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CHAPTER FOUR
Chapter Four
COLONY INTO CLIENT: FDR 1 S DREAM FULFILLED
Introduction
The day chosen by Washington for turning the
Philippines free was the Fourth of July America• s
own Independence Day. The Philippines was the first
Asian country under colonial rule to become an inde
pendent republic. The liberty that was conferred on
the Philippines was not exactly of the kind dreamt of
by such Filipino patriots as Jose Rizal or Artemio
Ricarte or Emilio Aguinaldo. The event was rather a
materialization of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
vision of an independent Philippines with 11 benevolent
American guidance 11• American 11 guidance 11 was sought to
be institutionalized through series of commitments that
the Filipino leaders had to accept prior to tpe
termination of direct American rule. A nation devastated
by the ravages of war and a people desperately needing
assistance to make a new start for themselves and their
country were confronted with a situation in which
Washington made clear to them, in its most friendly
of course, that the flow of American largesse might
depend on its obtaining Filipino signatures on the
line. President Roosevelt had a clear appreciation
the future usefulness of the Philippines as a dependa]
forward base after victory was achieved over the Axis
Powers. Thus when in the wake of the massive Japane.
attack in December 1941 Manual Oue20n proposed the
ne~tralization of the Philippines, Roosevelt's respon~
was an absolute "no". "My reply must emphatically dell
the possibility of the Government's agreement to the
political aspects of President Quezon's proposal ••••
American forces will continue to keep our flag flying
the Philippines so long as there remains any possibili
of resistance ••• , 11 Roosevelt wrote to General Douglas
MacArthur. 1 The President had no hesitation in castin
aside the neutralization clause of the Tydings-McDuffi
Act that he himself signed in 1934. It was in the sam
spirit that General MacArthur had declared when he was
evacuated from the Philippines: "I shall return".
1 For details see Frazier Hunt, The Untold Story 4
Douglas MacArthur (London, 1954), pp.250-55.
91
92
"Primary Base Area"
The surrender of American forces in the Philippines
and the occupation of the country by Japan inflicted deep
"munds in the American psyche. The very bases that America
had built had begun ~o serve its enemy. But at no point was
there any doubt in the minds of the President or American
military leaders that eventually Nippon would suffer defeat
and American control of the Philippines regained. By the
closing months of the year 1942--the year of Nazi defeats
at El Alamein and Stalingrad--A.rnerican naval poitJer was being
brought to bear against the Japanese in the Pacific area.
Admiral Ernest J. King, the new Navy chief in t-1ashinqton, was
determined to augment the rnomentlli~ of operations in the Pacific
with offensive manoeuvres against Japan deviating from the
earlier strategy of a defensive "t..rar against the latter. Though
the recapture of the Philippine Islands from the Japanese
occupying forces lvas still a long way off, General George
c. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army, 't>Jas already thinking
about ensuring the restoration and control in the post-·w·ar era
of naval and air bases in the Philippines. ~rhe fact
that the United States had promised to confer freedom
on the Islands in 1946 only served to heighten Marshall's
sense of urgency. In a telephone conversation with
General Malin Craig, a former Chief of Staff of the us
Army who was called back to active service in 1941, on
1 November 1943 General Marshall said:
Here's what~~· on account of the fact that Quezon ceases to be President on November 15th, the Government has £Q ~ special measures in order to keeQ him in ~ QOSition Of QOWer •• • • Specifically what they (Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox) want is to get certain commitments between now and the 15th on the Naval Bases and Air Fields in the Philippines. They feel that it would be much better to get a conuni ssion from whatever Government Quezon represents at the present time than to take that up after action which gives them independence. So that we•ve got to act pretty fast •••• 2 (Emphasis added)
That was what Marshall, who was to be acclaimed as the
93
11Architect of Victory 11, wanted. For American purposes,
a certain pliable Filipino was to be kept in power. Had
he not shown himself to be adequately cooperative, the
General would have wanted action to remove him from
power. It was, as will be described subsequently, a
pattern that was to be repeated in the years that
followed. Under Marshall's directions, preliminary
2 Secret, Telephone Conversation between General Marshall and General Craig, 1 Novemberl943, ABC Files 686 Philippine Islands (8 November 1943) Section 1-A, Modern Military Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.c.
94
studies were undertaken in order to establish the I~st-
war military requirements for the defence of Western
Hemisphere as well as the American possessions and
prote~torates in the Pacific region. The studies
envisaged, among other things, the establishment of a
chain of military and naval bases to form a defence
ring around the Western Hemisphere. Bases in the
Philippines under the control of the United States were
to constitute the outermost defence line of the strategic
ring. Projecting technological developments in air war
fare the researchers reached the tentative conclusion
that even with bases in the Philippines, the United
States might not be immune to bombardment by long
distance aircrafts of the future. However, the Philippine
bases would at least ensure against a major surprise
attack from the Asia-Pacific rim. such would not be the
case "if this boundary were not extended to the greatest
possible distance across the seas". 3 Land-based aircraft
and aircraft on mighty carriers operating out of bases
in the Philippines could score the Pacific and give early
3 Memorandum for Secretary of War, 4 November 1943, ABC Files 686 Philippine Islands (8 November 1943) Section 1-A, Modern Military Branch (MMB), National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C.
95
warning of hostile naval or air activity. Philippines-
based naval or air power could be effectively brought
to bear against an enemy based in mainland southern
Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged on the Secretary
of War, Henry L. Stimson, himself a fonner Governor
General of the Islands, the imperative necessity to
conclude agreements for future control of bases in the
Philippines. A Departmental memorandum stated:
All factors regarding US post-war requirements in the Philippine Islands point ~oward the necessity for securing commitments from President Quezon under the broadest possible p~ovisions. These should be so general and so sweeping in nature as to permit exact location to be determined by US military and naval authorities upon conclusion of the war. The rights obtained should be complete and absolute •••• 4
President Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth,
passed away in the United States on 1 August 1944.
Sergio Osmena was proclaimed the new President of the
Commonwealth in Washington. In Tokyo, the Japanese had
found their own Filipino, Jose P. Laurel, to serve as
"President" of the Philippines. Osm~na•s pro-American
ieanings were as strong as those of Quezon, as has been
4 Ibid.
96
pointed out in the previous chapter. American officials
had nothing to worry about as the result of the death of
Manual Quezon. Osmena assured Secretary of State Edward
R. Stettinius in April 1945 that whatever suggestion the
United States would make relative to its requirements of
bases in his country 11 would be agreeable to him". 5 The
American side was soon ready with a document for his sig-
natuxe. By signing an agreement with President Henry s.
Truman on 14 May 1945, Osmena fulfilled his promise.
President Truman got what his JCS wanted--an agreement
"so sweeping and so general as to permit exact location
(of bases) to be determined by military and naval authori-
ties upon conclusion of the war 11• The two parties agreed
that 11 the fullest and closest military cooperation will
be observed ••• and the military plans of the United States
and the Philippine Government will be closely integrated
in order to ensure the full and mutual protection of the
United States and the Philippines". 6 This agreement
5 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Lockhart), 21 April 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 (Washington, f).t. ) • Henceforth this source will be referred to as FR.
6 ·us House of Representatives, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Commdttee on International Relations, United States Policy in the Far East, (Washington, D.c., 1976}, vol.7, part-1, p.12.
97
contained ten provisions of which nine enumerated the
special rights and previleges to be given to the United
states by the Philippines. Besides, it incorporated
two lists, entitled: (a) "Areas in the Philippines in
which the United States may Desire the Right to
EstabliSh Bases, As Submitted by the war Department";
(b) "Areas in the Philippines in which the united
States May Desire the Right to Establish Bases, As
Submitted by the Navy Department". A total of thirtY
eight facilities and ihstallations in thirteen different
locations 1.1·cre included in the agreement.
Soon after this agreement was signed the Joint
Chiefs of Staff made known their desire that nothing less
than complete American sovereignty over the bases in the
Philippines was desirable. 7 They designated the Philippine
Islands as a "Primary Base Area•. The term was defined as
a place "strategically located and adequately developed,
comprising the foundation of a base system essential to
che security of the United States, its possessions, the
7 Memorandum for the Joint Post-War Committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 July 1945, SPJGR 1945/5422, ABC Decimal Files 686 Philippine Islands (8 November 1943) Section 1-B, P&O Division, MMB, NA, Washington, D.c.
Western Hemisphere, and the Philippines and for the
projection of military operationsu. 8
98
In pursuance of the objective of making the Phili-
pprbnes a "Prl.mary Base Area", on-the-spot su:cveys and
studies on military bases and naval reservations were
conducted by the experts of the War and Navy Departmentso
The Joint Chiefs of Staff's instructions were set forth
in the following terms: (a) The military bases in the
Philippines were to constitute an integrated system for
all forces- air,_ground and sea; (b} The bases should be
so located as to provide maxlmum accessibility, with due
consideration to the danger of surprise attack; (c) The
bases should be capable of expansion to meet probable
trends in developments of future implements of war;
(d) The bases should afford maxlmum advantage for health
and sanitation, except where incompatible with strategic
requirements. 9 The Joing Chiefs of Sta:Ef took it for
8 Secret, Joint Staff Planners: United States MilitahX Assistance to the Philippines in the Post-surrender Period, 1 October 1945, J.P.S. 756/1, Copy~ 41, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS 686.9, Philippine Islands (11-7-43), Section-2, MMB, NA, Washington, D.c.
9 Memorandum by William D. Leahy, Fleet Admiral of us Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commanders in Chief of the Army and Navy, to the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, 27 September 1945, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ccs 686.9 Philippine Islands (11-7-43) Sec.2, MMB, NA, Washington, D.c.
99
granted that the Philippines bases would be needed far
into the future, serving as vital part of the American
security system for East and Southeast Asia and the
Pacific. Fleet .Admiral William D. Leahy, military
adviser to the President, put forth the point to the
Secretaries of War and the Navy and the Chiefs of Staff
of the Army and the Navy:
It can be expected that effective munitioning capacity in East Asia will eventually result from the progressive industrialization of its vast population, approximately one-half of the world's total. For the future security of the United States against a possibly unfriendly and militant Asia, or an Asiatic-European coalition, we must be able to continue to control the Pacific Ocean. such control iS necessary not only so that we can project our own offensive forces against the Asiatic mainland, but also so that we can deny an enemy access to the 'Western Hemispherc3 by way of the Pacific Ocean. In arriving at this conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not thinking solely in terms of the present blt in terms of the future, the next twenty-five, fifty, one hundred years and beyond •••• lo The Admiral spoke for the Uhite House in endorsing the perceptions of the JCS. The bases in the Philippines would be needed for "one hundred years and beyond" to function as both "outposts" and "springboards" from which American military might might be projected in order to "uphold American policies and interests in the Far East, including the fulfilment of its international commitments".
Memorandum for the President, by William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Conunander in Chief of the Army and Navy, 19 October 1946, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, MMB, NA, Washington, D.c.
100
on submission of reports of the on-the-spot studies,
the Joint Staff Planners prepared a fina 1 report in
February 1946 for consideration of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. After due consideration of the report on
"United States Requirements for Military Bases and Rights
in the Philippine Islands", the JCS requested Secretary
of State James F. Byrnes on 28 March 1946 to negotiate
with the Philippine Government agreements that would
bring forth the results desired. Even before the date
set for independence for the Philippines American represen
tatives began secret negotiations in June 1946 with the
Philippine President. The timing was important. Osmena,
who had promised full cooperation with the United States
on the issue of granting base facilities, was de:fe ated in
the presidential election held in 1946 and Manuel Roxas
was elected to the presidency to become the first president
subsequently of the independent Republic of the Philippines.
Roxas had served at Bataan, Corregidor and Mindanao during
the first Philippine campaign. He was twice successful
in befooling the Japanese, first, by leading guerrilla
operations in Luzon while apparently collaborating with
them and secondly, by escaping from the presidential party
of Jose Laurel which the Japanese were "transporting" back
to Japan. He went over to the American-side soon after
101
his escape and General MacArthur promptly promoted him
to the rank of a general. Roxas was described as a
"withdrawn, serious man ••• \'Jho seldom smiled". He was
11 very Spanish in his habits, using English l'Tith an
appearance of reluctance". At the same time, he was a 11 practical man and less impulsive or emotional. He
knew that no Filipino politician could win a presidential
election by being anti-American or, for that matter,
could continue long in the office by adopting anti-
American policies. The new President lost no time in
announcing a pledge of allegiance to the United states.
In a statement to the press on 27 April 1946, Roxas
declared: "I am absolutely determined to do everything
in my power to make America's Far East Policy effective
through whatever the United States needs. The sooner
America's needs of strategy are mapped out so we can go
to work, the better, I'll be pleased". 12 Washington wanted
a pro-American president in the Malacanang Palace, but it
11 Geoffrey Bocca, The Philippines: Arne rica • s Forgotten Friends (New York, 1974), pp.111-13.
12 Memorandum for the Secretary of War, by Lt. General J.E. Hull, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, 29 April 1946, ABC Files 686 Philippines (8 November 43), Sec 1-B, P&O Division, MMB, NA, Washington, D.c.
102
also felt that such a man should have capability to get
things done in ways beneficial to US concerns. It was
possible that the hard-core nationalists would take
advantage of excitement and emotion of the newlJr indepen
dent people and fan anti-American feelings. The Philippine
leaders were in fact quite well known for their quality of
quickly changing sides for political expediency. American
interests might suffer in case such a situation arose.
The United States did not want to take chances in view
of the importance it attached to the maintenance of a
high le¥el of influence in the Island.
A Colonial Constitution
To begin with, the new-born Republic inherited a
Constitution, that had been framed more than a decade before
independence under the tutelage of the American colonial
rulers. The character of the Constitution which was
largely influenced by the Philippine Independence Act of
1934, was based on the American constitution. The pro
visions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act made it legc:1lly
binding that the draft Philippine Constitution would
not be operative without receiving the approval of the
103
President of the United States. 13 Such approval
necessarily meant that there was nothing in the
Constitution that Washington would regard as unaccept-
able in terms of vital American concerns. The Consti-
tution did not undergo any significant changes until
President Ferdinand E. Marcos altered its structure a
little in 1973 to strengthen his powers in the aftermath
of the declaration of Martial Law.
A Neo-colonial Economic Structure
The economy of the Philippines was made subservient
to the American economy, with the Filipinos themselves
seeking US help to tackle the ugprecedented devastation
inflicted on the Philippine economy during the war. The
degree of Filipino weakness was brought out by the fact
that President Manuel Roxas started his administration
with a budget of $130 million with an expectable
13 Section 4 of the Philippine Independence Act (PL 127) of 1934 stipulateds "After the President of the United States has certified that the constitution conforms with the provisions of this Act, it shall be submitted to the people of the Philippine Islands for their ratification •••• "
104
government revenue of $25 million. 14 Manila, Cebu City
and Baguio, the summer capital, were in ruins. Produc-
tive industries had been destroyed, trade was at a
stand still, transportation was damaged and there was
acute shortage of the basic necessities of life such as,
food, clothing and medicine. That the situation was
propitious for extracting terms from the Philippines was
thus set forth by Millard E. Tydings, Chairman of the
committee on Territories and Insular Affairs in a
memorandum to President Truman: In the mean time and
before independence is finally granted, the Army, Navy
and Air Force Should reach an agreement with Filipino
authorities concerning retention of bases. This should
not be postponed. Filipino politics being what t,hey are,
it may be much more difficult to obtain agreement: on
the military bases we need several months from now than
in the appropriate present •••• we should not lose the
present opportunity to get them. 15
14 Letter, President Ronas of the Philippines to President Harry s. Truman, 6 August 1946, President's Secretary's File, B-185, Truman Library, Indepen-dence, Mo., USA. ·
15 Memorandum to President, by Millard E. Tydings, Chairman of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, 25 April 1945, President's Secretary's File, Subject File: Foreign Atfairs, Philippine Island (1), Truman Library.
lOS
Before a final agreement was reached on the bases,
the United States enacted a Philippine Trade Act more
than two months before the Philippine independence. This (1...
Act had.ltprovision known as the "Parity Clause" which made
it obligatory for the Philippines to grant American
citizens equal rights with the Filipinos to exploit or
develop or utilize the natural resources of the i.slands.
The purpose was partly to rehabilitate the American
community in the Philippines which, along with the
Chinese and Japanese communities in the islands, had
dominated economic life in the Philippines in the pre-war
years and were in a bad shape as a result of the ravages
of war. In 1934 more than seventy per cent of the
domestic trade of the Islands were in the hands of
foreigners, including Americans ~o altogether had
constituted only one percent of the population. That one
percent had contributed four-fifths of the taxes collected
by the government. 16
The intention behind the "parity Clause" was to
restore and reinforce presence and influence of the
Americans in the Islands. The United States Congress
16 A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven, 1964), pp.452-53.
106
enacted another law, the Philippine Rehabilitation Act,
on the same day, making it contingent upon the
Philippines to accept the Trade Act. The Rehabilitations
Act stipulated that:
No payments under title 1 of this Act in excess of $500 shall be made until an executive agreement shall have been entered into ••• providing for trade relations between the United States and the Philippines •••• l7
If the Philippines wanted American aid for rehabilitation,
it had first to accept the terms prescribed by the Trade
Act. The Philippine economy had been heavily dependent on
its trade with the United States throughout the period
of colonial rule (See the Table for trade statistics).
And now it was almost on the verge of bankruptcy. It
needed extensive amount of external assistance for its
survival as well as revival of its economy. No source of
such help other than the United States was available. One
bottleneck was, the Philippine Constitution. The "Parity
Clause" of the Philippine Trade Act contravened a
Philippine constitutional provision that called for sixty
per cent share in all corporations to be in the hands of
17 See Title VI of Philippine Rehabilitation Act, Public Law 370, Approved on 30 April 1946.
TABLE (IN THOUSANDS OF PESOS)
1939 1940 1946 1947 1948
Total Exports 315,784 311,849 128, 375 531,096 638,410
Export to USA 259,059 258,308 075,318 306,481 418,185
Percentage of Exports to USA. 82 83 59 58 66
Total Imports 245,130 269,688 591,716 1022,700 1136,409
Imports from USA 167,383 210,374 515,332 882,151 939,229
Percentage of Imports from USA 68 78 87 86 83
Sources Digest of United States Government Activities in the Republic of the Philippines, 1949, White House Central File, Confidential File, Truman Library, Independence, US.A. ·
.... 0 ....:I
108
the Filipinos. In order to meet the new American
conditions, arrangements were made to promote an amend-
ment bill in the Philippine Congress. Passage of the
amendment required a minimum vote of 72 in the Lower
House and 18 in the Upper House. Given the composition
of the Houses, the chances were bleak of getting the
required number of votes in the Congress to get the
amendment passed. The Philippine Government met the
situation by ousting eight coalition minority Representa-
tives and three coalition Senators on the ground of
alleged frauds and terrorism in certain provinces of
central Luzon. The interesting exercise in getting
around constitutional provisions in order to accommodate
conditions imposed by US legislations was viewed bene
volently by the Administration and Congress in the
United States, notwithstanding their oft-proclaimed
commitment to make the world safer for democracy.
In addition to the aparity Clause", the Trade Act
tied the Philippine peso with the American dollar. The Act
provided:
The value of Philippine currency in relation to the United States dollar shall not be changed, the convertability of pesos into dollars shall not be suspended and no
restrictions shall be imposed on the transfer of funds from the Philippines to the United States •••• 1a
109
Thus a country that was supposedly to become independent
and sovereign was made to accept a series of .. thou shalt
not 11 in vital areas relating to its own currency and
economy. President Roxas of the Philippines had no
hesitation in signing the trade agreement with the
United States on Independence Day. He bad already
informed the United States High Commissioner a few days
earlier that he would sign the agreement on trade relations
after the independence ceremonies on 4 July. It seemed
to him that tlif the signature is after independence, it
will not make any difference how long after•• 19 Paul
McNutt, the High Commdssioner, promptly agreed and
Roxas signed the agreement on 4 July 1946. The Act meant
that the United States would be dominant factor in the
economic life of the Islands. High Commissioner McNutt
was philosophical over the emerging state of affairs.
18 Philipnine Trade Act, Public Law 371, Approved on 30 April 1946.
19 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Associate Chief-' Division of Commercial Policy (Willoughby). 28 June 1946, 611.11831/6-2846, ~, 1946, vol.B.
110
He wrote that it ••shoUld be obvious that after 30 years
of forced development into an almost complete economic
dependence a sudden reversal of economy is impossible
without courting disaster. The mistake was ours and
we have an obligation to adopt remedial measures which
will not destroy Philippine economy". 20 The High
Commissioner found it possible to be at once an advocate
of "remedial measures" and to be an upholder of a policy
that might increase Filipino dependence on the United
States for a period of indefinite duration. McNutt's
actual view on the Philippines was, in fact, Deflected
in his remark that -- "while our flag flies over the
. 1 d f i '11 t u21 1s an s, no ore gn power w1 resspass •••• He was
of the view that if the United States should withdraw
from the Philippines, it would lose its open door policy,
its freedom of the seas, and its voice in Oriental diplo-
macy. He was never, like others, concerned about the
independence of the Philippines and now that the Phili-
ppines was going to be independent, he was all for at
20 The United States High Commissioner (McNutt) to Richard R. Ely of the Office of United States High Commissioner, Washington, 8 January 1946, 611.11B31/ 1-1046, FR, 1946, vol.S.
21 Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy (Washington, D.c., 1977) 1 p.12e
least the United States flag flying over the military
bases in the Philippines.
111
McNutt was a key member of the American delegation
that later went to Manila to negotiate for the military
bases agreement. He wholeheartedly supported and worked
for the trade agreement with the Philippines because be
knew that economic control would help in getting a base
agreement signed.
There was widespread agreement within the executive
branch on maintaining the linkage between economic pre
eminence and retention of a structure of military bases.
This had been the case till a few years before the out
break of war in Europe. In the late 30s, as has been
mentioned before, the problems brought on by the Depression
and the pressure from the agricultural and labour lobbies
had led to strong sentiment among several members of
Congress that the economic linkages with the Philippines
might in certain respects be disadvantageous to the United
States. During the war years when some elements in the US
Government underwent a temporary spell of self-induced
idealism, the Department of Commerce itself spoke piously
of economic developments of the Philippines to meet the
long-tez:m needs of the Filipino people themselves. A
Departmental memorandum written in 1943 stated:
In as much as the war has brought about the economic separation of the United States and the Philippines, the Department believes that a favourable opportunity is afforded the Philippines to develop its economic structure on the solid basis of long-range needs rather than on artificial basis of 22 economic dependence upon the United States.
112
But as victory in the war approached and considerations
of emerging global security requirements began to
dominate the thinking of American political and
military leaders, "realism" quickly overcame idealistic
concerns over what was good for the Filipino people.
Robert ~. Patterson, Under Secretary of war, wrote
to Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs William L.
Clayton in June 1945- " •••• I trust that, in consideration
of trade policies to be applied to the Philippines,
consideration will be given to the military objective •••• u 23
Influencing Foreign Policy
Formulating and implementing foreign policy without
22 Secret, Recommendation of the Department of Commerce Regarding Trade Relations With the Philippines, ABC Files, 686 Philippine Islands (8 Nov 1943) Sec 1-4, MMB, NA.
23 Secret, Circular Letter, Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War to William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, 4 June 1945, ABC Files, Ibid.
113
external dictation or manipulation is the hall-mark of
a truely sovereign nation. one issue that American
policymakers had to consider was whether with the grant
of freedom, the former American possession should be
left untrammelled to conduct its foreign policy according
to its own lights. A satisfactory position would be if
a political leadership could be in place in the new
republic that would voluntarily or on the basis of
some persua~ion adopt a course in international affairs '--
fully in consonnance with the objectives and policies of
the United States. As an Asian country and as also one
of those that were to be called as developing nations, a
cooperative regime in the Philippines might perform a
useful service as a stalking horse to put forth position
that the United States might not want to try out as a
trial baloon. Establishing close ties with the foreign
service that the new republic was to set up and accustom-
ing Filipino personnel to work closely with their us
Pending the final establishment of the requisite Philippine Foreign Service establishments abroad, the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines agree that at the request of the Republic of the Philippines the United States of America will endeavour,
.. ·I-
in so far as it may be practicable, to represent through its Foreign Service the interests of the Republic of the Philippines in countries where there is no Philippine representation.24
114
In accorda~ce with the Treaty American Embassies
in many countries represented the interests of the
Philippines. Moreover, washington offered to train
the Filipino foreign service officers who were
recruited to serve in countries where Manila could
afford to establish embassies or consulates. The
old linkages of the colonial era between the upper crust
Filipino gentry and the American establishment remained
virtually unaffected. After the advent of freedom with
the Malacanang Palaceinhabited by successive Filipino
presidents acceptable to the United States and the
foreign service establishment drawn mostly from the
gentry with many educated in the United States the new
republic was set on a course that was to win praise
for the Philippines in the years ahead as a "loyal friend'' • .
There were from time to time voices raised by some Filipino
leaders against 11neo-colonialism 11 and undue subservience
24 See Article-111 of the "Treaty Defining Relations Between the United States and the Phil:lppines", Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, 1568.
115
to the United States, but these had little effect on
the shaping of Filipino foreign policy during the period
covered in the present work and for many long years
thereafter.
Paramount Patronage Over the Military
The task of ensuring a pro-American orientation
on the part of the military establishment of the post
independent Philippines was yet another im~ant
Washington objective. No major problem on this score
was expected because of the very satisfactory past
experience and FilipinD participation along with US
forces in the struggle against Japan.
When the United States had granted commonwealth
status to the Philippines and President Manual Oue20n
in 1935 had a legal basis to establish: the armed
forces for the Islands, he invited the for.mer Chief of
Staff of the us Army to serve as his military adviser. 25
The General's sincere work and the subsequent war time
25 Neena Vreeland, G.B. Horowitz, Peter Just, Philip Moeller and R.s. Shinn, Area Handbook for the Philippines (Washington, :D.c., 1976), p.349.
116
experience had created an environment quite favourable
to friendly cooperation in the future between American
and Filipino military establishments.
Filipinos recognised that they had virtually to
make a start from scratch and that American aid was
indispensible for raising, equipping and maintaining
an army, navy and airforce. On the American side
Filipino armed forces under dependable leadership was
regarded as important to maintain law and order inter-
nally, to deal with potential insurgencies and, aboveall,
to ensure security for US bases and installations.
Indeed, even while the war was on progress the JCS had
26 given thought to these very issues. As early as
1943 the JCS had called for the early formation of an
effective Filipino army and envisaged its primary
task as the maintenance of law and order and countering
27 sabotage.
26 Extracts from General Eisenhower's Remarks to the Congress, 15 January 1946, ABC F~les, 686 Philippine Islands (8 November 1943) Sec~I-B, RG 319 MMB, NA. Also see, Background Information About the Philippines, 14 June 1950, DRF Information Paper No.410, Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State.
27 Secret, Joint Staff Planners: United States Military Assistance to the Philippines, JPS 756/1, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, n.9. Also see, Secret, Memorandum to SWNCC, by A.J. McFarland, Brigadier General, US Army Secretary, 12 March 1946, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SM-5233, CCS 686 Philippines Islands (11-7-43), Sec.4, MMB, NA.
117
The 11 law and order 11 problem in the Philippines
assumed serious proportions when some of the guerrillas
who had fought against the invading Japanese forces with
American a~s and equipment escaped to jungles after the
war and joined the leftist Hukbalahap forces. According
to Washington, law and order in the Philippines was a
prerequisite for peaceful executive of its post-~~r
military programmes in the Islands. Moreover, a standing
Philippine Ar.my ready to meet any possible threat from
the Hukbalahap forces or other armed bands was considered
politically more expedient and economically less e~pensive
for the United States than stationing American Armed
Forces in the Philippines. Continued presence of large
number of American soldiers in the Philippines was also
not feasible on account of large-scale demobilization at
horne. The War Department believed that American commit-
ments in occupied areas like Japan and Germany, to say
nothing of Korea, Austria and Italy, \<lrere of a character
that would require the stationing of most of the available
US troops "at present and for the foreseeable future". 28
28 Top Secret, Letter, The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the secretary of State, 29 November 1946, General Records of the Department of State, 811.24596/11-2946, Diplomatic Branch, NA.
118
Military Assistance
It was with the Philippines that a beginning was
to be made in Asia of military assistance as an instru-
ment of us foreign policy. Important elements in the
United States Government felt that to build goodwill
and secure manmum dividends out of the same a programme
for the provision of military assistance should be
initiated before transfer of power. Legislation towards
this end was introduced in the US Congress and its early
enactment for 11political reasons" was strongly urged
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by both
the Departmental Chiefs of Naval Operation and by the
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff of the US Army. 29
29 us House of Representatives, Selected Executive Se:ssion Hearings, n. 7.
(The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Vice-Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, stated before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives: that the Navy Department would consider it highly desirable that this legislation be enacted without· delay. The Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff of the US Ar.my also favoured an early enactment on the ground that the United States would legally take back all arms and equipment then in possession of the Philippine Army after granting independence to it and hence an early legislation of this type was a legal and logical need in order to have a substantially strong force in the postindependent Philippines for the defence and security of the country.)
Secretary of State James Byrns also pleaded for
the early approval of the military assistance bill in
119
a letter to the Speaker of the House •. Byrns specifi
cally linked the issue with that of maintaining American
military installations and naval bases in the Philippines
after granting independence to the colony. 30
Manila had no reason to oppose the Military Assis
tance Bill introduced in the us Congress. The prevailing
politico-economic conditions did not enable the Phili
ppines to raise and maintain a standing ar.my without
external assistance. Although there was no immediate
external threat to the Philippine Islands requiring a
strong military force in the post-war period, a reasonably
strong standing armed forces was very much necessary to
fight the domestic foes of the nascent republic. A strong
military, moreover, is an important symbol of an independent
nation. The Filipino leaders expressed support to the
Military Assistance Bill. Carlos P. Romulo, the Resident
Commissioner of the Philippines in Washington, asked for
the early passage of the Bill, telling the House
Committee:
30 Ibid.
•••• ~e will need not only the guns and tanks and the planes but other military supplies as w!ll, such as food, clothing, and fuel •••• 3
120
The l:l; 1 1 rQrociucn r'nngressional approval on 26 June 1946,
camE :he day the Philippines became inde-
penc ~ effective for a period of five years.
It provided for instruction and training of military and
naval personnel of the Philippinesr maintenance, repair
and rehabilitation of military and naval equipment in the
possession of the Philippines, and transfer of authorised
arms, ammunition and implements to the said country.
It provided for instruction and training of military
and naval personnel of the Philippinesr maj.ntenance, repair
and rehabilitation of military or naval equipment in the
possession of the Philippines, and transfer of
US arms, ammunition and implements to the said country.
Winning People 1 s Heart
A certain level of economic development sustained
by us assistance in a friendly country was considered an
important pre-requisite by Washington. The accepted
concept was that economic problems would create political
31 Ibid.
121
instaldlity and provide a fertile ground to local enemies
of the government as well as the external ally of the
country to operate. The United States was willing to
commit a significant amount to bring about rehabilita
tion of the war-torn economy of the Philippines. It
embarked upon a large programme of rehabilitating the
Philippine agricultural and industrial infrastructure.
By 1947, nine American agencies were engaged in an overall
rehabilitation programme consisting of ten separate but
essentially related fields. The agencies were1 (1) u.s.
War Damages Oommdssion, paying claims for losses of both
private and public propertiesa (2) u.s. Bureau of PUblic
Roads, reconstructing roads, streets and bridges~ (3) u.s.
Army Corps of Engineers, rebuilding ports, piers and
warves; (4) u.s. Public Health Service, establishing
quarantine and public health programmesr (5) u.s.
Weather Bureau, equipping, training and establishing
vita. weather services~ (6) u.s. Civil Aerooautics
ation, building an airport, with airways traffic
radio communication, and navigational aids;
Fish and Wildlife Service, increasing the fish
catch to supply larger quantities of their essential
Filipino basic food; (8) u.s. Maritime Commission,
supplying ships and training crews to move Philippine
122
Commerce between 7000 islands and world ports, (9) u.s.
Coast and Geolegic Survey, charting wrecks in harbours,
floating derelicts, mines and other hazards, to make
shipping and water-borne commerce safe.
The us Agencies associated with the rehabilitation
programme indicate the wide scope of the activities that
were carried on. While Washington was cognizant of the
relevance of the programmes for its own longer-range
interests in the Islands, the Filipino people in general
responded to them with goodwill and appreciation. The
fact that there was no other source of help was one factor
that acted favourably in respect of the United States.
Whether the amount expended in the Philippines for
rehabilitation was commensurate with the damage and the
suffering that the Islands had suffered as a result of
Japanese occupation and subsequent us military operations
against the Japanese is somewhat questionable. If the
per capita rehabilitation e~enditure that the United
States had incurred for rehabilitation, of say Belgium,
which had been of little assistance to the u.s. during the
war years is compared with the per capita expenditure for
the Filipino people, a more revealing measure of American
123
priorities may be oound. American magnanimity towards a
non-European ally did not seem to have been adequate.
There was not much thought given in Washingt:on to the
possibility of a much larger outlay for the Philippines
for the speedy and balanced development of its agricul
ture and industry. Any desire to make the Philippines
a showpiece of this kind was not harboured at that time
nor subsequently. Had such an imaginative progranme been
implemented, a more prosperous Philippines would have
emerged and the goodwill that would have been generated
among the people would have been the best insurance
against any danger to American strategic concern in the
Islands in the future. On the other hand, as will be
seen in the next chapter, the United States fell into
the habit of safeguarding its concerns through looking
for a pliable occupant of the presidential position in
the Malacanang Palace.
FDR's Dream Fulfilled
The Philippines had become independent on 4 July
1946. The new nation bad a constitution that bore the
mark "approved by Washington". Its economy and currency
were tied to those of the United States. Its military
establishment and infant foreign service apparatus were
124
closely linked to those of the United States. As a
condition of independence it had accepted the presence
on its soil of a large array of us installations and
their complement of American military forces. Those who
came to occupy positions of power in governmental busi
ness or landlord circles had no serious complaint about
the situation. From even those prominant politicians
of the opposition there was no organized voicing of
opposition to the nature and level of the us presence.
Among the ordinary people in general there was little anti
Americanism. And in the Malacanang Palace here was a
President of the Republic, who after briefing by the
American Arnba ssador, was ready to make a "unilateral
speech", the key parts of which had been cabled to
Washington in advance. The speech was to support the
role of the United States with enthusiasm. None the less,
the military base negotiations were no easy go. The
Filipino leaders knew that the very presence of foreign
military bases in the country conspicuously compromised
the sovereignty of their country. Moreover, while the
Trade Agreement was likely to bring some economic benefit
to the country, the military bases maintained by the
United States were to serve no direct purpose for the
125
Philippines. The Star Reporter, a Philippine newspaper,
which had earlier criticized the provisions permitting
US bases, carne out with fresh advice: ...... After all
there is no conceivable threat of immediate invasion
of the Philippines with the Japs out of the way.
So, let•s sleep over it. It would be to everybody's
advantage if we did. 33
The negotiations which were going on for months
informally and for weeks formally in a top secret
environment were for the first time leaked to the press
in september 1946 and created a sensation in the country.
The Manila Times on 3 September 1946 reported a "deadlock" . .
in the negotiations and attributed the report to "reliable
sources". The Evening Times wrote that US Arnba ssador
McNutt ••was understood to have stated, rehabilitation
aid for the Philippines would be easier to get", if the
military bases agreement was signed soon. The Star
Reporter commented in its editorial:
If reports were accurate, the terms now preferred would virtually result in the establishment here of e~ra-territorial rights for army personnel. And judging from the number of bases contemplated, one gets the impression the whole archipelago would just about be converted into one vast military reservation ••••
33 Star Reporter, 5 September 1946.
•••• And if were to become a military reservation, we might as well elect a Moncada governor and enlist the country as a state of the Union.34
The leak shocked both the Malacanang Palace and the
White House. President Roxas publicly denied that
126
there was any deadlock. He appealed to the persons
possessing information regarding the base negotiations
to refrain from disclosing such infoz:mation "to our
national advantage" and at the same time priv·ately
admonished the negotiators and thus helped bring
about an abrupt end to the "leaks 11•35
Only days after the "leak11 the Philippine Congress
was to assemble for a special session. Indications were
there that there might be a Congressional uproar on the
issue of military bases and thus the negotiations were
suspended for the time being. The memory was still alive
of the Trade agreement that was only recently approved
by the Congress with much reluctance. A change of one
vote in the Philippine Senate could have defeated the
34 Ibid.
35 Letter, Julius c. Edelstein, .Acting Director of Information and CUltural Relations, to the Secretary of State, 148, General Records of the Department of State, 811.24596/9-646, CS/HH, Diplomatic Branch, NA.
127
bill. 36 Roxas did not want to face a possible Congre-
ssional uproar against the base negotiations, coming
soon after a sudden "leak" to the press. gave assurances
to Ambassador McNutt that he ''will resume discussions
personally participating during latter part (of the) week
beginning September 30 ... 37
Roxas, however, gave a different justification
of the slow progress of the ••conversations", as be
called, on the military bases agreement to-his own people.
A Malacanang press release on 6 October 1946 stated:
The Conversations have entered a technical phase involving the solicitation of opinions and data from surveyors, land experts, and engineers •••• ,As a result, formal meetings will be spasmodic and progress will probably be slow until all opinions and data are thoroughly canvassed and analyzed.38
But what delayed the conclusion of the agreement was
the constant irritation arising from alleged misconduct
of the American soldiers, mostly raw recruits, who were
stationed in the Philippines. The New York Times reported
that the deterioration of the morale of the American
36 Letter, Lockhart to Vincent, Division of Philippine A£fairs, Department of State, 25 September 1946, Ibid., FW 811.24596/9-2546 CS/V, DB, NA.
37 Telegram, Ambassador in the Philippines to the Secretary of State, 30 September 1946, 811.24596/ 9-3046, IS, 1946, vol.8.
38 ER, 1948, vol.8.
128
troops in the Philippines was not only damaging America's
image but also was alienating the public there who had
of late begun to ask that the Gis who had fOught shoulder
to-shoulder with Filipinos should be brought back to re-
place the "brash, ill-mannered, slovenly and contemptuous
children you now call soldiers"~9 General MacArthur
attributed the deteriorating morale of the American
troops to the "irresponsibility" of some of the "raw
rec.ruits", but he thought that the root of the problem
sprang "from an understandable feeling of nationalism on
the part of the Filipinos, who desired to exercise to
the full their new and deserved liberty and independence 11• 40
A particularly reprehensible instance of misbehaviour by
US soldiers involving violence against a Filipino commu
nity in the Palawan Islands heightened the public indig
nation. The people of Palawan Islands sent a petition
of grievance charging that American military police had
beaten householders, dragged them from their beds,
detained them illegally and violated many other civil
rights of the Filipinos. The Thirteenth Air Force Head-
quarters, while not denying the occurrence of such an
incident, announced that "lack of knowledge of the law"
39 New York Times, 21 October 1946. 40 Ibid., 24 October 1946.
129
was partly responsible and that "military personnel who
knowingly conducted illegal searches will be discip
lined''• 41
All these events were bound to affect the on-going
negotiations on military bases. At one time the Philippine
Government insisted that all US .Army Forces be removed
from the Manila area. Partly due to this development,
the War Department in the United States reconsidered the
strategic and political importance of the Army bases in
the Philippines and recommended that the US Army forces
should be withdrawn from the Philippines on schedule
which would permit an orderly closing out of the Army
interests over there. 42 President Harry s. Truman accepted
the recommendation and authorized the withdrawal of all
Army forces save one composite air group with a "very
small" ground detachment and accordingly the War
Department suspended all permanent base constructions
in the Philippines.
41 Ibid., 31 October 1946.
42 Top Secret, Memorandum for Joint Chiefs of Staff on War Department Requirements for Military Bases in the Philippines Islands, by the Chief of Staff, u.s .. flrmy, 23 November 1946, J .c.s. 1027/8, Records of Joint Chiefs of Staff, ccs 686.9 Philippine Islands (11-7-43), Sec.4, MMB, NA.
130
0-n the ofhei-- htt.:nol_J . the American
Navy attached considerable importance to the naval bases
situated in the archipelago. The Navy Department pointed
out that 11 there will exist a need for Naval forces to
operate in the Western Pacific indefinitely. Although
in war it is feasible to use mobile support by Naval
aux~liaries, in peace it is necessary to have certain
shore facilities for reasons of economy in operation
and also to provide hospitalization, recreation, and a
nucleous of key facilities for dependents 11•43
However, there was a possibility of misreading the
American Army's withdrawal not only by the Philippines
but also by many other American allies in the Far East.
In order to pre-empt an interpretati_on of the US Army
withdrawal as 11 a sign that the U.s. is loosing interest
in the defense of the Philippines and in the Far Eastern
matters 11, the State-liar-Navy Co-ordination Comnittee• s
Sub-committee on Foreign Policy Information prescribed
the following course of action, among a few other
alternatives:
43 Top Secret, Memorandum for Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11Navy Department Requirements for Bases and Rights in the Philippine Islands 11
, by the Chief of Naval Operations, 6 December 1946, J.c.s. 1027/9, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ccs 686.9, Section 4, MMB, NA. ·
Unilateral statement by Roxas in which he expands further on Philippines• desire to retain u.s. forces in Philippines and in which he may point out to the Filipino people the advantage of such retention. This statement should be discussed with Roxas by Ambassador Mcl~utt.44
131
Roxas obliged. u.s. Ambassador Paul McNutt sent a por-
tion of the President Roxas• speech telegraphically to
the Secretary of State before it was delive~d: The
speech was on the following lines:
We are, as you know, in the midst of negotiations for an agreemeq,t for bases for the mutual protection of the Philippines and the United States •••• ! am able to report to you that the United States Government has shown every disposition to consider our wishes in this matter. It has in no instance been arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable in the location of the base sites.
Recently the American Government showed extreme anxiety regarding press reports that fundamental relations between the Philippines and the United States were being endangered by the presence of American troops here. It is my judgement that those press reports were largely inaccurate. Partly as a consequence of these reports the United States recently expressed herself as perfectly willing to withdraw all military forces from the Philippines, unless we desired otherwise ••••
44 Top secret, SWNCC Sub-Committee on Foreign Policy Information: Withdrawal from the Philippines, 16 January 1947, FPI3, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ccs 686.9 Philippine Islands (11-7-43), Sec.5, MMB, NA.
Since the matter of the conduct of American troops here became of general concern, conditions have rapidly improved to a point where these troops and forces have again become welcome guests in our land. I expect that the base agreement will be signed within a short time •••• 45
132
The United States was apprehensive that its decision to
withdraw American troops from the Philippines could be
interpreted as lessening of its interests in the Phili
ppines. This fear was sought to be removed through a
statement by the Philippine President himself. Such a
statement would also remove the irritants and quicken
the pace of the military bases negotiations, Washington
rightly thought. The Military Bases Agreement was
signed on 14 March 1947.
This was perhaps the fulfilment of the Rooseveltian
dream. An independent Philippines 11 under benevolent
American guidance"! At a time when the British, French
and the Dutch were well entrenched in Asia and Africa,
and Italy and Japan were still trying to carve out
45 Urgent, Telegram, ~ 157, The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the SecretarY of State, 27 January 1947, 811.24596/1-2747, EB, 1947, vol.6. It was to be delivered on 27 January ,itself.
133
territories for colonization, the United States Congress
passed an Act in 1934 to decolonize the Philippines. And
now in the post-war period when Britain was making last
minute preparations to leave the 11 jewel 11 of the 11Crown".
France and Holland were vainly striving to regain control
over their colonies in Indochina and Indonesia respec
tively, the United States not only achieved a political
victory by granting independence to its .Asian colony
but successfully positioned itself as a patron of the
Philippines and strengthened its military presence in the
Pacific by signing a Military Bases Agreement with the
Philippines. The Philippine Islands, once considered an
"Achilles Heel" of America, was tu:cned into a powerful
military bastion of the United States in the Far East.
The bastion proved its worth during the Korean War and·
traumatic Vietnam War. The Philippines still houses two
largest overseas bases of its patron--one at Clark Field
and the other at Subic Bay.
