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Chapter 5

Transnational Capital:

Valuing Academic Returnees in a Globalizing China

Stanley Rosen and David Zweig

For many years, the Chinese government was deeply distressed about the loss of Chinese

intellectual power resulting from the “brain drain”. However, as Cheng Li notes in his

introduction, in the past five years, more and more mainlanders who studied abroad have been

returning to China. What forces are driving academics to return? One potential explanation is

that those who return have accumulated a form of “transnational capital,” viz., some

enhancement of their human capital that is based on international knowledge or linkages

accumulated overseas that are not readily available in China. We would assume that given

China’s expanding international linkages, the Chinese government, domestic organizations, and

even the Chinese marketplace will view this transnational capital positively and reward it

accordingly.

While transnational capital remains the key focus of our study, and potentially our

primary explanation, we also want to address some other potential explanations that might

trigger a reverse brain drain. Starting from the assumption that there are four possible “levels of

analysis” or explanation—international level changes, state-level or government policies,

organizational explanations, and individual calculations—we feel it is necessary to explore the

potential impact and intersection of these different levels.

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For example, significant changes in the external environment—such as the collapse of

the IT sector in the U.S. and the loss of jobs there—could push people to consider returning to

China. This explanation would not be incompatible with a “failure while abroad” explanation

that seems to be popular among those people who did not go abroad. Moreover, international

organizations, such as multinational corporations (MNCs), which need returnees, may offer

packages that will bring people back. Or international donors, such as the Ford Foundation, may

fund new domestic organizations, which are based on returnees. In this way, these types of

international organizations recognize the value of “transnational capital” and therefore help

promote the reverse brain drain.

Second, government policy changes could be very important. These shifts may be related

to the “transnational capital” hypothesis in that the government’s preferential policies to

encourage returnees would be based on a recognition of the value of transnational capital and the

government’s desire to bring these people back. Clearly, the recent government emphasis on

building China through science and technology (keji xingguo), as articulated by former party

leader Jiang Zemin, reflects a recognition that overseas students and scholars have somehow

accumulated important knowledge that is critical for building a rich and powerful China.

Third, domestic organizations, such as universities, research laboratories, and private or

state-owned firms may have developed a strong interest in acquiring these people and their

transnational capital and therefore vie with each other to attract the best and the brightest.

Sometimes, they may be getting incentives from the government to do this; at other times,

competition may have emerged among leading institutions to acquire returnees in order to

enhance the organization’s reputation. To this extent, they may be offering higher salaries, better

housing, and other perquisites that will bring people back. Here, too, we must consider the

potential importance of institutional innovations, whereby organizations carry out significant

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internal reforms to create an organizational culture that is more conducive to attracting returnees.

This might be separate from any special remuneration that might be given to the returnees.

Finally, we will look at individual level explanations, which would entail some clear

awareness by returnees of their relative value in China, particularly when compared to their

value overseas, which then convinces them to return. Challenges to this hypothesis might be

familial reasons—for example, to be near aging parents—or some sense that there was simply no

more room for upward mobility in the West.

There are of course difficult methodological questions making a “levels of analysis”

approach somewhat problematic. Returnees have offered a variety of motivations for their return,

which may vary depending on the forum in which these reasons are presented. For example,

reasons given in the openly circulated Chinese media, and in interviews as well, often encompass

multiple motivations for returning, from the “politically correct” – e.g., to serve the country – to

the specifically familial. One way of assessing such varied motivations is to examine whether

these self-reported explanations have changed over time. For example, if references to changes

in government policy–-such as the relatively recent emphasis on “serving the country” (wei guo

fuwu) without returning to live in China”– are cited only in the more recent reports, we may

reasonably assume that our second level is becoming increasingly important. In addition, we

have drawn on a variety of methodological sources, including surveys conducted at Chinese

universities by Chinese social scientists, individual interviews, reports in the openly circulated

Chinese media, restricted circulation (neibu) materials, and government documents to explore

the consistency presented in these varied accounts.

However, our primary data source is a survey carried out in 2001 with 106 returnees and

90 locally educated academics who had either never gone overseas or had gone overseas too

briefly to be considered a returnee (see below for our definition of “returnee”).1 This has been

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supplemented by individual interviews conducted overseas and in China. In evaluating whether

returnees possess “transnational capital”, we seek to determine “objectively” if these returnees

have greater capabilities than locally trained academics, whether they are making greater

contributions to China’s academic development than locally trained academics, and whether they

are indeed being rewarded more than people who did not go overseas. If they do have stronger

capabilities and are making greater contributions, then the greater rewards may be justifiable.

We also employ some data from an earlier survey carried out in 1997, which allows us to

compare those with foreign Ph.D.s and those with domestic Ph.D.s, who went overseas for post-

doctoral fellowships.

International Political Economy

The global political economy and external forces clearly played an enormous role in

pulling academics out of China. The relative value of an individual’s labor inside and outside

China pushed many students and teachers to try to get overseas.2 Moreover, for scientists within

universities, access to equipment in the West unavailable in China helped convince some people

to go overseas. Foreign assistance, such as World Bank loans in the 1980s (1983-86), paid for

many Chinese to go out to gain academic degrees, mostly Ph.D.s, and to learn how to work the

new equipment that was being imported into China through World Bank money.3 However,

while the equipment came into China, many individuals who went out never returned. Foreign

organizations and companies, quick to hire or support overseas mainlanders who had scientific

skills, also played a key role. Finally, in the aftermath of the Chinese government’s military

crackdown on the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in June 1989, over 60,000 mainlanders

received U.S. green cards while another 11,000 got Canadian residency, and eventually

citizenship that allowed them to stay overseas forever.

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Foreign institutions enthusiastically recruited Chinese graduate students, who in many

cases were critical cogs in the research work carried out in research universities in the United

States. Thus while many politicians in the U.S. wanted to cut off all academic exchanges with

China after Tiananmen, American universities were at the forefront in calling for a continuation

of student admission programs from China.4

Domestic Political Economy

Since the late 1990s, universities have become much more aggressive in encouraging

overseas scholars to return, with many offering very significant preferential policies. For

example, Xiamen University’s website offered returnees a salary supplement of 100,000 RMB,

research grants, two research assistants, a three-bedroom apartment and research equipment.

However, website enticements or proffered promises are not always honored in practice.

One professor returned to Shanghai based on a deal he had cut with the administration, only to

find that the Personnel Department was unwilling to give him the housing package that he had

been promised.5 After vacating his overseas post, he found it difficult to leave China again, so

he had to accept the lesser package. In addition, some universities or departments within

universities have shown a preference for hiring their own Ph.D.s, who they send abroad as post-

doctoral fellows. In this way, they can generate loyalty to their department, increasing the

likelihood that the faculty member will return. In what follows we will examine this cohort of

post-docs to see if they develop substantial amounts of transnational capital. Within some

universities, there appear to be significant battles, not only between returnees and locals, but

even among the returnees themselves. Indeed, such battles – and the “war stories” that have

been reported by interviewees – have further complicated our analysis. Clearly, these conflicts

have induced individuals – and even groups of scholars – to leave their university and move

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elsewhere, but we need to distinguish between conflicts based on personality and leadership style

and those more relevant to our analytical categories.

Government Strategy and Policy

The Chinese government has clearly played a role in encouraging people to study abroad.

However, once they were overseas they were not given sufficient support, thereby insuring that

the outflow turned into a “brain drain.” Various types of data show that overseas scholars, even

those who were “sent by the state” (guojia gongpai), relied more and more on foreign assistance,

rather than Chinese government monies. This is particularly true for scholars “sent by their unit”

(danwei gongpai), many of whom were university teachers. For example, a study conducted by

a research group in China found that over 80% of the funds used by “unit sent scholars” to

support themselves came from overseas sources, while only 17% came from their home unit.

Thus, while these universities may have kept a position open for these people even when they

were overseas, it is unlikely that the teachers felt an excessive sense of loyalty, and therefore

much responsibility to return to their original unit.

Indeed, this situation has been reported in Chinese journals targeted at the top leadership.

In an analysis intended for decision makers, entitled “China’s Grim Situation: Shortages and

Loss of Talent,” the author described what he called “the severe outflow of talent from brand-

name universities,” noting that interviewees at Beijing University (Beida) reported that graduates

from the physics department would commonly leave parting messages to each other, such as

“See you in the United States.” After providing statistical data on the outflow from various

departments at Beida, the author noted that “the secret of the success” enjoyed by American and

Japanese enterprises in taking away talent from Beijing, Qinghua and Fudan Universities “lies in

the large investments in scholarships.”6

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Such admonitions apparently have had an influence in reorienting government priorities.

In the past few years, the Ministry of Education has given as many as 12 leading universities

significant amounts of funding to turn themselves into more globally competitive universities.

One of the stipulations of these grants is that 20% of the funds must be used to enhance their

human capital, which means hiring people from overseas. This is part of a larger strategy to

create clusters of talent for the coming global competition. The well-known Changjiang

Scholars Program, supported by Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-hsing, is also associated with this

strategy.

Individual Economic Interest

Our final level of analysis is the individual returnee, in particular their economic interest.

According to Qian Ning, Chinese who go overseas are searching for the American Dream. They

need something substantial to draw them back, especially if they have been able to fulfill the

American Dream in the West.7 Here we ask a series of questions that can be addressed in a

formal survey. In effect, we are concerned with why individuals return and how they are treated

after their return, particularly in comparison with those of relatively equivalent academic

attainments who have not left. Are individuals returning because they have become more valued

inside China than overseas, measured by such indicators as higher salaries and better housing?

What factors determine the value of returnees? Do those who are considered more valuable –

measured objectively in terms of benefits provided by their units – receive more grants, have

more international linkages and more international projects, or attain more success in aiding

others to go abroad? Do they work in some specialized field, which is in short supply in China,

now commonly called a que men? Indeed, did individuals go abroad with the intention of

returning after improving the quality of their human capital? This would be in keeping with the

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scholarly literature, which suggests that the skills individuals seek overseas are ones that are

particularly useful in the country of origin.8

On the other hand, if they return in part because of their own failure to succeed abroad --

one director of a Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) institute said that returnees reflect the 50th

to 80th percentile of the Chinese talent overseas; in other words not the top 20% who prefer to

stay overseas where they have succeeded -- then many who return and may fall into the 50th and

60th percentile are not likely to have been that successful overseas or be any more successful at

home than talented people who did not go abroad.

The Survey

Methodology

A major debate revolves around the definition of “returnee.” Initially, back in the 1980s,

it was seen to be enough if someone had gone overseas for six months; for our study, the

minimum for labeling someone a “returnee” is that they had been overseas for a minimum of one

year, while today many see the “hai gui pai” (or “sea turtles”) as including only people who have

graduated overseas. In a recent detailed investigation of returnees at Beijing University who had

been given leadership posts, the authors clearly defined “returnees” as “students who have

obtained academic degrees abroad and in the Hong Kong and Macao regions, or who had already

obtained intermediate-level work titles before going abroad and then conducted a year or more of

advanced studies abroad.”9 This definition matches the one adopted in this paper.

In structuring our study, we wanted to have a control group of people who were similar

to our returnees in terms of age, academic quality, areas of expertise, and so forth, and whose

only major difference was that they had not been overseas. In this way, we could attribute any

differences between the two cohorts to the fact that the “locals” had not been overseas. However,

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we did face some slight problems in creating such a control group. First of all, the locals in our

survey are a little younger, with 13 (or 14.4% of the control group) being under the age of 30,

while none of our returnees were that young. Yet, this finding should not be surprising, as

people who went overseas for a degree will be older by necessity, while teachers in China who

may have a Master’s degree and stay on at the university may well be between the ages of 25

and 30 and can still be worthy scholars.

Second, in terms of where they got their highest degree, the control group contained a large

number of people with just a local undergraduate degree (42.2%), while only 19.3% of returnees

only had a local undergraduate degree. This latter number is surprisingly high, but some of the

returnees (18/104) had received their highest degree before 1980, suggesting that they were what

were in the late-1970s called the “gugan” or “core elements,” in that they had received their

undergraduate degree before the Cultural Revolution and so were the major group to go overseas

in the late-1970s and early-1980s.

The share of people in the two cohorts with a domestic M.A. was similar (30.3% vs.

34.4%), while both groups had relatively similar numbers of people with domestic Ph.D.s (22%

vs. 20%), a factor which increases the comparability of the two groups. The big difference was

that 9.2% of the returnees had overseas M.A.s, and a similar percentage had overseas Ph.D.s.

Thus, except for the large number of locals holding domestic undergraduate degrees, the two

cohorts were roughly similar.

In terms of the location of the schools, we interviewed in five cities – Changsha, Suzhou,

Nanjing, Guangzhou and Kunming – giving us a good geographic distribution. In these five

cities, we carried out interviews in seven universities, with 54% of our interviewees from

universities under the Ministry of Education, 43% under provincial bureaus of education, and

3.3% from a ministry-run school. In terms of distribution, the greatest weakness with our sample

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is that 30 of our returnees and 30 of our locals were all from Hunan University in Changsha,

which meant that almost one-third of the interviewees came from the same school.

Capabilities and Contributions

First we explore the question of whether the returnees made more significant

contributions to their universities. In this way, we address two key questions: first, did they

actually acquire transnational capital, which increased their value relative to those who did not

go overseas? Second, did they get “preferential treatment?” If the answer to the first question

was affirmative, then perhaps they deserved more rapid promotions, better housing and other

preferential policies and incentives that the universities gave them to return.

One of our first major differences is in language capabilities. Among returnees, 41.3%

described their foreign language ability as “very good,” while only 10% of locals did so. While

only 13.8% of returnees said that their language skill was just “so-so” (yi ban), 43.3% of locals

felt this way. The differences among those who chose “relatively good” (jiao hao) were less

striking. Therefore, to the extent that having good foreign language skills is important for

people’s careers in an internationalizing China, the returnees were better positioned to participate

in the global academic world.

Indeed, in the recent Beijing University survey of returnees who have been given

leadership posts cited above, the importance of knowledge of foreign languages is noted as the

first of four “outstanding advantages” that returnees possess. Such knowledge, it is suggested,

enables them to utilize foreign language materials, conduct direct exchanges with foreign

scholars, and inform themselves about the newest developments in academic circles abroad in a

timely and accurate manner.10

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One way to measure their relative contributions and capabilities is to look at their

publication records. If we look at their publication record in overseas journals, a sphere where

the returnees should clearly dominate, we find that after returning to China, 32% of returnees

had published articles overseas, with most of them publishing from 1-3 articles. Joint

publications with overseas scholars, including articles (21.1% versus 8.9%) and books (4.6% vs.

1.1%) (p<.04), show a similar pattern. Yet, 22.8% of the locals also reported publishing in

overseas journals (though we have no way to compare quality),11 which reflects the

internationalization of the academic community in China.12 But two-thirds of them had

published only 1-2 articles. Interestingly, only 9% of the returnees had published overseas before

leaving China, which suggests that their time overseas was quite helpful for their ability to

publish abroad.

In terms of publications in core domestic journals (zhongwen hexin qikan), locals do

publish more in these journals than returnees (table 1). This is unsurprising since such

publications should be their “bread and butter;” as academics, if they did not publish here, where

would they publish? Thus, 74.4% of all local academics reported publishing at least one article

in a core domestic journal. However, returnees are also transferring ideas and scholarship into

China, some of which must reflect knowledge gained overseas. Thus, 42% of the returnees

reported that since returning, they had published an article in an important (core) domestic

journal. But an analysis of publications in core domestic journals presents its own

methodological problems. According to interviewees, given the nature of Chinese academic

publishing, a publication in a “core” journal may not necessarily be a quality publication, since

not all core journals are of equal stature.13

Table 1. Key Differences Between Returnees and Locals* Returnees Locals (n=106) (n=90) % % Those recently receiving Provincial level research project 53.2 38.9 National level research project 43.1 27.8 Collaborative research project with industry 24.8 13.3 National Patents 10.1 2.2 Recently** published or accepted for publication in international journals 38.5 22.2 in key (hexin) domestic journals 24.8 47.4 Those presenting papers in international conferences held outside China 38.5 11.1 held in China 39.4 18.9 Those holding positions in national academic associations 45.0 24.4 Those supervising PhD students 94.4 44.9 Those teaching new graduate courses*** required courses 64.2 33.3 elective courses 51.4 23.3 Those holding administrative responsibility in the university 57.8 37.8 Those often reading foreign books and journals 61.5 31.1 Those maintaining strong international contacts (2 or more times/month) 40.4 17.8 Those helping colleagues and friends to go overseas 44.0 24.4 Those who succeeded in helping students to go overseas 60.6 23.3 Those who helped establish international collaboration projects 29.4 14.4 Those making arrangements for foreign scholars to conduct research in China 34.9 10.0 Those translating foreign materials 30.3 17.8 Those believing their foreign language skills were good or very good 86.3 48.9 Those who were very satisfied with their current housing 22.1 11.1 Those believing they were promoted quickly or very quickly in the past 5 years 23.9 10.0 Those believing they were able or very able to utilize their capabilities 64.2 47.8 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Note: * We report only findings that were statistically significant at the .05 level. **For returnees, we only counted publications which followed their return to China. ***For returnees, we only counted new courses which came after they returned to China. Source: Academic interviews in China, Spring 2001.

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Turning to their real research projects, the returnees far surpass the locals. In terms of their

success rate in gaining national-level projects, 20% of returnees had such projects while only

14.4% of locals did (table 1). In terms of cooperative projects with businesses (heng xiang),

where one would assume that the locals would dominate, 24.8% of returnees had made these

research links, while only 13.3% of locals had such ties. Of course, the most significant

difference was in international projects: 13.8% of returnees had established such international

projects. Although this may appear to be a smaller percentage than expected, it reflects the fact

that only 14.7% had gone overseas to get a degree, another 15.7% had gone out specifically to

participate in an international research project, and 52.8% had gone out as visiting scholars (jin

xiu); by contrast, only one local had established an international project.14

The findings from the Beijing University study cited above are highly congruent with our

results. From 1978-1997, returnees accounted for more than two-thirds of Beijing University’s

winners of national- and provincial-level awards for advances in the natural sciences, science

and technology, and inventions. Since the beginning of the Eighth Five Year Plan period (1991-

1995), returnees have presided over more than three-fourths of the 170 Social Sciences

Foundation projects.15 Even under the Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-1990), the 143 returnees at

the Electronics University of Science and Technology comprised only 15 percent of the faculty

but completed 41 percent of the total research projects. As of 1991, they had received 30 percent

of the national- and provincial-level awards received by the university.16

We also looked at their relative level of contribution to the university and their profession.

Returnees clearly have been given more responsibility within the universities, with 60% of locals

never having any administrative responsibility versus 27.5% of returnees (p>.00). In a previous

study, Chen and Zweig found that many of the “core” elements who went out in the early 1980s

became deans or vice-deans, while many who returned in the mid-1980s became department

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heads.17 Thus in this group, 3.7% held university or college level positions, 37.6% held

department level positions and 16.5% headed up teaching or research groups. However, the only

major difference between the returnees and locals is that many more returnees have held

positions as department heads (37.6% vs. 15.6%) (p>.00). We also find very striking differences

in their level of participation on academic boards at the national level.

While an argument could be made that such individuals were already prominent before

they went abroad – indeed, that might have been the reason why they were chosen to go –

confirmatory evidence from other sources, such as the Beijing University survey cited frequently

in this paper, suggests that their prominence clearly increased because they had returned from

abroad. The Beida study, in noting that returnees account for the great majority of leadership

posts at the university, attributes this to two main factors. First, the university attaches great

importance to these people and boldly promotes them to leadership posts. Second, decisions on

leadership posts are closely tied to the university’s strategic plan for building a first-rate world-

class university. International exchanges are seen as crucial to this strategy. More specifically,

the Beida study on leadership examined cadres at or above the deputy department (chu) level and

some important section (ke) level positions. Of the 476 leaders so identified, there were three at

the deputy ministerial level (fu buji), 5 bureau (ju) heads, 11 deputy bureau heads, 101

department heads, 205 deputy department heads, and 151 important section level heads.

Significantly, 337 of the 476 (71%) had experience studying abroad.18

Indeed, other surveys are congruent with these findings. For example, a survey of

returnees at a number of universities in Beijing conducted beginning in 1995 and examining

those who had returned in the 1980s and 1990s found, with regard to professional titles, that the

range of promotions for returnees had been “quite extensive.” They found that “before going

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abroad, 93 persons had senior professional titles whereas today 173 persons have senior

professional titles, an increase of 86%.”19

Finally, these two groups have made significantly different contributions to the academic

efforts of their universities and colleges, so they may deserve special treatment. First, we found

remarkably different levels of involvement in the supervising of graduate students. Over 94.4%

of returnees are graduate supervisors, while only 44.9% of locals supervise graduate students.

Even if the 13 locals who are under 30 years of age are removed from the sample, the differences

between the two groups are still statistically significant.20 It appears that returnees’ courses are

more likely to be “required,” as 17.4% of returnees are teaching required graduate courses versus

only 4.4% for locals. And they are teaching more graduate courses overall, including the elective

courses. Moreover, their transnational capital allows them to pass on international knowledge to

Chinese students. For example, the returnees are much more likely than locals to use the “fruits

of international exchanges” in their classes, with 56.9% using them a great deal (10.1%) or rather

often (jiao duo—46.8%), as compared to locals, who use them a great deal (6.7%) or rather often

(22.2%), for a total of 28.9%. Once again, the recent Beida survey confirms our findings. Of the

533 doctoral supervisors, 422 (around 80%) are returnees.21

International Linkages

A key aspect of transnational capital is derived from global linkages. Clearly, people

who went overseas should have much stronger international ties, but how much stronger are

those ties? As we saw above, returnees have much stronger foreign language skills, which

simplify the process of global exchanges. They also read a lot more foreign language materials,

with 62% of returnees reporting that they often read foreign journals versus 31% of locals. The

two main reasons that locals give for not reading many foreign language materials is that they do

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not have time (38.9%) and that they have weak foreign language skills (36.1%), while returnees

justify not reading many foreign language materials primarily because their units do not have

these materials (50.0%) or that they, too, do not have time (37.5%). Thus, while lack of access

to foreign language materials is the main factor holding back the continued development of the

returnees’ transnational capital, weak language skills and lack of time are the main problems for

locals.

Our returnees have international contacts much more frequently. Among returnees, 20%

have contacts at least once a week (5.6% have daily contact), while another 21.5% have contact

every other week. Compared to this total of 41% who have what we might call regular contact,

only 18% of locals have similar levels of contact. Most strikingly, however, if we look only at

the 80 locals who responded to this question and combine those who never had any foreign

contacts (32.1%), with people who have contacts less than once a year (23.4%), then 55.5% of

locals basically have no international contacts.22

What kind of transnational interactions do these two groups have? Do these interactions

strengthen their own value and their value to China? Returnees are much more likely to

facilitate the flow of foreign information, expertise and projects into China. Returnees are twice

as likely to provide links for international cooperation (29.4% vs. 14.4%), and three times as

likely to introduce foreigners to their unit (34.9% vs. 10.0%). They also are more likely to

translate foreign language materials (30.3% vs. 17.8%), which brings foreign ideas into China.

Returnees serve as bridges for people to go abroad. Almost half of our returnees report

that they had helped colleagues go abroad (44.0% vs. 24.4%) and 60% reported that they had

been successful in helping students go overseas (60.6% vs. 23.3%). On the other hand, 60% of

locals reported that they had never helped students get abroad. Removing the non-respondents,

two-thirds of locals have never tried to help any students go overseas, a rather shocking finding

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given the demand for overseas linkages by Chinese students, and the level of internationalization

of China’s education system. These findings also suggest that, given the continuing fever to go

abroad, local faculty members are unlikely to attract many students.

Indeed, returnees create an atmosphere that promotes growing abroad as essential to

one’s success. Based on in-depth interviews with over 100 students in eight universities across

China, Chen Shengluo noted the respect with which returnees, in contrast to locals, are treated on

campus. In an environment in which both the Chinese and the foreign media is viewed with

suspicion, returnees have become a trusted and crucial source of information on the outside

world. Students at Beida and Qinghua suggested that an important indicator of a person’s

ability was whether (s)he could study in the United States. As Chen quotes one of his Beida

interviewees: “As soon as I entered Beida I discovered that everyone, including teachers and

students, all said the same thing: Take the TOEFL exam and study in the U.S. Everyone has the

same idea, that the most outstanding students go to the U.S. I’ve never heard anyone say that the

most outstanding students remain at Beida.” A Qinghua interviewee noted: “As soon as I

entered Qinghua the talk of going abroad was like an outbreak of chicken pox (chu shuidou).

You simply couldn’t hide from it.”23

Finally, while the differences are not statistically significant, it is worth noting that in the

previous two years, 55% of our returnees had not gone overseas at all; however, 36.5% of them

had gone abroad in this period, suggesting a fairly vibrant flow of transnational exchanges. In

fact, 22.2% of locals had also gone overseas in the past two years. Indeed, as we shall suggest

in our conclusion, based on data from Beida and elsewhere, it appears that returnees have, in a

real sense, “won” and that locals also recognize the necessity of going abroad as a prerequisite to

compete for leading academic positions and research grants at home.

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Rewards, Recognition, and Problems

We have documented fairly clearly that the returnees have acquired transnational capital

and, because of it, have been making more contributions to their universities than those who

have not been overseas. Moreover, while those contributions may be based on their ability to

expand the universities’ global linkages, we can also see such contributions in terms of graduate

teaching, administrative posts, publications and research. But have they been rewarded for their

greater contributions? During earlier periods, based on press reports and interviews, one might

have hypothesized that jealousy among colleagues and narrow mindedness among university

administrators might serve as institutional blocks to the natural workings of the marketplace

which should reward the greater contributions and higher value of the human capital

encapsulated in the returnees. In fact, universities in general, with their tenure and hierarchical

systems, limited job mobility, and the very political nature of personnel decisions within

universities may not be very responsive to market forces.

In evaluating the rewards given to returnees and locals, we wanted to differentiate

between subjective views of the two groups and more objective measures. If market forces are at

work, and even more, if university administrators have tried to lure overseas scholars through

various preferential policies, then we might find a significant difference between these

“objective measures” and subjective perspectives.

Our best opportunity to look at this issue was in terms of the key question of housing. In

our survey, most locals reported living in 2-bedroom (31.1%) or 3-bedroom (42.2%) flats, with

another 17.8% living in 4-bedroom units. On the other hand, almost half of the returnees

(48.6%) lived in 3-bedroom flats, with another 33.9% living in 4-bedroom flats. Only 14.7% of

returnees lived in 2-bedroom units. Yet when asked to evaluate the differences in the housing

conditions of the two groups, returnees downplayed their better conditions. Thus, 68.8% of

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returnees saw their housing and that of the locals as “about the same” (cha bu duo) and only

1.8% saw it as much better; 25.7% saw it as “a little better” (hao yi xie). However, the locals’

evaluation seems much more on target with 14.4% seeing returnees living in much better

housing, 54.4% seeing them living in “a little better” housing, and 27.8% seeing it as “about the

same.” Given the fact that fewer than 18% of locals lived in 4-bedroom flats, their evaluation

does seem more appropriate.

We can also look at the objective and subjective situation in terms of research funding.

As pointed out above, 20% of returnees got national level grants while only 14% of locals did so.

Similarly, 24.8% of returnees had cooperative projects with businesses, while only 13.3% of

locals had such ties. And while 13.8% of returnees had international projects, only one local had

an international project. However, in terms of their subjective evaluation, 18.9% of locals

believed that returnees got much more research funding than locals, while only 2.8% of returnees

believed this to be the case. And while 45% of returnees believed that they had received the

same amount of money as locals, only 15.6% of locals felt that way (p.<.00).

Similarly, in their responses to purely subjective questions, returnees wanted to assert that

they had received only slightly better treatment than the locals, while the locals saw returnees as

having received significantly better conditions or treatment. For example, in terms of promotions,

18.9% of locals believed that returnees were promoted much more quickly than locals, while

only 1.8% of returnees held that view. While 45.9% of returnees believed that the pace of

promotion of returnees was about the same as locals, only 13.3% of locals felt this way (p.<.00).

We also asked them to evaluate the treatment the returnees received from their unit’s leaders.

Among locals who responded to the question – 18% of them did not respond – 32.4% believed

that their unit’s leadership “enthusiastically welcomed” the returnees, while only 13.3% of

returnees felt such an enthusiastic welcome. And while 25.7% of returnees believed that their

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unit’s leaders made no distinction between the two groups, only 12.1% of locals felt that way.

Even more striking is that in response to a question about how the state treats the returnees, over

31% of the returnees did not see the state giving them special treatment, while only 10.5% of the

locals did not see the state favoring returnees. Clearly, there is a wide disparity in how these two

groups evaluate the response of the government and China’s formal institutions to the returnees,

with the locals feeling quite disadvantaged. Finally, in terms of “the fruits of their work”

(gongzuo chengguo), returnees were more likely to believe that they have been more productive.

For example, relative to the locals, 6.4% of returnees saw the fruits of their work as “very much

more” (duo de duo), 71.6% saw the fruits of their work as “somewhat more,” and 18.3% saw

their output as “about the same” (cha bu duo). Interestingly, locals did recognize that returnees

were more productive than the locals in their unit, but the evaluation of the size of that gap

differed. Thus, when evaluating the fruits of the returnees’ work versus the locals, only 2.2% of

locals selected “very much more,” 51.1% picked “somewhat more,” but 35.6% felt that the

results were “about the same.” (p.<.004).

Returnees and locals cited the same obstacles in their work. The most important

problems were funding, equipment, lack of information flow, inflexible management, and the

difficulty of managing interpersonal relations. These problems are repeatedly cited in Chinese

media and in other surveys. In the survey of returnees at several Beijing universities cited above,

there were three major areas of dissatisfaction: (1) shortage of research funds, insufficient

subsidization, and narrow range of beneficiaries; (2) low wages and benefits, and poor

conditions; and (3) shortage of housing. The shortage of research funds was the source of the

greatest dissatisfaction for virtually every returnee, although satisfaction levels varied from

school to school.24 The Beida survey on leadership noted two specific problems returnees faced

that set them apart from the locals. First, owing to the relative simplicity of interpersonal

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relationships abroad, returnees were not very skilled at handling such relationships after

returning to China. Second, returnees was often seen as a threat by persons in the same work

unit who had not studied abroad, so there was a certain attitude of rejection and jealousy.25 In

our survey as well, returnees more often selected “difficulty of managing interpersonal relations”

than locals. A overseas scholar with a joint appointment at the University of Toronto and Beida

interviewed by Zweig in Toronto expressed similar problems.

Some reports from internal publications, particularly in the mid-1990s, went further, and

explain why government policy shifted toward rewarding returnees by the late-1990s. One

report noted that “people often refer to those who go for studies abroad as ‘gold-diggers’.”

Moreover, in a scathing rebuke of local academics, the report criticized not only the damage

done to Chinese education and research by successive political movements of the past, but also

the damage resulting from the new commodity economy. One section is worth citing in some

detail:

Today, the mentor system (daoshi zhi) in postgraduate education in China

has become a mere formality, and the students hardly ever see their mentors.

Nor is much of anything new presented in classrooms, so the students get a

feeling of being deceived. Hence, education of postgraduates and doctoral

candidates in China has lost its attraction for college students who have

ambitions to engage in scientific research. A teacher in Beijing University’s

personnel department put it bluntly: ‘Foreign-trained Ph.D.s are different

from locally trained Ph.D.s, and that’s a fact. Ph.D.s who come back from

studies abroad are able to teach three or four different subjects and teach

them very well. But locally trained Ph.D.s are, in general, only capable of

lecturing on the little that figured in their graduation thesis, and not very

creatively at that.’ The backwardness of China’s research standards as

compared with those in the developed Western countries will see no

fundamental change in the short term, nor will the ‘going-abroad-fever’

abate in the immediate future.26

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Comparative perceptions of why people return

One important question that can get to the heart of the disagreements between returnees

and locals is why they think people returned. Here the systemic level of analysis plays into the

discussion. Overall, locals see reasons external to China as the force driving people back, in

particular the inability of the overseas scholars to find development opportunities overseas. Thus,

in the eyes of 19% of locals, failure to succeed overseas has brought returnees back, even though

a systemic approach could see this as reflecting a contracting market in the U.S. and Canada, that

is, a shift in the global political economy. Still, only 5.5% of returnees selected this as a reason

for returning. Second, locals emphasize the government’s policy, which reflects their resentment

at the preferential policies meted out to returnees, who they generally think failed overseas.

Finally, for their second choice, many locals (29.1%) believe that returnees are coming back

because of higher social status in China, reflecting a view that returnees get undue privileges.

On the other hand, returnees focus on domestic factors, such as the fact that they can do

their own thing in China (31.2% vs. 12.2%), and their higher social status in China (13.8%

among first choices). They do, however, see one external factor at work: their difficulty in

entering mainstream society overseas (13.8%), a factor beyond their own capabilities to manage.

Thus, either they are pulled back by opportunities to utilize their increased human capital, a

response that is well in line with the “brain gain” literature, or they are driven back by a glass

ceiling that does not recognize their enhanced human capital. Interestingly, when we asked

those who were overseas in 1993 why they thought people would leave the United States, racism

was a common explanation.

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Testing the Rent-Seeking Hypothesis: The “Que Men” or Shortage Phenomenon

A key hypothesis underlying our study is that people return to China because they believe

that there are greater returns to their human capital in China because of the value added that they

gained overseas, and because the technology that they mastered is in short supply in China.

While such opportunities bring high profits in the marketplace, it may be harder to evaluate this

within a more academic setting. Yet research scientists did put forward the idea of the “que

men” or field in which there is a shortage, arguing that those people who go overseas for a Ph.D.

often look for a research or thesis topic which is in short supply in China.

We can look at this data in several ways. First, how many people who returned were

working in a field that was in short supply in China? Of all returnees, 19.3% reported that the

domestic supply of human talent in their field was extremely short (feichang jinque), while

another 46.8% reported that the domestic supply in their field was relatively short (bijiao jinque).

Second, when we look at the comparative responses of returnees and locals, we see that

returnees are twice as likely to be working in fields that are in very short supply in China (19.3%

vs. 8.9%), which suggests either that they were able to go overseas because they were working in

a valuable field, or more likely, that that they learned something overseas that was in short

supply in China.27 In support of the second conclusion, our data show that when we asked

returnees if what they studied overseas affected their decision to return, 24.1% of those who

answered that question said that their field of specialization had a “very big” influence on their

decision to return, while another 41.8% said that it had a “relatively important” influence. Thus

the transnational capital they acquired overseas, and which made them more valuable, helped

bring them home.

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The Fever to Return

As with many of the popular responses to internationalization in China, a “fever” to

return has emerged. According to Schelling, fevers are the collective or macro-level outcome of

individual micro-level actions that result from the anticipated action of everyone else.28 Thus, if

many people believe that others are reacting to a limited opportunity, or that those who engage in

a certain activity are likely to benefit but that the opportunity to participate or the benefits of

participation are limited, a fever may emerge. Hu Angang also attributes fevers to the fact that

the government often creates economic opportunities in China, but then closes down those

opportunities when demand exceeds supply.29

Today, many people overseas are concerned that the opportunities to return and the good

positions could dry up.30 The government is investing heavily in creating new academic posts,

but people overseas fear that there will be a limit to those opportunities. If true, then they might

never be able to get back to China and could remain stuck overseas. An informant from a

mediocre university in New Zealand had gone back to China in spring 2003 to see if there were

any good opportunities. He spoke about feeling great psychological pressure to return to China

soon, or else it would be too late. Indeed, this pressure had been felt even earlier. One

interviewee who had returned to China from Japan in 1996 told a reporter that he “must return to

China to establish my own position. If I wait any longer, the opportunity will be gone.”31 This

problem may be particularly acute in academia, and less so in business, as the number of

academic posts is limited by institutional arrangements. Unlike businessmen, academics cannot

simply decide to come back and open a company—they need a position in an academic

institution. Moreover, people who are looking to return, particularly if they already have a post

overseas, want good “platforms,” such as associate director or director of a research program,

which are in short supply, so as these positions emerge there is a surge of demand. Finally,

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many returnees want to negotiate a position as a full professor, the number of which is severely

limited.

Conclusion

The results of our survey enable us to answer some, if not all, of the questions we posed

at the outset of this paper. For example, on most of categories we explored, returnees were

treated better than locals. This fact confirms the institutional level of analysis, as universities

adopted important preferential policies, such as in housing. However, the improved treatment of

returnees in recent years cannot be separated from important changes in government policy. The

commitment to establish a small number of “first class” (yiliu) universities able to match their

foreign counterparts has improved the status of returnees. In December 1998, the Ministry of

Education and 63 Chinese universities jointly published a series of advertisements in the

overseas editions of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) and Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily)

offering employment for 148 specially appointed professors, known as “100,000-yuan

professors.” The universities were told to provide suitable research benefits to those so chosen.

The professed intention was to attract scholars remaining abroad and demonstrate that China was

welcoming those who contemplated a return, and the effusive press reports duly noted that the

group of 148 to be named in March 1999 would “receive the highest salaries ever given since

New China was founded.”32 Indeed, the Ministry of Education has appropriated special funds

ranging from 600 million to 1.8 billion yuan to Beijing University, Qinghua University, Fudan

University, Nanjing University, and Shanghai Jiaotong University with the primary aim of

raising the salaries of their teaching staffs and becoming “world class”. As the number of

returnees began to increase, with leading universities now flush with new funds competing “to

attract high-level talent back to China ‘by hook or by crook’ and regardless of the price,” the

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Chinese media, reflecting the discourse on Chinese campuses, began to debate the positive and

negative effects of these new policies.33

But governmental policy had more than one prong. On May 14, 2001 a major document

was jointly issued by five ministries to encourage students who had gone overseas to “serve

China.”34 Demonstrating the government’s increasingly flexible policy, the document

enumerated how students who are green card or even foreign passport holders could return to

China and receive the same benefits as local Chinese in terms of job prospects, housing

purchases, and schooling for their children. By coordinating the initiatives and policy

implementation from the various ministries involved with overseas study and re-integrating

returnees, the document also sought to ensure those who did return that they would not face the

same frustrating difficulties of re-integration reported by earlier returnees and widely discussed

in the internal media.35 Significantly, the document offered the freedom to come and go, even

assuring those remaining abroad that they could also serve the country in important ways.

Such governmental initiatives have contributed to the comfort level of returnees, who are

now much less concerned about arbitrary policy changes. They also have created new and

appealing lifestyle “models.” One increasingly popular pattern, for those who can manage it, is

the so-called “dumbbell model” (yaling moshi), in which overseas scholars have invested in

China and also keep a residence abroad, frequently traveling back and forth. Discussions in the

Chinese press have noted how WTO entrance will further enhance this model, by making it

easier to travel to the U.S. While the authorities hope this will further enable returnees to make

use of their extensive connections abroad and attract funds there, these scholars are also

encouraged to bring their research results back to China and apply for funds domestically. One

article enumerated the advantages of the dumbbell model in appealing to overseas scholars to

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return, noting that “returning to China [under these new flexible conditions] does not really

require a reason”.36

Finally, at the individual level, people who return have strong personal and economic

reasons to do so. They get greater access to research grants and projects than those who did not

go abroad. People know that they possess knowledge that is not available in China, increasing

the value of their transnational capital. Therefore, they assert, they have returned to China

because of the enormous opportunities that China’s academic institutions offer to them.

In a real sense, the battle is over and the returnees have “won”. This can be documented

in several ways. First, the leading universities, with Beida in the forefront, have put returnees in

charge. To succeed at Beida, an academic must go abroad; every year, just for advanced studies

lasting more than a year, Beida sends out 25-30 people. The Beida “model” of administrative

and academic reform, which greatly favors returnees, has become so prominent and cutting edge

that it has been widely reported in extensive cover stories in the most popular Chinese

magazines.37 Despite extensive criticism within Beida and the dilution of its most controversial

aspects, interviewees in China – as well as reports in the Chinese media – suggest that the Beida

approach will, over time, be widely emulated, leaving returnees in the dominant position within

Chinese academic institutions.

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Appendix 5.1 Sources of Informants for Academic Survey Returnees Locals Hunan University 30 30 South China University of Agriculture 7 14 Nanjing University 11 10 Nanjing Aeronautical University 17 0 Suzhou University 12 6 Yunnan University 22 20 Zhongshan University 7 10 _______ _____ Total 106 90 Notes: 1 Funding for this research was provided by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Research assistance was provided by Lou Shaoling and Gao Yanling. Data analysis was done by Dr. Chung Siu Fung. 2 See David Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), chapter 4. 3 Ruth Hayhoe, China's Universities and the Open Door (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989). 4 The analysis presented in this overview is of necessity simplified. For example, the global economy has also played an important role in bringing people back to China. One example would be the dot.com boom in the late 1990s, which had a complex effect in both pulling people back to China and stimulating their desire to go abroad. In addition, Hong Kong, while a special administrative region within China, has been an important source of returnees. A significant number of academics in Hong Kong have been considering returning to China, but only if they can find the right “platform.” See David Zweig, “’Parking on the Doorstep?:’ Mainland Professionals in Hong Kong,” presented at the conference on “New Directions in Chinese Foreign Policy: A Conference in Honor of Allen S. Whiting,” Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, 7-8 November 2002. 5 Zweig interview, 2002. 6 Lingdao juece xinxi [Information for Leadership Decision Making], No. 16, 1999, 21. 7 See Qian Ning, Chinese Students Encounter America (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002). The original Chinese version was completed in 1995. There have been many books published in China warning against the seductiveness of the American dream for unwary Chinese. For example, see Dong Dingshan, Meiguo meng de ling yimian [Another Side to the American Dream] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshu guan, 2000). 8 George J. Borjas and Bernt Bratsberg, “Who Leaves: The Outmigration of the Foreign-born,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 78, no. 1 (1996), 165-76. 9 Topic Group for the ‘Study Concerning Beijing University Returnees Assuming Leadership Posts,’ “Study on Beijing University Returnees Assuming Leadership Posts,” Chuguo liuxue gongzuo yanjiu [Research on Overseas Studies Work] No. 3, 2002, 7-22, at 8. For a translation, see “Brain Drain and Brain Gain (V),” Chinese Education and Society, ed. Stanley Rosen, Vol. 37, No. 2, March-April 2004, 34-60. 10 “Study on Beijing University Returnees,” op. cit., 10.

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11 It has been difficult to determine the number of publications in overseas “refereed journals.” 12 Michael Agelasto and Bob Adamson, eds., Higher Education in Post-Mao China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998). 13 The concept of a “core” domestic journal remains controversial in China. Under recent reforms in higher education, promotion is based on publications in core journals. In social science, for example, core journals are subdivided into “A,” “B,” and “C” categories. For example, while the flagship journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) – Zhongguo shehui kexue (Social Sciences in China) – is the only Academy journal ranked “A,” the major journal from each of the Academy institutes is given a “B” ranking. However, as is widely known in China, the quality of these “B”-level journals varies enormously. Thus, while the Institute of Sociology’s Shehui kexue yanjiu (Sociological Research) is considered very strong, the journal of the Institute of Political Science – Zhengzhixue yanjiu – is far weaker, presumably because of the differential development of these two disciplines in China. In addition, again according to interviewees, the importance of “guanxi” (relationships) in getting published, the lack of an effective blind peer review system, and other factors also raise questions about the quality of at least some of the articles in the core journals, particularly, but by no means limited to, those with a “C” ranking. Finally, some of the best and most widely read recent journals are not considered “core” publications. Arguably, in China’s still evolving academic maturation, these more traditional factors would benefit the locals, given their networks in China. 14 Clearly, there must be a definitional problem here, since only 13.8% said that they had established international projects, yet 15.7% reported going overseas to work on a joint (international?) project. Perhaps some of those who went out on joint prospects were not the same people who had established the project. 15 “Study on Beijing University Returnees,” op. cit., 11. 16 Interviews by Chen Changgui and David Zweig, spring 1992, Chengdu. The cohort interviewed in 1997 shows similar results, with 56% of long-term sojourners having received national-level projects after returning compared to only 34% of people who had been overseas for less than two years. Similarly, 61.7% of long-term sojourners got provincial grants vs. 46% of short-term sojourners. 17 Chen Changgui and David Zweig (Cui Dawei), "Dui wai kai feng yu Zhongguo daxue" (China's Open Policy and Chinese Universities), Gaodeng jiaoyu yanjiu (Journal of Higher Education), vol. 77, no. 1 (1998): 50-56, reprinted in Xinhua wenzai, no. 4 (1998): 158-162, and People's University Journal Reproduction Materials (Fuyin baokan ziliao), Gaodeng jiaoyu (Higher Education) G4, May 1998, 36-42. 18 “Study on Beijing University Returnees,” op. cit., 11-17. 19 Wang Ruiyin et al, “An Investigation into and Analysis of the Circumstances of Returned Overseas Students at a Number of Institutes of Higher Education in Beijing Municipality,” Chuguo liuxue gongzuo yanjiu [Research on Overseas Studies Work] No. 2, 1997, 14-16. The survey included Beijing Polytechnic University, The Beijing Foreign Languages University, the Capital Normal University, the China University of Politics and Jurisprudence, Qinghua University, and the Northern University of Communications. Of the 400 questionnaires sent out, 290 (72.5%) were retrieved. 20 One of the sharpest critiques of the favoritism given to returnees is over the issue of being a graduate student supervisor. One article complained that under the current system, returnees who received a Ph.D. overseas, but may never have trained anyone while overseas, suddenly are awarded the right to train graduate students, while locals who may hold an M.A. degree and have

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been training graduate students for many years, suddenly lose that status to returnees. Being appointed to train graduate students brings many financial and status advantages, including the right to establish a Ph.D. center which can receive money from the government. For such a criticism, see “Zhaolai nuxu qizou erzi—tu yang boshi man hua ‘tu’ yang” [Gaining a son-in-law only to have the son walk off in anger—Casual Comments about Domestic and Foreign Ph.D.s], http://www.wenxuecity.com, 2/28/02. Thanks to Dr. Wei Liang for finding this article. 21 “Study on Beijing University Returnees,” op. cit., 11. 22 Compared to the scientists and business people whom we interviewed, our returnee academics interacted with people overseas less frequently. 23 Chen Shengluo, “The Two Americas: Views of America by Chinese University Students,” Qingnian yanjiu [Youth Studies] No. 6, June 2002, 1-8, with the quotes from p. 5. This is an edited version of a longer study. For additional details on Chen’s findings, see Stanley Rosen, “Chinese Media and Youth: Attitudes toward Nationalism and Internationalism,” in National and Global: Chinese Media Discourses, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 97-118. 24 Wang Ruiyin et al, “An Investigation…,” op. cit. 25 “Study on Beijing University Returnees,” op. cit., 20. Interviews by Zweig in Toronto with an academic holding positions in China and Toronto showed similar problems. 26 Li Nianqing, “Why It Is Hard for the ‘Going-Abroad-Fever’ to Cool Down,” Gaige neican [Internal Reference Materials on Reform] No. 4, 1997, 18-21. 27 If we drop those who did not respond from our analysis, the Chi square was significant at the .02 level, suggesting that the difference between these two cohorts was not simply random. Or, if we treat these non-responses as “having no opinion” and put them in the middle of the scale, the findings are also significant at the .02 level. 28 Thomas C. Schelling, Micro-Motives and Macro-Behavior (New York: W.W. Norton, and Company, 1978). 29 Hu Angang, “Why China’s Economy Consistently Experiences Wide Fluctuation,” Gaige neican (Internal Reference Materials on Reform), no. 15 (August 5, 1995): 6-9, in Chinese Economic Studies, vol. 29, no. 3 May-June 1996, 59-64. 30 Academic officials in Qinghua University suggest that the number of top posts in key universities is unlikely to dry up quickly, so there is no need for a “fever.” However, people overseas seem to disagree. 31 Fang Yi, “Ten Ph.D.s on their Motives for Returning to China,” Zhongguo qingnian yanjiu [China Youth Study] No. 2, 1997, 4-7. 32 Yang Gu, “Ph.D.s Who Have Studied Abroad Vie for Jobs,” Beijing qingnian bao [Beijing Youth Daily], January 10, 1999, 1, 3. 33 “High-Salaried and Specially Engaged Professor, How Much Money Are You Worth?” Daxue sheng [China Campus] No. 12, December 2000, 14-15. See also Li Hujun, “A Million-Yuan Annual Salary for Professors: Is It Worthwhile After All?” Nanfang zhoumo [Southern Weekend], June 13, 2002, 21. These articles are translated in “Brain Drain and Brain Gain (V),” ed. Stanley Rosen, op. cit., 88-101. 34 Renfa No. 49, 2001, entitled “A Number of Opinions on Encouraging Overseas Students to Provide China with Many Different Forms of Service”. For a translation, see “Brain Drain and Brain Gain (III),” Chinese Education and Society, ed. Stanley Rosen, Vol. 36, No. 2, March-April 2003, 6-11.

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35 For an example of such problems, see Li Nianqing, “Going Abroad Is Hard, and So Is Coming Back After Completing One’s Studies,” Gaige neican [Internal Reference Materials on Reform] No. 5, 1997, 28-31. 36 Zhang Guoqing, “Study Abroad, Study Abroad!” Zhongguo daxuesheng [China Campus] No. 1, January 2002, 30-31. 37 Among many examples, see Sanlian shenghuo zhoukan [Sanlian Life Weekly] No. 28, July 14, 2003, 22-31; Liaowang xinwen zhoukan [Outlook Weekly] No. 51, December 23, 2002, 14-23 (which discusses the efforts of Beida and Qinghua to become world-class universities); and Nanfang zhoumo [Southern Weekend], July 10, 2003, 1-3.