CAUSATION . CREATION AND REALITY

(i) INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapters we have seen that, according to Gaudapada, reality is 3‘at and all its further modifications are vitatha. On account of these spatio-temporal raodifications, the real or reality becomes samvrta and so does not remain reality qua reality. In the third and fourth chapters of his thesis, Gaudapada expounds yet another argument to show that, from the point of view of reality, nothing is 'born' or that the reality as it is, is not born. It is only in the anthropocentric language that the concept of being 'born* has significance. It can be easily seen that these two argiiments are related.

The argument which Gaudapada is developing in the later part of his v/ork is in response to certain problems that arise in the earlier parts of his thesis. Once we accept the view that the world of our experience is only a modification of reality which only and that this world is not to be identified with reality, there arises the question of the ’creation’ or ’origination’ of the world of our experience. It is

CHAPTER V

in response to tills problem that Gaudapada develops his

argument of ajati, i.e. reality as it is, is never born,

in the sense that it is always there. To regard something

as ’born' , or as having certain characteristics, is a human

’creation* and in fact such modifications are not real

changes. It may be admitted that origination, creation,

Jati etc., are words suggesting causation. And to assert

that there is no real change or that the reality is never

born is to take a position against causality. It will

therefore be worthwhile to understand Gaudapada’s views

on Causation. Let us now see how he develops his

argument.

(ii) THE NOTION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT : TTIEIR MEAM'ING

According to common sense notions of cause and effect,

a cause is that which produces something, and an effect is

that which has been so produced. These notions are relational

notions, i.e. a cause is regarded as a Cause of something

and an effect is regarded as an effect of something. Sometimes,

the notion of 'self-caused' is also used. But this notion

seems to be metaphorical in character, like that of a

'self-prescription’. Notions of cause and effect are used

by a common man, a scientist, and a philosopher. For

example, we may regard arsenic as the cause of the death

of a person. A scientist may explain the phenomenon of

heavy bodies falling down by saying that gravitational

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force is the ‘cause' of this phenomenon. Philosophers

also have used the notions of Cause and Effect and have

offered a good deal of analysis of the relationship that

exists between the tv;o. Philosophers have used these

notions in somewhat different senses. Thus, these concepts

are not only used in the context of change, but also in

the context of creation, or actions or misery. About the

’creation* of the world, those who believe in God, assert tke.

that it iSjl God who 'creates’ the world. Or, e.g. in the

context of human action and human miseries, Buddhists said

that the root cause of the miseries is the ignorance.

Similar is the case when an Advaitin says Ajnana or

Ignorance^ is the cause of the empirical world.

It appears that we use the notions of cause and

effect not only in the case of things, but also in the

case of persons, feelings, social or institutional2realities,*the substances, or the absence of something.

Thus, e.g., we regard milk (a substance) as a 'cause'

of the curds. Similarly, we sometimes regard persons

as the 'cause' of something (Smith as the 'cause' of troubles).

1. It may be noted that if we write the word ignorance with

capital ’I ’ , it would have altogether a different signifi­

cance. Perhaps in the Buddhist and Advaitic thought

this has happened.2. See "Tospers John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis,

(1954) pp.221-249.

117

We also regard certain social facts or systems or conven­

tions as the causes, (e.g. the rigid caste system as the

• cause* of the oppression of the low-caste people). Some­

times we also use the notion of cause with reference to

feelings or emotions (e.g. his frustration caused him. to

become violent). Similarly, the absence or the lack of something

is regarded as the ’cause' (e.g. the lack of oil caused the

moving car to stop, or the lack of vitamins causes wealmess

etc.). The point is, we use the notions of Cause and Effect

in so many different situations. All these diverse examples

suggest that when we use these notions, we also refer to

other factors such as the time element, power (to produce

or stop producing something), potentiality, change,

reversibility or the otherwise of the cause-effect order,

invariability (of the effect following the cause), modifi­

cation, origination and so on. Using these notions of

cause and effect, we try to generalize the particular

instances of causal relationship. Thus, to say that

'arsenic causes death' is to explain the instances of

arsenic causing death in the form of a generalization.

And once we try to give a generalization, we seem to be

going beyond the individual instances. Thus, 'arsenic

causing death' in the form of a generalization could be

true even if no one takes arsenic.^ In short, what we

1. Barlingay S.S., 'Causation' unpublished paper.

118

understand by ’cause' and 'effect’ can be stated in the

following way : (1) The ’cause’ is that \ jhich produces or

gives rise to something else. (ii) The cause is an antecedent

of the effect, i.e. the cause must precede its effect.

(ill) But if something is a ’cause’ of the other, its being

earlier in time does not necessarily make it a ’cause’.

The cause must have a power to produce the effect. (iv) The

order of cause and effect, if it Is a temporal order, then,

cannot be reversible, i.e. the 'effect' cannot occur first

and then the 'cause'. (v) That in certain cases ’cause’ and

’effect’ could be regarded as 'identical in essence'.

(vi) The effect could be regarded as the emergence of

something which is new and peculiar. (vii) That if something

is to be regarded as a cause, then it must produce some

effect, etc., and so on.

As is seen above, categories of cause and effect are

used by us ^ hen vre try to give some explanation of the

phenomenon of change. In the common sense conception of

causal relation different beliefs are involved. When an

attempt is made to systematize the common sense conception,

different models of the causal relation would emerge. Some

of these models may emphasize different aspects of the

common sense conception. And hence these models would

function as different theoretical explanations. But these

explanations are not always identical and so we are led to

different causal models in different situations when we

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believe something 'causing* something else. Thus, e.g. if

we regard the case of a seed giving rise to the sprout, as

an instance of cause-effect relationship, we will get the

following model of cause-effect relationship. In this

model, we could say that the cause C produces and causes

the effect E. Such a causal series could be further extended

Thus, we can think of a continuous causal series. In this

series, the cause produces some effect, and this effect in

its turn, again produces some further effect. In this

model, any particular ’effect’ can be both a cause of the

further effect, while it might itself be an effect of the

earlier cause. Thus, the cause Cg might be an effect of

the cause C^, while the cause Gg might be regarded as the

cause of C^. The difficulty that arises with reference

to this causal model is that once we admit that the ’cause’

in this series is an effect of some earlier cause, then,

we shall have to go on till we come across a ’first cause’.

In other words, this model leads to infinite regress.

That is, either we shall have to begin at some point, or

we have to admit that such a series is beginningless.

The second causal model of the cause-effect relation­

ship we can think of is of the form A causing B. This is

so when a particular cause produces a particular effect;

but we are riot able to generalize. In such a case we will

not be able to say necessarily that something is the

cause of something. This model thus prevents the uniformity

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of causation, and in fact the regularity analysis too.

We can also think of another causal model where

we can say that the name cause and the name effect do

not apply to two different phenomena but apply only to

the two states of the same thing or phenomenon. In this

model, the effect that emerges is not a totally new thing,

(i.e. having no identity whatsoever with the cause) but

it is only the modification (again either real or apparent)

of the same thing. The effect is thus, in essence, the

same as its cause. Examples such as milk giving rise

to curds etc., have been interpreted in this way. In

fact, a physicist’s utterence that 'everything is a

matter’ can be interpreted as that everything is reducible

to matter. And if one regards the matter as a cause,

then, when a physicist says that everything is matter,

what he would be saying is that everything is a modifica­

tion of or is a different form of the same matter. In

this way, we use the language of ’contained in'. That

the curds are already contained in the milk, or, that

the oil is ’contained’ in the oil seeds and so oh.

It may, however, be noted that the modification

brought about by the so called effect may not be real

(as for example curds from milk), it may be just

apparent (for example, waves from water which appear

for sometime and then disappear), If the effect is

not real then it does not possess the same status as

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that of the cause and in such a case the Cause-Effect

process automatically comes to an end. If modification

that is effect has the same status as that of its cause

the process may or may not continue, but it would have

the potentiality to continue and produce further effects.

We could thus distinguish these various causal

models as suggested by these examples like milk as a

cause of the curds, earth as a cause of the pot, arsenic

as the cause of death, or the moon as the cause of the

tides in the ocean and so on. Again, on the basis of the

element of Power and the status of cause and effect,

we could distinguish between a causal series which is a

continuous one, and a causal series which is not so.

We can say that the causal series is continuous,provided

the 'effects' in such a series have a power to produce

further effects. On the contrary, if one denies that

the effect does not have a power to produce or create

a further effect, then one seems to be limiting the

causal series only to some one cause and the effect it

produces.

In connection with the cause-effect relationship,

we sometimes use the word 'real'. We for example

say that something is a 'real cause' or is a 'real

effect'. In such and similar cases we use the word

'real' in the sense of having power to produce. Thus,

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if the partjicular cause succeeds in producing the effect,

or if it has a power to produce the effect, we regard it

as a real cause. Now, if we think of a continuous causal

series, then in such a series both the cause and the effect

will have to be regarded as ’real’. Because, in such a

series, not only the (original) ’cause’ but also the

•effect’ would have power to produce some (further) effects.

On the contrary, if we deny any such power (to produce

further effects) to the effect, v/e would regard it as

unreal; or at least less real. In other words, we sometimes/

tend to decide the ’reality' of causes and effects through\

their causal efficacy. However, the ’reality’ of cause

and effect is also sometimes determined in terms of

’dependance'. If something is dependent upon something

else, then, that which is dependent is regarded as less

real, than that on which it is so dependent. The * cause’ ,

which is not dependent upon anything else, is regarded

as ’real’. In this context, one could say that whatever

is ’produced’ is, in some sense, dependent upon that

which produces it, and hence compared to the cause which

produces the effect, the effect is less real. Now, on

this analysis, it is possible, to regard the cause also

as unreal, if one discovers that it is also ’produced’

by something else. Thus, if we apply the criterion of

’dependance’ to the continuous causal series, we shall have

to regard all such ’causes’ which are ’produced’ as unreal.

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The on'^,,7 cause, w' iich we think is not produced alone would

have to be regarded as real. But such a view leads U3 to

accept that in the strict sense of the term, stich a ’cause’

is not a cause at all. For the series is reducible to

real cause and less real or unreal effect. So t',''e question

of production does not arise. If b/ cause we mean the

cause other than the first which is 'produced' or 'is born’

then, the first cause which is not produced or is not born

cannot be re-'arded as a cause. It seems that Gaudapada

develops this kind of ar^ujTient, that the reality as it is,

is not born (since it is always present) and hence, is

not the 'cause’ of this \^orld. The arf-ument that he

develops is that the categories of cause and effect are

operative only in the world which we believe is ’born'.

T' e above discussion points out that one could

distinguish between certain causal models by distinguishing

several factors such as Power, Dependance, modification,

manifestation, and so on. ';Ie started with a brief account

of the comir:on sense conception and use of the categories

of cause and effect. This discussion led us to the

presentation of diff’erent models of the causal relation.

When these models are embeded within different philosophical

contexts, they , ive rise to different philosophical theories

of causation. To proceed further \vith Gaudapada’s theory

of causation it would be necessary to have som.e account

of Indian theories of causation as they are likely to

throw light on the view propounded by GaudapSda.

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(iii) A BRIEF NOTE ON INDIAN THEORIES OF CAUSATION; SATKARYA. ASATKARYA AND 7IVARTA DOCTRINES

Indian theories of causation are usually grouped

under (1) Satkaryavada and (2) Asatkaryavada. Satkaryavada

again can have two forms, (1) Parinamavada and (2) Vivarta-

vada^. Asatkaryavada may also be thought to have two forms,

i.e. (1) Pratitya Samutpada or Niranvya vada, and (2)

Arambhavada. In this section, we shall in brief, try to

understand what -is meant by saying that the karya (effect)

is sat or asat, and similarly, parinama or vivarta. It is

on the basis of these views that we should consider Gaudapada’s

views on cause effect relationship, sometimes known as

ajativada. Historically, satkaryavada, with the stress

on Parinama is associated with Samkhyas. In fact, one eould

say that the vivarta effect is also potentially present in

the cause, for unless the cause has the efficacy of producing

the ’vivarta effect* it v/ould not be so produced. The_ I

vivartavada is usually associated with Sankara school of

vedanta.

CA) SATKARYAVADA

According to the Satkaryavada view, the effect (karya)

is believed to be existent (Sat) in a potential form in its

1, We are aware that ordinarily vivartavada is not taken

as specis of Parinamvada.

cause. Thus, what we regard as an effect is not a new

entity. The effect is in essence the same as its material

cause; the cause changes its form after the causal process,

and therefore^"cause ... is a potential or an unmanifested

state of its effect Various examples from our

ordinary life suggest this. For example, one may ask why%

a mango-tree does not come into existence from the grape-

seed or, why the curds are not produced from the oil-seed

and so on. Now, this account of the cause-effect relation-I

ship raises a problem regarding the change that is involved

in the causal process. That is, although we could regard

the effect as in essence the same as its material cause,

yet, the question arises as to whether the change or the

transformation that takes place in the cause, is a real

change or a real transformation. That is, suppose v;e say

that is an effect, and in essence is the same as X,

the question is whether the change that takes place

between X and X^ is a real one. Samkhyas, it is said,

believe that the change that we talk of between X and X^

is a real change. This is the meaning of their Parinamavada.

To illustrate, suppose there is some wood of which the

table is regarded as an effect. The transformatlon

that takes place between the wood (cause) and the

1. Bharatiya M.C., Causation in Indian Philosophy (1973)p.36.

126

table (effect) is regarded as a real transformation.

Similarly, the usual examples of milk and curds, earth

and earthen pots etc., suggest this. The Samkhya doctrine

of Satkaryavada or Parinamavad.a, thus, means that, "the

material cause undergoes a real change in its shape, but

as far as its essence is concerned, it does not change;

the essence continues to be the same through the whole

cause-effect series. An effect, thus, does not differ

from its cause essentially."^ Samkhyas give the following

argument in support of their Satkaryavada : Asadkaranad-

Upadanagrahanat .... By this argument, it is said,

that Samkhyas seek to establish the essential identity

of the cause and effect.

In the above argument of Samkhyas, or for that

matter, anybody who might say that the cause and effect

are essentially identical, the following points seem to

be presupposed.

(i) The change that we envisage betv;een cause and

effect should not be characterized in terms of production

but it should be characterized in terms of modification.

In other words, the change that takes place between the

1. Ibid. p.37.

2. SK - 9.

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initial state (say X) and the end state (say X^) is only

the further modification of the initial state, i.e. X.

The end state is not ’produced’ , (in the sense of being

produced anevO but is only a modified state of the earlier

one.

(ii) This again presupposes, that there is the same

substance of which we can distinguish the initial and the

end states. Thus, e.g. of the same substance say X, ve

can distinguish betv;een Y and Y as initial' and end states.X OTo illustrate, we could say that it is the same substance

clay (X) , of which v;e could distinguish the two states i.e.

a lump of clay (Y^) , and the pot (Y^) . Both the Initial

and the end states are the parinama of the same substance.

That is, what is presupposed is that some material nucleus

is modified at different time points. That is at time t^,

the same material nucleus X is modified as Y ^ , and at time tg

the same material nucleus X is modified as Y^.

(iii) To say that something is modified into something

else, would mean that (a) something is developed into

something else. Thus, e.g. the iron could be described as

’developed’ into the form of an iron chair or a cot. Thus,

the development of some material into various forms could

be regarded as a modification of txhe material in different

forms. (b) It may also mean that certain features of the

material, or of the thing, disappear and certain new

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features begin to appear. Thus, e.g. the same fruit which

has certain features now (say hardness, a particular taste,

colour etc.) would acquire certain another features at

the next moment (say softness, a sweet taste, different

colour etc.). Thus, a modification would mean that at

least some features of the thing or of the material, which

are now (at a particular time) present, are replaced by

certain other features at another time. (c) Or it may

also suggest that the thing or a matter may change all its

features which it has now, (at a particular time). Thus,

e.g. the milk when it turns into curds, changes all its

features such as form, taste, colour, texture etc. But

in both these cases, i.e. whether a thing is modified

partially or completely, what is believed is that in

both these cases of change, the material nucleus remains

the same. In other words, if we do not consider any

other thing and merely say that a particular thing has

developed or is modified into something else, then, it is

called Parinama. Thus, the change i.e. Parinama, of

certain aspects or features of a particular thing into

some other aspects is defined in the Yoga-Bhasya as

’ avasthitasya ca dravyasya purvadharmanivr.ttTa dharmantarot-

pttihi parinama iti.”^ That is, "disappearance of the

1. YB-III.13.

129

previous aspect and the appearance of the new aspect of

a substance, while the substance itself remains constant."

Civ) However, whether we talk of any one particular

aspect, or talk about the whole as changing into something

else, it is possible to regard that the change of any one

aspect, or the change of the whole itself, is a real change.

This seems to be presupposed in the doctrine of Parinama.

That is, the aspect say ^ changing into an aspect , are

both real. The only thing that we have to note is that

the new aspect i.e. is not completely un’identical with

the earlier aspect i.e. A. Both A and A^ are identical

with each other. This identity is in terms of the essence

which is com.mon to both A and A-, . This seems to be the

Saifikhya Satkaryavada or Parinamavada.

(B) ASATKARYAVADA

Although, the Nyaya theory of causation is termed

as Asatkaryavada, or sometimes as Arambhavada, and is

usually differentiated from Samkhyas or from Buddhists,

yet, in one sense, it is similar to the view of Samkhyas.

When e.g. Naiyayikas say that the karya also has the

Samavayikarana, what they point out is that the effect

(karya) is not completely new. To say that the karya

and karana have the same ground or a substratum (adhikarana)

1. Bharatiya, op.cit, p.51.

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1

and to say that the effect (kar.ya) ’pre-exists’ in its

cause (karana) are not to say two different things. This

becomes clear when Naiyayikas regard the threads as the

Samavayikarana of the cloth. When Saifikhyas say that the

curds pre-exist in the milk, what they seem to suggest

is that we cannot explain the causal relation in terms

of temporal relations alone. Usually, we think of the cause

and effect in terms of such temporal relations as ’earlier

than' and 'later than'. But, when we regard that which

comes earlier and that which comes later as cause and

effect respectively, we think that, that which comes

earlier is the cause of that which com.es later. But this

may not be true. Again, that which comes later, is,

very often treated as the "creation” of that which is

earlier, or that which is already existent. But, the

whole point seems to be x-:hether we can regard coming into

existence in the later course of time as a 'creation'.

And to this, Saifikhyas (and also Naiyayikas) answer in

different ways. Strictly speaking, for Samldiyas, there

would not be any 'creation*. Similarly, in the case of

the Naiyayikas, considering their use of the concept of

Samayayikarana, it is possible to argue that there is no

creation. The Naiyayika doctrine is called arambhavada,

because of their use of the notion of Avayava and Avayavin,

Naiyayikas, it seems might have thought of some such

examples as the mirror and the broken pieces of it or

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*the threads and the cloth. The object existing as a mirror,

and its broken pieces, are two different things. Similarly,

to exist as threads and to exist as a cloth are also two

different things. To exist as a piece of cloth presupposes

the distruction of the separate existence of the threads;

(at least in some sense). In Nyaya terminology, to exist

as a Avayavi is the beginning of a new existence. It is

only in this sense that there is a "beginning" (aram.bha) .

But, this beginning (arambha) should not be mistaken for

the creation (utpatti) .

(C) VIVARTAVADA

Historically, the vivarta doctrine is conceived as

a variation of the Satkarya doctrine. That is, the effect

exists in the cause which produces it, is accepted by both

the Satkaryavadins as well as those who assert the vivarta

doctrine. The only difference between them is that on the

Parinama doctrine, the effect is regarded as the change of

some material nucleus and this change is a real change;

whereas on the vivarta doctrine, although the effect

potentially exists in its cause (in the sense that the

cause has potentiality of manifesting an effect), yet,

the effect is not a real effect, but is only an ’illusion or

unreal transformation* .

It seems that all these three views on causality

in general are concerned with the questions (i) whether

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the cause and effect are both real, or (ii) whether the

cause alone is real and not the effect, or (iil) whether

the effect alone is real but not the cause which produces

it. This last alternative i.e. the effect alone is real

but not the cause of which something is an effect is

contrary to our experience and therefore is not discussed

by these thinkers. The first and second i.e. whether both

the cause and effect are equally real or whether the cause

alone is real but not the effect - seem to be of importance

for our purpose. Considering Satkarya or asatkarya

doctrines, the problems that are usually discussed are

whether the effect is an altogether a new entity or that

it is not so. The asatkarya doctrine, it is said, assetts

the first i.e. an effect is an altogether a new occurrence,

a new entity, and the Satkarya doctrine, it is said,

asserts that the effect is not a new entity or an occurrence,

but is only a change of the cause. For our purpose, however,

the question, whether the effect pre-exists in its cause

or is a new entity is not that Important. Even if we prove

that the effect pre-exists in its cause, does it follow that

we would not regard the effect, when it becomes manifest,

as a real effect ? Suppose, we say that the ’table' in

some sense, pre-exists in its cause (i.e. wood), do we

not still regard the table, as a real existent ? We do

regard the table, the fan, the bricks, etc., as real

existents. Therefore, the question, whether the effects

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exist in their causes or not is not so important for our

purpose. The question is, whether pre-existing or a new

occurrence, are we going to regard the effect as much real,

as much existent, as its cause. The real question seems

to be, then, whether the cause and effect are both the real

existents. It is on this point, that the vivarta doctrine

seems to be asserting that it is only the cause which is

a real existent; whereas the effect is only a further

modification of this existent. This raises a further

question regarding the status of the cause and effect.

The problem is whether we could say that both the cause

and effect exist in their own right. And it is in this

context now we shall try to understand what is Gaudapada’s

argument on causality. As we have seen, he distinguishes

between the reality (Sat) which exists in its o/jn right

and the Bhavas or the Bhedas i.e. the manifestations (of the

Reality). The question therefore is, v/hether the Bhavas

or Bhedas, too are ontologically real. The answer which

Gaudapada gives is that the Bhavas or Bhedas ’exist' only

in the human world. They do not constitute the reality as

it is. Ontologically they are non-existent, not born (ajata).

The language of ’being born’ etc., belongs to the human world,

the anthropocentric world. Let us see how Gaudapada develops

his argument.

134

Civ) A STATEMENT OF GAUDAPADA'S AJATIVADA

(a) SOME INTERPRETATIONS

Gaudapada’s views on causality are described by the

term ajativada. Jati means birth and the ajati means that

which is not born. The following account of Gaudapada's

ajativada is given by Prof. T.M.P.Mahadevan. He x-ncites,

"The central theme of Gaudapada's philosophy is that nothing

is every born, not because ’nothing’ is the ultimate truth,I _

as in Sunyavada, but because the self is the only reality.

’No jiva is born, there is no cause for it, this is the

supreme truth; nothing whatever is born ...' The self is

unborn* there is nothing else to be born_^origination is

mere illusion, non-origination is the supreme truth.'’ ^

Prof. T.M.P.Mahadevan points out that following are the

arguments for the doctrine of non-origination. These

arguments are (1) ’’Those who believe in the transformation

(parinama) of the original Being into the world subscribe,

to the view of the unborn being born. But it is a

blatant contradiction to say that the -unborn is born. So

what the disputant should say is : what is born is born

1. Mahadevan, op.cit, p.128. He refers to these karilcas:1GK 3.43 : na kascij jayate jivah sambhavosya na vidyate.

etat tad uttamam satyam yatra kincin na jayate.• •also GK 4.74.

135

as something else. This however is unsatisfactory because

one would then be launched on an endless process of seeking

causes. Therefore, of what is real, birth through Maya

alone is intilligible and not in.reality."^And (2) "The

nihilist (asad vadin) maintains that the non-existent is

born. But this view does not stand to reason, because

what is non-existent cannot be born either really (tattvatah)

or illusorily (mayaya) . Txhe son of a barron woman is

nowhere seen to take his birth either in reality or through- - 2maya." Referring to these two arguments from Gaudapada

karikas, Prof. T.M.P.Mahadevan, concludes that it is "the

real alone may be said to be born, and that too, not in3

reality, but through maya." This is how, by and large,

Gaudapada’s argument for ajati is explained by the scholars.

We find further reference being adduced to, when Gaudapada’sargument is being explained further. For example, Gaterina

Conio refers to the following karikas from Gaudapada, to4elaborate his ajati argument. She first refers to the

karika where Gaudapada, it is said, is pointing out the

'infinite regress’ involved in the causal principle. The

karika reads, "ajad vai jayate yasya drstantasya nasti vai.

jattac ca jayamanasya na vyavastha prassaj^Lyate" (GK. 4.13).

Miss Conio further observes that the first half of the above

karika says that, "there is no example of something produced

by an unborn.

1. Mahadevan, Ibid. p.131. He refers to GK 3.27 i.e. sato hi mayaya janma yujayate na tu tattvatah.

2. Ibid. p.131.3. Ibid. p.131.4. Gaterina Conio, The Philosophy of Mandukya karika (1971)p.99.5. Ibid. pp.100-101.

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S!ie also alludes to the following illustrations and arguments

given by Gaudapada in order to propound fiis ajati ariuraent.

(i) She refers to kSrika Nos.Ill, 3-7 and 9 wherer

the analogy of Akasa which is uncreated is given and is_ r

argued that this one akasa is not really divided into many,

on account of its being enclosed in different pots etc.

Actually, the karika 3.7 suggests that different 'divisions'

of one space, are not 'parts' or the 'effects' of the one

space._ r

(ii) Gaudapada also quotes Srutis and gives a

scriptural basis for ajati argument (karikas III, 23, 24, 26).

(iii) "Things are unreal, like a dream, and what is

unreal cannot be originated, for there is no origination

of the unreal."

Civ) If something is already existent, it cannot be

originated.

(v) "If cause and effect are identical, then we have

to admit that the cause identical with the effect is

originated, and not eternal, and conversely, if the effect

is equal to the cause, it is to be considered unborn as the

cause and not generated, (karikas IV. 11.12)".

(vi) "One cannot maintain the beginninglessness of

cause and effect, for if the antecedent of a cause is an

effect, the relation v;ould be reversed like having the

birth of a father from a son. (karika Nos.IV. 14 and 15).

(vii) The order of cause and effect must be determined. »

If the cause and effect are simultaneous, they cannot be

related. (kSrika IV.16).

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(viii) The illustratiojj whicli is often given In support of the causal relationship, i.e. the illustration of seed and the sprout is Itself to be proved yet (karika IV.20)

This in short, is the summary of Gaudapada*s ajati argument as it is given by Conio. His argument for ajati has been interpreted by the scholars like Prof. Mahadevan or Prof. V.Bhattacharya, or Conio, or Nikhilananda, in more or less the same way. In the context of this exposition, let us see what Gaudapada really wants to say about causality.

(h) GAUDAPADA’S AfJGUMENT FOR AJATI

13S

Gaudapada is not giving just one single argument which can be termed as the argument for ajati. Gaudapada is presenting a complex argument v/hich needs a further analysis. It would be useful, therefore, to re-arrange his karikas, where he is presenting his argument for ajati, i.e. his argument for causality.

Gaudapada,begins his argument for ajati, by firstreferring to the view that those things which are alreadyexistent or those things which are non-existent are thought

2of as having the possibility of being born.'" Scholars

1. Ibid. pp.103-105.2. GK 4.3 : bhutasya jatim icchanti vadinah kecid evahi.

abhutasyapare dhira vivadantah parasparam.

have suggested that in this karika reference is made to Parinama and asatkarya doctrines. Gaudapada is pointing out that we think that the effect is something which comes into being as a new entity or as a thing, or that we think that the change of something (which is already existent) is new i.e. which ’comes into being’. Thus, with regard to the thing, or the change of a thing, we think that these are originated, or that they come into being. With reference to these views, Gaudapada is pointing out that

•

neither the change nor the thing which can be said to be originated or comes into being. Because, if something is already existent, it cannot be said to be ’originated’ again. And similarly, if something is non-existent, it cannot be originated.^ Here what is meant perhaps, is that the category of existence cannot be applied to that which is non-existent. Thus, even if we regard that the effect as a change of something which already exists, then, it is not born (i.e. which is aja). Similarly, if we regard the effect as a new occurrent, then, since it was

2not existing before, it cannot be said to be existing mow. This seems to be contrary to our experience. Because,

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1. GK 4.4 : bhutam na jayate kincid abhutam naiva jayate. X ’ GK 4.5

we think tiiat if sometliing comes into being means that it was not existing before it was ’born*. But, this is precisely what Gaudapada is challenging. For Gaudapada, as we have seen, the existence of a thing ought to be a continuous one. For Gaudapada, the contingent, or a determinate existence is not a real existence. Therefore, he could say that that which does not exist prior and posterior to its production, does not exist even in the middle. Such an argument is then, applicable to both the change of a thing as well as the thing which we believe comes into being. Thus, Gaudapada, in the next karika suggests that both the views (i.e. Satkarya and asatkarya) really point out that neither the change nor the thing (effect) is ’born'. They are really speaking Ajata. (Ajata should be distinguished from Ajati. Ajati, is of course Ajata. But literally it means that which is not a jati i.e. which has no classness or form or categorization).

Here, some clarification regarding the terra ajata is needed. Ajata literally means that which is not born. However, the language of 'being born' or 'being unborn' or 'comes into being' etc., is rather loose. Because, the proper context in which the word ajata is used is that of Reality. That is, from the point of view of the

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whole, nothing is said to be jata (i.e. born). The reality as it is, is neither ’born' or ’unborn* in the sense that these categories of ’being born* etc., are not applicable to the reality. Reality is in this sense aja. (It should be borne in mind that aja is not to be identified with soul or jiva). Gaudapada makes it clear that such a reality which is aja cannot be predicated as either * being born’ or 'as being unborn'.^ Such categories are not applicable to the reality which exists in its own right. The reality which is Sat is beyond the change; and therefore, decay or passing away etc., is not applicable to reality. This he points out in the karika where he says that all the dharmas by their very nature are free from jaramarana.That is, the very nature of reality is beyond such epithets. Gaudapada says that a conception of the reality as 'born*

Oetc., is due to the ’thought* i.e. due to our thinking.

Thus, Gaudapada first points out that the reality as it is, is beyond the categories of change, birth, decay, and death. This argument he propounds in karikas Nos. 3 to 10 of the fourth chapter. Now, the argument that he develops in the next few karikas, is an argument which is concerned with certain problems such as the relationship of cause

1. GK 4.3 and also GK 4.7.2. GK 4.10.3. GK 4.10.

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and effect, the order (i.e. the temporal sequence) of the cause and effect, the reversibility or otherwise of the cause and effect series, the dependance of the cause and effect, etc. Gaudapada begins his argument by

•

saying that if we regard the cause itself as the effect,then we shall have to admit that the cause (as an effect)is ’born‘ Thus, e.g.,if we take such a model as thecause giving rise to an effect, which in its turn becomesa cause for some further effect then, the 'cause* in sucha series will be an ’originated* cause. Thiis, e.g., ifwe regard C as the cause of and again as the causeof Cg and so on (C ... ... ...) then, in the firstplace, we shall have to seek the cause which itself isnot an effect of something. Unless we come across sucha cause, we shall have to go ad infinitum. Gaudapada seemsto be denying this type of a causal model. Because, outof the 'causes’ in the series, C, ... ... C etc.,’ I 2 3each one of them is 'produced' by the earlier one, that each one of them is 'born' , or ’has come into existence’. Gaudapada seems to be suggesting that if something is to be tjie ’cause' of something else, then, it must be different from the effect. If both the cause and effects are said to be ’born’ or ’have come into being’ then, there will be no difference between the two. With reference

1. GK 4.11.

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to the existence, th.e cause must be ’existing in its own rigfit* . If we regard the effect as that which is born, that which comes into being, then, the cause of this effect must not be so. Now, if we accept this model of causality (where the cause in its own turn 'becomes an effect of some earlier cause) then, Gaudapada suggests that we cannot regard the cause (which is an effect) as unborn. Here, in this karika, it seems that Gaudapada is using the word aja, in the sense that it is not 'produced’ or 'has come into being’ as a result of’. Gaudapada also uses the word Nitya in this karika. The reason seesm to be that, that which is aja is also nitya. Perhaps Gaudapada is suggesting that jata or jati implies im.permanance. That which is originated is not permanent.Thus, that which is really aja, if we regard it as ’born' or as jata, then, we shall have to say that it is not permanent. Gaudapada is denying this. The cause is to be regarded as aja. If someone regards the effect also as aja, then, again the problem of the permanence of the cause arises. This he makes clear in the next karika.^Thus ,, having said that it is the cause which is aja and not the effect, Gaudapada now explains that there is no illustration of something coming into being from that which is aja. Gaudapada here suggests that that which is beyond the categories of birth etc., cannot be said to

1. GK 4.12 : karanad yad ananyatvam atah karyam ajam yadi.* « « jayamanad dhi vai karyat karanam te katham dhruvam.

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’produce’ anything. The reality as it is does not produceanything. Here, in this karika, the word aja v/ould referto the reality. And if someone says that the effect isborn out of the cause which itself is so, then this leads

1to the infinite regress. It is thus, clear, that in these three karikas, i.e., karika Nos. 4.11-13, Gaudapada

•

is denying the causal relationship of the form A causing B and B causing C and C in its turn causing D and so on.The grounds on which he is denying this type of causal relation are that in the first place such a causal relationship leads to the infinite regress, and in the second place, if we try to avoid this difficulty, we shall have to think of such a cause which is beyond the category of birth, dependence and so on. But even such a cause cannot be said to 'produce' something because, at that state, nothing is said to be produced, everything is merely what it is. The whole idea seems to be that that which is unborn (aja) , that to which the categories of ’being born' etc., are not applicable, cannot be regarded as the 'cause* of something.

He also discusses the nature of the causal order, its temporal sequence, its reversibility or otherwise,

1. GK 4.13 : ajad vai jayate yasya drstantastasya nasti vai.• •jatac ca jayamanasya na vyavastha prasajjyate.

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and also whether from certain instances of the 'effect’ following from the ’cause', we can prove that the relation of causality exists. Gaudapada examines such illustrations as the seed (bija) giving rise to the sprout (ankur) and says that such instances (as the instances of 'cause’ producing the effect) do not conclusively prove the notion of causality. To use the modern idiom we can say that for Gaudapada the case of seed and sprout is the case of 'constant conjunction’, but it does not prove cause-effect relationship. By referring to this, and similar illustrations^ we cannot ipso-facto prove that these are the instances of causal relationship. Gaudapada

•2says this clearly in karika 4.20. Again, such illustrations and the causal model which they suggest clearly indicate that we cannot be sure which of the alternatives in the pair is prior to the other as any one of them can be treated as either a cause or effect.Thus, the illustrations of seed and sprout, or the egg and the hen, suggest some kind of a circular model.And the difficulty that arises with reference to this

1. In this connection V.Bhattacharya refers to Nagarjuna who discusses the illustration of fire and fuel. See

also j op.cit, pp.125-126.2. GK 4.20 ; bijankurakhyo drstantah sada sadhyasamo hi nah.• « •

na ca- sadhyasamo hetuh siddhau sadhyasya yujyate,

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circularity is that we cannot distinguish what is causeand what is effect. In other words, we cannot say thatcause or effect comes into existence at a particular time.This argument is developed by Gaudapada in the karika

1No,4.14. Similarly, if v/e regard the cause-effect relation­ship cyclic then, we are led to such absurd conclusions

2like son is the cause of his father. Analyzing, these illustrations such as seed and sprout, etc., what Gaudapada

•

is really hinting at, is that the causal relationship must be established in such a way that the cause and effect should not occur simultaneously. Gaudapada says that if we regard cause and effect as simultaneous,

3then no relation of causality can be established. And even if we establish the causal order in- such a way

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1. GK 4.14 : hetor adih phalam yesam adir hetuh phalasya ca.• • • •

hetoh phalasya canadih katham tair upavarnyate.• • • «2. GK 4.15 : tatha janma bhavet tesam putraj janma pitur yatha.3. GK 4.IS : sambhave hetuphalayor esitavyah kramas tvaya.

• •

yugapat sambhave yasmad asambandho visanavat.

V that the cause is an antecedent of the effect, even thensuch an order will not help. Because, that which is earlier in time does not necessarily become the cause of that which is subsequent in the time series. In such karikas, Gaudapada is analyzing the two views of causal relationship, viz., that the cause and effect are simultaneous or that they are governed by the relationship of earlier than and later than. On both these views, one cannot logically prove that the relationship is that of causality. Gaudapada in the next two karikas develops another argument, which in our opinion is extremely important for the understanding of his views on causality.^' Gaudapada points out that the causal model as suggested by such examples as seed and sprout is such that any given ’cause’ in the series of cause and effect, is dependent on some previous cause which itself is an effect of some earlier cause. It seems that for Gaudapada

•

that which is dependent on something else cannot truly V be described as a cause. He seems to be distinguishing

that type of causal series where the particular cause gives rise to an effect and the causal series ends as no further effects or causes are produced from the one which can be regarded as a continuous causal series, or a series which goes on. If we draw the following

1. GK 4.17 and 4.18.

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I

diagrams this point would become clear. Consider, e.g.,a causal series of the form C ... E, such that the causeC produces effect E. This series does not continue further.

C CConsider again the causal series of the type C - E - C E ... etc. Such a series can go on so long we want it to continue. Gaudapada is suggesting that neither the first nor the second type of causality exists in reality.Gaudapada says that neither 'of itself* nor from something which is other than itself that something which is existent, or non-existent or existent and not existent originates.^

It seems that the above mentioned arguments which Gaudapada puts forward are with reference to the accepted views on causality. What we regard as Gaudapada's ajati doctrine is thus divided into two parts, the one where he criticizes certain views on causality as they are expressed by others and the second where he shows that from the point of view of the reality or from, the point of view of the whole, nothing can be said to be originated or is changed. In further sections, we shall consider karikas \rheve he further explains his argument from the point of view of reality. The arguments we have considered till now, are about certain causal relationships which

1. GK 4.22 : svato va parato vapi na kincid vastu jayate.sad asat sadasad vapi na kincid vastu jayate.

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we think are operative In the world of our experience.It seems that Gaudapada is analyzing certain causalrelationships as they are suggested by certain illustrationssuch as bija and ankura, or the milk and curds, or theearth and earthen pots. Some of these illustrationssuch as bija and ankura suggest that we cannot determineobjectively which one of them is first 'originated’ andis the ’cause’ of the other. Similarly, as seen in theearlier sections, such illustrations as milk and curdsor earth and earthen pots etc., suggest that no new ’entity*has come into existence, what appears to be originatedis merely a modification of something which is already inexistence. In some of his karikas, Gaudapada points out

1this. The philosophical conclusion he establishes fromthis point, then, can be stated in this way i.e. there isno utpatti (coming into existence) from the point of viewof reality. Again, as regards the change of the substanceas suggested by milk-curds analogy, what he seems to besaying is that really speaking nothing is either constitutivelyor contingently modified as something else. Prakriti issuch that it never forsakes its own nature. It remains

2merely as it is. In this sense, neither an entity nor a change is said to be originated (aja).

1. GK 4.3 onwards,2. GK 4.9 : samsiddhiki svabhaviki sahajapya akrta ca ya.

prakritih seti vijfieya svabhavam na jaha.

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150

Another argument which Gaudapada propoimds is expressed in karika 4.24 and a few immediately following karikas.^ This is a very peculiar argument which Gaudapada is propounding. He first states the views of others, namely that the knowledge (prajnapati) or m.iseries

I p(samklesa) has a ’cause' (nimitta). Gaudapada, accepts this view, but in the next karika says that from the point of view of reality what we regard as nimitta (cause) is

3 _'afterall no cause’/' The argument that Gaudapada develops can be interpreted in this way. By accepting the views of others (in the present context, the views of Yijnanavadinsi.e. idealists) Gaudapada accepts that knowledge i.e.

Iprajnapti and miseries i.e. samklesas, must have a cause.That is, if ’knowledge’ is to be possible, there must be something of which it is a knowledge. In other words, he seems to be criticizing the subjective idealist’s position as it is expressed in saying that esse est percipii.

1. GK 4.24 : prajnapteh sanimittatvam anyatha dvyanasatah.• • samklesasyopalabdhes ca paratantrastita mata.

2. GK 4.243. GK 4.25 : nimittasyanimittavam isyate bhutadarsanat.

See Mikhilananda’s translation, op.cit, p.239.

Gaiidapada by accepting the view that prajnapti has animitta, points out that we require the subject/objectduality (dvya) in order to have knowledge. If we wantto distinguish between a genuine case of knowledge fromillusion or imagination, then, the presence of the objectmust be accepted in the knowledge situation. If one deniesthis, i.e. if one holds the view that knowledge is merelya subjective impression, then, to distinguish betweenillusory or imaginary from the veridical (experiences)would becom.e difficult. As we have pointed out in thebeginning , Gaudapada makes a distinction between the

0

world (reality) which exists in its own right and the world as the common sense conceives it. He seems to be accepting the first, i.e. the world or reality which exists in its own right and denies the second i.e. the world as conceived by the common sense. However, to deny the world as it is, conceived by the common sense, is not necessarily to accept subjective idealism. Gaudapada in the present karika in fact seems to be accepting the view that the presence of the 'object’ is necessary in the knowledge situation.

Difficulty, however, arises vrhen we try to understand- 1the phrase Anyatha Dvaya nasatah. Which Dvaya Gaudapada

is referring to ? As we have seen, that the reality

1. GK 4.24.

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according to Gaudapada is Advaya. So, Dvaya Nasa shouldbe acceptable to him. It can be conjectured that whatGaudapada really wants to say is that although the realityis Advaya, (everything is only one), yet, when we talkabout some epistemological situation, such a situationwould be possible only when we presuppose duality of thesubject and the object. If one denies this duality, then,no knowledge would be possible. GaudapSda, seems to beaffirming this position. Gaudapada's o m view however istxhat from the point of view of reality what we regard asa cause, is properly speaking not a ’cause’. The 'cause''effect' process itself is anthropocentric, i.e., it ariseswhen we split the reality into the knower and the knov/n.In fact, there is no knower and the knovm, but reality thatexists in its own right. Once we realize this, then whatwe regard as a cause ceases to be a cause. All this he expresses

1by saying, 'nimitasya animitatvam isyate bhutadarsanat.What Gaudapada is suggesting in this and the following karikas is that once we realise that the reality is reality, and that it is not caused by any external agency, than we will also realise that the introduction of the cause-effect categories is anthropocentric. What we regard as effects are nothing but the forms which we ascribe to the reality or to a part of reality. The forms are thus only our impositions on the reality and are epistemic or

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epistemologlcal in nature. The manifold forms are called jati, because tiiey are generated. But reality as it is, is far from it and hence is not ’caused'. Such cause-effect series arises only when one thinks of the pluralistic universe. It is in the world of plurality where objects interact upon one another and where objects etc., change that the cause effect model is applicable. The sphere of its application is thus the pluralistic world where 'changes* take place. Pluralism itself arises in human knowledge and is anthropocentric. Supposing we regard this world as non-pluralistic , and also deny any change taking place in this world; then, evidently the causal model would not work.

It should not of course be forbidden to think (although such thinking may be anthropocentric) that the reality is a whole having continuity and temporality. To say that it has temporality, is quite different from saying that it is in time. When we say that it is in time we think of time as a container, as a substance. When we think of temporality we do not mean any such thing. We do not mean e.g., that the time as an independent entity. Thus, on this hypothesis it is possible to think of reality as cit or Prana, which in ordinary language is expressed as 'filled* in time.Whether or not Gaudapada has to say something in the matter, we can imagine two kinds of causality, one ontic and the other

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epistemic. For to conceive a change from Sat to Sat, for example, as a form of development would be one kind of process and cfiange from Sat to Bhava would be another kind of process. The first v/ould be ontic. Perhaps this process could be in the mind of Gaudapada when he talks of Prana• •

’ - - - 1 and ceto'msun purusah prthak etc., in the karika 1.3.Although there is not a sufficient evidence in Gaudapada karikas to point out whether or not Gaudapada discards both these kinds of causalities, logically, it is possible to

Ideny the epistemic causality and still accept the possibility of ontic causality. But, of course, such ontic causality will merely be the continuity of the same stuff, and in the strict sense of the term will not be a causality at all.If cit or consciousness or Prana is depicted on the scale of time, the ’earlier’ and the ’later’ of this continuity could be distinguished but in the strict sense of the term, the ’earlier' would not be the ’cause’ of the later. Because, there will be the sameness of the identity. In our ordinary language when we use the word identity we either talk of non-temporal identity, or spatial identity, without thinking of the identity as continued in time.It can be easily seen that when we talk of personal identity

1. GK 1.3 : prabhavah sarvabhutanam satam iti viniscayah.!sarvam janayati pranas’ ceto’msun purusah prthak.

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or self-identity, it is the identity running through the time. If such continuity is supposed to be infinite as is suggested by the word ananta, then, the cause-effect categories would be simply inoperative. To conclude, when we divide this reality into spatial or temporal finltudes we can talk of cause-effect relationship. But dividing this reality into such divisions is itself a human activity and hence it is anthropocentric in nature.

This, however, leads us to the problem of ’creation’ in Gaudapada’s philosophy. We shall discuss this in the next chapter.

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