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Chapter Six

Comparing the case studies, conclusions and recommendations

The preceding three chapters have outlined in detail Zimbabwe, Namibia and South

Africa’s experience of DDRRR. Whilst each of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa’s

novel but different DDRRR processes occurred in a localized setting, certain comparative

elements manifest themselves. This chapter comparatively looks at the main findings of

the assessment of the three cases as they relate to the research questions. It shall deal with

DDR first and then Repatriation and Resettlement. The chapter subsequently examines

the implications, if any, for future DDRRR programmes in African countries such as the

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, as each DDRRR process takes place in

a unique setting the chapter does this by drawing some practical policy recommendations

and food for thought for enhancing future DDRRR efforts.

6.1 Preceding Conflicts

The dynamics of the preceding armed conflicts including the inter-force as well as intra-

force disposition, strategies, equipment and hostility impacted planning, implementation

and results of DDRRR. DDRRR featured strongly in the three countries transition to

independence and democracy following negotiated settlements to lengthy armed anti-

colonial struggles. While South Africa’s was the longest it did not involve significant

military engagements. The fact that the armed conflict was low-key may have

inadvertently have resulted in the low emphasis on the planning and execution of DDR.

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However, what made its armed conflict and subsequent DDR uniquely complex was the

involvement of seven separate armed formations. Namibia’s was the second longest

violent conflict but involved one armed liberation movement, PLAN, against the SADF

and South African controlled local armed formations. Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle,

involving three fully-fledged and mutually suspicious armies (ZANLA, ZIPRA and RSF)

was bitter and atrocious. The belligerents were mutually hostile along liberation and

counter-liberation lines. In Zimbabwe and South Africa the presence of more than one

liberation army was accompanied with intra-liberation movement tensions. In all three,

liberation armies used small arms and light weapons with significant implications for

post-war disarmament. It appears the DDRRR policies and programmes were not

strongly linked with these dynamics of the preceding conflicts.

Various foreign forces were at play during the liberation struggles in the said three

countries. The liberation struggles in Zimbabwe and Namibia took place during the Cold

War era. At the time (1960s-1989) foreign forces affiliated to both camps of the Cold

War were at play in southern Africa. In Zimbabwe the main international backers of

ZANLA and ZIPRA were the communist Chinese and former Soviet republics,

respectively. Regionally, Mozambique and Zambia provided rearguard support for the

two liberation armies. Apartheid South Africa provided the RSF’s war effort with varied

assistance. From the late 1970s South Africa was the regional bulwark of the West

against communist expansion. Partly due to the Cold War estrangement, China and the

former Soviet Union were excluded from Zimbabwe’s negotiated talks, transition to

independence and DDRRR despite their significant roles during the struggle. The

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UK/Commonwealth controlled and influenced the process.

In Namibia the former Soviet Union, China and the Organisation of African Unity,

through its Liberation Committee, weighed in with logistical and training support for

PLAN’s liberation war effort against South African forces. Many SWAPO recruits were

also trained at Angolan and Cuban military units. The international forces at play also

included the Contact Group comprising the USA, Britain, West Germany, Canada and

France. The Group’s 1978 “Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian situation” –

designed with the involvement of the UN, South Africa, SWAPO and Front Line States –

significantly formed the basis of UNTAG’s mandate and deployment plan. This followed

the US-brokered New York Accords by Angola, Cuba and South Africa that settled the

regional conflict that had entangled Angola, Namibia and South Africa. The Soviet

Union witnessed the signing of the accords. The foreign forces, at play during the

liberation struggle, were involved in their different ways and influenced Namibia’s

internationalized and successful transition to independence including DDRRR.

Compared to Zimbabwe, Namibia’s DDRRR was undertaken at the end of the Cold War

enabling a collective effort by the international forces at play.

This trend of communist support for the liberation movements continued in South Africa.

MK and APLA –the country’s two main liberation armies- received material and

logistical support from Russia, China and Cuba in their struggle against apartheid South

Africa’s military forces. During South Africa’s DDRRR, after the end of the Cold War,

the parties’ local political will was critical as South Africa embarked on a domestically

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managed process.

Armed conflicts triggered international and internal population movements in all the

three countries. Zimbabwe stood out in that it had significant categories of both classical

refugees and IDPs. The majority of the former were in camps managed by ZANLA and

ZIPRA. Namibia’s conflict mainly created a classical refugee population that crossed

international boundaries into countries including Angola, Zambia and the former German

Democratic Republic. In Angola and Zambia refugees sought protection in SWAPO

camps. The South African conflict forced about 40 000 people into exile. Due to security

imperatives the majority of these did not register with UNHCR and were not in refugge

camps. In all the three countries the former liberation movements assumed political

power and transformed themselves into post-conflict governments. The wartime

proximity between the churches and the nationalist movements facilitated the former’s

institutional role in the repatriation operations.

6.2 Negotiated Settlements and DDRRR

The country specific conflict termination frameworks and post-conflict military and

budget contexts influenced policy decisions to plan and implement DDRRR. In

Zimbabwe the conflict terminating Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979 was

the basis of the first DDRRR initiatives under the control of the UK-led Commonwealth

Monitoring Force and UNHCR. The goal then was to facilitate the independence of

Zimbabwe through the Commonwealth monitored elections. This saw practical DDR

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being postponed as emphasis was placed on the minimalist CMF’s presence, to create a

transitional-friendly framework through the separation of the suspicious antagonists, who

retained their military capability. The transitional military aspects of the Lancaster

House Agreement meant that it would not provide a successful model for Namibia and

South Africa.

The agreement clearly provided for a UNHCR organized repatriation process. In the

post-conflict era the independence government’s demobilization and reintegration policy

decision was influenced by security and budget considerations. The end of the war,

successful conduct of the transitional elections and formation of the new defence forces

engendered the perceived improved improvements in the security situation. It was also

deemed fiscally prudent to shed the size of the bloated new consolidated Zimbabwe

National Army. This was planned to be accompanied by the reintegration of the

demobilized into sustainable civilian careers. A smaller pre-integration demobilization

programme aimed at pruning “unfit” military personnel preceded the demobilization and

reintegration policy of 1981-83.

In Namibia DDRRR was facilitated by the multilateral New York Accords that provided

for the implementation of the Settlement Plan. Unlike Zimbabwe, the plan provided a

clear policy and UN institutional framework for Namibia’s transition to independence

and by inclination DDRRR. UNTAG provided the military, political and technical

support for the disarmament and demobilization process. This helped reduce possibilities

of protagonists clashing –like the ZANLA-ZIPRA clashes in Zimbabwe- when DDR

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started after UNTAG’s inauspicious start and augur well for the success of the process.

The UNHCR led the repatriation process according to the plan. The major goal of

DDRRR was to create the appropriate stable security framework for the conduct of

Namibia’s transitional elections. As the UN/UNHCR intervention was guided by specific

mandates and short timeframes, the post-conflict and long-term reintegration of both ex-

fighters and returnees was the prerogative of the SWAPO-led independence government.

National minutes, accords and agreements mainly by the National Party and the ANC

paved the way for South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy. The local

Multiparty Negotiating Forum and the new government established the institutional and

policy framework for DDRRR. The preponderance of national mechanisms was mainly

influenced by the apartheid government’s reluctance to involve external mediators and

actors. The delayed or non-involvement of parties such as the PAC meant that not all

sides were included in the crafting of the national DDRRR programme and the national

institutional framework.

6.3 Conceptual and Institutional Frameworks

The lack of comprehensive DDRRR polices and competent dedicated institutional

frameworks undermine the effectiveness of the process. Zimbabwe and Namibia both had

international agreements and frameworks that structured their transition to independence

and by inclination some DDRRR aspects, whereas, South Africa experienced a much

more internally driven process. The UK/Commonwealth, mandated by the Lancaster

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House agreement concerned itself with cease-fire monitoring, separation and containment

of the hostile forces, initial troop integration and Zimbabwe’s subsequent transition to

independence. Disarmament, demobilization and repatriation were an integral part of the

UNTAG independence plan for Namibia. In all three, the UNHCR and BMATT were the

other important institutional actors besides the concerned parties and the governments.

The transitional environment, in all three cases, was characterized by historical mutual

mistrust and animosity as preceding conflict dynamics influenced the establishment of

post-conflict unitary armed forces and DDR. The resultant insecurity and uncertainty

posed challenges to integration and DDR.

DDR was closely linked to the logically strategic establishment of unitary and legitimate

national defence forces that were crucial for post-conflict peace and nation building.

While the scale and composition of the armed formations differed, the three countries

faced the structural challenges of integrating more than one military formation. In

retrospect, the classical element was the emphasis that was placed on the formation of

new defence forces as part of nation and peace building in all the three countries.

BMATT, accepted as a neutral, professional and competent institution, assisted the

training, professionalization and/or unification of former belligerents in all three

countries. This was under different contexts. Unlike Zimbabwe and Namibia, in South

Africa BMAT’s later invitation was influenced by the resistance and dominance of the

old SADF. While BMATT was able to exercise considerable influence over the

integration process in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the SADF’s continued dominance

weakened BMATT’s authority over the establishment of the new SANDF. Despite the

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difficulties encountered in the creation of representative post-conflict national defence

forces all three countries eventually succeeded.

UNHCR effectively discharged its statutory responsibility of assisting repatriation. The

agency played its normal and traditional humanitarian role to facilitate the safe and

dignified return of refugees, exiles and IDPs. In Zimbabwe and Namibia the UNCHR

initiated the repatriation programme and invited the religious community as its main

implementing partner. It was the opposite in South Africa where the UNHCR, belatedly

invited by the reluctant apartheid regime, came on board against the backdrop of

SACC/SABCB initiatives. In all three the UNHCR was productively assisted by like-

minded agencies including UNESCO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO.

The UK/Commonwealth presided over Zimbabwe’s transition to independence. This was

a short-term project based upon the UK’s desire to exercise authority over the process

and influence the outcome through limited engagement. The former Soviet Union and

China, erstwhile major international players, were excluded. A result was the modest

CMF’s initial operational deficiencies and organizational flaws. These, including

inadequate pre-deployment briefing time; “dearth of administrative supplies” and

problematic administrative arrangements are well documented by Susan Rice.789 The

shortcomings, however, did not impede Zimbabwe’s successful transition.

In post-independence Zimbabwe a policy with the dual aim of demobilization and

789 S.E Rice The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International

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reintegration was stated. A much more appropriate institutional framework in the nature

of the multi-ministerial Demobilization Directorate was emplaced and appropriately

located in the labour and social services ministry. However, an array of factors such as

incompetent personnel, inadequately oriented ex-combatants, unfavourable economic,

social and political frameworks as well as lack of monitoring and revision mechanisms

impeded the effective reintegration of the majority of the combatants.

Namibia’s transition to independence was managed by a United Nations that was geared

at asserting itself at the end of the Cold War. Notwithstanding the UN mission-creep

inspired tragedy of 1 April 1989 that saw antagonistic forces clashing and that “almost

ended the UN mission before it had begun.”790 The UN ultimately “was very key because

(it) really played the role of a midwife and saw the independence and the transition

through.”791 The UN’s determination for UNTAG to succeed is mirrored in the robust,

elaborate institutional framework that UNTAG was. This made the mission both credible

and workable and greatly contributed to its success. As Leonard Kapungu has explained,

Namibia was a responsibility of the UN, so the UN was determined for UNTAG to succeed. It was more involved in Namibia than it had been involved anywhere. It negotiated the settlement. It put all its support. UNTAG was well resourced. At the end of the operation every vehicle in the operation was given to Namibia unlike in other countries, for example Somalia, where equipment are withdrawn.792

Cedric Thornberry, Chief Aide to UNTAG’s SRSG, notes that one of the novel features

Peacekeeping, (D. Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990), pp.183-208 790 C. Thornberry, A Nation is Born: The Inside Story of Namibia’s Independence” (Windhoek, Gamsberg Macmillan Publishers, 2004), p.87 791 Interview with Professor Andre du Pisani,10 November 2004, Windhoek 792 Interview with Dr L Kapungu, Director, Centre for Peace Initiatives (formerly UN Lessons Learnt Unit,

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of its success was

UNTAG’s funding was full and prompt…There was a unique sense of universal responsibility, when the mission was called to action, and a widespread feeling that it must be given every support. Thus it was fully funded (though UNHCR had difficulty in making its budget)…It was capable of carrying out the quite ambitious programmes that had been presented to and endorsed by the UN’s General Assembly in February 1989.793

The operational and logistic capacity of UNTAG enabled it to establish a highly visible

nationwide, neutral international institutional presence necessary for the effective

implementation of DDRRR aspects of its mandate. In addition, the fully emplaced

UNTAG was guided by the fundamental UN principles of consent and impartiality. This

heightened the parties’ confidence in its security-building measures and activities.

Namibia’s transition process was planned over a long time. This translated to clear

understanding about the definition of the transition project. There was clarity about the

mandate, goals, strategies and scope. More importantly, the link and centrality of

DDRRR components to the broader goal of transition to independence via peaceful and

credible elections, was elucidated. A clear timetable and relatively realistic targets were

formulated for the implementation of these. All the above factors combined galvanized

the UN’s effectiveness in implementing DDRRR as an international “third party.”

In South Africa’s case national institutions were established to formulate, implement and

manage DDRRR. This was mainly under the framework of the local but higher political

Harare, 4 June 2002 in G.A. Dzinesa “A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia” International Peacekeeping, Vol 11, No 4, Winter 2004, pp.653-654 793 C. Thornberry, A Nation is Born: The Inside Story of Namibia’s Independence” , pp.378-379

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authority Transitional Executive Council (TEC). Local ownership of the transitional

process and DDRRR meant a very important strategic advantage for South Africa. The

process was essentially domestically driven and less contested because it was a product

of a process of internal negotiations and bargaining rather than an externally imposed

framework. Chris Landsberg commented that the process would not

necessarily have been more successful if it was done by an agency like the UN. In fact it would have been less successful. Of course it had its own limitations because it was home-driven. But there is one thing that will stand it in good stead in the long run. Because it was driven by home actors it makes it legitimate and credible. So the chances of somebody in future questioning it and trying to walk out of it are far less.794

National management of the process was also crucial as the DDR-implementing nations,

themselves, “are stuck with the (DDR) processes in the long-term and it’s not a quick fix

solution that an international organization can just come and fix although it is often very

necessary.”795 South Africa’s mainly locally driven DDRRR process was well placed in

terms of credibility, legitimacy and sustainability.

Notwithstanding this, South African solutions for South African DDRRR challenges

were not effectively implemented. For instance, the Service Corps as the major vehicle

for creating and implementing reintegration had significant shortcomings. The location of

the Service Corps in a military department meant it absorbed and reflected a military

perspective. It is not surprising that the Service Corps methodology recorded less than

794 Interview with Dr Chris Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, 29 November 2004, Johannesburg 795 Interview with Sasha Gear, Researcher, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 22 September 2004, Johannesburg

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impressive achievements. As analysts have pointed out, there is a need for organizational

change given the inherent challenges faced by the Department of Defence to perform as

an institutional focal point for implementing the essential reintegration component of the

country’s DDR strategy.

6.4 Disconnect between DD and R in DDR: The Impacts?

In post-conflict DDR contexts where there is a gap between the two D’s (disarmament

and demobilization) and the R, the reintegration needs are rarely adequately met. To be

effective and positively contribute to peace DDR should be implemented as a holistic and

comprehensive process. Notwithstanding the strategic imperatives of swift establishment

of unitary post-conflict defence forces and demobilization of superfluous fighters the

equally important reintegration component of DDR was inadequately addressed in all

three countries. The government-led reintegration strategies were either poorly

implemented where policy statements were in place or worse when they were an

afterthought. This effectively created a gap between DDR’s two D’s and the R. The

impact on the re-integration of the mostly non-statutory forces (former liberation

fighters) was adverse as there was no legal basis for their eligibility for state pensions and

other assistance on the basis of their military status.

As has been illustrated in Chapter 3, in Zimbabwe’s case, it was not the absence of a

DDR policy per se that undermined the process. The Zimbabwe government tabled a

normative demobilization (and reintegration) strategy in the “Demobilisation within the

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Zimbabwe National Army” official policy document. The policy document, which

supposedly formed part of the conceptual framework for DDR, did nothing to ensure the

implementation of the reintegration programmes that it stated. The Demobilization

Directorate was set up as the managerial framework to implement DDR in a precise

format. The answer to DDR’s failure is rooted in practical institutional and programmatic

deficiencies against a backdrop of unfavourable contexts. Despite the presence of a

policy statement this translated to the absence of a dedicated reintegration policy by

government and meant that DDR essentially failed to guarantee the human security of the

fighters. This in turn had significant implications for post-conflict peacebuilding

Namibia’s disarmament and demobilization were successfully carried out by UNTAG.

While ultimately providing the necessary security environment for disarmament and

demobilization the UN’s intervention was specific and short-term. UNTAG did not have

a post-conflict mandate to assist with reintegration. This left the planning and

implementation of the long-term and important reintegration component of DDR to the

devices of the new SWAPO government. There were no steps to ensure continuity

through UNTAG’s post-withdrawal synergy with relevant local bodies such as the RRR.

This created a gap between the two D’s and the R particularly as the government failed to

craft a comprehensive reintegration strategy. As in Zimbabwe and South Africa’s cases,

the national military, “the NDF was actually one of the first agencies of the state to be

established and the reasons were political; reasons of political stability and consolidating

state power very quickly and playing a role in the nation building project.”796

796 Interview with Professor Andre du Pisani,10 November 2004, Windhoek

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In addition to its unique role in “serving as vehicle and mechanism for national

reconciliation,”797 through the integration of former antagonists the NDF absorbed

segments of the ex-fighters. Beyond this, a carefully articulated and comprehensive

reintegration programme to make unabsorbed and unemployed ex-fighters productive

citizens, dealing with the state in the new society, was not immediately designed by the

government. A coordinated and sustainable reintegration strategy, in the form of the

Peace Project, was only developed in response to demonstrations by ex-fighters

disaffected by their poor socio-economic status close to a decade after the war had ended.

In South Africa emphasis was put on the establishment of the consolidated SANDF and

not the reintegration of ex-NSF who could not integrate. “In contrast to the amalgamation

process, which has been driven by the imperative of the larger settlement process, the

demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants appear to have enjoyed a much

lower priority.”798 Unlike the SANDF amalgamation process swift and comprehensive

reintegration strategies were absent with negative results. However, unlike in Zimbabwe

and Namibia, ex-fighters did not engage in widespread and concerted protests. The

MKMVA, for one, attributes it’s refraining from holding demonstrations to wartime

inculcated “political consciousness and discipline.”799 However, this belittles the fact that

797 M. R. Rupiya and G. A. Dzinesa, “A Military History of Namibian Defence Forces (NDF), from 1990 to 2004” forthcoming in Evolutions and Revolutions: Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa (Pretoria, ISS, 2005) 798 M. Malan, “Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict South Africa: The Need for a Comprehensive Demobilisation and Remobilisation Programme”, African Security Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1996 < www.iss.co.za?Pubs?ASR/5NO4?Peacebuilding.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2005 799 Interview with Thabiso Radebe, MK Military Veterans Association Financial Director, 12 April 2005, Johannesburg

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the small-scale protests that did not conclusively catch the sight of the politicians could

be explained in terms of the absence of a national representative body and unity of

purpose among ex-fighters.

DDR’s potential of contributing a peace dividend was not fully realized. In all the three

case studies the negative results of crisis management stop-gap measures and/or

inadequately implemented long-term reintegration initiatives were glaringly palpable.

These were reflected by widespread and numerous human security indicators such as

unemployment, poverty, among segments of the countries’ ex-fighter and returnee

populations. A related contextual similarity was that the governments that abdicated their

responsibility by failing to properly reintegrate ex-fighters later found themselves with a

price to pay as restive ex-fighters’ protests threatened national stability. The expectations

among ex-fighters that followed realization of independence or democracy fizzled into

disenchantment due to the various institutional and contextual factors that militated

against effective reintegration.

Ineffectively reintegrated ex-combatants became involved in post-war destabilizing

activities thereby threatening the newly found post conflict peace. In Namibia a result of

the inadequate human security dimensions of reintegration was the post-1995 public

protests where ex-combatants who found themselves almost unwanted and marginalized

in the new society marched and demanded cash payments, employment and recognition

from government. The timeframe of the major demonstrations by unemployed Namibian

ex-fighters in 1997 significantly coincided with countrywide protests by disgruntled war

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veterans in Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, in the case of South Africa, small scale protests by

aggrieved MK and APLA ex-fighters have occurred since 2000.

6.5 Content of DDR assistance

As we have seen in the individual case studies the demobilization and reintegration

packages differed. However, certain trends are discernible. First, there was an underlying

assumption that ex-combatants and returnees were disposed to a post-conflict rural

agricultural settlement and occupation. Mersie Ejigu and Tekalign Gedamu pointed out

that “Given the agrarian nature of most African economies coupled with a low level of

literacy, it may be assumed that most combatants are of a peasant origin with a low level

of professional skills.”800 In all the three case studies this assumption was reflected in the

provision of the magic agricultural kit: the hoe, the spade, seeds etc that would facilitate

socio-economic reintegration in the post-war rural economies. In South Africa and

Namibia unarmed ex-fighters who repatriated under the UNHCR received reintegration

packages that included agricultural implements.

It is, however, not known how many ex-combatants and returnees actually (re)settled in

rural areas in the three countries. The focus on agricultural-oriented assistance was

particularly problematic in South Africa’s case where the bulk of ex-fighters “have (had)

been recruited from urban environments.”801

800 M. Ejigu and T. Gedamu, Conversion in Africa: Past Experiences and Future Outlook, (Bonn, BICC, 1996), p.17 801 M. Malan, “Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict South Africa: The Need for a Comprehensive

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Second, in all three countries financial packages constituted part of the reintegration

assistance. A major element of Zimbabwe’s 1980s DDR programme was the

demobilization allowance of a monthly stipend of Z$185 spread over a two-year period

or a lump sum of Z$4 440. The same amount was paid to all who were demobilized

regardless of rank. Provision for the funding was made under the national defence

budget.802

In Namibia whilst no initial cash package was planned in 1991 the unemployed former

PLAN combatants were paid an unvarying one-off gratuity of R1 400. The funds were

provided by the South African government to balance off earlier monetary compensation

provide by the same regime to South African controlled forces such as ex-

SWATF/Koevoet.

In South Africa a one-off gratuity was made available to registered demobees. The scale

of the gratuities differed as they were calculated according to length of service in the

liberation armies. As at December 1997 the total paid for the demobilization of 4 143 was

R82 752 639.803 The national fiscus bankrolled the gratuities. In all three countries the

financial support scheme bought at least the short-term peace of ex-fighters despite

concerns over its adequacy.

Demobilisation and Remobilisation Programme”, African Security Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1996 < www.iss.co.za?Pubs?ASR/5NO4?Peacebuilding.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2005 802 Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 21 July 1981 803 J. Higgs, The Critical Component: Personnel Strategies for the SANDF to 2000 and Beyond,

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A similar and third component of the reintegration strategies was encouragement to

continue education or vocational training and start up small enterprises. In Zimbabwe

vocational and training programmes were planned alongside the novel ZIMFEP project

to provide ex-fighters with technical and academic education. The Development Brigade

to equip trainee ex-fighters with mainly practical and agricultural skills for self-sufficient

civilian life was instituted in Namibia. Likewise the Service Corps was established in

South Africa with the aim of training demobilized combatants to prepare them for

civilian livelihoods.

However, these strategies such as technical training and cooperative business ventures

largely failed due to various conceptual, institutional and operational environment factors

discussed earlier. Ex-combatant’ specific housing, land access and long-term health

insurance were absent in all three reintegration strategies. The significant shortcomings

of the reintegration initiatives are exposed all the more by the financial payouts which

exposed the initiatives’ short-sightedness. The short-term financial assistance failed to

guarantee the long-term sustainability of the ex-fighters denting national stability. In all

three countries protests by ineffectively reintegrated ex-fighters within a decade or so of

the implementation of DDR reflected this.

6.6 Political and military contexts

(Johannesburg, SAIIA, 1999), p.15

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Zimbabwe’s immediate post-independence political framework was not ripe for effective

DDR. In spite of official pronouncements adopting a policy of post-conflict national

reconciliation, pre-independence ZANU versus ZAPU ethnic based tensions undermined

black on black understanding. The bad relations between the two political parties

contributed to the collapse of their coalition government, the dissidence menace and the

insecurity that rocked Matabeleland and parts of Midlands in the 1980s.

In addition to these internal threats was the external threat posed by apartheid South

Africa. Against this backdrop the ZANU government embarked on a remobilization

programme which, in essence, was the antithesis of demobilization. For a decade political

divisions also prevented the establishment of a unitary War Veterans Association around

which demobilized fighters could have mobilized to take part in the development,

implementation of DDR. Incomplete national reconciliation also impacted reintegration

as the white controlled private sector was reluctant to hire ex-combatants.

Attainment of independence was against the background of a highly divisive and

oppressive political context. However, Namibia’s post-independent relations were made

possible by the effectiveness of the national policy of reconciliation. That the former

antagonists integrated with ease into the new NDF, a successful “vehicle and mechanism

for national reconciliation” was instructive. This limited the danger of disgruntled

integrated members employing military means to disrupt the post-conflict nation building

project. These political relations, aided by the absence of a fragmented armed liberation

movement, were generally facilitative of integration despite some destabilization

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attempts by fifth-column elements. This provided the government with a chance to plan

and implement effective reintegration programmes for the demobilized.

However, as we might recall, the government guided with the policies of national

reconciliation and treatment of all Namibians as equals did not take this chance. It is also

noteworthy that the “lack of political guidance and incomplete national reconciliation

proved problematic for (reintegration) programme design and implementation.”804 The

result was that the ineffectively reintegrated former combatants continued to pose a threat

to the society at large.

South Africa’s DDR occurred following the collapse of apartheid in South Africa and in

the post-Cold War years. Not only did the collapse of the Cold War remove any external

military threat perceptions to national security allowing the state to focus more on human

security. The changing international political landscape then was also characterized by

newfound cooperation and inter-linkages between South Africa and its SADC neighbours

particularly Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique. This offered South Africa a chance to

draw lessons from her neighbours’ experience of military forces’ integration and DDR at

regional forums. In the preface of a report on one such conference Ambassador Joseph

Nanven Garba noted:

It is not just that South Africa is larger, more populous and economically dominant. It is also that, as the big guy on the block (just as my own country [Nigeria] in West Africa), it tends to view itself as the fount of progress and wisdom with nothing much to learn from the little guys in the neighbourhood: As

804 N.J. Colleta., M. Kostner and I Wiedohofer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, (USA, The World Bank, 1996), p.46

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it happens, however, these same neighbours have in their various ways already experienced many aspects of the problems a new democratic South Africa has to tackle.805

Notwithstanding this, typical inadequacies were manifest in South Africa’s

demobilization and reintegration. Tsepe Motumi and Penny McKenzie summarized what

other researchers have also identified: South Africa’s “Demobilization has been poorly

planned, badly executed and wholly inadequate in meeting the needs of ex-combatants. It

has failed to take into account some of the lessons learnt from demobilization processes

in other developing countries and, in fact, repeated some of the more obvious mistakes.”

806 These oversights, also manifest in Zimbabwe and Namibia’s experiences, included

lack of needs assessment, socioeconomic profiling of ex-combatants and absence of job

market surveys.

At the national level South Africa was in the throes of a volatile and highly charged

political context. The desire to secure control of national power structures by the

liberation movements or to retain power and influence by the former apartheid authorities

negatively impacted DDR. Commenting on South Africa’s incomprehensive DDR plans

Mark Malan noted “In fact, the framework for such a (comprehensive) programme

should ideally have been put in place before 27 April 1994. Perhaps a ‘trial-and-error’

approach was unavoidable, given the manoeuvring for the acquisition or retention of

political power of the various parties at the multiparty negotiating forum.”807

805 Ambassador J.N. Garba, “Preface” in The Southern African Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Project, (USA, Institute of International Education, 1994), p.iii 806 T. Motumi and P. McKenzie, “After the war: Demobilisation in South Africa”, in J. Cock and P. McKenzie, From defence to development, David Philip, Cape Town, 1998, pp.181-182 807 M Malan, “Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict South Africa: The Need for a Comprehensive Demobilisation

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6.7 Economic contexts

In all three countries the colonial legacy of oppressive and divisive structures and

institutions bequeathed the country’s new governments with unfavourable economic

frameworks. While the post-conflict economies were relatively intact they were

characterized by high unemployment levels. It was difficult to undertake DDR during the

early post-war economic restructuring. In all the three countries the small white

controlled formal private sector proved to be a closed employment destination for ex-

combatants, many of whom lacked the requisite job skills. The efforts by the three

governments to restructure the economic context and address socio-economic imbalances

met with limited success.

The unfavourable broader economic environment meant that the broader population was

affected by unemployment among other ills. This may blur significant differences

between the ex-fighters and their comparable civilian counterparts.808 However, as we

have seen most ex-combatants deserved special and comprehensive reintegration

assistance. This was lacking or lethargic, particularly, during the immediate post-war

and Remobilisation Programme”, African Security Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1996 <www.iss.co.za?Pubs?ASR/5NO4?Peacebuilding.html>, Accessed on 24 March 2005 808 For instance in 1998 John Nkomo, then Zimbabwe’s Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, commented: “I think in the eight years we have gone through, too many things have evened out between the ex-combatants and the non-ex-combatants. We should now be addressing unemployment as a national problem that faces both the veterans of the war and those who were young during the war, but who have now attained the age of majority.” Quoted in N J Kriger, “The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and National Identity” in Bhebe N and T Ranger, eds., Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War, v1, (Harare, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995)

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periods.

The perilous social and economic contexts in which reintegration occurred in all, was

aggravated by certain common factors. These included the failure of wider socio-

economic programmes to underpin DDR efforts; the lack of a vibrant business

development skills and entrepreneurial support component. Devoid of the necessary

business support, including capital and equipment, vocational training graduates

resembled skilled fisherman without fishing rods. For instance, in South Africa the

Service Corps’ scope was limited to training and did not support post-training placement

and business ventures.

6.8 Social contexts

In all three the potential of social capital was not powerfully mobilized to enhance DDR.

The mobilization of the wider communities was critical for the progression and success

of anti-colonial struggles. Raising awareness and better still embracing the wider society

in the DDR programmes life-cycle would have had potentially positive effects. However,

the three DDR strategies did not involve sensitization of the wider communities in which

the ex-combatants and returnees were meant to reintegrate. The wider Zimbabwe society

was not educated on the welfare and security imperatives of planning and implementing

comprehensive DDR.

The society was not primed to be accommodative of ex-combatants particularly the

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disabled and women fighters. The reintegration of the latter category was mainly

problematic in a post-independence patriarchal setup. Later tensions between sections of

wider civilian populations, perhaps oblivious of the shortcomings of the 1981-1983

programme, and the war veterans after the implementation of the second policy on

reintegration could have been avoided if time was taken to update the awareness of the

former. Traditional spiritual cleansing rituals, later employed with positive impacts in

Mozambique to address the psychosocial problems of ex-fighters in conjunction with

local community integration,809 were not widely implemented.

In Namibia the government did not raise the awareness of the community in what it could

do to assist the reintegration of women former freedom fighters. Notwithstanding

national encouragement of the wider population to accommodate returnees including ex-

fighters patriarchal gender relations were reflected in gender insensitive reintegration

strategies. Also, when devising the Development Brigade and Peace Project it appears

little efforts were made at conscientising the wider community or to incorporate its input.

6.9 Special categories

A result of incomprehensive and inconsistent reintegration was the double jeopardy of

special categories of former combatants, mainly women and the disabled. While in

Zimbabwe a policy decision was later made to open a national rehabilitation centre for

disabled ex-fighters this was inconsistently implemented. The otherwise strategic noble

809 See for example J. McMullin, “Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in

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move was undermined by various institutional and implementation impediments. The

obvious result of the unsustainable “physical, mental and spiritual” rehabilitation policy

was ineffective physical and psychosocial reintegration. This exacerbated the PTSD-

induced psychosocial problems of the already disaffected former combatants. The

situation was compounded for female ex-fighters in particular single mothers.

Likewise, in Namibia “No special efforts were undertaken to facilitate reintegration of

spouses and female ex-combatants.”810 In the absence of a comprehensive and gendered

immediate post-conflict reintegration strategy vulnerable categories faced formidable

difficulties in Namibia. The physically disabled and psychosocially affected received

little or no rehabilitation assistance. Targeted assistance in the form of minimal monthly

allowances only materialized in 1998 following ex-fighter demonstrations. Bereft of

gender specific reintegration assistance, women former fighters, including single

mothers’ encountered significant difficulties. The high incidence of PTSD among ex-

combatants is therefore not surprising

In South Africa official psychosocial rehabilitation programmes for the mentally

distressed ex-fighters were absent. However unlike in Zimbabwe’s case, the post-

apartheid constitution-making process and reconstruction was gender-aware.811 Even the

Service Corps – the major official vehicle for reintegration – provided for courses

traditionally associated with women such as baking and dressmaking. These progressive

Mozambique?” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No.4, Winter 2004, pp.625-643 810 N.J. Colleta., M. Kostner and I Wiedohofer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, (USA, The World Bank, 1996), p.54 811 V. Farr, Gendering Demobilization as a peace building tool, (Bonn, BICC, 2000), p.26

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plans were undermined by the general institutional deficiencies that dogged the Service

Corps. Although the Service Corps’ training covered women-friendly courses, the well

documented failures of the programme worked against their fruition.

The presence of a strong women’s movement was pivotal and enabled South African

women to influence “the drafting of a gender-aware constitution after the apartheid war

ended.”812 A woman MK ex-fighter stated the favourable societal gender relations:

Already women in the country knew they had rights…already society was beginning to grapple with those issues in South Africa. At the point that I joined the struggle in the ANC the understanding politically was beginning to mature to say that women are parallels, as much as soldiers and partners in the liberation struggle as men. When we came back society was happy that MK also had women. There was recognition to say that we were flowers of the nation who should be treated with respect.813

6.0.0 Redressing earlier DDR shortcomings?

There was a bottomless well of disenchantment and general disillusionment among ex-

combatants who had suffered because of years of unsuccessful reintegration initiatives.

Ex-combatant demonstrations of varying scales but with a significant impact

demonstrated that ineffective DDR was a major threat to peace and stability in the three

cases. This was a red flag that the national authorities found dangerous to ignore.

Differentially influenced by security imperatives, ethical and humanitarian considerations

the three governments embarked on new reintegration initiatives. The challenge remained

812 V. Farr, Gendering Demobilization as a peace building tool, (Bonn, BICC, 2000), pp.12-13 813 Interview with Pamela Daniels, MK ex-fighter and Managing Director, MK Military Veterans Association, 22 October 2004, Johannesburg

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how to right earlier ineffective DDR without disturbing sustainable development and

national cohesion.

In Zimbabwe’s case the government’s ‘second policy on demobilization and

reintegration’ emphasized state-sponsored pensions. Besides buying time and the peace

of the ex-fighters the second policy did not comprehensively address their long-term self-

sufficiency and security problem. Gerald Mazarire and Martin Rupiya commented on the

short-comings of the second policy:

The first is lack of focus on the “Class of ’83.” Put differently, handing out exactly the same levels of grants and pensions to war veterans that had been unemployed since 1980 and those that are in cabinet or the top leadership of the armed forces creates a gap. The chasm is not narrowed or closed through this action. In fact, because the currency then collapsed by losing nearly three-quarters of its value, the “Class of ‘83” could not weather the economic hardships in the same way as the other employed colleagues. Second, handing out large sums of cash to previously unemployed and homeless privates who had no preparation for the windfall and with no strings attached turned out to be an ill-conceived idea. Many simply squandered the proceeds and within weeks were queuing outside government doors for further assistance…Third, the number of people being supported have placed an extra burden on a small economy that has less than two million formally employed workers that are providing the regular tax revenue.814

As housing and employment components were lacking most of the ex-fighters continued

to experience livelihood problems. There is also no record of how many previously

landless ex-combatants benefited from the government’s ‘fast-track’ land resettlement

programme since 2000.

814 G. Mazarire and M. R. Rupiya, “Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe’s Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes, 1980-2000,” Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2000, p.77

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Namibia’s Peace Project that revolved around public sector employment exemplifies one

relatively sustainable approach to long-term ex-fighter reintegration. It ensured that ex-

combatants were not confined to dependence on state-funded monthly altruistic handouts.

While these would have probably removed the current and immediate threat to peace and

legitimacy of the government posed by the riotous fighters’ public service employment

alleviated the ex-fighters poverty in the long-term.

South Africa’s new reintegration initiatives have met significant challenges. As we write

the Department of Defence is working on the reorganization of the Service Corps mainly

relating to its appropriate location.815 Slow steps are also being made towards the

establishment of a representative national war veterans association that would facilitate

implementation of the support provided under the Military Veterans Act.

Notwithstanding this, these reforms have not been comprehensive enough.

6.2 Repatriation and resettlement

Conceptual and Institutional Frameworks

Colonial rule and ensuing liberation struggles resulted in large numbers of Zimbabweans,

Namibians and South Africans seeking sanctuary in neighbouring countries. Zimbabwe

had the largest classical refugee population of about 250 000 alongside a significant

number of IDPs. The majority of the refugees were in camps that were run by the

815 Interview with Tsepe Motumi, Chief of Policy and Planning, Department of Defence, 5 April 2005, Pretoria

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liberation movements, ZANU and ZAPU, in Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana.

Namibia, with between 44 000 and 90 000 refugees out of a population of 1.4 million,

had a significant refugee per population ratio. With an estimated 40 000 in exile South

Africa had the smallest assisted returnees’ population.

The resolution of the refugee problem through negotiated settlement of conflicts in all

three facilitated the implementation of the desirable voluntary repatriation as a durable

solution to the problem. The signing of the Lancaster House Agreement between the

Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian government in December 1979 facilitated the

implementation of Zimbabwe’s voluntary repatriation and reintegration process.

In Namibia the New York Accords paved the way for the implementation of Namibia’s

Independence Plan that provided for the voluntary repatriation operation ahead of the

transitional elections. The Multiparty Negotiations settled South Africa’s prolonged anti-

apartheid struggle allowing for the voluntary repatriation and reintegration exercise. It is

notable, however, that the volatile security environment inside South Africa negated the

prospects of fundamental changed circumstances in the run-up to the transitional

elections.

The peace deals meant that the conditions in the home countries were positively

changing to pull refugees back home. The conflict settlement determined the

timeframes for the repatriation operation. Notably “repatriation in Namibia was part of

a peace plan with distinct time limitations. UNTAG’s military component provided

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protection, and various international bodies were available to facilitate the repatriation

programme.

Namibian exiles returned to participate in election campaigns, and, unlike South

African exiles, returnees were better informed of what was expected of them.”816

Repatriation could not be confined to the pre-election period and was thus drawn out

in Zimbabwe and South Africa. In the former, the repatriation of special categories

was actually earmarked for the post-election period. In both South Africa and

Zimbabwe the repatriates were apprehensive as they returned when the very security

apparatus they had escaped from was still in place.

In all three countries repatriation processes the UNHCR, in line with its core and

statutory function, provided the pivotal institutional framework. The British government

invited the UNHCR to carry out Zimbabwe’s repatriation on the basis of the Lancaster

House Agreement that was specific on the process. Namibia’s UNTAG- managed

Settlement Plan tasked the UNHCR to assist the return of refugees to enable them to

participate in the independence elections. In South Africa’s otherwise nationally

managed transition UNHCR acceded to the government’s request and facilitated the

voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees and exiles. The Zimbabwe

government cooperated with neighbouring host countries. For Namibia, a tripartite

agreement was signed by the UNHCR, SWAPO, Angola and Zambia, the main collective

host nations of Namibian refugees. In South Africa, the government and the UNHCR

816 SACC/SACBC, Report on the National Consultation On The Repatriation of South African Exiles, held

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signed a Memorandum of Understanding. These cooperative arrangements allowed for

better coordination of the process.

While the UNHCR provided the overarching international institutional framework, it

established cooperative relations with an array of related UN agencies, NGOs and

churches. The UNHCR established strategic and important partnerships with churches

who were trusted and were consistent allies of liberation movements; in Zimbabwe it

was Christian Care. It was the Council of Churches in Namibia and in South Africa

the South African Council of Churches/South African Catholic Bishops’ Conference.

In Zimbabwe, a tripartite agreement was signed by the UNHCR, Christian Care and

Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Some 46 000 Zimbabweans returned to their home country under the official UNHCR

programme in time to particpate in the February 1980 independence elections. 42 736

Namibians, a significant proportion of the country’s refugee population, voluntarily

returned as part of the UNHCR programme in time for the transitional elections. The

UNHCR repatriated 7 300 South Africans in time for the 1994 post-conflict

democratic elections. In Zimbabwe and South Africa the majority of the refugees or

exiles returned spontaneously outside the UNHCR framework.

Conflict termination largely cleared the flight-inducing contexts and provided for

timely repatriation and a comprehensive solution to the large-scale refugee problem.

at Koinonia, Judith’s Paarl, Johannesburg, 16-18 May 1990,p.6

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The democratic transitional elections in all three were a powerful pull factor to the

home countries. Pre-election returnees were enfranchised and they participated in

inaugural democratic elections that brought into power legitimate governments. This

consolidated the conflict terminating agreements and promoted the broader context of

post-conflict peace building and reconstruction.

In Namibia and South Africa, provision was made for significant numbers of disarmed

combatants to repatriate under UNHCR operations as peaceful returnees. This offered

important opportunities and a potential platform to synergize reintegration of ex-fighters

with that of returnees under an integrated war-affected-population assistance project.

Indeed, the returning cadres received similar relief reintegration packages as civilian

returnees. Besides this, however, there was no further comprehensive assistance for the

broader returnee population. Later, in both Namibia and South Africa separate assistance

was planned for ex-fighters. The incomprehensive assistance was undermined by other

economic and institutional frameworks.

It was different in Zimbabwe where there was no practical disarmament prior to the

repatriation exercise. The Lancaster House Agreement limited UNHCR repatriation

operation to purely civilian refugees:

With effect from 2400 hours on 21 December 1979, all movement by personnel of the Patriotic Front armed forces into Rhodesia and all cross-border military activity by the Rhodesian forces will cease. This agreement will take effect on a basis of strict reciprocity. The British Government will request the governments of countries bordering on Rhodesia to make arrangements to ensure that externally based forces do not enter Rhodesia. Provision will be made to permit

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the return of civilian personnel to Rhodesia in order to vote or engage in other peaceful political activity. Border-crossing points will be established, under the supervision of the monitoring force, for this purpose.817

This meant that from the onset there was no underlying platform for coordinated

reintegration of the ex-fighters and refugees.

6.3 Repatriation and Resettlement: Assistance and Challenges

UNHCR’s practical involvement in all three was not limited to preparation for

repatriation up to the transportation of the refugees back home. The agency and its

implementing partners provided relief assistance to the refugees upon arrival in their

home countries. Typical assistance packages comprised food rations, agricultural

implements and seeds. The latter was aimed at facilitating the integration of agricultural-

oriented returnees.

Zimbabwe’s post independence short-medium term reintegration component of the

repatriation programme included packages of blankets, utensils and simple tools to about

9000 needy families818 as well as agricultural assistance. This, aimed at developing the

capacity of returnees to be self-reliant in the long run, included vegetable seed packs,

tillage and training programmes. In Namibia besides the settling-in package consisting

food, clothing, health care and basic household gear returnees did not receive further

targeted governmental assistance. This occurred when UNHCR’s “reconstruction section

817 Constitutional Conference Held at Lancaster House, London September to December 1979, A cease-fire agreement signed by the parties (Annex E) 818 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, 23-27 March 1981, Conference

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of the (repatriation) programme had been under funded.”819 Further drought aid channeled

through WFP in response to the government’s appeal was “distributed among the general

population and not limited to returnees.”820 Besides the basic kit South Africa’s returnee

assistance was short-term with the main component being the UNHCR/NCCR limited

monetary grants.

The Zimbabwe government strategically linked returnee resettlement – the majority IDPs

being of a rural origin - with the closely related rural reconstruction programme “which

restores rural infrastructure to serve the economy and social needs of the people.”821 The

returnees, while recipients of quasi-targeted assistance, were ultimately bundled with the

broader communities in national level reconstruction strategies like in the land reform

programme. While the Namibian government adopted the policy of not differentiating

returnees from stayers the returnees’ effective reintegration was dented by the generally

incomprehensive post-war rehabilitation programmes under difficult economic

landscapes.

It was a commonplace observation that the all three resettlement programmes faced

similar challenges. The returnees’ sustainable reintegration was impacted by

characteristic problems such as landmines; access to land; housing and property;

unemployment and poverty. The three countries were subjected to the problematic issue

of landmines. Unlike Zimbabwe and Namibia, landmines have not been a major concern

Documentation, Salisbury, p.26 819 Namibian, 30 may 1990 “Food Crisis Looms as UNHCR aid to refugees ends at the end of June” 820 Namibian, 30 may 1990 “Food Crisis Looms as UNHCR aid to refugees ends at the end of June” 821 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, 23-27 March 1981, Conference

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in South Africa. In Zimbabwe and Namibia there were no immediate demining

programmes in actual and potential returnee receiving areas. Up to the present landmines

continue to be disruptive of effective and sustainable resettlement of the broader

communities through denial of access to land and human and livestock casualties. For

instance, ICBL reported that in 2003 Zimbabwe had 26 new mine/UXO casualties,

including five people killed and 21 injured while Namibia had twelve new mine/UXO

casualties, including three killed and nine injured.822 There is no special treatment for

landmine victims who have to receive emergency medical treatment from local health

centers in the mine-affected areas.823

The slow and ambiguous progression of land reform combined with the landmine

problem hampered reintegration of returnees and IDPs in the three countries. Since 2000

the Zimbabwe government has attempted to redress skewed land ownership through its

controversial land reform programme. The result of this programme is that of “4 500

commercial farms that were the backbone of Zimbabwe's strong agricultural sector in

2000, only 600 remain in the hands of whites, while about 200 000 black farmers have

been given land.”824 There are also no records on how many of these new farmers are

former returnees, IDPs or former combatants.

Documentation, Salisbury, p.25 822 ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2004 <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/namibia> Accessed 12 April 2005 823 In early 2002, the Zimbabwe Mine Action Center established the Victims Assistance, Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Resettlement Office tasked with establishing and maintaining a mine casualty database, and coordinating activities for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of mine survivors. 824 “Zim to compensate white farmers” <http://www.mg.co.za/articlepage.aspx?area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__africa/andarticleid=214880. Accessed on 11 April 2005

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In Namibia the “very slow and cumbersome” land resettlement process has resulted in the

persistence of skewed land ownership patterns. “Around 3,800 farmers, the majority of

whom are white, own 44 percent of arable land, an imbalance (new President

Hifikepunye) Pohamba and the ruling South West Africa People's Organisation

(SWAPO) have vowed to address by buying land from the commercial farmers.”825

Similarly in South Africa one of the government’s challenges remains the need to

“allocate additional resources over the next three years to cover outstanding claims in the

land restitution programme”.826

Generalized returnee-specific job placement and housing assistance was restricted.

Against the backdrop of unfavourable economic frameworks returnees, like ex-

combatants, faced unemployment problems. While some returnees, particularly party

officials, managed to get comfortable job openings in Zimbabwe’s post-independence

bureaucracy the majority of returnees had to face the employment problems facing the

wider society. In Namibia surveys reflected unemployment rates as high as 57% among

samples of the returnee population.827 The ANC’s Sibusiso Ndebele, commented that

“The problems of disgruntled cadres who have returned from military camps in Africa to

the prospect of no jobs and homes, is no different from the dilemma of most of the 42

000 exiles who have trekked back to South Africa in the past three years.”828

825 “Namibia's second president since independence is sworn in” < http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/138523/1/.html > Accessed on 12 April 2005 826 Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the Second Joint sitting of the third Democratic Parliament, Cape Town, 11 February 2005 827 R. Preston, “Returning Exiles in Namibia Since Independence” in Allen T and H. Morsink, eds., When Refugees Go Home: African Experiences, (London, James Currey, 1994), p.260

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In all three countries clear, comprehensive and coordinated physical and psycho-social

rehabilitation programmes were absent. The result was that special and vulnerable groups

were affected in the same manner as ex-combatants.

Returnees and IDPs faced formidable reintegration challenges. UNHCR intervention was

crucial in the short-term. However, in line with the 1951 convention UNHCR did not

have a long-term post repatriation mandate. In the absence of coordinated and

comprehensive long-term reintegration strategies sizeable returnee and IDP populations

ineffectively reintegrated. This occurred because the unfriendly economic contexts

constrained returnees’ self-sufficiency. Untenably reintegrated returnees in all the three

countries, unlike ex-fighters, did not engage in disruptive demonstrations of their plight.

An analyst provides a possible explanation:

The issue to that would likely relate to the various bases of power that the groups control. Returning refugees may have greater degrees of education and depending where they are returning from may come with certain material resources. Often refugees continue to represent a vulnerable category with no political voice and certainly not a lot of economic power. Whereas if you look at resources controlled by ex-combatants, unless there has been active disarmament and destruction of these weapons, there is still, even if it may be implicit, control of threat of violence and that has tended to attract more attention than someone who does not control that form of space.829

The volubility of returnees was also dented by the absence of representative associations

around which they could have organized and mobilized for long-term resettlement

assistance.

828 Sunday Times, 22 August 1993 “Defiant MK cadres end siege after meeting with Mandela” 829 Interview with Loren B. Landau, Director and Research Coordinator, Forced Migration Studies Programme University of the Witwatersrand, 14 March 2005, Johannesburg

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6.4 Conclusion: Recommendations

This dissertation has examined how the nature of armed conflict, conflict terminating

agreements and subsequent conceptual, institutional, political and socio-economic

frameworks under which DDRRR occurred determined the process in Zimbabwe,

Namibia and South Africa. The DDRRR processes occurred in unique settings. The

challenge for the liberation-movements-turned governments was to plan and implement

DDR alongside the creation of representative and unitary national defence forces under

tenuous security frameworks. The balance between the political party-controls the

political elites would have on coercive instruments such as the armed forces- themselves

expected to serve a post-conflict national mandate and agenda- was difficult to effect in

practice when planning and implementing DDR. Repatriation and resettlement of

returnees also had to be balanced with the wider post-conflict reconstruction

programmes.

General policy recommendations to enhance future DDRRR processes can be discerned

from the comparative interpretation of the three case studies. Since DDRRR is crafted

and implemented under unique contexts the following recommendations do not attempt

to provide a prescriptive panacea for successful DDRRR.

It is vital to understand and consider the distinct preceding conflict dynamics in the

plan and implementation of DDRRR. In many ways the nature of DDRRR processes

and the impacts are a product of the specific conflicts. Military strategies and equipment

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used such as the easily concealable SALW used by liberation armies also impacts on the

effectiveness of DDRRR components. Wartime inter-party and intra-party relations

including past military aggressions and suspicions haunt relations at integration and

DDRRR

There is a strong need to emphasize DDRRR in the conflict terminating negotiations

and peace agreements. DDRRR should be an integral part of the peace process and not

an add-on. It might be wise to coin them “peace and DDRRR agreements”. The centrality

of DDRRR in the conflict terminating agreements should be to facilitate policy making

and general programming to guide future DDRRR approaches at the earliest stages of

peace processes.

Coordination of the post-conflict “DDR” and the “RR” is needed to meet the needs

of war affected populations. While targeting specific populations the two processes

intersect and deal with war affected people with some common needs. For instance both

categories require support for reintegration into the post-conflict society. In this

endeavour separate institutional bodies may be set up to manage the two processes but

should be coordinated under an umbrella framework dealing with the broader

community-based reintegration. This is particularly important where repatriation

operations would have indiscriminately bundled unarmed cadres with civilian exiles and

refugees.

The principle of interconnectedness should apply in the programming and execution

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of DDRRR which should not be conceived as an event or one-off action. There should

be no gap between the two Ds (disarmament and demobilization) and the R(eintegration)

of ex-fighters or between repatriation of refugees and their resettlement. The most

complex challenges lie in the post-demobilization and post-repatriation phases where the

long term sustainability of ex-combatants and returnees is crucial for the broader peace

building and reconstruction. It is important that the crossroads of UN/UNHCR

withdrawal be tied up with the implementation of a sustainable long-term reintegration

and development plan. This would ensure strategies that do not subjugate beneficiaries to

perpetual welfare support.

Reformulation of the wider economic frameworks is necessary as effective DDRRR

cannot standby a stagnant economy. Social and economic development, expansion and

reconstruction are crucial for the success of the process. The economy is the engine for

societal development. It is imperative for the government to accede to sound economic

management principles, in this way the government creates a favourable operational

environment aimed at promoting sustainable human development for the wider

population

DDRRR should be linked to wider post-conflict strategies to build or enhance solid

economic and social foundations. Demobilization and reintegration should be linked

with infrastructural rehabilitation programmes and demining thus providing employment

for ex-fighters while positively contribution to broader post-conflict peace building and

reconstruction.

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DDRRR processes must encompass the principle of a comprehensive, coordinated

and sustainable approach. DDRRR conceptualization should productively involve

identification of needs and realistic goals, definition of appropriate strategies, mobilizing

the necessary resources, balancing DDRRR with affordability. Once planned, DDRRR

should be aligned with consistent practical implementation to remove the chasm between

policy statements and actual progress on the ground. This should be done under credible

and authoritative implementing institutional frameworks that nurture the confidence of

the beneficiaries. The said directing institutional bodies must be composed of persons

who are competent to facilitate efficient management of the process. For the purpose of

appropriateness and effectiveness the institutional frameworks should ensure

involvement of appropriate local and international stakeholders or actors, including the

intended beneficiaries. Various stakeholders and actors – governments, international

NGOs, local communities etc- are sensitized and directly involved in all stages of

DDRRR particularly the R and R stages. This would enable DDRRR to be an interagency

process, bundling resources and coordinating efforts for sustainability.

DDRRR affects the post-conflict lives of the targeted population and needs to be

implemented in as participative a manner as possible to ensure that it includes their

input and does effectively serve them. While impetus may come from the consistent

implementation of strong policy statements, the sustainability of the process is dependent

upon inculcating a sense of responsibility in the ex-fighters themselves from the onset.

Although most refugees repatriate spontaneously it is nevertheless crucial to have a

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participatory and efficient management framework in place for organized and supervised

repatriation particularly for special or vulnerable categories

A flexible implementation approach combined with a vibrant monitoring and

evaluating mechanism is necessary to mitigate impacts of ineffective DDRRR.

DDRRR programming should adopt a systematic approach to identifying, assessing and

reducing the negative effects of an unsuccessful DDRRR. Evaluation findings should

feed into appropriate modifications and future reintegration initiatives.

DDRRR implementing institutions should embrace the principles of accountability

and transparency. The institutions may report to a higher statutory authority or in the

case of implementation by the government to Parliament and it must be accountable for

its use of finance and its funds will be audited. This would prevent institutional

deficiencies compounded by lack of forensic audits with the fiduciary duty to root out

corruption and wide ranging investigation into financial irregularities

Planning and implementation of DDRRR strategies should be based on the

understanding of the very complex political, economic and social contexts in which

the process takes place. While taking into account the specific needs and socio-

economic profiles of the heterogeneous ex-fighter community, DDRRR initiatives should

be tailored to the country’s specific contexts to enhance chances of effectiveness. For

instance, it would be useful to plan and develop market-oriented reintegration and

resettlement strategies that close the gap between education/skills and actual market

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demands.

Ensuring the human security of ex-fighters and returnees via effective DDRRR

facilitates regime and national security which then allows DDRRR to achieve its

promise of positive contribution to peace building. Ineffectively reintegrated ex-

combatants can only go so far. There comes a time when disillusioned and enflamed ex-

combatants shift from an acquiescent mood to a confrontational one against the state.

Whilst UN peacekeeping operations may have exact mandates to implement under

specified timeframes there is need to ensure continuity through post-withdrawal

synergy with relevant local bodies. This could also be achieved by tasking peace

operations with clear post-conflict assignments geared towards long-term peace and

development.

DDRRR programmes should strategically balance the security imperatives and

genuine concern for the welfare of ex-fighters and returnees. Failure of some

reintegration initiatives can be explained by the emphasis placed on the need to deflate

the security threat potentially posed by ex-combatants through quick-fix compensation

payouts that did not guarantee their mid to long term sustainability.

Corrective measures that do not disrupt the national social and economic fabric

should be devised. Remedies should be implemented to right ineffective DDRRR while

avoiding cataclysmic economic consequences that disturb sustainable development and

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the broader long-term stability of implementing country. Namibia’s Peace Project

exemplifies one sustainable approach of alleviating ex-fighters’ poverty that resulted

from previous ineffective DDRRR.

The establishment of representative national associations at the earliest possible

time is important. These might be involved in the development and implementation

of DDR strategies. Ex-fighter organizations provide members with organized

representation thereby presenting a vehicle to voice their interests and grievances.

Contact and interaction among forces of previously separate armed formations or civilian

supporters of different parties may also remove suspicions and tensions and spur

reconciliation at the grassroots level. National war veterans associations enable ex-

fighters to speak with a collective voice in pursuit of securing recognition and

recompense for their liberation war roles while safeguarding their future well-being.

Returnee’s organizations could have similar productive impacts.

Post-conflict protection of fundamental human rights and ethnic groups’ rights

assists the success of reintegration. Abuse of human rights and continuance of violent

wartime inter-ethnic animosities and clashes undermines effective reintegration and

DDRRR’s overall contribution to peace building. Volatile post-independence contexts

disrupt reintegration and may actually create a fresh wave of displacement and

malcontents.

There is a symbiotic relationship between effective DDRRR and genuine national

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reconciliation. Genuine national reconciliation creates an appropriate environment for

successful DDRRR while national reconciliation feeds on the stable politico-military

framework that is fostered by effective DDRRR. Prioritization of reconciliation when

planning DDRRR augurs well for post-conflict affable inter-party relations as well as the

flexibility and accommodativeness of ex-fighters and returnees by the usually

apprehensive wider civilian communities.

The success of DDRRR is a function of both external help and local political will.

The international community’s preparedness to financially underwrite and provide

resources for DDRRR can enhance the process. Equally significant is the parties’

unquestionable political will and commitment to the success of the process.