CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND STATE RESPONSE: THE KAKDWIP CASE

A contingent of 1200-strong Eastern Frontier Rifles,

(EFR), a paramilitary force, was dispatched to Kakdwip to

start a mopping-up operation. Including the number of armed

police forces already there, the total Government force was

raised to 1,5101, besides the existing policemen of Kakdwip

thana. They had help locally from members of the Village

Defence Parties (VDP) who numbered 20 to 25 per village. In

contrast, the regular guerilla force in southern Kakdwip

numbered some 20 to 25, a "Gang of 25", 2 as the Calcutta

newspaper, Statesman described it. Apparently, the Govern­

ment considered this 50:1 ratio of law-enforcing machinery

necessary, because what the guerillas lacked in material

resources tl'2y made up in the "wide local support". 3

The EER had successfully quelled guerilla activities in

Mymensing in 1947, putting down the "most serious outburst 114

of the Hajong peasants in the most inaccessible areas of tr£

district in 1947. The overall charge of the operation was

given to Major Chatterjee, Additional District Magistrate, c;

an Army Officer.- soon after the EFR contingent reached

Loyalgunge on 22 December 1949 and started thl"'ir operation,

the landlords who had fled earlier, began returning. The

267

CPI in its turn invited.Moni Sinha, the leader of the Hajong

movement to Kakdwip to advise the local CPI leaders on

countermeasures.

The armed police and EFT aided by the VDP started comb­

ing operation at Haripur on 23 December 194 9. All the men­

folk of the village were brought to Hazras cutchery of which

Sachindra K. Ghosh was a manager. Those whom Ghosh pointed

out as culprits were tortured. The terrified peasants were

then told to join the VDP and help in the capture of gueri-

llas. Several groups of them were formed. All were to

report at tr.e cutchery by 7 a.m. everyday; defaulters would

6 be treated as culprits.

The next day, accompanied by the local peasants, the

police-EER-VDP combine combed Chandranagar, Sibrampur and

R adhanagar. Three hundred people were rounded up, brought

to the cutchery, and given the same treatment as the Haripur

peasants the previous day.

The combing operation was still on, when the guerillas

decided to attack the police-EFR force. On 26 December,

a Medical Unit of the Government, while on its way back to

Loyalgunge from Radhanagar, escorted by some members of the

EF.R, was fired upon by the guerillas. But an embankment

stood between the two parties 7 , and the attack failed. The

guerillas went back to their camp and decided that, despite

the failure of this attack, they would continue the guerilla

268

action on the armed police-Em whenever they raided any

village. They tried to follow up on thts decision by

attacking an EER-police force which was proceeding towards

a village to raide it. But then they noticed from their

hiding place that the raiding forces had themselves surroun­

ded by the villagers as baffle walls. (The military adopted

the same tactic to suppress the Telengana peasant movement 8 also.) Earlier, the communist-led peasants had employed

similar tactics, that is, of compelling the supporters of

the landlords and the police to surround them, using them

as baffle walls. 9

After that the intensity of the combing operation made

the guerillas• stay in southern Kakdwip impossible. One

group of guerillas headed by Ashoke Bose escaped to northern

Kak.dwip and they burnt down a cutchery of Fatikpur (close to

Budhakhali) in collusion with some local peasants on the

night of 29 r:ecember. But in the small hours of the morning

of 30 recember, the police raided the houses of Naren Mal,

a guerilla and of Jhantu Rahul, a volunteer of Bishalakshni­

pur and arrested four guerillas - Dhiren Mal, Bhagyadhar

Maity, Bhabatosh Sinha Roy and Naren Mal. They failed to

capture Ashok.e Bose. 10 The guerillas let themselves be

captured by a tactical blunder. On the noon of 29 December

they joined a public feast at the house of a peasant volun­

teer on the assumption that all the participants were their

own people. But there were two police informers among them.

269

As hoke Bose escaped because he did not stay at night with

the others in the same house. 11

Immediately after the burning of Fatikpur cutchery, the

EFR was deployed at Budhakhali. In a small village like

Budhak hali, as many as six to seven hundred armed policemen

and EFR began to patrol day and night, and to raid the

12 peasant hanes.

Despite the arrests, guerilla activities did not sub­

side. Armed with banbs, revolvers and sten guns, they raided

and attacked three or four houses of VDP captains on the

night of 1/2 January 1950 at Rajnagar in northern Kakdwip.

In the attacks, eight persons were seriously injured and

four died, one of them a woman. 13 The DSP came on the

following day from Loyalgunge headquarters fcc an on-the­

spot inquiry. On the night of 16 January, 1 950 the guerillas

burnt down the house of a landlord of Mousani, the cu tc~ry

and barn of Dwarik samanta at Namkhana. An attempt to burn

down a landlord's barn atRadhanagar was unsuccessful. In

one case, some guerillas set fire to a co~shed and killed

several heads of cattle of a landlord. According to some, 14

this they did with an intention that the landlords might not

cultivate their land. It is widely believed that some

Muslims, among the guerillas, indulged in the killing of

the cows and bulls.

sane 31 guerilla actions took place in Kakdwip from 15

December 1949 to 16 January 1950. In six cases, revolvers,

270

sten guns and bombs were used; as many as 15 cutcheries,

nine houses and four school buildings were destroyed. The

guerillas concentrated more on arson than on armed attacks.

This was because during the win~r, it was easier to burn

down houses than attack armed force!!. The nUJ'I1ber of people

killed on each side was the same: 13. Fran this party of

numbers it would appear that both parties were equally

bent on follo,ing the policy of an eye for an eye and a

tooth for a tooth. To pay the Kakdwip CQnmunists in their

own coin, the local police had recruited some persons to

burn down the houses of local Oommunists.

The unabated activities of the guerillas even in the

face of massive armed forces' presence spread panic among

the landlords and their supporters. Afraid for their lives,

many of them used to leave their houses in the winter night

and hide themselves behind haystacks. The Ananda Bazar

15 Patrika reported:

The situation of this area (Kakdwip) has gone out of control. All the big landlords have run away. Even most of those who have 15 to 20 bighas of land have fled away. All sharecrOp­pers and small ryots have removed their women and children. Most crops lie rotting in the field. Of late, the COmmuni~tss burning of peasant houses and shooting a few of them to death, have terrorized the peasantry so much that most of the families have removed their women and children elsewhere; those who have stayed back take shelter in the houses close

to the police camp.

?71

The report was only partially correct. While it was true

that most of the big landlords had left their houses, and

those who did not. took shelter in houses close to the police

camp, it was wrong to say that the peasants were terrorized

by the guerillas. The panic of the peasantry was in fact

caused by the combing operation of the police and the EER,

not the guerilla actions. As Sachindra K. Ghosh writes:

"The villagers of Maharajgunge had fled to the jungle for

fear of the canbing operation. "16

SPECIAL POLICE:

The English rulers had realized, from their experience

of handling the Great Revolt in 1857 that sane "statutory

powers" should be given to their hencl'tnen to crush success­

fully any future revolt in India. With this end in view,

they framed the Police Act V of 1861 which empowered them

to confer upon the District Magistrate (IM) the power to

appoint any member of the public as a Special Police Officer

with the same powers, privileges, protection as the regular

officers of the Police. Tb suppress the Kakdwip insurrec­

tion the COngress Government made use of this Police Act

in 1950. The Special POlice, all belonging to the landlord

class, were supplied uniforms and 30 DBBL guns, and given

training in the use of firearms17 by the Officer-in-Charge

(OC) of Kakdwip.

272

The landlords and their supporters formed a committee

to supply various food articles to the Government farces.

The members of the committee, all VDP men, would go to

peasants• houses and forcibly collect whabever they could

lay hands on. Those brought by the police to the camp were

also compelled to supply food for them. Besides, the members

of the committee along with the police also looted rice, he­

goats, ducks etc. from the peasants • houses. 18 To gratify

the police, some landlords would also offer them ghee, he-

goats etc.

To suppress the guerilla movement, the Government forces

cordoned off as many as 1,080 square miles so as to stop

entrance into, and exit fran the area. After their combing

operations on 23 and 24 December the police arrested on 28

December 150 peasants from Maharajgunge. Rajnagar, Gayener

Bazar and the adjoining places were combed on 29 December;

out of the 131 or so men brought to the cutchery, 107 were

later released. From Purbapara and Dakshinpara of Haripur

on 31 December and Patibunia jungle on 14 January 1950, 80

and 46 persons respectively were arrested. In this way the

combing operation went on until most of the guerillas were

arrested. 19

In the 11 days between 24 December 194 9 and 4 January

1950, in five raids the police arrested 707 persons, i.e.,

273

140 persons on average per day. Not a single gu~rilla how­

ever was among the arrested. Even in the midst of such

police operations, Kshirode Sera, a guerilla, dared to

attack two Congress! tes of Haripur with bombs. 20

The police, EFR and VJ?P men would raid villages and

jungles in the day time; at night, they patrolled the entire

area and kept watch on the riverways with searchlights. 21

Curfew was clamped on the area and continued for ten months. 22

Rewards were declared f~ supplying clues leading to the

arrest of guerillas. For instance, a reward of Rs.6 00 was

declared f~ Bhusan Kamila's arrest: and much more f~ Gajen

Mali's. Every villager was issued an identity card, which

they were instructed to carry with them wherever they went.

such arrangements were also made at Da'kshin Chandanpiri,

Sudhakhali and other villages and they continued till the

mid-April 1950. 23 The going was how too hot for the gueril­

las and they were on the run. Some guerillas went into

hiding in the forest. The police arrested them when they

came out from hiding in search of food, shelter etc. Some

four guerillas man•ged to flee. By January 1950 the Kakdwip

guerillas lost all contact with the underground party.

some 20 to 22 guerillas, including Ashok Bose, Gajen

Mali, 9ijoy Mandal, Kishori sahu, sudhir Sahu, Bhusan Kamila

etc. fled fran Kakdwip by a boat belonging to their party by

the end of mid-January 1950. They had with them all the

firearms they possessed. But Kangsari Halder, Ananta Kui ti,

274

Kri tibas Das, Manik Hazra etc. were not in the boat. 24 For

about a month and a half the guerillas in the boat stayed

at Sagar island which they had ultimately to leave for want

of food. After staying some weeks in the boat Atul and

Bistu left it. While they were on the way to Midnapore,

they were caught by the police. Ashoke Bose left the boat,

took an assumed name, Pr.akash Chandra Roy, and was able to

remain underground for good. Kishori, Terani and Sudhir

Sahu left the boat and went to Midnapore where they were

arrested later. Bhusan was arrested on 6 March 1950 at

Tanker Bazar (near Namk hana) where he had gone to collect

food. 25 Gajen Mali and Bejoy Mandal stayed on in the boat.

They were anchored at Jambudwip, an island in the Bay of

Bengal, but one day while they were asleept the boat acci­

dentally lost its anchor and it came floating to Bakkhali

beach of Kakdwip. On 26 February, after a gun duel the

Special Police officers along with the VDP men were able

to arrest them. They were arrested with two revolvers and

two sten guns along with a lot of communist literature. 26

Others, namely Kshirode sera, sujoy Barik, Phani Halder,

Ananta Kuiti, Shyam Mandal were also arrested later on.

Kshirode sera took the guise of a mad man but he was identi­

fied and arrested. 27 Ananta Kui ti was arrested from his

26 hideout under a haystack in his house. Sujoy Baril<, Phani

Halder, Shyam Mandal and two others were also arrested by

1 March 1950. 29 The Intelligence Branch of the Government

failed to arrest Kangsari Halder though he was staying in

275

West Bengal in disguise. Halder allowed himself to be

arrested 12 years later by the :eel hi police.

KAKDWIP Ca:J'SPIRACY CASE:

The west Bengal Government started a criminal conspi­

racy case popularly known as Kakdwip Conspiracy Case against

36 persons of whom 30 had been arrested. The other six whan

the Government failed to arrest were Kangsari Halder, Ashdk

Bose, Iswar Kamila, Jogendra Guria, Bhagyadhar Das and Hari­

pada Sasmal. The Government formed a Special Tribunal Court

to try the cases but the Supreme court declared it as un-

constitutional. The west Bengal Government constituted another

Special Tribunal by promulgating an Ordinance, but this also

was declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme court. There-

after the Government set up a third tribunal under the Tribu­

nals of criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1952 (West Bengal Act XIV

of 195 2). 30 The accused were finally tried in the third

special tribunal under sections 1208, 302, 436, 148, 307 etc.

of IPC. Out of the 30 accused, the court released three

during the trial because of insufficient evidence. Q1 11

December 1953 the Court acquitted 18 and convicted nine

accused persons and sentenced each of them to imprisonment

f~ life. 31 Those transported for life were Gajendra Nath

Mali, Bij oy Krishna Mandal, Bhusan Chandra Kamila, Maniklal

Hazra, Tarani sahu, Bhim Chandra Ghorui, D,JijPndra Nath Dinda,

Kshirode sera and Sujoy Chandra Barik. 32 Tarani Sehu belonged

to Rajnagar of Kakdwip, Maniklal Hazra to sarachi of Diamond

276

Harbour and the remaining seven to Haripur-Loyalgunge. They

were all peasants. The total jail terms awarded against

Gajen Mali, if calculated separately, amounted to 77 years. 33

I<angsari Halder was elected a member of Parliament in

the second general elections held in 1957 frcm the Kakdwip

area even when he was an absconder. The Delhi police arres­

ted him along with Jogen Guria outside Parliament House on

21 August 1957: they were tried and released b.y the Supreme

Court on 10 April 196 2. Along with Kangsari and Jogen Guria,

the nine persons convicted earlier, ~~re also acquitted. 34

Thereafter the Government withdrew all cases against all the

four absconders and this was notified on 5 September 1962. 35

CONSEQUENCES OF THE MOVEMENT:

The repression let loose by the police and the landlords

in I<akdwip was not known to outsiders because of the blanket

ban imposed on their entrance into the Kakdwip area. The

police and the landlords formed by themselves a clique in

every village which became a law unto themselves. The forms

of torture used were to beat black and blue, to insert pins

into nails, to push wooden rule into the rectum, and the like.

In the absence of the male members who were arrested or

had gone into hiding, the MembPrs of the VDP and the police

would come to the huts of the peasants and rape their women

at night. sane women were able to protect themselves by

resisting the police with sharp cutters, daos etc. Such

277

dishonourable activities might have continued for long;

but when Joynal Sheik•s (local leader) sister was raped,

he brought it to the notice of the officer of EiR who

36 immediately intervened to stop it. Ironically, when

the congress Government had decided to make use of the prO­

visions of west Bengal Volunteer Force Act and also those

of the Police Act, Dr. B.c. Roy, the Chief Minister stated

in the Assembly that the force to be raised under the pro­

visions of these two Acts would "help the administration as

voluntary agencies in the protection of the poor and afflic-

37 ted. " The facts suggest that the VDP men in the Kakdwip

area had acted as a legalized armed gang of the Government.

The landlords of Haripur-Loyalgunge employed some rnen

to demolish the peasants• houses frQn December 1949 to March

1950.

The CPI-led peasants had boycotted all landlords during

their movement, in retaliation the landlords after the

failure of the insurrection resorted to boycott, and a much

more severe one. Ananta Kuiti's wife died of cholera un-

attended because of the boycott, as no.doctor was allowed

to visit her. 38 The children of the boycotted houses were

expelled from Haripur school. Moreover, the male members

being absent, their women had to cultivate their land them­

selves because no labourer was allowed to work for them.39

Such boycott continued for two years.

278

All sharecroppers involved in the violent movement

were evicted by the landlords. To avoid any future compli­

cations, the landlords filed cases to the effect that they

were not sharecrOppers.

CPI •s Fail.Y£.!.§: The CPI farmed a defence fund, the

Kakdwip Defence Fund on an all-India basis to finance the

cases of undertrial prisoners and to rehabilitate the affec­

ted families. With the money collected, 16 bighas of culti­

vable land were purchased at Gopi Giri •s chak of Haripur.

The deed was registered in the name of Pravash Roy, a vete-

ran peasant leader of the 24 Parganas district, and the seven

guerillas who had been sentenced to life imprisonment did

not get any. Manmatha Ghorui of Sibrampur, a local leader

was responsible for loOking after the land. In April 196 2

when the Government released the guerillas from prison, a

split within the CPI had becane an almost settled fact because

of factional rivalry within the party, although it officially

came about in 1964. The convicted peasants remained loyal to

the official CPI group but both Pravash Roy and Manmatha

Ghorui joined the break-away group which later formed the

CPI(M). 40 Manmatha Ghorui continued to enjoy the fruits of

the land. The guerillas were thus left without any succour.

Gajen Mali, the commander of Loyalgunge guerillas, who had

been a sharecropper of 150 bighas of land, died after his

release without food and treatment; his wife, Tilottama,

took to begging. The CPI had premised to give her Rs.10 per

279

month but more than once they defaulted. Bhupati Jana was

denied shelter even in his own village and settled down at

Sagar island. 41 Kshirode took to stealing wood from the

reserved forest to stay alive. Ananta Kuiti died in distress

within two years after his release. Sujoy Barik became a

day-labourer. Bijoy Mandal, because all his lands had been 42 taken away, toOk to dacoity.

Out of the 50 families surveyed in Haripur, the peasants

of 15 families actively participated in violent actions. As

many as 14 out of these 15 families, i.e., 93 per cent, were

totally ruined as a result of their involvement in the CPI­

led insurrection. Out of the 50 families, three were forced

to join the movement by the local cPI leaders. One of them

was victimized and economically ruined. Since seven families

remained inactive, they did not face any economic loss. Only

one family that had its house close to the landlord's was

burnt down when the landlord • s house was set on fire by the

Communists. Out of the SO, six families opposed the movement.

Five of them did not suffer any loss; the crOp of one was

forcibly taken away by the CPI-inspired peasants.

At Chanpiri, Rakhal Jana, the secretary of Chandanpiri

Kisan Samiti, reported that the movement had totally pauperi­

zed him. Bhupati Manda!, who following the advice of the sec­

retary of the Provincial Committee of the CPI went to throw

away the three pistols and 16 bombs in his possession into

the river water, was seriously injured because the bombs went

280

off while he was lowering them into the river; this ulti­

mately led to his complete blindness. He told me that he

was living by begging at the village hats. 43 Rustom Shaikh,

Nilmoni Maity, Raj ani Bera and some other local leaders were

ccmpelled to leave the village for good. Many local peasants

who suffered most became disillusioned with the party. 44

After the failure of the movement in 1950, the Kakdwip

peasants could not press any demand on their landlords for

two to three years. The ordinary peasants sided with the

landlords in fear.

The Budhakhali peasants under Kangsari's leadership had

not been involved in violent actions, and the police repres­

sion there was not as intensive as at Haripur-Loyalgunge. Since

they did not suffer as much as their Haripur counterparts,

their confidence in the party was not much shaken. The

lotdari exploitation and oppression stopped, and sharecroppers

started getting 60 per cent of the crop. The Budhakhali

peasants realized that their unity frightened the landlords

and so they began to value their collective strength. Even

the peasant women became more conscious of their social posi­

tion. But though the movement had abolished the lotdari

system, it brought new prcblems, chief among which was the

non-availability of advance in cash or kind. 45

B arg:adar Laws: As a consequence of the movement, the

Bargadar Ordinance was pranulgated in 1949 and was converted

281

into an Act in 1950. Harendra Nath Chaudhuri, the Education

Minister of the west Bengal Governmen~ said while introdu-

cing the Bill in the Legislative Assembly, that "No new

rights are going to be conferred by this Bill. 1146

Increase of State Power: To counter the violent act!-

vities organized by the CPI, the west Bengal Government armed

itself with more powers. Besides having recourse to certain

special powers under the Police Act of 1861, National Volun­

teer Force Act etc. it increased the allotment for the police

budget which in 1950-51 showed an increase of ~.1,16,19,000

i.e. about 32 per cent, canpared with that of 1948-49.47

The armed police force was increased by two battalions by

195o.48

The movement attracted the attention of the west Bengal

Government to Kakdwip. To take the edge off the Communists •

popular appeal, the B. c. Roy Ministry provided in its budget

for the financial year 1952-53 a sum of Rs.1,50,COO earmarked

for "the OOmmunist affected area", meaning Kakdwip.

CONCLUSICN:

In adopting the policy of capturing state power through

armed insurrection like its counterparts in other countries,

the CPI did not examine carefully India's diversity and vast

size, the state of political consciousness of its peOple and

its unevenness, class structure, the nature of bourgeois state

282

power, the party's own strengths and weaknesses. The party

did not study the country's political reality with as much

patience and diligence as they should have, but simply got

carried away by the thesis of Zhdanov, a soviet theorist.

The Kakdwip movement in 1948-50 failed firstly because it

was based on that impractical thesis. Even if we treat the

Kakdwip movement as a regional peasant struggle for the

capture of state power, we can find some special reasons

49 for its failure.

(1) The a> I leaders began with the idea that it would

not be easy for the Government to suppress the guerilla

st.ruggle in such an inaccessible place as Kakdwip. They

expected that both revolutionary organization and struggle

would spread spontaneously to other parts of the country fran

Kakdwip. The way the Government suppressed the movement

proves that such things cannot succeed in a small place like

Kakdwip. Rather, it was easier for the Government to suppress

it in such a small place, since it could concentrate its

power more effectively. Surprisingly, the leaders of the

Naxalbari peasant movement did not grasp this lesson even

two decaded after the Kakdwip movement.

(2) No movement can continue unless the people are poli­

ticized. The Kakdwip peasants supper ted the a>I and toek up

arms when they were led to believe that they would get lands

and paddy. When they saw, after the police repression had

been let loose, that there was no such possibility, they once

283

again sided with the landlords to avoid being tortured by

the police. To prolong the movement it was necessary that

the peasants should be given revolutionary consciousness.

The Kakdwip peasants did not know anything about the seizure

of State power 1 the dictatorship of the proletariat, socia­

lism etc. Only a few local leaders had heard these terms,

but the level of their political consciousness could not be

said to be high.

(3) The CPI did not pay sufficient attention to the

preparation for the armed struggle in Kakdwip, though they

had started it. The peasants received guerilla training

only for a few weeks. For the use of firearms the peasants

did not get the necessar¥ training.

(4) Because the peasantry had little idea about the

state's power - its police and military strength, its intel­

ligence - they dared to challenge it with a few firearms. Had

they got a proper idea of the State power~ they would have

pondered the matter more seriously before plunging into an

anned struggle, the Objective of which was to establi9h

ccmmunist rule by violent means.

(5) The CPI got the peasant of Chandanpiri and Budhakhali

to confront the police by spreading a false rumour about

police guns. But the loss and sufferings caused by these

rumours prevented their further involvement in the movement.

A peasant movement Obviously cannot be based on false pro­

paganda or rumour.

284

(6) The police and military failed to do anything to

suppress the movement until they began to receive help fran

the local landlord class organized in the VDPs. If the in-

surrection had any chance of success it would have been

possible only if the insurrectionists had wiped out the

members of the landlord class from the "liberated area"

because this could have enabled it to keep the Government

machinery ineffective in the area for some ti.:ne. To quote

Mao Tse-tung, ''It is the pivotal struggle in the second

period, the period of revolutionary action. Without victory

in this struggle, no vict~y is possible ••• to secure land

and other means of production, and so on. ,.so Though the

Kakdwip peasants could drive out some landlords and killed

a few, they could do nothing to the leader of the landlords,

nor could they root out all of them.

(7) M!y intra-party conflict is sure to weaken such a

movement. In Kakdwip area, the two leaders, Kan.gsari Halder

and AshOk Bose could not agree as to the nature of the action

to be taken. so there was no uniformity in the nature of

action taken in the Kakdwip are. As a result, the movement

became weak. The violent actions of the peasants were confined

only to southern Kakdwip. Besides this, the intra-party

conflict that continued within the CPI in 1949-50 helped the

Government to exploit it to its own advantage. This becanes

51 evident fran the secret report, a part of which runs as

follows:

285

We have been receiving regular reports from the jails of increasing within the party and in fact the present situation has enabled us safely to release two prominent canmunists, viz • ., Professor Hiren Mukherjee and Gopal Halder, who are out of favour with the group in power on the ground that they are refor­mists and have been displaying a "bourgeois" attitude towards the present policy.

The Government took advantage of the situation by using one

group against another to weaken the party. The intra-party

conflict gradually became more marked; the preparation for

an aimed struggle got less attention. By May 1950 the anti­

official group removed R anadi ve from the party leadership

and decried the Ranadive line as "sectarian". But the

party leadership failed to formulate a new party policy by

themselves. 52

Other than reasons enumerated above, the failure of the

movement can be attributed to the Congress Party's policy in

regard to Tebhaga, which was primarily a continuance of the

old British policy of suppression. aut whereas the Raj's

policy had no legitimacy by which it could gather support

from a section of the populace, the Congress being a national

party could bring out just that bit. The congress had the

advantage of leading the national movement which gave it an

immense amount of political support. The movement eclipsed

the peasant struggle as it had captured the imagination of

the majority. This partly explains the victory of the

government. On the other hand the CPI 's act of mobilizing

the peasants for violent action was not perceived as quite

286

•legitimate• not only by the opposition (Government and the

Congress) but by a section of the population. One can

suspect inadequate poli ticisation on the part of the CPI,

which lead to its ultimate failure.

c. Rajeswar Rao, M. Basavapunnia~ Ajoy Kumar Ghosh

and s.A. Dange then flew to Moscow. The Moscow leaders

headed by Stalin focmed a COmmission in this regard. 53

Acc~ding to Kangsari Halder, "Stalin had prepared a new

party programme. n54 The politbureau of the CPI published

the draft programme in April 1951 and it was adopted by all­

India party conference held in calcutta in October 1951. 55

Obviously, the insurrection under the CPI leadership at

Kakdwip - both during its rise and decline - was determined

by factors external to the local peasants.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

287

Sachindra K. Ghosh's diary, 22-12-1949.

.:!'.b! statesman, 22-1-1950, p.5.

~ret Fortnightl,l Rfiio!t fo£_ the first half of December, 1949; sd/- s. Sen, C ef secretary to the Govt. of west Bengal, the 9th Jan., 1950; Calcutta, p.l.

Secret Fortniglltl]' R!J?<]I"t f~ th~ fir;t half E.£ February, 1947; sdf- H.E.s. Stevans, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of tiest Bengal, Calcutta, the 17th Jan. 1947, para 7.

§~cret Fortnigh..YU~port fgr the first half of Januar~, 1950; sd/- s. Sen, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of west Bengal, Calcutta, the 21st Jan. 1950, p.l.

Kshirode Bera, sta~ent.

KshirOde sera, statement, and Govt. of west Bengal, v. Kangsar i Halder.

P. Sundarayya, _'!'elel)gana Perl.!! •s ~truggl~d Its Les­sons (calcutta: M.B.A., 1977 , p.198. -§.fsret. fOEttl~ghtly Relort_i.9£_ the second h,g,!~ ~i June, 1949; sd/- s. Sen, Ch ef Secretary to the West senga! Govt., the 6th July 1949; see also Mani!,!, No.4, 10.7.1949 p.lO.

see Ashok Bose, .~ anglar §.!.!.Y_.:!'.!l!ngana Lalgu¥}_g~, ..9?• .£.!!., pp.49-50.

Ibid. -Bijoy Jana, Interview, Budhakhali.

Govt. of west Bengal, v. Kangsari Halder.

Amilya Roy Choudhari, OC, Kakdwip thana (1948-55), state­ment, 2R• cit.

,bnanda Bazar Pa_g"ik,St, 24-9-1356 BC (8-1-1950), p.l.

.§~cret Fortn}.ghtl~ Report f,9r tpe sec<?J.lLhill of Decembe£, 1949 for west Bengal: sd/- s. Sen, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of west Bengal, Calcutta, the 9th Jan. 1950, p.l.

288

17. Hrishikesh Maity, statement.

18. Srinath Ranjit, Congressite, Haripur, interview.

19. Sachindra K. Ghosh's diary, dates: Dec. 23, 24, 28, 29, 31, 1949 and Jan. 4, 1950.

20.

21.

22.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

sachindra K. Ghosh's diary, 4.1.50.

Interview with Prakash Roy, the assumed name of AshOk Bose, calcutta, .!il.R• .£!.3:.

Rashbehari Ghosh, J$~,!p_~£_Krishakder Banoh_a,p, BoOk­let (in Bengali), p. 9.

Rakhal Jana, Dakshin Chandanpiri, statement, .21?• .£ll.

Amilye Kamila, member, Loyalgunge Guerilla squad, ~xit­ten statement, El?• ili•

..!!?J.E..; also Sachindra K. Ghosh's diary 6.3.1950: also interview with Prakash Roy, ~· ~.

The Govt. of west Bengal Vs. Kangsari Halder, El?• ~·1 see also Arnrita Bazar Patrik.a, 2.3.1950, p.4: also SachindraK.-Ghosh's diary, 28.2.1950.

Kshirode sera, statement, .5?.P• ~·

Jagat Mohan Kuit, s/o Ananta, Haripur, statement.

Sachindra K. Ghosh's diary, 27.2.1950, 28.2.1950, 1.3.1950, 2.3.1950.

Govt. of west Bengal Vs. Kangsari Halder, c2. cit., also swadhinaJ:51, 27.8.1360 B.s. (13.12.1953), p:-2.

31. swadhinata, 26.8.1360 B.s. (12.12.1953), p.l.

3 2. .!.!?.!2·: also Govt. of west Bengal Vs. I<angsar i Halder.

3 3 • Jl2..!E•: also Kangsar i Halder Vs. the State.

34. ~-

3 5 • J.~5l. an tar, 6 • 9. 1 96 2, p. 3 •

36. Srnt. Bar ada Ghorui, wfo Dwijen, a guerilla, statement.

37. west Bengal Le~islative Assernbly ProceegiE~, vol.l, No.1, 1950, p.63.

289

38. Jag at Mohan I<ui ti, statement.

3 9. Intervie•t~ with Smt. Tulsi Das, w;o Kri ttibas, a guerilla, Haripur.

40. The CPI (Marxist) was born at the Tenali Convention, July 1 ~4. For details, see Mohan Ram, Indian canmu­nism: Split. w_!thin Split (Delhi: Vikas, 1969), p.201.

41. Shyam Manda!, statement.

42. Interview with some villagers of Haripur, Chandanpiri, Lalygung.

43. Interview with Bhupati Manda!.

44. Kangsari Haldar, unpublished part of his article "Kak­dwiper Tebhaga Andolan ", .2!?• ~.; also Gunadhar Mali, statement, Haripur_

45. Prahlad samante and Bej aya Jana interviet'i at Budhakhali, .2R• ..£!S.

46. Speech by Harendra Nath Chaudhuri, the then Education minister of the west Bengal Government, ~t_]~ngal Legislative ~lJ~embly Proceed.!!,l_g.§, vol. I, No.1, 195 0, p.122. While introducing the 9ill in the Legislative Assembly he said, "No new rights are going to be con­ferred by this Bill (Bargadar Bill)."

47. Of. Government of west Bengal (Finance Department), _fivil Budge_t_Est_;rn~te 19S0-5j, p.238 and Government of West Bengal, Finance Department, _9,j.vil Budget Estimate _for the year j9J 8-4.9, p.193.

4 a. !i.!!St Bensal LegJ:..slati ve ASj!_!ptbl_y: proceedings, vol. 2, 1950, pp.175-6.

4 9. K. Sarkar, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, calcutta.

so. Mao Tse-tung, selected works of Mao Tse-tun.9, vol.I, p.35.

51.

52.

Secret For t,Di..9.l::!S.!Y R eJ?gr t_ fPF t_tle second half of M_a~, 1949; sd/- s. Sen, Chief Secretary to the Govt. of West Bengal, calcutta, the 21st May, 1949, p.l.

Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall windmillar, COmmunism in India (Berkeley: OJP, 1959), p.2987 also "§bowanl sen, s ta temen t.

53.

54.

55.

290

P. Sunderayya, Telengana Pe~le's Struggle and Its Lessons (calcutta: CPI CM) i?"ub"Iication, 1'97 21, p. 3 981 see also c. Raj eswara Rao, The Historic Tel_!!ngana stru,le: some Useful Lessons fran Its Rich Ex.J2erience T~ l h : CP I p"ub1 I cat"! On, 1 ifi~f} • ~ w

Kangsari Haldar, statement, 17.6.72.

Mohi t Sen (ed.), Document of the History_ of the COmmu­!list Par;ty of India rr:elh1:-PPH, 1970), p.1.