CHAPTER- 3

THE NATURE OF PURU$A IN MIMAMSA

In this chapter we shall exclusively discuss Mimamsa philosophy with special

reference to the nature of puru~a. In Indian tradition, it is this school which

gives a detailed account of moral deeds and moral actions. It is said to be a

sovereignty of ethical law. 1 "The Mimamsa is a philosophy of active life and

teaches the indispensability and inescapability of ethical action, as ethical action

is the supreme governing force of the universe. The basic concepts of such a

philosophy are, first, the agent of ethical action must be real; second, action

itself must be real; third, it must be the controlling and guiding force of the

universe and fourd1, the universe as the field of action has to be real. The

Mimamsa expounds and attempts to defend four of these. "2

In the Mimamsa system, emphasis on duty and activism is justified for two

reasons. "first, the sunyavada (nihilism) of the Buddhist philosophy and the

extreme asceticism of the Jaina system endangered the social development of

human life; second, the over emphasize on the speculative aspect of Vedic

philosophy, which had resulted in giving preference to knowledge of the self

(atma-vidya) or the unmanifested cause of the manifested universe, has led to

the neglect of the scientific interpretation of the Vedic terms as enjoined in the

2

P.T. Raju, Structural Depths of Indian Thought, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 40-77.

Ibid., p. 41.

79

braluna7Ja-s. . .... This system tries to counter balance the extremist views of the

heterodox schools of Buddhism and Jainism. It also tries to compensate for the

negligence of the orthodox system towards the ritualistic and the activistic

aspect of the Vedic thought. "3

J aimini was the first composer of Mimarilsasutra and Sahara was the first

commentator on his work. Later on, Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara

popularized and developed this philosophy, albeit in their different styles and

distinct views. After them, it was Murari Misra and many more who interpreted

this work though they did not agree with each other on several issues. The four

major questions which come under the perspective of the nature of puru$a and

are dealt with by the Mimamsa, are as follows:

(i) dharma;

(ii) action and its relation to dlwrma;

(iii) the subject matter of the Vedas with special reference to the idea of

dharma; and

(iv) the method of interpretation of the Vedas with illustrations by means .of

which one can understand them, discussed at length by this school.

This system is the longest of all with two thousand seven hundred sutra-s

arranged in twelve chapters, each of which has eight parts consisting of four

3 I.C. Sharma, Ethical Philosophies of India, Johnsen Publishing Company, Britain, 1991, pp. 215-217.

80

parts each with the exception of three. 4 Each part of a chapter deals with

different aspects of the four questions which constitute the subject matter of this

system.

The central theme of Mimari1sa is the adoption of dharma as enjoined in Vedas.

It is dharma that controls the universe and produces for the agent of action what

he desires and what his action deserves. It is the governing ethical force of the

universe. The sutra begins with the enquiry into dharma, 5 i.e. What is the

nature of dharnw?, what are the means to knowledge of dharma? To both these

queries, the sutra says that dharma is indicated by means of the Vedas as

conducive to the highest good· It does not stand for merit only. It helps ·in

achieving the goal and leads to success in this as well as life beyond. Dhanna in

itself is self-sufficient and infallible. The only source of dharma is vidhi-s

(Vedic injunctions).

THE NATURE OF PURU$A

All the inquiries related to dharma are concerned with puru$a, an empirical

moral agent. So, it is important to know the nature of this agent. As stated in

the earlier chapter, Mimamsa philosophy is quite similar to that of Nyaya-

Vaise~ikas with regard to the nature of puru$a. Puru$a consists of sarlra

4

5

K.T. Pandurangi, Purvamimamsa from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, Vol. II, Part 6, Center for Studies in Civilizations, 2006, p. xxv.

Atlulto dharmajijfiiisa. Mlmtililsastitra, 1 . 1.1 .

81

(physical body), indriya-s (sense-organs), manas (mind), jfitma (consciousness)

and atma (soul). Each of these perform different functions and partake in

performing action. Apart from these constituents, the role of apfirva, i.e. an

unseen force generated by the past acts of dharma and adharma, (virtue ai1d

vice) is very important. Sartra is the product of elements as prt!zvi etc. It is

limited, unconscious, inactive and thus perishable.

lndriya-s, like sartra are also perishable. They are the instruments for the

cognition of external objects. They are unconscious instruments of the atman.

Five indriya-s are derived from five elements. Manas is also considered as an

indriya but it is an internal organ which perceives the apprehensions of the

indriya-s about external objects and also the qualities of the atman like cognition

·and even pleasure and pain etc. It assists the cognition of the external objects

through the external sense organs. Unlike Nyaya-Vaise$ika, Mimamsa holds

that manas is not a!JU (atomic). It is also not quick in motion. Indeed, it is vibhu

(all pervasive) and aspandan (motionless). It is neither a cause nor an effect.

Though it is all pervading but limited by the sartra. Manas, according to

Kumarila, is an unconscious instrument of atman and atman is controller of the

manas. It is all pervasive because it can not be touched and produced by any

.other object. It is pervasive like space and time but functions within the sartra

only. Prabhakara does not agree with Kumarila regarding manas. He holds that

manas is a!JU and quick in motion. According to him, manas is an internal

82

organ of the titman. It supervises the functions of the external indriya-s. It is

eternal and in contact with titman on account of merit and demerit.

Mimarilsa accepts without reserve the doctrine of the existence of the self or

atman. 6 Amza, according to them is puru~a which is distinct from sarlra,

-indriya-s and manas. It is nitya (permanent reality) and atmajyoti~z (self­

illuminated). The titman is distinct from sarlra because :

1. "Activities like breathing, winking etc. do not belong to the body. These

are not found after the death even though the body is found. Therefore,

these are the attributes of some other entity that is distinct from the body.

2. Joy, sorrow etc., are cognized by oneself not by others. The bodily

attributes are perceived by others, but these are not perceived by others.

Hence, these belong to atman.

3. By the desire also atman can be inferred. A person desires something that

is already known to him. Therefore, the knower and desirer should be

one and the same. This means there is a permanent titman. This argument

is intended to refute the view that the vijfiiina, that is momentary, can

serve the purpose of the cognizer. The cognizer has to be enduring.

4. By memory and recognition also a permanent titman can be inferred.

6

These arise only in the case of the objects that are already known and to

the same agent who knew. This proves an enduring agent.

Mimti.nisasti.tra, pp.18-24; Slokavartika, pp. 689-728.

83

5. The expenence as ahmn, i.e. 'I' establishes the atman. The atman Is

capable of knowing itself, i.e. svasarizvedya.

6. The initiative to continue the work that was done half way is an earlier

day on the next day also indicates an enduring self. "7

The Purvamimarilsa concept of atman is broadly similar to that of Nyaya-Vaise$

ikas. However, Bhaga differs from them on the concept of at man.

He discusses atman under Atmavada in Slokavartika. Atman is nitya (eternal),

vibhu (all pervading), distinct from sarlra, indriya-s and manas. It takes different

sarlra-s in different births and transmigrates from one sarlra to anqther and

serves as the agent and enjoyer. 8 When it is said that he is an agent, it is not

meant that he himself actually performs the actions. Whatever activities are

performed by his sarlra and indriya-s, he initiates them. The sarlra and indriya-s

can not perform any activities on their own. Atman has to initiate them. That is

why, he is an agent. lfiiina, suklw-duf:zkha, iccha, prayatna, raga, dve~a,

smhsktira, dharma and adharrna are the modifications of the atman but not

eternal like atma. These modifications do not take place in the state of deep sleep.

Prabhakara differs from Bhaga on two points. One, he does not admit of any

change or modification of atman when cognition arises. Two, he holds that the

7

8

K.T. Pandurangi, 'Metaphysics and Ontology of Purvamimamsa' in Parvamlmiinl.sa from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, Vol.II, Part 6. (ed.) K.T. Pandurangi, Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2006, p. 115.

Slokavartika, Ratnabharti Series-3, 73.

84

atman is not cognized as an object of cognition as 'aharh', or 'I'. The atman

always reflects as an agent in the cognition and never as an object. One and the

same cannot be both subject and the object. All cognitions consists of a knower,

an object and knowledge. The cognition of these three together is called sanivit

in the Prabhakara tradition. The sarhvit is self-revealing while atman and the

object are not self-revealing. He argues that if atman is considered as self-

revealing, then, one will have to have the ·cognition of atman even during deep

sleep.

In all, the entire unit, i.e. sarlra, indriya-s, manas and atman is calledjlvdtman,

who is an empirical moral agent. This agent has been given the important

position in Mlmarilsa system. He is supposed to perform his actions according

to Vedic injunctions. In case of any difficulty in understanding, authen~ic

interpreters should be consulted. These authentic interpreters are neither gods

nor God. They are those empirical moral agents who follow the rules of

interpretation.* Thus, empirical puru$a is self-contained as far as the following

of dharma is concerned. He carries out the details of the prescribed acts.

Empirical puru$a is entitled to perform sacrifices also. He is responsible for his

status and final goal. Quite often he is attracted towards complexities which

(These rules of interpretation are laid down by Jaimini in his sutra-s which are to be adopted to find out the real meaning of the provisions, including the clauses or words incorporated therein, having due regard to the object and purpose of the provision, whenever it is necessary. But later on, Maxwell's principles of interpretation are used.)

85

bring to him sufferings. Vedic injunctions help him in resolving these

complexities. Hence, puru~a should act according to Vedic injunctions.

JAGAT AND PURU$A

According to Mimihilsa, jagat is nitya. The system believes in the dynamic

nature of it which is inherent in it's constituents. Puru~a is part of this jagat but

his final aim is to liberate from the jagat. He may leave this jagat, but his own

moral realm does not leave him. Puru$a lives in his world of action. He should

adhere to his duties and not to go beyond dharma and adharma. One of the

purposes of this adherence is to restore convictions in the conduct and to

synthesize between empirical and transcendental aspects of life, so that he can

lead a balanced life. Moreover, the welfare of society and status of peace and

happiness is achieved, for puru~a and society are complimentary to each other.

This jag at is a moral world where he discovers the basic moral principles which

govern the world and him. These moral principles create a moral force which is

fundamental, eternal and responsible for guiding puru$a 's actions.

PURU$ARTHA-S

The theory of puru~iirtha also helps in guiding puru~a 's actions. The early

Mimarilsa, as available in Jaimini and Sahara, accepts dhanna, artha and kama

only. It is only later that the fourth value, i.e. mok$a has been recognized in the

.system of Mimarilsa. The artha and kama have social and material well-being as

the ideal and lead to abhyudaya and mok$a is the highest end which aims at

86

spiritual well-being culminating in ni[1sreyasa. But mok$a is not nivrtti

(cessation from activity). It is a realization of nityasukhabhivyakti (eternal

happiness) with pravrtti. But the better course is the course of active

participation which leads to eternal happiness and not mere cessation which

leads to self-negation.

DHARMA AND CEREMONIALISM

The main aim of Mimamsa system is to discuss the true nature of dharma which

is injunctive in nature. It says that all actions must be conducive to dharma. One

accrues dharma or adharma from the proper accomplishment of actions. The

system presupposes the following:

(a) "All such actions which are enjoined in Vedas compnse of dharma. "9

Interestingly, Kumarila m his Slokavartika, has posited various other

notions of dharma and, after rejecting all those, he has concluded that

they cannot be known through Veda as puru$artha. It is only sreya or

happiness attainable by dravya, gu!Ja and karma which is meant by

dharma.

(b) The one and the only source of knowing dharma is Veda as word or

9

§astra. The very definition of sastra implies those activities or refraining

sreyo hi pur~aprlti~z sa dravyagu~Jakarmabhi/:l, Codntila~a!Ja~l sadhyat tasmiit tesvanadharmatti. Kumiirila, Slokavtirtika, Codntisiitra, 191.

87

from them which are enjoined by the sastra through eternal or non-

eternal staments. 10

(c) The Veda is self-validated and reqmres no extraneous source for its

authenticity. Here, a question naturally arises as to what is the basis for

accepting self-validity of the Vedas and how to ensure the efficacy of

Vedic statements. To this, the reply of Jaimini is stated in the famous

SO.tra as follows:

Autpattikastu sabdasyarthena sambandhastasya jfianamupadeso'-

V~·fJtirekascarthe' nupalabdhe tatprama!Jaliz Badaraya~zasyanapek~atvat. 11

From this it follows that dharma, an objective category, is essentially of the

nature of an artlza which has been sanctioned by vidhivakya explained in terms

of sukha and dul:zklza. Whatever does not produce dul:zkha in excess of sukha is

artha and whatever produces du~zkha in excess of sukha is anartha. Hence,

punt~a should avoid anartha and participate only in those actions which produce

artha. Following and performing dharma may bring happiness to the agent vis-

a-vis society.

Dharma is essentially non-empirical in nature. It is also said that there is no

dharma in non-empirical anartha-s even if it is prescribed by scriptures, for

10 Prav.rttirvti niv.rttirvti nityena krtakena vti purhstif!l, yenopatiryeta tacchtistramabhidhzyate. Sabdaparicclzeda, 4.

11 Btidaraya~wsyanapek~atvtit, Mimtirhstisutra, 1.1. 5 Quoted by S. Kumar, 'The concept of Veda-Apuru~eyatva' in Purvamimtuizstifrom an Interdisciplinary Pont of View, (ed.) K.T. Pandurangi, Vol. II, Part 6, p. 236.

88

anartha-s are evil and dharma is essentially artha. With regard to non­

empirical artha and anartha, there is a controversy between Prabhakara and

Kumarila whether artha and anartha are in the act or in the consequence.

According to Prabhakara, dharma is objective, not a quality of the atlnan and is

not identified with kriya or act enjoined by the scripture. It is a new category

revealed by niyoga, i.e. the imperative or command or more precisely it is

revealed by preraiJa - the authoritative advice to the will implied in such a

command. The preraJJa is a kind of impulsion in the atman which is the cause

of certain physical processes or effects. According to Prabhakar, in certain

ceremonial scriptural prescriptions there is an element of anartha. For

example, syenena abhicaraiJ yajeta - one who wishes to kill his enemy should

perform the sacrifice of syena. Such an act involves infliction of pain on the

enemy. It is essentially adhanna and anartha. Hence, such acts should not be

performed, as dharma consists of artha only, for the sastric prescriptions lead

to artha and result m dharma. Sastric prescription includes only

nityanaimittikakarma-s (unconditional duties) and kamyakarma-s (empirical

duties). In either case there is dharma so far as there is no anartha involved. In

nityanaimittikakarma-s, there is no sukha or dubkha. Such karma-s purify the

mind and transcendental freedom can be attained. In kamyakarma-s there is

artha but it gives material pleasure. However, in either case the dharma is not

an act itself but apilrva which is revealed by preraiJG in the atman produced by

niyoga which is involved in siistric injunctions. Prabhakara holds that their

89

conduciveness is in their intrinsic validity as self-positing duty. It is this aparva

which appertains necessarily to the prescribed acts of scriptures as duties that

constitute their moral authority or validity. Though the duties consist in sastric

prescription, their moral authority is independent of sastra being due to their

ontological essence as duty which implies apilrva. Thus, aparva is the ground of

their objective validity while prerat:tti IS the ground of the objective validity

being subjectively known.

Kumarila Bhana on the other hand, holds that dharma is not a non-empirical

.category. It is the prescribed act in itself which is sreyaskara and conducive to

good. There is no difference between kamyakarma-s (conditional duties) and

nityanaimittikakarma-s (unconditional duties). Kumarila Bhaga, as opposed to

Prabhakara says that codanalak~at:ta~z artha~1 dharmaf:z does not exclude

codanalak~at:ta~1 anartha. All sastric prescriptions are artha and not anartha.

The anartha enters within the scope of sastric prescriptions by way of nivrtti

(prohibitions) and constitutes the subject matter of ni~edha codana-s or negative

prescriptions. The prohibition of an anartha prescribed in itself is an artha. He

defends ceremonialism on the ground of validity which is derived from Vedic

authority. This applies both to nityanaimittikakanna-s or kamyakanna-s. These

acts are obligatory as they are prescribed by sastric code of injunctions and

prohibitions. The Bhaga school accepts ceremonialism in all its arbitrariness.

Bhaga also assumes apilrva (an objective potency) but not as intrinsic essence of

these acts as self validating. It is not known by any unique feeling of moral

90

impulsion but only by implication (artlulpatti) from their being scripturally

prescribed as duties. According to Bhatta, there is apurva in these acts but this

objective potency is not itself dharma. The acts themselves as scripturally

prescribed are dharma and apurva is only an implication of their essence as

dharma or moral duty. According to Kumarila, dharma as constituting the

contents of sastric prescriptions is in two forms which is as follows:

(i) the positive stistric prescriptions (the good involved in the act enjoined)

(ii) the negative stistric prescriptions (the cessation of dharma from

anartha-s). Punishment is entailed if one still performs ni$edha acts.

Many more v1ews are available on ceremonial acts as producing artha or

anartha. For example, the Sarilkhya school does not give any significance to

those Vedic acts (ceremonial) which involve hilizsti. Such acts are not conducive

to sreyas, the highest good which help the empirical purU$G from the taint of

sanistira. In so far as these acts produce injury to the sentient beings, they are

bound to bring sufferings. These acts are same as those empirical acts which are

prompted by motive of gain. They may produce happiness which is perishable

and ultimately lead to sufferings. Thus, Sarilkhya condemns ceremonial acts as

these acts are in the form of avidya. They arise "from aviveka or from the

absence of the proper discrimination of the true nature of reality." 12

12 S.K. Maitra, The Ethics of The Hindus, University of Calcutta, 1963, p. 95.

91

The Nyaya-Vaise~ika differ with Sali1khya. According to them, ceremonial acts

are not devoid of moral significance. They are conducive to dharma, if dtJly

accomplished. They are essential and indispensable for moral culture and are

conduce to the moral perfection of the agent. Dharma, according to them is the

quality of the atman and thus subjective in significance. This subjective quality

is acquired after discharging the objective code of duties. These duties are:

(a) the sadharaiJa dharma (duties of universal scope)

(b) vise$a-dhanna-s or var!Jiisramadharma-s (the duties of one's tiSrama and

of one's variJa or social class).

They comprise of both ceremonial actions as well as duties of specific stage.

Nyaya-Vaise~ikas' view differs from both Sarhkhya's (who condemn ceremonial

acts) and Kumarila's (who accept ceremonial acts). They defend ceremonialism

on ethical grounds and try to provide moral rationale. The Naiyayikas do

accept apurva but only as subjective disposition or modification of the self. (For

Prabhakara, it is neither known by implication as Kumarila holds nor by

inference as Naiyayikas hold but it is immediately revealed to the self.).

Kumarila does not accept any such disinterested morality in the strict sense. For

him dharma necessarily implies good in the conditional as well as in the

unconditional duties. In this way they are unable to get beyond ceremonialism

and externalism as they regard the sastric prescriptions not only as the ground

92

of the moral authority of the duties but also as the only evidence of their

conduciveness.

A different version on ethical worth of ceremonialism is given by Sari1kara, a

Vedantin. He holds that ceremonial activities do not constitute the highest good.

They give only relative satisfaction but they do have moral significance since

merit and consequent possibilities of karma generated from them. They help

puru$a in preparing to move towards higher morality. Such activities are

performed by those puru$a-s who adopt pravrtti-marga and not the nivrtti. The

former path is for the one who participates in the empirical life, who is

governed by the feeling of attraction and aversion. Duty here serves as a means

to the satisfaction of desired ends. These ends may be empirical or non­

empirical. These empirical duties are generally customary or general practices

adopted in the society one belongs to. Even the empirical sciences such as

science of medicine, the science of the rules of conduct etc. are said to be its

sources. Some of the empirical duties are laid down in Vedic kannaktiJJda.

These empirical and non-empirical duties together constitute the moral code to

fulfill the desire. Such duties in any case do not constitute the highest good. On

_the other hand, the latter path that is pravrtti-marga is path of knowledge. It is

the life of absolute cessation from desires and therefore from duties prompted

by desires. It is the sphere of those virtues where there is no reference to any

extraneous, empirical ends. This path takes one to practice sadhanacatu$_taya

(the four-fold discipline) which leads to atmajfiana and jlvanmukti. This

93

realization implies that all limitations are shaken off and recovers its true

essence as the unlimited and eternally accomplished being. Thus, according to

Sarhkara the highest duty is that which conduces to this knowledge. The duties

of the mundane affairs have moral significance only as a preparatory training

for the discharge of higher duty which ultimately leads to highest knowledge

where all ethical and worldly duties cease.

Ramanuja, a viii${advaitin does not believe in Karmasmi1nyiisa. 13 Duties should

be discharged disinterestedly without any desire for consequence. These duties

are significant in the sense that they are conducive to the highest knowledge. In

this context Ramanuja speaks of papakarma-s and pw;yakarma-s. Papakarma-s

lead to suffering and pw;yakarma-s lead to happiness. All papakanna-s are

obstacle to knowledge. Sometime even pw;yakarma-s become obstacles when

they are performed with interested motives for some rewards. They become

obstacles in accomplishing the highest end yet they qualify to achieve

knowledge. Mere duty gives impermanent and insignificant results, for such

results are relative and do not lead to knowledge.

Bhagvadglta talks of one more path which is a synthesis of two paths enunciated

by Sarilkara namely, pravrtti and nivrtti. It is called Nivrttikarmanulrga or the

path of disinterested duties. According to BhagavadgWi, the highest duty is not

the cessation of duties but is one which fills this void or cessation with concrete

13 Ibid., p. 104.

94

content, which asks for the accomplishment of duties of life, i.e. duty for the

sake of duty. It is the stage of karma without material motive. The famous

saying in this regard is, "to action alone hast thou a right and never at all the

fruits of actions be thy motive, neither let there be in thee any attachment. to

inaction." 14 GWi strongly urges to act without attachment or desire for phala,

because phala is beyond our power.

On the whole, one may say that actions play a vital role in Mima1i1sa system,

but the actions which imply the scriptural duties are given greater importance

whether they are rationally justified or accepted on their own authority. These

scriptural duties which are called Vedic prescription or vidhivakya-s are

distinguished from empirical duties. These Vedic prescriptions are given greater

importance because of their "evidential value and validity with regard not only

to the present but also the past, the future and the super sensuous, the remote

and the mediate. Hence, it transcends all the limitations of space and time and

produces knowledge of what is artha, tattva and reality. It is thus superior as a

source of knowledge to sense experience (indriya-s) as well as the other source

of knowledge ..... Codana thus bridges the gulf between the empirical and the

non-empirical, the phenomenal and the transcendental." 15 The system holds that

"man has to live a life of constant activity. Without action, he cam10t have any

14 Kanna!Jyevtidhikaraste mti phale~u kadacana, Ma karmaphalaheturbhurmti te sa!J1go 'stvakarma!Ji. Bhagvadgltti, 11.47.

15 S.K. Maitra, The Ethics ofthe Hindus, p. 112.

95

conditions of life, And any life, good or evil. He cannot, therefore, have either

pleasure or pain. Every man desires pleasures and a happy life here and

hereafter. He has therefore to know what actions to perform and what to

avoid. " 16

Hence, there is a provision for certain rules in the form of vidhl-s and ni$edha-s

(obligatory) and arthvada-s and namadheya-s (non-obligatory).

MEANING AND CLASSIFICATION OF VIDHI-S

Vidhi has not been separately defined by Jaimini. It's meaning is indicated in

one of the sutra-s which defines dharma. 17 It has a trait of a command. 18 Jaimini

classifies vidhi-s on the basis of binding nature of the provision as follows:

1) Obligatory or mandatory rules:

(a) Vidhi-s - positive cmmnands (a direction to do a particular act.)

(b) Ni$edha-s - negative commands (a direction not to do a particular act)

2) Non-Obligatory:

(a) Arthavada-s- non-obligatory rules connected with vidhi-s.

(b) Namadheya-s - non-obligatory rules not connected with vidhi-s.

16 p. T. Raju, The Philosophical Traditions of India, Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, l971,p.83.

17 Codanti l~a!J-o 'rtlw dharmaf:t. Jaiminisutra, 1.1.2. 18 M. Rama Jois, 'Mirnarilsa Rules of Interpretation', m Purvamlnuin1sti from an

Interdisciplinary Point of View, Vol. II, part 6, p. 600.

96

Vidhi-s necessarily contain a direction/compulsion which should be followed.

When an act is performed even without it, it IS no vidhi. For example, the

commands like 'shut the door,' 'eat fruits', etc. are no vidhi-s. There is no

compulsion involved in performing them. If someone wishes to do, he would do

it without any rule. But when a rule contains a direction which conunands to a

particular act, which a person may not wish to act but has to act under the force

·of a command, it is vidhi. For example, 'follow traffic rules', 'pay tax' etc. are

vidhi-s . There is compulsion involved in doing such acts. No one would like to

do such acts voluntarily.

The meaning of ni~edha presupposes a conunand which is similar to vidhi but

negative in form. It is a command to a person not to do an act for example,

there is no ni~edha involved when someone conunands 'do not eat fruits' but

there is a compelling factor involved when some one says 'do not break traffic

rules'. In the latter case a person is likely to break the rules unless there ts a

force to stop him.

Arthawida is a statement connected with a vidhi, without adding to it or

detracting from it. It is a subsidiary provision which may explain the reason of a

vidhi or may illustrate it. In itself it is neither a rule by itself nor a modification

of the main rule. In other words, arthavada consists of words or expressions

used along with a vidhi to make the rule more understandable even though

without these words vidhi would be complete in itself. However, there is an

97

exception when arthavada becomes a vidhi. 19 This exception means that though

a sentence is part of a vidhi but appears like arthavada. If in reality it

incorporates any injunctive rule by way of addition to the vidhi, it should be

regarded as vidhi and not as arthavada. 20 It is a statement containing reason by

virtue of the independent significance and explanation. 21

Namadheya is a word or expression which forms part of a law text but not a

.part of a vidhi. It indicates the meaning of the word, i.e. What it means or what

it excludes. 22

PROCEDURE TO APPLY VEDIC INJUNCTION

Not only puru~a has to follow certain rules and regulations, there is a provision

for procedures to be followed in applying Vedic injunctions.

According to Mimarhsa, this procedure may be explained as follows:

. ·"The objective of sabdlbhavana, i.e. Prompting or generating interest, 1s to

enable the sacrificer to undertake the initiative. Undertaking initiative 1s

arthlbhavana. Therefore, generating the arthlbhavana is the objective of

sabdlbhavana. The sabdlbhavana is the import of the optative termination lin.

Therefore, knowledge of this lin serves as the instrument. Mere cognition of lin

19 Jaiminisiitra, 1.11. 25. 20 Ibid.,l.4.2-4. 21 Ibid.,1.11.26. 22 Ibid., 1.4.2.

98

and the comprehension of its import, i.e. Prerm:u'i is not sufficient to produce

initiative. It needs to be supported by the information that the activity enjoined

for undertaking is a worthy one. This is generally provided by the arthavada-s

mentioned by the side of the injunctive statement. These arthavadasa-s euology

convey prasastya, i.e. worthiness of the recommended activity. This is

itikartavyata, an aid to make the preraiJa, 1.e. Sabdlblzavana effective. . ...

Sabdlbhavana ya~1 arthlbhavana sadhyatvenanveti linadijiianam kara~wtvema

anveti, prasastyajiianam itikartavyatatvena anveti. Thus, arthibhavana accords

with sabdlbhavana in respect of the purpose, knowledge of lin etc., accords in

respect of the cause, while worthiness of the recommended action accords in

respect of what is undertaken. "23

Prabhakara does not accept this application procedure of Vedic injunctions. He

rejects the concept of sabdlbhavana on the ground that there is no evidence. to

say that the injunctive suffix has a vyapara designated as prera~uJ, i.e.

prompting to cause the initiative. The initiative does not necessarily follow on

hearing an injunctive statement.

Consequently, the idea of arthlbhiivana (initiative) being the result of the

sabdibhavana cannot be accepted. He holds that scriptural prescriptions are of

the nature of niyoga. It is revealing itself as self-established, self authoritative

law to the agent. There is a unique relation between a . command and the

23 K.T. Pandurangi, 'Exposition of Dharma as the Central Theme of POrvamimarhsa' in Purvamlmii.rh.sti from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, Vol. II, part 6, pp. 179-80.

99

conu11anded which differs radically from the relation of karta and kriya. The

relation between karta and kriya is causal while the relation between command

and commanded is of revelation. Niyoga only reveals the law, it does not

compel. There is moral prompting in it which is entirely different from physical

or psychological promptings.

According to Prabhakara, the arthlblzavana is subordinate to the vidhi. The

vidhivakya-s are obligatory by its very nature and necessarily reveal itself as

.authoritative or binding in the consciousness of the agent. It is cognized through

a unique mode of consciousness, atmakufavise$a, i.e. an excitement or i.tllpulse

in the self which is svaprakasa. These vakya-s induce the feeling of impulsion in

the self. On hearing vidhi one becomes conscious of this impulsion in oneself. It

is a self-validating experience which validates the moral imperative in

consciousness. This atnw.kuta is not peculiar to moral impulsion or prera!Jti but

exists in laukika prerm:ul or non-moral impulsion also. It is present in requests,

invitations and other non-moral experiences. This is such a unique experience

which cannot be further analyzed. Other than the experiencer, no one else can

understand it. Imperatives thus, impel only in the sense of revealing the law as

duty, i.e. by inducing the knowledge of its authority. It is this sense of the

authority of the imperative in the form of cognition that is binding on puru$a as

duty that constitutes pravartakatva, the power of the motivation of the vidhi.

But, atnw.kuta is not a subtle force. It's function is to move the moral agent by

100

making the vidhi known which is radically different from bhtivanti. As

·compared to atmakuta, bhavanti is causal determination or compulsion.

These two kinds of relations, i.e. causal relation and that of revelation, are not

accepted by Kumarila. According to Kumarila, the concept of bhavana is

sufficient to explain the authority of scriptural imperatives.

As soon as one hears a scriptural injuncti<?n, he is conscious of two bhavana-s

(operative processes) which account fo~ the obligatoriness or the moral authority

of injunctions and together constitute the mode of operation of the vidhi. They

are:

(i) The sabdibhavana (the optative agency of the categorical imperative

which calls for puru~apravrtti in the moral agent).

(ii) The arthibhavana (conveyed by the general verbal termination of the

agent's will which brings about the act).

The former is a process outside the puru~a and the latter is a process within

·him. Further, Kumarila holds that the relation between the two bhavana-s is of

ekapratyayabhidheyatva, i.e. being expressed in one and the same affix. As

soon as puru~a hears a statement containing a verb that is in optative, he

understands that he is directed to undertake the activity mentioned by the verb.

Ordinarily, such a direction is given by a puru~a. However, in the case of Vedic

statement, there is no puru~a behind it. Therefore, the optative suffix itself is

taken as giving the direction. This aspect of bhavana is designated as

101

sabdfblu'ivana and direction generates initiative on the part of the listener . to

undertake the activity in the statement "yajeta svargakama~1". This initiative is

designated as arthfbhavana. The word artha means the objective, the purpose.

Since this initiative intended to achieve the objective, i.e. svarga, it is called

arthfbhavana. There is no priority or posteriority between them. Indeed, the

sabdibhavna necessarily involves arthibhavana. To implement a direction and

an initiative there are three requirements: ·

(i) sadhya or bhavya (an objective something to be realized)

.(ii) sadhana orktiraiJ.a (the means to achieve it)

(iii) itikarttavyata (manner in which the activity is to be carried out)

Thus, sadhyarhsa i.e. the object to be realized by the operation of the imperative

is the inducement of puru~apravrtti. This inducement of the agent's will lead

necessarily to the realization of the empirical action which is arthfbhavana.

Hence, arthibhavana is a necessary implicate of sabdfbhavana. Some followers

of Bhana school differ from Kumarila with regard to two bhavana-s being

·coordinated. They hold that as the sabdibhavana leads to arthibhavana; the

former is primary (pradhana) and the latter is auxiliary (gauiJ.a). There are

some who believe that arthibhavanii is a principal operation and the

sabdtbhavana is secondary.

The Naiyayikas, however do not accept Kumarila's as well as Prabhakara's

view of the moral imperative. According to them, there is neither sabdfbhavana

102

(any impersonal operation of the imperative) nor niyoga (any unique feeling of

impulsion). It is only a phalecclui, presenting itself in the form of moral

obligation or duty. There is nothing unique in the consciousness of authority. It

is not sabdaikagocara[l, induced by only sabda or verbal command. Being a

compound of smrti (past experiences) and abhila$a (desire), it may arise with or

without verbal conunand. The validation of imperatives in consciousness is a

process in the moral agent consisting in the impulsion of desire which arises

from the expectation of the consequence. Scriptural imperatives being the

prescriptions of the lord are personal commands to imperfect finite beings.

There is compulsion implied in such commands. This is because the lord creates

good and evil through injunctions and prohibitions. The desire for the good and

aversion towards the evil is involved in the injunctions and prohibitions. This

desire for good and aversion for evil in the agent are the real operative forces

and moral authority is the operation of the good and evil through the agent's

subjective desires and aversions.

Thus, one thing is clear from the above elaboration that it is vidhi as imperative

-that inspires the consciousness of duty which involves sense of obligation in the

puru$a, a moral agent. Vidhi is the highest authority which constitutes

obligatoriness on the moral agent as duty or dharma.

OBLIGATORINESS OF VIDHILIES IN THE ACT OR IN THE END

According to Mimarilsa, this obligatoriness of moral actions of puru$a do not

arise from the consequence. There is prompting of the imperatives in the

103

consciOusness. Prabhakara holds that "there is no extraneous end in the vidlzi as

imperative, morally, psychologically or metaphysically. The imperative is irs

own end and constitute the sanction, the motive as well as the moral authority of

the vidhi. It is the independent, intrinsic authority of the command which

determines motive and choice. "24 The motive is not i$!asddhanatajfiiina as

Naiyayikas believe but simply the cognition of something to be done as

produced by the representation of it as speCifying the self. There is a difference

in the motives, so there is a difference in the conception of duties too. For

instance, if the motive is good as subjectively determined, moral obligation will

be only the authority of the agent's freely chosen end and if the motive is simply

the act as self-referred, moral obligation will be the imperative presenting itself

as the law of the agent. Even in secular injunctions, the impulsion itself is a

unique feeling and not a form of desire for the consequence. Motives also are

not necessarily the consciousness of some ista or good. Indeed, it is this

erroneous view which impairs the conception of moral authority or obligation.

The motive of the will is simply the consciousness of something to be done as

produced by the representation of the act as a self qualification. The self itself is

"identified with the act to be done which acts as motive and not the consequence

of any good. Thus, in moral promptings there is no external factor involved

rather there is prompting of the imperative in the consciousness. This prompting

(prerm:z_d) of obligation as produced by the revelation of the law in

24 S.K. Maitra, The Ethics ofthe Hindus, p. 128.

104

consciousness is all that is required to move to act and not any consciousness of

extraneous end. Naiyayikas are wrong in conceiving an end or phala as a

necessary accompaniment of the vidhi. A vidhi does not imply more than two

anubandha-s

(i) adhikaranubandha or niyoga (an agent's command)

(ii) vi$ayanubandha (the act commanded)

The consequence is not one of the accompaniment of the imperative. It is

relative to the understanding of the puru$a and not the intended meanmg of

vidhi. The command impels simply by revealing the act as obligatory. When the

agent is impelled by the desire for the consequence as in kamyakarma-s, the

imperatives are udaslna, indifferent or morally neutral. The imperative in

kamyakarma-s declares the act being merely a means to the desired end. Its

operation consisting only in the establishment of this sadhyasadhanatabhava

(means end relation). Vidhi does not derive its force from any extraneous end

either in kamya or nityanaimittikakarma-s. The difference between the two

karma-s is that in the former it is without any imperative character while in the

latter, the imperative is its own end, it is self authoritative or self validating.

According to Prabhakara, what is true of vidhi is true of ni$edha also.

According to Kumarila, "the end, the consequence determines only the motive

or the choice, but not the obligatoriness of the imperative ...... The phala or

consequence is only pravarttaka, i.e. a psychological motive but is not vidheya,

105

1.e. the objective of moral imperative. It is a psychological implication of the

moral action, an end as motive being necessary for moral as for all action, but it

is not a moral implicate of the imperative which is obligatory independently. of

the end. "25 Kumarila points out that the phala determines only the pravarttaka

(motive) and the choice and not the vidheya (obligatoriness) of the imperative.

The moral authority of the imperative is thus independent of an end. There are

two main points of difference between Kurriarila and Naiyayikas. One, Kumarila

holds that the phala has to be conceived because of its logical and metaphysical

necessity rather than its moral implication; Naiyayikas, on the other hand

believe that phala must be conceived so that the impelling character of the

imperatives retain and clear distinction between right and wrong is maintained.

Two, according to Kumarila, phala enters only into the motivation of the act

and does not determine its authority on the agent whereas according to Nyaya,

the consequence as good determines the objective authority of the imperative

though not subjective obligatoriness which implies something more, i.e. agent's

subjective reference.

Regarding the source of this obligation or the impelling character of vidhi, the

Naiyayikas believe that it lies in the motive of the agent. If the motive is good,

the moral imperative must also appeal through the consciousness of good which

does not necessarily imply pleasure. If the motive implies no such

consciousness, the imperative would be independent of all the considerations of

25 Ibid., pp. 126-127.

106

utility. It is either pleasure or the avoidance of pam m the case of

kamyakarma-s, i.e. ordinary empirical actions done with material motives. In

the case of mumuk~u, the personal seeking of the transcendental freedom, i~.ta is

duflkhena atyantikatz viyoga~z (total and absolute freedom from suffering). The

freedom which a mumuk~u seeks, arises from virakti (dispassion). There is

neither attraction nor aversion. This differs essentially from the avoidance of

pain which is prompted by aversion, for freedom from pain is never absolute in

the case of aversion. There can be two different motives with two different

agents. For some, there may be material motive which is important, for the

others, it may be the transcendental freedom. Hence, motives are not given as

matters of fact which act mechanically on the agent. They are themselves the

effects of subjective valuations or subjective self-determination. What is

pleasure and motive to one is not necessarily pleasure and motive to the other.

Thus, Naiyayikas hold that motive is conceived as a subjectively determined

value.

Contrary to Prabhakara, the Naiyayikas hold that the motive being the

consciousness of the i~.ta or good, the imperative derives its force from

i~_tasadhanata viz., conduciveness to good. The obligatoriness of the imperative

.is thus the worth of its end appealing to the consciousness of the agent. As this

worth itself depends on the agent's kamana (desire) for the good and therefore

on subjective valuation or subjective preference, obligatoriness also depends on

the subjective desire/force of the agent's desire for the end. This kamana in the

107

agent may or may not be pure. In kamyakarma-s this impulse is not pure, for

the actions are performed with material motive. In the case where the actions

are performed purely for transcendental freedom this impulse is pure.

However, in both the cases, desire is a necessary factor. It determines the

subjective worth of the value of the end that constitutes the motive and also

determines obligatoriness of the imperative. The fact that the good acquires

subjective value or worth through subjective preference does not imply that it is

objectively neutral. Without an objective value there is no significance of

subjective value. Indeed, moral value has authority in two senses: the objective

authority that is the intrinsic authority independent of agent's choice or

preference; the other is subjective authority which depends mi agent's desire for

the particular end. This constitutes that obligatoriness of the moral value is thus

a compound of the objective authority of the end and the force of the subjective

desire. Obligatoriness is different from the objective authority of the imperative.

Though in both the cases the authority is due to the imperative. The objective

authority arises from the intrinsic worth or value of the end, while

obligatoriness is due to the objective value being subjectively appropriated

through a particular desire. In other words, there is an intrinsic worth in certain

ends which ought to determine choice and this is their objective authority which

.is independent of choice. When they are chosen, they acquire subjectivity in

addition to their objective authority and this is their obligatoriness. Thus moral

108

obligation would be inexplicable without the conception of an end. It is only

through phala, the wrongness or rightness of an action becomes intelligible.

Naiyayikas do not accept Prabhakara's view of explaining moral obligation.

They call explanation as superfluous which leads to an indefinite series of ends

which has no end. This anavastha (instability) can be avoided only by bringi"ng

the external consequences with intrinsic independent authority. While answering

to their charge, Prabhakara rather calls their assumption of an extraneous end as

superfluous. He says that the fallacy of the Naiyayikas consists in conceiving

moral or sastric imperative on the analogy of secular injunctions. Since the

secular injunctions appeal through an external sanction, there must also be a

sanction for the scriptural imperatives. Naiyayikas forget that scriptural

imperative are ultimate, irreducible and absolute while secular imperative are

relative and acquired. Thus, the difference between the scriptural and secular

injunctions imply a corresponding difference between their respective authority.

Moral injunction is svatantra or autonomous.

To sum up the above discussion regarding the obligatoriness of the moral

actions, Naiyayikas hold that it is only it's i$_fasadhanata, or conduciveness to

an end appealing through the agent's desire. On the contrary, for Bhaga and

Prabhakara, it is independent of extraneous end; an end being only necessary· to

.constitute the psychological motive and not the moral authority of the duty

109

according to Bhatta; and being only implied and never consciously present to the

agent, according to Prabhakara.

OPERATING PROCESS OF VIDHIIN AGENTS' CONSCIOUSNESS

As Prabhakara, Kumarila and Naiyayikas have different vtews regarding the

nature of moral authority, they also differ on the issue as to how moral

imperative influences agent's consciousness, so as to lead to the accomplishment

of duty?

Prabhakara holds that bhtivaflii causes krti (the will) in the agent. It is not same ·.•·

as the niyoga because niyoga does not cause or determine. It is only a prerm:u.l

or authoritative suggestion to the will. This suggestion is the revelation of the

law as imperative which is distinct from physical or psychological compulsions.

Prera!Jii implies prai$)1aprai$asambandha (the relation of the cmmnand to the

agent commanded). It is revealed to the agent. Thus, it is different from

blulvana. It is prior to bhavana in consciousness of duty. Prabhakara clearly

indicates that prera(lii is not a form of action. It's fundamental character is that

of jfiapaka, knowledge inducing, and not karaka, action making. Jfiana is not

kriya. According to Prabhakara, there are different forms of prermJa as in

request, promises etc. They are expressed by the different moods of verbs viz.,

lot, lin etc. There are different modes of prera(la which are due to different

upadhi-s. These upadhi-s are the circumstances of their application for prayoga.

It may be of samavi$ayaprayoga (equal to an equal) or of hlnavi$ayaprayoga

110

(superior to an inferior) etc. In each case there is an impulsion in a particular

mode. In every case impulsion is not of the nature of causation or compulsion

though each case· is particular according to the circumstances of its application.

Prerm:u'i is an atmadharma. Like the atlnan or the self, it is svasarhvedya,

known only through itself. It is not pramd1Jdntaravedya (known through any

other process of knowledge). It is an ultimate irreducible fact of consciousness

just as the self is. It is itself the ground or the reason of the bhautikavyapara,

the empirical, psychological process which constitutes the willing of the act

commanded. It can only be felt where there is an imperative present to

consciousness. It follows the dharma, the code of duties that are morally

obligatory known only through sabdapramaiJa. Such duties imply preraiJa and

revealed through preraiJa only. Thus, according to Prabhakara, prera~1a,

through conunand, is essentially of the nature of enlightemnent which does not

interfere with agent's freedom but influences agent's consciousness. It is not a

simple fOgnition but the cognition of an act to be accomplished which implies a

unique feeling of excitement that is unanalysable.

Kumarila holds that the operation of the imperative is independent of any

extraneous end. A vidhivakya is charged with a peculiar prompting force,

sabdlbhavand which is of the nature of causation. This calls forth puru~aprav.rtti

(the agent's will) which leads to the accomplishment of the act, arthlbhavana.

111

According to Naiyayikas, the imperative being obligatory through i$,tasadlzanta

(conduciveness to an end), the operation of the imperative in the consciousness

is of the desired end to which it conduces. Since the end itself is constituted or

determined by the subjective desire, the action of the imperative implies the

action of the desire in the agent's consciousness. The imperative presents the

duty as conducive to an end.

OBJECTIVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH IMPERATIVES

Purw;a, a moral agent is to follow imperatives. But, is there any objective to be

achieved through these imperatives? To this Prabhakara says that the imperative

itself is it's own end having absolute value and validity. There is no extraneous

end not even psychological or logical implication. The object of the imperative

is the imperative itself. The object of the command and the command are one

and the same thing. But this sameness is not apparent due to intellectual

incapability. When vidhi is the motive, the sense of an unsatisfied demand

accompanies the action. It is this demand of the command which acts as the spur

to action and the fulfillment of the command requires nothing but the agent's

actual willing it. There is no extraneous end which is involved. The imperative

is itself the motive, the end and the sanction too.

Bhagas hold that the imperative necessarily refers to the end which is logically

implied in it. It is required for the motivation in the execution of it. However,

.the moral authority of the command is independent of this end.

112

Naiyayikas hold that the object to be accomplished is just an end which is other

than the imperative. There is no preraka or impelling function of the

imperative. The end is subjectively determined. Though sometimes they do

speak of imperatives as being impelling, but this is vyavaluiranultra (mere

usage). The command is not the object which is to be accomplished. In

accomplishing his duty, the agent is conscious of an end that constitutes the

object of imperative. It is an extraneous· act which validates the imperative.

Impulsion is derived through the end which alone has intrinsic value and

validity.

In the Mimatilsa school of thought, an empirical moral agent has been given the

most exalted position in creation. He alone is capable of understanding the

significance of Vedic rituals, vidhi-s, dharma etc. Even the basic moral

principals are discovered by him. Along with that there is always an eternal and

fundamental force which has been guiding in adjusting agents' action to the

environment. There is no need for a supreme being in the form of God to

control, for puru~a is self contained. Puru~a himself is capable of controlling

and carries out the entire details of the prescribed act. 26 Puru$a himself has to

depend on himself to chalk out his programmes for realizing the goal. As and

when he is under the cult of sufferings and complexities, moral principles help

him in understanding of dharma.

26 Karturva ~rutisarhyogadvidhi/:t kiirtsnyena gamyate. Mlmarnsasutra, 6.1.5.

113

Puru:;a lives in the world of actions and he must perform them. Beyond puru:;a,

the world, actions and ethical potency, there is nothing. To build up his ethical

potency, puru:;a may follow injunctions to form his future. This potency creates

the conditions of enjoyment. Thus, the ideal of life is of continuous activity and

enjoyments of its fruits. There is no life without actions. That is why, a state of

liberation is not very much desirable in Mimamsa system. Even a life of

celibacy is not recommended. It is said clearly that a husband cannot fulfill the

obligations of perpetuating the ancestral line and ca~mot perform the sacrifices

to gods without wife. Even Samkara and Ramanuja, who gave a lower place to

ethical action than to knowledge and devotion, but maintain that ethical actions

purify mind and prepare for the higher knowledge and devotion. According to

Sarilkara, ethical actions are dispensable while Ramanuja says that one should

continue following the injunctions till the end.

Ethical actions produce merits and demerits from good and evil actions

respectively. This merit and demerit is given the status of sakti (force) by the

·Mimarilsa school. This force is adr:;.ta (unseen) and apurva (extraordinary).

Though there is a controversy between Kumarila and Prabhakara regarding

ethical potency yet they do believe in the reality of this force and treat action as

an expression of this force. This potency resides in the atman till the occasion

comes for becoming it to be active. There is still variation in views of Kumarila

and Prabhakara regarding the issue of this force residing in atman. Prabhakara

in this context depends on the sacred Vedas to make his ideas intelligible but

114

Kumarila holds that actions produce an impression (smizskara), a kind of imprint

in the at man and sticks to it like an inherent quality till it burst into activity. The

controversy apart, one thing is very clear about this school of thought that is

their realistic outlook towards jagat and puru$a makes it very practical. Its

contribution towards Indian ethics is of the utmost value.

One finds another classification of duties, as without performing duties, puru$a

is of no worth, which is as follows:

(a) Laukika (secular)

.(b) Paramarthika or Sastrlya (transcendental or scriptural)

The laukika duties concern the natural life of puru$a so ·are derived from

experience as to what is beneficial or harmful to him. The authority that is

attached to them is only relative and thus by no means infallible. It is precisely

in view of this difficulty that the Mimarilsakas admit of paramarthika duties.

Regarding paramarthika duties they hold that kamyakarma-s (conditional upon

individual desires) are different from nityanaimittikakarma-s (unconditional

·duties). As regards the nityakarma-s and the naimittikakarma-s, the former are

unconditionally obligatory for all time, whereas the latter equally

unconditionally obligatory but only when their nimitta-s or special occasions

arise.

As far as the nityanaimittikakarma-s are concerned, Piirvamimamskas hold that

they are moral imperatives and one is obliged to follow them. But in

115

ktimyakanna-s, the agent's desire for empirical ends is implied. The

Prabhakaras contend that the imperative as pravartaka and morally obligatOry

requires only two things viz. niyojya or the person commanded and a visaya or

the act commanded, since there are only two anubandha-s of vidhi. But in

ktimyakarma-s along with these two anubandha-s, there is a third factor of

'desire' involved. For example, in injunction 'svargakamo yejeta ', he who

desires happiness in heaven, must perform the particular sacrifice. In the terms

'svargaktima' (the agent who desires happiness in heaven), there is a subject of

command (adhiktiranubandha) and in the term 'yejeta' (the injunction of the

particular sacrifice), there is object or the act commanded (vi$aytinubandha).

Therefore, it is by logical implication that the act viz. the yajikriya which is

bhtivtirtha must be svargastidhana to the desired happiness in the heaven. If it

were not so, the term svargaktima would be meaningless. Thus, the act of

sacrifice is a stidhana (means) and the happiness in heaven is the stidhaya (end).

There is stidhyastidhanabhtiva. This stidhyastidhanapratlti is logically implied in

the prompting of the imperative. In this case which is quoted above, ~he

pravartakatva, the impelling character of the vidhi as the moral imperative does

not extend to svargtidiphala or ends of happiness in heaven. The agent is

prompted by his own subjective desire towards this end. As this empirical

motive intervenes in ktimyakarma-s, the vidhi as non empirical motive becomes

udtislna or indifferent. In other words, the imperative is deprived of its

character of moral impulsion by the presence of the empirical motive. The only

116

operation of the imperative m this case is to produce sadhyasadhanapratlti

(consciousness of the act) as a means to the desired end, and to indicate the

manner of accomplishing the act thereby the end to which it is a means.

In another example, 'agni$omiyahiri1sa' and 'syena' Agni$omiyahinzsa involves

evil in the form of pasughata (slaughter of animal) and second case also

involves evil in the form of the destruction of the animal. As far as the

agni$omiyahin1sa is concerned, it is morally legitimate, according to

Prabhakara. This hilizsa is involved in the ceremony of agni$oma. It is included.

in the itikartavyatirilsa (manner of accomplishing the ceremony) and is covered

by sastrlyaprav.rtti, the moral function of the imperative. But syena is not

morally legitimate, according to Prabhakara. In this case, hirnsa is phalarnsa,

i.e. the part of the end or object which is aimed at. Samanyavidhi condenms

syena as adlwrma or morally evil. Thus, for Prabhakara hilizsa is right or wrong

according to the nature of particular injunction which involves it. Syena is

adharma or anartha, thus morally wrong. Such anartha-s are scripturally

condemned. Contrary to anartha-s, there are artlw-s which do not produce

unhappiness in the excess of happiness. They are dharma-s having the marks of

scriptural sanctions. Prabhakara also speaks of some artlw-s which are desirable

but not imperatives thus, not dharma in the strict sense. Similarly, there are

anartlw-s which are not prohibited. Hence, artlw-s and anartha-s which are

devoid of moral significance does not come in the category of dharma. All

Vedic prescriptions are independent of extraneous ends, where such ends exist

117

as it is seen is kamyakarma-s, injunction looses its character of moral impulsion.

Even the atmasvarupaparavakya-s of the Upani~ads which declare realization of

the self's true nature as the highest end are unauthoritative. Thus, according to

Prabhakara, Vedic laws as vidhi-s are not eternally self-accomplished result of

the absolute as realized consciousness which is held by Advaitins. In fact it is

the act of duty itself in its pure essence. Such an act possesses self-evidencing

and self-validating authority. Thus, it is the unconditional duties without any

extraneous end which should be considered duty in the strict sense. These duties

constitute dharma, i.e. the accomplislm1ent of the imperative for the sake of

imperative without any reference to any fruit or satisfaction. This is the highest

good, ni~1sreyasa or parama puru$tirtha.

Kumarila rejects the view of Prabhakara that the validity of the Vedas consists

exclusively in the obligatoriness or authority of specific acts as duty. He says

sabda (verbal testimony) is not necessary for any duty to be accomplished. It is

not invariably a command but a simple declaration of truth. The upani$adic

texts which declare the intrinsic worth of the self may not be imperative but

such accomplished realities which are an end in themselves. According to

Kumarila, Moral imperatives of accomplished realities having intrinsic value

and are thus established themselves as their own ends. The ends which are non

morally implicated in moral imperatives are of two kinds:

118

(i) du(1klu1sambhinnaril sukham (pure happiness)

(ii) nityasukham (eternal happiness or bliss).

In the former case, there is no eternal happiness, as it may be exhausted through

bhoga and thus ends in a rebirth. They are relatively good. While in the latter

·case, one has the realization of atmaj!lana. The ends are dharmadharmavirodhi

(opposed to dharma and adharma). They bring nityasukha (eternal happiness).

Since whatever is enjoined by scriptures is an artha and therefore dharma,

syena also is an object of vidhicodana. The end is only a non-moral implicate of

the duty and does not affect its nature as moral authoritative. The objection may

be raised here is that if §yena is artha then what is anartha? To this Kumarila's

reply is that the desire of an end is a psychological condition of volition in every

-case, i.e. the negative as well as the positive form of it. There is hitaprapti or

attainment of the good as a motive in positive willing, while there is

ahitaparihara or avoidance of evil as a motive in negative willing. There is the

law of selection and rejection as a psychological condition which holds good in

all cases. Thus, in ni~edha there is a desire for an end and desire to avoid sin

and suffering as well. According to him, there is desire for an end in all

scriptural imperatives, negative or positive. Such desire is psychologiCal

_condition of the accomplishment of the duty though not necessary for the moral

impulsion or obligatoriness of the imperatives. This is true of both conditional

and unconditional duties. Indeed, the prohibition implies a forbidden impulse in

the agent and are conditional on the agent in two ways:

119

( 1) the forbidden impulse in the agent,

(2) condition on his desire to avoid the consequence thereof.

In both the cases there is a desire for an end as a condition of psychological

motivation and an impulse as the condition of the moral application of t.he

command. The unconditional injunctions, however, apply without reference to

any subjective impulse and thus, are conditional on desire only in respect of

psychological prompting.

Apart from the controversy between Prabhakara and Kumarila on various issues

like, ceremonial acts are artha or anartha; application procedure of vidhi-s;

obligator ness of vidhi-s lies in the act or in the end; operating process of vidhi-s

in the agent's consciouness; objectives to be accomplished in following vidhi~s;

the nature of duties etc., it is significant to note that both believe in the

authority of the Vedas and puru$a, who is a moral agent plays a vital role in

prescribed activity either through niyoga or bhiivana.

Though Mimamsa system does not add anything special to the Nyaya view with

regard to the nature of puru~a as far as it's constituents like sarlra, indriya-s,

nwnas and atman are concerned, yet the exposition and analysis of puru$a 's

activity through the concept of dharnw by way of vidhi-s, ni$edha-s, bhavaria,

prera!Jd, niyoga, atmaku_ta etc. is technical, novel and commendable. This

technicality is perhaps to avoid the possibility of error and to retain the

120

uniformity. Since the system believes in the authority of the Vedas, it IS

mandatory on the part of puru$a to follow Vedic injunctions.

The system believes that "the aim of life is to live and, because life is activity,

to be constantly active. But to live does not mean to vegetate, but to enjoy. The

greater and perfect enjoyment is found in heaven, so it is the aim of human life

to attain heaven. This heaven is a state of mind, and without mind there can be

no pleasure, not even pain. And pleasure can be had if one performs the actions,

including sacrifices, necessary for producing heaven". 27 He should lead a life of

action and adhere to his duties and not to go beyond dharma and adharma. This

world, according to Mlmarhsa, is a eternal and moral where puru$a discovers

moral principles which guides his actions for his well-being from moral,

material social and spiritual point of view. The obedience of the injunctions ·Of

the Vedas and also insistence on the performance of rituals as a duty for the

sake of duty, is necessary. The system lays a great stress on the value of

dharma or moral duty.

"According to Mlmarhsa, dharma is not only the virtuous act, as enjoined by

the Vedas, but it also stands for the potentialities which store the effects of the

virtuous acts and which is called apurva. Although dharma as apurva has it's

own significance as one of the kii.myakarma-s, or optional actions, which store

_merit and aim at the attainment of svarga, or heaven, the real meaning of

27 P.T. Raju, The Philosophical Traditions of India, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1971, pp. 84-85.

121

dharma is understood to be the disinterested duty of the individual to perform

sacrifice, yajfia, etc. strictly according to the behests of the Vedas without

aiming at a1iy fruit, the attainment of the heaven or the like. "28

The system also reasserted the importance of Vedic philosophy enunciating the

standard of duty. The detached performance of duty should not be taken as a

blind faith of the Mimarhsa system in the authority of the Vedas. It reveals that

'the ethical attitude has the purpose of total development of human personality.

Though the dharma of the highest order, according to Mimarilsa must

necessarily be deduced from the Veda, yet the guidance of the smrti29 as well as •

the examples set by good persons30 and good institutions31, have also been

regarded as the basis of duty by the Milnamsakas. This indicates that the

approach of Mimarhsa system towards dharma is practical, which is seen in the

following of millions of people. It is said that "the life of a Hindu is governed

-by the Vedas, so that the Mimarhsa rules are very important for the

interpretation of the Hindu law. "32 The system presupposes a particular view of

human being, who is a moral agent and to whom all moral responsibilities may

be attributed.

28 I.C. Sharma, The Ethical Philosophies oflndia, p. 235. 29 Mimiirhsasatra, I, 3, 3-4. .

Quoted by Keith A.B., The Karma Mimiirhsa, Kanti Publications, Delhi, 1989, p. 85. 30 Ibid., I, 3, 8-9 .

. 31 Ibid., I, 3, 15-23. 32 S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, London, 1958, p. 418.

122

Puru!fa-Parlk!;ti of Vidyapati also envisages a puru~w, who is a moral agent and

to whom the virtues like vlrya, dhl, vidyti, saurya, viveka, utstiha etc. are

attributed, so that he can earn become a real puru!fa. It is the puru!fa 's conduct

which is the centre of moral reflections. He must cultivate the virtues to retain

his dignity for himself as well as for the welfare of the society. It is to be noted

here that human dignity was at stake during Vidyapati's time as is evident from

his writings. There were multitude of religious creeds and sects, each claiming

to be genuine and more authentic than the other. "There be several kinds of

heretics ..... such as Buddhists, Materialists (Carvaka) and the like, and many

sectarian teachers, logicians, philosophers, ritualists (Mimarilsakas) and others

who preach varying creeds with mutually opposing dogmas, and who are skilful

each in finding arguments on his own side. "33 Under these circumstances, one of

the major issues that cropped up to retain the human dignity was to know the

nature of dharma. Vidyapati, without prescribing any cult, suggested a course

of life which could be easily understood, accepted and followed by people at

large. Thus, in Vidyapati's view, dharma is to follow the tradition continuing in

one's tribe or community. He has followed the Indian tradition in treating

dharma supreme. Through the tale of a Contrite Prince, Vidyapati conveys that

"righteousness is the base of royal rule. "34 His practical approach of dharma is

33 G .A. Grierson, Ibid., p. 126. 34 Ibid., p. 133.

123

observed in one of the tales entitled 'The Tale of Adept in Book-Lore' 35 which

conveys that the interpretation of the principles of dharma should be according

to the circumstances, for ultimately these are meant for the welfare of puru~a.

35 Ibid., pp. 73-76.

124