Chapter 2

Idea of Labour: Ideologies and Perceptions in the 1930s

Working and living conditions of industrial workers produced a set of discourses on

labour, so-called "labour problems". They were not identical with the real problems of

the workers, but created from the subjective perceptions of social, economic and

political condition of industrial workers by the labour leaders with various social

background, capitalists and bureaucrats. As the industrial working classes in India made

their existence felt increasingly both in economic and political spheres, such discourses

on labour gradually assumed greater importance, as an object of the application of

international standard of working and living conditions by the bure~.ucracy, as the basis

of demand by the labour leaders, as a concession by the capitalists to the labour

movement, and as an item in the agenda of politicians.

One aspect of labour politics is the battle of contesting discourses on labour, for

discursive hegemony over other discourse. Of course, labour did exist with their

"actuality". Every discourse on labour was challenged by a response from labour. This

is another aspect of labour politics. Subaltern Studies and Chandavarkar attempted to

rescue the "actuality" from the orthodox labour historiography in different ways.'

However, as we shall see, the producers of these discourses developed methods,

sometimes elaborate and sometimes simply brutal, for ignoring, accommodating,

intently misrepresenting, and repressing the actuality of labour. If every nation is

imagined, class relation in it is also imagined. It is not meaningless to clarify the

discursiveness of the iabour politics and the way in which it worked in the process of

making a nation.

1 Chakrabarty, 1989; Chandavarkar, 1994.

63

1. Labour Leaders

(1) Moderates

We shall see, to begin with, a group of labour leaders called moderates. They were more

a group of labour leaders with various social background rather than ideological

category such as communist or Gandhian labour leaders.

Most of the moderate labour leaders came from a middle-class background. This

feature was shared by most of communist and Gandhian labour leaders, too, but what

distinguished the moderate leaders from others in this respect was that their middle-

class origin most directly and explicitly characterised the ways in which they viewed

and interacted with labour. The middle-class background of moderate labour leaders

affected their perception of labour. Like the philanthropists and social workers of the

nineteenth century, the moderate labour leaders believed that labour was a backward

social group, to be improved socially, economically, and morally. There was an unsaid

premise in this idea that labour was passive in this process of improvement labour by

themselves could not make any progress. The participation of the middle-class leaders

in labour movement was justified by this idea about labour. No common cause between •

their class and labour was required, since they belonged to different classes to begin

with.

Moderate labour leaders had common objectives and methods: improvement of the

social and economic conditions and the legal status of industrial workers, employment

of constitutional means and not violent methods to achieve these goals. In their primary

concern about the social and economic conditions of workers, the moderate labour

leaders were successors of the social reformists and philanthropist leaders of the

nineteenth century in their function and outlook. But with the reform of legislatures

after the First World War, politician-type leaders likeN. M. Joshi and Diwan Chaman

Lal came to the fore. As labour representatives in the Central Legislative Assembly,

64

realisation of labour welfare legislation became their main activity.

To achieve improvement in the condition of workers, moderate labour leaders

resorted to constitutional means. They considered strikes as a right of workers, but

thought that strikes should be conducted only as a last resort and that too for the

improvement of working and living conditions only. The constitution of the BTLU, a

moderate labour union formed by N. M. Joshi in 1926, included a clause that one object

of the union was to "endeavour to settle disputes between employers and employees

amicably so that a cessation of work may be avoided."2 The function of moderate labour

leaders in the labour movement was more or less complementary to the state. They

mediated between labour and state, and encouraged the state to grant labour various

benefits. The existence of the state was therefore essential for them. Naturally, the,v had

no motive to change the existing social order.

As long as the workers passively received the economic benefits and welfare

measures the moderate labour leaders promoted, they could say tbat they represented

the cause of labour. But the workers did have other aspirations which the moderate

labour leaders did not or could not see. In large strikes, where something more than

economic concession was at stake, the moderate labour leaders were overshadowed by

more radical labour leaders. In the general strike in Bombay cotton textile mills in 1928,

the moderate labour leaders at first opposed the strike, but were compelled to join in the

Joint Strike Committee, where they lost the initiative.3

(2) Communists

The idea of labour held by labour leaders and nationalist leaders in the colonial setting

had a close relation with their perception of the role of nationalists and native capital in

the nationalist movement. Communists had ~onventionally perceived nationalists as

2 N. M. Joshi Papers, No.S4. 3 Chapter 1, Section 3.

65

'nationalist reformists': nationalist were joining hands with native capitalists, who in

their tum conspired with the imperial forces in the exploitation of the masses in the

colonies. As for India under the British rule, in the view of Communists, nationalist

leaders in the Congress belonged to this category of 'nationalist reformists'. For

example, Abdul Halim of the Bengal Workers' and Peasants' Party wrote in 1929, of the

mistakes made by the Left trade unions:

... the Left-wing fails to draw a sufficiently sharp ideological line between itself

and the nationalist reformists of the Jawaharlal Nehru type, thus failing to prove

to the masses: (a) that the nationalist reformists are sacrificing the interests of

the workers for the interests of the nationalist bourgeoisie; (b) that they are co-

operating with the Right-Wingers (N. M. Joshi, Shiva Rao & Co) in order to

undermine and disrupt the Left-wing trade unions; (c) that the nationalists

reformists should be discarded; as labour leaders. 4

Therefore, "the united front tactics by the Left Wing" was "utterly wrong", and as an

appropriate attitude towards the nationalists, he stated:

Not less persistently and sharply the Left-Wing should criticise the nationalists-

reformists like Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Bose, etc., as the exponents of the

interests of the nationalist bourgeoisie within the labour movement, as

absolutely unfit and unreliable elements to lead the labour movement. 5

Communists considered the cooperation with nationalist in any form to be unjustifiable.

4 Abdul Halim, "Task of the Left-Wing Trade Unions of India", 25 November 1929, in Jyoti Basu, et al.(eds), Document of the Communist Movement in India, vol.III, Calcutta, 1997, p.6. 5 Abdul Halim, "Task of ... ", p.11.

66

The Left elements in the Congress did not escape from the attacks from communists. In

1934, Palme Dutt published an article titled "Congress Socialism: A Contradiction in

Terms". The title itself shows their disbelief in nationalist party, or the Congress, as a

way of attaining their goal.

In this traditional idea of the communists, the nationalist feeling of working classes

was linked only to their economic discontent resulting from the exploitation of the

colonies by imperial forces, of which native capitalists and bourgeois nationalists were

important partners. If the working classes became conscious of their own class interest,

all of them were to be the targets of their revolutionary movement. Thus, in their view,

revolutionary movement had priority over the nationalist movement and the solution of

the former question would automatically resolve the latter. In this historical process,

working classes would inevitably be led by communists. The only reason why working

classes supported the Congress was that they were misled by the skilful tactics of

nationalist-reformists. It was considered necessary, therefore, for communists to

continue the exposure of nationalist reformist to the masses, the result of which, they

thought, would be a return of the masses to their natural place under the leadership of

communists. In this argument, labour was represented as an entity to be led, or misled,

by others, with no regard to their own initiatives.

In the middle of 1930s, the communists in India changed their policy and took the

United Front Policy. This policy is important for us in two ways. First, it is one of the

factors deciding the relationship between the communists and the Congress in the latter

half of the 1930s, especially under the Congress ministries, which will be examined in

the following chapters. Second, it reveals how the communists in India were influenced

by the international communist movement and how their idea of labour was dictated by

the theoretical work. It is not that we are contesting the suitability of the change of

policy or the new policy in the current situation of Indian politics, or insisting that there

67

should be alternatives to it. We just propose that the adoption and pursuance of their

policies was made on the premise that they, and they alone, were able to grasp the

situation surrounding the Indian working classes and also to dictate and lead their

historical mission.

In early 1930s, the Communist Movement in India was undoubtedly declining. They

were defeated in the big strikes in the late 1920s; many leaders were arrested and put

under trial in Meerut; sectionalism was prevalent among the leaders who escaped arrest;

they lost the influence with the workers. To cap it all, the government banned the

activities of the CPI and other related organisations in 1934. There emerged a sign of

the change in policy. As early as 1932, the CPI began to be criticised for isolating itself

from the nationalist movement, both inside and outside India. 6

But the adoption of the new policy had to wait until the Seventh Comintern

Congress was held in Moscow in 1935. The argument in the Congress was influenced

by the experience in China where the Communist Party successfully assumed a

nationalist role, and the policy of the CPI was criticised for isolating the masses by

being detached from the nationalist movement. As a result, the resolution on "The Anti-

Imperialist Peoples' Front in the Colonial Areas" was adopted by the Congress. It

instructed communists in the colonial areas to participate in the "mass anti-imperialist

movements headed by the nationalist-reformists" and to make an effort to form a united

front with them on the basis of an "anti-imperialist platform". 7

This change of policy in the Comintern was confirmed in India by an article written

by P:llme Dutt and Ben Bradley and published in Inprecorr in February 1936. This

article, known as "Dutt-Bradley Thesis", reviewed their traditional view of the Congress

as a bourgeois party, and proposed to form the united front with them. They maintained:

6 Haithcox, 1971, pp.206-208. 7 Haithcox, 1971, pp.211-214.

68

The National Congress has undoubtedly achieved a gigantic task in uniting wide

forces of the Indian people for the national struggle, and remains to-day the

principal existing mass organisation of many diverse elements seeking national

liberation.

The existing bourgeois leadership of the Congress, the authors asserted, made number

of decisions against the interests of the masses and the national struggle in the past. But,

their "opposition to a particular leadership or to particular policies", they went on, was

"only intended to assist the mass army of the national struggle, represented by the

Congress, and to assist and strengthen the national struggle". So, it was necessary not to

impair "the degree of unity that has been achieved through the National Congress" but

to extend it. 8

The Congress was a party of "a restrictive individual membership" based on

ideology or creed, like non-violence. But such an ideology or creed prevented the

Congress "from embracing the broadest front of all who support the national struggle".

It was urged to establish a united front of the Congress with trade unions, peasant

organisations, youth associations and other anti-imperialist mass organisations. For this

purpose, the constitution of the party should be amended so as to permit the collective

affiliation of those mass organisations. 9

As a consequence of this change of the policy of the world and Indian communist

movement, the role of the working classes in the nationalist movement necessarily

changed. For the first time, communists admitted that there was nationalist

consciousness among working class which could not necessarily be reduced to class

interests. But they did not have any means of exploiting this consciousness. Although

8 Rajani Palme Dutt and Ben Bradley, "The Anti-Imperialist People's Front in India", published in "INPRECORR" of 29 February, 1936, in Document of tbe Communist Movement in India, vol.IIT, pp.223-224. 9 Dutt and Bladley, "The Anti-Imperialist ... ", pp.224-225.

69

communists became aware that working classes did not behave solely out of economic

discontent or class interests, they could not explain it within their idea of labour. In the

Indian case, they had no other way than opting for the Congress, which seemed to have

achieved "a gigantic task" in this respect.

In the organised labour movement, the effect of this change in the policy of

communists appeared in the form of a move for the re-unification of all-India trade

unions, which had split in 1929, when moderate labour leaders left the communist-

dominated AITUC and established the National Trade Union Federation. Unity was first

achieved between the AITUC and the Red Trade Union Congress (henceforth referred

as RTUC). Accepting the invitation from the AITUC, the representatives of the RTUC

participated in the AITUC fourteenth session of the AITUC held at Calcutta on 19-21

April 1935. In the session, it was unanimously decided that the RTUC would be

dissolved and merged into the AITUC, according to the principles of unity already

formulated by the AITUC Executive Committee in January 1935. The terms of merger

were: the acceptance of the principle of class struggle, no affiliation to any international

organisation, the acceptance of AITUC as the only central labour organisation, etc. 10

The merger between the AITUC and the National Trade Union Federaton came

later. In 1937, the National Trade Union Federation made an appeal for the unity,

known as "Giri Proposal" and a joint board was established. In April 1938, a joint

session was held in Nagpur and it was decided that the two organisations would be

amalgamated on these conditions: no affiliation to foreign organisations, three-fourth

majority for decisions on political questions and the General Council to have equal

number of representative from each organisation. Nevertheless, the formal merger had

to wait for two more years. 11

We have to note that this change in the Communists' ideas of the Congress and

10 Sukomal Sen, 1997, p.306. 11 Sukomal Sen, 1997, pp.324-326.

70

working classes in India was initiated by the decision made abroad, that is, by the world

communist movement As Overstreet and Windmiller maintained, the Communist

Movement in India had to function in a "dual environment", that is, an international

communist community and a national political community. 12 In the Comintern, the idea

of Indian working classes and nationalist bourgeoisie must be formed and revised, at a

more abstract ievel than in India. It was acknowledged in the Seventh Comintern

Congress that the Comintern had erred in applying its policies "to the concrete condition

of the working class movement" in various parts of the world, but the adoption of the

united front policy was not made on "the concrete condition", but on the theoretical

application of the experience in China to India. One symbolic fact of this was that the

CPI was not represented at the Seventh Comintern Congress. 13

The communists in India made a change in their policy of the same kind during the

Second World War. In January 1942, they called for support to Britain in its war effort,

following the declaration of anti-fascist "People's War" after Germany invaded the

Soviet Union. The decision was made regardless the fact that India was still under

British rule.

It is no being suggested that all decisions of the Communist Movement in India

were taken by the Conuntern or that their activities were completely separated from the

working classes whom they claimed to lead. It is maintained that the Indian communists

acted according to their discourse on labour, which was based on subjective and, in

particular in the case of communists, theoretical perception of labour. For the

communists, labour, as a workiug class, was a historical force that continued to march

towards their own liberation from the existing social order, which was necessarily

exploitative and hostile to workers. But its course should be dictated and their actions

disciplined by the intelligentsia, the communist leaders. To put it differently, labour was

12 Overstreet and Windmiller, 1960, p.3 and pp.9-14. 13 Overstreet and Windmiller, 1960, p.159.

71

an entity to be led or misled by others: communists should lead them, because,

otherwise, they would be necessarily misled by the other reactionary forces. The

perception of communists about Indian situation was that the working classes were

being misled by nationalist reformists within the Congress.

In the 1930s, they began to notice and consider the nationalist consciousness of the

working classes, but only theoretically: nationalist consciousness of Indian workers was

just appreciated as a weapon in the hartds of nationalists to lead, or mislead, the working

classes, which the communists should exploit through the united front with nationalists.

But the working classes were deprived of their own initiative as per their idea of labour.

Communists joined the politics of labour, which grew in significance under the 1935

Act, as one of the contenders for the right to lead and control workers, along with other

participants like various labour leaders, nationalists, and bureaucracy.

(3) Gandhian and Congress Labour Leaders

With the formation of an industrial working class in India and the transformation of the

Congress from an elite political organisation into a nationalist organisation with a

broader base of mass support after the First World War, it was inevitable that Congress

should pay attention to them. That they were interested in the rapidly growing labour

movement was reflected by the fact that a number of nationalist leaders attended the

inaugural session of the AITUC, and ti1at three of its first presidents were

simultaneously the president of the Congress. 14 The Congress faced a new question.

They had to decide whether they would admit the participation of industrial working

class in the nationalist movement. Some Congress leaders, such as C. R. Das saw the

working classes as a new momentum to the nationalist movement. Gandhi, on the other

hand, did not allow working classes to join the nationalist movement, or politics as

14 Revri, pp.84-86. Revri writes that this does not necessarily mean the close interdependence between the two organisCJ.tions.

72

such. He thought that the Indian industrial workers were too premature, according to his

labour theory. As the result of a controversy between them in the beginning of the

1920s, Gandhi succeeded in putting through his idea. 15

The relation between thP; Congress and the labour movement until 1937 took a

unique form: on the one hand, the announcement of official labour policy without an

actual commitment to labour problems except the resolutions at the annual sessions,

and, on the other hand, an active participation of individual Congress leaders in labour

movement in various forms such as holding of office in labour organisations and taking

the role of representatives of workers in negotiation with the employers.

When we consider the labour policy of the Congress, we cannot overlook the

influence of Gandhi's ideas on labour and its practice in Ahmedabad. Officially, the

labour movement in Ahmedabad had nothing to do with the Congress. Gandhi stressed

that his relation to the movement was only personal. Nevertheless, Ahmedabad had

continued to be a source of ideology and personnel to the labour policy of the Congress.

Gandhi's involvement in the labour movement in Ahmedabad started with his

activity for the settlement of the cotton mill workers' strike in 1918, a well-known

episode. 16 The cause of the strike was the withdrawal of a plague allowance, which the

millowners had paid since 1917 to cope with the shortage of labour caused by the

epidemic of plague in the city. When the millowners decided to abolish the allowance

and proposed a 20 per cent increase in wages the following year, the workers felt

dissatisfied and demanded 50 per cent increase because price rise was extremely rapid

after the First World War. Anasuyaben Sarabhai, who was a sister of prominent

millowner Ambalal Sarabhai and engaged in the welfare work of workers, Shankerlal 15

For the ideas on labour of C. R. Das and this "indirect debate" between Das and Gandhi, see Rakhahari Chatterji, 1984, pp.126-204. 16

Judith Brown included Gandhi's involvement in the strike, as well as the movements in Charnparan and Kheda in this period, in the practice of satyagraha, a unique form of his political activities. Judith Brown, 1972, pp.S2-122; For an account of the strike by a person close to Gandhi, see Desai, 1951.

73

Banker, and the Collector of the District contacted Gandhi to seek for his help. By this

time, Gandhi had consolidated his position as a national leader through his activities

among the Indians in South Africa and among the workers of indigo plantations in

Champaran. On his arrival in Ahmedabad, he met the millowners and succeeded in

making them agree that the dispute should be referred to an arbitration board.

But before the arbitration board started its proceedings, workers in some mills struck

work. Millowners refused arbitration and declared lock-out, then all the workers went

on strike. Gandhi persuaded the workers to reduce their demand to 35 per cent increase

in wages from the original 50 per cent and made the workers take pledges that they

would not resume work unless they got 35 per cent increase in wages and that they ·

would not resort to violence during the strike. After the strike continued for twenty-one

days, the millowners announced that the workers willing to accept a 20 per cent increase

in wages could resume work, and those who refused to work on that term would lose

their job. The morale of the workers got markedly depressed. Gandhi declared fast unto

death. Being concerned about the effect of the fast of an influential figure like Gandhi,

at last the mill owners agreed for arbitration. The final terms of settlement were: (1)

After resuming work, workers would get the wage increased by 35 per cent for the first

day and by 20 per cent for the second day; (2) the dispute would be referred to an

umpire; (3) until the decision of the umpire, the workers would get 27.5 per cent wage

increase; ( 4) After the decision of the umpire, the wage until the date. of the decision

would be adjusted against 27.5 per cent and the balance would be paid to the workers or

returned to employers. Later, Anandshanker Bapubhai Dhruva, the umpire, decided in

favour of the workers.

The strike left the Ahmedabad cotton textile industry with a unique labour-capital

relations accompanying an elaborate machinery for the settlement of disputes. The

Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association (henceforth referred as ATLA), or the Majur

74

Mahajan, was established on 25 February 1920. Anasuyaben Sarabhai was elected the

president. The workers were organised into craft unions affiliated to the central

federation. The chief function of the Association was welfare activities among the

workers: it maintained two dispensaries and a hospital, twenty-three schools, evening

classes in chawls, a library and a reading room, four physical culture centres, a cheap

grain shop, restaurants, a savings bank, Cheap Loan Department. The RCLI regarded

this as "the only union with an elaborate range of welfare activities". 17

Labour-capital relations in Ahmedabad were based on the collaboration between

employers and employees through the representative organisations: the ATLA and the

Ahmedabad Millowners' Association (henceforth AMOA). They developed elaborate

proceedings for the settlement of disputes. The Government of Bombay, in the evidence

before the RCLI, described the system as follows:

In the Ahmedabad cotton mill industry it has been.mutually agreed between ,the

Ahmedabad Millowners' Association and the Ahmedabad Labour Union that all

grievances should, in the first instance, be discussed between the workers

themselves and the managements of the mills concerned. If any worker has a

grievance he reports to a member of the council of representatives from his mill.

the member speaks to the head of the department and the agent of the mill, if

necessary. If the grievance is not redressed a formal complaint is recorded with

the Labour Union. The Labour Union official - usually the secretary or the

assistant secretary - gor-s to the mill, ascertains the correctness of the complaint

and requests the mill officer or the agent to redress the grievance. If no settlement

is arrived at during this stage the matter is reported by the Labour Union to the

Millowners' Association. The Secretary of the Mill owners' Association speaks to

the mill concerned and tries to settle the matte!' amicably. The procedure in 17

RCLI, p.328.

75

connection with grievances of a general nature referring to several mills or several

workers in a mill are also similarly dealt with. If the workers do not get redress

after the matter has been discussed between the Millowners' Association and the

Labour Union, the matter is fmally referred to the Permanent Arbitration Board. 18

This arbitration system continued its working, though intermittently. 19

The strike of 1918 was also important because Gandhi's ideas on labour problems

were expressed for the fust time. In the course of the strike, he addressed the workers

and wrote pamphlets for the guidance of the workers, in which he unfolded his ideas on

labour problems, such as labour-capital relations, meaning of strike, and living wage.

Gandhi developed his ideas in occasional writings on labour in later years, though it was

still neither systematic nor comprehensive. From the speeches and pamphlets during the

strike and his later writings, Gandhian labour theory can be summarised as follows.

First, the mutuality between labour and capital characterised his idea on labour-

capital relations. Workers and capitalists need each other in the production: workers

have to use the wealth of capitalists to get necessities for their living; capitalists cannot

continue their production without workers. They have common interests in the

prosperity of the industry to which they belong and labour was regarded as the owner of

the industry as well: "In my opinion the mill hands are as much the proprietors of their

mills as the shareholders"20 The relations between them were often compared to that of

father and son: "The relation between mill-agents and mill-hands ought to be one of

father and children or as between blood-brothers. "21 As a result, for Gandhi, class

struggle was neither natural nor inevitable. He believed that it was "perfectly possible to

18 RCLI, p.336. 19 For the working of the arbitration in the later period, see Patel, 198 7. 20 Young India, 4 August 1927. 21 Young India, 10 May 1928.

76

avoid it. 1122

Second, Indian industrial workers were regarded as immature both in their class and

national consciousness. This perception of immaturity made the participation of the

workers in politics inappropriate, at least in the present stage. During Assam tea coolies

strike in 1921 in the period of Non-cooperation, Gandhi stated that he thought it "most

dangerous thing to make political use of labour until labourers understand the political

conditions".23 He did not allow the ATLA to affiliate to the AITUC nor establish official

connection with the Congress. Moreover, this idea prohibited the workers from

conducting political and sympathetic strikes. Gandhi stated during the strike mentioned

above that in India "we want no political strike".24 In his opinion, "the labourers and

artisans of India have not arrived at that stage of national consciousness, which is

necessary for successful sympathetic strikes. "25

Third, it imposed the principle of non-violence on workers. As Gandhi demanded

workers to take a pledge of non-violence in the strike of 1918, workers should conduct

strikes in a disciplined manner and not do any damage to capitalists or their property.

They must not coerce the willing workers to stay out of work by violence. This

principle decidedly restricted way of conducting strikes. All picketing "without

indubitably just cause", according to it, is violent and generally no picketing should be

resorted to by individuals. 26 This had significant implications on the tactics of strikers in

the Indian situation where employers could find black legs easily in the over-supplied

market of labour. Moreover, this principle formed the ideological background for the

~ejectiou of class struggle and revolution.

Fourth, it emphasises "decent" living wage. Workers have a right to receive living

22 Harijan, 19 October 1935. 23 Young India, 16 February 1921. 24

Young India, 16 February 1921. 25 Young India, 22 September 1921. 26 Harijan, 2 December 1939.

77

wage, which guarantees them decent standard of living. The demands of workers should

be based on this criterion and should not be exaggerated. Workers should make a

demand only for justice, and should not exploit the economic situation of capitalists:

"both the demands and the means adopted to enforce them must be just and clear. It is

unlawful demand which seeks merely to take advantage of the capitalists' position". 27

Not demand, therefore, should harass the employers or the government.

Lastly, it provided for the settlement of disputes between labour and capital by way

of arbitration. Every dispute should be brought to an arbitration board consisting of the

representatives of labour and capital, and, if the agreement is not reached there, it

should be refen ed to an umpire whose decision is final and binding on both sides.

Strikes should be regarded as the last resort to be employed only after all the means of

negotiation are explored. This principle of arbitration easily led to the view that

arbitration could be a substitute for strikes and no strike is necessary as far as arbitration

was functioning, though strikes were not denied theorethically. As we shall see later,

this became the policy of the Bombay Congress Government on labour disputes. 28

After the establishment of the A TLA, the Ahmedabad cotton textile industry played

the role as a laboratory for the experiment of Gandhian ideas regarding labour. Through

its activities, the A TLA trained many Congress labour leaders, who played a central role

in making the labour policy in the Congress Government under the 1935 Act and also in

independent India. Gulzarilal Nanda was one of such leaders. He became the Secretary

of the ATLA in 1922 kept the position till 1946; in 1937 he was elected to Bombay

Legislative Assembly from the Ahmedabad labour constituency, and appointed the

Parliamentary Secretary to the Government of Bombay (Labour and Excise). 29

27 Young India, 10 October 1920.

28 h See C apter 6. 29 After independence, he was the Minister of Labour and Housing of the Government of Bombay ( 194 7 -50) and the Union Minister of Planning, Labour and Employment (1957-62); and the Prime Minister (1964 and 1966). For his biographical details, see, Kalhan, 1997.

78

However, the success of the strike and the continuing functioning of the arbitration

system in Ahmedabad was less due to the merit of Gandhian ideology, than to other

conditions of Ahmedabad. As the RCLI pointed out, the labour-capital relations in

Ahmedabad depended on conditions unique to the city. The presence of Gandhi was the

most unique condition of Ahmedabad. The RCLI stated that the scheme for the

settlement of disputes in Ahmedabad "depended largely on the unique position of Mr.

Gandhi, whose influence in Ahmedabad, both with the employers and the workers, is

very great. "30

But even this personal influence of Gandhi should not be overestimated. As Sujata

Patel pointed out, Gandhi's influence, especially with the employers, would not have

been so strong or lasting, if the interests of the Ahmedabad cotton textile industry were

not in direct confrontation with the interests of Lancashire, and if the Ahmedabad

mill owners were not comparatively loyal to the cause of nationalism. 31 Moreover, we

could also point out the social and cultural reasons for the success of arbitration system

in Ahmedabad. The Ahmedabad cotton textile industry drew its labour force from the

city or its district, in contrast to the Bombay labour force consisting of migrants. As a

result, the employers and workers shared "not merely the same religion but the same

mother tongue". 32 Caste system in Ahmedabad was another reason. Gujarati caste

system had a "highly centralised, autocratic structure" and "their peculiar form of social

organization, in which control over almost every aspect of mundane life was exercized

by the leading sheds of the caste." As a traditional commercial centre, Ahmedabad kept

well-oraganiscd caste institutions especially for commercial purposes.33 This rich guild

tradition formed a background for successful functioning of the A TLA and the

arbitration system. Ahmedabad had trade guilds like mahajan for merchants and panch

30 RCLI, p.337. 31 Patel, 1987, pp.65-81. 32 RCLI, p.337. 33 Dobbin, 1972, p.98.

79

for artisans, specialised m partiCUlar occupations. Ano nagarsem, wnu ucauu~o;;;u Lu

sara[ mahajan, "represented the city's interests and those of the various points of time .

... In addition, he used his influences to settle disputes between various guilds or

individuals by setting up punch or an arbitration". The craft basis organisation of the

ATLA and the arbitration system had their roots in this tradition. 34 We should notice that

the Majur Mahajan, another name of the Association, suggests its relation with the

traditions.

All this shows that the labour-capital relations in Ahmedabad did not rely on

Gandhi's personal influence alone, much less on the merit of his ideas on labour. Quite

logically, the arbitration system in Ahmedabad dependent on the local conditions would

not work elsewhere, at least, as smoothly. It is not surprising that the attempt to

transplant the Ahmedabad system to other places failed. Hindustan Mazdoor Sevak

Sangh, established in 1938 to extend the experiment of Ahmedabad to other centres,

was not able to obtain good results.

The strike of 1918 and the development of the labour-capital relations in

Ahmedabad revealed the weaknesses that Gandhian ideas on labour inherently

possessed: it has an enormous difficulty in its application to real labour problems

without the suitable conditions, naturally or artificially prepared. For example, the idea

of living wage, or fair wage, lacked clarity. As per his idea, living wage could be

decided by examining tht: price of necessities and expenditure of a worker's family. But

the idea did not give any reason why this minimum amount could be the "decent" living

wage, nor the way in which the actual profit was divided between capital and labour. In

reality, living wage should be decided by someone rather arbitrarily. The arbitrator had

the right to decide the living wage, though he was required to make an "investigation"

of the economic situation of the workers before the decision. The concept of living

wage, therefore, was not economic: it was either political or ethical compromise 34 Patel, 1987, pp.l3-16.

80

between labour and capital. This character of compromise had already been shown in

the strike in 1919: workers' demand of 35 per cent wage increase, which was

recommended by Gandhi, was just the mean between 50 per cent, the original demand

of the workers, and 20 per cent, the millowners' proposal~ 27.5 per cent increase in wage

until the decision of the arbitrator, was the mean between the demand from labour and

capital. The arbitrator a(imitted that he could not decide the living wage:

Under these circumstances [lack of information], I cannot come to a decision

regarding a really just solution of the disputes. But it being desirable that the

workmen should get the arbitrator's award without further delay, I have had to

arrive at practical justice. 35

The reason he submitted for his award based on "practical justice", 35 per cent increase

in wages, was that "in the majority of mills" it was "already being given".36

Moreover, Gandhian ideas on labour-capital relations depended on the role of an

impartial outsider as an arbitrator, whose influence on both sides must come from

activities other than labour-capital relations. In the case of strike in 1919, the invitation

to Gandhi from Ahmedabad, in the first place, was due to his reputation in politics. The

capitalists agreed to an arbitration due to his declaration of fast. Although it was said

that the fast was not intended to influence or coerce the employers, it did have the

effect. Even Gandhi himself admitted: "But it was not possible for me to stop my fast

from having any effect on the millowners."37 While the arbitrators could carry out their

role with the help of Gandhi's influence and favourable conditions in Ahmedabad, the

realisation of Gandhian ideas was difficult in places where such persons or conditions

35 Desai, 1951, p.91. Emphasis original. 36 Desai, 1951, p.91. 37 Desai, 1951, p.96.

81

were not available.

The Congress as a party, did not make any official involvement in labour movement

nor mobilise industrial workers as a class for their nationalist struggle until they took

office in the provinces in 1937 under the Government oflndia Act, 1935. The activities

of the Congress Labour Sub-Committee, which was established in the Congress Nagpur

Session in 1921 in the atmosphere of growing interests in labour movement after the

war, dwindled in the subsequent years till mid-1930s. The only activities that the

Congress did for industrial workers were occasional resolutions expressing sympathy

with the workers on strike.38

This lack of concern of the Congress for working classes was partly due to the

ideological influence of Gandhi in the party and the effect of his views on labour, which

once prevailed over those in favour of mobilising labour for the national cause. But it

was more due to the middle-class character of the Congress. In the 1920s, the main

political·current in the Congress were those who believed in the tactics of council entry.

The members of such councils were either nominated by the government or elected on a

very limited franchise. They did not see any need to mobilise the masses for the

nationalist struggle, but even feared to do so, because it would threaten their

constitutional way of politics, or at its worst, endanger the existing order of society, as

was shown in the last stage of the Non-Cooperation. Ironically, Gandhi, who opposed

·the inclusion of working classes in nationalist politics, was to lead the broad-based mass

movement, though he strictly restricted them to one of non-class character.

In spite of this lack of actual commitment to labour movement, the Congress

maintained or even gradually developed their ideas on labour. We do see a change in

the tone of the resolutions concerning labour from the early 1930s. It shifted from

simply expressing sympathy with working classes and their movement (though it 38 For example, a resolution in support of the strikers in Bombay, adopted by the All India Congress Committee, Delhi, 3-4 November, 1928, Zaidi, vo1.9, p.497.

82

continued), to making promises to improve the social and economic position of working

classes in their plan of the society, in which the Congress assumed the responsibility for

such improvement. Nothing more clearly reflected this change in ideas on labour than

the the resolution on Fundamental Rights and Economic Programme adopted in the

Congress J(arachi Session in March 1931. It defined the "Fundamental Rights" of

industrial workers as follows:

3. A living wage for industrial workers, limited hours of labour, healthy

conditions of work, protection against the economic consequences of old age,

sickness and unemployment.

4. Labour to be freed from serfdom or conditions bordering on serfdom

5. Protection of women workers, and specially adequate provisions -for leave

during maternity period.

6. Prohibition against employment of children of school-going age in factories.

7. Right of labour to form unions to protect their interests with suitable

machinery for settlement of disputes by arbitration. 39

The resolution became a manifesto of the Congress for social and economic issues in

the 1930s. 40 As we shall see later, its contents were incorporated in the Congress

Election Manifesto in 1936, and formed the basis of the labour policy of the Congress

governments under provincial autonomy. 41

Political requirements were the reasons for this change in ideas. In the first place,

39 Zaidi, vol.10, pp.111-112. 40 It was resolved at the ewe in 1934 that the resolution condensed should be printed on Membership Forms. Indian Annual Register (JAR), 1934, vol.1, p.297. 41 See Chapters 5 and 6.

83

the mass politics emerged in the late 1920s as, on the one hand, constitutional reform

was going on and the next constitution was expected to be more democratic, however

limited it would be, and; on the other hand, socialist movement grew during this period

and began to mobilise industrial workers and peasants. Both in constitutional and

agitational politics, the Congress had to mobilise the masses simply to prevent others

from mobilising them.

For these reasons, the character of the nationalist movement led by the Congress

began to be transformed in the late 1920s. The rejection of the Simon Commission and

the declaration of Puma Swaraj at the Congress Lahore Session in 1929 shows that it

began to aim at the creation of an independent nation. Thereafter, the Congress

gradually defmed various aspects of such a nation and adapted their activities to the

definitions. Indeed, the Congress functioned as if it were the state: their claim to

represent the entire nation and to be the sole agent for national integration of regions,

religious communities and economic classes; the reform of the party organisation for

representing and arbitrating those interests. Logically, the industrial workers, as well as

peasants, would be a constituent part of this supposed nation, and clear-cut policies of

the Congress towards them should be. formulated, though their operational details, or

practicability at all, was kept vague at this stage.

In terms of classes, the Congress envisaged independent India as a multi-class

nation based on the principles of class collaboration and non-violence, instead of class

struggle and violent revolution exhorted by socialists. It was demanded of the masses to

give up the idea of improving their social and ~conomic conditions by way of violent

revolutionary political action. In return for that, they were promised social and

economic benefits, as was declared in the Karachi Resolution. The Congress Working

Committee (henceforth referred as CWC), in a resolution adopted at the meeting held in

Bombay on 17 and 18 June 1934, clarified that the economic programme in the Karachi

84

resolution contemplated "neither the confiscation of private property without just cause

or compensation nor advocacy of class war", and that confiscation and class were

"contrary to the Congress creed of non-violence". It added that the CWC contemplated

"healthier relationship between capital and labour". 42

This change in the character of nationalist movement and the idea of multi-class

nation formed the framework in which the Congress class policy was formulated. The

Congress was supposed to serve the whole nation, not any particular class. Thus, the

policy was marked by balancing and mediating. For the working classes, they extracted

from the capitalists as much economic benefit as they could with their influence on

them. This characterised the labour welfare policy of the Bombay Congress

Government during the period of provincial autonomy. For the capitalist class, they

cooperated in opposing the British economic interests and the economic policy of the

colonial government. In addition, they guaranteed the capitalists that the existing

capitalistic economic system would be followed in India.

The Congress was supposed to be neutral between the two classes. But this

neutrality did not mean that they dissociated themselves from being concerned about

them, as the colonial government did. Rather, they would play the role of an arbitrator

by wielding their influence over the two classes as the only representative of the nation.

In their view, the Congress should have an authority to intervene and control labour-

capital relations, according to the re:quirement in the struggle for independence and the

plan of nation-building.

The Congress always reminded the capitalists that there was another class whose

interests the Congress should care about. Vallabhbhai Patel, one of the leaders most

sympathetic to the capitalists, spoke to the cotton dealers just after the inauguration of

the Bombay Congress Government: "In the demands you have made from the Congress

Ministry you can naturally expect all possible sympathy, but you cannot forget that 42 Zaidi, vol.lO, p.400.

85

there are other interests whose claims, by their nature; should have precedence over all

others."43 B. G. Kher, the Prime Minister of the Bombay Congress Government, told the

capitalists at the annual· meeting of the Indian Merchants' Chamber in 1939, that the

government was pledged to "the improvement of the lot of the poor", even if it clashed

with the economic doctrines of commercial and industrial community. 44 At least a part

of Indian capitalists understood this character of the Congress rule, and that it would be

the basis of the plan for welfare state, on which the Congress and Indian capitalists later

agreed for the economic planning of independent India. 45

While the official labour policy of the Congress was shaped by the political

requirement of the Congress, it was also based on Gandhi's ideas on labour. The effects

of his ideas on the Congress labour policy was rather ideological and rhetorical than

practical, as were his ideas on other issues. Perhaps, apart from taking advantage of his

personal influence, Gandhian ideas on labour - political immaturity of Indian workers,

principle of non-violence, mutuality between labour and capital, emphasis on arbitration

- were consonant well with their idea of multi-class nation~ When they applied the idea

to their labour policy, Gandhi's ideas on labour and the achievement in Ahmedabad was

brought in, and they remained an ideological basis of the official labour policy. This

explains their assertion of the uniqueness of their labour policy in spite of the fact that

their measures concerning labour depended on Western and bureaucratic institutions. 46

The officiallab.:>ur policy of the Congress created a problem for the party. If the

Congress played the role of an arbitrator between labour and capital, they needed to

possess enough authority over both of them outside the labour-capital relations. In fact

their authority as arbitrators, in Gandhian labour theory, depended upon the reputation

43 Bombay Chronicle, 6 September 193 7. 44 Report of the Indian Merchants' Chamber, 1938, p.xli. 45 See Chapter 4. 46 Chandavarkar point out the influence of Western legal institutions on those of the Congress. Patel, 1987, Chandavarkar, 1998, pp.284-285.

86

gained in the field other than labour movement. Naturally, nationalism was to be a

source of authority for the Congress. As far as the spread of nationalism among the

industrial workers was concerned, the Congress had to help the workers develop

maturity and be conscious of their national duty, but they had to do this without having

them participate in the nationalist movement. The official labour policy by itself was

not able to present a sclution to this difficulty at least not until they set out to organise

labour in their national, class collaborationist manner in the late 1930s.

Along with their official policy of non-commitment, the attitude of the Congress

towards labour movement always had a different current: individual participation of the

Congress leaders, who believed in the necessity of mobilisation of working classes for

the nationalist struggle. This was possible because of the organisational feature of the

Congress. The Congress was not a political party which imposed uniformity and

discipline but an political forum in which those with different political persuasion could

take part. Thus, in 1920s and 1930s, number of Congress leaders took the office of trade

unions, and led strikes.

In the 1930s, those in the Congress who believed in the mobilisation of working

classes for nationalist struggle by way of social and economic reforms formed

themselves as Left-wing of the party. The formation of the Congress Socialist Party in

1934 by the Leftist Congress leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan, Ashok Mehta was the

most radical self-expression of the Left in the Congress party. They chose to r.;:main

within the Congress Party and radicalise the party from within by opposing the existing

Gandhian leadership.

Jawaharlal Nehru was a representative figure of that current of the Congress labour

policy. His active participation in the labour movement in his individual capacity was in

contrast to the official policy of avoidance. He often made sympathetic statements when

big strikes occui-red. He was elected the president of the AITUC in 1929. With his

87

popularity as national leader and his position in the ewe, he became the leader of the

Left-wing of the Congress in the 1930s. The CSP also regarded him as a channel

through which they could influence the policy of the Congress. In January 1936, the

party adopted a resolution recommending Nehru for the presidency of the party. 47 The

Left-wingers of the Congress, the CSP and the followers of Nehru, formed a group of

significant influence in the party. Although we cannot get an accurate figure, it was said

that one-third of the members were supporting the Left. Nevertheless, as we shall see,

they yielded to the conservatives of the party, the so-called Right-wingers, in the

process of office acceptance under the 1935 Act.

It is difficult and perhaps wrong to attribute this retreat of the Left-wing of the

Congress to a single cause. But it can at least be said that it had a connection with the

idea of labour held by the Left-wing leaders. It is important to notice that even the ideas

of Congress leaders who supported the participation of the working class in national

movement, or who individually joined and led the labour movement, had put a limit to

it, because they also thought that the mobilisation of working classes must be under the

control of the Congress. They did not allow the working classes to take an initiative. At

the grass roots level, Congress leaders who were involved in strikes tried to avoid

workers taking their own initiative in the strike. They thought that it would necessarily

lead to volatility, disorder, and violence. In this sense, they shared the idea of labour

with Gandhi who thought that Indian labour was immature. The method the Congress

leaders usually employed was to take over the leadership from the workers and to get

the strike under their control.

At the level of high politics, the Left-wing leaders thought that the working classes

could play a significant role in the nationalist struggle but it was only within the

Congress organisation and under the middle-class Congress leadership. The CSP could

not achieve the purpose for which it was established. Its activities were absorbed in the 47 Haithcox, 1971, p.240.

88

effort to defend their identity from the communists. This meant that they regarded it

important to stay within the Congress and maintain its identity as nationalists. For

Nehru, it was more important than anything else to maintain the solidarity of the

Congress, which he believed to be an indispensable means of realising the national

unity and achieving independence. He may be sincere in expressing his concern for

social reforms but he could not sacrifice the Congress. 48

As a result, the attempt of the Left-wing leaders like Nehru to introduce the

dynamism of working classes into the Congress confmed it into a narrow organisational

framework of the Congress Party. There is no doubt that the activities of the Left-wing

greatly contributed to the popularisation of the Congress in the 1930s. But they were not

able to take control of the party nor make the Congress the party for the poor. The '

industrial workers, along with other working classes and peasants, was compelled to

coexist with the capitalists and landlords in the party as equals theoretically but not so in

practice.

2. Capitalists' Idea of Labour

The capitalists' idea of Indian labour was characterised by the emphasis on their social

backwardness. The capitalists in India, both Indians and foreign, on many occasions

described their workers by words such as illiteracy, inefficiency, indiscipline,

improvidence, and immorality. The IJMA stated in their memorandum to the RCLI:

"The labour in Indian jute mills is entirely different from the labour in mills abroad, and

illiteracy, undoubtedly, has a great deal to do with this aspect." 49 To some extent, there

was truth in their statement. For example, most workers remained uneducated and the

literacy rate among the industrial workers in general was very low.

But it was not the actual condition of workers with regard to education or literacy

·---

48 Chandra, 1975. 49

RCLI, vol.S, part.l, p.305.

89

but the requirement of production, that is, recruitment of labour force from the rural

areas, intensive use of cheap unskilled labour, dependence for supervisory staff on the

Europeans, that formed the capitalists' idea of labour. As we shall see later, they thought

that the relatively low cost of labour was the key to the competitiveness of their

products in international market or in competition with foreign goods in the domestic

market; they did not require literate or efficient but costly labour. In other words, the

capitalists' idea of backward labour was the characteristic of labour they had tolerated in

return for its low cost.

The capitalists' idea of the backwardness of Indian labour had a close connection

with the method of labour recruitment and the organisational structure of the mills. The

fact that most of the labour in Bombay cotton mills and Bengal jute mills was recruited

from rural areas largely contributed to this idea of Indian labour in the mind of

capitalists. Capitalists often complained of the migratory nature of labour, expressed in

the high rate of absenteeism and turnover, and, as we shall see, used it as a pretext for

not adopting labour welfare measures. But there was the other side to this picture. As

Chandavarkar says about Bombay cotton textile industry, the loose deployment of

labour was a part of their "business strategy". 50 It was not an exaggeration, therefore,

when the RCLI said that a picture that "the main industries of India as manned by a

mass of agricultural workers, temporarily forsaking the mattock and the plough to add

to their income by a brief spell of industrial work in the city" was only "in the minds of

some employers, whose attention is focused on the rapidity with which their own labour

force changes. "51

The capitalists presumed that the workers, whose mentality was inherently rural,

were vulnerable to various evils of urban life. They noted on many occasions the moral

degradation of the workers in urban setting. The IJMA stated, "In an industrial district,

so Chandavarkar, 1994. 51 RCLI, p.12.

98

however, there are always temptations for the young that are not found in their up­

country homes, such as gambling, drugs, etc. "52

A sign of a connection between the capitalists' idea of labour and the organisational

structure of the mills can be seen in the description of the staff orgahisation in the mills

as given by the millowners. In the memorandum submitted by the IJMA to the RCLI,

they stated, "The bulk of the work in the mill is unskilled" and the .skill necessary for

the work "is obtained in the course of actual employment". Therefore, "facilities for the • training of jute mill workers are negligible." The prospect for the promotion of the

unskilled workers was very limited on account of their being uneducated. At best, they

were able to become sirdars, "according to capability, efficiency, service, and the

authority which they display over their fellow workers", and not due to their educational

qualifications. Indeed, it was thought that sirdars were of the same species as the

ordinary workers. "The managing staffs of the jute mills", on the other hand, " ... are,

almost without exception, comprised entirely of Europeans trained and experienced in

the United Kingdom ... " Even the subordinate supervising staff was "the more or less

educated babu who has never been a mill operative himself. "53

Since completely different qualifications were required for the ordinary unskilled

workers and the managing staff, capitalists thought that the division between them were

insurmountable by an education given later. It was widely known that the capitalists in

India were indifferent to education, basic or technical, of their workers. In Bengal,

"Facilities for education, except in a few isolated instances, are conspicuous by their

absence" 54 ; In Bombay, as late as the end of 1930s, the Bombay Textile Inquiry

Committee remarked: "Nothing impressed us more during our tours of the various 52 RCLI, vol.S, part.l, p.283. 53 RCLI, vol.S, part 1, p.281. Emphasis added. In this chapter, we are not concerned with the fact that the managing staff of the Bengal jute mills were exclusively Europeans, as the idea of uneducatedness of labour manifested regardless of races of the managing staff. We will return to the question of racial factor in the Bengal jute industry in Chapter 4. 54 RCLI, vol.S, part.l, p.304.

91

cotton textile centers of this Province than the almost complete absence of education

among workers. "55 Thus, the idea of uneducatedness were inseparably related to the

unskilled workers. Onee this relationship was established in capitalists' ideas, the

uneducatedness or their inability of being educated gradually became regarded as

natural and inherent quality of labour. One capitalist remarked that if workers became

educated they would cease to be workers and that, if such cases would happen, it would

strike him "forcibly". 56

The capitalists' idea of labour was most clearly expressed in the question of

efficiency of Indian industrial workers. When the Indian Tariff Board investigated the

question of tariff protection of the Indian cotton textile industry, they found that Indian

cotton textile workers were much less efficient than the workers in Japan, the United

Kingdom, and the United States. The number of spindles per operative was 180 in India,

240 in Japan, 500 to 600 in England, and 1,120 in the United States. The average

number of looms attended by an operative was 2 in India, 2.5 in Japan, 4 to 6 in the

United Kingdom, and 9 in the United States. 57 The Board recommended that the number

of spindles, looms and roving frames should -be increased. 58 The recommendations of

the Board, however, were not realised for a long time. In Bengal, too, the low efficiency

of Indian workers was well known. One millowner estimated that the efficiency of

Indian workers was about half of that of Dundee counterpart. 59

We should draw more attention to how this phenomenon was understood, explained

and utilised by the capitalists. The Bombay cotton textile millowners took up the

question of inefficiency of labour to justify their demands for tariff protection to the

industry. In their argument, chiefly made before the ITB, the industry was not

55 TLIC, 1940, p.279.

56 RCLI, vol.S, part.2, p.174.

57 ITB, 1927, pp.136-137. 58 ITB, 1927, p.l38. 59

RCLI, vol.S, part.2, p.14 7.

92

I

inefficient because of the lack of effort or. the convenience on the part of capitalists but

due to the inherent characteristic of inefficiency of the workers themselves. In their idea

of labour, the workers were naturally inefficient because they still possessed the

mentality of peasants and were unable to get used to the discipline of modem factory.

They thougnt that the high rate of absenteeism and turnover were typical manifestation

of this backwardness of labour. They were so irrational and conservative that they

disliked and resisted any change in the organisation and process of production, even if it

was to their own interest. The Bombay millowners complained to the ITB about the

adamant opposition of the workers to any attempt to improve efficiency, and used it as .

an excuse for their inability to carry out rationalisation recommended by the ITB of

1926.60

In Bengal, the question of low efficiency of the workers was employed to refute a

complaint of Dundee jute industry that in the jute mills in Bengal the workers were

exploited to a much higher degree than those in Dundee and that the competition of

Calcutta was unfair. The chief purpose of the visit of Tom Johnston, Member of

Parliament for Dundee, to Calcutta in 1926, was to expose the low wages and poor

working conditions in Calcutta.61 The Bengal jute millowners argued that the low

efficiency of the industry was rather an evidence of the generosity on the part of

mill owners, which allowed the workers to work their own way, in contrast to the severe

work discipline imposed on Dundee workers. This argument presupposed the natural

inefficiency and inadaptability to work discipline of the Indian workers.

The question of inefficiency had different meanings in Bombay and Bengal,

according to the characteristics of the industries and the kind of problems they faced,

and the attitude of capitalists to inefficiency also differed. But the cause of inefficiency,

as the capitalists assumed, was the same: backwardness of labour. It was to their

6° For instance, ITB, 1934, vol.2, p.43. 61 s tewart, 1998, p.18.

93

advantage to suppose the backwardness of labour as the cause of the lower productivity

of the industries. For the capitalists, backward and inefficient workers was an easy

excuse to explain the difficulties of the industries. Whether the capitalists allegedly

attempted to change it, and failed, as in the case of Bombay cotton textile industry, or

they allowed it to continue, as in the Bengal jute textile industry, backwardness of

labour always existed in the capitalists' idea of labour because of its utility.

This socially and economically constructed idea of backward labour was

complemented by a paternalistic self-image of capitalists. One manifestation of this

self-image was their claim that they knew all the necessities of workers, some of which

even the workers themselves did not know due to their ignorance. The capitalists ·

thought that they m~intained a close touch with the workers and were always open to

their grievances. The memorandum of the IJMA stated: "All grievances brought to the

notice of the management are carefully investigated, either by the European in charge of

the department or by the mill manager, who is always accessible for the hearing of

complaints either by the workers themselves or by a deputation of sirdars. "62 At the

same time, they thought the the workers were so ignorant that they did not know what

they really needed. When the representatives of the Messrs. Bird and Co. were asked

whether the port workers under their control had ever approached them in connection

with welfare work, they replied a bit contemptuously: "No, there is one thing which

they like, and that is the cinema. "63 The idea was that only the employer could know the

condition and necessities of the workers, not the workers themselves.

Another expression of the self-image of the capitalists was that they described

themselves as the benevolent protector of the workers thrown into the modem industrial

settings. The workers received from the capitalists decent working and living condition

which could never be realised in their village. The Bengal jute millowners mentioned:

62 RCLI, vol.S, part.l, p.280. 63 RCLI, vol.S, part.2, p.107.

94

Living in lines provided by the millowners undoubtedly improves the worker's

standard of living, and labour must miss: - ( 1) filtered water supply; (2) electric

lighting; (3) pucca drainage; and the comfort of the pucca house, when they

return to their somewhat primitive villages. 64

When the Bombay Chamber of Commerce was asked their opinion by the Government

of India about the periodical conference for prevention of industrial accidents in 1931,

they opposed the inclusion of the representatives of workers in the members of the

conference, because there was no workers' organisation and the workers themselves

were "not sufficiently educated to enable them to participate usefully in the proposed

conferences". Thus, they continued: "The interests of the workers must therefore be

safeguarded by cooperation between officials and employers. "65

One difficulty that the capitalists felt in their effort to improve the quality of life of

the workers was that the workers did not understand what the capitalists were doing for

the benefit of the workers. Even when they adopted some welfare measures, they we

were to fail, because, they thought, the workers did not understand the benefit due to

their illiteracy, ignorance and conservativeness. The BMOA complained to the ITB in

1932 that they could not carry out the recommendations of the previous Board such as

efficiency scheme and standardisation of wages unless the workers themselves and their

leaders give up their "unreasoning opposition to reforms"66 Bengal capitalists predicted

that "a system of creches would not be welcomed" by the workers and that it would

"take a long time for creches to become popular", because of "the question of caste

64 RCLI, vol.S, part.1, p.283. 65 Letter No.S07-34 of 5 March 1931, from the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, to the Director of Information and Labour Intelligence, Bombay, in Annual Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, 1931, p.18 7. 66 Letter No.1042/121 of 1932, the BMOA to the ITB, 31 May 1932, in ITB, 1934, vo1.2, p.26.

95

difference". 67 As for housing, the workers preferred "to remain in a congested unhealthy

busti instead of taking advantage of the sanitary quarters provided by the millowners,

which, in most cases, are available at a cheaper rental than is being paid for the quarters

provided by sirdars. "68 Frequent occurrence of accidents in spite of precautions on the

part of employers was "usually the result of the men disregarding instructions and

removing covers and guards".69 "Safety first" propaganda was "very difficult to put into

operation owing to the illiteracy and ignorance of the worker" 70

Nonetheless, the self-image of the capitalists as a force of enlightenment for the

workers, which was originally derived from the backward image of labour, offered at

the same time a completely opposite picture. As a result of their consistent efforts,

capitalists thought, the condition of workers were steadily improving and the workers '

were gradually getting used to welfare measures. H. P. Mody, the chairman of the

BMOA, was proud in 1933: "the wage level in Bombay, ... stood higher than that of

practically every other country in the world", as they continued to pay high wage to the

workers in spite of the Depression. 71 Bengal jute· mill owners thought about the standard

of living of the workers: "it is an undoubted fact that in recent years there has been

some improvement in this respect, and it is quite reasonable to anticipate that such

improvement will gradually continue. "72 They claimed that the efficiency of workers

was "improving year by year" and they were satisfied with the pace of increase. 73 They

stated: "It is well-known ... that the Indian jute mill worker is comparatively highly paid

in comparison with other industrial labour in this country"74

We can see a strange coexistence of backward and improving images in the 67 RCLI, vol.S, part.1, p.286; part.2, p.161. 68

RCLI, vol.S, part.1, p.282. 69

Annual ReportoftheBombayChamberofCommerce, 1931, p.187. 70 RCLI, vol.S, part.2, p.107. 71

BMOA, 1933, p.v. 72 RCLI, vol.S, part.1, p.304. 73 RCLI, vol.S, part.2, pp.159-160. 74 RCLI, vol.S, part.1, p.307.

96

narrative of the capitalists. The capitalists' discourse on "labour problems" was the

reflection of their idea of the workers as backward peasants, which, in its turn, was the

reflection of the recruitment policy and the organisational_structure of the industry. But~

at the same time, this "labour problems" had been solved within the same discourse in

which they described themselves as protectors of the workers: Since they knew all the

needs of the workers and generously gave benefits to them. In the discourse of the

capitalists, therefore, "labour problems" did not exist, as long as their industry was

concerned. Therefore, the chairmen of the BMOA commented on labour situation in the

years between big strikes: "Our relations with labour during the year were of a happy

character"~ "With the exception of small isolated strikes, labour has been contented and

worked well throughout the year". 75 The IJMA also stated: "labour, on the whole, has '

been contented" and "Relation between the staff, European and Indian, and the rank and

file of the workers are, with rare exceptions, harmonious without intimate. "76

The capitalists in India imagined an exclusive relation between the workers and

themselves based on their subjective perception of labour. It was as if their territory,

where capitalists could yield an overall control over the workers, and the workers could

receive economic and moral benefits from the capitalists, both being contented. But if,

as the capitalists claimed, there was no discontent among the workers, there could be no

labour disputes and strikes. Then, they could not give an explanation for the strikes that

were actually occurring in the mills. Questions and answers between the RCLI and R.

B. Laird, the current chairman of the IJMA shows this:

Maulvi Latafat Hussain (M.L.C., Assistant Commissioner): Is it not a fact that

the mills are unwilling to settle the demands of their workers until the workers

go to a strike?

75 BMOA, 1930, p.v; 1935, p.ili. 76

RCLI, vol.S, part.1, p.307; p.281.

97

R. B. Laird: It is not at all a fact. We do consider all their grievances.

Maulvi Latafat Hussain: Then why the workers are going into the hands of the

so-called strike leaders?

R. B. Laird: That I do not know. 77

As the capitalists thought that they took care of all the needs of workers and that the

workers were content with the condition, they employed the influence of outsiders to

explain the cause of labour disputes and strikes. It is true that most of the labour leaders

in Indian trade union movement came from social groups other than the industrial

working class. When the Indian Trade Unions Act was enacted in 1926, the

Government had to allow half the executive of a union to consist of outsiders. 78

But in the discourse of capitalists the outsiders were defined more by the above-

mentioned perception of labour or labour-capital relations than by the real existence of

those leaders. We must be careful when we consider the relation between the existence

of outsiders and the lack of organisation as the capitalists in India thought. They did not

think that the absence of organisation of workers was due to the activities of outsiders,

though they publicly asserted so. For the capitalists, all labour leaders were outsiders,

because, they thought, no genuine workers' organisation could exist, an organisation

whose leaders came out of workers themselves and whose purpose was the

improvement of working and living condition. According to their idea of labour,

workers were not able to organise themselves because of their illiteracy and ignorance,

and it was not necessary to do so, because the employers were fulfilling their needs. If

there was a labour organisation, it should not be genuine workers' organisation, but the

product of outsiders. 77 RCLI, vol.S, part.2, p.lSS. 78 It is possible, of course, to interpret this provision as restricting the influence of outsiders among the executives of a union to less than half of them. But either interpretation proves the importance of outside labour leaders in trade unions.

98

..

The capitalists thought that the outside labour leaders without exception were

exploiting the workers for their own political and other purposes. The relation between

the workers and outsiders that the capitalists imagined, was one-sided exploitation of

the former by the latter, because the workers did not have any discontent with the

employers. The tendency of the capitalists not to recognise trade unions on the ground

that they were not "genuine", was based on this idea. The capitalists did not imagine

that the workers took advantage of the leaders available from other section of society or

that the outside labour leaders could really represent the workers.

The attitude of capitalists at the time when the outside labour leaders were less

active, gives another evidence for the convenient use of the word outsiders. Although

they always complained that the outside labour leaders had been preventing the '

establishment of genuine workers' organisation in the industry, they did not find such

"genuine" organisations nor make an effort to create good relations with labour even

after the influence of outsiders having been removed. In Bombay, after the end of

general strikes of the cotton textile industry in 1928 and 1929, which the millowners

regarded as the result of the agitation of outsiders, and the collapse of the communist

movement in the city, they just found a vacuum of labour movement. Still, the BMOA

reiterated the traditional opinion before the ITB of 1934 that any efficiency scheme was

blocked by the adamant labour leaders. 79

It is well known that the millowners often rejected to negotiate with the

representatives of strikers on the ground that they did not really represent the workers,

or that the demands of strikers were false. The Bengal jute millowners regarded the

general jute mills strike in 1929 as the product of outsiders. 80 R. B. Laird, the chairman

of the IJMA commented: "the strike was engineered by outside influence. "81 The

79 ITB, 1934, vol.2, p.43. 8° For the account of the strike, see Chapter 1, Section 3. 81 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 10 August, 1929.

99

mill owners ignored the claim of workers' representatives that an immediate cause of the

strike was the change of working hours from fifty-four hours to sixty hours, because it

"was not anticipated that such a change would disorganise labour, as it was a case of

longer hours and higher wages, which, in the ordinary course of events, would be

welcomed by labour in other countries." They took the position that they knew the

necessities of the workers. Thus, the capitalists' version of the cause of strike was:

agitators, posing as leaders of labour and as members of the unregistered Bengal

Jute-workers' Union, began to get busy, and taking advantage of a few mills

being on strike, eventually managed to bring to a standstill about 70 per cent. of

the jute mills in Calcutta and districe2

No direct negotiations took place between the workers' representatives and the

millowners during the strike. The millowners refused direct negotiations with the union

on the ground that it was not registered. At last, an agreement was arrived at with the

intervention of the Government of Bengal. But, later, before the RCLI, they asserted

that they did not inake an agreement with the union, but only with the government. 83

The imagined labour-capital relations, or their supposed territory, as a product of

their subjective perception of labour, should be maintained by rigorously excluding the

labour leaders from the actual relations. This is the reason why they were so often very

alert to any attempts on the part of workers to organise themselves. No labour leaders

should intervene in it, and those who tried to do so should be regarded as outsiders and

hence excluded.

It was not only the labour leaders that the capitalists in India tried to exclude from

the labour-capital relations. The labour-capital relations in the minds of capitalists was

82 RCLI, vol.S, part.l, p.306. Emphasis original.

83 RCLI, vol.S, part.2, p.159.

100

so exclusive that they also resisted to any intervention by the government. This aversion

of the capitalists to the government intervention in labour-capital relations appeared

both in the question of labour disputes and labour welfare.

As for the intervention of the government in labour disputes, the capitalists clearly

distinguished between the use of police force in the strike and the intervention of the

government in the settlement of labour disputes. While they welcomed the former, they

rejected the latter in principle. Looking back on the Bengal jute strike in 1929, where

the jute millowners approached the government for help, they claimed that they did not

want the intervention of the government. It was just the police protection of the workers

going to work that they asked from the Government. Their reply to a question of the

member of the Commission was: "we held the opinion that the Government should not

have intervened between the strikers and ourselves." They asserted that the government

might be justified in doing what they did in the critical situation of the strike, but, even

then, they objected to the intervention and the terms of settlement. 84

The same position was taken towards the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, by which the

government for the first time was given legal power to intervene in the labour disputes

as such; the central or provincial government may appoint a Board of Conciliation or a

Court of Enquiry. The capitalists were in favour of the Act, which also had provisions

prohibiting general and lightning strikes in particular industries, but they at the same

time hesitated to accept the principle of government intervention in the labour disputes.

The BMOA remarked on the bill:

My Association is not averse, . . . to the introduction of Court of Inquiry or

Boards of Conciliation which have for their object the settlement of trade

disputes, but still maintains that Government should not intervene in any way in

a dispute: (1) unless the dispute was of a major nature, (2) unless all reasonable 84

RCLI, vol.S, part.2, pp.169-170.

101

means to bring about a settlement by direct negotiations between the parties

concerned had been tried and failed, or were convinced: (3) that peace, order and

good government were endangered. ( 4) The Association also held that a Court of

Inquiry should not be instituted unless at least one party to the dispute demanded

such an inquiry and that a Board of Conciliation should not be appointed except

on the application ofboth parties to the dispute. 85

The IJMA approved of the Act, but only because they had "no option in the matter".

And if some machinery was to be set up for settling disputes between employers and

employees, they preferred to do it themselves if possible. 86 In all the six cases in which

the Act was applied for the first eight years, no Court of Inquiry or Board of

Conciliation was appointed based on the application from the employers. 87

The same aversion to the government intervention can be seen in the question of

labour welfare. The importance of the voluntariness of employers in improving the

working condition of the workers was repeatedly asserted whenever labour legislation

was proposed. The Bengal jute mill owners commented in 1931 that legislation on the

provision of maternity benefit "was unnecessary", "in view of mills generally having

adopted some form of payment". 88 Later, when the legislation was actually proposed,

they employed the same argument. 89 In regard to legislation on establishment of creches,

too, they maintained that they should be allowed to experiment it themselves. 90

But nothing represented this opinion of the capitalists in favour of their voluntary

action in labour welfare better thun the minutes by Victor Sassoon appended to the

85 BMOA, 1928, p.267. 86 RCLI, vol.S, part.2, p.173. 87 Government of India, Bulletins of Indian Industries & Labour, No.62, Industrial Disputes in India 1929-1936, New Delhi, 1937, pp.9-12. 88 RCLI, vol.S, part.1, p.286. 89 See Chapter 5. 90 RCLI, vol.S, part.2, p.161.

102

Report of the RCLI. Victor Sassoon, a cotton magnate in Bombay, was appointed as a

member representing Indian capitalists. He criticised the hastiness of other members of

the Commission in resorting to labour welfare legislation to improve the working

condition, and stressed the importance of voluntary efforts of employers:

my colleagues in their desire for statutory reforms have not in my opinion

sufficiently stressed the useful part played in this country by the voluntary

efforts of employers in the past: ... I on my side consider that attempts to deal

with these econom~c subjects should be carried out voluntarily as far as possible,

and that statutory aid should only be invoked where it is absolutely necessary.91

For the capitalists who thought that only they knew their workers, it was not enough

that the measures concerning the working conditions shou1d be left to the voluntary

efforts of the industry, but they were left directly upon the employers of the workers in

each mill. This attitude of capitalists partly explains the lack of uniformity of labour ' .

conditions not only between industries or industrial centres but also between mills of the

same industry in the same centre or mills under the same managing agent. The IJMA,

although it was effective, at least to some extent, in restricting the production of the

member mills, admitted that they had no combined policy with regard to labour welfare

and that it had been left to the individual mills. 92

The capitalists' idea of labour as being backward and their self-image as the

benevolent protector of them produced the exclusive relationship between capital and

labour in which the former could wield effective control over the latter. This relation in

the mind of capitalists was only possible by confining labour to a state of imagined

backwardness and by depriving them of their independence. But in reality, the workers

91 RCLI, p.476. 92 RCLI, vol.S, part.2, p.141.

103

were neither the backward peasants content with the economic benefits their master

gave them, nor indifferent to the class and nationalist politics. The capitalists were

gradually compelled to fight a severe battle with labour leaders and the government to

maintain this imagined relation with the. workers.

3. Bureaucracy's Idea of Labour

The bureaucracy in colonial India had three different but mutua~ly related ideas of

labour, each of which reflected their function in colonial India One was the function of

protecting and promoting economic activities in the colony and they regarded labour as

an essential element of such activities. Second, as imperial agents whose duty was to

bring about ideas and institutions of the advanced home to the remotest corners of the

empire, and they saw labour as the subject of the empire. Third, to maintain law and

order of the society, and they regarded labour as a potential threat to it.

(1) Labour as an element of economic activities

One of the important function of the colonial government in India was providing the

infrastructure for various kinds of economic activities in the colony: they constructed a

system of irrigation, built a network of communication and transportation such as

telegram and railways throughout the country, abolished barriers of local customs, and

enacted commercial laws. Supply of labour \'tas included in this programme. It is well

known that the colonial government played a significant role in creating a stable supply

of labour to tea plantations and coalfields in eastern India.

This function of the colonial government decided the character of the bureaucracy's

concern for labour. They regarded labour as one of the elements of production process

along with raw material and machinery. Their concern was how to produce the

circumstances in which the economic law of supply and demand could work smoothly

104

on labour. With vast population and poor economic conditions in rural India, there must

have been abundant supply of cheap labour, but in reality shortage of labour was

prevalent, especially in the early stage. Any obstacle to the availability of labour was to

be removed by the government. Chakrabarty pointed out that the interest of bureaucracy

about the working and living conditions of workers was confined to the issues which

affected the supply of labour, for example, spread of epidemic among workers. 93

In this respect, the government in most cases helped the capitalists because they

could utilise the availability of cheap labour which added to the competitiveness of their

products. At the same time, the bureaucracy kept an eye on the excess use of labour on

the part of the capitalists. As the only goal of the capitalists was profit, it was the role of

the government to protect the workers from the excesses of the capitalists for the

purpose of reproduction of labour of quality. Labour welfare measures of the

government, particularly labour legislation concerning the working condition was, at

least partly, motivated by this idea of labour.

The bureaucracy's idea of labour as an element of production process and the

restriction of their duty to the smooth working of economic laws, was reflected in their

position of non-intervention in the labour disputes. So far as the principle of free trade

was not obstructed,·they did not intervene in the labour disputes. In spite of their action

to the strikes by police force, they always emphasised their position of non-intervention

throughout the 1920s. In their discourse, there was a clear distinction between the

intervention in the labour disputes and the use of police force in strikes. In the early

1920s, when one labour leader inquired the Government of Bombay about the position

of the government to strikes, the government replied:

. . . I am directed to inform you that the policy of Government is opposed to

interference in the merits or conduct of Industrial Disputes so long as the means 93 Chakrabarty, 1989, Chapter 3, pp.65-115.

105

employed by the parities to the dispute are lawful, peaceful and threaten no

imminent danger to essential interests of the community, or except in so far as

the good offices of Government may, on a favourable occasion ansmg,

contribute to an amicable, settlement of the causes of the disputes. 94

Although, in practice, the government sometimes took action in big strikes, but it

was only at the very late stage of the strike. In the general strike of Bombay cotton

textile mills in 1928, the Government of Bombay did nothing in the direction of

intervention for the first six months. In 1934, R. D. Bell, the Home Member of the

Government of Bombay stated in the Bombay Legislative Council that the policy of the

Government was one of non-intervention unless the dispute threatened to lead to

violence.95 Referring to this stated policy, another official of the Government of

Bombay later observed that the general strike of Bombay cotton mills in 1934, where

the police opened fire on the strikers, and some labour leaders were arrested by the

application of the Bombay Special (Emergency) Powers Act, was "instances of this

exceptional action"96 In the general strike of Bengal jute mills in 1929, the intervention

of the Government of Bengal resulted in the settlement of the strike. But, still, R. N.

Gilchrist, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Labour Intelligence

Officer and Registrar of Trade Unions, made it clear before the RCLI that the

Government of Bengal had to intervene in the strike on the ground of preservation of

law and order, and that the basic position of the government to labour disputes was that

94 J. Crerar, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department, to J. Baptista, 4 February 1921, MSA, Home(Pol), 550-H. 95 "I hope I have satisfied the House that the policy which the Government follows of keeping a clear ring for the two parties as long as possible and of entering that ring themselves only when the dispute threatens to lead to violence is not only the correct policy but is the only possible one which a self-respecting Government can adopt." 9 March 1934, Bombay Legislative Council Debates, vo1.39, part.19, p.1024. 96 The Government of Bombay, Political and Reform Department, 10 February 1937, MSA, Home(Pol), 550-H.

106

"of non-interference in private disputes". 97

There was a slight change in the policy of the colonial government on labour

disputes in the late 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, when they began to look for a

possibility that the government could promote an amicable settlement of labour

disputes. After the great wave of strikes in the end of the 1920s, the Government of

India enacted the Trade Disputes Act, 1929. Just after the general strike of Bombay

cotton textile mills in 1934, the Government of Bombay passed the Bombay Trade

Disputes Conciliation Act, 1934, that provided for the appointment of a Labour Officer

and a Conciliation Officer.98 The Government of Bombay announced in February 1937

that they had "now come to the conclusion that the principle of non-interference in

industrial disputes requires definite modification".99

However, even this new policy was motivated by their concern with law and order.

In the same circular announcing the new policy regarding industrial disputes, the

Government of Bombay mentioned that they considered the question "from the point of

view of the prevention, if possible, of such disputes, and their early settlement" that "it

is the intention of Government to endeavour to maintain industrial peace throughout the

Presidency". 100 It was only in those disputes which actually arose or were likely to arise

that the government intend~d to intervene. The new policy laid down that the

intervention should be done more systematically, that is, not at the discretion of the

officer. But the reason why the government should intervene and the extent to which

they could intervene remained unchanged.

97 RCLI, vol.5, part.2, pp.229, 230. 98 Kooiman, 1989, pp.89-97. 99 The Government of Bombay, Political and Reform Department, 10 February 1937, MSA, Home(Pol), 550-H. 100 The Government of Bombay, Political and Reform Department, 10 February 1937, MSA, Home(Pol), 550-H.

107

(2) Labour as Subjects of the Empire

One justification of the imperial rule was that it would convey ideas and institutions

developed at home to the backward people in colonies. In India, too, good governance

was regarded as the most substantial benefit which Indian people could enjoy under the

British rule. Here emerged the idea of imperial subjects, who could enjoy the benefit of

being ruled under the empire. The colonial bureaucracy had the responsibility of

carrying on good governance for the subjects. Of course, this idea itself presupposed the

unequal relation between the ruler and the ruled. The responsibility of the bureaucracy

for the subjects in colonies was inseparably connected with the former's control of the

latter in every sphere of colonial life. The direct rule of India, established after the

inauguration of the Indian Empire in 1877, and the gradual increase of the volume of : .

administration after that, enhanced this supposed responsibility of the bureaucracy.

This function of bureaucracy produced another idea of labour: labour as subjects of

the empire; workers should be given an equal legal status as other subjects of the

empire; they should be given the protection of the state, so long as they were under the

rule; they should be relieved from inhuman economic condition or from unjust

exploitation by, or unjust subjugation to, others. Furthermore, this idea had some

relations with the idea of welfare state in Britain: the state has a responsibility for the

standard of life of the people.

This idea of labour dictated the labour welfare policy of the government. The

history of labour welfare legislation in India was the one of introducing the measures

already in force in Britain, and later, of the international standards of working and living

conditions laid down at international conferences. Enactment of a series of Indian

Factories Acts in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, was

justified by the government from the charitable point of view, though continuous

pressure from Lancashire and the emergence of labour movement might be the

108

immediate causes. How effective it was to appeal to the duty of the government which

was based on the idea of labour as imperial subjects, was evident in the fact that

Lancashire cotton millowners, chose to employ this appeal to the charity of the

government in their representation for introducing Factories Act in India. 101

After the First World War, the government began to introduce the international

standards of working and living conditions. The Washington Labour Conference held in

1919 adopted a Convention which specially provided India with eleven hour working

for male adult workers. The Government of India ratified, and materialised it in the

Factories Act of 1922. The basic line of recommendations of the RCLI appointed in

1929, was "to adopt a procedure tending toward Western ideals", as Victor Sassoon ·

complained and as the majority of the Commission admitted. 102 In the 1930s, the labour

welfare policy of the government took the direction of realisation of the

recommendation of the RCLI. The Government of India often consulted with provincial

governments about the possibility of the realisation of the recommendations.

The labour welfare legislation in India thus undoubtedly had a characteristic of the

introduction from above. Indeed, it was generally thought that labour welfare in India

was much ahead of the times, considering the economic condition, the state of labour

organisation and the degree of consciousness of industrial working classes. The Chief

Inspector of Factories complained before the RCLI that he experie!lced difficulty in the

administration because the labour welfare legislation had been made without any say in

101 Mehta, 1954, pp.124-131. 102 Victor Sassoon said in his minute, "My European colleagues are naturally influenced by what has taken place in the West and have endeavoured to adopt a procedure tending toward Western ideals: on the other hand my Indian colleagues, perhaps not unnaturally, consider that, if the machinery of the West is introduced in the East, the consequences will be the same in both Hemisphere." The majority of the Commission refuted this by saying that their recommendation was "very far from an attempt to copy the methods of the West as they stand", but at the same time said, "we see no reason why India should not utilise the result of experience elsewher~ instead of repeating all the experiments herself.", RCU, pp.4 7 6, 486-48 7.

109

Ius maKmg or consciOusness ot the enect, on the part ot workers. w•

It should not be regarded that labour welfare legislation was an altruistic move on

the part of the government. Just as the concept of the Indians as the imperial subjects

depended on the actual subordination of India to the British, the idea of labour as

subjects was closely connected with the necessity to put labour under the sole control of

the government. This view supported their paternalistic view about labour and

themselves: ignorant workers and just and benevolent government. It was neither the

outsiders nor even labour themselves but the government who could really understand

the necessity of workers and could give them an improvement of working and living

conditions. They felt little need to pay attention to demand from labour, even less to the

one from "outsiders". Although demands, for example, for sickness insurance or '

unemployment insurance were made during the strikes, the Government of India, in

their consultation with provincial governments on labour welfare legislation~ referred

only to the proceedings of international convention and its adoption in India The

government consciously excluded the possibilitY of the introduction of welfare

measures from below.

In the interest of the government, the introduction of labour welfare legislation

should not be represented as a concession to the militant labour movement, though, in

fact, it was. It must be a symbol of the government's concern for labour as the subjects.

As a part of the idea of imperial subjects, which was an expression of unequal relation

between Britain and India, the idea of labour as subjects was rooted in their conviction

of their rule in India. Therefore, labour welfare legislation was a part of their efforts of

maintaining the empire, though it might apparently show a progressive tendency and

bring out some improvement of economic condition of the workers.

(3) Threat to Law and Order 103 RCIJ, vol.S, part.2, pp.180-181.

110

The third idea that bureaucracy had on labour was related to their function of preserving

law and order of the society. Law and order had always been given the first priority in

the administration of the British India. For one thing, it was the numerical inferiority of

the British in India that made them concerned about that question: without maintaining

law and order, the existence of the British in India would become impossible. But for

another thing, law and order was the justification for their rule: good governance in the

land where disorder would have prevailed. For them, the breakdown of law and order

was the most evident proof of the incompetency to rule, and the loss of the reason for

not giving autonomy to the Indians. This argument was employed to the last days of

their rule in India.

Gyanendra Pandey argues that the image of communally-divided Indian society was

"constructed" according to the necessity of bureaucracy, especially that relating to the

question of law and order, in the process of colonial rule. He also observes that in this

process of construction, particular characteristics influencing law and order, such as

"bigotry", were assigned to one commimity or another. 104 Similar characteristics were

given to Indian labour by bureaucracy in the process of dealing with labour disputes.

The preservation of law and order had the first priority in this field. Even before the

government reviewed their policy of non-intervention in labour disputes in the first half

of the 1930s, the preservation of law and order had been the only and sufficient excuse

for actions by the government. They were free to employ police force to deal with

strikes on the ground of the preservation of law and order.

Bureaucracy regarded Indian labour as a potential threat to law and order. Only

those characteristics of labour that could prove dangerous to law and order and justify

actions of the authority to them, were repeated in the discourse of bureaucracy on

labour. Bureaucracy shared, to some extent, with the capitalists the idea of

backwardness of labour: Indian workers as illiterate and uneducated. As per this idea, 104 p d an ey, 1990.

1 1 1

-

Indian workers were by nature violent, and any trifling matter would develop into

violence against the employers or destruction of their properties. Strikes, even those

from purely economic origin, always had the possibility of developing into disturbance.

The most significant symptom of this backwardness of labour was, bureaucracy

supposed, the unorganised state of labour: Labour could not organise themselves due to

illiteracy and lack of education. R. N. Gilchrist, admitted that the slow development of

trade unionism in Bengal was "due to lack of education". He also thought that the

conciliation machinery such as Labour officer, which had good results in Britain, was

unworkable in India, where labour "in great majority of cases" was "entirely

unorganised", and that works committee had not been formed "because of the ignorance

of employees". 105 Another expression of the backwardness of Indian 1abour, as

· · bureaucracy assumed, was the inclination for communal divisions and violence.

ln fact, this unorganised state and communalistic tendency of Indian labour ~ould

· ., not -be attributed solely to the illiteracy ... oLlabour. The employers obstructed .any

organising effort on the part of workers by victimisation and refusal of recognition, and

consciously manipulated their communal feeling by favouring workers from one

community at the expense of those from another. But bureaucracy ignored these causes

and reduced the question to the characteristics of labour.

Bureaucracy interpreted the question of outsiders on this idea of labour. They

thought that the workers were easily misled by the influence of outsiders who were

exploiting their ignorance by leading them into disturbances. Whenever a large-scale

strike occurred, the main concern of the authority was whether the influence of

outsiders existed or not, especially after the emergence of communists on labour

movement since the mid-1920s. How much the concern was related to law and order

can be seen in the fact that it was the work of police or Intelligence Bureau to observe

the strikes. In most cases, almost routinely, the government confirmed the influence of 105 RCLI, vol.S, part.2, pp.242, 231, 235.

1 12

•

outsiders.

Bureaucracy consistently tried to weaken or eliminate the influence of outsiders on

th workers. One measure they often took for this purpose was the physical separation of

them from workers: externment orders under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure

Code prohibiting particular labour leaders from entering and staying in the working

class areas. The orders were often resorted to especially in the Bengal jute mill industry:

it might be thought to be easier for the orders to achieve its purpose, as the mills were

scattered in the suburbs of Calcutta and adjacent districts. The fact that bureaucracy

thought such orders to be effective shows that they put much importance on the outside

influence in strikes and ignored the labour's own initiative.

Labour welfare measures by the government came out in this context, too.

Bureaucracy's idea was that the workers should be economically content Jest the

outsiders exploit the economic condition of workers to mislead them. This economic

behaviourism of labour by bureaucracy was overlapping with their idea of Indian labour

as ignorant creatures.

Bureaucracy's idea of labour, which was fashioned according to the functions of the

colonial government in India, rendered their attitudes towards labour problems a

complicated mixture of non-interference in labour-capital relations, steady efforts for

labour welfare, and obsessive concern with law and order. This general tendency in

bureaucracy's labour policy requires scholars to be careful in judging the characteristics

of labour welfare measure and its makers. First, it cannot be denied that labour

legislation went on advancing, the reasons for which might be the maintenance of the

quality of labour force, the imperial motive, or concern for law and order and that its

progress was not reversible, though the speed of advance varied. Therefore, just taking

up one particular measure at a certain point of time does not necessarily mean the

progressiveness of its takers. Second, labour welfare measures should not be dealt with

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in isolation, but in relation to other measures. In particular, labour welfare measures and

measures on labour disputes were the inseparable part oflabour policy.

Conclusion

The growing involvement in labour of those from various sections of society produced

discourse on labour, called labour problems. As the discourse was produced by elites in

society, the so-called labour problems were not problems for labour, but problems about

labour for the achievement of their own political, social, economic goals of elites. The

idea rather subjectively held by those elites on labour, and on themselves in relation to

labour, produced and consolidated the discourse.

For labour leaders, despite the difference of groups or parties, such as moderates,

communists and Congress, labour was the means of achieving or confirming their own

social or ideological task. They all believed that labour should be disciplined for this

purpose, by political or moral education and social improvement. It never occurred that

their task was changed to suit to the reality of labour.

Capitalists considered it essential to keep their social superiority over labour to

maintain the labour-capital relation, which, they thought, should be controlled by the

capitalists to continue the production with profit. They depicted labour as backward and

unaccustomed to industrial settings, but at the same time, enjoying benefits the

capitalists gave, and gradually improving.

Bureaucracy's idea of labour was closely related to their functions to rule India and

to the colonialist representation of Indian people. While labour, whether as an element

of economic activities or subjects of the empire, was allowed to entertain the protection

given by the state so far as they were subject to its rule, the defiance to the rule should

be, and indeed was, severely punished to keep the rule. It is in this context of ruling

India that the two aspects of labour policy of bureaucracy - a steady introduction of

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labour welfare measures and high, often excessive, alertness to strikes - should be

explained.

These discourses were competing against each other, but one common point is clear.

In the discourse on labour in India, labour was given the position of historical and

determined passivity on which others worked. Labour leaders, capitalists and

bureaucracy made general plans, and labour was only allotted a function in it. This

functional view of labour deprived labour of not only their aspiration but also the

actuality. They were only allowed to exist in the plan of others.

The Government of India Act, 1935 rearranged the arenas of this ideological

contestation, in Bombay and Bengal. The battles of discourses were intensified because

of increased labour representation provided by the Act. But the gap between the labour

policy as an ideological contestation and the actuality of labour was not bridged: it

manifested in the form of numbers of unworkable measures and unexpected .. response,of

labour to the labour policy of the government.

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