_ mineclearanceunitst.oproviceadditionalpr otectionagainsts n i p e r ~ andby-passedpillhoxes.A radiorequestt ohigherheadquartersre-vealedthatonlythedemonstratormodelwasthenavailable.Thedem-onstratorwasdeliveredtoanDrdnancecompanyformounting.Inthe absenceofdetailedplansanddrawings,difficulty wasexperiencedin installingit.Norec ordisavailableastowhetherit waseverem-ployedbytheengineers.149 EmploymentofSherman-Crocodiles.ThefourSherman-Crocodile flamethrowersde liveredt otheNint hArmyinNovemberwereissuedto the739thTankBattalion,Special(MineExploder),wherethey'I'lereor-ganizedintoapl atoonandcrewstrained .Thisplat oonmovedfrom Gulpen,Holland,toAldenhoven,Ger Qany,on9February1945.From9 to23February.Thepl a t oontrained1';i ththe29thInfantryDivision vihichhaC.usedCrocodilesatBrest.1'1hentheflamethrowerplatoon crossedthehoerRiveron24Februar y1945,theunitreceivedorders tomoveuptotheCitace latJulieh,Germany.Li ghtsillallarmsandma-chinegunfir eemanatingfromtherehadbet: nanuisancef ortwodays. A moataveragingabouteir:hty-fivefeetinwidthandabouttwentyfeet dee psurroundedtheCi t adel.Thewallsofthefort,whichwerevery thi ck,hacbeE"nhitinseveralplaces,butit wasstillaformidable obs tac le.Theplancalledforflamingthesouthwallaswellasfiring 75-mr.;.shellstoforcethedoor.Thefourflametanksstartedinto 149HqSevent.hArmy,Cm1SecHistHpt,}l OV44,p.12.InCHLV!I1. - 189-position.TwotankswhichtroublebeforereachingtheCitadel hadtobewithdravm.Theothertwoproceededasplanned. FlamingstartedwhentheCrocodileswereaboutseventy-fiveyards fromthewall.Theflamewentoverthewall.forcingtheGermanstore-treatunderground.Thegateswereblownopenbytwentyr oundsof'75-mm. shellsfiredbythetanKs.Theflametanksthenmovedtothegatewhere theyflamedtheopening.Theinfantrythenwadedacrosst hewater-filled moatintotheCitadelaslastfourGermansleftalivefledthrough thetunnelsandscamperedoutacrossthenearbyhillside.Thefamed Citadelwhichfellat1500on24'Februaryt oburnf ort wo days.150AftercrossingtheRhine,the739thTankBattalion,Special (MineExploder),supportedthe2dArmoredDivision,butthe offeredlittleforuseoftheflamet hrowers.151 4.RequirementEs,tablishedforMainArmamentTypeFlameThrowers BecauseofcertaincombatdefiCiencies,suchaslackofmaneuverabilitJ andvulnerabilityofthetrailer,whichhadbeenobservedwitht he Crocodileflame, throwers,technicaloU'icersintheEuropea'nTheater watchedcloselythedevelopmentofamainarmamentflamethrowerinthe UnitedStatesduringthesummerandautumnof1944.152 Thedevelopment 150 (1)Ltr,CO739thTkBn(Special)(Mi1lt: Army,22Mar45,sub:FlameThrowers. (2)A/ARpt,29thInfDiv,Feb45,p. Sp(M.E.)Hist,1Mar43- 21Nov45. toCml0Ninth InCmlC SchLib,6 .(3)739th\{edTkBn, l51r39thMedTkBn,Sp(M.E.)Hist,1Mar43- 21rJ ov45. l52Persltr,CmlAdvisertoG-3SHAEFtoACCWSf orFldOpns,22Jul1.4,. InCMLVIG. Scannedby MilSpecManuals - 190-carriedonbytheUa tionalDefensehesearchCouncil""asofspecialin-tere s t.Theresultsofthisdevelopmentwerereportedtothet heater inAugu st1944.153Th emainobjectionatETOUSAwastheinadvisability ofsacrificingtanksfortheinstallationofsuchflamethrowerswhen there!'lasalreadyashortaEeoftanks.Atthistime,however,field commander shopedthattheauxiliarytype( E4-5)thenbeingf urnished, v:ouldmeett heirneedsforamechanizedflameweapon,154InI:cember, limitedprocurementof!:la inarmamentunits,de signatedE12-7Rl, hadbeeninitiated.Atthistimeit wasthoughtbyArmyGroundForces thatt hisunitwouldbeneeded,eventhoughthea t erindicationshad beentothecontrary.It wasexpectedthatt.wentyunits1'louldhe available15January,155InJanuary1945 ,t het heaterchemical officerwasadvis edthatnoneoftheE12-7Rlmodelsw01,ldbeauthorized forexperimental be causeofthedemandf ortheminthePacific.156 ItwasalsoannouncF- dthattheflametanksshouldbeontheirwayto thet. heatersbythemiddleofFebruary.157 l 53Ltr ,OC(:1'StoCml0ETOUSA,9Aug44,sub::Flarne'T' hr owerTankI:-velopmentbyNDHC.InCMLWG. [-IqETOUSACt'"ST, OCCWS,28Aug44,sub:FlameThrowerTankDe.-ve lopment.Gno470. 71/303 .InC!,u,WG. 155 Persltr,I 'eput yCCWStoCmlAdviserG-3SHAEF,29Dec44.Ino.U,V!G. 1561stInci ,26Jan45 ,onltr,CCml0ETOUSAtoCCTIS,7Dec44,sub: Flame'ilir ower,\iechanized,E-7.InCMLWG. 157 Persltr,ACf orF1dOFtlSOCCYIStoCCm10ETOUSA,12Jan45.In CiII.XlD. - 191-Scannedby MilSpecManuals On14,Jarruary1945,theCommandingGeneral,TwelfthArr!lYGroupsub-lIittedarequestfortwelveofthefirsttwent yEl2-7mainarmament flamethrowersforoperationaltests,andreque s tedinformationasto dateofavailability.l58TheCommandingGeneral,SixthArmyGroup,how-Aver.,reportedthat,oo'l ingt ot heshortageoftanksandpersonnel,the valueofsuchaweaponWasmorethanoffsetby"tyingupl!therequired numberoftanks,thet rainingofnecessarycrews,andtheaddedburden toserviceunit.s.Healsostatedthatthearmoredf orcesUnCleI'his commanddefi nitely ,'lOul dnotgiveupanyoft hei.rtankst oprovi demain armaGlentflamethrowers.l59 On22Febrllarythethea t el'r eceivedinformationfromtheY,.arIe-partmcntthattenunitscomplete,,:ithf ourE-8serv:icingunitscoul dbe :nadeavailableby1May . Thisinformati onwasf ollowedbyathea t er requestthatshipmentbemadebyt hefirstc onvoyinMay.160 On13Januar y,theComrnanci ingGeneral,TYl"e li'thAr myGr oup,asked hisa r mycO!'llr.1andersf ort heirr equirementsf orthemainarr:ta."Tl entflame throwe rs.TheThirdAr r.1:'oidnotr equestt heweaponsbecauseoftheir 158Ltr,CGTwelfthArmyGpt oCGETO,14Jan45,sub!p.rchanizedFl ame Thr owers.470.71.In12thArmyGprecor ds,470.71- Apparatus . l591st Ind,1Feb45,onItr,C ArmyGp,3Jan45,nosub . FTFuels ,Jan43- Feb45 . ern l0ETOUSAt oGmlAdviser,C- 36th In7thAr myern1Secr ecor ds ,470 . 71, InORB. l60rnCO!TIi ngRad,!1qComZ E70USAto12thArmyGp,22Feb45,sub:Fl ar:le Throwers,t:echanized,E12-7R1.In12thhrmyGprecords,470 .71-llppara tus. - 192-ScannedbyMilSpecManuals shortrange,thetinerequiredtorefuel.,and,limitedopEra tiol'Ia1time. 161 TherinthArmyproposedaneventualrequ irementofonese paratefla;ne t hrowerbattalionperar"1Y,as'l'lellasoneflanethrowercompanytobe madeorganicwitheacharmoreddi vision.ItViasrecon:mendedthatthe specialflamethrowingtankshavethefollowingcharacteristics:( 1) rangeapproxioately100yards;( 2)fuelcapacityatleast150gallons; (3)rateofdischargeatl eastthreegallonspersecond;(4)tankto re tainitsj)resentprinci palanosuhsi diaryar?lar'l ent;(5)theent i re flamet hrowertobecontainedinthetank;and(6)onlyaminimumof presentstoy/aget obedisplacec .162 InApriltheinstallationofF12-7IUflamethrowerswasciscontin-uedbecauseoftheshortagp.oft anks .lo'henthe\ Ciraskedthe theatertodecideifsixt. y-fivetan'rc scouldbedivertedfr omAprilallO-cationsfortheinstallationofmainarma.men tflamet hrm;ers,the theatera [ reedthatt he;.- could.16J Opini onsat l evelweredregardingtheneeclforsucha'\':eapon,b'.ltthethe'J. t ercOIllffianderwas Y:illingtosacrificeSO:1etanksinordertoobtainalargeflametank. Theseflametankshacbeenl oacedonshipsthe. twereI'eacJ't osail\hen theGovErnmentsurrenderedatH.heir:1Son7!fay1945. 1611st Ind ,22Jan45,onltr,CG12thArm31 Gp'thirdAr rn;;r,13,Jan45, sub:\:echanizedFlameThrowers.In12thArmyGprecords,470.?1 Apparatus. 162 1stInd,13Jan45,onHI',CG12thArmyGptoCOt:i nthArm:;',13 Jan45,sub:zedFlame'l'hrovlers.InCrdCSchLib, file1'-18. 16JRad,ca .... CXJ ':'-64434 ,4Apr45.( 2)ha d,C;,1-IH-6615,7API'1.5. ScannedbyMilSpecManuals - 1.93-CHAl' TZRI V Dnploymen tofMeehan! zedFl ameThro .... ersbytheEnem,y Al tho"o.l.br.boU:tr.eI tnl1a:1a:td.&:":,,! es.... E", D... 1 th mocneJ1i zedflamet hr ower s ,the!" ?isnor ecordoft hei remplo;'lnen t against St a t estroop s . Sir.ceGer mp_1s.!e ret hef irs ttode\' eloTlfl t.:-.e i n ',iorld',1:3 "1'I ,i t1 ssC.irne .... hatsurprisinE;t hattheydidnotu sethemto af,:r:'!a terex tentin',/orl d;{ Fl.!"11 .Thep erfor ma.nceof"t ::e lr:ll:Ulle ... 1,'co sl nler : o!'t o::.ursa:dt l".ereI':ere :ot'1.T"Ol !!icel reasonsforAccor din& n8e:t10roff icial, rog::. t edaf t e rtl:e.... a r,Iii t :!. -: ""i, reatf ait hint hefl awet or owera s a'.",r-... i nnl nt;'deepon.:!nd,a:::es. rllb.S194,r eco:nrnendec..t ot!": eSt affttedevelopmentofPofla'll et:-.r o ....e ri,itr.arange of200yar ds ,butthiswasopposedthePanzergener a l ,Guderian.Hence , li ttl eworkwasac t 'tal ly.+"ter Gur khas .... er etol dtl' l'I tit \\'fl 5II Justr"notherk1ndoft a nlr ,11theyrellier'''end r .qeeinedtheirc onfidence.TherenOc nsualt:!.. e sfro!!!. theflrune ,HhlchhadbM!1.i'irectedI'l.tBcl oselyshutteredbuil di ng . Onthe h,q nd,o n'"ofthe t hr o14e r sW.?I':'Tockedoutb 'a ba?; oo ka(P. I.A.'!'. )firt"r an\lTlp or"Iindol,' .S1lcr.su ccessas t heGe!'l':'lt !1l sce. s eth?village.... .... sr"!ta!.cenbo.t er inlr.ytheGermans little of thr0wereafterSalerno:(1)the Germantactical3i tuationwas,onthe\\T!-ole,defensiveand,bydoc-trine,theflamethrowerisstrictlyaweaponforandspecial useintheoffense;(2)theGermanArmyneverdevelopedatypeof thickenedfuelwhichwouldgivetheirflameweapons,arangecooparable tounitedState&napa:w,ortheBritishF.R.A.S.(InJanu?ry1945, El':"lllIp,cE>ptnredinBrugselsyield.ed12,000gallonsofthickenedfuel, 19 1nwhichrubberwasusedasthethickeningagent,butit wasthen toolateforthefueltobeofmuchuse;)(3)the ofthe Uni tedStatesartilleryandanti-tankfire...!hichl1Iil.i tedGermantank operations. 18 19 HqVCorps,:UstRecord,Oct44,G-2Sect,FartI- Enemy Si tiDn .p.1. Ltr,DrG.Bro1.:.6h ton.?Jan45,'TO.26a.I nT'2 c:-;li brary,ACC. - 200-Scannedby MilSpecManuals C!W'T:wiV SU'!lIMIYandtvaluatlon A.SU.''':'I1'I&.l", 1.Proc".n'ementandS..lppl y .Theneedfo ramechanizedflame feruseB6a.i n s tJap aneso:de f en ses.. asr ea lizedi n1943after t :tebattlesofG"..ludalcp.nFl lAndBuns..i.tt hisearlydate1t'liasthe opini onoffieldcommandersthatJapanesebunkerandcavedefenses c ould.not neutralizedwitht hecO"lventionalartillery.mort ar. ncvalgunfir e .Agreatmanya ttemp t sweremadsi nt hefi eld t omodifi edportablefl amethr owersontanks.Tbe Qeexperi-ment smet",ithlittl esucce S6,p r imarUyb ec8'ue thelimited f acili ti e savailableinthefield,theunsatisfactoryignition sy stemont he flamegun .a ndthelimitedfue lcapacityofthe mociifl ed.portabl eflamethr owerf uelunit .&.OQutmi dc.l eof1944 ,tr.eMari neCorpsobt ai nedafew ::; /"-5a '.lxlli a r ytp.nkf r omt heUnite dStat e sand empl oy edt hemi nt he0pE>rat:!. on .I n81 tuat10ns..... heret ank s c oul d'beu s eoi ,provedf ar8Uneri ort otheportabl e t : .ro\l e r .ASar esultofs':ithmechani z. edfl a.'!l et hro .... ers . thedemandforauxiliar yfl runet ':"", ro"'!ersi::c T'?El sed.War _201_ Scannedby MiiSpecManuals producti onQi ino t t heneedsofthetheater duringnext year,18-l flametr.r owerswere"buil tinFJl.waii.In1 :'-')of t hes eunit s ,t h'?fuel9.ndpressu:- '3unitsweremanufact '.lr ed.l oc ?lly and.i nt her ema i ningthirt y-four,f uell.ndpr e ssureu...'1 i tSwpr e00-tainedfromt heUni tedSt at e s.Tn eflameguns...... eremanufe.ct'.lrec_in Hawaiifr owc:desi t;nobtainedfr omt heArmored] orc eatFortKnox, Kentucky.Sufficientunitsfr omt !"ieUnit edState sdidnei;become availableintheun t ilJun e1.f-acti c s... er eo: tendevelOp ed ontheba.tt lefi e ld.-- >'05-Scannedby MiiSpecManuals lortheXYUahuoperationitplannedtoeachtank withacompanyofmainarmamentflamethrower However,therewerenotenoUghflamethrowersandinstead aflametankdetachment"'DSacidedtoeac,"stand.ardtankbattalion. It ... asestimatedthatfortyEl2-':'L:,}.flamethrowersfromtheUnited Statesandfifty-sixPOAmainarmamentflamethrowersweretohave availabletoSixthirmyfortheoperation. 3.MaintenanceandServici ng.IntheCentralPacificArea, andservicingoftankswasaccomplishedbyorganic orattachedpersonnelwhohadbeentrai n8dinachoolsand1nflame t=.rovershopsinOahu.Forexample,two:'Tavy'.5eabe98,IIwhohelped buildt Jetanks, tnemtoIwoJ1masupervisedmain-tenanceandservicing.AtO;dnawa,personnelofthe71:3thArmored Thro\.,.erBattalion,provisional,performedthoseduties.The .. mechanicsandtechnlcl anshaclactuallyhelpedtomanufactureandin-stalltheweaponsandthoroughlyunderstoodthem.Themixingof fuelfortheflametanksatOkinawawas byCWS&nd thefuelwasissued1nthesamewayas IntheSouth-vestPaci fie,',\,hereachemicalplatoonvas . attachedtoeach diVision,OW'Smennotonlymixedfuelfortheflametanks,butwere employedtoassistinserviceandmair:tenance.ForKyushu t1on,achemicalserviceplatoonwasassignedtoeach divi-8ionendthelrdutiesincludedmixingfuelandmaintainingflamethrower s. - 206-Scannedby MilSpecManuals lntroductionofmechanizedflamethro'.:erri nthel'cclf1c causedmuchfavorable fromfirst1ntheMarianas untiltheendofthewar.Mount ine.flat:!ot ....rowers1ntankswa et he answerto::1'..1(' 1"ofthea.i'"ersocri tid s:nportableflatlethrower. I.e i tsshort itsli mitedfuelcapacity.anditsexcessive wei ghtasamanpackweapon.mechanizedfl8l!let r r o\'! ercoulr. approachapo s1 tiODwi thoutfearofthemurderoussniperfir"l!\'hich habi tuallycoveredenemyposi t i ons.Whenthewarended.therangeandi nc reasedfuelcapaci tyofthemaintflamet hr o\rer hadalmo stcertainlydoomedtheauxiliaryflamethrowerto ThepOpularityof mechanizedflamethrowerswithbothinfantry andtankunit swasattestedbythenumer ous fo r flame tunks.Bytheend'ofthe"'a.:',r!'qt:.e s"tsforlargecapacityfl ame weremanytimesg reaterthan.thesupply.Althoughthere ."eremanyunfavorabler epo rtsontheperfor rr: a.nceoft hea'J.x1l1ary fla:netl'.rower s,there....asneveranreportonef f!'ct ive- 0:- large thrower&.Manybattalionandregimental mendersincl udedstatementsi ntheirActiontotte t hr ttheadvancehedoftenbeen upcecauseflametanks hadnotbeenava1lable. - 207-Scannedby MiiSpecManuals I nitiall;; ,AtT.:c redForce a. for mechanizedfl amet hr owersthatc ouJ db9i nstal l ed1nt a nks outapp reciablyreducingt hearmament.Thisl edtot he d.evelOp mento faw:1Harytypoflaoethr ower s ,effect iveness andce:pab1l1 tiesof.... hichwereeclipsedbythe:l 1'I. 1nnrmBJllen ttype. I nfantrymen ,inc ludingc orpsanddIvlsi on recorni zed thesuperior 1 t yofaprimary- p 'Jrpoee....eaponoverthatofadual purpose.... eapon.However ,a ttheendoft r. ewart herewerestill anumberofc fflcers1ntheArmoredForce,.,.hofeltthattheflame [,Unshoul dbemountedco- axiallywitht he75-cm.or90- mm.onthe ta.'1kA.ndt hatfor tyrou."I. c.sof75-tl::l. .o r:wen t yr oundsof 90- rt.:1 .8!l1.'"l;u.'1 i t1 onshoulc.ber et ai nedforutewi t hthefl8l:l to!tbro.,.eT. Suc hanarr30gementna turallyreducedeffi c i encyo ft helarge cs:peclt:.:!1. a.::let r.ro ..... en:rndtendedt oi ncorporatethe.... eakne s sof auxiliarytyp e,orduclpurno se...eanorThemount i ngof"bo tb. acannonandaflamethro ..!erI name d1UJ1lfl ametankdI dn')ta,pear J u stifi ed1nviewofthef actt !:e tfl 8!l'l!O .... ere added.to thest a ndardt ankbat t 2. l1 onsa ndth.... ttactica ldo ctrinewe sbe- sed onthe - 208_ Scannedby Mi lSpecManuals APPGJ!1[X1 TechnicalRepor tNo.23,ProjectNo .35 43rdChemicalLaborat oryCompany A. P. O.957 c/oPost mas t er,SanFrancisco,Calif . 20Apr il 1944 FLA.!!. ETHROt'ER .AR!.iOHED,SELF- PROPw.Ell n iSTALLATION- nAIKTENANCE- OPERATI ON - 209-Scannedby MilSpecManuals COOTElITS Abstract 211 I nt roduction211 Hist orical211 'l'heoretical 211 Ex;Jeri.r\ental-Instructions ,oper ationsand ofthe: l a'!\eThrower,Armored,Self-Propel l ed220 Discussion226 Concl usions2J3 APpendices Appendi xA(\iithdrawn) 9(Photographs ) APpendixC- 210-Scannedby MilSpecManuals ABSTRACT I .Int!:oductlon AfterthedemonstrationatKokoHeadBeachon3Februaryl S44ofthe II Alligator "mountedCanadianRonsonFlameThrower,i t"'asdecidedto mountthisunitinanAmericantankf orthef ollowingreasons: a.Togi vetheoperat orsufficientprot ectiontoapproachclose enoughtohisobj ectivetoassureitsneut ralization . b.Toobtainaflamethrowerofgreatfjrecapacity. Theinstallationofthisunitassignedt othe4JrdChemicalLab-CompanybytheCPA,ChemicalOffice,A. P. O.958. Theobjectofthisreportist opresenttheworkaccomplishedto date. II .Historical 8 .TheRonsonthrowerunitisusedbytheBrjtishArmymounted i naBrenUniversalCarri er. b.sever alexperimentshavebeenmadebyU. S.For cesi nthefieldto :idaptthe[tl'!\er icanfla:tethrowerforuseinalighttank. c.-;- "oY' kisbei ngc;lrriedontheSt andardOi lDeve lopnentCompany toinstalltheUodelQflar.lAguninamodifiedtur retandbasketoft he Li ghtTank ,/.t5Alinpl aceofthe37!!lIi.1gun.Thisinstallationhasafuel capaci tyof125gallons,sufficientf ora50secondburningtime . III .Theoret i cal Itisfeltthattheidealweaponoft hist;:,.' peshouldhavethefol l ow_ inga.Itshouldbeasupportingweapondesienedsolelyasa"FlaT.e Thr ower,Armored,Self Propelled!! . b.Sufficientarmortosmall armsfire . c . d.Small ar msfirepower . e.fuelcapacityutilizingthespaceavailable . f.Theflanethrowerunitshouldbe9 0installedthatitcanbe easilyandrefueled . g .ruet otheinflammabilityoftheunitsafetyfeat.uresshouldbe includedwhereverpossibl e . Scannedby MiiSpecManuals _211-IV.Experimental Threetypesoftankswereavailableinthisarea:theYJA5Medium Tank,the'fediumTank,andthe(Guiberson)LightTank. Thefirstt,votankswereprimarilyrejectedbecauseif aflame thr owerYd. ththeRonson'scharacteristicswereinstalledineitherof thesetankstheresultingweaponwouldhavenotacticalvalueasatank orasanarmoreclflamethrower,duetoagreatdepletionoflareecali-berfirepowerandalowflar.1efuelcapacity. ByinstallingtheunitintheTank,Light,\13whichisatpresentan obsolescent-weaponavailableinthisarea,thisvehiclewouldbeprimar-jlyaflar;nethrowerwithalargefuelcapacitytobeusedf oras pecific missionasneeded. ThustheunitwasinstalledintheTank,Light,-with4fueltanks inthehull,thecontrolboxint hespaceformerlyoccupiedbythe assistantdriver'sseat,t heCO2 pressurecylinderinahorizontalposi-tionintheleftsponsonancthegunintheturretinplaceofthe 37mmgun.Oneco-axiallymounted. 30cal.;.\C- providesarr.1Sfire power. CharacteristicsandData , .It .ofvehicle26,000lbs. ofunit,empty2,150lbs. Fuelcapacity175gals. Fuelsystemoperatingpressure180- 250psi. Effectiveraneeforrenderingcovered positions(pi llboxes,etc.)untenable60- 65yards Effectiverangefortemporaryne'.ltralizRt i on75- 100yards Effectiverangeforattackingopenpositions suchastrenches,f oxholes,etc.100- 125yards Fuelconsumption - 2gals/sec. Dlrationoffireat200psi.2min. Firecont rol Depression260mils15deg. Elevation32011\i 1518deg. Traverse35br.1ils20deg. Traverseinturret2, 850mils160de e . Scannedby MilSpecManuals - 212-Ir.str uctionsaref orinstalling,firing,refuelinG,andmain-tai nincthiswea pon . V.!:1.scussion Theacvantagesofthisflamethrower,ar!10red,selfpropelledover portableunjt a .Protectionagainstsmal larmsfireanashrapnel . b.Protectivefirepower( . 30cal.MG). c .Longerranee . d.Thr ep.asmuchfueldischargepp.rsecond . e.Twelvetimesasr,reatfi r inr;time. Theweaponrequirestwonen,thetankdriverandtheflameaunner . Anysui tableliquidfuelavailableinthefieldandusedinthe portableflamethrowerorthickenedf uelsusi ngupto) . 75%Na pal:n(by wei ght )ingasolinecanhefiredbythisweapon . VI.Conclusions Thedesignedpr oj ecthasbeenandeivensat isfactoryf i eld t ests . Furthrwork ,ifdesir ed ,will becarriedonunderthedi rectionof theCPAChemicalOf fice. Scannedby MiiSpecManuals - 213-I.Introduction Thei nstallationoftheRonsonF.U.L.MKIVFlameThrowerUnitinan Americantank,wasassignedtothe43rdChemicalLaboratoryCompanybythe CPA,ChemicalOffice,A.P.O.958.Capt.ConradE.Caspar,193rcTank Battalion,A.P.O.91)7,wastheconsultantfro!:ltheArmoredForce. Afterthedemonstration,3Februaryat .KokoHeadBeach,ofthe "Alligator"mountedCanadianRonsonFlameThr cwer(see43rdChemicalLab-oratoryReport,T.R.No.3,4February1944)it wasdecidedtomountthe RonsonFlameThrowerinan tank,forthereasons: a.Togivetheoperatorsufficientprotectiontoapproachclose enought ohisobj ectivetoas sureitsneutralizati on. b.Toobtainaflam.ethrowerofgreatfirecapacity. Theobj ectofthisreport.jstopresenttheworkaccomplishedtodate. II.Historical a.TheRonsonFlameisdescribedindetailinaCanadian report"RmrSONF.U.L.MKIVPNIT,(Canadian)- - InstructionBookandParts List- 1942"for"TheDepartmentofNationalIfence,Canada";issuedby Thestewart- Warner- AlemiteCorporationofCanadaLtd.,Belleville, Ontario.ThisunitisusedbytheBritishAr mymountedonaBrenUniversal

b.CFSTheaterofOperationsLetterNo . 8,27November1943listsa reportbytheChemicalOfficerofthe37thDi visionofanimpr ovisedtank mountedportablefla::let hrowerwhi chwasusedbythe3rd' {arineDivi sion. Inthisinstancet wosetsoffueltankswereused,andtheflamethr ower wasmountedbyrenovingthebo.;machinegun. c.AportableFla:leThrower improvisec!t obeoperatedfroman E3AllighttankisreportedbytheChemicalOfficeroftheXIVCorpsin TheaterofOperationsLetterNo . 6,gOct obpr1943 . d."lor kisbeint',noneonFlar1eThr oY: ers,E4-5anclE5-5as reoortedinC'1r,C;Theat erofOper ationsLettertvo .11,da ted9March1944. e.StandardOilDevelopnentCom.panyreportedona"Demonstrationof YodelQ- November19,1943.TheLit',htTank sturretandturret basketweremodifiedtopermitthei nstallationoftheQ gunall auxiliaryfuelandpropellantgas wi t hiLthebasket.Atpr esent testsarebeing.continuedonthistypeoft.ankm.ountedflamethrower.The fueLcapacit:>,is125r; alloris,S'J.ffici entfora50secondburningtimeand rangesvaryingfrom85to150yards'J.singathic kenedfuelc8nsistingof 3%Na pabingasoline.The37:nr:lgunhadtoberemoved. f.F'J.rtherrefereI'ceismadetoflamethrowersmountedontanksused byf oriegnnati o!1s . FieldLab.2-3-3);Tactical &:Technical TrendsNo .39,2 1943,pp.9to11describestheGermanFlamp. ThrowingTank,?ZKW2(F). Scannedby MilSpecManuals - 214-g.UemorandumtoLt.GeneralR.C.Richardsonof21February1944 , II11seofFla::lf'ThrowersforAttackofJap,meseI:'efenses"referstothe large,lonerangeflamethrowerF... 1or Q flamethrowerdeveloped byStandardOilCo.

IV. Althougheachoftheabovereferredunitshasgreatadvantagesover anyportableflar;',ethrowerinregardstorange,protection,andcapacity it isfeltthattheidealweaponofthistypeshouldhavethefollowing characteristics: a.ItshouldbeasupportingweapondesignedsolelyasaitSelfPro-pelledArT1']o!"edFla:-:i.eThr owerlt b.S,.tfficientarrr: ortowi thstandsmallarmsfire. c."(aneuverability. C.Smal lar MSfirepower. e.fuelcapacit:r utilizingthespaceavailable. f.Theflamethrowerunitshouldbesoinstalledthatit canbe efficientlymaintainedandrefueled. [>wetotheinfla::unabili oft.heunitsafetyfeaturesshouldbe includedwhereverpossible. Thisreportwillbeconcernedonlywiththeadapt.ationoftheRonson FlameThrowerUnittotheU.S.Tank!If3,Light. Experimental( SeePhotosandDrawings) Threetypesoftan'-neone:'1YATf i. re,!" 1"r1R-As "'n t tho. ofp }'utno',' J.'''::.'..ls on.t ro('uesto fthe inf": ntr;,!.!'i - ll-'t"n1,..c,rn"""ino(li:1'\-,ivouf1c . 'Ryth","nel') f \.'o.n ''''of tl-, ofl ? "!1o t"'nlrOn" r,,-t or s F''\..It.'1,)-::' 0,', c"usto'!''''c.tot '. oir11 "" '"' eanons,and thei r:.fantr: - \-.. :- ,.. : : .... coul ct.do . '.,=c :,r.i qu'":ort ". :;f l ".'l,"tC:'.':Sir'c O:-,,,; :l.l1Cti on\.'i tl:ot:cc r ..cL.rif:.' i :i,i ',t:.'"L 1!c"!2ndp"rr.1itinft'.ntryto2.dv!'nce .',ih"lntrcis ', ;I: S coldbya25-footdron-offto2."') lat'?!O.uben,?-pth,arORd\':'IS dozedOverthecliff."An dflAmeadvpnceddown rORe. andtheinfantryha dmovedontothep late0uwhentankswererel3sed at1630. 5-Ctanks,adozer,anda.nametank"forkedoverarid,'Cethat hedhelduptheinfantryforfourda.ys.Co:nbinedacUonresultedin a300yardadvanceAndseizureofthework: ity. The 4t :.ga rDi vusedt!my:sandafl a.meb .n 1c ou." leoffl pmet a. n',:sfr om5th Divfor mODDingunpnocketofresist pnce. DDlus24 .5-A'sfl -"m"t"n1r , "r' S"use d,dthver-y-"'"oodeffecton _ _ Scannedby MilSpecManuals e!!Tplaced'!'lnemyin.cliffe." annoutefter athoroughpoundinl'fromthe7550fthe"SeverRl"DocketsofJffOSwereburnedoutwithtank(fromandconsiderablefiresunportWASgoi yenth",infAntry.LR tertheflame was tomOppingupgr oundtakenbyLT1-27tho.preceding day.Workingcloselywithengineers.thisjobwasdone .... " flametankmovedtothefrontbuttheFTrep ort ed. ".Acti vi tyWaaratherlight.Usedonlyonehalfloa.dofII The4thMrHDivbegansecUTinp:tolo.avetheisland.Tv,roflame tankswereleftwi ththe5t':lTankBn . Twoothersstillsupn or t edre-maining4thMarDivacti on. 3rdMarDivagainborrowedaflamstankformopping-upand"usedittoexcellentadvantage." Dplus25.(1 6Mar45).5-A'sflametankwasheldinreadiness butno tused. 5-]1 sflamet a...l'lkcooper a ted1; lithHtankdozerinma:dngandclear-ingoutaro a doververyroughterrain.JBn anesethrewanumberofgre-nadesatthedozer.butnodamagedona.Thedozerwouldmake2.0 yardsofroad,andtheflametankwouldcomeupandfhunethearea.then thedozerwouldcontinuetheroadforanothershortspace. con-tinuedacro s sthedrawtillthedozerbladeWasblown . offbyaburied aerialbomb.Theflametank:movedt otheleftflankandwasflaming aridgewhenit washi tinthefinaldrivebyashellfromaU. S.t ank abandonedbyourtroopstwoday s"befo Te .A.r egulartankcoveringthe flametankknockedoutthe inthetank. The4tt MarDivcontinue.d exceptf orthe. andafewreguh.rtanks.The tanksrema i nedatthefro '1 t,sup-portingLT:;';';24andROT25.AfterorganizedenemyresistancehAdceased at1500.however,IIi tWI1Snece ssnrytocallbackoneflamethrowerand onemediumtanktoneutra lizeonecaveinzoneof]LT3-25.This cavehadpreviousl;rbeentA.ken,butwhenengineersatt errm tedtoblowit closed.theyweret akenunderfire.Thecavewesfinallyblownshut at1800afteraroadhadbeen"bulldozedtowit hin50yardsofthecave andthetankhad.firednap a lmintothemouthofthecave. II The3rdMa rDivlaunched attackat0840,An d by1000theflankhpd2dvanced.100y&rdsunderi ntensesniperfire andin d. ividualsuicideattacks.Japaneserani:1togroupsofU.S.In-fantryandtankswithdemoliti oncha r gesRndgrenades.andflame tanks,borrowedfromthe4tha nd5thM2TDivs.offere!8.rothesea.Hadethreetripsi nthis area.WasreportedNipswerejump i nroffcliffsintothesea .Very goodday./I A5-CnametankerreT) or teo,liThet l: ird'Y) l a t oonan,lthreeflametanlrs 1nsupportof2-28.Theareathey'tIereoperatinginhac1.beenthor cughly goneoveronthethreepreviousconsecuti VI?d8YI.TheJapenes""were movingfromthemainpocketofresista.ncearoundthedivisi onleftflpnk intothisarea.4200gallonsofflamefuelweredumpedinthisareatoday -Theresul tsofthefourdaysofon era tioninthi spocketgaveDnethe 1m'Gressionthe t1 tmusthaver a. inedroastedJapanese,a sthey very thicklystrewovertheentirea,rea..Notankslost,nocasual ties." 9l'i 87380-61-22 - 299-Scannedby MilSpecManuals Dplus34.(25?-ip,r45).ThiswasthelastdayofLT2-'28 andLT3-28facedeachotherono"01'1osi tesidesofth'3'smRllareaofsteep ridg'3s[endarockyravinefl,;>nkedbyacli ffoverlookingsea.The endwasnear.The2ndplatoonof5-Esunp ortinr- 3-28useditslo?dof fuel,andcouldadvancenofurther.wasbetterforthpflpmet 2nks withthe1st"l)latoonsU'D!)orting2-28.'!:'heflametpn": s ,cra 't,lingtoRn onthecliff,pou redlOAdaft erloadoffuelint o laststuDDorngull yun tilfi \'elOr'.ds""p-r"!gone.An,a":1rnuni tionc.umn8Y-u J oded.FromsidesNprineeniners offtheenemyasthey rushedf r omc n resandroc',(sin e.nd oftheseHrchingflame. Itwasto o f orthe Tho movedin,Rndby noon theCOll"1 entsonFlamefanks.Thestoryofth'flametanl{ssnep.'.rsfor itself,a ndm8.'(esli stingofcommentss1tn erfluous,those avail ablehereincludedfortherecord. Fle.metanksnlonewouldha.vebeenun..t",ut ht:lposi 'Cion. b.CoB- 1stPlatoperatingwith6thEarTkBnoorn",aCllVt!dana inTA757v-RSWS.4Japantlsewertlkillt:ldana galsofNapalm expenaea. PlatoperatingwithCoC,18tTkEninTA7874-Leoulanot rtlacht h",irtargets.vaPlatoperatingwithCoA,1stTkEnburneasmall cavesatTA7773*Hana7774-X,andasmailportionofthetownofWANA. gals01'Napalmwereexpenaea.TheCo nopersonnelor vehioularoasualtie::l. c .CoC- 1stPlat,atchatoGaPlat,CoD,706thTkEn,firt:lu andridgesinTA807;:,-UV.OrientationandInf-tank supportwasexoellent.Nodefinitere sultsobservea.Onetank,operating wi thCoD,706tnTkBn,rireuariugeinTA TheCol:iUsta1n.,ano personnelorvehicular 15May1945 1.NooftankscoL'IlIlittea1 2.Nooftankload. soffuel 1 - -Scannedby MilSpecManuals 3.Nooftanksop6rativeatpresenttime28 4.Nooftanksinbivouacbutnotoperative10 5.Narratives a.CoAanaCoBcommitteonotanks. b.CoC- GUPlat,atchutoCoA,786thTkEn,committea1 flamethrOWtlr.S/SE;tTullyfil"t!UoneloaoorNapalmatcave::!ana inTA7974-V,receivinggooafromtanksanuInl. Bi8Cal killeo5Japanest!. 16May1945 1.Nooftanksconnnittt:!u8 G.No01'tanks10aos01"f'ueluSt:Jo8 3.Nooftanksdisab1easa.DuetomechanicaluU"ficulty1 b.Duetoterrain 4.Nooftanksoperativeatprt:JStmttime5.Nooftanksinbivouacbutnotop",re:ti Vtl8 6.Narrative: a.CoA- 1stPlat,atchatoCoA,76MTkBnanuGdEn. Ini wasgivenof JaponhiliatTA At1400tht:!t;tanc1aratanksworkt!ooVt:lrtht!positionwith75mm.Lt f.Lamethro ..t:lupportl:labyInr,movt!uupanufirt!uthl:lir killingaboutG5Japant:!8t:!anutlxplooingst!vt:lralammooumpseJapanese attempteatoreachtheflamethrowerswithsatchelchargesanawtJrekillea. Sgt thl:lnfiredtht!same killingapproxGOJapant!st!. Whilewithura.. ingfrom mission,SgtKostelny'stank thrt:lwatrack, andthecro .."al:itlvacul:lt",uby tan!C:s. b.CoB- 1stPlatwor!Cing"iththt!6thMarTkEn,burneucave8 inTA767G-B.GJapant:Jst:!"tirekilLl:lubyourtan!CMGfirl:leSgtWebb's engine!' ailtluinJapterritoryanuhaatobeevacuatea.\)aPlat,atcha toCA,1stMarTkBnana7thMarRegt,burnt!Gtht!townofWANA.No definiteresultswereobserved. c.CoC- GaPlat,atchcitoCoC.706thTkBn,wasconuni tteato supportthtJaaVI:ll1Co01'106mntankanaburnrt:1v"rc",/Slop",atTA7974-V. Tari;;tltar"a\'Ia::swir"acn01'n,amt:1gunanuoauo"uroarortankto btltlxposoutoATfir",.Aft"rsu;:stainingont!hit(AT)onthtlrighT;roar sponbon,tht:rlam.,thro .. t::Ir.. i t:huro ... 7.ReInlirlCo'ThemitS/SiunorCoC'sflamtlWatSinaccoraanotJwith properuStJ0ff!amtlthro"tlrlS. --Scannedby MilSpecManuals 17i.ia.y1945 1.NooftanksCOmnU'tteaIG G.No01'tankloaa:;offu",l.Ul:>ea1;:: Nooftankl:>ail:>abh1U:a.Duetoterrain ;:: 4.Noort anksop",rl.l'tivt:la'tn ro;:,oni;.tl'T',t;5.No01'tnnIz:;inoi vouacbutno'tOpt; ratl Vo7 6.Personne l:a .KiIltJainaction:NontJ b.'Wounot:lainac tion1 ---7.Narrative: a.CoA- 1stPlat,ope ratingwithCoA676;)(1TkBn,insupport0 1' 1stEn,Ini',wa.sgiventht1mi::;sion'01'f iringasinallvillage .Lt. Lyles'tank th"mi ;:s;:,iunanuroInl.lino::luinthuI.lrol.ltoU l;iOhi::; CAl"VHG 's.Approx;)OJapanesowo r",ki l.l.eabythef lameanaLG's.Sgt BenISon'stank.. asg;ivo::Inmi:;olunofburning8.cut1'romwhichthoI n.!.Wtu:! r"c"ivingMGandsniperfire.ThiswasdoneandanumberofJapanese ranouttobekilledbysupporti ngInfandt anks.SgtBenson'stankkilled abou t15. b .CoB- 1stPl c.t ,ope ratingwiththe6thEa.rT:.;:Bn6burnedcaves andareatargetsinTA7672-AP. .2Japaneseknowntobekil led .2dPlat , operatingvfithCoC,1st TkBnandthe. 5thLarRegt,committed2flame throwersatTA7873-CD11IIJ.TombsandcavesVTereburned.Oneflame hudtobeabandonedbecauseofabrokentract .Radiosvrerer emoved andsunsdisar med .3dPlatwasatchdtoCoC,1stTkBnandsupported byCo's1B.ndKofthe5thReGt .4flamethr ovrsrsVlerecOlTlJ":li ttedat 1945":ithtanksupporte.ndburned5tombs ,12caVElSe.nd3housesin TA7879-EIJ.7JapanesewhoranintoatOr:lbvrerek illed,8.Svrere2"l"rho atteiilptedtot hrowgr enadesatt het anks . c.CoC- 3dFlatwasatchdtoCoC,706thTkBn.SgtParady's tankwasat toburnaculvert,ridgeandseveralcaves.Approx 50JapanesewereflushedtobekilledbysupportingInf .Onitsreturnt he flamethrower'selectricalsystembrokedovmandit wastowedbacktothe bivouaca r ee. .SgtSchrumwentintoactionat1200toburncavesandthe brusharoundaroa.dblock.About25J apanesewhoranoutwerekilledby supp ort ing s. 18 1945 1.Nooft ankscom::nitted9 2.Nooftankloadsoffuelused11 3.Nooftanksdisabl ed:a.Duetomechani ca ldifficulty2 b.Duetoenemyl e.ndmines1 - 337-Scannedby MilSpecManuals 4.Nooftanksoperativeatr,:resentti:ne28 5.nooftanksinbivouacbutnotoperative7 6.Narrative: a.CoA- 1stSec,1stPlat,withCoA,763dTkEnand1stBn, 383dInf.SgtBenson'stankfiredahillsideandditchatTA8170-J.He thenremainedintheareatousehisi,IG'sonthesurroundinghills.Lt. Lyles,withstandardtanksupport,wasgivenmissionoffiringareverse slope.TheywereunabletoreachtheslopebecauseofATfirewhich penetratedone763dtank.2dSec,1stPlat,operatedwithCoA.763dTk Bnand2dBn,383dInf.SgtKnottswasgivenmissionoffiringovera bluffthatthe75'scouldnotreach.Berolledhisflamedawnthere-versesideof thebluffandalsofiredsomecaves.Hekilledapproxi-mately15Japanese.ThisactiontookplaceinTA827l-P.2dPlatwas givenamissionwithCoC,763aTkBn.Inordertoreacht hetarget theyhadtopassthroughacutwhereminashadpreviouslybeenen-countered.Be.ngaloretorpedoeswhichwereexplodedtodetonateanyre-mainingminessucceeded.incavingint hecuttosuchanextentt hatthe tankswereunabletogetthrough. b.CoB- 2dPlat,atchdtoCoC,1stliarTkEnand7th1.lar Regt,conunitted3flamethrowerswhichfired5loadsofNapalmatcc. ves andtombsfromwhichJapaneseI!iGfirewasreported(TA7879-HIJ).No positiveresultsobserved. c.CoC- 3dPlat,atchdtoCoC.706thTkBnand305thInf, fired4loadsofNapalminTA7873-).Caves,culverts,housesanaaroaa blockwereengaged,resultinginnumerousJapanesebeingdrivenouttobe killedbysupportingM-8fire.OnetankwaslostduetoATminewhich blewoffatrack. 1.Nooftankscommitted5 2.Nooftankloadsoffuelused4 3.Nooftanksdisabled:a.Duetoenemylandmines1 b.Duetoterra.in1 ----4.Nooftanksoperativeatpresenttime26 5.Nooftanksinbivouacbutnotoperative7 6.Narrative: a.CoA- 2dPlatoperated2flamethrowerswithCoC, Tk Bninsupportof2dEn,382dInf.AtSstAchenbachfiredcave s anaentrenchmentsinvicinityofTableTop(TA8172-K)withGood supportfromtanksandInf.Inburningal ar bccavetheflameswent throubhthecaveandoutofanotheropening.AnumberofJapanese - 338-Scannedby MilSpecManuals wereandtheflamekilled50.At1300SgtAlbera burnedcavesinthesameareaandkilledanestimated35Japanese. Histrack wasbrokenonthewayoutanathe763atanksbroubhtout thecrew. b.CoB- 2dPlatoperatedwithCoC,1stlJarTkBnand5th i.: arRegt.2flamethrowerswerecom..m.ttedtoburncavesanatombs.As theywithdrew,LtSutherland'stankhit2minessinrultaneouslyandblew bothtracks.Thisaction"[asinTA787:5-HI.1mortjf lamethrowerwas inthesameareaatlGOOanaburneeseveralcaves. c.CoC- Notankswer ecommitted. 20

1945 1.NooftankscomIni ttea10 2.Nooftankloadsoffuelused10 3.Nooftanksdisabled,a.Duetoenemyfire1 4.Nooftanksoperativeatpresentti;ne25 5.Nooftanksinbivouacnotoperati va8 6.Narrative: a.CoA- 1tankfromGdPlatatchdtoCoC,763dTkBninsupport of382dInf,burnedaridgelineinTA8172-L.Noresultswereobserved. 'J.CoB- 1stPlat,atohdto6th:':arTkBn,attackedcavesin TA7672-1.6Japanese""ereseentobekilledbyourguns.2dPlat,atchd toCoA,1stl!arTk ' Enand2dBn,letllarines,corami tted:5flamethrowers at0830EneburnedcavesandtombsinTA7873-HIJU.2MGtswerereported inthisarea,butaftertheflamethrowersfired,theIn1'movedinwith-outaraftinb fire.Twotankswerecommitteainafternoontoburn smalltownontheNedgeofSHURI(TA7873-S).Onetankbrokedownonthe waytothetarget,butLtKrallcontinueaanacomp1eteamission.On hitirtlturnht!toweatheaisabledtankuntilitagain.4 wert!killeain action. c.CoC- 2dPlat,atohatoCoC,706thTkBncommittedSgt Tyler'stankat1100inTA toburncavesandridges.Hereceived notankandverylittlelnfsupport.LtBrandino'stankwascommittedin thesameareaanawasknockedoutby47mmfirefromJapanesetank.S/Sgt Tullyat assaultedariugt!inTA7B73-CDsupportedby tanks. ThehoseflaIlltjunitwassupporteabyG-75mmt8.nks.Thehoseflameunit w'lsemployed,butthelnfoperatorwaswounaedbysmallarmsfir",.Sgt. RichardsoufireaoneloadofNapalmatcavesana inTA supportea 1standardtank.lnrsupportwaslacinginthisdutjtosmallarms - -Scannedby MilSpecManuals d.Atapprox1500intheafternoon,Lt.Brandlnowasengagedin burningthereversesiaeorariugeinTA787t>-Owhenhistankwashit bythe47mmfirefromaJapanesetank.LtBrandinotstankwasdestroyea bythefireafterreceivingthehit.MajLittlepage,CaptCrowleyand theC.0.,Cot,706thTkEnwereabletoobservethisactionfroman OFinthevicinityofTA787:5-BandMajLittlepagelocatedtheJaptank. TheJapanesetankwithdrewandthenpulledupintoanotherpositiontobe abletobringfireonthe706thtankswhichwerenearwhereLtBrandino hadbeenknockedout.AfterspottingtheenemytankinitaMajLittlepagegotintoatankbelongingtotheC.0.,706thTkBnCoC, anawiththehelpoftheC.0.,fireaonanadestroyedthe tank. 7.Remarku 1. 2. a.JapaneseKilledToday b. No No CoA CoB CoC TOTALS CoA CoB CoC TOTALS TksCom- TksDis-mittedab1edby no EnemyAct i on 4 1089 1459 36322 o 10 o 10 TksDis-ableC1for otherrea.sons 14 15 21 50 21May1945 oftankscommitted9 oftankloadsof'fuelused11 Todate 445 37:-5 470 1288 GalsNa-palsex-penaed 18,600 30,000 27,450 76,050 ;:s.Nooftanksdisabloala.Duetomeohanioaldiffioulty1 4.NooftanklSoperativeatpresenttime'1.7 6.NooftanklSinbivouaobutnotoperative5 6.Narratives a.CoA- Notankswerecommitted b.CoB- 1stPlat,atchdto6th MerDi v,burnedafewhouses ontheNedgeofwhichwereharboringsomesnipers.2dPlat With,flamethrowersfromthe Plat,wertJatchdtoCOA,1stMar TkBnandthe1stMarinesinanadvancetotheNedgeofSHURI.2 flame werecommitteaat0800.2inSHURrwith6- 75mmtanklS anti1onaridge75ydsN01'SHURIwith tanks.Alltankswore supporteabyMar1ntlfireteams.Allloa.dswer"fireaberor",093U. NumerousJapanesowtJreseonandaboutsomebyout guns.lflamethrowerswerecommittedinthesameareaat1030,one - 340-Scannedby MilSpecManuals ot'which outcaves. Plat,atchdtoCoB,1stMarTkBn, supportedthe5thMarinesadvancealongadrawNWofSHURI.2 loadswerefireaonareverseslopeana1 knowntobekilled. One throwerwasc ornmi tteaonthesameareaat1300toburn cavesanatombsandtosilenceaJapaneseMG.OnemoreloaawaS at7burialvaults,15J ap anese. c.CoC-Platcommitteaflame withth61stPlat, CoC,706thTkEn.Onefl amethr owerthrewatrackat0900anawas evacuated.SgtArmstrongmoveduptot hesametargetat and fireaoneloadatmachinegunsext,snipersanasomehouses. 7.Remarks. e. .JapaneseKilled: b. CoA CoB CoC TOTALS TksCom-mitted 110 115 147 CoA CoB CoC TOTALS TksDis-abledby EnemyAction 4 9 9 Today o 46 o 46 TksDis-abledother reasons 14 15

51 May1945 1.Nooftankscommitted2 2.Nooftankloadsoffuelused1 ToDate 445 419 470 1:534 GalsNa-palmex-pended 18,600 3:5,000 "1. 7,750 79,350 :5.Nooftanksdisabled'a.Duetomechanicaldifficulty1 4.Nooftanksoperativeatpresenttime28 5.Nooftankl:SinbivouacbutnotoperatiV86 6.Narrati VI::tJ a.CoA- Notankl:Swerecommitted b.CoC- 1stPlat,atchdto6thMarDiv,oommittea2 flamethrowerbe.nJUbeaoneloaaofNapalminburningeaV6bnearTA767G-R. c.CoC - Notankswerecommitted. 7.Rem.e.rksl - -Scannedby MilSpecManuals a.JapaneseKilled: Anerrorin b.TksCom-mittea CoAHG CoEli5 CoC147 TOTALS:5711 CoA CoB CoC TOTALS ye steraay'srt1port TksDil:l-ableaby Ent:1myaction 4 9 G 15 TOd!?_y t!howttaACo'stotal TksDis-ableaothttl' reasons 14 15 GG 51 G;j- G9Uay1945 1.No0 1'tankt!operat:ivea.tprt1senttim",:5;:' c.Nooft anksinbivouacbutnotoper ativeG at ToDate 5:50 419 470 1419 4115. Na-palmex-pended 18,600 ;5;;,;:'OU G7,7 50 79, 65U :5.Narrative:Th",per-ioaG:5-G9Maywasspentonma.intenanottandrest astheweatht1randterrainprohibitt1dtheuse01'tanks.Atz9l1uO,Co Brttoeivtlualowlevel.attackby6-8f'rienulyairorart.Th",bivouae areawnshitbytwo500Ibbombs,Cal50MGantirockets.Therewereno casualtit1s. 4..Remarlet!:Onetan1-:ofCoB,S/SgtLintner's,returnt1U1'romOranance withextraarmor.Itnowwei ghsabout4"tons,butth",arivt1rrt:1portt1u iteasytooperateanaabletomuddyroadsin4thgea.r.I t r ''") ];).'.l i :1 Cl t obeseenifthiswei ghtispraoticalfortheContinental 9ngin'"unaercombatconaitiontl. :50llal- 9June1945 1.Nooftanksconunitted2 2.Hooftanksloudsoffue 1used4 3.Nooftanksoper ativeatpresenttime39 4.Nooft anksi1. vouacbutnotoperative4 5.Harrati ve I a.DuringtheperiOd:30May- 9June,thebattalionSawnoaotion withtheexoeptionof1stPlat,CoB. - MG-Scannedby MilSpecManuals b.1stPlatCoB_wasatchd . tothe6thMarDivfortheamphibou8 landingsontheOROKUPeninsula,withthemissionoftakingt heNA.'iA AIRFIELD.On4Junetheyloaded4f lavnethrowersonanLeTatP